Iran has prevailed, and the Middle East has changed

Four lessons from a war Tehran didn’t lose

By Dmitry Trenin, a research professor at the Higher School of Economics and a lead research fellow at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. He is also a member of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC).

US President Donald Trump has, in the end, found a way out of the situation he created by embarking on a reckless war against Iran. The threat of destroying an entire civilization provided him with the pretext to step back.

Indirect negotiations between Tehran and Washington, conducted through intermediaries, primarily Pakistan and, behind it, China, have produced a ceasefire. Trump may claim that Iran was cowed by his threats, but the reality is different.

A ceasefire under conditions where the Strait of Hormuz remains under Iranian control suggests that Tehran has not backed down. Washington, in effect, has.

It is too early to speak of any “golden age” emerging from these talks. But the outlines of the conflict’s outcome are already visible.

1. Iran has held firm.

For decades, Iran faced the threat of joint aggression by the United States and Israel. That threat has now been tested, and has failed to break Tehran. Neither Washington nor Tel Aviv proved capable of imposing their will by force.

The result is clear: Iran has consolidated its status as a major regional power, standing alongside Israel as one of the decisive actors in the Middle East.

2. The Gulf states have been exposed.

The Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf have discovered both their vulnerability and their dependence. In a conflict between the US/Israel and Iran, they proved unable to defend their own interests. Meanwhile, American bases on their territory, far from guaranteeing security, became magnets for Iranian retaliation.

Conclusion: US security guarantees have been shown to be unreliable. This lesson will not be lost on Washington’s allies.

3. Military power has reasserted primacy.

The conflict has underlined a broader truth about the emerging international order: military force outweighs economic and financial leverage.

As Pushkin wrote:

“All is mine on earth, said gold.
All is mine, said iron cold.
I will buy it all, said gold.
I will take, said iron cold.”

Sanctioned Iran, burdened by economic difficulties, has effectively withstood, and in strategic terms defeated, a global superpower. Meanwhile, its far wealthier southern neighbors have been reduced to little more than spectators, or worse, targets.

Conclusion: In today’s world, hard power determines outcomes.

4. Iran has changed internally.

Iran has emerged from the conflict intact, but transformed. During the war, a shift long anticipated by analysts appears to have taken place. Real power has moved away from the clerical establishment and toward the security apparatus.

The country is no longer defined primarily by its formal leadership, but by the senior ranks of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Conclusion: Iran will remain an Islamic republic, but one in which the IRGC plays the decisive role. Its policy is likely to be firm, disciplined and pragmatic.

Russia’s position

Moscow has navigated the conflict with a degree of strategic discipline. It has maintained its principles, calling aggression by its name, expressing solidarity with Iran, and vetoing what it viewed as an unbalanced UN Security Council resolution on the Strait of Hormuz.

At the same time, it has preserved working relations with key actors: explaining its position to Gulf partners, avoiding direct confrontation with Trump, and refraining from damaging ties with Israel.

The broader consequences of the conflict, a temporary spike in oil prices, strains in transatlantic relations, and a further diversion of US attention from Ukraine, have unfolded largely independently of Russia’s direct involvement.

Looking ahead

The war has opened new opportunities for Moscow. Iran, having endured a severe test, has strengthened its regional and international standing. This creates conditions for closer cooperation between Russia and Tehran.

More broadly, the outlines of a new Eurasian security architecture are becoming visible. Russia, China, Iran – alongside states such as Belarus and North Korea – form the core of this emerging system.

In the south, Iran has effectively halted an American geopolitical advance. In the west, Russia seeks to do the same in Ukraine. In the east, China continues to expand its military capabilities while advancing its diplomatic agenda.

It is through such developments, not declarations, but shifts in power and alignment, that a multipolar world is taking shape.

The Gulf has a new boss. Here are three scenarios after the pause

Extended truce, renewed war, or endless strikes – each reshapes the region in Iran’s favor

By Sergey Poletaev, information analyst and publicist, co-founder and editor of the Vatfor project. 

