The Instrumentalization of Diplomacy in Contemporary Conflicts

In the contemporary world, rivalry among powerful countries has reached its apex, with the strongest states often competing for alliances, resources, strategic positioning, and global influence to advance their interests. Although the tactics of the powerful states have diversified, their goal remains the same.

Abbas Hashemite

The Cold War: Diplomacy as a Tool of Restraint

The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union (USSR) is one of the classic examples of great-power competition. The sides opposed each other due to their contrasting ideologies. Despite significant tensions between the two sides, the two sides only fought limited proxy wars in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, avoiding indulging in a direct full-scale war. The main reason for this was that the Cold War was mainly predicated on diplomacy rather than direct military confrontation. It was due to diplomacy and backchannel communications that the two nuclear powers prevented a direct, full-scale war.

The Evolving Role of Diplomacy in Great Power Competition

The historical trajectory of great power competition and rivalry demonstrates that the objective remains the same despite varying actors and contexts

However, in the contemporary era, amid ongoing developments, a key question emerges: whether diplomacy continues to play the same role or whether its function has evolved in the context of great power competition. The ongoing situation in the Middle Eastern region diverges from the historical perspective. In this new era, global powers, especially the United States and Israel, use diplomacy as an instrument to regulate war rather than resolving mutual disputes. Today, the fundamental function of diplomacy has become significantly intricate in modern armed confrontations. The United States and Israel are using diplomatic efforts to regulate wars and conflict, accompanied by ceasefires and international humanitarian law violations, and military operations.

The Israel–Palestine Conflict and the Limits of Diplomacy

The ongoing Palestine-Israel war is one of the prime examples of this scenario. Regional and global powers like the US, Qatar, and Egypt used diplomatic efforts to mediate only a temporary ceasefire and provision of limited humanitarian aid to the Palestinians rather than achieve a permanent resolution of the conflict. As a result, the war in Gaza persisted for more than three years, causing the deaths of more than 72600 innocent Palestinian civilians. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) also raped numerous Palestinian women during this war. In addition, over 90 percent of the civilian infrastructure in Gaza has been intentionally flattened by the IDF. All these atrocities transpired despite continued diplomatic efforts.

Power Politics and the Instrumentalization of Diplomacy

In the modern world, diplomacy is mostly influenced by the strategic interests of major global powers. They even bypass diplomatic processes to achieve their strategic interests. For instance, the United States invaded Iraq despite strong opposition by the United Nations, showing how powerful nations override diplomatic formalities and international law for their strategic goals.

Similarly, powerful states also influence the implementation of international law. In the Israel-Palestine war, several debates over human rights and civilian protection emerged at different international forums. However, the enforcement of international law was never observed in this case, despite concerns of the majority of the world, as its implementation and application are totally dependent on political will and cooperation of states.

The Limitations of Global Institutions

These violations and overriding of international law occurred because emerging power dynamics over the past 3 to 4 decades allowed powerful states to consider themselves above the law. The International Criminal Court (ICC) also faces a similar dilemma as it prosecutes war criminals, but the enforcement of its decisions is totally dependent on the cooperation of different states. The ICC, for instance, issued arrest warrants for the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 2024. However, due to no accountability mechanisms and poor enforcement, no progress on the cases has ever been reported, rendering the ICC an ineffective institution.

Netanyahu visited the United States and Hungary after the ICC arrest warrant. However, both states officially welcomed him despite these warrants. This demonstrates that powerful states prioritize their strategic interests over international law. These instances also demonstrate the evolving contours of global politics and suggest that diplomacy remains a prevailing system, though it has been reshaped by the changing dynamics of global power politics. In a world where the unequal influence of states defines the boundaries of the implementation of international law, diplomacy has been reduced to a tool used by powerful international actors to achieve their strategic interests rather than a neutral mechanism of peacemaking and conflict resolution.

Conclusion: Diplomacy and the Future of Peace

In conclusion, the historical trajectory of great power competition and rivalry demonstrates that the objective remains the same despite varying actors and contexts. However, the only thing that has evolved is diplomacy, which is no longer used as an instrument to prevent military conflicts. Rather, it has now become a tool that shapes the scope, pace, and consequences of modern conflicts and wars. In such a system, the real question is not whether diplomacy can still help deliver peace and prevent wars but whether it can ever get rid of the influence of the great powers, especially aggressors like the United States and Israel.

Аbbas Hashemite is a political observer and research analyst for regional and global geopolitical issues. He is currently working as an independent researcher and journalist

The UAE and the Unravelling of Gulf Consensus

The United Arab Emirates’ exit from OPEC is not a technocratic adjustment to oil policy; it is a geopolitical signal. Beneath the surface of production quotas and market strategy lies a deeper rupture: the erosion of Gulf unity as a guiding principle of regional order.

Salman Rafi Sheikh

Accelerated by wartime vulnerability, sharpened by diverging alliances, and rooted in long-standing tensions with Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi’s decision marks a decisive shift. What is ending is not just membership in a cartel but the illusion that the Gulf still acts as a cohesive strategic bloc.

The Limits of Security Guarantees

The ongoing confrontation involving Iran has exposed a critical contradiction at the heart of the UAE’s regional positioning: a state built on stability and economic openness remains deeply vulnerable to geopolitical shocks. Despite its sophisticated defense systems and strategic partnerships, the UAE found itself directly exposed to missile and drone threats in ways that unsettled its carefully cultivated image as a secure hub for global capital. Within just the first few weeks of the war, hundreds of billions of dollars were wiped out of the UAE. The issue is not simply material damage but reputational risk: vulnerability undermines the very economic model on which the UAE depends.

