Monday, June 15, 2026

Mystery surrounds death of Iranian AI pioneer in France, with fingers pointing at Mossad

By Yousef Ramazani

The body of Dr. Ali Ehsanian, a distinguished Iranian artificial intelligence researcher who had previously collaborated with the Ministry of Defense, was returned to Iran on June 11, 2026, nearly six weeks after his mysterious death in Nice, France.

Though the cause of death remains under investigation, all evidence points to Israel's spy agency Mossad, which has, for years, systematically assassinated young Iranian scientists.

On March 28, 2026, in the midst of the third imposed war on Iran, Dr. Ehsanian was killed in Nice, the second-largest French city on the Mediterranean coast, under circumstances that Iranian authorities and domestic media have described as suspicious.

His body arrived back weeks later, and was laid to rest the following day after a large public funeral in Omidiyeh, followed by burial in his hometown of Jahrom, in Fars Province.

Dr. Ehsanian was no ordinary researcher. He held a PhD in Electrical Engineering from Sorbonne University in Paris, received a prestigious Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions grant from the European Union, and collaborated with Iran's Ministry of Defense during his military service from 2018 to 2020.

His areas of expertise – artificial intelligence, machine learning, and next-generation wireless networks – are regarded by military analysts as dual-use technologies, with direct applications in military communications, drone swarms, electronic warfare, and edge computing.

His assassination is being seen as part of a broader campaign by foreign intelligence services, chief among them the Israeli Mossad, to decapitate Iran's scientific and technological progress.

It is a decades-long campaign that has previously claimed the lives of numerous nuclear scientists and, more recently, AI researchers.

Brilliant academic trajectory

Dr. Ehsanian's academic record was exceptional by any standard. In 2011, he ranked 195th among 280,000 participants in Iran's national university entrance examination, the Konkur, and secured first place in Mathematics in central Qom province.

He was admitted directly into two master's programs simultaneously at Amirkabir University of Technology – one in Electronics and one in Communications – through the university's Exceptional Talents Office, bypassing the national graduate entrance examination entirely on the strength of his outstanding undergraduate achievements.

He earned his bachelor's degree in Electrical Engineering from Amirkabir University in 2015 and graduated with two master's degrees from the same institution in 2018.

Immediately after completing his master's degree, Dr. Ehsanian served his military service from 2018 to 2020, during which he collaborated with Iran's Ministry of Defense. While the precise nature of this collaboration has not been publicly detailed, his placement in a defense ministry role is consistent with how Iran utilizes its most talented technical graduates during their military service.

Following his military service, he pursued doctoral studies in France, earning a PhD in Electrical Engineering (Communications) from Sorbonne University in Paris in 2024.

Dr. Ali Ehsanian

His doctoral dissertation was titled "Distributed Optimization and Machine Learning for Virtualized 6G Wireless Networks," focusing on network slicing in 5G and 6G systems, distributed machine learning, deep neural networks for wireless resource allocation, edge-cloud AI architectures, and low-latency communications.

Dr. Ehsanian also received a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions grant under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research program as an Early Stage Researcher in the SEMANTIC project.

He was a member of the National Elites Foundation of Iran. His documented publications include research on slice resource allocation using distributed deep neural networks for 5G and beyond, exploring how AI systems can split processing between edge devices and cloud infrastructure to improve wireless network performance while reducing latency.

Suspicious death in Nice

The exact date of Dr. Ehsanian's death is reported to be March 28, 2026, approximately six weeks before his body was returned to Iran.

Notable gaps exist in the public record. French police have not issued a public statement naming Dr. Ehsanian or confirming the opening of a homicide investigation. French prosecutors have not announced charges or identified suspects. Major French newspapers have stopped short of publishing investigative reports into his death.

The Iranian foreign ministry, through spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei, confirmed on May 4, 2026, that the ministry was following up on the case through both the Iranian embassy in Paris and the French embassy in Tehran.

Baghaei described the case as "a very bitter incident" that occurred "on the 24th or 25th of Farvardin" (corresponding to April 13-14, 2026, though other sources specify March 28) and said Iran has a duty to seriously pursue the rights of Iranian citizens everywhere in the world.

