The Message of the Enemy’s Airstrikes

By Mohammad Raad, Al-Akhbar newspaper

The “Israeli” airstrikes that targeted residential buildings and commercial shops in Beirut, the southern suburbs, and the mountains, as well as in the South and the Beqaa, are the acts of a defeated enemy-desperate over its inability to achieve the objectives it dreams of in Lebanon.

They are by no means an indication of any field achievement revealing that the enemy has reached a strategic position through which it can impose a fait accompli on the Lebanese, forcing them into submission, surrendering to its will, and yielding to its blackmail.

The martyrs, the wounded, and those affected are the sons and daughters of our honorable people. Their loss, pain, and the grief of their families are a merit and a shared burden with the fighters who confront, on the battlefield, an enemy that seeks to subjugate the homeland, humiliate its people, and violate sovereignty and national dignity.

Every drop of blood shed in confronting this enemy, rejecting its objectives, and resisting its aggression stands as an indictment against every coward, defeatist, or false claimant of honor, patriotism, or sovereignty-those who seek the enemy’s approval while mocking those who sacrifice their lives to repel its aggression.

Liberation is not achieved without effort, resolve, and struggle. Sovereignty is not secured without self-confidence, trust in the people and in God, and a refusal to take instructions and directives from those who are the enemy’s protectors, friends, and partners.

Lamenting the losses, victims, and destruction during the confrontation and resistance against a savage, criminal enemy-one that seeks nothing but harm and ruin for the country, its officials, and its citizens alike-turns into empty rhetoric and incitement, a dance upon the wounds of the honorable, and a vile and spiteful exploitation and glorification of the enemy’s crimes and airstrikes that violate civilian lives, international law, agreements, and norms.

In the spirit of patriotism, we should stop dwelling on the mistakes of our people while they are resisting the enemy’s project and objectives. As for spreading rumors, manufacturing climates of incitement, and adopting authoritarian measures that deepen national division-these are policies that bear no relation to national logic or genuine patriotic action.

Those who are shortsighted, whatever their position, should not imagine that the self-appointed guardians care more for the country’s interests and welfare than the honorable resistance fighters who offer their blood and lives cheaply for the nation’s dignity and the honor of its people.

Through the savage airstrikes it launched against Lebanon—out of malice, hatred, and spite-the “Israeli” enemy sought to send a message to its American patron: let us mock the world and diverge in our stance on accepting the proposed truce with Iran. You may accept it, while I refuse-and you have no authority over me. I am your pampered proxy, deserving to hold sway over you and to drag you into war in pursuit of my own interests and in defense of my entity.

These brutal Zionist airstrikes-likely to be repeated-are the message, but will that message achieve its aim?

What we believe is that the path toward ending the war in the region serves shared interests between Iran and the United States, and it cannot achieve the desired success with Iran unless “Israel” halts its fire in Lebanon.

The resistance knows where the enemy is most vulnerable, and Iran knows its responsibilities well. There is no need for some Lebanese to become further entangled beyond the mistakes they have already made against their country’s sovereignty and the unity of its people.

Do not rush into the slide-what awaits at the bottom is more perilous than enduring the impact.
*Head of the Loyalty to the Resistance parliamentary bloc

Can US-Iran talks in Islamabad succeed amidst zionist slaughter in Lebanon and blatant US duplicity?

Crescent International

The Serena Hotel in Islamabad where indirect talks between Islamic Iran and the US are scheduled to be held on April 11. Informed observers, however, are skeptical given the zionist slaughter in Lebanon and US backing for it that the talks will be held.

Pakistani officials are excited about the prospect of hosting indirect talks between the US and Iran in Islamabad scheduled for April 11.

Rumours spread by the Wall Street Journal that an Iranian delegation had arrived in Islamabad was categorically rejected by Tasnim News Agency saying that as long as zionist attacks on Lebanon continue, there is no prospect of any talks.

Given this situation, will they be held at all?

Can they succeed unless the zionist onslaught on Lebanon ends?

Doubts have been cast because the zionists launched their genocidal attack on Lebanon immediately after the ceasefire announcement.

It resulted in the slaughter 254 civilians and injuries to another 1,100, some of them critically.