The UAE’s decision is best understood not as a rupture, but as a revelation. It exposes the extent to which the foundations of Gulf cooperation have already shifted

By contrast, Saudi Arabia appeared relatively insulated, not immune but better shielded diplomatically and strategically. Riyadh’s longstanding networks, including its ability to mobilize intermediaries and leverage broader geopolitical relationships, helped mitigate the scale and frequency of direct confrontation. This asymmetry did not go unnoticed in Abu Dhabi. It reinforced a growing perception within the Emirati leadership that collective security frameworks in the Gulf are uneven at best and unreliable at worst. Indeed, it led Abu Dhabi to punish Pakistan for helping the Saudis more than Islamabad could help the Emiratis. The implication is profound: if regional coordination cannot guarantee security in moments of crisis, then its value diminishes. Under such conditions, adherence to collective economic mechanisms like OPEC becomes harder to justify.

Towards Regional Dealignment

The UAE’s exit must also be situated within a broader reconfiguration of its regional alliances. Over the past decade, Abu Dhabi has steadily moved toward a model of strategic autonomy—prioritizing flexibility over alignment and bilateralism over multilateral consensus.

This shift is visible across multiple domains. The UAE’s normalization of relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords marked a clear departure from traditional Gulf consensus positions. Its engagement in conflict zones such as Yemen and Sudan has frequently diverged from Saudi priorities, revealing competing visions of regional order. Even within economic policy, the UAE has pursued aggressive diversification strategies that occasionally place it in competition—not coordination—with its neighbors.

Tensions with Saudi Arabia have been particularly consequential. Disputes over oil production quotas within OPEC+ have surfaced repeatedly in recent years, with the UAE pushing for higher baseline production levels to reflect its expanded capacity. These disagreements reached a visible peak in 2021, when negotiations nearly collapsed over Emirati objections. While temporary compromises were achieved, the underlying divergence persisted.

Beyond oil, the two states are increasingly competing as economic hubs. Saudi Arabia’s efforts to attract multinational headquarters to Riyadh—through policies such as requiring firms to base regional operations in the Kingdom—have been widely interpreted as a direct challenge to Dubai’s dominance. This competition extends to logistics, tourism, and investment, eroding the informal division of labor that once underpinned Gulf economic cooperation.

Within this context, the UAE’s decision to leave OPEC is less an isolated policy move than the culmination of a broader strategic trajectory. Emirati officials have indicated that the country is reassessing aspects of its multilateral engagement, emphasizing flexibility and national interest over institutional commitments. The message is clear: the era of automatic alignment is over. The more ‘flexible’ approach is a proxy term for what lies ahead: more dealignment, more divergence, and more conflict within the Gulf. The regional fault line is no longer between Iran and the GCC; it lies within the GCC as well. It is specifically targeting the Saudis.

The UAE’s exit from OPEC means that more oil will be available in the market. It also means oil prices would shift to decrease over time. Saudi Arabia needs high oil prices — around $90 (€77) per barrel —to fund government spending and its ambitious Vision 2030, a set of huge infrastructure projects to cut the Kingdom’s reliance on fossil fuels. Every extra barrel the country holds back means lost revenue, which hurts the country’s ability to grow its economy.

From Cartel Discipline to Competitive Energy Statecraft

At its core, OPEC represents a model of collective discipline, one in which member states coordinate production to influence global prices. For decades, this framework relied not only on shared economic interests but also on a degree of political cohesion among key Gulf producers. That cohesion is now eroding.

The UAE has invested heavily in expanding its oil production capacity, aiming to reach and sustain higher output levels in the coming years. Remaining within OPEC, however, would require continued adherence to quotas that constrain this capacity. From a purely economic perspective, the opportunity cost is significant, especially in a market environment characterized by volatility and shifting demand patterns.

More importantly, the logic of coordination itself is being questioned. As global energy markets evolve—with the rise of US shale, the energy transition, and increasing geopolitical fragmentation—the effectiveness of cartel-based management has diminished. States are increasingly prioritizing agility over discipline, seeking to maximize national advantage in a less predictable environment.

For the UAE, exiting OPEC offers several advantages: the ability to adjust production more rapidly, the freedom to pursue bilateral energy partnerships, and the flexibility to respond to market signals without institutional constraints. It aligns with a broader shift toward what might be called “competitive energy statecraft,” in which states act as independent players rather than coordinated members of a bloc.

This shift has significant implications for OPEC itself. The departure of a major producer like the UAE weakens the organization’s internal cohesion and raises questions about its future effectiveness. While OPEC Plus—which includes non-OPEC producers like Russia—has provided an expanded framework for coordination, its stability ultimately depends on the willingness of key actors to subordinate national interests to collective goals. The UAE’s exit suggests that such willingness is no longer assured.

Beyond Exit: A New Gulf Order

The UAE’s decision is best understood not as a rupture, but as a revelation. It exposes the extent to which the foundations of Gulf cooperation have already shifted. Looking ahead, this transformation is likely to deepen. Saudi Arabia will continue to assert leadership within OPEC, but with diminished authority. Other Gulf states may not follow the UAE’s path immediately, yet they too are navigating the tension between coordination and autonomy. The result may not be the collapse of regional institutions, but their gradual hollowing out.

