From Iraq to Iran: What the latest war revealed about US airpower

For the first time in decades, American jets, tankers, and AWACS have been damaged at scale. Iran’s attrition strategy is changing the rules of the air war

By Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retired), an Indian Air Force veteran fighter test pilot and is the former Director-General of the Center for Air Power Studies in New Delhi.

During nearly six weeks of the war on Iran, the US has suffered heavy military aircraft losses, now exceeding those recorded during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Iran’s recent downing of an American F-35 jet marks the first time in 23 years that a US fighter jet has been shot down in combat; the previous instance was in Iraq in 2003, when an A‑10 was lost. 

Over the seven years of the Iraq campaign from 2003 to 2009, total US aviation losses amounted to 129 helicopters and 24 fixed‑wing aircraft, with only 46 attributed to hostile fire. The remaining cases were due to malfunctions, fuel exhaustion, and pilot error.

Since the start of the Iran war, the US has lost at least 44 aircraft, including the first incident of the US fifth-generation stealth F-35 Lightning II being hit. The list includes four F-15E Strike Eagle (the Wall Street Journal cited a fact sheet stating that the original model costs at least $31 million, while the cost of newer models is close to $100 million), two A-10 Thunderbolt IIs, two Lockheed C-130 Hercules, two Boeing E-3 Sentries, eight Boeing KC-135 Stratotankers, one Boeing CH-47 Chinook, one Sikorsky HH-60 Pave Hawk (damaged), two Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawks (damaged), four MH-6 Little Bird helicopters, and 17 General Atomics MQ-9 Reapers (at about $30 million each, totalling close to $500 million).

High-value AWACS and multiple KC-135 tankers were damaged by Iranian strikes on regional airbases.  In the first four days of the war, Iran hit almost all US military bases (or locations hosting US aircraft) in the Gulf. It struck key US ground radars linked to the THAAD air‑defense system, other early‑warning radars, and multiple radar and communication nodes.

At Bahrain’s Al‑Jufair base, two radar domes housing AN/GSC‑52B SATCOM systems were destroyed by Shahed‑2 drones, according to US press reports.

In the UAE, an area of Al Dhafra base with several satellite antennas was hit, while it is still unclear whether the AN/TPY‑2 radar of the THAAD system at Al Ruwais was damaged. In Kuwait, structures at Ali Al Salem base connected to SATCOM systems were damaged, and at least three radar domes at Camp Arifjan were destroyed.

At Saudi Arabia’s Prince Sultan base, at least one strike hit a satellite‑communications area where an AN/TPY‑2 radar had previously been deployed. The large AN/FPS‑132 fixed‑face AESA early‑warning and long‑range anti‑ballistic radar at Al Udeid in Qatar also appears to have been struck. Iranian sources further claim damage to another AN/TPY‑2 at Muwaffaq Salti base in Jordan, though this remains unconfirmed. In Kuwait, in addition to damage to some structures at the Ali al Salem base that appear to be connected to SATCOM systems, at least three radar domes at Camp Arifjan were destroyed.

Most of these high‑value radars – along with aerial refuellers and AEW&C assets – were targeted using ballistic missiles or relatively inexpensive Shahed drones (costing between $20,000 and $50,000 each).

While US lost many high-value ground assets in the region and nearly 44 aircraft, Israel had minimal losses on the ground and only slow-moving UAVs in the air. Israel is a regional player, and has had years of experience in targeting ground assets in Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Lebanon, among others. Israel has been perpetually at war. Being a small country, it has been conscious of securing its assets under hardened shelters. It has nearly ten Iron Dome-class AD systems, among others, such as David’s Sling and Arrow. The Israeli Air Force has fine-tuned tactics to keep its own assets secure.

The reasons behind US losses

The Iranian Air Force was grounded or destroyed in the early air action by the US and Israel, which have flown more than 10,000 combat flights since the conflict began. The Iranian Air Force was no match for the US Air Force in terms of numbers and technology. While a significant number of Iranian air defenses were also neutralized, enough survived to engage adversary assets.

