An Analysis of Saudi Arabia’s Behavior toward the Triangle of Iran, America, and Yemen

SCFR Online - Opinion: Riyadh, amid the Iran war, Yemeni pressure, and ambiguous Washington guarantees, has turned to flexible balancing in order to both preserve its security and increase its bargaining power.

Abbas Daraei – Expert on West Asian Affairs

Saudi Arabia’s behavior cannot be explained merely by a fixed alliance with America or a possible direct confrontation with Iran. The US and Israeli regime war against Iran and the intensification of the conflict in Yemen have compelled Riyadh to strike a balance between sole reliance on Washington’s military power, protection of vital infrastructure, prevention of the war’s expansion, and preservation of its own economic development programs. Saudi Arabia still needs America, but at the same time it seeks to reduce the cost of complete dependence on a single foreign patron.

Saudi Arabia’s economy; resilient but vulnerable

One of the outcomes of the recent crisis has been the exposure of the gap between Saudi Arabia’s financial capacity and the physical vulnerability of its economy. The Atlantic Council report, in a hypothetical stress test, has examined a complete halt of Saudi oil exports until the end of 2026. According to this scenario, approximately 75 billion dollars of oil export revenue and 203 billion riyals of the Saudi government’s oil revenues would be lost; however, financial reserves, foreign assets, borrowing capacity, and the relatively low ratio of government debt to GDP can prevent the immediate transformation of the shock into a financial crisis.

But the same report warns that Saudi Arabia’s economy may face an “infrastructure and geopolitical shock” before “financial failure.” Oil production has declined from about 10.9 million barrels per day in February to 6.2 million barrels per day in August, and the east-west pipeline, designed to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, had an operational capacity of about 4 to 5 million barrels per day before the September 10 and 11 attacks; therefore, Riyadh has the financial resources to withstand part of the shock, but it cannot fully replace a damaged refinery or pipeline with money.

Yemen and Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability chain

The intensification of Ansarullah’s attacks has increased this vulnerability further. Published reports speak of the expansion of missile and drone threats against Riyadh, Yanbu, Taif, and southern areas, as well as increased pressure on shipping in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb. The International Crisis Group report also considers the US and Israeli regime war against Iran as one of the factors behind the renewed intensification of the conflict on the Yemen front and emphasizes that Ansarullah’s attacks have increased pressure on Saudi oil exports and shipping.

As a result, the Persian Gulf, Saudi territory, the east-west pipeline, and the Red Sea have become a single security chain. The alternative route to Hormuz is also not immune, and the “Responsible Statecraft” website argues that attacks on oil facilities, pipelines, and export routes have shown that Saudi Arabia’s sole reliance on American power does not necessarily mean Washington’s ability to prevent any attack.

Washington’s guarantee; real support or ambiguous?

In these circumstances, Marco Rubio’s statements about America’s adherence to defense commitments toward Saudi Arabia are important for Riyadh, but the scope of this commitment is not clear. Rubio said Washington “will fulfill its commitments,” but did not say that in the event of the crisis’s escalation, America would enter the war directly. Analyses by the Persian Gulf Studies Center and Chatham House also distinguish between military support and direct entry; US support can include equipment, intelligence, satellite imagery, operational planning, and defense reinforcement.

Here, the gap between “reliable security” from Riyadh’s perspective and “sufficient support to maintain the balance” from Washington’s perspective becomes apparent. On the other hand, “Responsible Statecraft” believes that the “America First” approach drives regional partners toward reducing dependence on a foreign power.

Saudi Arabia between Washington, Ankara, Islamabad, and Beijing

The establishment of the Makkah Joint Defense Pact among Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey is important in this same framework. This pact is not a substitute for the security alliance with America, but it can add a complementary layer to Riyadh’s security. The International Crisis Group also considers the Red Sea arrangements and the R4 group, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan, as part of a more diverse security structure around the Red Sea.

China is another complementary option. “Responsible Statecraft” argues that the pressure of war can bring Riyadh and Beijing closer; but this does not mean a complete replacement of America, rather it is because China simultaneously has relations with Iran and the Persian Gulf countries and can play a complementary role in economy, technology, and diplomacy. In this way, Saudi Arabia can create a kind of “security multilayering” in which America remains the main source of military support, Pakistan and Turkey remain regional partners, and China remains an economic and diplomatic partner.

Iran’s diplomatic opportunity

For Iran, this situation can create an opportunity to redefine relations with Riyadh. The common point of the two countries is the necessity of preventing the war from spilling over into energy facilities, shipping routes, and the regional economy. Therefore, dialogue about the security of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, protection of energy infrastructure, non-targeting of civilian facilities, and crisis management can, alongside geopolitical competition, become an area of common interests.

This approach is more important in circumstances where Saudi Arabia is assessing the limitations of the US security guarantee. Riyadh may still rely on Washington, but the experience of attacks on its territory and infrastructure has shown that the deterrent power of a foreign ally is not necessarily identical to the ability to prevent all war costs for a regional partner.

Ultimately, Saudi Arabia’s behavior must be understood within the framework of a multifaceted policy: maintaining the alliance with America, developing regional security arrangements, preventing the Yemen war from becoming attritional, protecting the economic program, and expanding ties with China and other powers. This approach does not necessarily mean distancing from Washington, but rather an attempt to reduce the risk of complete dependence.

