Saturday, February 14, 2026

Islamic Republic of Iran: An Independent Pole in a Hegemonic World

Dr. Bilal al-Lakkis

The Islamic Revolution in Iran deserves to be studied deeply. It is a truly unique experience, one that moved “against the prevailing current.”

Many believed its progress and success to be impossible. It has operated within systems fundamentally different from what is dominant in both East and West, and among Muslims and Arabs alike. Yet after 47 years, its weight and stature continue to grow, despite an intensification of surrounding challenges unprecedented for any comparable socio-political experience.

No regional state—and not even a global power—has previously confronted the United States (as the leader of the West), withstood it, and managed to survive, persist, and advance.

Germany collapsed after two decades, and the Soviet Union did not survive four decades after World War II before disintegrating and collapsing.

We are speaking of a trajectory of challenges that have accompanied this revolution since its victory, challenges unmatched by any anti-Western experience in history.

Not a single year passed without threats, intimidation, tightening measures, sanctions, distortion campaigns, and both overt and covert wars. Yet it preserved its resilience and course, advancing toward the production of the aspired polarity according to its own vision, until it has today become one of the few most consequential wills in our world, alongside global powers such as the United States, China, and Russia (and it appears that Germany is returning as well).

The paradox is that we are speaking of a regional state with limited geographical foundations, yet as it approaches the fifth decade of its revolution, it appears determined, willful, and dynamic—building its diplomatic, political, intellectual, artistic, scientific, social, and military model, supported by a level of popular backing unprecedented for any revolution so long after its establishment.

You see it advancing, challenging, exercising patience, maneuvering, confronting, playing on the edge of the abyss, fighting, waging wars, negotiating, imposing its conditions, maintaining internal cohesion, launching satellites into space, competing in medicine, engineering, sciences, philosophy, literature, art, and cinema, and offering the world lessons in the manufacture of stature and parity rather than begging for them.

It presents a methodology worthy of contemplation in building power, self-reliance, and refusal to shelter under the shadow of any global power or seek their appeasement. In other words, it asserts that polarity can be built according to a new definition of the components and elements of a pole.

Polarity should not be confined exclusively to military, economic, and technological dimensions; rather, it may be constructed upon other foundations. This is closely linked to understanding human needs, preferences, and crises, and identifying those capable of responding to them. A sound idea can restructure the global power architecture if its conditions are met.

(Photo: unknown)

In this sense, the Islamic Republic succeeded in avoiding the traps of stagnation, monotony, dissolution into other systems, or submission to the realities of international equations and rules by becoming merely an imitation, an echo, or a shadow presence.

Some states build their policies and influence on maneuvering and exploiting the contradictions of others; by contrast, it can be regarded as a creator and producer of space, an expander of it—not a filler of voids or a gambler on external contradictions. It carries a banner; it does not slip under others’ banners.

From its first day, it set out to produce—first in the regional environment and then globally—a distinct discourse that spoke to peoples and to a human need for dignity, justice, and parity. The call of Resistance is an action, not a reaction.

Resistance, as it understands it, is the language of our current era: a complete ethical and intellectual system that bends power—where possible—toward truth, not truth toward power.

Primacy belongs to truth, to will, determination, self-confidence, and peoples; to wisdom and courage; to challenging hegemony rather than flattering it—yet a smart challenge. Primacy belongs to a correct understanding of the world and its deep needs, to the soundness of motivations, and to the tight linkage between motive, goal, and impact (one of America’s greatest problems today).

Through this, it succeeded in generating attraction for many across the world. It was both revolution and reform at once: it overthrew the Shah’s tyranny through popular power while confronting the head of tyranny, the United States, and at the same time integrating whatever was positive in the cumulative human experience.

In a world governed by the logic of the jungle, it sided not with brute force but with courage; in a world of impulsiveness, with wisdom; in a world of arrogance, with humility; in a world of “peace through force,” it adopted peace through right grounded in strength; in a world that despises peoples, it moved to enhance their participation and presence; in a world dominated by material motivations, it elevated ethical and moral ones; and in a world of haste, it chose patience and steady, cumulative progress.

Thus it distinguished itself from the West as well as from many Islamic religious currents and states, refining a discourse of its own without compromise for the sake of arrival, as other religious trends have done.