Islamic Iran expressed dismay at the zionist war criminals’ wanton killing of Lebanese civilians after US president Donald Trump had signed off on the ceasefire announcement by Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif.

The White House was directly involved in “shaping” it, having reviewed and approved it before publication, according to a New York Times (NYT) report on April 8.

Commenting on the NYT story, The Cradle wrote: “the report says Washington saw and signed off on the statement in advance, indicating that the announcement was not an independent diplomatic move but part of coordinated communication.”

Despite Trump’s threat to annihilate Iran’s civilization, published on his Lies Total (aka Truth Social) if it did not “comply” with his demands by 8:00 pm (Washington time) on April 7, behind the scenes, US officials were actively seeking a way out as the deadline approached.

The NYT report further asserted that diplomatic channels were far more active than the public messaging indicated, with the ceasefire appeal reflecting a managed effort rather than a spontaneous initiative.

Sharif’s post itself had appeared earlier with the header “Draft – Pakistan’s PM Message on X.”

It fueled speculation that the text had been provided externally (from the US) before publication.

It called for extending the deadline by two weeks, reopening the Strait of Hormuz as a “goodwill gesture,” and implementing a temporary ceasefire across all fronts (our emphasis).

The 10-point plan that Iran had submitted to the Pakistani mediators specifically mentioned a halt to fighting across all fronts, directly naming Lebanon.

The Pakistani premier’s statement on X also explicitly stated that “the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America, along with their allies, have agreed to an immediate ceasefire everywhere, including Lebanon and elsewhere, EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.”

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi wrote on X that “the US can either have a ceasefire or wage war. It cannot have both”referring to the zionist assault on Lebanon.

US Vice President JD Vance, who will lead the US delegation to the indirect talks, later said the US never promised to include Lebanon in the ceasefire.

He alleged that Iran’s belief that it was included came from a “misunderstanding.”

Vance did not explain what the “misunderstanding” was.

Trump had on April 7 said that Iran’s 10-plan could form the basis of negotiation in the indirect talks.

He too, later denied that Lebanon was included in the ceasefire agreement.

This came about after the indicted war criminal Benjamin Netanyahu said it wasn’t.

Unless the zionist slaughter in Lebanon stops immediately, the chances of talks, even if held indirectly, appear slim.

The American delegation, in addition to Vance, would include Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner.

The two are hardcore zionists and poisonous snakes.

Iran has had a very bitter experience with them on two separate occasions when they were close to a deal and yet the US-zionist duo attacked Iran.

Foreign Minister Araghchi has stated that there is “zero trust” in US officials and their pronouncements.

What the US will do to restore that trust will be tested in Islamabad, if the talks occur at all.

Iranian officials must treat the Americans’ promises with great caution.

Abbas AraghchiIslamabadPakistanUS-Iran indirect talksJ D VanceMohammed Bagher QalibafDonald TrumpShehbaz SharifLebanon

America Has Reached the Limits of Its Power

By Fyodor Lukyanov, RT

Donald Trump has declared the start of a new “golden age” in the Middle East after announcing a ceasefire with Iran. The war, at least for now, has been paused. And while predictions are always risky with this White House, there is at least a chance that the fighting will not immediately resume.

That alone matters. A prolonged war would raise risks for everyone, but above all for Washington. For all the bombast coming from the US administration, America has always been deeply uncomfortable with prolonged uncertainty and strategic risk. It is one thing to threaten. It is another to endure the consequences when threats fail.

The precise terms of the ceasefire remain unclear and may not yet be fully agreed. But the central political fact is already visible: Faced with determined resistance, the US stepped back.

None of the sweeping demands set out at the start of the operation were met. Trump’s all-caps demand for Iran’s “UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER!” now looks more like political theater than strategic doctrine. Yet behind the social media drama, something more rational prevailed in Washington: When pressure fails, it is better to retreat than to escalate into a situation you may no longer control.

The feverish rhetoric before the truce served a purpose. It allowed Washington to claim that Tehran had blinked, while creating such a sense of looming catastrophe that any pause in fighting could be sold as relief. The White House will now try to present restraint as victory.

This conflict is undoubtedly a milestone in the wider transformation of the international system. But it is not the end of that process. Nor is it the final chapter in the struggle for the Middle East.

