Risks of working through un-Islamic political systems

Editor

One thing that revolutionary Islamic movements have largely been clear about since the Islamic Revolution in Iran is that trying to come to power through democratic processes in the political systems established and run by secularist politicians in Muslim countries is a waste of time. The repeated and total failure of the Jama’at-e Islami in Pakistan, the marginalization of Necmettin Erbakan’s Refah-led coalition government in Turkey, and the suppression of the Islamic Solidarity Front (FIS) in Algeria, when it was on the verge of a massive victory in the country’s elections of 1991, are just some of the various ‘democratic’ Islamic experiments and experiences pointing in the same direction.

However, some Muslims point to other experiences and try to reach other conclusions; in fact, some Muslims point to some of the same experiences and try to reach different conclusions. These include both some Islamic movements, and Muslim thinkers committed to democracy and democratic processes. The Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) is a case in point. It has ruled the state of Kelantan for some years, with considerable success, and in last month’s Malaysian general elections was also elected to run the important state of Terengganu. The ‘Islamist’ political parties in Turkey (Refah until it was banned, and Fazilat since then) have also built their reputations and records on the basis of successes in local government. In both cases, the reputations of the Islamic movements involved have been enhanced, as their successes have tended to demonstrate at least some of the advantages of Islamic social organization, values and administration.

The question which arises, therefore, is whether these successes disprove the Islamic movement’s general rejection of the political party approach, and justify working through existing political systems. The answer is a barely-qualified ‘no’, and the evidence of Turkey is all one needs to explain the point. Refah successes in local government encouraged Muslims to work through the mainstream political system at the national level. However, a Refah government was totally hemmed in by the institutions and norms of the secular state, and was powerless do anything of its own choosing. The same would have been the case even had Refah controlled a majority of seats in the parliament, rather than being in coalition with one of the most aggressively secular parties in the country. One unfortunate consequence of Erbakan’s failure in government has been that Islamic parties have also suffered in local politics.

The object of any Islamic movement must be the ‘total transformation’ of the society and state from one based on secular and western bases, as exist in virtually every Muslim country today, to one based on Islamic values, principles and norms. Such a transformation cannot be brought about from within a non-Islamic system.

This commitment naturally places limits on the long-term value of participation in local or regional politics. The arguments here cut both ways. Certainly there is the possibility of demonstrating the practicability of Islamic values in collective community affairs, to counter the common anti-Islam propaganda myths that Islam is out-of-date or has no relevance beyond that of a purely personal faith. The fact that Islamic government can make life much better for many people is also relevant; that, after all, is the object of the exercise. However, such local involvement must not become an end in itself, to the detriment of the longer term object of the ‘total transformation’ of the society. One possibility is that the movements become ‘moderated’ by involvement in ‘real politics’ and lose their revolutionary edge, becoming used to the relative ease and short-term rewards of mainstream politics. This process is, of course, encouraged by secular politicians and commentators. Another process leading to similar results is if the workers and activists of the movements are tempted by local successes to try to repeat them nationally.

PAS’s success in winning power in Terengganu, to go with their established record in Kelantan, is welcome, of course. What is worrying, however, is the news that PAS leader Ustad Fadhil Nur has been appointed leader of the national opposition in parliament by the four-party Alternative Front. PAS has long been warned of the dangers of working in the system; they are in danger of falling into familiar traps - again.

Muslimedia: December 16-31, 1999

 

Editor

The hollowness of the west’s ‘democratic revolution’

Editor

West Germans on the Berlin Wall in 1989

The collapse of the communist bloc in 1989 is regarded in the west as the definitive triumph of democracy, a ‘Democratic Revolution’ to rank alongside the other great revolutions of western history, the French (1789), the Russian (1917) and the Chinese (1949). Dating revolutions is never easy, but for historic purposes the Democratic Revolution of 1989 is usually dated by the fall of the Berlin wall, on November 9, 1989. So it was that the 10th anniversary of that event last month was marked not only in Germany but around the world.

