The diplomatic impasse between the United States and Iran and Russia’s growing role

US–Iran negotiations collapse amid rising tensions and mistrust, particularly over the Strait of Hormuz, pushing Iran ever closer to Russia despite internal pressures. Leveraging its balanced relations with all key actors, Russia emerges as the most credible mediator and offers a backchannel for dialogue.

Aleena Im

Introduction

Isaac Goldberg once noted, “Diplomacy is to do and say the nastiest things in the nicest way.” And Russia is, no doubt, a master of it. Whether it’s Europe or the Middle East, Russia has always outsmarted the US, both on the battlefield and at the table. This time, once again, Russia has emerged as a credible intermediary, chased by both the Americans and Iranians. Since the inception of the US-Iran war in late February 2026, the hostilities have neither ended nor cooled down. A couple of rounds of talks occurred in Islamabad in the last few weeks, but all in vain. The first one failed due to the maximalist demands of the US, while the second one was cancelled by President Trump as the trust deficit increased between the two. Thus, the collapse of negotiations and an immediate trip of Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi to Russia highlighted a new trajectory in the ongoing negotiations.

Failure of Negotiations

The West strove to isolate Russia diplomatically – but the recent deals Russia has made globally show just how flawed their plan was

In the meantime, the US has imposed a naval blockade on Iranian shipping vessels, while Iran has limited and even intimidated vessels going through the Strait of Hormuz, creating tension due to control over one of the most critical energy routes in the world. The Islamabad Talks 2.0 did not convene, as the Iranian side made it clear that there wouldn’t be any negotiations with the US officials if they keep their current antics up. As a consequence, U.S. President Donald Trump has called off a visit to Pakistan by special envoy Steve Witkoff and adviser Jared Kushner, who were to engage in negotiations with Iranian officials. In the weeks since, both sides have accused the other of a lack of progress, with Iran accusing the U.S. of demanding too much, while the Trump administration has called for Iran to return to the negotiating table on American terms.

Two Letters, Two Stories

Amidst the ongoing negotiations and Iranian officials’ visit to Russia, two highly confidential letters have grabbed media attention.

As of 24 April 2026, a highly confidential letter reportedly written by a group of senior Iranian officials to Mujtaba Khamenei was leaked. The letter pointed out that the ‘economic conditions of Iran are critical’ and ‘Iran cannot carry on like this, which means that the only way left for them is to engage in negotiations with the U.S. concerning their nuclear file.’ The Western media is disseminating propaganda that Iran is under intense power struggle between the hardliners and moderates.

The second letter was overtly highlighted by Russian President Vladimir Putin during his meeting with Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi on 27th April 2026. President Putin noted, “Last week I received a message from Iran’s supreme leader. I would like to ask you to convey my most sincere thanks for this and to confirm that Russia, like Iran, intends to continue our strategic relationship.” Now, this statement clarifies three things. First, Iran’s Supreme Leader is no doubt wounded but alive, negating the West’s propaganda of his death. Second, the fake news of Khamenei’s presence in Russia is most likely untrue. Last, it nullified the Western narrative of power struggle inside Iran. Whether it’s the Supreme Leader or the reformist politicians, both are united on engaging Russia in the peace talks as a credible intermediary.

Russia Acting as a Bridge

Countries like Pakistan, Oman, or Turkey have offered mediatory roles, but none of them has resulted in a positive and lasting result yet. What makes Russians different from these mediators is their global standing when it comes to the US, Israel, and Iran. It is important to note that Pakistan has a non-existent relationship with Israel. Being a major power, Russia can speak to all these countries, has always been mediating throughout history, and can become another mediator behind the curtain.

One such example is how President Putin called on the Supreme Leader of Iran to act rationally regarding Israel’s assassination of Hamas’s leader in 2024. Interestingly, one day before the 12-Day War, Putin met with Iran’s FM Aragchi in the Kremlin. The following day, an Iran-Israel ceasefire was finally secured. However, in the quest for a way out, the parties may now look to Russia as a possible negotiator.

Opportunity for Putin

On one hand, Iran is facing severe economic backlash due to infrastructural damage during the war and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz by the US. On the other hand, the Trump administration is also seeking a way to get out of this war. Trump’s compromise on Ukraine has given the Kremlin a chance to present him with negotiating leverage for Iran. The US will require a channel through which to communicate (indirectly) with Iran if it chooses to put an end to this war. Therefore, Russia has an opportunity to play a role as an intermediary due to its close contacts with Iran. This does not mean that Putin can decide to end this war in a day; however, he can take part in the negotiations over any possible deal between Iran and the US, and possibly manage a longer ceasefire. He could serve as a new communication channel between the belligerents since he has contacts in Tel Aviv, Washington, and Tehran.

Future Prospects

The two key issues where the negotiations are still lingering include Iran’s nuclear enrichment and the Strait of Hormuz. The shipment of nuclear dust from Iran to Russia could be a possibility. Although the US has initially stressed the transfer of nuclear material to the US only, the ever-increasing volatility could pressurize Trump to consider the Russian option. Russia has already helped in this respect. In 2015, Iran delivered 9-11 tons of enriched uranium to Russia for 137 tons of uranium ore to generate electricity. Moreover, Russia could be a guarantor that Iran’s nuclear program will be halted/monitored. In addition, to secure his position in the upcoming midterm elections in November this year, Trump might revive the idea of ‘Board of Peace’ to settle the Ukraine and Iranian issues simultaneously.

Conclusion

The West, in particular the US, has tried its best to undermine Russian security and economy, but all in vain. The West is facing a complete failure in Ukraine, resulting in the collapse of NATO. In the case of the economy, the US initially imposed sanctions on Russian oil and gas exports. However, during the Iran war, the US was forced to lift these sanctions, allowing Russia to supply its energy products in the wider Asia-Pacific region. Likewise, the West strove to isolate Russia diplomatically – but the recent deals Russia has made globally show just how flawed their plan was. Here once again, Russia seems to be the sole credible mediator in the US-Iran war. Russia’s clever moves, straightforward approach, stability, and long-term strategies have resulted in the beginning of the downfall of the West.