Iran, above all, has demonstrated resilience. It has completely undermined the core assumption behind the US-“Israeli” campaign, namely that a sufficiently powerful blow would be enough to bring down the Islamic Republic or force it into submission.

Tehran’s response was not spectacular in the conventional military sense, but it was effective. Iran widened the theater of tension and signaled that the costs of escalation would not be confined to military targets. It forced its opponents to reckon not only with Iranian retaliation, but with the fragility of the wider regional system.

This matters because the endurance of the US and its regional partners is limited. Iran’s, by contrast, has historically been much greater.

The so-called Axis of Resistance also proved more durable than many had assumed. Despite the serious damage inflicted by “Israel” over the past two years, pro-Iranian forces in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq remain a strategic factor. Even where they did not intervene directly, they raised the temperature and forced the attackers to remain on edge.

The broader effort to neutralize Iranian influence has therefore backfired. Iran has emerged bloodied but still standing. Even if Tehran’s claims that any settlement must happen on its terms are partly negotiating tactics, one thing is already clear: Iran’s regional weight has not diminished in the way Washington and Tel Aviv intended.

Negotiations with Tehran are now unavoidable. The real question is what Iran itself wants.

Its previous strategy of regional expansion contributed to many of the crises now engulfing the Middle East. There is also the unresolved issue of its nuclear program: What exactly is Iran seeking, and what price is it prepared to pay? Iran appears to have entered a new internal phase as well, with power shifting further toward security institutions. That leadership will now have to weigh ambition against reality.

For the wider region, the implications are profound.

The Gulf monarchies have had a sobering experience. There will be no return to the comfortable old formula in which security could simply be outsourced to Washington in exchange for money and loyalty. That arrangement, which underpinned the region since the Cold War, has been badly shaken.

Publicly, the Gulf states are unlikely to make dramatic gestures. But privately, their search for new hedges and new partners will intensify. China, South Asia, Russia and, to a lesser extent, Western Europe will all become more important in their calculations.

That doesn’t mean the Gulf will accept Iranian dominance. The monarchies will not tolerate Tehran having unchecked influence over the Gulf or the ability to dictate terms in the Strait of Hormuz. Their policy is likely to become more complex: containing Iran where possible while engaging with it where necessary.

“Israel”, meanwhile, has not achieved its stated aims either. However loudly victory is proclaimed, the basic strategic reality has not changed. The Iranian factor remains. It has not been eliminated, nor weakened enough for “Israel” to feel genuinely secure.

The domestic consequences for the US are harder to judge. Trump’s self-congratulation already rings hollow, but much will depend on economics. If oil markets stabilize, the White House will try to move on quickly and insist disaster was averted thanks to Trump’s leadership. Whether that helps Republicans in the November midterms is unclear.

Still, Trump has always had one instinct his critics often underestimate: He knows how to survive setbacks and reframe them.

The larger conclusion, however, goes beyond Trump. The US remains immensely powerful. Its military reach, financial leverage and ability to shape events are still formidable. But they are not limitless. America can still influence outcomes but can no longer simply impose its will at any cost.

That lesson has now been absorbed far beyond Tehran. Allies and adversaries alike will draw their own conclusions. Iran may be a special case, but a precedent has been set.

This is another step toward a different world, one in which coercion is less decisive and the old assumptions about American omnipotence increasingly obsolete. Trump may wish to replace a liberal American-led order with an illiberal one under US dominance. But the events of recent weeks suggest something else: a world moving beyond any order Washington can fully control.

How Iran decimated US power projection in West Asia: Military lessons of 40-day war

By Mohammad Molaei

As the ceasefire comes into effect after 40 days of aggression against the Islamic Republic, with violations continuing on the Lebanese front, military analysts worldwide are just beginning to unpack one of the most unexpected outcomes of modern military confrontation.

They are examining how the Islamic Republic of Iran, against the full American air and naval power backed by the finest allied systems, managed not only to survive but to inflict high costs and ultimately achieve a historic victory despite overwhelming odds.

Iran's success did not come through matching the United States in crude technological adequacy or superior system quantities. Rather, it resulted from an advanced, multidimensional asymmetric approach integrating mass, accuracy, mobility, electronic warfare, and unremitting innovation.

