Over nearly two decades, Ansarullah has evolved from a local armed movement into an influential actor in Yemen and the wider region. Its trajectory has included the Saada wars, the fall of Sanaa, the war with Saudi Arabia, the development of missile and drone capabilities, and its presence in the Red Sea—extending its impact to global trade and energy markets. Ansarullah’s transformation in Yemen cannot be explained simply by the growing number of missiles, drones, or military capabilities at its disposal. It is the result of nearly two decades of warfare, social organization, battlefield experience, the gradual collapse of Saudi-backed state structures in Yemen, access to parts of the former army’s weapons stockpiles, temporary alliances, and Yemen’s geographic position. Together, these factors transformed Ansarullah from a local armed movement in Saada into an actor whose actions can affect maritime security, international trade, energy markets, and political developments in the region and beyond.
From “Believing Youth” to Ansarullah
Ansarullah’s roots can be traced to the “Believing Youth” movement in Saada province, which emerged in the 1990s with the aim of strengthening the religious and social identity of Yemen’s Zaydi Shiites. As tensions between the movement and the government of Ali Abdullah Saleh intensified, the dispute escalated into armed confrontation.
The first major turning point came in 2004, when the first Saada war broke out between government forces and supporters of Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi. Hussein al-Houthi was killed during the fighting, after which the group, led by members of his family, continued its armed struggle.
The Saada wars, fought between 2004 and 2010, provided the movement that would later become Ansarullah with years of military training and battlefield experience. During this period, the group gained experience in asymmetric warfare, ambushes, the use of mountainous terrain, the mobility of small units, and fighting better-equipped government forces. That experience later became a military asset in the broader wars in Yemen.
2011: The Beginning of the Collapse of the Political Order
The 2011 protests and Ali Abdullah Saleh’s departure from power pushed Yemen’s political system into a fragile new phase. Under a Persian Gulf Cooperation Council-backed power-transfer plan, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi became president in 2012. His transitional government, however, faced a range of structural problems: the military and security institutions remained fragmented, rival political and tribal groups retained significant power, and the central government lacked effective control over many parts of the country.
The Hadi government’s decision to remove fuel subsidies in 2014 also led to higher fuel prices and increased economic pressure on the population, becoming one of the issues Ansarullah used to mobilize public support.
Under these circumstances, the weakness of the central government was not merely a political problem. It gradually created space for the expansion of the power of ethnic and religious actors.
A Temporary Alliance with an Old Enemy
One of the most important factors behind Ansarullah’s advances in 2014 was its temporary alliance with Ali Abdullah Saleh, the former president who had himself fought Ansarullah years earlier.
The alliance brought together an unusual combination of military capabilities and political and tribal networks. Forces loyal to Saleh retained influence in parts of the army and security apparatus, and these capabilities were brought together with Ansarullah’s forces.
In September 2014, Ansarullah forces and Saleh’s allies entered Sanaa. A report by the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies indicates that some army units, particularly forces close to Saleh, offered no effective resistance to their advance.
The development was significant because Ansarullah was no longer merely an armed movement operating in northern areas; it had gained access to Yemen’s political center.
Hadi’s Resignation and the Collapse of the Transitional Government
After the fall of Sanaa, the political crisis entered a new phase. Ansarullah deployed a network of observers and representatives in ministries and government institutions, while tensions with the transitional government intensified.
In January 2015, following mounting pressure and the abduction of Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak, the president’s chief of staff, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and Prime Minister Khaled Bahah resigned.
Hadi subsequently fled Sanaa for Aden and withdrew his resignation. Ansarullah forces and Saleh’s allies also advanced south, eventually forcing Hadi to leave Yemen and travel to Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia’s intervention, therefore, cannot be viewed simply as a response to Hadi’s resignation. The resignation was part of a broader process of the collapse of the transitional political structure that had begun with the fall of Sanaa and entered a new phase with Hadi’s flight to Aden, his withdrawal of the resignation, and the advance of Ansarullah forces toward the south.
Why Did Saudi Arabia Enter the War?
For Riyadh, developments in Yemen were not simply an internal crisis in its southern neighbor. Saudi Arabia’s long border with Yemen, its history of direct confrontation with Ansarullah in 2009, concerns over instability in Yemen, and the strategic importance of the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab had all made developments there a major security concern.