(Photo: unknown)

From day one it challenged and confronted, ensuring the purity of the experience and preventing its distortion. Its revolution was not delivered by an external “midwife,” nor did it arise through Western assistance; it was a rare revolution that confronted one of the world’s most powerful security apparatuses (SAVAK). It was a victory over the Shah, a Western agent and a partner of Israel—and, in its depth, a victory over the United States and Israel.

The revolution did not judge rulers by gender or sect, but by conduct and position. Hence, it differed profoundly from many Islamic interpretations, a distinction the world is gradually coming to understand—most recently underscored by its stance on the war on Gaza, during which it experienced isolation amid international silence and betrayal.

Today, the United States and Israel openly speak of overthrowing the experience of the Islamic Republic in Iran and are working forcefully toward that end. They have failed thus far—and are likely to fail disastrously—simply because Iran’s foundations and the context of its rise are strong and solid, while the foundations and context of its enemies’ actions are weak.

Through its path and positions, Iran has drawn the world and peoples closer to itself and farther from the United States and Israel, undermining their legitimacy, particularly in the recent confrontation with the Resistance Front. It has altered the stance of regional states and regimes toward it and their hostility to it, as they have come to understand that their interests lie not in conspiring against it but in preventing such conspiracies. It has reaffirmed that standing with Palestine—as the central cause of the region—is a shared interest for all of them and their states. Its people are more united around it and more embracing of its system, while on the opposite side—America, Israel, and the West—everything is inverted: Arab pillars have collapsed, American society is deeply divided, and sharp polarization grips it.

A war on Iran lacks consensus; it is opposed by the majority, and neither global nor legal support for it exists. Moreover, such a confrontation would not be with a regional power alone, but with a religious and political Resistance current with effective reach across the region and the world.

(Photo: unknown)

The United States has been accustomed, since the mid-twentieth century, to fighting wars against weak states and fragile regimes, wars backed by substantial external and internal—and sometimes legal—support.

Despite this, it failed catastrophically, with its own leaders acknowledging the strategic disasters those wars produced. How, then, today—when rivals lie in wait, and it faces a real, capable power backed by peoples with legitimacy, capacity, and long endurance?

Those who once claimed that this experience and discourse ran contrary to the global trajectory and had no horizon for success misjudged reality and must now reconsider. They acknowledge that its insistence on weaving its uniqueness, building self-confidence, and producing what resembles it—and what it deems a genuine human need rather than a falsification of preferences—has placed it today in a higher position among nations.

They recognize that it now articulates the discourse of the world’s oppressed with will and resolve, a fortified shelter that protects them all, and an Islamic voice marked by fraternity and dignity.

These elements, combined with the major challenge it currently confronts in facing the United States in these historic days—bearing threats but also opportunities—may place it at the threshold of global polarity if it succeeds in overcoming the present challenge and thwarting the enemy’s objectives, whether through negotiation or, should it occur, military confrontation.

Most likely, it will succeed, because its internal, regional, and international contexts are favorable, and its resilience and capabilities are solid, while the context of America—and of Trump—stands at one of the lowest points in U.S. history, as noted, and because wars in today’s world are no longer primarily military.

Author

  • Dr. Bilal Al-Lakkis is a prominent Lebanese political writer and researcher, widely known for his articles and lectures on political thought and Resistance theory.

    Among his notable published works:
    — U.S.–Saudi Relations After September 11
    — Citizenship: Theory and Practice in Challenge — Lebanon as a Case Study

The Necessity of Support for Iran by Islamic Countries

The Islamic Republic of Iran serves as a defensive frontline, a security shield, and in essence, a protective stronghold for all its neighboring countries.