For Iran, the most important message of this development is that the gap between “America’s security commitment” and “Saudi Arabia’s real security” can become an arena for diplomacy. The recent crisis has increased Riyadh’s incentive for security diversification and maintaining a communication channel with Tehran; in such circumstances, the sustainable security of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea has become more dependent than ever on regional mechanisms and dialogue among the main powers.

Tehran’s Preparedness for Peace or Multi-Front Warfare

Amid ongoing military-political and economic pressure from the US and Israel, Iran is demonstrating full readiness for fierce resistance and a protracted multi-front war, while simultaneously keeping the door open for a diplomatic settlement on its own terms.

Samyar Rostami

US decision-makers have placed a multi-layered approach toward Tehran on their agenda, encompassing threatening rhetoric, economic pressure, military movements, accusation-mongering, and psychological-media manipulation.

Washington is seeking to simultaneously place on its agenda the policies of “crisis escalation,” “security surprise,” “deceptive diplomacy,” and “surprise action.”

Washington’s Multidimensional Pressure

Many in Iran believe there is a large-scale campaign of psychological and intelligence operations. This targets Iran, the Axis of Resistance, and Iranian public opinion.

Several main goals are being pursued: Instilling a sense of defeat, intimidating society, reducing resilience to new shocks, deepening divisions and eroding trust in the establishment, fomenting insecurity, strikes, unrest, discord, and tension in Iran.

Moreover, Iran’s position is that it will not enter nuclear negotiations as long as the Strait of Hormuz issue remains unresolved

The US also uses psychological warfare against Iran. This includes a multi-faceted campaign of historical claims, terrorism accusations, and unfounded allegations aimed at Tehran.

While Iranian civilization has remained one of the influential sources of human civilization. Marco Rubio’s recent comments in Athens reference Xerxes’ campaign from 480 BC. He mentioned the destruction of Greek cities. This seems like an effort to create hostility toward Iran’s rich history.

Washington has increased economic pressure on Iran. It aims to isolate the country and has tightened land route closures in and out of Iran. Its approach is designed to use economic pressure to compel Iran to capitulate.

Meanwhile, while Donald Trump talks about a quick end to the war with Iran, Washington keeps up its military actions against Tehran.

The United States and Israel are in an ‘unfinished war.’ So, both Washington and Tel Aviv see continuing the conflict and weakening Iran’s power as a key strategy.

Washington is boosting its military forces and readiness to restart the war soon. It plans to deploy warships and add about 9,000 to 10,000 American troops.

The Pentagon appears to have also drawn up plans to attack Iran’s drone and missile arsenal, energy facilities, and other military targets.

Currently, the sole diplomatic engagement between Iran and the United States is based on Iran’s seven-day proposal. However, the sequencing of actions—namely, which of the two countries takes the first step—the scope of issues, and how to end the dispute remain the main challenges to reaching an agreement.

Tehran’s Readiness for Peace or Multi-Front War

Donald Trump said the U.S. won’t take military action against Iran until after the congressional elections on November 3, 2026. However, in the past phases of the war, Iran faced military strikes even while diplomatic talks were happening.

Messages from Iranian officials indicate that Tehran is prepared for any scenario—war or diplomacy.

Moreover, more and more people in Iran are embracing the idea that, If you want peace, prepare for war. Tehran sees a big win for the Axis of Resistance. They view the expulsion of American forces from Iraq as a success. Also, Ansarallah is making strides. Meanwhile, the crisis is growing in Gaza, Lebanon, the West Bank, and Syria.

In fact, what is happening in Yemen, Iraq, and other fronts of the Axis of Resistance constitutes a major geopolitical development in Iran’s favor. Emerging forces will change the region’s politics and security. They will also boost the resistance efforts in the area. Plans aim to protect the political structure and social order. They also include steps to counter future threats. Washington seems to have missed how much Iranians cherish their homeland and its independence. Many Iranians, regardless of their political views, think the United States wants to destroy Iran or make it submit.

Economic pressures on the Iranian people are clear. However, Iran’s history shows strong resilience. Their experience in facing external pressures and sanctions has definitely grown. Therefore, despite differences in preferences between officials and political currents, they effectively do not accept Washington’s extensive pressure.

Tehran says the Strait of Hormuz can reopen if the naval blockade on Iran is lifted. They also want Washington to return to its signature in the Islamabad Understanding. From Tehran’s perspective, it will not reopen the Strait of Hormuz until the seven conditions under the Islamabad Understanding are fulfilled.

Iran emphasizes reciprocal actions and an end to unilateral demands; therefore, it does not accept a process based solely on Washington’s demands. From Tehran’s view, it is unacceptable to include the nuclear issue in the upcoming negotiations. From Iran’s perspective, the security of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz is indigenous and regional, and no extra-regional power has the right to threaten, maintain a hegemonic presence in, or intervene in these waters.

Moreover, over the past months, Iran has become more resilient. The strengthening of targeting, military tactics, the indigenization of the defense industry, the production of strategic weapons,, and Iran’s navy and defense capabilities have enabled it to confront a protracted war.

In the concept of defense in depth, defenders make efforts to subject the attacker’s combat power to pressure and attack before it reaches the point of effectiveness. In any conflict, Iran may consider U.S. military bases, logistics centers, airports, and support infrastructure in the region as valid targets. Deployed warships could also be included. In fact, while Washington seeks to keep more military pressure options at its disposal, Iran will seek to raise the cost of using those options.

