By Ali Minabi
TEHRAN – Western leaders assumed they could keep the Palestinian bloodshed, the flames of war in Iran, and the resulting costs far removed from their own societies.
They believed American and European citizens would continue watching the war unfold on their screens, without it affecting their lives or reshaping their political choices. But the massacres in Gaza shattered the moral barrier, while U.S.-Zionist aggression against Iran shook energy and shipping markets.
Then came the ballot boxes and popular protests, declaring that wars ignited beyond national borders can return home as questions of legitimacy, bills to be paid, and votes of political punishment.
These developments are not isolated events. They are different expressions of a single moment: the erosion of the hegemonic order’s ability to wage war, monopolize its narrative, and leave others to bear its costs.
The collapse of moral immunity
October 7, 2023, marked a major turning point in the history of the conflict, not simply because of what happened that day, but because of what the ensuing genocidal war exposed about the true nature of the Zionist project and the limits of the Western shield protecting it.
What the West presented under the banner of “self-defense” turned into mass killing, starvation, the destruction of hospitals, schools and residential neighborhoods, and an attempt to make life itself impossible in the Gaza Strip.
By October 2026, the number of Palestinians killed in Gaza had exceeded 74,000, according to figures reported by UN agencies citing the Ministry of Health. This is in addition to hundreds of thousands of wounded and displaced people and the devastation of most of the foundations of everyday life.
Yet the political impact of the massacres extended far beyond the Strip. Every child pulled from beneath the rubble demolished another fragment of the Zionist narrative. Every aid convoy prevented from entering exposed Western double standards. And every weapon delivered to the occupying regime shifted its supporting governments from bystanders to active accomplices.
Despite the continued official Western alignment with the Zionist regime, the massacres brought about a profound shift in public consciousness, particularly among young people, students, trade unions, and Arab and Muslim minorities.
When war became an election issue
U.S. elections have traditionally been decided primarily on economic issues, taxes and employment opportunities, while foreign policy has taken a back seat, so long as Washington’s wars are fought far away and ordinary Americans do not feel their direct costs.
But the aggression against Iran changed that equation. Disruptions to energy supplies and shipping fed directly into fuel, transport and commodity prices, turning foreign policy into a domestic issue that affected American household incomes. The question was no longer: What is America doing in the Middle East? It became: Why should Americans pay, out of their own salaries, for a war they never chose and cannot see an end to?
The midterm elections laid bare the scale of public anger. Democrats seized control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate, delivering a sweeping political rebuke to the Trump administration. Voter surveys showed that rising living costs, the war on Iran, and the desire to rein in the president’s actions all converged in shaping the vote.
More than half of those who took part considered the war not worth the price it had exacted. Foreign policy had left the confines of strategic planning rooms and entered the household fuel and grocery bills, turning a distant war into an everyday concern inside American homes.
This outcome reveals a shift in how voters calculate the costs of war more than it signals a wholesale ideological transformation within American society. Those who punished the Trump administration did not necessarily become opponents of imperialism. They simply rejected the idea that American power could launch an open-ended war and then demand that they pay for it in the name of national security.
Europe: Two angers converge in the streets
Protests across Europe have taken different forms. Some demonstrations stand in solidarity with Palestine, demanding an end to arms supplies to the Zionist regime and the imposition of sanctions. Others are social movements protesting soaring fuel and housing costs, declining wages, and deteriorating public services.
Yet both currents converge around a single question: How can governments find the money to finance wars while asking their populations to shoulder the burden of austerity?
Amsterdam witnessed a demonstration attended by more than 200,000 people, protesting economic and military ties with the Zionist regime. At the same time, social protests spread across dozens of European countries, driven by the rising costs of living, fuel and housing, alongside the erosion of public services.
The war on Iran added further fuel to Europe’s accumulated crises, shaped by neoliberal policies, soaring housing costs, stagnant wages, and the decline of the welfare state. As energy costs climbed, the gap between government priorities and public demands widened. Increasingly, sections of society began drawing a direct connection between the money allocated to war and arms spending and the cuts imposed on schools, hospitals and public services.
Essentially, the costs of hegemony abroad converged with the costs of austerity at home. Moral outrage over Gaza met the anger felt in people’s pockets over the war. What unites these two currents is declining trust in governments that raise the banner of human rights while providing political and military cover for the massacre of Palestinians, allocating funds to war as public services and living standards deteriorate.
Breaking the privilege of waging war without paying the price
The significance of Iran’s resilience must be measured both by what it achieved and by what it prevented. It thwarted the expectation of a swift victory and denied the U.S.-Zionist alliance a privilege they had long taken for granted: striking others without paying a proportionate price.
Resilience in the balance of power does not mean emerging unscathed. It means preserving political will and the capacity to respond, while preventing an adversary from turning military superiority into a lasting political victory. Through its geographical position, military capabilities, and influence over the energy and shipping equation, Iran was able to make the continuation of the war a burden on its adversaries and the global economy alike.
A U.S. strike was no longer a decision detached from oil prices, shipping movements, voter sentiment, or the future of the ruling party. The question was no longer, “When will Washington strike?” It became: Can Washington afford the consequences of its own strike?
When public opinion changes, the balance of power changes with it.
This is the deeper meaning behind the debate of a multipolar world. It does not emerge through political declarations, nor does it mean that military and economic powers become equal. It begins when a single power can no longer turn its superiority into unquestioning obedience, and when other states and forces acquire the capacity to resist, absorb attacks, and impose costs on the aggressor.
The new world is taking shape not only through the rise of China and Russia, but also through the resilience of regional powers that refuse to submit, through populations gradually withdrawing their legitimacy from wars of hegemony, and through a global economy whose every lever Washington can no longer control on its own.
The significance of these transformations lies in the power of the people. They have stripped the architects of war of their immunity from accountability and demonstrated that blood spilled beyond Western borders can turn into anger on Western streets, and that the costs they sought to impose on others can return as votes punishing them at the ballot box.
Victory does not begin with the sudden collapse of the hegemonic order, but with the erosion of its ability to escape the consequences of its actions indefinitely.
.webp)