This strategy turned historically strong American capabilities in air superiority and power projection into liabilities, while exposing the vulnerabilities of costly, high-tech defensive systems facing prolonged, low-cost saturation attacks.

Anti-access/area denial in the Persian Gulf: Holding US carriers at bay

Among the clearest evidence of Iranian military effectiveness was its maritime defense. The backbone of American power projection — US Navy carrier strike groups — was never free to operate without detection in proximity to Iranian waters.

Iranian coastal defense doctrine established a dense network of mobile anti-ship missile batteries, creating an impassable no-go zone.

Iranian anti-ship cruise missiles — such as the Noor (range approximately 120-170 km), the Qader (range approximately 200-300 km), and longer-range systems like the Abu Mahdi (some versions reaching 1,000 km) — forced American surface combatants to standoff range.

US carriers and their escorts never dared to approach within 300 km of the Iranian coast. Iranian forces fired multiple salvos of anti-ship cruise missiles at both short-range (300 km) and long-range (1,000 km) targets, typically accompanied by swarms of loitering munitions and fast-attack boats.

Although these attacks did not necessarily result in sinkings, they forced US forces to expend vast quantities of defensive missiles and divert air assets to protection missions, significantly impairing American offensive momentum.

Combined with sea-skimming profiles, terminal maneuvering, and saturation tactics, this made interception an extremely expensive affair. The US Navy found itself in an archetypal cost-benefit trap: pitting expensive multimillion-dollar interceptors against cheaper cruise missiles in a highly constrained littoral battlespace where response time was minimal.

Ballistic missile excellence and defeat of theater missile defense

Iran's ballistic missile force proved to be the decisive strategic weapon. Throughout the 40-day war, Iran maintained a very high volume of fire, launching waves of advanced missiles combining liquid and solid fuel systems with increasing accuracy and survivability.

The Kheibar Shekan (and its modernized versions) played a particularly significant role. This medium-range ballistic missile features a maneuverable reentry vehicle capable of making terminal-phase adjustments at high speed, making reliable interception by Patriot PAC-3 systems extremely difficult.

The combination of speed, altitude profile, and evasive maneuvers stretched the kinematic limits of several Western interceptors. The United States and its allies expended thousands of Patriot and THAAD missiles — costing billions of dollars — yet leak rates remained high enough to damage bases and infrastructure multiple times over.

Targeting the eyes of the US missile defense

One of the enablers of Iran's astounding success was the systematic targeting of the US missile defense system's "eyes." At the beginning of the war, Iranian retaliatory attacks — using both ballistic missiles and drones — damaged or destroyed at least four AN/TPY-2 radars associated with THAAD stations in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar.

These powerful X-band radars are essential for providing the long-range, high-resolution tracking needed to achieve exo-atmospheric intercepts. As several of these mission-critical sensors were either blinded or impaired, the effectiveness of the layered US-led missile defense architecture plummeted significantly.

The destruction of early-warning and discrimination capability meant that even advanced THAAD interceptors could no longer reliably engage incoming threats — particularly when Iran combined ballistic missiles with decoys and saturation salvos.

Short-range air defense: The stealthy killers of sophisticated aircraft

Although long-range capabilities dominated headlines, it was Iran's short- and very-short-range air defense systems that inflicted some of the most crushing damage on US airpower. Electro-optically guided, low-signature launchers such as the Majid (AD-08) and the Qaem-118 — with ranges of approximately 10-15 km — proved incredibly successful.

These systems lack radar emitters, making them nearly invisible to conventional radar warning receivers until a missile is already in flight. During the war, Iranian short-range air defenses were reported to have shot down over 160 drones and several manned aircraft, including F-15E Strike Eagles and A-10 Thunderbolt IIs. Most astonishingly, Iran claimed — and provided evidence of having downed or damaged at least one F-35 Lightning II.

This was widely regarded as nearly impossible before the war. The F-35's AN/AAQ-37 Distributed Aperture System (DAS) provides 360-degree infrared coverage and can detect incoming missiles, cue countermeasures, and even command evasive maneuvers without pilot input.