The almost apocalyptic rhetoric from US President Donald Trump, who threatened that “a whole civilization will die tonight,” suddenly gave way to de-escalation. By the evening of April 7, it was announced that the US and Iran had agreed to a two-week ceasefire; shortly afterward, Israel confirmed it would join. Over these two weeks, negotiations toward a permanent peace deal are due to be held with Pakistan acting as mediator.

This is exactly the scenario we saw as the most likely from the very beginning of the conflict.

The war could still resume (we’ll get to that below), but for now it looks like things are moving toward a reality where the Persian Gulf is, in fact, becoming Persian. Iran now effectively controls shipping in the Gulf and holds the Arab oil monarchies at risk – and the US appears to be accepting that.

Scenario 1: A prolonged ceasefire

Let’s assume the pause in hostilities lasts months – or even years. That’s entirely plausible: even if a formal peace deal doesn’t materialize, the ceasefire could simply be extended over and over again.

In that case, the top priority for the Arab states will be building a new generation of air defense. The blueprint is fairly clear: rely on cheap, mass-produced interceptors, whether ground-based (such as Russia’s Pantsir) or air-launched (like APKWS). Both Arab states and Israel will likely focus on this, alongside replenishing their traditional air defense stockpiles.

The second priority will be diversifying logistics – building new pipelines to the Red Sea and finding alternatives to Gulf shipping routes. The goal is obvious: break free from Iran’s Strait of Hormuz chokehold and reduce its leverage. That said, for countries like Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Iraq, pipelines across the Arabian Peninsula would mean dependence on another regional power – Saudi Arabia. And, of course, transit fees would apply.

None of this solves the core problem. The geography of the Gulf makes full protection impossible. Across more than 500 nautical miles (about 1,000 km) – like something out of an old arcade shooter – every shipping lane is within Iran’s reach. Along the coastline, ports, factories, desalination plants, oil storage facilities, data centers, hotels, and skyscrapers sit exposed like targets at a shooting range. Defending all of that from the sea is extremely difficult, and for the time being, the Arab states will likely choose to pay for safe passage.

At the end of the day, they don’t really care who provides that security umbrella. They used to pay the US; now they’ll pay Iran. The price isn’t even that steep – reportedly around $2 million per supertanker, which is just 2-3% of the value of the oil onboard. And ultimately, the buyers will foot the bill anyway.

In the East, one of the highest marks of a wise ruler is the ability to impose tribute on neighbors and make them acknowledge your authority. That principle is well understood in both Iran and the Arab world. Ironically, the US and Israel may have helped bring about a new regional order that actually fits local political logic.

Now Washington and West Jerusalem will face a long, uphill battle to rebuild their influence – and any move they make will be viewed with skepticism by Arab states: what if it all falls apart again? The alpha wolf missed his mark.

Scenario 2: Renewed escalation

It’s entirely possible that in two weeks the war could flare up again – potentially with even greater intensity. Iranian negotiators could be targeted again, triggering an earlier collapse of the ceasefire. Still, we see this as relatively unlikely: despite the considerable military capabilities of the US and Israel, they currently lack a clear path to decisively defeat Iran through conventional means.

Realistically, short of a nuclear scenario, the coalition has two main options.

The first is a campaign of intensive strategic bombing aimed at “bombing Iran back into the Stone Age.” That would require US strategic bombers to operate directly over Iranian territory – a risky proposition, as the incident near Isfahan demonstrated. In such conditions, B-52 bombers would actually be more vulnerable than modern fighter jets – they’re as easy to shoot down as civilian airliners, even for relatively outdated air defense systems.

Meanwhile, Iran’s missile capabilities have not only survived but shown signs of recovery and increased operational tempo. And US forces have been unable to seriously disrupt Iran’s drone launch infrastructure (including Shahed-type UAVs). That means any large-scale bombing campaign risks triggering significant retaliatory damage – especially against the oil-producing Arab monarchies – prolonging and deepening the global oil shock and potentially pushing the world toward a financial crisis.

Israel would also be exposed. According to a JPMorgan report citing the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, the success rate of Iranian strikes on Israeli territory has surged – from 3% at the start of the war to 27% by late March and early April – largely due to the strain and depletion of Israeli air defenses.