At the time, of course, the Democratic Revolution was greeted as a massive triumph, inspiring such grandiose theories as Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’. It was also, inevitably, related to the coming millennium, with the third millennium of the Christian/western era being hailed by some commentators as a coming ‘age of democracy’. In the popular perspective, for the consumption of those who know no better, this triumphalist tone is maintained. Among more considered views, however, this triumphalism has been toned down somewhat, and it was the latter view which tended to prevail as the tenth anniversary of the Democratic Revolution was marked.

The reasons for this change of tone are many and varied. The main one, however, is the realization that the advent of democracy is hardly regarded as good news by most people in the former communist bloc, and that former communist parties, leaders and ideas are increasingly popular. Of course, this is not admitted in the west, where the former communist parties tend to be euphemistically dubbed ‘nationalist’ or ‘conservative’; however, the growth and popularity of these parties is a matter of grave concern to the west.

The reasons for this apparently paradoxical phenomenon are not difficult to find. The Democratic Revolution was based on a lie; the lie that life in the west was some sort of utopia where everyone could live in luxury. (Westerners were equally given a distorted picture of life under communism, focus on low ‘standards of living’ rather than facilities available to people from the state.) People in the communist bloc welcomed the fall of communism because they were promised a consumer revolution, with easy access to video recorders, satellite television, fancy cars, big houses and all the consumer items of modern life. Like any salesman, however, the west was careful to hide the downside of this rosy picture -- the costs and the risks. In the eastern bloc, housing, health care and jobs were guaranteed by the state. In the west, the good life is only available to the minority who can make their own way in a dog-eat-dog environment, and the losers have no safety net to fall back on.

Valdas Anelauskas’s book Discovering America as it is (reviewed in the last issue of Crescent) exposes the bitter realities of American society, where huge numbers of children go hungry, millions of people have no easy access to healthcare, and crime and other social disorders are tolerated as long as they affect only the ‘underclass’ - which underclass is rapidly growing to dominate society. Millions of people in the former communist world are making the same discovery themselves, not by seeing the realities state of western societies, but by experiencing them.

Anelauskas, a former anti-Soviet dissident who emigrated from his native Lithuania to the US shortly before the collapse of communism, now regards himself as a anti-American dissident; which begs the question: what happened to all the other heroes of anti-communism? Where are they now that their people are in so much strife as a result of the Democratic Revolution that they called for and welcomed? Some, like Polish Solidarity leader Lech Walesa, are still struggling for their people’s welfare; but far more, like Slovakian president Vaclav Havel, are living the good life as part of the former communist bloc’s new Elite, enjoying the fruits of their good relations with the west while ignoring the ideals and principles which they once claimed to hold so dear.

Small wonder, then, that most of those celebrating the tenth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin wall last month were those who have benefited from the Democratic Revolution; while the former east German masses, supposedly liberated, were too busy trying to feed themselves and their children to celebrate.

Muslimedia: December 1-15, 1999

Imam Khomeini’s legacy alive around the world

Editor

Imam Khomeini, the tenth anniversary of whose death on June 4, 1989, was marked by millions of Muslims all over the world this month, was undoubtedly the most important figure in recent Muslim history, the man whose thought and leadership effectively gave birth to what we now know as the global Islamic movement. As Vali-i Faqih and Rahbar of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the first Islamic state of the contemporary era (albeit, inevitably, a prototypical and experimental Islamic state), he was the nearest thing the Ummah has had to Khalifah al-Rasul since long before the end of the Uthmaniyyah Khilafah.