Notably, Baghaei linked Dr. Ehsanian's case to two other murders of Iranian citizens in France, raising concerns about "racism and terrorist acts."

The absence of detailed French investigative reporting, combined with the Iranian government's insistence on pursuing the case diplomatically, suggests that the full circumstances of his death have not yet been publicly disclosed.

Return of Ehsanian's body from France

Indications of foreign intelligence involvement

While definitive public evidence remains limited, several factors suggest that Dr. Ehsanian's death was not accidental but rather a targeted killing by foreign intelligence services.

First, the timing of his death – during active US-Israeli military aggression against Iran – places it within a broader context of covert warfare. The joint US-Israeli aggression against Iran, which began on February 28, 2026, continued intermittently despite a ceasefire in early April, and included not only overt military strikes but also targeted assassinations.

Second, his profile matches the targeting pattern of Israeli intelligence. Mossad has a documented history of assassinating Iranian scientists with dual-use expertise – individuals whose civilian work carries clear military applications.

Dr. Ehsanian's research in AI-enabled communications, distributed machine learning, and 6G network optimization has direct military relevance.

As analysts have noted, his work on intelligent resource allocation in wireless networks can be applied to military communications, where bandwidth is limited and real-time prioritization is critical.

His research on distributed neural networks can enhance drone swarm coordination, allowing hundreds of unmanned aerial vehicles to share video feeds, navigation data, and targeting information without overwhelming communication links.

His work on edge computing – where data is processed locally rather than sent to a central server – is directly applicable to autonomous military systems that must operate without constant connection to distant headquarters.

Third, his prior brief collaboration with Iran's Ministry of Defense during his military service, while not indicating involvement in weapons design, would have made him a person of interest to foreign intelligence agencies.

Iranian memorial materials explicitly highlight this period of defense ministry collaboration, suggesting that it is considered relevant to its strategic value. Even if his published research was entirely civilian and openly available, his demonstrated willingness to apply his expertise to national defense would mark him as a high-value target for Mossad.

Fourth, the nature of the reporting of his death follows a pattern seen in previous assassinations of Iranian scientists, when Iranian officials initially spoke of suspicious deaths and eventually revealed the role of foreign services.

This pattern is consistent with Iranian authorities receiving intelligence confirming foreign involvement but not immediately disclosing all details publicly.

The absence of detailed French investigative reporting should not be interpreted as evidence that no crime occurred. European security services have on multiple occasions confirmed Israeli sabotage operations on their soil, sometimes years after the events. It remains possible that French authorities possess information that has not yet been released to the public.

Public funeral in Omidiyeh

Previous murders of Iranian AI experts

Dr. Ehsanian is not the only Iranian artificial intelligence researcher to have been assassinated by the Israeli regime.

On June 13, 2025, during a previous phase of Israeli-US aggression against the Islamic Republic, two prominent AI scientists were martyred in a bombing that targeted a residential building in northeastern Tehran.

Dr. Majid TajenJari, a 35-year-old globally recognized expert in artificial intelligence, and Dr. Mohammad Reza Zakarian, a gifted AI pioneer, lost their lives alongside family members, including Zakarian’s two young daughters, five-year-old Fatemeh and seven-month-old Zahra.

Dr. TajenJari served as the head of the Artificial Intelligence Commission at the Youth Chamber of Commerce of Iran. He earned gold medals at the 2012 and 2015 World Invention Competitions, registered a global patent in Russia in 2009, and received numerous awards from Switzerland, Croatia, Germany, Serbia, and Moscow.

His doctoral dissertation focused on developing a bilingual humanoid robot capable of speaking both Persian and English. He also co-founded an educational center to train children and teenagers in AI and Python programming, believing that scientific progress begins at a young age.

At the time of his martyrdom, his inventions in image processing, including facial recognition, cargo container scanning, and steel quality analysis, were being tested for industrial use.

Dr. Zakarian earned his bachelor’s degree from Isfahan University of Technology and a master’s degree from Malek Ashtar University, institutions renowned for cultivating elite scientific talent. According to his father, he consciously turned down multiple offers from foreign countries, including tempting scholarships and job opportunities, choosing instead to remain in Iran and serve his nation.