Aleena Im is an independent researcher and writer and is interested in international relations and current affairs

Difference Between Bringing Makkah To Al-Madinah And Keeping It In The Family

Abu Dharr

With faith and reliance upon Allah (SWT) alone, this writer cautions readers—particularly those conditioned by sectarian predispositions—that the following reflections may unsettle or even provoke deeply entrenched and propagandized attitudes.

Forewarned is forearmed.

The Context of Muʿawiyah’s Rise

During the administration of the third khalifah, ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan, Mu‘awiyah ibn Abi Sufyan emerged as the most influential governor in the Islamic polity. His original appointment as governor of Damascus was made by ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab.

It is important to note, this decision was not a slight against Imam ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib, nor was it meant to promote the Umayyad clan. Rather, ‘Umar’s strategy was to break the Qurayshi grip on Makkah, thereby diluting the influence of what might be described as the “Makkan elite”—those who had long maintained political, military, and psychological dominance prior to Islam’s triumph.

The purpose of this policy was to integrate Makkah’s population into the egalitarian socio-political order of Islam without reigniting armed conflict. The danger was clear: renewed confrontation would have pitted the committed Muslims of al-Madinah against the nominal Muslims of Makkah—those who had embraced Islam outwardly but many continued to retain opportunistic inclinations and an air of superiority.

When Yazid ibn Abi Sufyan, the governor of Jordan, passed away, the jurisdiction of Jordan was merged with Damascus, further strengthening Muʿawiyah’s position. Over time, he became the de facto ruler of much of Bilād al-Shām (Greater Syria).

Strategic Calculus of ‘Umar and ‘Uthman

It is crucial to grasp ‘Umar’s far-sighted strategy. His redistribution of authority was not to elevate the Umayyads but to test whether the Quraysh who had embraced Islam after decades of hostility—many with lingering ties to Byzantine trade networks—could transition into genuine Islamic governance without succumbing to external influence.

For generations, the Umayyads had commercial ties with Syria, a reality referenced in the Qur’an in Surat Quraysh. By relocating them to a frontier region newly liberated from Byzantine control, ‘Umar sought to absorb and redirect their ambitions in the service of Islam.

Upon assuming office, ‘Uthman confirmed Mu‘awiyah as governor of al-Shām, thereby continuing this strategy. Gradually, however, Mu‘awiyah’s power grew beyond what may have been intended. The deaths or resignations of other governors—such as ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn ‘Alqamah al-Kinani in Palestine and ‘Umair ibn Sa‘d al-Ansari in Homs—led ‘Uthman to consolidate more territory under Mu‘awiyah’s authority. By this stage, nearly all of Syria was under his command, forming what was effectively “a state within a state.”

Mu‘awiyah’s Exceptional Tenure

Unlike other governors who were periodically replaced, Mu‘awiyah remained in office across the successive khilafahs of ‘Umar, ‘Uthman, and Imam ‘Ali. His political dexterity enabled him to perform satisfactorily under ‘Umar’s stern leadership and to flourish further under ‘Uthman’s more lenient style.

His ability to maintain order and satisfy local expectations won him the loyalty of his constituents, who increasingly regarded him as a sovereign in his own right rather than a subordinate to the khalifah in Arabia. Unlike the turbulent provinces of Kufa, al-Basrah, and Egypt—where discontent with governors eventually led to the uprising against ‘Uthman—Syria remained steadfastly aligned with Mu‘awiyah.

The rapport between ‘Uthman and Mu‘awiyah was such that opponents of the khalifah were often exiled to al-Shām, including residents of Madinah itself. When ‘Uthman eventually banished Abu Dharr al-Ghifari, it was to Mu‘awiyah’s jurisdiction.

Abu Dharr’s Exile and the Emerging Power Shift

‘Uthman appears to have regarded Abu Dharr—a fearless critic of corruption and injustice—as a destabilizing force who might undermine efforts to peacefully integrate Makkah with al-Madinah. What he failed to grasp, however, was that Abu Dharr embodied the conscience of Islam, speaking truth to power and highlighting the widening gap between officials and the ordinary Muslim public. Suppressing Abu Dharr did not solve the problem; it exposed it.

This writer doubts that had Abu Bakr or ‘Umar been khalifahs at the time, they would have handled Abu Dharr as ‘Uthman did, nor would they have relied so heavily on Mu‘awiyah. Gradually, a subtle but significant power shift unfolded: ‘Uthman came to be seen as the minor ruler, while Muʿawiyah emerged as the major ruler.

A Critical Turning Point

Thus, Mu‘awiyah —originally a طليق [amnestied by the Prophet (ﷺ) the day Makkah was liberated] and not a صحابي [companion], a designation he later successfully but disingenuously drilled into muslim public opinion as both a companion of the Prophet (ﷺ) and a legitimate ruler. This was achieved through decades of political maneuvering, economic consolidation, and historical revisionism—a legacy that continues to shape Muslim memory to this day.

With the vast material resources of Greater Syria and the remaining Byzantine “modernistic” influence there, coupled with the pre-Islamic generational commercial ties between Makkah and Syria, Mu‘awiyah found himself in a power position to either join together the khilafah strategy which he knew was the social assimilation of Makkah into Islam after it was liberated, or to break away from khilafah central and its strategy and declare himself the ruler of the muslims.

Mu‘awiyah’s control over Greater Syria continued for many years – from the time of ‘Umar in office to the time of ‘Uthman and Imam ‘Ali. There was a type of synergy between Mu‘awiyah and the Levantines. The amity was such that as the years went by Mu‘awiyah was considered by his constituents more like an unbounded ruler than a ruler who took orders from the khalifah in Arabia.

No other والي [governor or regional chief administrator] lasted as long and as incrementally “progressive” as Mu‘awiyah did in his post with the advantage of resources in abundance and plentiful means. Mu‘awiyah must have been pleased to watch one governor after another being relieved of their responsibilities by ‘Umar and ‘Uthman while he carried on unabated and undiminished with more territories added to his jurisdiction.

Had Mu‘awiyah been delinquent in running the affairs of his region, ‘Umar would not have hesitated in sacking him. Had Mu‘wiyah committed any infraction ‘Umar would have reprimanded and punished him, no doubt.

In a cunningly astute manner, Mu‘awiyah kept up a satisfactory administrative performance when the ruler was stern [‘Umar] as well as when the ruler was easygoing [‘Uthman]. This may explain to a certain extent why Mu‘awiyah’s constituents showed no opposition to him or to ‘Uthman in the same manner that the constituents of the other governors in Kufah, al-Basrah and Egypt were restless with their governors and uncertain about ‘Uthman.