Tehran’s response may be comprehensive. It aims to deter countries from participating in or facilitating military operations against Iran. This reaction could extend beyond the Middle East. That is, the next war may spread to a broader geography. Even if Europeans participate in the war against Iran, they will not be immune. In diplomacy, Tehran has clearly stated its terms for ending the war. This comes from many logical reasons, America’s history, and distrust of Washington.

Hassan Qashqavi, spokesman for the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Parliament, recently emphasized the persistence of Iran’s seven conditions in the seven-day plan. He stated, “These conditions have been determined by the highest authorities of the system. They cannot be changed or violated at various levels of decision-making.” Therefore, maintaining Iran’s seven conditions is both logical and decisive. Moreover, Iran’s position is that it will not enter nuclear negotiations as long as the Strait of Hormuz issue remains unresolved.

Iran and Oman have successfully concluded their consultation process about the geographical coordinates for safe inbound and outbound routes in the Strait of Hormuz.

Outlook:

Even if the United States postpones action on Iran until after its own elections, Tehran might see this as a tactic to buy time for further military preparations. If three aircraft carriers were simultaneously present in the Middle East, with more than 20,000 sailors and Marines deployed at sea and hundreds of aircraft in the region, it would be the first such situation since 2003.

Therefore, the option of a high-intensity war, the possibility of employing high-intensity means, the destruction of facilities, and even mass killing against Iran undoubtedly exist. But the scenario of aggressive, high-intensity action by the United States and Israel to strike at Iran’s leaders or its nuclear and strategic facilities is more likely. In a situation where the United States and Israel possess the necessary motivation for confrontation with Iran, Iran has also placed strategic contingencies for countering the aggressive policy on its agenda.

Although Iran is bearing a high economic cost, in the view of many Iranians, enduring economic hardships to defend Iran is necessary. Any attempt to occupy or dismember the country will be met with resistance. Iran’s potential response—combining missile capability, defense readiness, multi-front warfare, and national will—will entail high and long-term costs and consequences for any anti-Iranian military action. One likely scenario is that maintaining the status quo—naval blockade and economic pressure—costs the opposing side less than going to war. In contrast, Tehran’s strategy will likely be to compel Washington to end its policy of containing Iran. However, the opportunity for diplomacy still exists. ‘Decisions in progress’ are not final; they change, are revived, and keep the situation in flux.

In practice, there is no military solution or one based on more sanctions. A resolution based on negotiation, justice, fairness, and diplomacy is the only win-win option. Thus, the final agreement between Iran and the United States may closely resemble the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding.

Samyar Rostami, а political observer and senior researcher in international relations

London’s Gamble with Military Support for Actions against Yemen

SCFR Online - Opinion: London's decision to provide military support to Saudi Arabia in the Yemen file, beyond a limited aerial mission, could confront Britain with broad legal, security, economic, and strategic consequences.

Hamid Khoshayand – Expert on Regional Affairs

Although the British government has sought to downplay the issue of dispatching a Voyager refueling aircraft to the region as merely responding to Saudi Arabia’s request for “defensive and temporary support,” this action cannot be assessed merely within this limited framework. Such a decision will, in practice, increase the level of London’s involvement in one of the most complex and attritional regional wars. Let us not forget that Saudi Arabia has for years faced serious difficulties in managing the consequences of this war.

At the same time, the question arises whether London can, through limited missions, both maintain its position among the countries of the southern littoral of the Persian Gulf and remain distant from the consequences of deeper involvement in the Yemen file? Considering that Washington has also not given a direct commitment to extensive military entry into this file, an increased British role could broaden the scope of responsibility and risks of this decision for that country.

Historical and strategic dimensions of Britain’s presence in Yemen

Britain’s role in Yemen cannot be examined only from 2015. Aden and the southern coasts of Yemen were, from the nineteenth century, part of the communication and maritime structure of the British Empire between India, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Suez Canal. Bab el-Mandeb is also not merely a regional strait; it is the chokepoint of communication between the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea and the Suez route, and its security is linked to the commercial and maritime interests of foreign powers, including Britain.

The record of Britain’s presence in Yemen over the past 15 years has also continued from managing the political transition after 2011 to direct military presence on Yemeni soil and now support for Saudi air capability. Official British parliamentary documents show that London, in addition to selling weapons to Saudi Arabia, accelerated the delivery of guided bombs after the war began in 2015, increased training in targeting and the use of weapons, and deployed its liaison officers at Saudi headquarters. In the first year of the war alone, an export license for approximately 3.3 billion pounds of weapons to Saudi Arabia was issued.

This record shows that Britain’s role has not remained limited to political support and has in parts approached operational cooperation; an issue that can increase London’s political and legal responsibility.

Legal and reputational consequences

From a legal perspective, British military support can have considerable consequences for that country. Published documents show that British Royal Air Force refueling aircraft supported US attacks on Yemen in 2025, and the Pentagon assessed that these attacks “very likely” led to 281 civilian casualties.

Human Rights Watch has also warned that British participation “may make this country complicit in war crimes.” Undoubtedly, the continuation of this path can provide the ground for international legal cases, diplomatic pressures, increased public criticism, and damage to Britain’s credibility in the field of human rights. From this perspective, the reputational blow of supporting military operations is one of the most important consequences London will face.