His research in AI and advanced computing contributed significantly to national technological development. He was martyred alongside his wife and two young daughters in an Israeli airstrike on a residential building in Tehran.

The targeting of AI researchers alongside nuclear scientists suggests that foreign intelligence services have broadened their definition of strategic scientific targets.

Like nuclear technology, AI is considered a dual-use field with both civilian and military applications. Iran’s progress in AI-enabled communications, autonomous systems, and network optimization is seen as enhancing its overall technological capability – and, by extension, its military effectiveness. Eliminating researchers in these fields is therefore consistent with a strategy of slowing Iran’s scientific advancement across multiple domains.

 Long campaign against Iranian nuclear scientists

The assassination of Dr. Ehsanian must be understood within the context of a decades-long campaign by Mossad to eliminate Iranian scientists working on strategic technologies.

This campaign dates back to at least 2007 and has claimed the lives of numerous nuclear experts, many of whom were killed on Iranian soil using sophisticated methods, including magnetic bombs attached to vehicles and remote-controlled machine guns.

The first known assassination was that of Ardeshir Hosseinpour on January 15, 2007. He was followed by Masoud Alimohammadi (January 12, 2010); Majid Shahriari (November 29, 2010); Dariush Rezainejad; Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan (January 11, 2012); and Mohsen Fakhrizadeh (November 27, 2020), who was assassinated using a remote-controlled weapon system while traveling in a vehicle outside Tehran.

The pattern continued during the 12-day war of aggression last year, which killed at least nine prominent nuclear scientists in a series of attacks.

Among them were Dr. Mohammad Mehdi Tehranchi, a theoretical physicist and president of the Islamic Azad University; Dr. Fereydoon Abbasi, a former head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), who had narrowly survived an Israeli assassination attempt in 2010; Dr. Abdolhamid Minoocher, a distinguished nuclear engineer and head of the Faculty of Nuclear Engineering at Shahid Beheshti University; Dr. Ahmad Reza Zolfaghari, a leading professor at the same faculty; and Dr. Seyed Amir Hossein Feqhi, a full professor and former deputy head of the AEOI.

These scientists were specifically targeted because their expertise was considered essential to Iran’s nuclear program, and their elimination was intended to slow or disrupt that program. The same logic appears to be driving the targeting of AI researchers.

Moreover, Iran is not the only country in the region to have experienced assassinations and suspicious deaths of scientists. In the years following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, as well as the fall of Bashar al-Assad's government in Syria, both countries have witnessed dozens of deadly attacks on scientists – often carried out by well-organized, unidentified groups.

Behind these groups, according to many experts, are Israeli, American, and other Western intelligence services seeking to cripple the region’s scientific elite and force the remainder to emigrate. Even Turkey has been a victim of scientific-industrial terrorism, with the mysterious deaths of numerous military engineers working on advanced technological projects.

Ali Ehsanian

Enemy’s goal: Iranian science itself

The pattern of assassinations – first nuclear scientists, now AI researchers – reveals that the enemy’s objective is not limited to any single program but extends to Iranian science and technological progress as a whole.

The US and the Israeli regime have consistently demonstrated that they view any field in which Iran achieves scientific excellence as a potential threat. Nuclear technology, aerospace engineering, missile development, advanced materials, cyber technologies, and artificial intelligence are all considered strategic domains where Iranian progress must be contained.

Modern warfare, as Iranian military analysts frequently note, is no longer fought only with armies and weapons. Scientific expertise itself has become a strategic resource.

Eliminating a scientist can delay technological projects by years, create gaps in expertise that cannot be quickly filled, discourage younger researchers from entering strategically sensitive fields, and degrade national research programs. The assassinations are not random acts of violence but calculated components of a long-term strategy of scientific decapitation.a

The targeting of Dr. Ehsanian in France, rather than on Iranian soil, according to experts, demonstrates that foreign intelligence services are willing to expand their operational theater to include third countries where Iranian scientists study or work.