Remember those who laid siege to ‘Uthman came from Kufah, al-Basrah, and Egypt – among them you could not find one person from al-Sham. The rapport between ‘Uthman and Mu‘awiyah was such that most of the times when someone disagreed with ‘Uthman, he would refer him to Mu‘awiyah or exile him to al-Sham; even individuals from al-Madinah were sent into exile in al-Sham.

The shift in balance during ‘Uthman’s khilafah laid the groundwork for one of the most consequential transformations in Islamic political history: the transition from a model of khilafah rooted in Madinah’s ethos of justice and collective leadership to a dynastic monarchy centered on familial and clan power.

And so, anyone who has done an atom’s weight of good shall behold it: and anyone who has done an atom’s weight of malevolence shall behold it - Al-Zalzalah, verses 7-8.

Islamic historyMuawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan

The Failure of Trump’s Iran Policy: ‘Bad Luck,’ Design, or Happenstance?

The Trump administration’s policy toward Iran — accompanied by mixed signals and increased pressure — is leading to a diplomatic deadlock, raising the risk of a large-scale conflict, and undermining confidence in American diplomacy.

Henry Kamens

WASHINGTON / ISLAMABAD — if you think Trump’s foreign policy has been rocky so far, imagine sending US ground troops into Iran. Like the captive in the Soviet film White Sun of the Desert—he was asked whether he prefers a quick death or prolonged torture — Washington seems to be choosing the slow, humiliating option.

Mixed messages, grandiose public claims, and a naval blockade that undercuts talks have turned peaceful diplomacy into a farce. The result: US credibility is shredded, negotiations are stalled, and a fragile cease-fire is teetering on the brink of collapse—exactly the kind of mess that could make a short war drag into a strategic disaster.

“Bad So Far” vs. “Worse to Come”

This approach ignores the principles of effective negotiation outlined in Getting to Yes, a staple in diplomatic training

Applying this to Trump’s foreign policy regarding Iran, especially the prospect of introducing ground troops, the analogy suggests that facing “death” in the movie scenario could be framed as a devastating regional conflict, immense human suffering, and a significant blow to US strategic interests and global stability, mirroring the inevitability and severity of the movie character’s fate, but on a geopolitical scale

The “worse to come” option exposes the potential for a full-scale ground war, followed by the crash of the world’s economy. Foreign wars have historically not worked out well for the United States. The option of “declaring victory and leaving with Trump’s proverbial tail between his legs” may be the best option for the world in general and the US in particular.

Even if a US military victory could be achieved, it would be nominal or fleeting, followed either by a difficult withdrawal, or a prolonged guerilla war, much like the Russian character in the movie who was facing either a quick death or prolonged torture.

Here are just some of Trump’s failures so far, domestic ones too:

1) A failed trade war with China

2) Annexation threats towards Greenland that reaped only indignation and ended in backtracking

3) Pressure on Canada that led to Mark Carney’s victory and brought Ottawa closer to Beijing

4) Congress’s decision to limit the White House’s ability to withdraw troops from Europe

5) The Supreme Court ruling that overturned the tariff war

6) His humiliation in ‘I’ ran, and it is growing!

7) And of course – the Epstein files

8) Relations with NATO being strained to the point of breaking

If history is any indication of things to come, the combination of bad timing, mixed messages, and coercive measures has so far sabotaged prospects for meaningful US–Iran talks in Pakistan and increased the danger the ceasefire will collapse—and by design!

Meanwhile, Trump is crashing and burning not only in terms of foreign policy, but now has fired another woman from his cabinet, on the domestic front. The first to go, on March 5, was ex-Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem. Then, less than a month later, Trump ousted former Attorney General Pam Bondi. Today, April 21, 2026, Labor Secretary Lori Chavez-DeRemer announced her resignation. The knives also seem out for Tulsi Gabbard, the Director of National Intelligence.

Never Ending War as a GREAT Distraction

So now he needs a great distraction, if not a victory in Iran, perhaps one in Cuba or some even greater distraction, to dial down the heat. The failure to negotiate without any desire for a good outcome, in at least to go through the motions, is most revealing. As of April 21, all efforts to negotiate face-to-face peace between the US and Iran remained unclear amid confusion over the US negotiators’ plans and uncertainty over whether Tehran would agree to take part.

Iran, with good justification, questions the good faith and real intentions of the US to come to the table with any actual intention of ending the war, as the US only wants to show to a domestic audience that it is the “shifty Iranians” who are spoiling a fair a and lasting deal.

Finger Pointing but the truth is clear!

Despite repeated public claims of progress, US-led efforts to broker a ceasefire and broader peace talks have so far failed to produce a durable breakthrough, or any breakthrough at all. Both sides continue to accuse each other of violating the fragile truce, while fundamental disagreements remain unresolved. If diplomacy continues to stall, that alone will stand as a significant policy failure, regardless of how either side seeks to frame it politically.

Crying Uncle!

It does not help with Trump making public statements of no compromise until a “deal” with the Iranians is about to happen, and how the Iranians are begging to negotiate does not help, which undermines trust and any semblance of legitimate leverage in the process.

It is almost certain that Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner are involved in any official negotiations for the purpose of making sure that no deals are made. They are most certainly Israeli assets and know who is buttering their bread.

Steve Witkoff | U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East

Witkoff is the quintessential Trump’s “closest buddy”—a billionaire real estate developer with zero prior diplomatic experience but too close for comfort to the President. Now he is tasked with handling the most radioactive files in the administration, including the Russia-Ukraine war, and the Iran nuclear standoff. The fact that he is the face of “deal-making” is nothing but a sick joke. In his world, a negotiation is only successful if the other side folds completely.

Jared Kushner | Special Envoy for Peace Missions

Perhaps one of the few, if not the only, close members of the family that Trump can trust, he has played a shadow-diplomacy role for years; Kushner was officially named Special Envoy earlier this year. Having brokered the Abraham Accords, he is the administration’s ideological anchor in the region. His role in the Islamabad talks is to ensure that any potential “breakthrough” aligns with the administration’s broader vision—one that prioritizes strategic alignment with traditional allies, demands of donors, and this leaves little room for Tehran’s current red lines. In other words, he is there to do Netanyahu’s bidding.