At the same time, the move signals a broader trend in global politics: the decline of multilateral discipline in favor of flexible, state-centric approaches. In energy markets, as in security, the emphasis is shifting toward adaptability and unilateral capacity. For the Gulf, the stakes are particularly high. The region’s influence has long depended on its ability to act collectively, whether in managing oil markets or shaping geopolitical outcomes. As that collective capacity erodes, so too does the coherence of the “Gulf” as a strategic concept. It might exist as a geography, but not as a regional political alliance. The UAE has moved first, but it is unlikely to be the last to rethink the value of consensus. What emerges in its place will not be unity, but something more fluid—and potentially more unstable.

Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs

A Fractured World Order and the Xi–Trump Test of Strategic Coexistence

The Trump-Xi summit, coming amidst fragile international markets, intensifying US-China competition, and escalating Middle East conflict, will critically analyze whether the two sides can manage competition without escalating risks.

Abbas Hashemite

A Summit Amid Global Instability

The summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and his counterpart, US President Donald J. Trump, scheduled from May 13 to 15, comes at a critical moment, as the world appears increasingly besieged by conflict and precariously clouded by uncertainty. Continuing instability in Europe, growing competition among major powers, escalating tensions in the Middle East, and fragile international markets have cumulatively created an environment in which even a minor diplomatic engagement between the United States and China carries immense significance. The intense global atmosphere has further increased the significance of this summit by turning it from a regular diplomatic engagement into a test of whether the two global superpowers can still distinguish between strategic rivalry and outright recklessness.

China’s Strategic Messaging and Global Posture

The US seeks to preserve a US-led unipolar order, while China advances an alternative international system defined by rigid state sovereignty and diminished Western dominance, rendering coexistence within the same global framework increasingly difficult

For Beijing, the summit offers a great opportunity to bolster its cautiously crafted image as a global stabilizing force in international affairs. The Chinese state knows that the international system is transitioning into an era of prolonged conflicts and disorder. Military blocs are solidifying, geopolitical disruptions are multiplying, and economic nationalism is surging all together. In such an international climate, Beijing seeks to present itself as a disciplined state advocating strategic patience, continuity, and stability rather than a revolutionary power wishing for global disorder.

However, this international posture is not entirely altruistic. The actual ambition behind this posturing is that China’s economic ambitions are heavily dependent upon uninterrupted trade routes, stable energy supplies, and predictable international markets. Indeed, chaos may weaken the US and other Chinese rivals, but protracted international instability jeopardizes its long-term international standing as much as it imperils the West.

Washington’s Strategic Calculus and Global Rivalry

The US government views this summit from an entirely different perspective. Washington sees Beijing as one of the global powers capable of challenging its global hegemony across technological, economic, and military domains. For the US, its competition with China is no longer limited to trade wars and tariffs. It holds that this competition has evolved into a broader conflict over supply chain control, strategic influence, technological dominance, and the struggle for a new world order.

Even amid this ongoing rivalry, Washington acknowledges an uncomfortable truth that a limitless confrontation with Beijing is not in its interest. The international financial markets are sensitive, the global economy also remains interconnected in this era of globalization, and international security is also excessively vulnerable to sustaining an unchecked collapse of bilateral relations between the two sides. This strategic contradiction forms the foundation of the upcoming summit. The US-China relations are marked by mistrust, yet both sides acknowledge that a strategic breakdown could be equally jeopardizing for them. Therefore, the challenge for the two sides is not merely a reconciliation, but coexistence.

Multipolarity, Middle East Tensions, and the Taiwan Factor

The timing of the summit further increases its significance as it unfolds during the ongoing war between the US, Israel, and Iran, placing the Middle East at the heart of global instability. This conflict threatens global maritime security, trade routes, and global diplomatic alignments. China’s economic stability and survival heavily rely on Middle Eastern energy supplies and maritime trade routes, making it one of the most affected states due to this conflict. A prolonged war between the US, Israel, and Iran would place significant economic strain on global markets and threaten Beijing’s economic stability at this particular juncture.

China also recognizes the strategic opportunity created by Washington’s increasing entanglement in multiple conflicts, including the Middle Eastern theatre, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and the Indo-Pacific military deterrence. The US involvement in these military conflicts creates opportunities for its competitors, especially Russia and China. These geopolitical burdens have provided Russia and China with an opportunity to expand their global strategic and diplomatic influence.

However, China’s objectives are more sophisticated than mere opportunism. Its interests lie in the continuation of American influence. It merely seeks a gradual transition towards a multipolar world order with limited US influence. This is one of the key reasons why Beijing always positions itself as a mediator and advocate for economic stability in international conflicts. Nonetheless, Washington views Beijing’s increasing diplomatic activism with skepticism. US policymakers see China’s portrayal of itself as a mediator and advocate for peace as an effort to expand its influence among states frustrated by US military interventions and economic sanctions. This US suspicion gains validation by the fact that China cautiously deepened its diplomatic ties with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf States during the time Washington was involved in military conflict in the region.

The Taiwan issue will also influence the summit. For Beijing, Taiwan is a matter of its national identity and sovereignty. Meanwhile, the US views Taiwan as a bargaining chip essential for ensuring regional balance and an indispensable issue for the credibility of the US among its allies. Neither side is likely to compromise on this strategic issue. However, both sides understand that any miscalculation would lead to catastrophic consequences for the entire globe. That’s why the upcoming summit is not merely symbolic and has gained immense strategic significance. In contemporary, uncertain, and volatile international economic conditions, diplomacy itself has become a symbol of stability.