The second option – a large-scale ground operation, either along Iran’s coastline or against Iranian-controlled islands – comes with all the risks of air warfare plus inevitable heavy casualties. The upside? Essentially none. Limited amphibious raids would achieve little, while a full-scale invasion aimed at regime change is simply not feasible.

None of this means escalation is off the table. It means that before escalating, US and Israeli leadership would have to solve the same equation they faced at the start of the war – but now with far fewer unknowns. Iran’s resilience, its military capabilities, and the extent of US-Israeli international isolation are now much clearer.

If shipping through the Strait of Hormuz resumes and is then disrupted again by US or Israeli action, they would be widely seen as responsible for triggering a global economic crisis.

Scenario 3: Low-level clashes under Iranian control of Hormuz

This is essentially a variation of the first scenario – and, in our view, the most likely one. In fact, it already appears to be unfolding: Iran is accusing Israel of violating the ceasefire with new strikes and is threatening (and likely preparing) to retaliate.

If traffic through the Strait of Hormuz continues more or less uninterrupted, a pattern of ongoing tension and sporadic exchanges could become the new normal. Israel carries out strikes (or Iran claims it was attacked); Iran responds by temporarily shutting down the strait for a day or two – maybe launching a retaliatory strike of its own.

After a few weeks or months, this kind of news simply fades into the background – a constant, low-level risk. The region becomes less stable, but the rest of the world largely shrugs – as long as oil and other resources keep flowing out of the Persian Gulf.

The US stepped back from Iran. Its allies will remember

Timofey Bordachev, RT

US Military Launches Operation Epic Fury Attacking Iran

Washington won’t risk everything, and now everyone knows it.

What will be the consequences for the United States of refraining from taking extreme measures against Iran?

It is too early to say what kind of lasting order, if any, will emerge in the Middle East after the failure of the US and Israel’s campaign against Tehran. Yet the decision to avoid escalation, and ultimately the destruction of an entire civilization, already allows for several conclusions, not only about the region but about the wider trajectory of global politics.

First, the episode once again demonstrates the limits of superpower capabilities when vital interests are not directly at stake. Second, international politics continues to drift in a dangerous direction, where the possibility of a general military catastrophe remains ever present. That drift, moreover, shows no immediate sign of slowing.

Once it became clear that Washington couldn’t break Iran’s resistance or force it to reopen the Strait of Hormuz using conventional means, the US faced a stark choice: retreat or escalate to the nuclear level. The latter was never seriously contemplated, despite the rhetorical threats. The US leadership understood that the stakes simply did not justify such a move.

As a result, the conflict has effectively been brought to a halt on terms favorable to Tehran. For many observers, this amounts to a fiasco for the United States: a failure to defeat a significantly weaker opponent and an inability to shield its Gulf allies, who have suffered from Iranian counterstrikes.

At the same time, this was a distant war for Washington, as the fighting took place thousands of kilometers from American territory. In purely technical terms, even the use of nuclear weapons against Iran would not have disrupted daily life in the US. Yet the political and strategic grounds for such escalation were plainly insufficient. This distinguishes the current moment from the summer of 1945, when the atomic bombings of Japan coincided with the closing phase of a world war and the emerging confrontation with the Soviet Union. Then, the use of force was tied to vital strategic objectives. In the case of Iran, it was not.

For Washington, in other words, the game was not worth the candle.

This restraint, however, carries consequences. It has become increasingly clear that American “security guarantees” are conditional and limited. The US will not go to any lengths to defend its partners, even those who rely on it most heavily.

This reality extends beyond the Middle East. In Europe, particularly among states along Russia’s western periphery, confidence in unconditional American protection has long been taken for granted. That confidence can no longer be absolute. Countries such as Finland and the Baltic nations have operated under the assumption that the US would always intervene decisively. Recent events suggest otherwise.

There is also a broader political dimension. The current US leadership, under Donald Trump, reflects a mindset in which material interests outweigh abstract considerations of prestige or power. Trump and his circle approach international affairs less as statesmen and more as businessmen.

Their rhetoric may at times appear apocalyptic, but their actions repeatedly demonstrate a willingness to compromise when the costs of escalation become too high.