To the administration’s detractors, these two aren’t negotiators so much as “enforcers” and Israeli assets. They have extensive private business ties to the region, and see eye to eye with Trump, and everything has a payoff. It is clear, and even Trump has signaled that the purpose of the Islamabad talks isn’t to find a middle ground but to dictate the terms of surrender. If their goal is to ensure “no deals are made” unless they are entirely on Washington’s terms, they are the perfect hitmen for the job.

It is a similar situation to the Trump administration’s approach to the so-called peace talks regarding Ukraine, where the losing side seems to think it can dictate terms to the side that is winning.

Diplomatic optimism fades

Any veneer of optimism around U.S.-led peace efforts with Iran is quickly washing away. Progress has given way to entrenched gridlock, by design, and the fragile, frequently violated ceasefire looks less like a path to peace than a temporary pause in conflict.

Islamabad demonstrates the divide between Tehran and Washington is widening, and with JD Vance just walking away. Disputes over Iran’s nuclear program and the Strait of Hormuz have hardened into non-negotiable positions. Tehran refuses to negotiate under a U.S. naval blockade, blackmail, while President Donald Trump insists he faces “no pressure whatsoever” to ease sanctions—further undermining incentives for compromise.

The result is a volatile mix of mixed messaging and saber-rattling, pointing to a broader breakdown in negotiations. With the ceasefire fraying—including in Lebanon—and Islamabad talks weighed down by unrealistic preconditions, renewed conflict appears increasingly likely. What the administration frames as resolve instead reflects stagnation, raising the risk of wider instability and economic fallout.

Getting to Yes!

Critics argue this approach ignores the principles of effective negotiation outlined in Getting to Yes, a staple in diplomatic training. Its focus on mutual gains, trust, and interests over rigid positions stands in stark contrast to current U.S. strategy—one that appears to prioritize pressure over progress.

Trump and his backers want to keep up the “maximum pressure,” and without clear off-ramps. Thus, Washington has engineered conditions for assured failure and painted itself into a corner. The result is a chaotic, fatal cocktail of mixed messaging and saber-rattling that shows a total breakdown in diplomacy.

What Donald Trump and his team, including the official US State Department, are practicing under the guise of diplomacy falls face flat in terms of making a win-win deal and does not even come anywhere close to leading down the proverbial road of good intentions.

Henry Kamens, columnist and expert on Central Asia and the Caucasus

The Unnoticeable Beginning Of The Transition From Legitimate Khilafah To Legitimate Imamat

Abu Dharr

One glaring fact of our early Khilafah/Imamat historical symbiosis that looks us in the eye is the fact that a peculiar opposition existed during the time of ‘Uthman in office that did not exist during the Khilafah of ‘Umar . This opposition gained traction first at the faraway peripheries of the Islamic body politic. We mentioned earlier the murmur and then higher pitch of Islamic defiance in places like al-Basrah, al-Kufah, and Egypt; then the wave of opposition to ‘Uthman finally found a sizable foothold in al-Madinah itself where ‘Uthman resides.

Now that we are somewhat familiar with the distant pockets of noncooperation or at least serious-minded criticism of ‘Uthman’s policies we should tackle the question: where exactly did the earnest and dangerous opposition to ‘Uthman originate. Did it originate in al-Madinah, the seat of Islamic power? Or did it originate in lands and regions at a distance from al-Madinah?

Another way of putting it: did the opposition begin among the Prophet’s true and tried companions the Muhajirin and Ansar and then from there it trekked all the way to the military frontlines of the Islamic commonwealth; or did this opposition to ‘Uthman begin in the ranks of the military who were stationed far afield from al-Madinah and then eventually made its way to al-Madinah—home of the Muhajirin and Ansar?

The answer to this question is somewhat hard to pin down. If the disapproval of ‘Uthman initially began in al-Madinah that would mean that the Muhajirin and Ansar were the forerunners who took issue with ‘Uthman—some more involved in the opposition than others. But, then, if the opposition started within the ranks of the military stationed at the frontiers, that would mean that it was the military that influenced the core Muhajirin and Ansar in al-Madinah—some of them reluctantly and others willingly.

There need not be a contradiction between a simultaneous development and progression of opposition both in al-Madinah and at the warfront regions. And if that is the case it appears that the boldness and then rebelliousness against ‘Uthman were to be expected due to the tribal disparities and social imbalances that began to displace the brotherhood, companionship and equality of the hitherto practical Prophetic and constitutional Qur’anic social order. Perceived discriminating gaps began to set into the governmental administration and there was a popular viewpoint that Islam in theory is no longer Islam in practice.

Complicating these civic mixed feelings was the fact that what was left of the Prophetic generation had to come to terms with and adjust to the ingressing effects and sways of Byzantine and Persian modernities. It was not within ‘Uthman’s ability or anyone else’s ability to turn this tide or to overpower these types of developments quickly.

Another way of looking at this is that when a limited power expands and becomes a limitless power, it is bound to encounter some type of opposition and that opposition, if not dealt with wisely, can turn (and will turn) violent. Muslim rulers and Muslim peoples are in the final analysis members of the human race and vulnerable to the ups and downs of human nature once the governmental disciplinary standards of Islam slip away and the administrative educative criteria of the Qur’an begin to fade.

It has been over 1400 years since that time period we are speaking about here and look around and discover, for yourself, how defying and demanding it is to correct the conduct of those in power and also to adjust the actions and activities of those who are in the opposition!

Now let us visit al-Madinah specifically and learn what the relationship between ‘Uthman, a Muhajir, and the rest of the Muhajirin and Ansar and see what was their attitude towards ‘Uthman.

First let us examine the relationship between ‘Uthman and the five others who were the first to endorse ‘Uthman as khalifah. These were the ones who constituted the nominating consultative council when ‘Umar was still alive. All of them were Islamic pioneers in their own right and all of them had a clean record of supporting the Prophet (ﷺ) and sacrificing for the cause of Allah (SWT).

All of them were well-liked and well-regarded by the Prophet (ﷺ) during his cherished life and he passed away appreciating their selfless contributions for the sake of Allah (SWT) and the Prophet (ﷺ) and all of them earned the Prophet’s good will and good wishes.