Rivalry Without Collapse: The Limits of Coexistence

However, the world still does not need to be too optimistic. A profound reality underlying this summit is that the two sides are no longer only competitors challenging for influence within the same international system. The actual competition between the two sides is over defining the contours of the international system. The US seeks to preserve a US-led unipolar order, while China advances an alternative international system defined by rigid state sovereignty and diminished Western dominance, rendering coexistence within the same global framework increasingly difficult.

Still, direct and complete confrontation serves neither side. Both sides acknowledge that any direct confrontation will be equally detrimental for them. Therefore, both states remain trapped in a paradoxical bilateral relationship marked by suspicion, rivalry, dependence, and necessity simultaneously. The upcoming Xi-Trump summit may not resolve these conflicts and issues. It may also not lead to historic breakthroughs, but its significance cannot be denied. At a time when the world is increasingly being driven by fragmentation, distrust, and escalation, even symbolic diplomatic engagement between the two sides carries immense significance. In the coming era, global economic stability and peace will entirely depend on the ability of the great powers to manage their competition rationally.

Аbbas Hashemite is a political observer and research analyst for regional and global geopolitical issues. He is currently working as an independent researcher and journalist

The effects of the Iran War and the future of the UAE’s role in the oil market

The UAE’s official withdrawal from OPEC and OPEC+ on the eve of May 2026 is a “turn” in energy geopolitics, from the “institutional convergence” model to “strategic autonomy”.

Samyar Rostami

In recent years, the UAE has invested heavily (approximately $150 million) in expanding oil production, increasing its maximum capacity to about 5–6 million barrels per day. The UAE’s new oil approach is a kind of “maximization of investment returns” and freedom from restrictions and coordination with its economic needs.

From another perspective, Abu Dhabi seeks to make the most of the remaining “opportunity” in energy transition by accelerating the extraction and production of oil.

With the UAE’s “divergence” from Saudi Arabia and the growing rifts in the GCC in areas such as competition for foreign policy and defining the role of regional leadership, the “Emirates First” policy and an independent player in the energy equation are being considered.

The UAE’s excess oil production capacity is only effective in conditions of security, stability, and peace in the Persian Gulf

The US-Israeli War Against Iran

The UAE has played a large direct and indirect role in facilitating and assisting the attack on Iran. Many in Iran believe that during the 40-day war, there was a lot of evidence and clues that showed that either the UAE attacked Iran or had visible cooperation with the aggressor and threatened Iran’s national interests.

In recent months, the UAE has suffered the most from Tehran’s retaliatory blow, and the UAE’s gas exports have stopped, and the UAE’s oil production (1.27 million barrels) has also decreased.

Also, the UAE is set to increase its daily production capacity to around 5 million barrels by 2027. But so far, the Iran war has disrupted energy supplies and supply chains through the vital Strait of Hormuz, damaging production facilities and slowing down the UAE’s national plans.

Crises and the Future of the UAE’s Role in the Hydrocarbon Market

The UAE’s decision-making on the future of its role in the oil market is certainly in line with the UAE’s production policy, current and future capacity, long-term strategic and economic outlook, the development of its energy sector, and the acceleration of investment in domestic energy production.

The future of the UAE’s role in the oil market depends on the pace of the energy transition. The UAE is also focusing on investing in increasing hydrocarbon capacity and developing other energy infrastructure.

In the future, the UAE’s role in the oil market is likely to be a combination of factors such as supply power and excess capacity to compensate for potential disruptions, production coordination, and the ability to influence supply quantities.

The UAE is redefining its economic geography to reduce its dependence on Hormuz and shift its economic rotation to the Sea of ​​Oman. Having two coasts is a major geographical advantage for the UAE and can completely change the route of crude oil exports to the Sea of ​​Oman.

The UAE, relying on infrastructure such as the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline, has a comparative advantage in bypassing Hormuz in peacetime. The port of Fujairah is the UAE’s most important ocean port and an alternative export route to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. However, in the event of a continuing crisis and war, Iran could blockade the UAE’s coasts. In any maritime blockade of the UAE, the country’s oil exports would face greater challenges.

Given the crisis in Iran-US relations, the security of energy transport routes in the event of a blocked Strait of Hormuz and tension in the Persian Gulf faces geopolitical risks.

Furthermore, the future role of the UAE will be determined by its production capacity, reserves, and spare capacity. The UAE could act as a “shock absorber” in the oil market due to its ability to increase production.

On paper, the UAE’s significant spare capacity is significant in a crisis-prone environment. The UAE could increase its production to more than 4.5 million barrels per day, while its quota was much lower. But if tensions or war disrupt supply or increase the risk of energy transport routes, the market usually searches for other options.

The continuation of the “Iran war” or any geopolitical crisis in the Persian Gulf could increase geopolitical risks and cause damage to the UAE oil regions, change the direction of energy flows, and form a risk premium in prices.

One of the most important tasks of OPEC and OPEC+ is to implement regulatory policies. Although the activation of unused capacities of the UAE and the ability to export independently and without quota restrictions have been highlighted by Abu Dhabi. However, cooperation with major producers within OPEC or in the form of OPEC+, especially Russia, is needed for broader coordination in supply, and market stability to maintain stability in the oil market.

The UAE’s move to withdraw from OPEC and OPEC+ is more of a political decision, influenced by the West, opposing Riyadh and reflecting a deep regional rift between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi or between two incompatible Arab views in the GCC. But it should be noted that Riyadh, as the largest OPEC producer, by using its power, may impose a heavy cost on the UAE.