In view of powerful radar jamming capabilities with the US and Israel, Iran mostly used IRST (infra-red search and track) systems to track and IR missiles to engage and shoot down aircraft.  Iran’s strategy aimed to create a “war of attrition” to increase costs for the US and its allies – despite clear US air superiority.

The fact that F-35 stealth fighter jet could be tracked and engaged indicates the possibility of Iran having used Chinese YLC-8B and YLC-8E advanced, mobile Chinese UHF-band 3D surveillance radars specifically designed to detect low-observable, stealth aircraft. Iran might have also used up-to-date intelligence from Russian satellites, often including the position of airborne aircraft.

The US lost more aircraft in the air due to a lack of coordination with the Gulf countries, where most of its assets are located. Also, more action has shifted south near the Strait of Hormuz, and when Iran started hitting assets in the countries that allowed housing US assets. Many of their radars and large air platforms were lying in the open. These assets were thus a relatively easy target. Iranians used drones and drone swarms to hit US military assets.

While the US Air Force and Navy have been exercising regularly with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, including “large force engagements,” the GCC nations have had almost no combat experience. Early coordination challenges with Gulf host nations, contributed to incidents like the initial friendly-fire loss of three F-15Es over Kuwait.

While the US campaign initially succeeded in degrading Iranian air defenses and leadership, it encountered serious operational and strategic failures as the conflict continued. The US underestimated Iranian defenses and tactics. Reports indicate that Tehran could have 50% of its missile launchers and drones intact.

Iranian forces successfully hid mobile air defense systems in tunnels and bunkers, allowing them to ambush US planes, proving it was not a one-sided conflict. Clearly, Washington’s “quick war” assumption had failed, turning the campaign into a long war of attrition. Iran also leveraged regional proxies, investing in low-cost drones, and threatening the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran successfully targeted US military installations across the region, including in Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Iraq, causing significant casualties. This demonstrated that US air dominance did not equate to security on the ground. Tehran relies heavily on inexpensive, locally produced drones like the Shahed, costing $20,000–$50,000, to overwhelm sophisticated, expensive air defenses as part of asymmetric warfare. Iran is fostering closer military ties with Russia, supplying drones in exchange for advanced technologies such as the S-400 system.

The US repeated mistakes from previous conflicts (Afghanistan, Iraq) by relying solely on aerial destruction without a viable, clear “day-after” political strategy to replace the targeted regime. Despite neutralizing senior leadership, the “rally-around-the-flag” effect became visible.

The conflict has already exhausted US military resources significantly, including high-value assets like Tomahawk missiles and Patriot interceptors, creating shortages in other critical theaters such as Europe and Asia. Most NATO members refused to join or help in replenishments. The global economic downturn caused by the war has been of great concern and is likely to have played a role in the ceasefire announced by US President Donald Trump.

Lessons from the U.S.–Israel–Iran War: Strategy, Illusion, and the Transformation of War

Ricardo Martins, New Eastern Outlook

From Donald Trump to Benjamin Netanyahu, the U.S.–Israel war in Iran exposes not only strategic miscalculations but a deeper transformation in how wars are fought, justified, and prolonged. What if the real lesson is that power no longer guarantees control—and that escalation now replaces strategy?

Introduction

“For 36 years, we believed that the American bases protected us; in the first war, we found out that it was we who protected them.” The remark attributed to the Saudi Foreign Affairs Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud captures a profound reversal in the logic of security in the Gulf.

The recent confrontation between the United States, Israel, and Iran has not only reshaped regional alignments but also exposed deeper transformations in the nature of war itself. Analysts such as Alastair Crooke, a former British diplomat and MI6 officer, have emphasised that this conflict marks a transition away from Western-dominated strategic paradigms towards a more fragmented and adaptive world order.

The actions of leaders such as Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu raise fundamental questions about the erosion of normative limits and the future of international order

In classical theory, from Carl von Clausewitz onward, war is seen as a continuation of politics by other means. Yet what this war suggests is more worrying: war increasingly escapes political control, generating dynamics that reshape both strategy and the international system in ways leaders neither intend nor fully understand.