From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, Ansarullah’s advance toward the south and its growing proximity to strategically sensitive areas posed a threat to Saudi security interests. At the same time, Ansarullah’s relationship with Iran became increasingly important in Riyadh’s regional calculations, although the scale and nature of that relationship have remained disputed. A U.S. Congressional Research Service report, in discussing Saudi Arabia’s decision, also points to Riyadh’s concerns over Ansarullah’s advance and Hadi’s request for intervention.
After arriving in Saudi Arabia, Hadi called for foreign intervention to restore his government. Saudi Arabia subsequently formed a coalition of Arab countries and launched its military operation in March 2015. The stated objective was to push Ansarullah back and restore Hadi’s government.
The Saudi-Backed Government Was Not a Unified Structure
One of the key points in understanding the Yemen war is that the forces opposing Ansarullah cannot be viewed as a completely unified bloc.
Saudi Arabia supported the Hadi government and backed various groups and forces on the anti-Ansarullah front. The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia’s main partner in the war, however, supported different local actors and forces in southern Yemen, including groups associated with the Southern Movement and, later, the Southern Transitional Council.
As a result, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi did not always share the same objectives. The Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies has also highlighted differences between Saudi and Emirati goals in southern Yemen and Abu Dhabi’s support for local forces.
The Yemen war therefore gradually evolved from a two-sided conflict between Ansarullah and the Hadi government into a complex web of domestic, tribal, political, regional, and international rivalries.
The fragmentation of the forces opposing Ansarullah, combined with Ansarullah’s own cohesion and organizational unity, was one factor that limited the emergence of a fully coordinated political and military front against the group.
A War That Made Ansarullah Stronger
Saudi Arabia’s entry into the war in 2015 was intended to shift the balance against Ansarullah. But the prolonged conflict had another consequence: it gave Ansarullah an opportunity to develop its military structure.
Years of warfare increased the forces’ battlefield experience, expanded its command network, led to more extensive use of missiles and drones, and increased its ability to strike targets at greater distances.
During this period, Ansarullah evolved from a predominantly ground force into an actor capable of using missiles and drones to strike military and infrastructure targets deep inside Saudi territory.
Iran’s Role: Ideological Influence and Emulation, Not the Elimination of Yemeni Autonomy
Iran’s role is one of the most important—and contested—issues in analyzing Ansarullah’s rise. The main dimensions of Iran’s influence on Ansarullah are widely described as the influence of the resistance discourse, ideological and religious connections, and the group’s emulation of the experience of regional resistance movements.
At the same time, differing reports exist regarding the precise extent of Iran’s military support, technology transfers, training, or direct involvement in specific operations, making it difficult to establish the exact scope of its role.
Ansarullah’s transformation should therefore not be viewed as the product of “foreign command.” The group is rooted in Yemen’s own social and political developments and makes decisions based on its own assessment of Yemen’s interests and circumstances.
Iran’s influence can be examined in terms of ideological and spiritual influence and the emulation of resistance thinking, but this should not be equated with the organizational and political independence of Ansarullah.
From Civil War to the Red Sea
The next major turning point in Ansarullah’s evolution was the expansion of part of its capabilities from Yemen’s domestic battlefield to the maritime arena.
Beginning in late 2023, Ansarullah attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea prompted some shipping companies to avoid the Bab al-Mandab and Red Sea route and instead take the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope.
The significance of this development lies in Yemen’s geography. Bab al-Mandab is one of the world’s major maritime chokepoints, connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Ships traveling between Asia and Europe through the Suez Canal must pass through Bab al-Mandab.
The U.S. Energy Information Administration reported that Bab al-Mandab accounted for about 12 percent of global seaborne oil trade and 8 percent of seaborne LNG trade in the first half of 2023. Following the attacks, the volume of oil and petroleum products passing through the route fell by more than 50 percent during the first eight months of 2024.
Developments in September 2026 marked another turning point in this trajectory. In early September, Ansarullah intensified its operations along the Red Sea coast, while reports emerged of an expanded presence by the group around the Mokha axis and Mayyun Island.
The significance of this development goes beyond the control of several cities or islands. Any increase in Ansarullah’s military presence in the area could enhance its ability to influence maritime dynamics and energy security.