This creates new challenges for Iranian diplomatic missions, which must now protect Iranian citizens not only at home but also abroad. The Iranian foreign ministry’s statement that it is pursuing Dr. Ehsanian’s case through both its embassy in Paris and the French embassy in Tehran reflects this new reality.

The response from the Iranian scientific community has been one of defiance. The father of Dr. Zakarian, the AI researcher assassinated alongside his children, spoke for many when he said: “They think by killing our scientists, they can halt our progress. But others will rise. The path doesn’t end here.”

The large public funeral for Dr. Ehsanian in Omidiyeh, followed by burial in Jahrom, was attended by thousands, demonstrating that the Iranian people regard these scientists as national heroes whose sacrifices will not be forgotten.

The memorial poster for Dr. Ehsanian bears the inscription: “Martyrdom is the reward of the deserving.” In the Iranian narrative, these scientists are not victims but martyrs – individuals who gave their lives in the service of their country’s scientific sovereignty.

Dr. Ali Ehsanian, Dr. Majid TajenJari, Dr. Mohammad Reza Zakarian, and the many nuclear scientists who preceded them are all part of a single story: a nation’s determination to advance despite the efforts of hostile powers to hold it back.

Nation’s steadfastness defeated US-Israeli ‘evil arrogance’: Top Iranian official

Chairman of Iran's Expediency Council Sadeq Amoli Larijani
Chairman of Iran’s Expediency Council Ayatollah Sadeq Amoli Larijani has praised the resilience and steadfastness of the great Iranian nation in the face of the "evil arrogance" of the US and the Israeli regime.

"The pure blood of the proud martyrs of this cruel battle, especially the pure blood of our dear and noble martyred leader (Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei), was a holy breath that ultimately led to the awakening and uprising of the entire nation," Amoli Larijani wrote in a post on X, following the Memorandum of Understanding reached between Tehran and Washington.

He added, "This experience once again revealed the truth that the fortress of Islamic Iran is only preserved by the presence of the people, the struggle of the Armed Forces, and the efforts of the authorities of the Islamic establishment."

Therefore, regardless of any hasty conclusions about the possible outcome of the MoU, the chairman of Iran's Expediency Council said he considers it his duty to pay his sincere respects and tribute to this great resistance, and ask the Almighty God for the steadfastness and piety of all walks of society, brave servicemen of the Armed Forces, and officials.

On Sunday, Iran's Supreme National Security Council announced that the MoU made between Tehran and Washington earlier in the day will bring an end to warfare on all fronts, including in Lebanon. Moreover, the naval blockade against Iran will also be ended completely and without delay. 

The SNSC secretariat declared that, guided by its late Leader Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, the instructions of the current Leader Ayatollah Seyed Mojtaba Khamenei, the steadfast support of the Iranian people, and the relentless efforts of the nation's armed forces, the Islamic Republic has concluded a phase of challenging and intensive talks.

The MoU is scheduled to be officially signed on Friday, June 19.

The strategic arsenal US lost in war against Iran – and why replenishment will take years

By Mohammad Molaei

The sheer scale of munitions consumed during the Third Imposed War is without modern precedent in American warfare. As reported by The New York Times, within just the first two days of the military aggression that began on February 28, an estimated $5.6 billion worth of precision-guided munitions were expended, a sum that exceeds the annual military budgets of most countries in the world.

Over the full 40-day war leading up to the fragile ceasefire in early April, US forces struck more than 13,000 targets, many of which required multiple munitions each. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the cost of the air campaign alone reached between $11.3 billion in its first six days and $16.5 billion by day twelve.

The total cost over 40 days of full-scale military aggression, followed by subsequent hostilities in the Persian Gulf region, amounts to a far greater sum. While the Pentagon has estimated the figure at around $25 billion, independent assessments place the cost closer to $100 billion.

These figures do not reflect a campaign defined by restraint or resource discipline. Rather, they reveal a military establishment that bet its most advanced precision arsenal on a war it expected to win quickly – only to find itself mired in a quagmire of its own making.

JASSM-ER: Draining the Pacific's first line of strike

No single weapons system reveals the strategic recklessness of so-called “Operation Epic Fury” more precisely than the AGM-158B Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile Extended Range, known in Pentagon parlance as the JASSM-ER.

