With elections approaching, Arab parties are once again needed for the numbers but kept at arm’s length, with Mansour Abbas navigating between the two camps.
The anti-Netanyahu camp is neither politically nor ideologically cohesive. Its only real point of convergence is the desire to end his rule. With elections approaching in September, that convergence risks becoming a trap – one that could reshape alliances in ways that outlast the vote itself.
Knesset member Mansour Abbas, head of the United Arab List (Ra’am), increasingly sits at the center of that dynamic.
After Al-Aqsa Flood: Shrinking political space
Since Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, Israeli society has shifted further toward the right. In this environment, cooperation between Jewish parties and Arab parties is no longer treated as a tactical option but as a political liability.
Despite this, both Netanyahu and his opponents continue to rely on Arab votes. The contradiction is now more exposed than ever, with Arab parties needed numerically, yet rejected politically.
Far-right Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich captured this mood when he argued that including Arab parties in government would be worse than the failure to prevent the Hamas-led operation on 7 October 2023. His position reflects a wider consensus that cuts across both coalition and opposition lines.
Former prime minister Naftali Bennett has repeatedly ruled out any partnership with Arab parties, calling instead for a purely Zionist government. By contrast, Yair Golan of the left-leaning Democrats has suggested reaching an understanding with Abbas as a way to remove Netanyahu. The gap between these positions illustrates the limits of opposition coordination.
The limits of Arab unity
Faced with this reality, Arab political leaders have sought to rebuild a joint electoral front. Ahmad Tibi (Ta’al), Yousef Jabareen (Hadash), and Sami Abu Shehadeh (Balad) have all pushed for a unified list that could consolidate votes and counter rising extremism.
Yet the challenge runs deeper than organization. There is no stable or effective framework for Arab political action within Israel.
Even the prospect of a joint list – potentially capable of winning around 15 seats – generates unease among Israeli parties. Writing in Ynet, Nebo Cohen argued that such a result would leave both major blocs increasingly dependent on Arab parties to assemble a governing majority.
Numbers and their consequences
A recent Maariv poll places Netanyahu’s bloc at around 50 seats, with the opposition at 60 and Arab parties holding the remainder. Neither camp can reach a governing majority on its own, leaving Arab votes unavoidable even as both sides try to keep them at arm’s length.
A unified Arab list reshapes that balance. Higher Arab turnout would come at the expense of left-leaning Jewish parties, while at the same time driving right-wing voters to consolidate in response. The result is a tightening of the political field rather than a clear shift in either direction.
Kingmaker
In this setting, Mansour Abbas has adopted a distinctly pragmatic approach. His initial condition for joining a joint list was that it remain technical – an electoral arrangement without binding political commitments. He later shifted, calling for a clearer agenda and guarantees that any government his party joins would not be brought down by its partners.
The shift reflects a careful reading of the system. Abbas’s party, rooted in the southern branch of Israel's Islamic Movement, a movement often associated with the Muslim Brotherhood tradition, is positioning itself along the lines of the ultra-Orthodox parties. Not as a fixed ideological ally, but as a flexible actor trading support for concessions.
Those concessions are usually limited to budget allocations for Arab communities. The leverage behind them, however, is not. In a fragmented Knesset, even a small bloc can decide whether a government survives.
That approach is shaped by recent experience. In 2021, Abbas helped bring down Netanyahu by backing the Bennett–Lapid coalition, becoming the first Arab party leader to support a governing alliance in Israel. The move earned him the label of “kingmaker,” while also accelerating the breakup of the Joint List.
Since then, he has kept all options open. Participation in government is not treated as a red line, but as a tool used when it delivers results.
Parallel tracks, incomplete agreements
Today, Hadash, Balad, and Ta’al are moving ahead with plans for a joint list, even without Abbas. At the same time, Abbas appears to be positioning himself closer to the opposition, potentially offering parliamentary support without formal participation in government. This allows him to retain maneuverability while negotiations remain unresolved.
For the opposition, the calculation is equally cautious. It seeks Abbas’s votes but avoids firm commitments that could alienate its base. The political cost of visible cooperation with Arab parties has risen sharply, particularly in the post-Al-Aqsa Flood climate.
Abbas’s choices are not shaped solely by domestic considerations. External factors – regional relationships and political signaling – also play a role.
He has previously acknowledged that foreign actors encouraged him to continue coalition talks with Netanyahu after the 2021 elections.
Qatar’s indirect relationship with Netanyahu has long been debated in Israeli political circles, particularly over the transfer of Qatari funds into Gaza before Operation Al-Aqsa Flood. Abbas referred to this relationship in the same interview, attributing it to what he described as Netanyahu’s relatively accommodating approach toward Hamas. Against this backdrop, and amid debate over the so-called “Qatargate” affair, regional considerations could still shape Abbas’s decisions – both on cooperation with other Arab parties and Ra’am’s position in the next Knesset.
Netanyahu, for his part, has moved to complicate Abbas’s position. Recent efforts by his allies to challenge Ra’am’s eligibility to run in elections point to a strategy aimed at weakening or sidelining him altogether.
The experience of the Joint List in 2019 and 2020 continues to shape current debates. On both occasions, its representatives recommended that Benny Gantz form a government in an effort to remove Netanyahu. The outcome – a unity government between Gantz and Netanyahu – left many voters disillusioned.
That precedent has reinforced skepticism toward tactical alliances that promise change but deliver continuity.
Diverging strategies within Arab politics
The contrast between Abbas and other Arab leaders is increasingly pronounced. Abbas presents a clear, transactional approach, trading support for tangible gains, mainly budget allocations for Arab localities.
Other parties remain more hesitant, caught between the urge to see Netanyahu go and the risk of legitimizing another right-wing government. The result is a fragmented approach that reflects the same divisions shaping Israeli politics more broadly.
The most likely electoral scenario is that Arab parties will run in two separate lists: a tripartite alliance and Ra’am. Recent polling places Abbas at around four seats, while projections for a unified Hadash–Balad–Ta’al list hover around five to seven.
In this configuration, Netanyahu would still fall well short of a governing majority, as neither Arab list alone would provide the 11 seats he would need to reach 61. The opposition, by contrast, could potentially rely on Abbas’s four seats to secure a majority. That dynamic increases Abbas’s leverage. His smaller bloc becomes decisive not because of its size, but because of the margins involved.
The cost of change
For many Palestinian citizens of Israel, Netanyahu’s legacy is defined by war, violence, and dispossession. The desire to see him removed cuts across political lines.
Yet the question remains unresolved: what comes after?
Removing Netanyahu does not automatically alter the structural direction of Israeli politics. The risk is that Arab parties could end up enabling a different right-wing government – one that continues similar policies with less intensity but greater political flexibility.
The dilemma, then, is not only about who governs, but about the terms on which that governance is formed. In a system where margins are narrow and alliances unstable, the price of change may extend beyond the moment of transition.