These figures point to an important reality: Ansarullah’s significance lies not only in its ability to launch attacks, but also in its capacity to create risk near a critical global chokepoint.
Bab al-Mandab: Geography That Creates International Leverage
Bab al-Mandab has enabled Ansarullah to extend its influence beyond Yemen’s borders. Even when the route is not completely closed, increased risk can alter the behavior of shipping companies, insurers, and tanker operators.
A vessel that considers passage through the Red Sea unsafe can choose the route around Africa. Such a decision means greater distance, higher fuel consumption, longer travel times, increased insurance costs, and ultimately higher freight costs.
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has reported that the Red Sea crisis significantly increased alternative shipping routes, travel times, and operating costs, with vessels that previously crossed the Red Sea in a matter of days in some cases being forced to take routes lasting several weeks around the Cape of Good Hope.
As a result, a non-state actor in Yemen has been able, through a combination of geography and military power, to influence the decisions of international shipping companies.
From Shipping to Energy
The impact of Bab al-Mandab is not limited to the shipping industry. The route is a major energy transit chokepoint, and any disruption or increase in risk can raise the cost of transporting oil and gas.
The U.S. Energy Information Administration has emphasized that even a temporary disruption at an energy chokepoint can cause supply delays, increase transportation costs, and put pressure on global energy prices.
In recent years, the decline in tanker traffic through Bab al-Mandab and the rerouting of vessels around the Cape of Good Hope have provided an example of this chain effect.
From this perspective, Bab al-Mandab’s military importance to Ansarullah is connected to an international economic impact—from higher shipping and insurance risks to increased transportation costs and potential effects on energy and commodity markets.
Confrontation with the United States and Britain
The significance of Ansarullah’s maritime capabilities became even more apparent in January 2024, when the United States and Britain launched airstrikes against the group’s positions and targets in Yemen in response to Ansarullah attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea. The first wave of strikes on January 12, 2024, targeted dozens of sites in areas controlled by Ansarullah, followed by further rounds of reciprocal attacks.
The confrontation entered a broader phase in 2025, when the United States launched an independent military operation against Ansarullah positions. The stated objective of the operation was to halt the group’s attacks on shipping in the Red Sea.
The direct involvement of major military powers in the crisis demonstrated that the scope of the Yemen conflict had extended beyond the country’s borders. Maritime security in the Red Sea, the protection of trade routes, energy security, and freedom of navigation had become part of the broader conflict.
In effect, Ansarullah created a new equation: the greater the maritime threat, the greater its economic cost for global actors; and the more foreign powers intervene to reduce that threat, the more the Yemen war becomes an international issue.
Geography Alongside Military Power
What has made Ansarullah a distinctive actor is the combination of several factors: a social base in parts of northern Yemen, extensive battlefield experience, access to some of the former government’s weapons and military infrastructure, the development of missile and drone capabilities, organizational capacity, the use of mountainous and coastal geography, and, ultimately, its proximity to one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints.
Ansarullah began as a local armed movement fighting the central government in Saada. It then became a decisive actor in the collapse of Sanaa’s political structure, entered a regional war with Saudi Arabia and its allies, and eventually managed to extend part of its military capabilities into the maritime and international arenas.
From Saada to Bab al-Mandab
Ansarullah’s evolution should be viewed as a chain of developments: the Saada wars, the accumulation of military experience, the weakening of the central government after 2011, the alliance with Saleh, the fall of Sanaa, the collapse of the transitional government, Saudi Arabia’s intervention, the prolonged war, the development of missile and drone capabilities, and finally its entry into the dynamics of the Red Sea.
In this trajectory, a war that was intended to constrain Ansarullah’s power became a prolonged period in which the group accumulated experience and developed its capabilities.
More importantly, Yemen’s geography gave these military capabilities an international dimension. Its proximity to Bab al-Mandab meant that the effects of a domestic conflict in Yemen could spill over into shipping, insurance, supply chains, energy transportation, and ultimately the costs of global trade.
For this reason, today’s Ansarullah cannot be assessed solely by the standards applied to a local armed group. Its weight derives from the combination of military capabilities, political organization, battlefield experience, geography, and its ability to create risks along vital global trade routes. At the same time, the precise extent of some forms of foreign support and the details of Iran’s role in technology transfers or military training still require examination of independent evidence and careful distinction between credible reporting and claims made by the parties involved.
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