The following outlines thirteen lessons that this war offers to geopolitical analysts, framed—where possible—within a theoretical perspective to add analytical depth.

Geopolitical Lessons from the U.S.–

Israel War against Iran

1. Asymmetric warfare is redefining power

Iran’s strategy confirms that military inferiority no longer implies strategic weakness. Through decentralised networks, drones, cyber capabilities, and maritime disruption, it has imposed disproportionate costs. As Alastair Crooke notes, the objective is not victory in the conventional sense, but the erosion of the adversary’s will and coherence. War becomes a contest of endurance rather than annihilation.

2. U.S. deterrence is visibly eroding

The vulnerability of bases, ships, and supply chains has undermined the aura of uncontested American dominance. Deterrence now depends less on technological superiority and more on resilience under sustained pressure. This aligns with analyses from the RAND Corporation, which highlight the growing exposure of high-value assets in contested environments.

3. Allies are no longer automatically aligned

European hesitation reflects a broader shift away from hierarchical alliance systems. As Alastair Crooke argues in the same interview, Western unity increasingly fractures under the weight of divergent economic and security interests. Solidarity is conditional, not assumed.

4. The Gulf is hedging its bets

Regional actors are recalibrating. The paradox exposed by the war is that hosting U.S. forces may increase vulnerability. Gulf states are therefore diversifying—engaging cautiously with Iran while deepening ties with China and other partners. Security is no longer outsourced; it is negotiated.

5. Geoeconomics has become a battlefield

The disruption of the Strait of Hormuz demonstrates how economic flows can be weaponised with precision. Oil, shipping routes, and financial systems, including de-dollarisation, are now integral to warfare. As noted in analyses by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, growing geopolitical fragmentation and competition are transforming economic interdependence—particularly around strategic chokepoints, and energy flows—into a domain of conflict rather than stability.

6. Regime-change strategies remain structurally flawed

Despite decades of failure—from Iraq to Libya—the belief that coercion can reshape political systems persists. Yet, analysts repeatedly argue that leadership decapitation strategies rarely achieve political submission. Instead, they often reinforce regime cohesion and legitimacy, trigger nationalist backlash, and fail to dismantle underlying institutional structures. Expectations that internal minorities or opposition groups—such as Kurdish populations in Iran—would mobilise against the regime under external pressure have likewise proven misplaced. Rather than weakening the Iranian state, external pressure has strengthened it. The “rally-around-the-flag” effect redirects domestic discontent towards external threats. This pattern, visible in the Iraq War and the Vietnam War, reappears with striking consistency.

7. Strategic illusion at the heart of interventionism

The expectation that pressure would trigger internal collapse in Iran reflects what Robert Jervis identified as misperception in international politics. External actors, such as Trump’s entourage (not the whole U.S. intelligence apparatus), Netanyahu’s 40-year desire, and the Mossad, project their own assumptions onto complex societies, thereby underestimating resilience and adaptive capacity. Jervis further argues that decision-makers interpret external signals through cognitive filters shaped by prior beliefs, leading to systematic errors.

8. From military victory to narrative management

With no decisive victory in sight, the battle shifts to perception. Leaders increasingly frame outcomes to domestic audiences, transforming strategic ambiguity into political narratives. War becomes as much about storytelling and media control as about territorial control and strategic outcomes.

9. The trap of escalation without an endgame

The United States entered the conflict without a clear political exit strategy. As Graham Allison would suggest, bureaucratic momentum and credibility concerns drive continued engagement even when objectives are unclear. Escalation becomes self-sustaining.

10. A post-hegemonic order is taking shape

The conflict reflects a broader redistribution of power in which no single actor can impose outcomes unilaterally. A striking illustration was the moment when Donald Trump turned to China to help de-escalate tensions and unblock the Strait of Hormuz: a reversal of traditional hierarchies in which Washington would have acted as the primary security guarantor. As analysts such as Alastair Crooke suggest, this signals a shift towards a more negotiated and pluralistic order, where even dominant powers must rely on rivals to manage crises they can no longer control alone.