Uniquely among recent Muslim leaders, he rose to leadership by the consensus of his fellow Muslims, who recognised in him exceptional qualities of taqwa and spirituality. But he always spoke for Islam and the Ummah as a whole rather than for any partial understanding of Islam. This was why millions of Muslims, Shi’as and Sunnis alike, accepted him as their leader, and sought to follow the revolutionary path which liberated Iran. Ordinary Muslims all over the world instinctively recognised him as a leader from the deepest traditions of Islam as soon as they saw him, whether live, on television or even in a newspaper. For ordinary Muslims, he came to embody a quality of humility and a pureness of iman that transcended every faultline in the Ummah, be it racial, national, linguistic, cultural or sectarian.

It is this spirit that the Islamic movement today is often said to have lost. Inevitably, people look for it in the Islamic state that the Imam created. All too often, they do not find it. Iran, people say, has failed to export the Revolution, is diluting the spirit of the Revolution, has joined the western-dominated international order instead of fighting it, or has become a nationalist, Shi’a state instead of an Islamic one. This is harsh; the expectations which people had for an Islamic state which was bound to be embryonic and experimental, as well as being subjected to the most venomous hatred and enmity by the west, were not reasonable. Not all officials of the state can be expected to share the qualities of the Imam himself. Having said that, in terms of nationalism and sectarianism in particular, too many have failed to maintain even minimum standards. However, as long as the understanding and vision of the leadership remains sound and unwavering, Iran will remain the leading edge of the Islamic movement, thanks to the momentum generated by the Imam’s unique leadership, and that of Ayatullah Sayyid Ali Khamenei.

But the failure of the Islamic movement outside Iran has arguably been the greater. Where the Imam transcended all divisions of the Ummah, too many activists outside Iran have fallen into every one they could find. Where Islamic Iran has sometimes been guilty of failing to take a broad enough view of the movement, Muslims elsewhere have often been guilty of demanding too much and failing to understand the limitations under which the Islamic state operates, and its own needs and imperatives. Too many are guilty of demanding and expecting from the Islamic state instead of assisting and helping it at a time when Islamic Iran needed it most.

Twenty years after the Islamic Revolution, there are many people in the Islamic movement who cannot remember the world without Islamic Iran, or without Imam Khomeini. With each generation, perceptions change. Islamic Iran is no longer a marvel to be wondered at, but an established feature of the geo-political landscape. And, for some - even within the movement - Imam Khomeini is no longer quite the presence he once was. But the movement today exists and works in a world shaped by his achievement. The challenge we face demands that we all work in the spirit of brotherhood and unity that he showed in his every action.

Imam Khomeini took a global view, focusing on issues common to all the Ummah, even though he came from, and worked largely within, a particular part of it. This ethos, that the things we share as Muslims, the things that make us Muslim, transcend the differences among us - and Islam and Muslims were never a monolithic faith or community - is one the Islamic movement must embrace if we are to move forward on the path Imam Khomeini, may Allah be pleased with him, has shown us.

Muslimedia: June 16-30, 1999

Kalim Siddiqui Memorial Seminar: legacy of an intellectual giant

By Zafar Bangash

It is fitting that the first Kalim Siddiqui Memorial Seminar to be held in London, on April 11, should discuss the theme: “The Global Islamic Movement - 20 years after the Islamic Revolution.” The movement and the Revolution were close to Dr Kalim’s heart; indeed, they were the essence of his life’s work which his colleagues and associates will discuss during the Seminar.

Through his writings and speeches, Dr Kalim (left) defined and analysed the concept of the global Islamic movement. He defined it as the “divine instrument of change”, its task in this era being to overthrow the present colonial- imposed order in Muslim societies through the process of Islamic Revolutions leading to establishment of Islamic States.

He postulated that the Islamic movement and the Islamic State are parts of a whole. The Islamic State, he pointed out, is the culmination of the struggle of the Islamic movement; it is the duty of every Muslim to strive to achieve it. Although the State can be destroyed, the Islamic movement cannot, for the movement, at its broadest level, consists of the Ummah itself, and all Muslims are its members and activist by definition.