The jet is also equipped with advanced infrared countermeasures, including cutting-edge flare dispensers and other systems designed to counteract optically guided threats. Nevertheless, Iranian electro-optical systems repeatedly achieved locks and hits — possibly indicating higher sensor sensitivity, superior image processing, or effective tactics that reduced warning time beyond the F-35's defensive capabilities.

These short-range systems formed a dense, mobile, and highly integrated air defense grid. Iranian crews adapted quickly as the war progressed: they refined engagement envelopes, improved camouflage and relocation strategies, and closed off previously exploitable avenues.

What began as an occasional threat became a tightening noose. According to American pilot reports, they experienced an ever-shrinking operating range, an increasing risk profile during close air support and strike missions, and a continued deterioration of freedom of maneuver.

The result was a slow strangulation of US air superiority — not necessarily through attrition of aircraft numbers, but through a drastic rise in the risk and cost of every sortie.

Delayed adaptation and cost-imbalance strategy

Iran's overall strategy rested on three pillars: mass (large quantities of cheaply produced drones and missiles), precision and maneuverability (enhanced guidance packages and terminal-phase evasion), and resilience (mobile launchers, underground bases, and rapid repair capabilities).

This dragged the United States and its allies into a war of attrition in which high-cost, limited-quantity munitions were traded against low-cost, mass-produced Iranian weapons.

Patriot and THAAD interceptors cost millions of dollars each and were often fired in two- or three-shot salvos against each incoming threat. The problem was exacerbated by swarms of drones, which forced defenders to choose between expending expensive interceptors or suffering successful attacks. The result was that US and Persian Gulf inventories were depleted, logistics systems were repeatedly overstretched, and political pressure mounted to de-escalate.

Iran also demonstrated remarkable operational learning. Air defense crews continuously adjusted frequencies, emission control protocols, and ambushing strategies. Missile forces rotated between fixed and mobile positions, employed decoys, and maintained launch efficiency despite persistent American and Israeli airstrikes.

Air corridors that had previously been open became highly contested, forcing American planners to either accept greater risk or reduce operational tempos.

A new model of regional deterrence

Neither side was able to win the Ramadan war on its own traditional battlefield. But in strictly military terms, Iran achieved its fundamental objectives: it deterred a full-scale ground invasion, foiled the “regime change” plots hatched by the enemy, and demonstrated that American troops and airspace were no longer safe havens of American hegemonic power.

This war highlighted a dynamic reality of modern warfare: the absence of qualitative technological superiority can be countered by quantity, asymmetry, and multi-domain integration.

Iran's ability to combine ballistic missiles that defeat or saturate theater defenses, anti-ship attacks that keep capital ships at standoff range, and short-range electro-optical air defenses proven effective against fifth-generation stealth aircraft — all of this demonstrates that Iran has built an effective A2/AD bubble far stronger than pre-war estimates suggested.

As the dust settles and both sides count the lessons, one inescapable fact remains: the mighty US military is no longer able to dictate its terms at an acceptable pace and cost against a resolute, well-armed regional power equipped with modern asymmetric capabilities.

Iranian military’s performance has rewritten chapters of the military playbook for future confrontations in the West Asia region — and has sent a powerful message that the era of unparalleled US domination in the region is past

The ceasefire may have prevented the continuation of a devastating war that could spill over beyond the region, but the military lessons of the ‘Ramadan War’ will continue to shape deterrence calculations, force planning, and alliances in the region for years to come.

Mohammad Molaei is a Tehran-based military affairs analyst.

Narrative of Hezbollah’s Collapse Evaporates in “Israel”: The Resistance Redraws the Balance of Power

Latifa Housseiny 

Hezbollah thwarted the enemy’s assessments and expectations. For 15 months, it believed that the resistance had weakened- if not completely ended-and continued to present this as the conclusion of the 66-day war in 2024.

After the more than two-month war, many Zionist officials concluded that the region was now in their pocket, particularly the Lebanese arena. “We pushed Hezbollah decades backward,” “the party is no longer what it was before the war,” and “its leadership and infrastructure were severely struck”- these were the headlines Benjamin Netanyahu declared after announcing the November 2024 agreement. Yet the most important part of his remarks was that “Israel” was in a ceasefire with Hezbollah, not at the end of the war.