According to Taghrib News Agency, Hojjat al‑Islam Seyyed Hosseini Mazari, head of Afghanistan’s Tebyan Cultural Foundation, wrote in a commentary titled “What do Iran’s issues have to do with non‑Iranians, and why should they feel concerned or involved?”:
What connection do Iran’s affairs have with non‑Iranians, and why should Afghan citizens—despite the vast challenges facing their own country, nation, and government—feel compelled to address Iran‑related issues or spend their time and resources defending this Islamic nation?
The answer is clear. Beyond the fact that Imam Khamenei is the religious authority and the Guardian Jurist of our era—whose obedience and support, according to the rich and contemporary jurisprudence of Twelver Shiism, is obligatory-
Beyond the fact that Iran’s leadership, government, and noble nation have consistently stood against global arrogance and supported the oppressed and the mujahideen—evident in their resistance against the United States and the Zionist regime on regional and global scales, and their unwavering backing of the Palestinian resistance, especially in Gaza, as well as in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and across the Islamic world—
Beyond the fact that since the beginning of the Afghan jihad, Iran has provided comprehensive and serious support to our country, our people, our fighters, and our refugees—
Beyond the fact that millions of our migrants currently benefit from Iran’s stability and security—
And beyond the fact that Iran is our neighbor, and its peace, stability, and nationwide security directly benefit the people of Afghanistan, the region, and the world—
The Islamic Republic of Iran is the defensive trench and security barrier for all neighboring countries—especially Afghanistan—and even for the broader region and the world. Should Iran, God forbid, collapse, Afghanistan would suffer severe damage and become the first victim. Other neighboring states, the Persian Gulf countries, Egypt, and others would quickly fall apart. Regional powers such as China and Russia would not only lose their stability but also become defenseless in the face of U.S. and NATO conspiracies, executed with the help of the child‑killing Israeli regime. Even freedom‑seeking humanity worldwide would face mass destruction, the annihilation of their infrastructures, and the collapse of the global order. Western‑Hebrew imperialism would eliminate its opponents and enslave the rest.
Therefore, not only are the people of Afghanistan obliged to support Iran’s leadership, government, and nation—so that they may stand firmly against the enemies of Islam, defeat them, and strengthen the power and dignity of the Islamic system and the Iranian nation—but every individual, movement, nation, and Islamic government is religiously and morally responsible to safeguard their own natural life and political, social, cultural, and economic security by seriously supporting the Leader of the Revolution, the government, and the great nation of Islamic Iran in all fields, at all times, and in all places.

Hoda exhibition to showcase Iranian Islamic clothing in Ramadan

TEHRAN- The National Exhibition of Hoda Iranian Islamic Clothing, dedicated to the holy month of Ramadan, will commence at Imam Khomeini Mosalla in Tehran on Wednesday. 

Over 200 producers of modest clothing and hijab products from across the country will participate at the event, showcasing their offerings under the supervision of relevant unions, the director of the exhibition said, Mehr reported. 

In addition to selling modest products, a section dedicated to various types of black and colored chador fabrics will also be active, Hamidreza Omidi added.  

Omidi further revealed additional features of the Hoda exhibition, stating that a free traditional chador sewing section will welcome the public daily. 

Other promotional sections include "See Yourself with Hijab" photography and gifts for first-time hijab wearers, he mentioned. 

A section for exchanging old black and colored chadors for new ones will also be available, he noted. 


For the first time this year, a special booth offering products needed by Hajj pilgrims will be operational, he said. 

Additionally, a daycare facility has been arranged for visitors' children, allowing families to explore the exhibition with peace of mind, he concluded. 

The aim of this event is to provide affordable and suitable clothing options for consumers, promote modest and chaste attire within the community, and ease access for families seeking a variety of modest clothing.

Previous editions of the exhibition have successfully taken place at the Children and Young Adults Intellectual Development Center and Imam Khomeini Mosalla.

The National Exhibition of Hoda Iranian Islamic Clothing will be running until March 6.

Iranian Islamic clothing is characterized by a unique blend of cultural heritage and religious principles, reflecting the country's diverse history and identity.

Traditional garments such as the chador, a full-body cloak worn by many women, signify modesty and devotion, while colorful patterns and intricate embroideries showcase the rich artistic expressions of Iranian culture. 

Over the years, contemporary interpretations have emerged, incorporating modern fashion trends while adhering to Islamic guidelines. 

This evolution highlights the dynamic interplay between tradition and modernity in Iranian society, demonstrating how clothing can serve as both a means of personal expression and a reflection of cultural values.

The UAE: One state or seven competing emirates under one flag?

Behind the skyscrapers lies a fragile federal bargain shifting toward Abu Dhabi and tested by the Emirates’ ties to Washington and Israel.

In December 1971, seven rulers sealed a pact that fused their territories into a federation. There was no uprising in the streets, no grand constitutional rupture shaped by popular will. 

What emerged was a calculated bargain among hereditary rulers who understood both their fragility and their ambition, as British power receded from the Persian Gulf and Washington’s shadow stretched steadily across the region.

That bargain still holds. But it has never been equal.

