
The US-Israeli conflict with Iran during 2025–2026 further sharpened Tehran’s strategic focus on its northern borders. Thus, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s participation in the farewell ceremony for Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in July 2026 and his subsequent meeting with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, unfolded amidst Tehran underscoring the necessity of insulating bilateral ties from extra-regional interference, particularly from NATO and its allies.
Iran’s presence in southern Armenia through the construction of the new tunnel is also a matter of preserving Armenian sovereignty, beyond purely economic and logistical issues
Key Aspects of Current Iran-Armenia Cooperation
One element of the US anti-Iran strategy involves undermining Iran’s logistics infrastructure and marginalizing its role in regional transit networks. This reinforces the importance of Iran’s cooperation with friendly nations in cross-border logistics infrastructure, above all the Aras Corridor and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), implemented by Iran jointly with India and Russia.
In this regard, in June 2026, the head of Iran’s state planning and budget organization, Seyed Hamid Pourmohammadi, paid a visit to Armenia, during which the parties discussed modernizing border infrastructure, in particular, the Norduz terminal; resolving outstanding customs bottlenecks; and eliminating existing obstructions along regional transport routes.
Serving these objectives are the construction works initiated in June 2026 by engineers and specialists of the Iranian company Ariana on the 7.2-kilometre Kajaran Tunnel. By bypassing the treacherous mountain passes and severe winter weather of the traditional route (it is precisely the mountainous terrain and challenging climatic conditions that make Syunik province, where the town of Kajaran, which gives the tunnel its name, is located, one of the country’s most difficult regions in terms of the throughput – ed.), the new tunnel will eliminate a major logistical bottleneck. This will significantly improve the speed and security of transit between Iran and Armenia, thereby paving the way for expanding daily throughput from the current 200 to as many as 1,000 trucks. And since conflict-related disruptions are affecting Iran’s southern maritime gateways, reinforcing the northern overland routes through Armenia by expanding throughput capacity across the Armenian-Iranian border will be of decisive importance for sustaining the continuity of Iran’s foreign trade and enhancing the country’s overall economic resilience.
The construction of the Kajaran Tunnel also furthers Tehran’s ambition, mentioned at the outset of the article, to minimize third-party interference in its bilateral relations, since the tunnel directly connects the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman to the Black Sea and the ports of Eastern Europe. This offers a strategically alternative route, first, that bypasses the Turkish territory, with Turkey being a key transport hub and simultaneously an important NATO member situated in close geographical proximity both to the South Caucasus and to Iran per se; and second, that substitutes for the increasingly popular “Trump Corridor” (also known as the Zangezur Corridor) in the South Caucasus, i.e. Donald Trump’s project to connect Azerbaijan to its Nakhichevan exclave directly through Armenian territory.
Another structural element of Washington’s policy to “strangle” Iran consists of active attempts to isolate the Iranian economy by means of imposing coercive sanctions. Nevertheless, despite the bids, in the first half of 2026, trade turnover between Tehran and Yerevan grew by 8.4 per cent to $371.4 million. Building on this momentum, both governments are implementing targeted measures designed to increase current bilateral trade from $768 million to an ambitious threshold of $3 billion.
The joint Armenian-Iranian energy projects are particularly directed towards achieving these goals. In 2026, negotiations are actively underway to operationalize the Turkmenistan-Iran-Armenia gas swap arrangement, which would allow Turkmen gas to be supplied to Armenia through Iran’s pipeline network.
Moreover, in July 2026, Yerevan and Teheran agreed on expanding the longstanding barter Armenian-Iranian program of “gas in exchange for electricity,” which would come in handy to Yerevan in its attempts to diversify the natural gas supply sources, hence softening Russia’s supremacy as a supplier to Armenia. Iranian gas, however, is roughly 2.5 times more expensive than its Russian “counterpart,” which, upon reaching corresponding agreements, would also contribute to increasing the volume of bilateral trade between Iran and Armenia.
Armenian-Iranian Cooperation: Geopolitical, Economic, and Logistical Benefits for Yerevan
Having examined the cooperation between Yerevan and Tehran from the Iranian perspective, it is necessary to trace what positive aspects this particular interaction also holds for Yerevan. Three factors of a geopolitical, economic, and logistical nature can be identified.
First and foremost, Tehran’s approach to functioning as a secure and cost-effective transit bridge, connecting the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman directly to the Black Sea through southern Armenia, aligns with Yerevan’s growing strategic imperatives, sending an unmistakable signal of Iran’s commitment to preserving Armenia’s territorial sovereignty over its southern province of Syunik.
The completion of the Kajaran Tunnel as a strategic alternative to the initiative proposed (or rather merely revived) by Donald Trump – the “Trump Corridor” – would eliminate the situation in which, in the words of former Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian, Washington legitimized Azerbaijan’s idea of the Zangezur Corridor, which originally violated Armenia’s territorial integrity, with Armenia having essentially agreed to “temporarily or permanently cede sovereignty over its own territory in Syunik, regardless of how the transit route would be controlled.” Therefore, Iran’s presence in southern Armenia through the construction of the new tunnel is also a matter of preserving Armenian sovereignty, beyond purely economic and logistical issues.
Second, in terms of “economic connectivity,” Yerevan perceives Iran as its primary gateway to South Asia and the Middle East, since nearly 20% of Armenia’s international trade already transits through Iranian territory. From this perspective, the completion of the Kajaran Tunnel and the modern highway to Yerevan would create a high-speed direct transport artery connecting Iran to Black Sea ports and Eastern Europe, offering a strategic alternative that bypasses Turkey.
Last but not least, by actively modernizing Iranian-Armenian border infrastructure, Iran provides for the development of Armenia’s transport system as a whole. Central to this is the initiative, which presupposes connecting the Iranian and Armenian railway networks through the construction of a pivotal 240-kilometre Meghri-Marand railway line.
Assessment of the Prospects for Armenian-Iranian Cooperation
The current five-year program, 2026–2031, of Nikol Pashinyan’s government explicitly prioritizes deepened partnership with Tehran, while the ongoing deliberations on a comprehensive Iran-Armenia strategic treaty are expected to establish a legally binding framework for long-term bilateral and geoeconomic cooperation.
Nevertheless, the prospects for the sustainability of Iran’s positions in southern Armenia hinge on geopolitical developments in the region, competition from alternative corridors, and Iran’s internal capacity.
Although the complete realisation of the Iran-Armenia-Georgia transit axis and the construction of the Kajaran Tunnel face serious obstacles – formidable alpine terrain, substantial capital requirements, and restrictive US sanctions in particular – Tehran remains firmly committed to developing the Armenian route as a vital guarantee of its broader access to Eurasia
Samyar Rostami, а political observer and senior researcher in international relations