Aware of his failing health, Dr Kalim described his last book, Stages of Islamic Revolution, as his ‘last will and testament.’ In it, he outlined the stages through which the Islamic movement must pass in order to establish an Islamic State. The Islamic Revolution he defined as that point in the struggle at which all forces converge to overthrow the previously established political order.

From Dr Kalim’s writings, two points stand out as essential for the Islamic movement: an intellectual revolution in Muslim political thought, and study of the Seerah of Allah’s Messenger from a power perspective. He devoted his life’s effort and writing to both. He was anxious to clear the fog of confusion that has engulfed Muslim thinking as a result of borrowing ideas of the west. He was unrelenting in his criticism of the nation-State structure, the political party approach and other accoutrements of western political thought. The consistency of his thought is striking. He did not have to adjust his postulates, because time and experience simply validated all of them. Kalim Siddiqui Memorial Conferences have been held regularly in South Africa over the last three years because that is where he passed away on April 18, 1996, shortly after attending an international conference on ‘Creating a New Civilization of Islam.’ He called South Africa his second home because of the respect and love that the Muslims of South Africa showed for him. Britain, where Dr Kalim lived throughout his adult life and where he did most of his academic work, has not had such conferences or seminars since his death. The only exception was the Memorial Conference jointly convened by the Muslim Institute and the Muslim Parliament of Great Britain in November 1996. Those familiar with events of the past three years in London would know the reasons for the lack of such activity since then.

Unfortunately, some of the institutions he left behind have become embroiled in disputes which remain to be fully resolved. The sorry state to which the Muslim Parliament has been reduced is perhaps the most depressing result of these disputes; it has had no session since 1996 and no meeting of members since 1997. Some institutions, like the Crescent International, have emerged unscathed; others are beginning to be nursed back to life. The important point is that at least some of the work has continued, alhumdulillah. The Institute of Contemporary Islamic Thought (ICIT) is a new vehicle establised to take up the work in the post-Revolution period. The new situation demands a fresh start. It takes up the development of Dr Kalim’s projects from where the Muslim Institute left off; the Institute’s work had, in any case, been largely overshadowed by the high-profile activities of the Muslim Parliament during the last years of Dr Kalim’s life. The 25-year history of Dr Kalim’s thought was dedicated to research into the contemporary, revolutionary Islamic movement, working in many different sectors all over the world. Essentially he wanted to generate an intellectual revolution in Muslim political thought as the foundation for Islamic revolutions which he expected would come decades later. Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1978-79 changed the timescale of Muslim history. Dr Kalim and his team threw themselves into studying and understanding the phenomenon of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, and explaining it to Muslims outside Iran in terms easily understood by all Muslims.

The intellectual interpretation of the Islamic Revolution apart, Dr Kalim also set out to practically serve the Islamic Revolution and the global Islamic movement. This was done through relaunching the Crescent International as a ‘newsmagazine of the Islamic movement’ as well as holding seminars around the world. The seminars and conferences have continued since his death. Apart from the annual conferences in South Africa, the ICIT and Crescent International have organised conferences in Pakistan as well. Journalism courses have also been held for the past two years in South Africa. Plans are underway to extend these activities to Pakistan as well.

The most important task to which urgent attention needs to be paid is the Seerah Project. Dr Kalim was working on a proposal to organise a World Seerah Conference before he passed away. He had outlined a tentative programme for such a conference. This is the challenge facing those who wish to pursue his work and to take it to the next stage.

The Kalim Siddiqui Memorial Seminar in London this month is intended not only to pay tribute to him but to relaunch his intellectual work. He always emphasised that the movement and its work were more important than individuals and institutions. Relaunching his work for the service of the movement and the pleasure of Allah subhanahu wa ta’ala is the best tribute that could be paid to him. The Institute of Contemporary Islamic Thought and Crescent International invite all Muslims interested in any aspect of the Islamic movement, however broadly defined, to join us in this work.

[Zafar Bangash is Director of the Institute of Contemporary Islamic Thought.]

Muslimedia: April 1-15, 1999

Zafar Bangash