11. The persistence of imperial logics

Despite repeated failures, interventionist doctrines endure. As analyses in War on the Rocks and related think-tank debates show, interventionism is deeply embedded within the U.S. national security establishment, sustained by shared norms and institutional incentives rather than isolated policy choices. This reflects what scholars such as Stephen Walt describe as the persistence of “liberal hegemony,” a strategy aimed at reshaping political orders abroad, which also reveals not only institutional inertia but also a deeper ideological commitment to shaping political outcomes abroad. John Measheimer bluntly puts it: “The Great Delusion – Liberal Dreams and International Realities”. Furthermore, the IR concept of “imperial overstretch”, associated with Paul Kennedy and later Jack Snyder, explains why great powers continue expanding commitments even when it becomes counterproductive.

12. The blurring of war and peace

This conflict illustrates how the boundary between war and peace has eroded into what Frank G. Hoffman conceptualises as “hybrid warfare,” and what the International Institute for Strategic Studies describes as persistent “grey-zone” competition. Cyber operations, economic coercion, and proxy engagements sustain a continuous state of confrontation below the threshold of declared war. In this sense, war is no longer a discrete event but a permanent strategic condition, unfolding across multiple domains without clear temporal or legal boundaries.

13. The erosion of normative constraints

A more troubling lesson concerns the weakening of the rules governing war. Questions surrounding proportionality, civilian infrastructure such as firefighters, electricity grids, schools, and hospitals, and pre-emptive strikes raise concerns about whether actors such as Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu are stretching and breaking the established norms of armed conflict. While not unprecedented, as it was displayed in Gaza and elsewhere, this trend signals a potential shift towards more permissive interpretations of force.

Conclusion

What, then, does this war teach us today, and for the future? Historically, wars have served as brutal laboratories of political learning. Yet the lesson that emerges here is not one of adaptation, but of repetition. The same patterns—misperception, overreach, and escalation without clear ends—recur despite decades of experience. As Robert Jervis demonstrates, decision-makers tend to interpret new conflicts through inherited cognitive frameworks, often misreading changing realities rather than adapting to them.

The statement by Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud underscores this shift: security can no longer be guaranteed externally, nor can war be neatly contained. Instead, it reverberates across regions, economies, and political systems. The actions of leaders such as Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu raise fundamental questions about the erosion of normative limits and the future of international order.

Finally, war still teaches, but what it teaches depends on the willingness to learn. If the past is any guide, the risk is not that lessons are unavailable, but that they are systematically ignored. In practice, the imperative to construct justificatory narratives for domestic audiences and looming electoral cycles often prevails over strategic reflection.

Why Washington needs talks with Tehran more than it admits

Behind Trump’s rhetoric lies a search for strategic pause, political cover, and a way to contain rising costs

By Farhad Ibragimov – lecturer at the Faculty of Economics at RUDN University, expert and lecturer at the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences and Mass Communications, Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation

In recent days, there has been a noticeable shift in US President Donald Trump’s rhetoric regarding Iran. Less than a week ago, Trump issued a 48-hour ultimatum to Iran, threatening strikes against Iran’s energy infrastructure if it refused to unblock the Strait of Hormuz. Now, Trump has expressed openness to negotiations and even claims that some contact with the Iranian side has taken place. This rhetorical shift may not reflect a genuine diplomatic process but could be part of an information strategy. After it became clear that Tehran was unwilling to make concessions and was unresponsive to Trump’s coercive pressure, the US attempted to make it look like the Iranian side was the one suggesting talks.

Israeli news outlet Ynet claims that Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has agreed to negotiate with the US. However, no credible evidence has surfaced to back this, raising questions about the sources of the information and its purpose. Given the current dynamics, these reports can be seen as propaganda aimed at crafting an image of Iran as vulnerable and eager for urgent dialogue with Washington. These interpretations might serve to reinforce the narrative of Tehran’s weakening position.