But then they did not all hail from the exact same pre-Islamic tribal status nor were they all equivalent blood relatives of the Prophet (ﷺ). Each one of them had his own fluctuating relationship with other members of society as well as his measure of prosperity and amount of possessions and wealth.

In no particular order let us begin with ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn ‘Awf who was related to the Prophet (ﷺ) through his mother Aminah bint Wahb. ‘Abd al-Rahman was a very rich merchant. He was a merchant before becoming a Muslim and a merchant after becoming a Muslim. He was known to be a bright “business man.” He knew how to make money and how to invest money successfully. He is known to have said: I see myself, every time I turn a stone I feel like I will find gold or silver beneath it. It is also reported that the Prophet (ﷺ) said to him:

يا عبد الرحمن إنك من الأغنياء، ولن تدخل الجنة إلا زحفاً، فأقرض الله يطلق لك قدميك

O ‘Abd al-Rahman! You are certainly one of those who are wealthy but you will only enter paradise crawling; thus, give somebody an advance (early payment) for the sake of Allah so that He will untie your feet.

‘Abd al-Rahman ibn ‘Awf was not known to be austere or ascetic; after all he was a Quraishi and carried himself as a Quraishi as a “member of the aristocrat” though polished by his Islamic properness and politeness.

He was known to have multiple wives from different tribes which would have put him in a favorable position had he chosen to be the leader of the Muslims as Arabia in general still had deep tribal significances and sensitivities.

‘Abd al-Rahman ibn ‘Awf had the unambiguous distinction of bringing Quraish and the Ansar together because he was married into those two exclusive blocs. Still, he debarred himself from “running for the office” of Khalifah even when there were others in that council of six who favored him among them ‘Uthman himself. ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn ‘Awf purposely sought a neutral position that would help him reconcile the internal good-hearted competition within the council.

Imam ‘Ali as well as the other members consented to ‘Abd al-Rahman becoming the go-between and intermediary among the members of the council after ‘Abd al-Rahman affirmed to Imam ‘Ali that he would bind himself to al-haqq [the truth and the facts] without favoritism springing from blood relationships or clannish preferences.

What would summarize ‘Abd al-Rahman’s position concerning statesmanship is his declaration:

والله لأن تُؤخذ مدية (سكين) فتوضع في حلقي ثم يُنفذ بها، أحب إلي من أن أتولى هذا الأمر

“By Allah! It would be preferable for me to suffer from an arrow piercing my mouth and exiting through the other side (of my head) than to assume this responsibility [of being the leader of the Muslims].” The bona fides of ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn ‘Awf were recognized by all the members of that council.

Later, when ‘Uthman was assigned the Khilafah position because of ‘Abd al-Rahman’s due diligence, it was he who felt that he would have to “keep a close eye” on ‘Uthman.

During the first years of ‘Uthman’s rule, ‘Abd al-Rahman was not in opposition to him. On the contrary, he tried to help ‘Uthman and facilitate what had to be facilitated; but then when the Muslim general public began to raise their voice against ‘Uthman, ‘Abd al-Rahman began to take their anxieties and affairs into somber consideration. This eventually resulted in ‘Abd al-Rahman defying ‘Uthman in political and “religious” matters which finally caused him to stay away from ‘Uthman. He stopped visiting him and did not talk to him.

‘Abd al-Rahman ibn ‘Awf took issue with ‘Uthman when the latter prayed four raka‘at knowing that the Prophet (ﷺ) and Abu Bakr and ‘Umar would pray two raka‘at when traveling. ‘Abd al-Rahman also was against ‘Uthman’s “liberal” allocation of money to his relatives.

And whatever issue you may disagree on among yourselves, [know that] its adjudication is to be conceded to Allah… [al-Shura, 10].

Al-Muhajirun Were Not Carbon Copies Of Each Other

Abu Dharr

The next one from among the Muhajireen and a participant in the six-member commissioning council that was tasked with agreeing on a khalifah to succeed ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab is Sa‘d ibn Abi Waqqas. In the tribal labyrinth of Makkah, Sa‘d hailed from the same kinfolk as ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn ‘Awf. Sa‘d was one of the first followers of the Prophet (ﷺ) during the early days of Islam in Makkah. He was known to have sacrificed considerably for Allah (الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ), the Prophet (ﷺ) and the Islamic community. It is reported that he was the first in Islam to shoot an arrow. He took part in the battle of Badr along with his younger brother ‘Umair who was honored as a shaheed in that pivotal battle.

Sa‘d fell ill in al-Madinah and the Prophet (ﷺ) paid him a visit and expressed a du‘a for his wellbeing and health. In the days and years after the Prophet (ﷺ) passed away, Sa‘d was to be found in and valiantly engaged in the frontlines of the battle of al-Qadisiyah. He is known as the hero of al-Qadisiyah and the vanquisher of Kisra (philosopher and king Khosrow, of Persia).

Sa‘d was one of the six who were nominated by ‘Umar to assume the position of Islamic leadership. It was ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn ‘Awf who disqualified Sa‘d in the same manner that ‘Abd al-Rahman disqualified himself from the highest office in the ummah.

And like ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn ‘Awf, Sa‘d had multiple wives from diverse tribes; from the tribe of Quraish he was married to one wife belonging to his family background.

There is information circulating in some history books that Sa‘d favored Imam ‘Ali as the leader of the Muslims. Maybe? It is also reported that ‘Umar advised that whoever is going to become the khalifah after him should task Sa‘d with an administrative/governmental position. Thus, when ‘Uthman became the khalifah he appointed Sa‘d as the governor of al-Kufah – a position he retained for over a year. After that ‘Uthman relieved him of his duties and replaced him with al-Walid ibn ‘Uqbah.

From all that we know, Sa‘d was loyal to ‘Uthman. It cannot be stated with certainty how Sa‘d felt towards ‘Uthman when the latter relieved him of his duties as governor of al-Kufah. Was he upset or composed?

When opposition to ‘Uthman picked up momentum, Sa‘d did not appear in the vehement protests but that is not to say that he may have expressed loyal opposition to ‘Uthman. When the opposition turned fierce, ferocious Sa‘d appeared to have been not taking sides.