The UAE moved closer to the US and Israel in the war against Iran. Many believe that the UAE, as one of the most important financial and military centers in the Persian Gulf, has increasingly expanded its security-weapons cooperation with Israel.

The UAE’s announcement of a “complete” review of its relationships, alliances, and reliance on specific partners (in the oil field) could be seen as a move towards closer alignment with the United States in regional policy. But the reality is that the UAE’s energy sector is particularly vulnerable to external attacks. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has shown how vulnerable its “visionary” plans and energy economic plans.

In the coming period, the UAE will join a number of independent oil producers, such as the United States. But the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC and OPEC+ will not weaken the overall influence of the other members.

The UAE will seek to reduce its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz by investing in alternative routes, such as its port of Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman. However, the Strait of Hormuz, a waterway through which much of the country’s oil and goods pass, could be a major variable in the future of the UAE’s role in the energy market.

Furthermore, the UAE’s excess oil production capacity is only effective in conditions of security, stability, and peace in the Persian Gulf.

Although the UAE wants to become an independent producer and be more flexible in the face of constant fluctuations in the oil market, frequent or prolonged wars and security and military disruptions in the region prevent the UAE from presenting itself as a stable hub for energy and oil trade.

Samyar Rostami, а political observer and senior researcher in international relations

The Strait of Hormuz Impasse: Why “Project Freedom” Doesn’t Solve the Problem and Where to Find a Way Out of the Crisis

The conflict over the Strait of Hormuz has evolved from a military duel into a geopolitical chess match, where the stakes are measured in percentages of global GDP, and the ceasefire hangs by a thread.

Mohammed ibn Faisal al-Rashid

The New Reality of a Double Blockade

What began as a military operation has turned into a protracted crisis that analysts are already comparing to the worst economic aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic for the global economy. The situation in the Strait of Hormuz — the narrow chokepoint through which about 20% of the world’s oil supply passes — has reached an impasse. A unique configuration has emerged, which experts call a “death grip”: Iran has blocked the strait in response to U.S. and Israeli strikes, while Washington has imposed its own naval blockade on Iranian ports.

The ceasefire announced by Donald Trump on April 7 is formally being observed, but it has only created an illusion of stability. More than 900 commercial vessels have accumulated in the Persian Gulf, unable to move forward or backward, and energy markets have been in a state of turbulence since April 2026.

The only way out is to abandon maximalist demands for regime change and accept an old but workable formula: a mutually beneficial compromise

While global powers search for a way out, Tehran has managed to demonstrate remarkable tactical ingenuity. Iranian tankers have found ways to circumvent the U.S. blockade by using unorthodox routes between the islands of Larak and Qeshm. This shows that the economic strangulation of Iran has its limits, and the country continues to adapt to pressure while maintaining control of the situation.

Negotiating in Time Trouble: Positions of the Parties and Tough Statements

The diplomatic front has been as hot as the military front in recent weeks. Iran, through Pakistani intermediaries, has sent Washington a detailed plan for resolution. According to Axios and confirmed by Iranian sources, Tehran’s new proposal involves a three-stage formula for peace.

The essence of the Iranian plan boils down to an “all or nothing” formula: Tehran is willing to discuss the nuclear program only after the blockade is lifted and a ceasefire is guaranteed. However, as correctly noted in the original points, for Tehran, the Strait of Hormuz today is not just a point on a map, but its main bargaining chip in negotiations for a comprehensive settlement.

The White House’s response has been dual and extremely nervous. On the one hand, President Trump made an unprecedented statement about the state of negotiations. “I am fully aware that my representatives are conducting very positive discussions with the country of Iran, and that these discussions could lead to something very positive for everyone.” — Donald Trump post on Truth Social.

On the other hand, this same rhetoric is accompanied by maximalist threats. In an interview with Fox News, Trump stated that if the Iranians try to attack U.S. ships participating in “Project Freedom” to escort the stranded vessels, they will be “wiped off the face of the Earth.” When asked by journalists about the possibility of new strikes, Trump threatened that if Tehran “behaves badly,” military action could resume at any moment.

Such dual communication — the carrot and the stick — is confusing even for America’s allies. Iran, for its part, is using symmetrical rhetoric. The IRGC command has stated that President Trump faces a choice between an “impossible operation or a bad deal for the U.S.”

The Israel Factor and the “Netanyahu Trap”

A key obstacle to progress is Israel’s position. As the provided materials suggest and political scientists confirm, Washington’s initial goals of “taming” Iran’s nuclear program were effectively dictated by Israel. While the Trump administration appears to be seeking a pragmatic way out of the crisis (opening the strait to save the economy), the Israeli leadership insists on the complete dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.

All experts without exception note that Israel is changing its rhetoric, becoming more hardline. Israeli strategists believe that since negotiations have stalled, it’s time to return to a military scenario to “deal with Iran once and for all.” This creates a conflict where Washington is forced to balance between the interests of the global economy (which needs an open strait) and its alliance obligations to Netanyahu.

Israel’s demands — to strip Iran of enrichment rights, dismantle facilities — make any compromise politically toxic for Tehran, which cannot agree to such a capitulationist scenario. If Tel Aviv and Washington fail to achieve this, it is highly likely that Tehran, as Jonathan Last argues in “ The Bulwark“, will emerge from this conflict as the victor, having withstood an attack by one of the world’s most powerful global powers and a state aspiring to regional leadership while retaining its strategic leverage. According to the author of the article, ‘this will look like a historic turning point, after which the idea of the US as a globally dominant country capable of imposing its own rules of the game on others will be definitively erased, and Washington’s image will be permanently undermined.’