In Tehran, this is perceived as an attempt to influence global energy markets. Public signals from the US, particularly from Trump, affect oil and gas price dynamics, especially amid tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz – a critical artery for global hydrocarbon supplies. In this context, talk of negotiations can be viewed as a tool for stabilizing expectations and reducing market volatility.

Iranian society and elites remain skeptical about negotiations with the US. Based on past experiences, Iran believes that diplomatic agreements with Washington do not lead to long-term de-escalation and are often followed by increased pressure or an escalation of the conflict. In the current situation, Iran maintains that its position does not necessitate immediate negotiations. Furthermore, within the regional landscape, Iran possesses the capability for asymmetric influence, utilizing allied actors and indirect means of leverage.

Internal dynamics and informational warfare

It’s also quite possible that Trump’s signals about purported or existing contact with the Iranian leadership serve not only foreign policy goals but also internal political goals. Specifically, they may aim to sow distrust and competition within Iranian elites through leaks about ‘secret negotiations’ and hints about individuals potentially open to dialogue. This strategy aligns with the logic of psychological and information warfare: Creating an atmosphere of suspicion, questioning the loyalty of certain political and military leaders, and undermining consensus on key foreign policy issues.

The unity of the political, military, and religious establishments is a crucial factor in Iran’s resilience in the conflict. In this context, the narrative about an ‘internal divide’ can be viewed as an attempt to inflict damage, and its consequences may prove more significant than direct military pressure.

Amid the talk of supposed negotiations, however, it’s interesting to consider potential political figures that could engage in talks. According to the US, one candidate might be Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, one of the most influential players in the Iranian political landscape. Ghalibaf occupies a unique position within Iran’s power structure. On the one hand, he represents the parliament, a key institution of political legitimacy that plays a vital role in balancing the interests of various elite groups. On the other hand, he has solid ties with both the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the country’s religious leadership, making him a possible link between the military, political, and spiritual centers of decision-making. In the absence of formal dialogue channels between Washington and Tehran, these types of figures gain considerable importance as potential informal negotiators.

Officially, however, Tehran denies having any sort of negotiations. Ghalibaf’s office has already stated that no negotiations with the US are taking place or are planned. This position aligns with Iran’s traditional diplomatic practice aimed at minimizing external pressure and maintaining an image of strategic autonomy. Public denials of negotiations do not preclude the existence of private communication channels, but they underscore Iran’s reluctance to acknowledge any dialogue on terms dictated by the US. Moreover, even for moderate Iranian politicians, engaging with Trump would be seen as an act of betrayal; if Tehran were to agree to talks, it would likely require the explicit approval of the supreme leader and the IRGC, who currently protect the integrity of Iran’s system.

If any contact does take place, it is likely to be conducted through intermediaries. In this regard, countries like Oman, which have experience mediating US-Iran discussions, traditionally play a significant role. Pakistan, too, could leverage its regional connections and channels of interaction with Iranian elites. This multilayered diplomacy allows parties to maintain maneuverability without making public commitments. Notably, Oman has been one of the few Gulf monarchies to speak out candidly, accusing the US and Israel of unwarranted aggression.

Strategic calculations: Why Washington talks and Tehran waits

The critical question, however, is to what extent these negotiations align with Iran’s current interests. Judging by the rhetoric and behavior of the Iranian elites, there appears to be a growing conviction in Tehran that the country has adapted to the hostilities with the US and its allies, including Israel. Furthermore, Iran believes that a prolonged conflict will undermine Washington’s international credibility, revealing its limitations in achieving strategic objectives.

In this context, the prolongation of the conflict becomes a calculated strategy. The longer the war persists, the greater the costs for the US. And it’s not just about military expenses but also political, economic, and reputational repercussions. For the Trump administration, this means finding a balance between displaying strength and avoiding a full-scale escalation (whether through a ground operation or even nuclear strikes) that could lead to uncontrollable consequences. Therefore, increased rhetoric regarding negotiations can be seen as an attempt to solidify an interim outcome and prevent an escalation of the conflict.