The potential destruction of Iran would have had far-reaching consequences for the Middle East and the global energy system. Washington is neither prepared for nor interested in such an outcome. Other major powers are drawing their own conclusions from this. China, in particular, has already adapted its approach, and Russia is doing the same, placing emphasis on pragmatic cooperation and mutual benefit in its dealings with the United States.

Looking ahead, this pattern is unlikely to change quickly. Should Trump be succeeded by figures such as J.D. Vance or Marco Rubio, the underlying logic will probably remain intact. These are politicians who are similarly disinclined to sacrifice tangible gains for abstract political objectives.

This trajectory will persist until the US either accepts a diminished global role or finds itself in a far weaker, potentially unstable position. It is precisely at that point, when the costs of inaction begin to outweigh the risks of escalation, that the calculation may change. Only then might the game truly become worth the candle.

And when that moment arrives, the consequences are unlikely to be contained.

Resident Fellow of American Enterprise Institute (AEI) a Zionist Think Tank Demands Murder of Iran’s Negotiators

Kurt Nimmo, Global Research

The CIA’s favorite newspaper, The Washington Post, is demanding the US continue its wanton terrorist murder in Iran by taking out negotiators currently meeting in Islamabad, Pakistan, with J.D. Vance and two Zionist real estate developers. Marc Thiessen, a columnist for the newspaper and a resident fellow at the neocon American Enterprise Institute, writes that if Iran refuses to capitulate, Trump should murder the negotiators. Marc, an American Zionist Jew, believes CENTCOM is able to eliminate “the remainder of Iran’s offensive military capabilities—including its ballistic missile, drone and defense industrial capability.” Trump has so far been unable to do this, as demanded by Benjamin Netanyahu, and instead has resorted to transparent lies.

“Total and complete victory. 100%. No question about it,” Trump told Agence France-Presse on April 7.

Pete Hegseth, the Jerusalem Cross tattooed Secretary of War, peddled a similar deception.

“Operation Epic Fury was a historic and overwhelming victory on the battlefield, a capital-V military victory,” he lied during a Pentagon press conference the following day. “Epic Fury decimated Iran’s military and rendered it combat-ineffective for years to come.”

This twaddle might work on your average incurious and intellectually disadvantaged American commoner tuned into Fox News and CNN, but it is a couple hundred light-years away from the truth: Donald Trump failed stupendously at regime change, ending uranium enrichment, blowing up Iran’s missile program, and forcing open the Strait of Hormuz. Instead of leveling with the American people, he trades in bald-faced lies in the hope his cult of personality will pull him through.

Not that Marc Thiessen is dissuaded.

“First, the president should direct Adm. Brad Cooper, commander of Centcom, to complete America’s military objectives,” he writes, apparently oblivious to reality. “That means eliminating the remainder of Iran’s offensive military capabilities—including its ballistic missile, drone and defense industrial capability.”

Next, Mr. Thiessen writes that after “Iran’s offensive missile capacity has been fully suppressed, the United States can take Kharg Island,” thus permitting Trump and Crusader Pete to land troops on the island without drawing a horde of hypersonic missiles and kamikaze drones.

Third, the resident neocon proposes Trump “secure Iran’s enriched uranium by establishing a virtual perimeter around it.” It would seem Marc is unaware of the fact the US and Israel have no idea where this alleged enriched uranium is kept. The fictive “daring rescue” of a pilot of a downed F-15E Strike Eagle served as a cover to find and steal said enriched uranium in the vicinity of Isfahan. Like Jimmy Carter’s Operation Eagle Claw, it was a dismal failure, although you are not allowed to know that.

Thiessen’s final point is right out of Bibi Netanyahu’s psychotic playbook—murder every Iranian involved in negotiations.

“Fourth, carry out a final barrage of leadership strikes, eliminating the Iranian officials who had been spared for the purpose of negotiations. Iran’s leaders must be made to understand that their lives literally depend on reaching a negotiated settlement to Trump’s liking. If they refuse to do so, they will be killed.”