This is not a conventional cruise missile. It is a stealthy, air-launched precision strike weapon with a range exceeding 600 miles, purpose-built to penetrate the most sophisticated integrated air defense systems in the world.

Its operational logic is explicitly tied to high-end war scenarios – specifically, a potential confrontation with China in the Western Pacific, where the People's Liberation Army has constructed the most elaborate anti-access/area-denial architecture in history. The JASSM-ER is the weapon Washington designed for its most serious adversary. And it is largely gone.

At the outset of the war of aggression launched on February 28, the United States held a JASSM-ER inventory of approximately 2,300 missiles. According to Bloomberg, citing a source with direct knowledge of the matter, US forces consumed more than 1,000 JASSM-ERs in the first four weeks of the campaign alone.

The New York Times, drawing on Department of War sources, placed total JASSM-ER expenditure over the full campaign at approximately 1,100 missiles. An additional 47 were fired in a separate operation to abduct Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.

The order to drain Pacific stockpiles for the Iran campaign, stripping missiles from US facilities across the continental US and repositioning them to CENTCOM bases and RAF Fairford in the United Kingdom, was issued at the end of March, according to Bloomberg.

JASSM-ER

The arithmetic is unambiguous and brutal. Of a prewar JASSM-ER inventory of 2,300, approximately 425 remain available for the rest of the world, roughly 18 percent of the prewar total. In the shorter-range baseline JASSM variant, approximately two-thirds of total stocks across both versions were committed to the Iran campaign, according to Bloomberg.

CSIS calculates that around 25 percent of the total combined JASSM inventory was expended in just 40 days of combat.

The unit cost of the JASSM-ER is $1.1 million per missile. The JASSM baseline variant costs $2.6 million per unit at current procurement figures. The roughly 1,100 JASSM-ERs fired in the recent war, therefore, represent approximately $1.2 billion in precision strike munitions, consumed in a campaign that failed to destroy Iran's ballistic missile infrastructure, did not fracture its command structure, and did not alter the strategic balance in West Asia.

Replenishment will not be swift, as per experts. The US Air Force has procured JASSM variants at an average rate of nearly 500 per year over the past decade, and existing orders in the pipeline mean that JASSM inventories will recover more quickly than other systems; CSIS estimates "several months to a year" for baseline replacement.

However, this timeline assumes no new wars, no additional campaign consumption, and full US Congressional funding of the FY 2027 military procurement request, which has not yet been appropriated.

Tomahawk: A thousand missiles in the 40-day war

The BGM-109 Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) is the oldest and most combat-proven precision strike weapon in the US Navy's inventory, having been used in every major American military operation since Operation Desert Storm in 1991.

Its versatility, fired from surface ships and submarines, capable of loitering and retargeting in flight, with a range of approximately 1,000 miles, makes it the Navy's primary instrument of long-range power projection.

The war against Iran consumed it on a historically unprecedented scale.

Tomahawk missiles

The Washington Post reported that US naval assets fired more than 850 Tomahawks in the first month of the third imposed war. The Wall Street Journal subsequently updated that figure to more than 1,000 over the full pre-ceasefire campaign period.

CSIS's analysis of the first six days alone identified 319 TLAMs expended, representing approximately 10 percent of the prewar inventory in less than a week.

The prewar Tomahawk inventory stood at approximately 3,200 missiles. The expenditure of over 1,000, therefore, represents roughly 31 percent of the prewar total consumed in 40 days, more than ten times the annual procurement rate.

The Pentagon ordered just 190 new Tomahawks in 2026, a figure barely more than half the number fired in the first six days of the war. The US Navy has requested 785 Tomahawks in the FY 2027 budget, a substantial increase from prior years, but CSIS projects these will not begin arriving in US inventories until March 2030, after 34 months of production lead time.

US Tomahawk inventories will not return to prewar levels until late 2030 at the earliest.