Economic and security consequences for Britain

British officials have declared the purpose of this action to be preserving maritime routes and preventing an increase in the cost of living in Britain. However, the continuation of military support for one side of the war can also work against this goal; because the intensification or prolongation of the conflict increases insecurity on maritime routes.

Any disruption in Bab el-Mandeb can increase energy prices, shipping insurance costs, and the price of goods, and intensify inflationary pressure in Europe and Britain. As a result, a policy pursued with the aim of protecting trade and containing domestic costs can, if maritime insecurity continues, increase part of those very costs and place greater pressure on households and the British economy.

The risk of expanding the conflict and eroding Britain’s capability

British support, even if limited and indirect, can be effective in the continuation of military operations against Yemen and increase the risk of further expansion or attrition of the war. Ansarullah officials have also considered this action a sign of London’s direct participation in military operations against Yemen. The formation of such a perception can expose Britain’s interests in the region, from ships and bases to companies and its nationals, to retaliatory actions.

On the other hand, Britain’s simultaneous entry into several military arenas, including Ukraine and East Asia, also raises the issue of strategic overreach and intervention beyond this country’s capacity. Increasing military commitments can put London’s financial, military, and political resources under pressure; especially in circumstances where Washington’s support for direct and extensive entry into the Yemen file is not certain.

Also, the continuation of this policy can intensify domestic debates about mission transparency, legal responsibility, and its costs in the British Parliament and public opinion; therefore, the consequences of supporting Saudi Arabia in Yemen are not limited to the battlefield and can also affect Britain’s regional position and foreign policy capacity.

Britain’s military support for Saudi Arabia in the war against Yemen can be analyzed within the framework of London’s long-term effort to maintain regional influence and secure trade and energy routes, but the expansion of this role can create new costs and responsibilities for Britain. Legal and reputational consequences, increased security risks, pressure on trade and energy routes, and the possibility of erosion of military and political capability are among the most important of these consequences.

From this perspective, continuing the current path can involve London further in a war from which exit will not be easily possible and whose costs may exceed the expected short-term benefits. Accordingly, the extent and continuation of British support for operations related to Yemen will become one of the important issues in assessing the future role of this country in West Asia.

The Doctrine of “Cognitive-Technological Deterrence” Against the Coalition of Soft War of the West and the Israeli Regime

SCFR Online - Opinion: The expansion of artificial intelligence and influence operations has drawn the field of conflict from physical space to the perceptual and algorithmic environment and has turned cognitive deterrence into a strategic necessity.

Younes Alizadeh – Artificial intelligence expert

The future war will not only be over land and sky, and the main battlefield may be the human mind and the algorithms that shape his information, narratives, and choices. Recent developments in information warfare indicate that the boundary between psychological operations, strategic communications, cyber warfare, and artificial intelligence technology is becoming blurred. If in the past the main objective of cognitive operations was to disseminate a narrative or false news, now the more important issue is influencing the environment in which humans receive, validate, and interpret information.

Artificial intelligence has provided the possibility of producing, personalizing, distributing, and reproducing content at a speed and scale with which traditional information defense mechanisms can hardly keep pace. The Atlantic Council’s recent study on the “multilateral cognitive warfare defense network” also shows that in the assessment of American policymakers, cognition has become an arena independent of security competition, and AI tools have made influence operations faster and more extensive.

From psychological warfare to engineering the perceptual environment

The difference between cognitive warfare and traditional psychological warfare lies in its level of targeting. The goal is not necessarily to convince the audience of a specific proposition, but can be the erosion of trust, increasing confusion, intensifying polarization, and creating doubt toward information sources. In such circumstances, even if the audience does not accept a particular narrative, widespread distrust of media, institutions, and official information can itself become a strategic outcome.

The Atlantic Council, in a report on US-Japan-Taiwan cooperation, has proposed with this same understanding the creation of a joint cognitive defense network; a network relying on shared threat identification, early warning, information exchange, and coordination among government, the private sector, and civil society. This report uses the term “brain control” to describe a new level of cognitive competition and warns that individual and merely reactive responses lag behind the speed of AI-based operations. However, this report is a policy study from the perspective of US security and its allies and should not be considered a neutral assessment of all parties to the dispute.

The Valdai Discussion Club website also argues in an article that Cold War-era geopolitical models are insufficient to explain power in the age of artificial intelligence; because algorithmic influence operations, AI-enhanced cyberattacks, and automated information campaigns can affect markets, public opinion, and political decision-making without a soldier crossing a border.

The Israeli regime and transferring the battle into algorithms

The importance of artificial intelligence in cognitive warfare becomes more apparent when generative platforms and chatbots themselves become part of the competition arena. A Wired Middle East investigative report tells of a specific example: the American company “Clock Tower X,” which provides services to the Israeli regime’s government, had a contract worth 46.5 million dollars in 2026, whose stated purpose in documents registered under “FARA” was “influencing the framing results” of GPT conversations. This company has also created a collection of websites to offer favorable narratives on political and security issues.

Wired’s experiment on six chatbots, including ChatGPT, Claude, Perplexity, Copilot, Gemini, and Grok, showed that some of these systems incorporated their content into their responses without the user mentioning the websites’ names. In one case, three systems reflected in their responses a figure that a website affiliated with this campaign was promoting. Of course, the report itself emphasizes that “influencing chatbots” is not the same as “influencing public opinion,” and evidence of the two must be assessed separately.