As a resident member of Zionism’s armchair warrior and ethnic cleanser class, Thiessen is apparently unable to process reality. Iran’s leaders are Shia. They hold martyrdom as a deeply revered concept, particularly exemplified by the martyrdom of Husayn ibn Ali at the Battle of Karbala, which is seen as a pivotal event that shapes Shia identity and theology.

Your average Likudite Zionist is unable or unwilling to understand where the Shia are coming from. In 680, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, refusing to pledge allegiance to the corrupt and illegitimate Umayyad caliph Yazid I, was murdered, along with his family and supporters. This tragic event is commemorated annually during Muharram, particularly on the Day of Ashura. It has a parallel in Iran’s refusal to capitulate to Zionists, Christian Zionists, and secular neocons.

After the US tricked Saddam Hussein into attacking Iran in 1980, Iranian leaders compared the war to Karbala, portraying it as a continuation of Husayn’s struggle against oppression. This narrative galvanized public support and maintained morale among soldiers, framing their sacrifices as modern-day martyrdom. The same eschatological vision serves Iran in the latest conflict, not that we should expect Trump and his Zionist handlers to give it an ounce of credence.

The think tank Zionist wraps up his fantasy by proposing “the U.S. should develop and implement a covert action plan to support the Iranian opposition” by providing it “with weapons, much as the U.S. once provided arms to anti-communist ‘freedom fighters’ across the world.” Not long ago, the CIA was arming and supporting “rebels” in Libya and Syria. The Islamist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group, or HTS, in Syria has an al-Qaeda pedigree.

I am not certain Thiessen has paid attention. The CIA and Mossad already tried this and it failed. Trump and his Israel First crew made the mistake of listening to David Barnea, the Mossad boss, who argued it would be a piece of cake to “galvanize the Iranian opposition” and overthrow the government. Netanyahu and Trump accepted the plan, while there were “doubts about its viability among senior American officials and some officials in other Israeli intelligence agencies,” according to The New York Times.

Zionists such as Marc Thiessen will continue to push for endless war against Iran despite the obvious fact anything they do—short employing tactical nukes—will result in failure. The murder of Iran’s negotiators and its leaders will not result in a coup and regime change. It will, conversely, further solidify support for an uncompromising response to Israeli and US aggression.

Why is Trump making the global energy crisis worse?

RT

The US has announced a blockade of Iranian oil-linked shipping, tightening pressure on already constrained Middle Eastern exports.

The US has tightened its grip on energy exports from the Persian Gulf with a new naval blockade on Iranian supplies, risking fresh shocks to already fragile global markets.

The move appears intended to increase pressure on Tehran following unsuccessful efforts to secure a diplomatic off-ramp after the US-Israeli bombing campaign stalled. However, it has left American allies uncertain and drawn a pointed response from China, which has issued veiled warnings regarding US naval activity.

Why is the US blocking shipping from the Middle East?

US Central Command announced a blockade targeting vessels traveling to and from Iranian ports in both the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, effective Monday. The restrictions, it said, “will be enforced impartially against vessels of all nations,” though further operational details remain unclear.

President Donald Trump described the measure as an effort to stop “any and all ships trying to enter, or leave, the Strait of Hormuz” — the vital corridor linking the two bodies of water and a cornerstone of global energy trade.

Iran had retaliated to the US-Israeli strikes in late February by effectively restricting transit through the strait, blocking shipments tied to what it considers “unfriendly” nations, imposing tolls on vessels from “neutral” countries, and allowing free passage for “friendly” ones.

While US officials accused Tehran of violating freedom of navigation, Trump suggested Washington could impose its own tolling system. Earlier in the conflict, US sanctions on Iranian oil had been relaxed to cushion global markets. The new blockade reverses that approach, reinforcing economic warfare on Iran while further undercutting supply for import-dependent economies.

What does Iran seek by blocking the Strait of Hormuz?