We cannot say that he contributed to the polarization of opinions during ‘Uthman’s last days in office as khilafah or thereafter. Later on he was asked: why don’t you get regimentally involved [in this Islamic civil strife?] He answered: Unless you present me with a sword that tells me this is a war between committed muslims and committed kafirs I will not fight.

In all the battles and wars prior to that, Sa‘d did not hesitate to sacrifice life and limb for the cause of Allah (الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ). When he felt that internal civil conflict is a “grey area” he excluded himself from military duty.

When Sa‘d died he did not leave behind a fortune compared to some other companions.

Next we dwell on al-Zubair ibn al-‘Awwam. He was a close relative of the Prophet (ﷺ). He was the son of Safiyyah bint ‘Abd al-Muttalib, the Prophet’s paternal aunt. Al-Zubair’s paternal aunt was the Prophet’s wife Khadijah, the matron of the committed Muslims.

That made al-Zubair the cousin of Fatimah—the Prophet’s daughter. Al-Zubair was also related to Abu Bakr as he married Abu Bakr’s daughter Asma’ (Dhat al-Nitaqain). This put al-Zubair at a cozy and comfortable relationship with the Prophet (ﷺ) as he was his brother-in-law.

Al-Zubair and the Prophet (ﷺ) married the daughters of Abu Bakr. The former married Asma’ while the Prophet was married to ‘A’ishah, Asma’s sister.

Since his childhood, al-Zubair was known to be strong, determined and courageous. He was also one of the early pioneering Muslims in Makkkah. He participated in the battle of Badr and all other battles and wars that the Prophet (ﷺ) attended. He was also one of two mounted soldiers at the battle of Badr.

After the Prophet (ﷺ) passed on, al-Zubair stayed in al-Madinah during the reign of Abu Bakr and ‘Umar. He did not leave except with permission from ‘Umar or to go to Hajj. ‘Umar appointed him to the six-member council that was tasked with working out who the new leader of the ummah will be.

He did not show any obvious inclination towards the two main competitors ‘Uthman and Imam ‘Ali. Al-Zubair seemed to have had confidence in ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn ‘Awf and his reasoning and good sense. After ‘Uthman became the khalifah he showed some affection or leaning towards al-Zubair.

In his Tabaqat, the Seerah biographer Ibn Sa‘d says that ‘Uthman gave al-Zubair 600,000 [dinars or dirhams?]. As a result, al-Zubair began to seek out the best ventures or investments for which he was told it was property acquisition. So he purchased land in ‘Iraq and he purchased land in Egypt. Ibn Sa‘d also mentions that al-Zubair was averse to having people entrust him with their wealth.

With time, al-Zubair’s wealth ballooned into a fortune so much so that his name was worked into short well-known traditional sayings about wealth accumulation. His moneymaking and business related activities subjected him to the ebbs and flows of successful and unsuccessful undertakings. At one time he had accumulated considerable debt due to which he instructed his son at the time of the battle of al-Jamal to pay off his substantial debt. Al-Zubair’s son paid off his father’s debt which is reported to have been 2.5 million dirhams.

This writer is aware that some of the information about the affluent companions of the Prophet (ﷺ) does not circulate and the reason for that may be to try to avoid the impression that wealth is corruptive and thus the companions of the Prophet (ﷺ) became dishonest or demoralized.

This fear of objective information coupled with a reactionary “flight of fancy” produces the sectarianism that we have been suffering from for a long time. Let us take control of our nerves and discipline ourselves to live with the actualities of our history…

There is enough information that tells us that al-Zubair’s wealth—after his debt was paid off and the rest inherited by his heirs—was between 35 million dirhams on the lower end and 52 million on the higher end… An in-between figure of 40 million dirhams is also mentioned.

This should come as no surprise if we realize that al-Zubair had extensive dealings in Egypt (Alexandria) and ‘Iraq (al-Basrah) as well as al-Kufah, in addition to eleven domiciles in al-Madinah, add to that the agricultural and other investment profits.

Knowing that, we can understand why al-Zubair initially was not one to express opposition to ‘Uthman’s “free market” policies. When ‘Uthman was under siege in his own house it was ‘Abd Allah ibn al-Zubair who was in charge of ‘Uthman’s residence security. ‘Uthman entrusted ‘Abd Allah ibn al-Zubair to pass on his will and testament specifying how ‘Uthman’s assets (estate) are to be distributed after death.

Be that is it was, al-Zubair remained peacefully disapproving of some of ‘Uthman’s administrative and political decisions along with other members of the Muhajireen and Ansar. We may sum it up by saying that al-Zubair was a “back seat” critic of not many of the decisions that were made in the office of the khalifah.

‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan, Sa‘d ibn Abi Waqqas, and al-Zubair ibn al-‘Awwam are in spite of everything included in the ayah:

Certainly, they who are securely committed to Allah, and who have forsaken the state-of-affairs of evil [in Makkah] and are striving hard in Allah’s cause – these are the ones who may look forward to Allah’s grace; for Allah is much-forgiving, tremendously merciful [Surat al-Baqarah, verse 218].

Iran’s Resilience- People and State- Topples American Superiority

Mohammad Raad, Head of the Loyalty to the Resistance Parliamentary Bloc

Al-Ahed Translations

Among the points that warrant reflection in any overall assessment of the US–Zionist war of aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran is “President Trump’s astonishment- his shock and anger at Tehran’s insistence on resilience and confrontation, and its refusal to surrender despite the heavy losses it has suffered. Chief among these were the targeting of the Leader of the Revolution, Sayyed Ali Khamenei, as well as a number of key military, security, and political figures, in addition to the widespread destruction of capabilities, facilities, missile launch platforms, air defense bases, radars, factories, and more.

Trump and his aides had not imagined that, after such strikes, there would remain in Iran those who would firmly persist in continuing the confrontation against the US–Zionist aggression- rising with high confidence grounded in broad popular participation unparalleled in the history of wars- in order to defeat the objectives of this aggression and block its project of domination. This project aims not only at controlling Iran, but also at dominating oil and gas markets, controlling strategic international passageways, and cutting off energy supply routes to China- the main declared target of American arrogance at this stage.