From this perspective, a logical contradiction arises: If the US were to achieve decisive success, there would be no real need for negotiations. After all, there’s no point in negotiating with a defeated adversary. Thus, the very initiative for dialogue indirectly suggests that Washington does not hold a definitive advantage and seeks a way out of the situation with the least possible costs. 

As for Iran, it shows readiness to play the long game. By refusing direct negotiations but theoretically keeping the door open for dialogue, Tehran maintains strategic flexibility. This position allows Iran to increase pressure while waiting for more favorable conditions in the future. Given that each day of the conflict escalates costs for the US, this strategy can be viewed as rational and aligned with the long-term interests of the Iranian leadership.

In the context of the current crisis, Washington’s persistent push for talks with Tehran can be explained by at least three strategic motivations. All three don’t have to be in play simultaneously; one of these motives is enough for the White House. In this light, Trump’s negotiation rhetoric isn’t so much a sign of diplomatic optimism as a tool for flexible maneuvering, especially as military efforts have not yielded quick or clear results, and Iran continues to dismiss claims of direct dialogue.

The first motivation might be that Washington needs negotiations as a tactical pause, allowing time to regroup, disorient Iran, and prepare for the next phase of military pressure. This hypothesis seems plausible, particularly since the current phase of the conflict has already exposed the limitations of America’s initial calculations. Notably, Trump’s decision to take a step back following threats against Iranian energy infrastructure came amid warnings from the Gulf Arab states and an acknowledgment of the potential scale of retaliatory actions. In this light, the negotiation agenda could serve the classic function of an operational pause: Regrouping forces, reassessing Iran’s capabilities, replenishing supplies, and refining coalition structures before the next phase of escalation.

The second motivation for the talks is that Trump may genuinely be seeking a way to end the war without appearing politically defeated. He may want to exit the crisis with minimal reputational damage. This scenario doesn’t seem far-fetched either. Amid ongoing strikes, the deployment of additional US forces in the region, and no clear signs that Iran is about to capitulate, negotiations become a means to declare at least partial success. For Trump, this is particularly important.

A prolonged conflict escalates costs across multiple fronts: From increasing pressure on energy markets, to rising anxiety among allies in the Persian Gulf, growing doubts about the effectiveness of the US strategy, and growing domestic criticism. In this context, Trump may seek to frame de-escalation as his own diplomatic triumph, shifting blame for military miscalculations onto those directly involved in executing the strategies. This tactic is familiar in American political practice; when operations don’t yield expected results, presidents often try to protect their political capital by deflecting scrutiny away from themselves and directing it toward members of their administration. Trump’s recent mention of Secretary of War Pete Hegseth in relation to the conflict shows that the White House is already crafting a narrative in which Hegseth could potentially be turned into a scapegoat responsible for any failures.

A third reason to initiate talks might involve buying time to encourage regional partners, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to become more actively engaged in the conflict, thereby forming a broader anti-Iran coalition. However, it’s important to note that there’s currently no clear indication that Riyadh or Abu Dhabi is prepared to join the fight alongside the US; in fact, the Gulf states have warned Washington about the risks of catastrophic backlash and the vulnerabilities of their own infrastructures. Nevertheless, from a strategic standpoint, the idea of expanding the coalition makes sense. The more players involved, the lower the cost of America’s participation; also, it would be easier to present the conflict not merely as a bilateral US-Iran confrontation, but as a collective effort to ‘restore regional stability’. In other words, the pause taken for negotiations may not only serve a diplomatic purpose, but may also be used for recalibrating the regional political-military front.

Taken together, these factors lead to an important conclusion: Trump’s talk about negotiations indirectly suggests that Washington lacks the decisive superiority needed to impose its terms on Iran without engaging in an intermediate political phase. If America were truly in a position of indisputable dominance, it wouldn’t need to urgently promote the idea of negotiations. 

Therefore, America’s push for diplomacy is not a sign of success; rather, it indicates that the war has proven to be more costly, complex, and politically sensitive than initially anticipated. This apparent realization likely drives Tehran’s strategy of prolonging the war: Every additional day of conflict raises the costs of the US operation in military, economic, and reputational terms, thereby strengthening Iran’s negotiating position.