The cost consequences compound the strategic ones. Each Tomahawk Block V costs approximately $1.87 million. The 1,000-plus Tomahawks fired in the recent war, therefore, represent approximately $1.9 billion in naval strike capability, consumed against a country that, at the ceasefire, retained its ballistic missile launch capacity, its underground missile production infrastructure, and its ability to control shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

The allied dimension of the Tomahawk shortage adds a further layer of strategic damage. Japan, which recently completed modifications on a destroyer to fire TLAMs and had purchased 400 missiles as part of its historic shift toward a more robust conventional deterrent posture against Chinese pressure, has reportedly been told that its deliveries may be delayed indefinitely because the United States must prioritize refilling its own depleted stockpiles.

Australia has also purchased more than 200 Tomahawks, and the Netherlands has purchased 175. All of these allied orders now sit in a queue behind American replenishment needs, weakening the combined deterrent posture of the US alliance network in the Western Pacific at precisely the moment that network is under the greatest pressure.

The defensive arsenal: Patriot, THAAD, and interceptor crisis

While the consumption of offensive strike missiles has drawn significant analytical attention, the depletion of America's missile defense interceptor inventory may carry even more severe long-term strategic consequences.

These systems, including the much-hyped Patriot PAC-3 MSE, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and the Standard Missiles SM-3 and SM-6, are not interchangeable with cheaper alternatives. They are the irreplaceable components of layered missile defense architecture, designed to defeat the ballistic and cruise missile threats posed by peer and near-peer adversaries.

In the Pacific scenario, they are the systems that would need to protect US forward bases, carrier strike groups, and allied territory from Chinese ballistic missile salvos in the opening hours of any war. Instead, they are being consumed in the Persian Gulf.

The Patriot PAC-3 MSE interceptor, at approximately $4 million per unit, was among the most heavily used anti-missile systems in the recent war imposed on Iran.

The New York Times reported that over 1,200 Patriot interceptors were fired during the aggression. CSIS estimates that Patriot usage, combined with the ongoing supply of interceptors to Ukraine, has left prewar PAC-3 inventory at critically reduced levels.

The Army's FY 2027 budget requests 3,203 Patriot missiles, a procurement figure that reflects the scale of the shortfall, but CSIS projects these will not begin delivery until May 2029, with full replenishment of prewar levels taking three or more years from the present.

Current Patriot production stands at approximately 650 interceptors per year, with roughly half going to allied orders. Lockheed Martin intends to surge production to 2,000 per year, but achieving this capacity requires years of facility and tooling expansion.

In the interim, the United States faces a set of allocation decisions with no good options: prioritize replenishment of its own depleted stocks, continue supplying Ukraine, or fulfill the orders of the 17 other countries that operate the Patriot system and are now watching their own deliveries pushed back indefinitely.

Swiss authorities have already threatened to cancel their Patriot purchase and seek an alternative supplier after being informed of delivery delays. The bilateral friction this production shortfall is generating with allied governments has been explicitly acknowledged by CSIS and represents a tangible erosion of alliance cohesion at a moment of acute strategic uncertainty.

THAAD anti-missile system

The THAAD situation is, by CSIS's assessment, the most critical of all. THAAD is the upper-tier component of the US missile defense architecture, designed to intercept ballistic missiles at higher altitudes and longer ranges than Patriot.

Its interceptors are expensive, scarce, and – as of the ongoing fragile ceasefire – severely depleted. CSIS estimates that between 52 and 81 percent of the prewar THAAD interceptor inventory was expended in the recent war and related offensives, building on roughly 150 THAAD interceptors already consumed during the 12-day war in June 2025.

There have been no new deliveries of THAAD interceptors since August 2023. Deliveries are not scheduled to resume until April 2027 at the earliest. The US Army's FY 2027 budget requests 857 THAAD interceptors, which CSIS projects will not complete the replacement of the usage during the recent war against Iran until the end of calendar year 2029.

Compounding the interceptor shortage is the damage or possible destruction of multiple AN/TPY-2 radar systems – the targeting backbone of THAAD batteries – during Iranian retaliatory strikes on US facilities in the region.

Only 13 AN/TPY-2 radars have been delivered to the United States in total. The loss or degradation of even two or three of these systems represents a qualitative capability gap that cannot be papered over by procurement requests. The US has also maintained only eight THAAD batteries in total, a number that was considered inadequate for simultaneous deployment in multiple theaters even before the war on Iran consumed the interceptors from those batteries at a rate far exceeding production capacity to replace them.