“Project Freedom”: Humanitarian Gesture or Provocation?

Tensions peaked on May 3–4 with the launch of “Project Freedom.” Trump announced the start of an operation to escort the stranded ships, calling it a humanitarian gesture.

However, the assessments of military experts cited in the source material proved prophetic: the operation was called “dangerous and useless.” By the next day, reports emerged that ships were coming under attack, and the operation’s goals remained unclear to shipping companies. Moreover, Iran regarded “Project Freedom” as a direct violation of the ceasefire regime.

From a military standpoint, as noted in BESA analysis, such an operation risks falling into a “knife fight” — a tactic for which the Iranian navy (specifically the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) has been preparing for decades, using speedboats, mines, and coastal missile batteries.

Ways Out of the Impasse: A Regional Security Formula

Given that time is running out and military force has not led to the capitulation of either side, unconventional solutions must be sought. Analysis of Iran’s 14-point proposal shows that Tehran has already shifted to a strategy of “geopolitical swapping”: nuclear concessions like those in 2015 in exchange for broad regional security.

To break the “death grip” and avoid a new round of war, the following conditions must be met:

– Separate the Nuclear Dossier from the Shipping Issue

There is a rational core in Iran’s current proposal (according to Al Jazeera): postponing complex nuclear negotiations to a later stage. The parties need to agree to a “delayed solution.” First — unblocking the strait under international control and a mutual suspension of military actions. The nuclear issue must return to the purview of the IAEA and the P5+1, rather than being held hostage by immediate military threats.

– Create a “Pan-Persian Security Architecture”

This is the boldest but also most viable point of the Iranian plan. Neither the U.S. nor Israel can guarantee lasting security in the Gulf alone. It is necessary to return to the idea of dialogue among the littoral states (Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar). External powers (the U.S.) must make way for regional mechanisms of non-interference and freedom of navigation, taking on the role of guarantors rather than sole managers.

– Lift the Blockade Step by Step Using a “Synchronization” Principle

The current double blockade is mutual strangulation. Washington and Tehran need to agree on a step-by-step schedule: the withdrawal of U.S. ships from the immediate area of the strait in exchange for the Iranians clearing the shipping channel of mines. Only equal and synchronized steps will allow potential military incidents to be dismissed as “technical glitches” rather than aggression.

– Remove Israel from a “Veto” Role

As long as Israel’s prime minister has a say in U.S. decision-making regarding security in the Persian Gulf, peace is impossible. Israel’s security interests must be discussed on a separate track, not linked to the immediate unblocking of the strait for tankers from the Gulf states. Washington must show strategic independence from its ally if it is truly interested in ending the global energy crisis.

Diplomacy Must Step In

As long as Trump talks about “positive negotiations” but continues to threaten to “wipe off the face of the Earth,” and Iran finds ways around the blockade, the world teeters on the brink of a recession. The impasse in the Strait of Hormuz is a crisis of political will. The only way out is to abandon maximalist demands for regime change and accept an old but workable formula: a mutually beneficial compromise in which Iran gets its assets unfrozen and pressure relieved in exchange for transparency, and the U.S. regains stable oil prices and freedom of navigation.

If this doesn’t happen in the coming weeks, “Project Freedom” risks becoming “Project Apocalypse.”

Muhammad ibn Faisal al-Rashid, political scientist, and expert on the Arab world

Iran’s current approach to relations with Russia

Many in Iran view Russia as a key partner for ensuring their economic survival. Russia can help Iran withstand sanctions, meet domestic food needs, and rebuild its energy sector.

Samyar Rostami

Political and Diplomatic Sphere

Iran-Russia relations, based on the signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty (CSP) in January 2025, cover the political, diplomatic, economic, trade, military-technical, security, energy, scientific, cultural, and educational spheres.

In 2026, the two sides’ relations are more dynamic, and high-level meetings continue. Russia condemned the US and Israel invasion against Iran in February 2026 and, through a statement, called these attacks illegitimate.

President Putin was the first leader to offer condolences on the martyrdom of the Supreme Leader of Iran and congratulated the leadership of Ayatollah Seyyed Mujtaba Khamenei.

Just as Russia intends to maintain its strategic relations, Iran also considers relations with Russia a “strategic partnership at the highest level”

Also, the previous message of the Iranian leader to Putin, high-level consultations between the two countries; holding more than 12 rounds of talks between the two foreign ministers; three telephone conversations between the presidents of the two countries; humanitarian aid of over 400 tons of goods to Iran; coordination in political positions between the two countries in international forums; and the veto of the draft American resolution are an important part of the strategic relations between the two countries in the new circumstances.

In this regard, on the first visit of Iranian officials to Russia since the last US and Israeli attacks on April 27, 2026, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi went to St. Petersburg to coordinate with his partner.

Araghchi thanked the Russian president for his recent messages and said that in our view, Iran-Russia relations are a strategic partnership that will continue with greater strength and scope.

These talks and meetings are taking place at a time when the ceasefire brokered by Pakistan has been fraught with tension since April 8 due to disputes over the Strait of Hormuz and the blockade of Iranian ports by the US, and the Iran-US negotiations are increasingly challenging.