No country in past or modern history could have withstood such major leadership and military losses as Iran did in March 2026 at the hands of the American and Zionist aggressors. Therefore, the shock that struck Trump and his partners is entirely natural. One of the key reasons for this overwhelming astonishment- and what deepens their disappointment and bitterness despite their exaggerated sense of power and dominance- is Iran’s resilience, steadfastness, sustained confidence, and continued ability to confront after the initial blow. It reflects a misreading and miscalculation of the foundations of the Islamic Republic’s system, and of the tightly interwoven ideological, mobilizational, organizational, and civilizational relationship between the leadership, its supporting forces, and the Iranian people- who, through their awareness and role, constitute the fundamental pillar of sovereignty and independence.

The Iranian authority does not descend upon the people by foreign parachutes or external directives, nor are the Iranian people merely a demographic mass filling a space to be tossed around by politicians in power struggles. Rather, they are active and serious producers of authority, based on firm visionary, principled, and realistic foundations that shape aspirations toward achieving both sectoral and comprehensive interests within the framework of the Islamic Republic’s national interests.

This unique interconnection- rare even globally and virtually absent in the Arab world- naturally shocks the reckless hegemon whose project of domination relies on an apparent superiority in vast material capabilities that are not matched by a minimum level of persuasive and positively influential civilizational values. Such values would otherwise make the US administration a credible example in upholding peace, security, justice, and stability.

Iran’s resilience and the steadfastness of the resistance in Lebanon are two models whose success will encourage their replication in many countries, systems, and environments that learn the lesson and respect their identity and existence.

Superiority does not merely mean possessing military and material capabilities to use against others in war. True superiority must also include a convincing justification that resorting to war carries legitimacy derived from adherence to the principles and values of international and humanitarian law. Without this, the powerful party loses its claim to superiority and instead places itself in the position of a bully or an outlaw.

Trump himself undermined and humiliated American superiority before the entire world when he threatened to use force to annihilate what he called “Iranian civilization,” revealing that the United States is not a force for building order, but merely a force of threat, destruction, and demolition. In doing so, he stripped away any claim to superiority or expectation of lawful, ethical conduct from his administration.

It has become clear- through both the current war and previous ones- that the imbalance within the American system between power and values is the deeper cause of US policy failures worldwide, despite all propaganda and promotional narratives- especially in dealing with countries whose peoples play an active role in shaping their systems and policies. The same applies to the flawed understanding and superficial assessments- shared by both the US administration and the Zionist entity- of systems rooted in genuine popular will. Hence the parallel shocks: the shock of the entity at Hezbollah’s ability to recover and quickly rebound after its leadership was targeted; and the shock of the United States at Iran’s continued resilience and confrontation in the face of a major war of aggression.

What we have witnessed in Gaza, and what the Hezbollah environment and the Islamic Republic of Iran have endured- had it been faced by any artificial state or environment in today’s world- the globe would have seen white flags covering rooftops. But history unfolds according to its own laws; those who have done wrong will come to know the fate to which they will return, and the final outcome belongs to the righteous.

The cohesion of the Islamic system in Iran and the resistance environment in Lebanon stems from the sincerity and depth of principled commitment to a civilizational mission, and from a more just and less selective application of laws, regulations, and norms within the system or society.

Respect for both the individual and the collective, a commitment to honesty and justice in practice, and the safeguarding of the integrity of this mission-driven model from distortion, defamation, and falsification- all of this strengthens cohesion and fosters readiness for sacrifice in defense of truth.
Because such elements of cohesion are rare in artificial or functional regimes, and in non-mission-driven societies, the rapid collapse of such systems under heavy enemy strikes- especially those targeting leadership and capabilities- is natural and proportionate to the force of the blow.

In contrast, in ideologically cohesive environments and systems that safeguard the interests and principles of such communities- sharing with them the responsibility of preserving homeland, sovereignty, human dignity, and vital interests- external aggression is met with an equal or stronger rebound in defense of existence and identity.

Iran’s resilience and the steadfastness of the resistance in Lebanon are clear expressions of this equation, and their success will encourage its replication in many countries, systems, and environments that learn the lesson and respect their identity and existence.

Hezbollah’s Advanced Drones Catch Enemy Off Guard, Reshape Battlefield Dynamics

By Al Ahed Staff

Hezbollah has significantly expanded its arsenal of high-precision, high-speed FPV loitering attack drones as part of broader efforts to enhance its military capabilities, informed sources told Al-Ahed News.

According to the sources, in the fifteen months following the November 2024 ceasefire, the Hezbollah has continued to advance the development of these systems. Key technical modifications have reportedly been introduced, including the integration of fiber-optic control systems, rendering the drones resistant to downing, jamming and signal interception attempts.

The sources added that Hezbollah now operates multiple types of loitering attack drones tailored for different combat roles. Some models are designed to target infantry units, while others are configured to strike heavy military equipment such as tanks and bulldozers. 

Among the most notable variants are drones equipped with high-capacity batteries, enabling them to travel distances of up to 50 kilometers at high speed while carrying payloads of at least 7 kilograms.  These drones are reportedly capable of destroying Iron Dome systems and disabling early warning devices.

Such advancements, the sources noted, require highly specialized technical expertise, placing the Islamic Resistance among leading actors in the field of drone technology. 

The development process involves innovation and adaptation of existing components to meet specific operational needs; an approach contrasted with conventional military reliance on imported systems.

The success of this effort is underscored by the unprecedented effectiveness of these loitering drones, which has compelled the enemy to hold discussions on countermeasures after admitting they were caught off guard by the technology.

The drones have inflicted unprecedented losses, contributing to growing unease among enemy ranks and establishing themselves as a persistent tactical challenge.

People’s Trust In The Leaders Reflects The Confidence Of Leaders In The People

Abu Dharr

One piece of information is due before we proceed. The cities of al-Kufah and al-Basrah were both established during the leadership of the second legitimate ruler of the Muslims after the Prophet (ﷺ), ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab. During his tenure, ‘Umar had appointed Abu Musa al-Ash‘ari as the governor of al-Basrah. ‘Uthman retained him in this position for a few years. Some historians say it was three years, others say it was six.

Most of the population of al-Basrah hailed from the tribe of Mudar [مضر.] It was one of the largest and earliest Arabian tribes. Quraish notably was a lineage within Mudar. Alongside them, other smaller tribal communities also settled in al-Basrah including groups who traced their ancestry to Yemen.