The importance of this experiment for Iran lies in the fact that cognitive operations are no longer necessarily limited to social networks or media and may be transferred through the path of search engines, content bases, and then a chatbot’s response to the user. As a result, the war has moved from the stage of “message production” to “engineering the path of the audience’s access to information.”

The cognitive-technological deterrence doctrine for Iran

Against such an environment, Iran’s cognitive defense should not be limited merely to denying news or responding after the publication of a narrative. The logic of cognitive deterrence is that the country can identify the source of the operation, monitor the scope of its dissemination, recognize social vulnerabilities, and quickly provide the audience with narratives based on data and documentation.

The first component of such a doctrine is the creation of an indigenous cognitive defense network that analyzes media information, social network data, search trends, AI-generated content, and algorithmic behaviors in a shared structure. The goal of this network should not be controlling public opinion, but rather increasing society’s ability to recognize influence operations and distinguish news, analysis, propaganda, and fake information.

The second component is technological resilience. Complete dependence on foreign platforms and chatbots in crisis conditions can create a strategic vulnerability. Developing indigenous language models, independent search engines, domestic cloud infrastructure, archiving and fact-checking systems, and Persian language processing capabilities increases the possibility of independent analysis of the information environment. Artificial intelligence here is not merely a content production tool, and analyzing massive data and discovering coordinated patterns is also part of cognitive defense.

The third component is the regional network. Cognitive warfare does not stop at national borders, and narratives cross multiple languages and multiple platforms. Cooperation among Iran and aligned countries in exchanging information alerts, fact-checking, media literacy, and developing AI tools can increase the cost of influence operations, without turning into a one-sided military system for narrative production.

Ultimately, cognitive deterrence becomes sustainable when it is based on trust, transparency, and the credibility of information. Successful cognitive operations often feed on information vacuums; therefore, the speed of informing, providing verifiable data, accepting error, and transparent explanation of ambiguities are also part of national power. From this perspective, cognitive-technological deterrence is not the digital version of traditional propaganda warfare, but an effort to make society, information infrastructure, and AI systems resistant to manipulation. In an environment where hard war is intertwined with cyber, spatial, and cognitive warfare, maintaining fact-checking, public trust, and decision-making independence also becomes part of the deterrence equation.

Mutual Support on International Platforms: Russia and Iran on the Path to a Multipolar World

Russian-Iranian relations long ago moved beyond the framework of ordinary good-neighborliness.

Viktor Mikhin

Today this is a strategic partnership, cemented by the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signed in January 2025. The preamble of this document directly records the parties’ desire to “promote the objective process of forming a new just and sustainable multipolar world order based on the sovereign equality of states, good-faith cooperation, and mutual respect for interests.”

This is not just a diplomatic formula. Behind it lies concrete joint work at key international platforms — the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS — as well as implementation of one of Eurasia’s largest infrastructure projects: the International North–South Transport Corridor.

SCO: From Observer to Full Member

Iran’s history of participation in the SCO spans almost two decades. Since 2005, the Islamic Republic had observer status, but full membership remained impossible for a long time because of UN sanctions that restricted the country’s participation in international organizations until 2016.

Multipolarity is not a polite formula from a communiqué. It is a redistribution of power, and it does not happen without resistance

The situation changed after the sanctions restrictions were lifted. Russia consistently supported Tehran’s desire to become a full member of the organization. In July 2023, Iran officially became the ninth member of the SCO — an event difficult to overestimate from the standpoint of regional security architecture.

Russia and Iran actively coordinate their positions within the SCO. As Konstantin Kosachev, deputy speaker of the Federation Council, noted, Moscow supports Tehran’s initiatives to institutionally strengthen the organization. In particular, Iran proposed creating an SCO Parliamentary Assembly — a permanent body that would unite the legislative bodies of member states. The Russian side assessed this initiative positively, and it is not ruled out that during Russia’s chairmanship in 2027 the topic will receive further development.

SCO member states have repeatedly confirmed support for Iran’s sovereignty and advocated resolving differences exclusively by diplomatic methods. This indicates that the organization is becoming not merely a discussion platform but a real instrument for protecting the interests of its participants.

BRICS: New Opportunities for Iran

No less significant was Iran’s accession to BRICS. Russia was among the countries that “actively helped facilitate Iran’s accession to BRICS.” Today the association includes ten states: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Iran, the UAE, Indonesia, and Ethiopia. In addition, Saudi Arabia holds the status of an invited country, although it has not officially confirmed its membership.

BRICS also has a category of partner countries that can participate in certain meetings but do not hold the same status as full members and do not sign the group’s declarations. This category includes Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

The scale of BRICS is impressive: the countries of the association account for almost 45% of the planet’s population, more than a third of global GDP, and about 40% of world industrial production. For Iran, which has been under years of sanctions pressure, participation in such a structure opens fundamentally new economic opportunities.

Alexey Efimov, a representative of Russia’s Trade Representation in Iran, emphasized that Tehran’s membership in the SCO and BRICS “not only changed the regional balance but also helped strengthen economic cooperation, reduce the impact of sanctions, and expand trade on the path toward a multipolar world economic order.” According to him, within these organizations meetings of finance, transport, and agriculture ministers are held regularly, making it possible to develop common approaches and implement joint economic projects.

Of particular importance is the transition to payments in national currencies. Today more than 90% of Russia’s trade transactions with BRICS countries are conducted in national currencies. Iran is also taking active steps in this direction, which directly reduces the damage from Western sanctions.