Seven Emirates, one destiny? 

The UAE is routinely portrayed as a unified, stable, forward-looking state – a Gulf success story that leveraged oil wealth, global trade, and strategic alignment with the US to project power well beyond its size

In recent years, it has added normalization with Israel and deepening security integration with Washington to that formula. Yet what is rarely acknowledged is that the UAE is not a monolithic state in the classical sense. It is a federation of seven hereditary emirates, each with distinct economic models, political cultures, and varying levels of wealth and influence.

The question, then, is not whether the UAE is stable today. It is whether the structural imbalances built into its formation can endure the mounting internal and external pressures of the coming years.

A federation built on asymmetry

The UAE was not created by a single ruling family consolidating power. It was born of negotiation. In December 1971, six emirates formed the federation. Ras al-Khaimah joined in February 1972, bringing the total to seven. From the outset, the union brought together territories that were unequal in resources, demography, and geopolitical weight.

Before British protection agreements carved out the Trucial Coast, large swaths of today’s UAE lay within Oman’s sphere of influence, where tribal confederations and maritime rulers operated under shifting Omani suzerainty. The federation is thus a recent political settlement, not the continuation of a historical state.

Abu Dhabi controls the commanding heights of the federation, overseeing roughly 96 percent of oil and gas production capacity – giving it not only the largest share of hydrocarbon reserves, but also decisive control over how and when that wealth enters global markets.

Dubai charted a different course. With limited oil, it built its identity on economic openness – ports, aviation, re-export, finance – turning geography into leverage. It compensated for resource scarcity through hyper-connectivity and risk-taking.

According to the Central Bank of the UAE, Dubai received 9.9 million international visitors who spent at least one night in the first half of 2025, and Dubai Airport handled about 46 million passengers during the same period.

The northern emirates followed other paths. Ras al-Khaimah relied more heavily on manufacturing, quarrying, and mid-scale trade. Sharjah positioned itself around education, culture, and a more socially conservative public identity, even as it sought to expand industrial capacity and job creation. 

Fujairah capitalized on geography, sitting on the Gulf of Oman and serving as a critical energy and shipping outlet beyond the Strait of Hormuz. Ajman and Umm al-Quwain, smaller and more financially constrained, depended more directly on federal redistribution and shared sovereign infrastructure.

These differences remain embedded in the federation’s architecture.

The federal design itself acknowledges hierarchy. The Federal Supreme Council, composed of the seven rulers, holds ultimate authority over major national matters. Yet substantive decisions require the agreement of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. 

In practice, this grants both emirates veto power on key federal issues. Rather than being merely two of seven; they are the twin pillars of the state. While that structure has ensured stability, it has also entrenched asymmetry. 

Abu Dhabi’s consolidation

The ruler of Abu Dhabi chairs the Supreme Council for Financial and Economic Affairs (SCFEA), established by law in December 2020. This body sets policy on financial, investment, economic, petroleum, and natural resource affairs, oversees relevant entities, and appoints members of strategic investment bodies.

For the other emirates, this council formalized what had already become reality, that decisive national economic authority increasingly emanates from Abu Dhabi.

On 30 January 2026, Abu Dhabi’s new sovereign wealth entity, Limad Holding, acquired Abu Dhabi Holding, consolidating hundreds of billions of dollars in state assets – airlines, utilities, and ports – under the direct leadership of the Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohammed bin Zayed. A Reuters report described the move as placing vast strategic assets under a tighter circle of control worth “hundreds of billions of dollars.”

Such consolidation reduces institutional fragmentation at the top. It also narrows the circle of decision-makers. In a federation built on negotiated balance, that has consequences. Fewer actors at the apex can mean greater efficiency. It can also raise the stakes of elite disputes during crises, particularly if other emirates feel sidelined.

The unease is rarely voiced publicly. It surfaces instead in subtle signals – commentary in Gulf media since 2019, warning of potential fragmentation; muted frustration among elites; and social media expressions that occasionally break through before being erased.

The episode involving Haitham bin Saqr bin Sultan Al-Qasimi, deputy head of the Ruler’s Office in Kalba, who briefly posted a tweet attacking President Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) before deleting it, offered a glimpse into tensions that rarely see daylight.

Dubai, Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah: Pressure points

If fragmentation were ever to materialize, it would not resemble street protests or separatist parties. Political parties are banned, public dissent is tightly controlled, and internal mobility is regulated. The UAE is not structured for open contestation.