The ship-launched Standard Missiles present a somewhat less acute but still serious picture. CSIS estimates that SM-3 expenditure in the recent war ranged from 31 to 60 percent of prewar inventory, while SM-6 consumption ran between 16 and 32 percent.

Both missiles carry production lead times of 36 to 39 months from contract award to first delivery. Inventories will not return to prewar levels until early 2029 – despite their relatively lower usage in the 40-day war of aggression – reflecting the cumulative effect of years of inadequate procurement before the war began.

The cost ledger: What was spent and what was not gained

The aggregate financial cost of the munitions consumed in the recent war against Iran, calculated from unit costs and reported expenditure figures, represents one of the most expensive failed military campaigns in the history of modern warfare.

The principal expenditures, based on CSIS data and DOD reporting, break down as follows. Over 1,100 JASSM-ER missiles at $1.1 million each account for approximately $1.21 billion. More than 1,000 Tomahawk missiles at $1.87 million each represent approximately $1.87 billion. Over 1,200 Patriot PAC-3 MSE interceptors at $4 million each amount to approximately $4.8 billion. More than 1,000 Precision Strike Missiles and ATACMS, at between $500,000 and $1.5 million each, add a further $500 million to $1.5 billion.

THAAD interceptors, along with SM-3 and SM-6 expenditures, contribute several hundred million more at their respective unit costs. The aggregate munitions cost of the war runs to well in excess of $10 billion, and that figure covers only the missiles, not the operational costs of the platforms that delivered them, the intelligence infrastructure that supported targeting, or the diplomatic capital expended in securing basing and overflight rights.

War Secretary Pete Hegseth himself, in testimony before the US Senate Armed Services Committee, acknowledged that replenishment will take "months and years, depending on the weapon system." CSIS's assessment supports that timeline in its conservative form and exceeds it in the more pessimistic analysis.

The combined picture across all seven critical munitions categories is that the US will not return to prewar inventory levels for any of its most critical systems before 2028 at the earliest, with Tomahawk, THAAD, and Patriot taking three or more years from the present.

Building inventories to the levels that war planners have identified as necessary for a high-intensity peer war, levels that were already considered insufficient even before the Iran war, will take additional years beyond that.

The China variable: A window of vulnerability measured in years

The strategic meaning of these numbers transcends the war against Iran in itself. The JASSM-ER was not designed to strike Iranian nuclear facilities but to defeat Chinese integrated air defense systems protecting military targets in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.

The Tomahawk was not stockpiled to prosecute a campaign in the Persian Gulf but maintained as the Navy's primary instrument of long-range strike in a Western Pacific contingency. The THAAD interceptors depleted over Iranian skies were the same interceptors positioned in South Korea and Guam to defend against North Korean and Chinese ballistic missile threats. They have been moved and their replacements are years away.

Even before the war against Iran, as assessments suggest, US munitions stockpiles were deemed insufficient for a peer competitor fight in the Western Pacific, based on the classified war-gaming conclusions of the House Select Committee on China.

That shortfall is now dramatically more acute. The think tank's characterization that depleted inventories have created a "window of vulnerability" for a potential Western Pacific war is not alarmist rhetoric but a straightforward arithmetic conclusion drawn from the procurement timelines and inventory figures its researchers have calculated from publicly available budget documents.

The implications for Chinese strategic calculations are substantial and not easily dismissed. Beijing's military planners have observed, in real time, that the US consumed its primary long-range strike inventory – the very capabilities designed to hold Chinese assets at risk in a Taiwan contingency – in a 40-day war that did not achieve its strategic objectives.

They have observed that the combined JASSM and Tomahawk inventories available for Pacific contingencies are now a fraction of their prewar levels. They have observed that THAAD batteries have been stripped from South Korea – degrading the missile defense coverage of a key US ally on China's periphery – and that their replacement is years away.

And they have observed that American production capacity, constrained by decades of procurement at peacetime rates and manufacturing lead times measured in years rather than months, cannot rapidly reverse any of these deficits, regardless of how much money US Congress appropriates.