Russian Ambassador to Iran Alexey Dedov noted that Iran’s membership in the SCO and BRICS “serves to strengthen bilateral relations to a significant extent” and creates new mechanisms for multilateral interaction. Thus, Tehran’s participation in these structures is not merely a formality but an effective instrument of joint work to shape a fairer world order.

The North–South Corridor: A Bridge Between the Baltic and the Persian Gulf

If the SCO and BRICS form the political-economic framework of a multipolar world, then the International North–South Transport Corridor becomes its material artery. This project connects Russian Baltic Sea ports with India and the Persian Gulf countries through Iranian territory.

The economic effect of the corridor is impressive. According to Russian Deputy Prime Minister Vitaly Savelyev, delivery of cargo along the North–South route takes 15 to 20 days, whereas the traditional route through the Suez Canal requires 35–45 days. Thus, travel time is cut by more than half, and logistics costs fall by 30–40%.

Over the past year, 21.5 million tons of cargo were transported along the corridor. Rail shipments toward Iran, as well as to African and Middle Eastern countries, are growing especially dynamically: container traffic in this direction increased by 60%, and travel time was reduced from 33 to 16 days.

A key link in the project is construction of the 162-kilometer Rasht–Astara railway. This section will connect Iran’s railway network with Azerbaijan’s, providing a continuous “seamless route” from the Baltic to the Persian Gulf. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk reported that surveying work on this section has already begun, and construction is actively underway.

Infrastructure achievements are not limited to the railway. A new railway bridge has been built on the border of Azerbaijan and Iran, a four-lane road bridge has been created, and construction of a new transport and logistics center on Iranian territory will be completed in the near future.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has set ambitious tasks: to double cargo traffic along the corridor and, by 2030, to triple it. Implementation of these plans will turn the North–South corridor into one of the key routes of Eurasian trade, an alternative to sea routes controlled by Western countries.

Multipolarity Not in Words but in Real Deeds

Mutual support between Russia and Iran on international platforms is still perceived by many in the West as diplomatic etiquette — as a ritual exchange of pleasantries between two “outcasts” who have no one else to talk to. This is a dangerous misconception. Behind it lies a conscious, carefully calibrated, and consistently implemented strategy of two sovereign states aimed at building a multipolar world — a world in which decisions are made not by a narrow group of Western capitals but by a broad circle of participants representing all the main civilizations of the planet.

And most importantly, this strategy is already producing results. It is measured not by declarations but by numbers: shares of GDP, tons of cargo, kilometers of rails, percentages of payments in national currencies.

Sanctions, conceived as a noose, worked as a catalyst. It was not possible to isolate Iran and Russia — they were pushed toward each other, and then together — into the SCO, into BRICS, toward the North–South corridor. Those who counted on division got a linkage. Those who bet on blockade got alternative routes, alternative payments, and alternative institutions. This is perhaps the main geopolitical paradox of the last decade: the harder the pressure, the tighter the union became.

But institutions without infrastructure are a framework without a roof. That is why the North–South corridor is so important. Fifteen to twenty days instead of thirty-five to forty-five. Twenty-one and a half million tons of cargo in a year. A 60% increase in container traffic, a reduction in travel time from 33 to 16 days. One hundred sixty-two kilometers of the Rasht–Astara railway, which close the “seamless route” from the Baltic to the Persian Gulf. This is not an abstraction — it is concrete, steel, and railroad ties. It is a route that passes by Suez, by Malacca, by Hormuz — by all those narrow points where Western fleets have grown accustomed to feeling like masters. Eurasia is getting its own transport artery, and with it its own logic of trade and its own resilience to external pressure.

And here it is worth saying directly. Multipolarity is not a polite formula from a communiqué. It is a redistribution of power, and it does not happen without resistance. Those who for decades have grown accustomed to dictating the rules will not give them up voluntarily. But history does not ask permission. It simply goes — along the Rasht–Astara rails, through the summit halls of the SCO and BRICS, through payment systems in which there is less and less dollar and more and more yuan, rial, and ruble.

Russia and Iran are not asking for a place in the sun — they are taking it. They are not waiting for someone to let them into another’s house — they are building their own. And they are doing it together.

The new world order will not be announced from a podium. It is already being built — quietly, persistently, in concrete and steel. And Russia and Iran are among those holding these blueprints in their hands.

Viktor Mikhin, writer, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, specialist on the Arab countries of the Near and Middle East

A New Yalta? Russia’s Revival, China’s Rise and the West’s Diminishing Influence

The West’s bid to isolate Moscow has backfired, as Russia reclaims its place at the negotiating table while China emerges as an indispensable power in a shifting world order. A potential G-3 summit could herald a new Yalta, where great powers redraw the geopolitical map while Europe and Ukraine risk being left out in the cold.

Taut Bataut

The upcoming APEC summit in China could eventually lead to the beginning of a multipolar moment, where three great powers — the US, Russia, and China — will be on the same table. History is evident that whenever the world order is under transition, great powers have to make concessions. Although the proposed meeting is not yet confirmed, the suggestion is on the table, and the talks have started.

It can provide Russia with a platform to restore its diplomatic image, and it can enable China to prove itself as a key player in global politics and Europe to signal that its security will be decided in its absence. This poses one very important question:

“Is the world moving towards the G-3 scenario, in which global affairs will be determined through direct negotiations between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing?”