As Moscow stood by Iran and used the veto tool to prevent the adoption of resolutions that could affect Iran’s interests, Tehran is also grateful for Russia’s strong stance in supporting Iran.

In addition to Russia’s ability to act and its presence in Iran’s neighborhood, the need for active diplomacy and high-level consultations, the exchange of views on regional and international developments, and the prospects for direct cooperation have increased Tehran’s need for greater coordination in positions with the Kremlin.

It seems that Iran-Russia cooperation has also entered a phase with newer dimensions.

The alignment of the two countries in many global trends, such as the construction of a multipolar world or partnership in structures such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, or the Eurasian Economic Union, highlights the importance of Tehran’s greater attention to relations.

In another dimension, the strength of Iran’s response, and Russia’s sensitivity to preventing the spread of conflict against Iran can be analyzed within the framework of this approach.

On the nuclear issue, Russia has made several proposals to resolve the disputes over Iran’s nuclear program and is ready to mediate.

While Moscow has repeatedly offered to maintain Iran’s highly enriched uranium reserves, and has confirmed its readiness to facilitate its transfer, it seems that if Tehran concludes that the export of enriched uranium is necessary as part of an agreement with the United States, the transfer to Russia is the main priority.

Security and defense area

Although the 2025 agreement is not a mutual defense pact and does not create a commitment to direct military assistance, there are developments and reports of extensive information exchange arrangements, direct transfers of military systems, or formalization of cooperation frameworks. In fact, Tehran’s willingness to engage in military-security-intelligence cooperation with Russia has increased compared to the past.

In the meantime, more cooperation can be expected in areas such as hardware and components, reverse engineering of systems, reconstruction of Iran’s war-weakened military-technical base, training, exchange of expertise.

Despite the strengthening of relations between some of the Arab GCC states and Ukraine, it appears that Tehran and Moscow’s cooperation in eliminating Ukraine’s negative presence in the Persian Gulf states is a win-win.

Economy and Energy

The trade turnover of Iran and Russia in the first 11 months of 2025 reached 4.8 billion dollars (13.1% increase). The long-term goal of the two sides is to reach 10-30 billion dollars of annual trade.

In the economic sphere, sanctions, as a structural factor, can play an important role in strengthening and deepening cooperation.

Both Iran and Russia are under the pressure of heavy sanctions. The war against Iran has affected the national and global economic order and has affected many equations at the regional and trans-regional levels in the energy market.

From Tehran’s perspective, continuous and serious consultations between the two countries to manage these conditions and develop cooperation in various fields have increased opportunities for cooperation between the two countries, and strengthened trade and energy routes.

Tehran has a positive view of strengthening Iran-Russia trade in terms of quality and quantity and much broader cooperation in the North-South Corridor (INSTC).

From the perspective of many in Iran, Russia can be a helpful and important player in Iran’s “economic survival”; “resilience” against sanctions and economic pressures; meeting Iran’s food and domestic needs; and rebuilding Iran’s damaged energy sectors.

As one of Iran’s most important strategic partners, Russia can help Iran’s economy in the post-war days and rebuild damaged sectors. Existing financial frameworks in Eurasia, such as the Eurasian Development Bank and agreements on the use of national currencies in transactions between members, the use of national currencies, and the exchange of goods and services, can also receive more attention in this direction.

Soft Power and Public Opinion

Strengthening Russia’s image and soft power among the Iranian people and political movements is important. Although in Iranian public opinion, expectations of the level of cooperation with Russia are higher than the existing realities, from the perspective of many in Iranian political movements, Moscow’s more active role is clearer than in the 12-day war. In other words, the totality of Russia’s actions and positions towards Iran have had a positive impact on public opinion inside Iran to some extent.‌

Outlook

The outlook of cooperation between Russia and Iran depends on domestic and international factors, sanctions management, maintaining continuous cooperation, adapting to the environment, overcoming infrastructure obstacles, and adapting to developments in world crises.

Neither Tehran nor Moscow is expecting unrealistic events or developments outside the framework of national interests. However, it seems that Iran-Russia relations as a strategic partnership at the highest level will become stronger day by day.

Just as Russia intends to maintain its strategic relations, Iran also considers relations with Russia as “a strategic partnership at the highest level,” and regardless of anything that happens, Iran-Russia relations will continue to strengthen.

Samyar Rostami, а political observer and senior researcher in international relations

Xi Jinping’s Four-Point Proposal for West Asia and the Persian Gulf

Strategic Council Online – Opinion: The four-point proposal announced by Xi Jinping, President of China, can be described as a new strategic framework for “peace and stability in West Asia and the Persian Gulf.”

Hamed Vafaei – Professor of China Studies, University of Tehran

This proposal, which has been presented simultaneously with the recent aggression by the United States and the Israeli regime against Iran and the recent tensions in the Strait of Hormuz, should be described as Beijing’s latest declared framework for playing a role in this sensitive, fragile, and complex environment.

According to the recent positions of the President of China, the four main pillars of this proposal are as follows:

1. Adherence to the principle of peaceful coexistence and the necessity of building a “common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security architecture” for West Asia and the Persian Gulf.
2. Adherence to the principle of national sovereignty with full respect for the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of the countries of the region, and the protection of the safety of personnel, facilities, and civilian institutions of all countries.
3. Adherence to the principle of the rule of international law with the aim of preserving the authority of international law in order to prevent the world’s return to the “law of the jungle”; and
4. The coordination of the two matters of “development and security” with the aim of creating a favorable environment for the development of the countries of the region and linking the two categories of security and development.