This is not the profile of a deterrent in robust health, but the profile of a military establishment that has consumed its premium, China-specific capabilities in a secondary theater without achieving the decisive outcome that would have justified the expenditure, and that now faces a multi-year period of structural vulnerability during which its ability to credibly threaten the use of force in the Taiwan Strait is materially diminished.

The CSIS report notes with the cautious observation that China is deeply aware it has no recent combat experience, while the US military has been engaged in wars on multiple fronts, and that this experiential differential may preserve deterrence until inventories are restored. This is a thin reed on which to hang the credibility of American extended deterrence across Indo-Pacific.

The deterrent value of operational skill is real, but it is not a substitute for the physical missiles that a deterrent posture requires, and Beijing's strategic calculus is driven more by inventory mathematics than by assessments of American tactical proficiency.

The production constraint: Why money cannot buy time

The Trump administration has responded to the munitions crisis with a series of framework agreements with major contractors – Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Boeing – committing to expand production capacity across the full range of critical munitions.

Lockheed Martin has agreed to quadruple THAAD interceptor production capacity from 96 to 400 per year. Raytheon has committed to increasing Tomahawk production to more than 1,000 per year and Patriot MSE output to 2,000 per year.

These are significant capacity targets that, if achieved, would substantially accelerate inventory recovery relative to current baselines.

But capacity is not production, and production agreements are not delivered missiles, according to military experts. The fundamental constraint is not financial but temporal. Manufacturing lead time for advanced missile systems – the period between contract award and first delivery – runs between 34 and 39 months for the most critical systems. Building new production facilities, qualifying new supply chains, training additional skilled labor, and resolving bottlenecks in specialized components such as guidance systems and rocket motors are processes measured in years, not quarters.

The FY 2027 defense budget, even if fully and promptly appropriated by a Congress that has not yet voted on it, will not produce a single additional THAAD interceptor or Tomahawk before 2030. The window of vulnerability is already wide open.

Hegseth's own assessment before the Senate Armed Services Committee, that replenishment will take "months and years, depending on the weapon system," represents, in the carefully hedged language of executive branch testimony, an acknowledgment that the US has accepted a period of strategic risk in exchange for a military campaign that did not deliver the outcome its architects promised.

The question that American strategic planners cannot answer to Beijing's satisfaction is how long that window remains open – and what Beijing's strategic interests, combined with this window of opportunity, might produce.

World leaders welcome MoU that ends war imposed by US on Iran

Traffic moves past the Iranian national flag displayed on a building at Enqelab square in Tehran on June 14, 2026.
A chorus of international praise has greeted the memorandum of understanding (MoU) finalized between Iran and the United States, which brings an immediate and permanent end to the US‑Israeli war of aggression on Iran, lifts the naval blockade, and reopens the Strait of Hormuz.

UN Secretary‑General Antonio Guterres welcomed the agreement as a “critical step” toward resolving the conflict.

“The Secretary‑General hopes that the parties will build on this new momentum and redouble their efforts towards a final resolution of the conflict,” his statement read.

Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani said Qatar “welcomes the agreement” and thanked Pakistan for its mediation, expressing hope that all parties will engage in future negotiations “in a positive and constructive spirit.”

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said he views the deal as “an important development for establishing peace and tranquility in our region” and welcomed it with satisfaction. He called for avoiding any provocations that could escalate tensions before the signing and thanked Pakistan, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

Britain, France, Germany and Italy issued a joint statement saying they are “prepared to lift relevant sanctions in response to clear, verifiable steps by Iran on its nuclear programme” and will work intensively with all sides to achieve a long‑term diplomatic settlement.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said Japan “strongly hopes” that a final agreement on Iran’s nuclear issue will be reached soon.

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese welcomed the agreement, noting that Australia has long called for de‑escalation and an end to the conflict.

New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters called the deal “pivotal” and “constructive,” stressing that “dialogue and diplomacy remain the most effective means of resolving longstanding issues.”

The MoU, finalized late Sunday, will be signed on Friday in Switzerland.

Under its terms, the war and all military attacks, including in Lebanon, have ended immediately, and the US naval blockade of Iran has been lifted.