In contrast, the speech of Hezbollah Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem spoke openly and without ambiguity about the recovery and reconstruction of the resistance’s military body. Details of the process were not disclosed, but work was proceeding at full speed. Meanwhile, the enemy continued escalating daily strikes and targeting operations in the south and across various regions.

On March 2, after tensions reached a breaking point, and after the enemy massed its forces along the Lebanese border simultaneously with the start of its war against Iran, the resistance decided it would no longer remain silent. It launched rockets toward the occupied north, and the Zionists began their campaign against all of Lebanon.

The first reaction inside the entity was shock following the resistance’s launch of six rockets. The “Israeli” assessment had not anticipated such a move; expectations were that Hezbollah would refrain from any confrontation because it was “deterred, defeated, and lacking any military capability, especially after the fall of Syria.”

The confrontation quickly escalated, with the resistance’s military operations intensifying day by day- increasing in number and in the use of guided and advanced rockets, shells, and drones- alongside expanding ranges and deeper strikes inside the entity and its settlements, as well as close-range clashes and the planting of explosive devices.

How Did the Enemy Receive the Shock of the False Narrative of Hezbollah’s Collapse?

Thus, in the ongoing confrontation with the enemy, Hezbollah imposed the equation of “evacuation for evacuation,” targeting the depth of the northern region. Based on this reality, more than one official, writer, analyst, and military correspondent within the entity acknowledged that the intelligence assessment in Tel Aviv had been mistaken and that the party had rapidly restored its capabilities. This was reported by “Israel’s” Channel 13 at the beginning of the war, citing a Zionist official. However, the clearest statement came from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself on the 14th day of the war, when he admitted his failure to prevent the growth of Hezbollah’s capabilities. He noted that estimates had indicated Hezbollah possessed around 150,000 rockets and shells before the war-an arsenal that could have caused widespread destruction in cities such as “Tel Aviv”, with the potential for between 15,000 and 20,000 fatalities in a war scenario. At the same time, he acknowledged that the party’s capabilities had not been completely eliminated.

“They Are Selling Us Illusions”

Nadav Eyal, a political analyst at Yedioth Ahronoth, expressed the prevailing “Israeli” viewpoint following the outbreak of the battle, stating that “Hezbollah’s resilience exposes the limits of ‘Israeli’ military strategy,” and arguing that recent “successes” had created the illusion that Hezbollah could be quickly paralyzed.

He quoted a former senior security official within the entity as saying that “the renewal of fighting with Hezbollah highlights a deeper strategic misunderstanding within the security establishment and the government,” noting that “they are selling the public illusions. The current security establishment and the government did not fully understand the foundations upon which the ‘successes’ of the war in the south and the north were built. This same misunderstanding now forms the basis of the mistakes being made regarding Hezbollah.”

According to the official, the central illusion lies in the belief that a new decisive strike could quickly cripple the party. The idea that there could be one major blow that would end the matter-or another strike from which it would not recover-is not how strategy works. Rather, a complete system of measures tied to a clear objective must be prepared and activated at a time chosen by oneself, not by the enemy.

Eyal further explained that political leaders in “Israel” were frustrated and had sent signals through media briefings suggesting that the “Israeli” army had been surprised by Hezbollah’s response, having expected only limited participation.

Within the army, these claims are viewed as an attempt to shift blame onto the General Staff.

Senior Zionist military officials say that assessments regarding Hezbollah’s recovery-and the stronger-than-expected performance of its leadership structure, including the party’s Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem-had already been conveyed to political leaders and to the public over the past year.

Accordingly, he concluded that Hezbollah demonstrated capabilities stronger than expected, even compared to estimates within the military establishment itself.

Misjudgment

For his part, political analyst Nahum Barnea of “Yedioth Ahronoth” argued that “‘Israel’ and the United States misjudged the reaction of Iran and Hezbollah, as both remain resilient and continue to respond with fire. More importantly, they have reached the conclusion that the worst is already behind them.”

“The Government Deceived Us”

Omer Bar-Lev, former commander of the General Staff’s elite Sayeret Matkal unit, a Labor Party Knesset member, and former Minister of Public Security, stressed that “Iran and Hezbollah succeeded, within just a few months, in rebuilding a significant portion of the military capabilities that we had neutralized in the previous round, and they did not hesitate to direct them against us.”