The G-3 Summit

The true meaning of the meeting will become clear only if there are some tangible agreements reached at it

According to the reports in the Wall Street Journal, Russian President Vladimir Putin has suggested a summit meeting between himself, U.S. President Donald Trump, and Chinese President Xi Jinping to reach an agreement on ending the Ukraine war. It is not yet verified, but if the meeting does take place, then it will not include Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The idea of this meeting came up during a call to Trump on Oct. 9 from a former Russian intelligence official who was informed about the idea.

As per Reuters, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said, “There have been talks of a meeting. I don’t know whether it has been finalized, but the president has been clear.” President Donald Trump has accepted the proposal of the summit. He has said, “We would have it to talk about nuclear weapons and denuclearization; if President Xi wants to have it, I’d have it.”

Washington’s Objectives

It seems like President Trump is very desperate to have such a meeting, and this could be the reason why he has agreed to the proposal so quickly. As there is a midterm election in the US next month, this meeting could provide a boost to his election campaign. For Trump, the ongoing Iran war, the Ukraine conflict, and some kind of economic deals with China and Russia could be a win package. Trump has stated that he would be focusing on denuclearization during the talks. Now what does it mean?

It simply means the end of the Iran war through the Russian and Chinese assistance. Trump has tried its utmost through other mediators but all in vain. Now he knows the very fact that only Russia and China could help him to get out of this vicious cycle. Recently, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi has stated that never in our history have Iran and Russia worked as closely as now. Secondly, such nuclear talks might include the ‘constructive strategic stability’ bargain, which was suggested by Chinese President Xi Jinping in May 2026 during Trump’s visit to China. Third, talks would include the Ukraine conflict. Any type of peace settlement could provide a significant boost to downgrading Trump’s popularity.

Russia’s Revival: From Isolation to Negotiating Power

Russia has been very clear in its objectives against Ukraine from day one. It was the US and Europe that orchestrated a fake narrative that Russia desires expansion in Eastern Europe. Still, the European countries are selling the Russian threat. Per Contra, Russia does not want war with the West. It only demands the safety and security of its borders from NATO incursions. Russia provided several chances to Ukraine to end the ongoing conflict, but President Zelensky remained stubborn.

And now what’s happening? Ukraine is in no position to even sit on the negotiation table. Russia’s negotiating power has increased. The West tried its best to isolate and derail the Russian economy. But now the US is itself concluding oil deals with Russia, and Europe wants energy supplies due to the upcoming winters. That means Russia, in one way or another, has succeeded in forcing NATO to be away from its borders. This trilateral summit could result in a Yalta-type settlement where the three powers would themselves settle the European thorn.

Decisions About Europe Without Europe

The only party that has been in complete loss is Europe. The so-called slogans of ‘as long as it takes’ and ‘nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine’ are now gone. The era of ‘everything about Ukraine without Ukraine’ has begun. And to be honest, Europe is in no position to further sell its fake propaganda against Russia. France is right now burning with protests, with Macron finding himself intertwined in the domestic politics. Germany is under the rule of a coalition government, and Merz’s party is under serious pressure. The UK is itself struggling to protect itself from external threats.

In addition, as per the official reports, the US has also stopped Starlink and Star Shield access to Ukraine. President Donald Trump has recently urged Ukrainians to select a new leader. He further said, “Maybe it’s time for Zelensky to get somebody else to negotiate.” President Zelensky recently accepted during an interview with NBC News and stated, “If such settlements between the US and Russia continue, of course we will not prevail, and we will not be able to stand.” Thus, Ukraine has been left in the lurch, not only by the US but also by its so-called “as long as it takes” allies.

Beijing at the Centre of Global Diplomacy

This meeting could be a turning point for Beijing, as long as the US meets Chinese demands related to the grand bargain and strategic stability. Trump has been interested in discussing the issue of denuclearization with Putin and Xi; however, Beijing has not been willing to participate in trilateral nuclear disarmament talks under the terms offered by Washington. Any progress would therefore require more than a symbolic meeting. What emerges is not so much an image of the China-led order but rather a world where China takes a place that Washington cannot ignore anymore.

Conclusion

The upcoming summit must not be confused with the predetermined redistribution of power around the globe. Indeed, the original Yalta Conference was held in the context of the approaching end of the Second World War. The modern world is much more integrated, and the goals of Washington, Moscow, and Beijing continue to differ quite significantly. Neither the venue of the summit nor the presence of the three leaders ensures any historic breakthrough. In this sense, the upcoming G-3 can be more about the question of who has the power to negotiate the very contours of the game. The true meaning of the meeting will become clear only if there are some tangible agreements reached at it.

Taut Bataut is a researcher and writer who publishes on South Asian geopolitics.

Threats and Strategic Opportunities of Artificial Intelligence

SCFR Online - Opinion: The acceleration of AI competition has shattered the boundaries of economic, military, intelligence, and cognitive power, turning this technology into a strategic component of national power.

Pooya Mokhtari – Cyber affairs expert

Artificial Intelligence; from General Technology to a Component of National Power

Artificial intelligence is no longer merely an economic technology or a tool for increasing productivity; rather, it depends on a set of infrastructural, computational, data, industrial, and human capacities that directly affect national power. In the US-China competition as well, superiority is not limited to the quality of language models or the number of advanced chips, and access to electricity, data centers, chips, cloud networks, capital, expert manpower, and the government’s capacity to regulate and enforce regulations also matters.

