The developments of the past two decades in West Asia show that religious rifts, although they have historical roots, have in many instances been exploited not as the main cause of crises but as a tool for managing geopolitical rivalries.
The experience of the Persian Gulf region, from the occupation of Iraq in 2003 to recent developments, indicates that whenever competition among regional and extra-regional powers has intensified, identity fault lines have quickly become activated, and religious differences have been dragged from the level of scholarly and doctrinal debate into the arena of security and political conflicts.
In the current situation, although the region's security map has undergone important changes compared to two decades ago, the logic of exploiting identity rifts remains one of the components of power politics in West Asia. Competition over energy security, control of strategic maritime routes, the balance of power among regional actors, and efforts to maintain or expand political influence continue to provide a context in which religious differences, instead of being managed through dialogue, are reproduced in the form of confrontational narratives. The occupation of Iraq in 2003 is considered a turning point in this process.
The collapse of the state structure, the dissolution of an important part of security and administrative institutions, and the creation of a power vacuum paved the way for the activation of sub-identities. In such an atmosphere, political rivalries gradually took on a religious color, and domestic and foreign actors each exploited these rifts in accordance with their own goals. The consequence of this situation was not merely Iraq's instability; rather, a wave of mistrust and religious polarization spread across various parts of the region – a process whose effects were also visible in subsequent crises.
However, a realistic analysis requires that the region's crises not be reduced solely to foreign interventions. Weak governance, structural corruption, unbalanced development, reduced political participation, the inefficiency of some government institutions, and the spread of poverty and inequality are also important factors that have increased the capacity to exploit identity differences. Experience has shown that the more social capital and national cohesion in Islamic countries are weakened, the greater the possibility of intervention and influence by external actors. Recent developments also confirm this reality.
Although trends such as the resumption of diplomatic relations among some regional countries, the expansion of security dialogues, and efforts to reduce tensions have presented a new perspective for West Asia, at the same time, cognitive and media warfare continues with unprecedented intensity. Today, an important part of geopolitical rivalries is pursued not on the military battlefield but in the media space, social networks, and cognitive operations – where, by reproducing religious stereotypes, distorting the beliefs of Islamic denominations, and spreading hateful narratives, efforts are made to weaken the capital of trust among Muslims.
In this framework, sectarianism is no longer merely a religious issue; rather, it has become a security and geopolitical variable. The more religious differences are highlighted, the more the possibility of forming regional cooperation, economic convergence, collective security, and strategic independence of Islamic countries decreases. From this perspective, the continuation of sectarian rifts, more than benefiting Muslim nations, increases the capacity for exploitation by actors who seek their interests in the continuation of instability and exhausting rivalries.
Therefore, the rapprochement of Islamic denominations should be considered one of the most important components of sustainable security in the region. Rapprochement does not mean eliminating jurisprudential and theological differences; rather, it is an approach to managing differences based on mutual respect, correct understanding of one another, and focusing on the common interests of the Islamic Ummah.
Historical experience has also shown that whenever scholarly dialogue among denominations has been strengthened, the possibility of political exploitation of differences has decreased, and the ground has been prepared for cooperation against common threats. Today, the Islamic world needs to rebuild mutual trust more than ever. This goal is not achieved merely through political statements; rather, it requires the production of shared scholarly literature, the correction of denominations' images of one another, the expansion of religious diplomacy, the strengthening of communication among elites, and active confrontation with divisive media projects.
Scientific and cultural institutions, especially centers tasked with the mission of rapprochement of denominations, play a strategic role in this regard, because by explaining commonalities, providing scholarly answers to doubts, and strengthening the culture of dialogue, they can prevent natural differences from turning into security crises. The order taking shape in West Asia depends, more than anything else, on the ability of Islamic countries to manage internal differences.
If the Islamic Ummah can turn its religious and ethnic diversity into a capital for synergy, many grounds for foreign intervention and exploitation will also be eliminated. In contrast, any reproduction of the literature of takfir, hatred, and confrontation will pose serious challenges not only to the national security of Islamic countries but also to the future of the Islamic world's convergence. Accordingly, the rapprochement of denominations is no longer merely a cultural choice; rather, it is a strategic necessity for maintaining regional stability, promoting collective security, and safeguarding the independence of the Islamic world against the complex geopolitical rivalries of the 21st century.
No comments:
Post a Comment