This proposal can be described as an important part of China’s “diplomacy and Global Security Initiative” strategy in the era of the multipolarization of the international system, the key dimensions of which include opposition to domination and unilateralism; a matter that, in the third clause, with an explicit reference to the phrase “law of the jungle,” directly refers to the current policies of the United States, including the naval blockade of Iran’s ports, joint attacks with the Israeli regime, and repeated violations of ceasefires by Washington and Tel Aviv.

Beijing believes that the West, especially the United States, through force and sanctions, has returned the world to the era of the “jungle”; while China proposes the “peaceful path of development” to the world. These concepts are among the key terms known as “Chinese characteristics” in Xi’s diplomacy, or “Xiplomacy,” which gain meaning alongside principles such as non-interference, development orientation, and opposition to unilateralism.

Xi, in fact, through this language, introduces his country as a “responsible major power” and a defender of “multilateralism” in the turbulent international system, and implicitly declares that the Western liberal order centered on the United States has failed. It is also necessary to recall that this is precisely the same language that Beijing used during the Ukraine war and the Gaza crisis.

Another dimension of this proposal is its security dimension and the proposal of a new architecture in this field, which is articulated in the first clause by presenting principles that can be described as a reiteration of parts of Xi Jinping’s “Global Security Initiative.” In this regard, instead of military alliances and frameworks such as NATO or the “United States–Israel–Arabs” axis, China focuses on a “common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable” architecture in the region. The important point is that this architecture is “non-American.” This framework is the same concept that China demonstrated in 2023 through its mediation between Tehran and Riyadh.

Another dimension of this proposal is its sovereignty dimension and the principle of non-interference, which, in the second clause, addresses the rearticulation of China’s classical position in confronting the approach of Trump’s America in cases such as “regime change” or “blockade.” This clause of Xi’s proposal directly defends Iran’s right to defend its territorial integrity and its waterways, including the Strait of Hormuz, and portrays the United States’ blockade as an illegal action. It should, however, be noted that China’s emphasis on territorial integrity and national sovereignty also takes into account its reservations regarding potential actions by Tehran in response to enemy aggressions from the territory of these countries.

Another dimension of this proposal is its economic-developmental dimension, which can be interpreted as one of the fundamental principles of China’s foreign policy and as the beating heart of Chinese diplomacy (Xiplomacy). The concepts intended by Xi Jinping in this clause should be sought within the content of his “Global Development Initiative.” An initiative that, by emphasizing “socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era,” underscores that China is no longer an “emerging power,” but rather, as a “responsible major power,” seeks to create stability through economy and diplomacy without deploying troops or sending weapons.

Overall, this proposal can be described not as a temporary tactical proposal, but as a long-term strategic framework for a “post-American West Asia.” It can be said that Xi Jinping, through this initiative, seeks to present China as a “neutral extra-regional major power,” or in other words, a “balancing weight” that maintains a strategic relationship with Iran, a comprehensive partnership with the Gulf Arabs, and economic relations with the Israeli regime.

In this context, the Strait of Hormuz card has created this golden opportunity for Tehran to elevate the level of its relations with China as a global power, from the usual and traditional framework of the past decade to the level of a “balancing weight,” while adhering to national interests and the three principles of dignity, wisdom, and expediency.

In light of Xi Jinping’s four-point proposal, China’s capacity to play a role in this crisis can be increased, but in the medium term it should be assessed as limited to soft and economic instruments. At the same time, considering the realities of policymaking in China under Xi Jinping’s leadership, it is necessary to understand that, in view of the objectives and frameworks of the Chinese Communist Party, Beijing’s potential mediation in this crisis will primarily be “facilitative” rather than “guarantor” in nature; this clearly has its roots in “Chinese realism” and the principle of “friendship without alliance.”

Ultimately, this proposal can be described as an indication of a new level of effort by an emerging major pole in the international system to utilize the existing environment for the definitive transition of West Asia from an “American order” to a “multipolar order,” in which China can have an unprecedented centrality.

The realization of this new order is, in the first instance, contingent upon the acceptance of regional actors, and in the subsequent stage requires Beijing’s movement from the phase of caution to new domains. The intelligent acceptance of this environment for Iran, in addition to elevating the level of Tehran–Beijing interactions, can lead to the facilitation of the country’s economic reconstruction after the war and a relative reduction of ongoing existential threats; however, the ultimate success of such an order naturally depends on whether Tehran and Beijing can transform this framework into a “grand bargain” or not.

Therefore, Xi’s proposal can be regarded as a manifestation of “Chinese patience diplomacy” in the Hormuz crisis, with entirely Chinese roots, including non-military, non-interventionist, and development-oriented engagement, and the calibration of a balanced movement (from a Chinese perspective) between Iran as an anti-American partner and the Arabs as economic partners, aimed at weakening American hegemony without direct confrontation.
In such an environment, the Islamic Republic of Iran must pay attention to several fundamental principles: first, that Beijing is a “friend,” but it views the world through a “Chinese” lens and thinks from the perspective of China’s interests; this means economy first, then security, and ultimately strategic patience.

Tehran must take into account that Xi’s proposal is a window of opportunity, not a guarantee, and if Tehran examines and analyzes it with a realistic perspective and an understanding of the Chinese viewpoint on today’s and tomorrow’s global developments, it can use the Chinese economic lever to reduce pressures and balance the current complex conditions.

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