Tehran’s broader war strategy combines resilience under bombing with escalating economic costs for the US and its allies. In addition to restricting maritime traffic, Iranian forces have targeted American military bases in Arab states and key energy infrastructure, including refineries, gas liquification facilities, and a Saudi pipeline enabling crude exports to bypass the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran’s payment system is designed to weaken US financial leverage, demanding settlement in yuan or cryptocurrencies. Iran, Russia, and other sanctioned states have been building infrastructure to circumvent Western-controlled financial channels for many years. Tehran views continued control of Hormuz as a way to compensate for damages inflicted on Iran.

The approach has had some impact. Last week, Trump announced a ceasefire and a willingness to pursue negotiations aligned with elements of Tehran’s proposed framework for ending the conflict. However, indirect talks hosted by Pakistan on the weekend did not produce a breakthrough.

As US Vice President J.D. Vance put it: “What we have given here is a ceasefire. We stopped bombing the country. What we expect the Iranians to give up is a reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.”

What was the immediate effect on oil trade?

Brent crude rose above $100 per barrel following Trump’s initial announcement of the blockade before dipping back under the psychologically important threshold.

Shipping companies and energy traders are now “scrambling to understand the fine print” of the US measures, according to Bloomberg, with many reportedly pausing operations until enforcement mechanisms become clearer.

However several tankers previously linked to Iranian oil transport – including at least one owned by a Chinese firm – have continued transiting the Strait of Hormuz, potentially setting up an early test of US resolve as soon as Tuesday. However , no vessels with active transponders have reportedly exited the Gulf of Oman since the blockade took effect.

What was China’s reaction?

Trump has argued that as a major oil exporter the US stands to benefit from additional sales and is not as interested in an open Strait of Hormuz as China. Beijing has blasted the US blockade, signaling its intent to maintain energy cooperation with Iran.

”Our ships are moving in and out of the waters of the Strait of Hormuz,” Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun said on Monday. “We have trade and energy agreements with Iran. We will respect and honor them and expect others not to meddle in our affairs. Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz, and it is open for us.”

Last week, Russia used a military escort to protect its oil exports passing through the English Channel, in what some British media called a humiliation for London. China likewise has the capability to escort tankers if necessary.

“Unless the US wants to start a war with China – when it cannot even handle a war with Iran – that’s a choice for them to make,” popular political commentator Carl Zha told RT. “I don’t think even the Donald Trump administration would be that foolish.”

What are US allies saying?

The EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, has expressed confusion over the blockade, saying: “It’s not entirely clear what is the action by the US.” She added that Brussels seeks a return to pre-conflict conditions without restrictions imposed by either side.

Saudi Arabia has urged Washington to abandon the blockade and continue negotiations, concerned that Iran could escalate further by targeting shipping routes such as Bab al-Mandeb through its Houthi allies, according to the Wall Street Journal.

Israel, meanwhile, has endorsed the US move. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Washington and West Jerusalem remain “in constant coordination,” dismissing speculation of any rift with the US.

What is Russia saying?

The Kremlin has declined to offer detailed commentary, with spokesman Dmitry Peskov citing a lack of clarity about how the blockade will be implemented. Moscow assumes that the impact on global markets will be negative.

Previously criticizing the Trump administration’s foreign policy, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said the Americans “want to take control of all the routes” for global energy trade.

Beijing reportedly worked behind closed doors to push the US and Iran towards the ceasefire. However, Russian analysts question whether the blockade would affect the Chinese approach to the crisis.

“An attempt to arrest Chinese tankers and trigger an escalation may seriously backfire on Trump,” Malek Dudakov, an expert on US foreign trade, told Lenta.ru. “He essentially lost his previous trade wars with China and was forced to make concessions. Ruining relations with India after just signing a trade agreement would likewise be like signing his own death warrant.”

Is this just Trump being Trump?

Trump is widely criticized for injecting further instability into international relations through his confrontational approach, particularly toward Iran. His record includes the 2020 killing of General Qasem Soleimani and support for Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure last year.

At the same time, US heavily-armed support for global freedom of navigation has long been viewed as self-serving, not unlike the British Empire’s in the 19th century. London crushed Imperial China by force to secure the Chinese market for opium trade that Beijing sought to prohibit.

Trump’s naval blockades of Venezuela, Cuba, and now Iran are just expanding long-standing policies aimed at denying trading opportunities to nations America seeks to suppress.