Instead, pressure appears in less visible domains such as elite cohesion, socio-economic bargains, and exposure to external financial shocks.

Glitzy Dubai illustrates the first line of vulnerability. Its model depends on credibility as a predictable, dynamic global hub. The Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) emphasizes its independent legal and regulatory framework to attract global capital. Yet that openness makes Dubai sensitive to shifts in the global regulatory climate.

Corporate tax, introduced for the 2023 fiscal year, and a local supplementary minimum tax taking effect on 1 January 2025 have forced Dubai’s long-standing model of easy entry and differentiated zones to adapt to a more uniform federal tax environment.

At the same time, repeated western warnings about the use of UAE-based networks for sanctions evasion and financial opacity have heightened reputational risk. Dubai carries a disproportionate share of financial exposure. A sudden contraction in capital flows or a reputational shock tied to sanctions enforcement could reverberate quickly through its economy.

Dubai has drawn closer to the federal core. The appointment of the crown prince of Dubai as minister of defense in July 2024 tethered Dubai’s leadership directly to a central sovereign function. It was a strategic alignment move – one that reduces the likelihood of overt divergence.

Ras al-Khaimah presents a different test. The emirate has pursued differentiated growth projects, most notably the Wynn Al Marjan Island integrated resort. In September 2023, the UAE Commercial Gaming Regulatory Authority (GCGRA) was established as a federal body to develop a framework for commercial gaming and national lotteries. 

On 5 October 2024, Wynn Resorts received the UAE’s first commercial gambling license for Ras al-Khaimah. This marks a major policy shift in a federation that had long prohibited gambling.

The test is twofold. Federal regulation means centralized oversight, largely from Abu Dhabi. Yet social and cultural norms vary across emirates. If gaming becomes a significant revenue source and tourism magnet, Ras al-Khaimah’s bargaining power within the federation will increase. It may draw tourist flows that would otherwise head to Dubai or Abu Dhabi, sharpening internal economic competition.

Sharjah, meanwhile, balances a conservative cultural identity with industrial and energy expansion. In November 2025, Sharjah’s Petroleum Council announced a new natural gas discovery at the Al-Hadiba field, reinforcing the emirate’s long-term push to strengthen its domestic energy position.

Yet Sharjah also carries a heavier debt burden relative to its size. In its May 2024 sovereign rating assessment, S&P Global Ratings underscored the emirate’s comparatively elevated debt burden, with gross government debt standing at roughly 52 percent of GDP in 2023.

Each of these emirates operates under the same flag. Each also pursues a distinct model of legitimacy and growth.

Security state and elite cohesion

The second axis of potential strain lies in how dissent is managed. In the UAE, opposition is treated primarily as a security issue. Over the past year, high-profile cases linked to what authorities describe as terrorism-related offenses have resurfaced.

Human rights groups have reported on the so-called UAE84 case, a mass trial involving 84 individuals. On 4 March 2025, Human Rights Watch (HRW) stated that the State Security Division of the Federal Supreme Court rejected appeals and upheld convictions. Authorities accused the defendants of establishing or running a secret entity designated as terrorist under the Anti-Terrorism Law.

Such cases reinforce elite discipline. They also send a message about the boundaries of permissible discourse. In a federation dependent on negotiated power-sharing among ruling families, cohesion at the top matters more than public contestation below.

However, the absence of visible opposition does not automatically translate into the absence of tension. It means tension, if it exists, circulates within elite networks rather than in the streets.

External entanglements and internal cost

The UAE has deepened its integration with Washington’s security architecture and normalized relations with Israel, embedding itself further in US-led regional frameworks. These alignments deliver technological, military, and financial advantages. They also carry political and reputational costs across West Asia.

As the federation expands its involvement in Israeli-linked projects, it risks widening the gap between external strategy and internal social currents. For smaller or more conservative emirates, the calculus may not be identical to that of Abu Dhabi’s strategic planners.

The UAE remains far from collapse. Division is unlikely in the near term. But the federation’s durability rests on continuous management of asymmetry – economic, political, and cultural. As Abu Dhabi centralizes authority and external commitments deepen, the margin for error narrows.

The UAE is one country in law. In practice, it is seven emirates negotiating power under one flag. Whether that negotiation remains balanced will determine the federation’s future.