The Strait of Hormuz: Trump’s Looming Waterloo?

Ma Miaomiao, Beijing Review

It seems that the Strait of Hormuz has become a defining test for U.S. President Donald Trump, with the strategic waterway threatening to upend his political future. Trump claimed aboard Air Force One on March 29 that Iran had agreed to most of a “15-point plan”—a boast he amplified by dubbing the waterway “Trump Strait.”

Tehran swiftly dismissed the claims as “excessive, unrealistic and unreasonable,” with Iranian parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf going further, alleging that Washington was seeding such reports to “manipulate financial and oil markets” and potentially lay the groundwork for assassination attempts against Iranian officials. Whether credible or rhetorical, such allegations underscore the depth of mutual distrust.

The U.S. approach against Iran, with the war beginning on February 28, rests on a misjudgment of Iranian society. The assassination of Iran’s ex-Supreme Leader Seyyed Ali Khamenei and other top officials did not topple the government, but instead unified Iran in its determination to fight foreign military intervention to defend sovereignty.

Trump told newspaper Financial Times on March 29 that he intended to “take the oil in Iran,” naming Kharg Island, Iran’s primary oil export terminal, which handles 90 percent of its crude exports, as a target, revealing a policy driven by resource appropriation.

Handling roughly one fifth of global oil trade, while the Strait has not been entirely closed, the de facto throttling of the world’s busiest chokepoint for oil has sent shockwaves through global energy markets: Oil tanker traffic has plummeted by over 90 percent compared to pre-conflict levels.

The conflict has widened as Iran’s “axis of resistance,” including Yemen’s Houthis, stepped up coordination, targeting shipping lanes and U.S. assets. Major carriers have suspended their Red Sea routes, detouring around the Cape of Good Hope—reversing hopes of normal shipping and raising global trade costs.

Millions showed up for the latest wave of “No Kings” protests, drawing an estimated 9 million people across more than 3,300 events worldwide on March 28, denouncing the unauthorized war and soaring living costs.

Geopolitically, Trump faces divergent agendas. French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot rejected “an imposed war on Iran,” calling for diplomacy. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said the conflict is “not a matter for NATO,” yet Germany shares intelligence with the U.S. Saudi Arabia is torn, anxious about escalation but dependent on U.S.-provided security. Israel continues to press for strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.

Domestically, Trump’s standing is eroding. Nearly 60 percent of Americans surveyed by an Associated Press (AP)-NORC Center for Public Affairs poll released on March 25 thought the campaign has gone too far. A March Harvard-Harris poll showed Trump’s job approval rating has dropped three points to 43 percent.

Trump’s staff shake-ups highlight internal division in Washington. Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem was fired by Trump on March 5. Director of the National Counterterrorism Center Joseph Kent resigned on March 17 over policy disagreements with the Iran war strategy. Trump ousted Pam Bondi as attorney general on April 2.

The Republican Party is split. According to an AP report on April 1, with Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio viewed as the Republican Party’s strongest potential candidates in the 2028 presidential primaries, the two must balance their roles in the Trump administration with their future political plans. “It’s very obvious from the way Rubio talks about Iran and the way Vance talks about Iran that they are of different casts of mind.”

It’s almost an open secret that Vance disagrees on current Iran policy, and many senior lawmakers have already announced they will retire before the midterms in November.

With the midterms approaching, Trump’s Iran choices are tied to his survival. Doubling down risks higher oil prices and more protests; conciliation would anger his “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) base—and Israel. Trump’s own warning to Republican lawmakers—”If we don’t win the midterms… they’ll find a reason to impeach me”—sounds like a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The military operation’s cost is also staggering—$3.7 billion for the first 100 hours ($890 million daily), with total costs potentially hitting $1 trillion, according to a U.S. defense think tank. The International Crisis Group has warned that the standoff is in a “dangerous phase of informal escalation,” with neither side ready for all-out war but both escalating tensions.

The Strait of Hormuz may prove to be Trump’s Waterloo, but one defined not by cannons, but by political overreach.