He acknowledged that “the reality is complex, and the ‘Israeli’ government-which misled the public regarding military achievements against Hezbollah and Iran, ignores the residents of the north, allocates billions of shekels in its budget as coalition funds, and remains incapable of passing an equal conscription law for all its ‘citizens’-will continue to mislead the public.” He concluded: “We will not achieve total victory, and Hezbollah will not disappear.”

“Hezbollah Retained Its Strength”

Reserve Brigadier General Guy Hazut affirmed that “Hezbollah has retained most of its military strength and, over the course of a year and a half, has managed to restore some of its capabilities and self-confidence.” He added that “the gap between declarations about Hezbollah’s defeat at the end of Operation ‘Northern Arrows’ (the 2024 war) and the current reality—in which Hezbollah is able to launch dozens of rockets and drones every day-has led to public criticism and calls to exploit Operation ‘Roar of the Eagle’ [the ongoing war against Iran) to defeat Hezbollah once and for all.”

Hezbollah “Has ‘Israel’ by the Neck”

“Hezbollah has ‘Israel’ by the "neck-this was the conclusion reached by Zionist military analyst Avi Ashkenazi, who noted that the party had spent the past year and a half rebuilding and rehabilitating its capabilities in southern Lebanon.

Illusory Victories

Former head of the Operations Directorate in the “Israeli” occupation army, Israel Ziv, asserted that “in contrast to stories of illusory victories, Hamas has regained strength in Gaza, Hezbollah continues fighting and paralyzing both the north and the center, and Iran continues launching missiles in the third round.”

The Return of Guerrilla Warfare

In another article, Ziv confirmed that the infrastructure established by Hezbollah remains partially intact and is still being used, while the organization itself has changed. It is no longer what it was a year ago. After the strikes it endured, it shifted from a “semi-regular army” model back to guerrilla warfare. It has reduced its visibility and now operates through small cells, relying on precise knowledge of the terrain. Its method depends on ambushes and rapid strikes rather than direct army-to-army confrontation-it searches for opportunities. He added, “This is where the problem lies: the more you expand deployment and deepen incursions, the more opportunities you give it. It needs only a small number of cells to carry out painful attacks.”

Political, Not Military, Assessments

According to Channel 12’s northern correspondent Guy Varon, Hezbollah will neither be defeated nor disarmed at the end of this “campaign.” The security and military establishment bases its assessments on a political track that is currently unavailable. More importantly, the political leadership in “Israel” does not clearly explain to residents or public opinion what is happening in the north, limiting itself to saying that the battle will be long-and that is all that is being offered.
More Shock

“Haaretz”, days after the start of the battle, reported that Hezbollah had recovered faster than expected, quoting senior political officials in the enemy entity who said they were “surprised” by Hezbollah’s capabilities. Channel 12 likewise reported, citing a Zionist security source, that Hezbollah had widely redeployed its rocket launch platforms in ways that make them difficult to target.

Hezbollah Has Not Disintegrated

Zionist military analyst Avi Issacharoff also stated that “Hezbollah’s Secretary-General succeeded in remaining the primary decision-maker and in preserving the chain of command and control,” adding that “Hezbollah shows no signs of disintegration or collapse. In recent days, Radwan Force fighters have managed to deploy south of the Litani River and continue attempts to set ambushes for ‘Israeli’ forces there.”

All of the above underscores the element of surprise that Hezbollah managed to impose in this ongoing battle. Circles within the enemy continue to speak of this success and to build their reading of the war upon it-a war that, so far, has granted neither Netanyahu nor his army victory or military advancement, but rather a solid barrier against the project of occupation and control over Lebanese geography, particularly the south. The surprise represented by the resistance’s combat capability-missiles reaching their targets, the preservation of an effective leadership structure, and the organized and increasingly impactful management of the battle-indicates that the collapse “Israel” spoke about for 15 months never occurred at any moment.

Strategic defiance and reconfiguration of power: Iran’s rise as a new global power

By Abdullahi Danladi

The Islamic Republic of Iran’s 40-day confrontation with the United States and Israel may be interpreted, from a critical geopolitical standpoint, as nothing short of a profound rupture in the established architecture of global power.