The Atlantic Council’s study on the competition between the two “AI blocs” of the US and China in Africa shows that model quality alone is not determinative, and infrastructure, financing, regulation, government capacity, and the ability to absorb technology can also be effective in the competition’s outcome. Another report from the same institution on US-Africa technological partnership also emphasizes that regulating AI rules, training elites, and creating institutional networks are part of the geopolitical competition over this technology. Consequently, soft power, standardization, and technology diplomacy have also become components of AI power.

China also pursues the use of AI technology within such a broad framework. Research by the Merics Institute shows that the development of energy infrastructure and clean technologies in China strengthens the electricity and industrial capacity needed for advanced technologies, including AI; therefore, AI competition cannot be separated from competition over energy, industry, and supply chains.

The US and China; Competition over the Technology Ecosystem

The recent dispute between Washington and Beijing over “model capability extraction” indicates that AI competition has entered a stage where even the outputs of models and the method of reproducing their capabilities have become a national security issue. In September 2026, US security officials accused several Chinese companies of extensive use of the “capability extraction” process to extract the capabilities of American models, but the Chinese side rejected the accusation and called it the politicization of a technical issue; therefore, this case should be considered part of the intensification of the technological conflict between the two powers, and its details should still be evaluated within the framework of the parties’ claims.

At the same time, Trivium China has reported that the two countries have turned to dialogue about AI on the eve of their leaders’ meeting. This trend indicates that technological competition does not necessarily lead to disconnection, and Washington and Beijing simultaneously need mechanisms to manage risks and prevent technological competition from turning into broader instability.

In the meantime, open models can also become an important tool of technological influence. ASPI’s analysis explains that China, by developing models with open weights and creating institutional mechanisms for their transfer to other countries, links the supply of technology with standardization, training, and capacity-building. This approach provides countries of the Global South with cheaper access to advanced models, but at the same time can create new dependency at the level of infrastructure, standards, and data.

Hybrid Warfare; the New Arena of Cognition and Information

One of the most sensitive areas of AI application is cognitive warfare and information operations. Media reports about the AI threat landscape review report prepared by Anthropic say that the company has announced that some government institutions of countries have used the Claude model to produce propaganda, design cognitive operations, and monitor opponents. These cases have been raised based on the company’s own assessment and should be considered merely as a company’s claim about how its systems are used.

The strategic importance of this issue is not limited to a specific case. AI can reduce the cost of producing targeted content, creating fake personas, analyzing audiences, mass translation, generating messages tailored to different groups, and monitoring the information environment. As a result, cognitive warfare can transform from limited and costly operations into a more scalable process.

The North Korea example also shows that AI can multiply existing capabilities in cyber warfare. ASPI argues that this technology does not necessarily create a completely new capability but can drastically reduce the cost and time of executing existing capabilities.

Military Acceleration; Operational Advantage or New Vulnerability?

The military application of AI faces a fundamental contradiction; the very speed that creates operational advantage can make control and evaluation more difficult. FPIF warns about the Pentagon’s acceleration in deploying AI tools, stating that the widespread use of commercial systems in military infrastructure can put security discipline, data control, and assurance mechanisms under pressure. According to this report, the use of generative systems in the US military structure is no longer limited to limited experiments and has expanded to areas such as planning, logistics, supply chain, and administrative affairs.

The issue is not just a model error. A published analysis on “repeatable error” in AI emphasizes that the main danger arises when a systematic error can be reproduced many times and on a large scale. From this perspective, AI security depends more on the quality of evaluation, data validation, and the design of control mechanisms than merely on model accuracy.

Eurasia Review also argues that the next arena of AI competition is “institutional speed”; that is, how quickly governments can test, evaluate, authorize, standardize, and operationalize technology without losing legal control and correction mechanisms; therefore, the strongest model does not necessarily create the fastest strategic advantage, and institutional capacity for safe technology absorption is also determinative.

AI Governance; Technology Control or Preserving Advantage?

The debate over AI regulation oscillates between two main views. The Hoover Institution warns about preemptive regulation, stating that strict and early regulations may limit innovation and competition; in contrast, the expansion of military, intelligence, and economic applications of AI has increased the necessity of creating safety and accountability rules.

At the global level, great powers have not yet reached complete agreement on the limits of these rules. The US seeks to maintain its technological advantage, China creates new standards and institutions for the development and transfer of its models, and Global South countries are also trying not to be mere consumers of technology. The experience of international cooperation in peaceful nuclear technology also shows that technical standards, export rules, political restrictions, and unequal access to technology can affect the development path of developing countries; an issue that is repeated in a different form in AI governance.

For Iran, the main message of these developments is that AI cannot be pursued merely at the level of using ready-made tools. In conditions of increasing technological competition, processing power, data, indigenous models, cybersecurity, human resources, electricity infrastructure, data centers, and legal mechanisms will all be part of national power. On the other hand, reliance on foreign models can create dependencies in data, standards, and infrastructure.

Ultimately, AI is becoming a “multi-purpose power technology”; a technology that links economy, security, intelligence, cyber warfare, cognitive operations, and technology diplomacy together; therefore, the US-China competition over AI is part of the broader redistribution of global power. For Global South countries, including Iran, the main issue is creating independent capacity to benefit from AI, reducing vulnerability to technological domination, and active participating in the rules that are being formed.