For reasons perhaps best known to him, ‘Umar had a preference for appointing individuals of Yemeni origin to govern al-Basrah despite its oerwhelmingly Mudari population. In al-Kufah, he appointed al-Mughirah ibn Shu‘bah, a member of the Thaqafi tribe, predominant in al-Ta’if, and a pre-Islamic rival of Makkah’s Quraish. In contrast, governors appointed to Syria and Egypt—regions heavily populated by southern Arabians—were from the Mudari-Quraishi lineage.

The best explanation for this strategic pattern of appointments lies in ‘Umar’s possible intent to undermine the lingering parochial arrogance and tribal pride of the pre-Islamic era. By installing governors who were not from the same tribal roots as the governed, he sought to curb the deeply ingrained tribal self-importance and reorient society toward the Qur’anic principles of unity and justice.

Al-Basrah remained peaceful under Abu Musa al-Ash‘ari as governor. Initially, there was no tension between the rulers and the ruled. Abu Musa al-Ash‘ari was widely regarded as a close companion of the Prophet (ﷺ). His record of struggle and devotion placed him in a favorable light with respect to the messenger of Allah (ﷺ).

During ‘Uthman’ administration, however, the specter of pre-Islamic ‘asabiyah—communal and tribal fanaticism—started to reemerge. Individuals gradually began identifying themselves more with their tribe than with the egalitarian Islamic brotherhood that had defined the Prophet’s generation.

This creeping tribalism and a subliminal sense of ‘asabiyah began to overshadow Islamic solidarity and Qur’anic unity. Three major regions within the Islamic realm were now governed by Quraishis: al-Walid ibn ‘Uqbah followed by Sa‘id ibn al-‘As in al-Kufah, Mu‘awiyah ibn Abi Sufyan in Syria, and ‘Amr ibn al-‘As in Egypt, succeeded by ‘Abdullah ibn Abi al-Sarh. Only one, al-Basrah, was governed by a non-Quraishi, Abu Musa al-Ash‘ari. He thus stood out as the “odd man out” in a slowly forming subtle era of “official ‘asabiyah” that began to displace the populist ethos of Islam.

This emerging “power configuration” did not go unnoticed by Quraish, by ‘Uthman’s kin, or by the Mudaris in al-Basrah. A particularly revealing incident involved a Mudari named غيلان بن خرشة الضبي [Ghaylan ibn Kharshah al-Dabbi] who went to ‘Uthman with a pointed question: is there no one younger and more energetic to govern al-Basrah? Why should an old man like Abu Musa al-Ash‘ari, who has remained in office for six years after ‘Umar’s death, still hold the reins of power?

This prompted ‘Uthman to dismiss Abu Musa al-Ash‘ari. Other accounts mention complaints from some Basran residents, who criticized Abu Musa’s increasing rigidity, abrasiveness, and alleged inflexibility. A delegation even traveled to ‘Uthman’s court to petition for his dismissal, accusing Abu Musa of bias and favoritism toward his own kind—meaning the Yemenis.

In response, ‘Uthman relieved Abu Musa al-Ash‘ari as governor and appointed his own maternal cousin عبد الله ابن عامربن كريز [‘Abdullah ibn ‘Amer ibn Kurayz] who was merely 25 years old at the time.

Despite some criticism over this act of partiality, ‘Uthman defended the appointment, claiming that ‘Abdullah was highly capable. This proved to be more than rhetoric. ‘Abdullah demonstrated resolve, competence, and a clear sense of priority, especially concerning military matters. His relationship with the general populace was thoughtful and largely well-received. This stood in contrast to the strained dynamics seen in al-Kufah and Egypt governed by al-Walid and Sa‘id, and ‘Abdullah ibn Sa‘d ibn Abi Sarh respectively.

A key factor in this improved rapport may have been that ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Amer, like the majority of al-Basrah’s residents, was a Mudari. This is not to suggest that all was harmonious. A faction within al-Basrah eventually joined the broader revolt against ‘Uthman, suggesting that not all Basrans were content with the Khalifah or his appointees.

Both al-Basrah and al-Kufah shared a common trait: emerging opposition to ‘Uthman. In al-Kufah, this opposition represented a majority; in al-Basrah, a minority. In both cases, certain opposition figures were forcibly relocated to Syria.

This forced displacement of dissenters from al-Basrah was a clear injustice. Some were exiled merely on suspicion, without solid evidence of disloyalty. One illustrative example is the case of عامربن عبد القيس [‘Amer ibn ‘Abd al-Qays]. He was accused of violating Islam because he refused to eat meat, declined to marry, and allegedly neglected Jumu‘ah salat.

The case reached ‘Uthman, who summoned ‘Amer to al-Madinah. Upon investigation, it became evident that the accusations were unfounded. ‘Uthman permitted ‘Amer to return to al-Basrah with honor.

An alternate version of this episode recounts that ‘Amer was sent to Mu‘awiyah in Syria, who received him hospitably and offered him a table spread with meat. Upon seeing him eat, Mu‘awiyah realized the earlier claims were baseless.

Mu‘awiyah probed him further. ‘Amer explained that he once refrained from eating meat after witnessing a butcher’s brutal treatment of a sheep. He prayed Jumu‘ah at the rear of the mosque and was the first to leave. As for marriage, he simply did not want to be coerced into it.

Mu‘awiyah intended to send him back to al-Basrah but ‘Amer refused due to the betrayal and informant culture he had experienced. He chose to remain in Syria, adopting a life of asceticism and discipline, maintaining a close relationship with Mu‘awiyah.

The main criticism of ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Amer among the public stemmed from his familial link to ‘Uthman and his youthful age. The governance model was clearly shifting from Prophetic meritocracy to tribal loyalty and dynastic networking.

One particularly telling episode involved ‘Abdullah initiating his ‘umrah ihram from the Persian frontier, a gesture designed to evoke public admiration and piety. When tribal and political partisanship (‘asabiyah) begins to dominate, a spectacle of religiosity is often used to mask underlying political motives. This may have been one of the earliest examples of such performative religiosity—an Islamic façade atop non-Islamic political behavior.

‘Uthman made his disapproval of this act known. Yet, this incident illustrates the extent to which governors would go to secure public approval.

The Prophet (ﷺ) had this to say about clannish self-centeredness:

دعوها فإنها منتنة [Ditch it (‘asabiyah) because it emits a stench].

Islamic history