What has unfolded is not merely a sequence of military exchanges or strategic posturing, but a deeply symbolic contest between hegemonic dominance and defiant sovereignty, one that has unsettled long-held assumptions about technological supremacy and coercive diplomacy.

For over four decades, since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran has endured one of the most comprehensive regimes of sanctions and embargoes in modern history.

These measures were explicitly designed to strangulate its economy, fragment its institutions, and ultimately compel political capitulation.

Yet, paradoxically, they have instead incubated a doctrine of strategic self-reliance that has matured into a formidable national capability. In classical strategic theory, prolonged external pressure often induces dependency; in Iran’s case, it has produced autonomy.

The most striking manifestation of this autonomy is evident in Iran’s indigenous military complex. Deprived of access to Western arms markets, Iran has cultivated a sophisticated ecosystem of missile engineering, drone technology, and asymmetric warfare doctrine.

Its ballistic missile programme, once dismissed as rudimentary, now constitutes a credible deterrent capable of penetrating layered defense systems.

This transformation has not only altered regional threat perceptions but has also forced global powers to reassess the efficacy of sanctions as a tool of containment.

✍️ Viewpoint - Forty days that shook the Empire: How Iran turned the tables on US and prevailed

By Sarwar Abbashttps://t.co/i51LGERkDt

— Press TV 🔻 (@PressTV) April 8, 2026

Equally significant is the ideological dimension underpinning Iran’s resilience. The martyred Leader of the Islamic Revolution had consistently framed resistance not as a tactical necessity but as a civilizational imperative.

In this paradigm, confrontation with external powers is not merely geopolitical; it is existential. Consequently, any attempt to decapitate leadership structures or destabilize the system tends to generate the opposite effect: consolidation, mobilization, and firm resolve.

The notion that the loss or targeting of key figures could ignite a latent retaliatory capacity reflects a broader historical pattern in which perceived oppression fuels rather than diminishes resistance.

From a regional perspective, Iran’s strategic depth extends far beyond its territorial boundaries. Through a network of aligned actors and ideological affiliates, it has constructed a multi-layered deterrence architecture that complicates any direct military engagement.

This distributed model of influence ensures that pressure exerted on Iran reverberates across the region, thereby raising the cost of confrontation for its adversaries.

Perhaps the most globally consequential aspect of Iran’s strategic posture is its proximity to, and complete authority over, the Strait of Hormuz. This narrow corridor, through which a significant proportion of the world’s petroleum supply transits, represents a critical chokepoint in the global economy.

The mere disruption of this strategic waterway has historically been sufficient to trigger volatility in energy markets and anxiety in global capitals. Thus, any escalation involving Iran inherently transcends regional boundaries, transforming into a matter of international economic security.

✍️ Viewpoint- Trump’s military gamble against Iran backfires spectacularly with no exit strategy

By Abbas Ali Abedihttps://t.co/06y6NVI1pC

— Press TV 🔻 (@PressTV) March 15, 2026

The reported shock and recalibration among Western political figures, often personalized in narratives involving figures such as US President Donald Trump, underscore a deeper reality: the erosion of predictability in asymmetric wars.

When a heavily sanctioned state demonstrates the capacity to impose tangible costs on far more powerful adversaries, it challenges the very logic of deterrence as traditionally conceived.

Yet, even within this fiery tableau of power and defiance, the emergence of a ceasefire highlights a critical counterpoint: the mutual recognition of vulnerability.

The reopening or stabilization of vital economic arteries, particularly maritime routes, is not merely a gesture of de-escalation but an acknowledgment that unchecked confrontation carries unacceptable systemic risks.

In sum, the Iranian experience represents a compelling case study in strategic endurance. It illustrates how sustained pressure can, under certain conditions, catalyze innovation, cohesion, and geopolitical assertiveness.

Whether characterized as a “miracle” or as the predictable outcome of an adaptive strategy, the reality remains that Iran has disrupted the conventional hierarchy of power, forcing the world to confront a new paradigm in which resilience, rather than sheer force, defines the contours of influence.

Abdullahi Danladi is a member of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria.