Sunday, February 08, 2026

UK’s ‘prince of darkness’ falls to Epstein’s shadow

 By Garsha Vazirian

TEHRAN – The unsealing of a three-million-page digital archive by the U.S. Department of Justice has unleashed a tectonic shift in European politics, exposing a necrotizing web of corruption and state-level betrayal.

While the American political class remains largely insulated, the United Kingdom is currently undergoing a purge of its neoliberal vanguard, most notably Peter Mandelson—the “prince of darkness” whose decades of shadowy influence have finally hit a criminal wall.

The fallout reached a fever pitch this week as Mandelson resigned from the House of Lords and saw his properties in London and Wiltshire raided by the Metropolitan Police.

Emerging evidence from the files suggests that Mandelson, while serving as Business Secretary, utilized his cabinet position to leak market-sensitive data and classified government bailout plans—including details on the 2008 financial crisis and the €500 billion Greek debt package—to Jeffrey Epstein.

These leaks allegedly facilitated illicit gains for the financier’s inner circle, representing a profound breach of the Official Secrets Act.

Prime Minister Keir Starmer, now fighting for his political life, admitted he was aware of Mandelson’s “friendship” before appointing him as Ambassador to Washington in 2024 but claimed the peer “lied repeatedly” about the relationship’s depth.

The scandal has ignited a broader firestorm across the continent, revealing a globalized system of elite impunity.

In Norway, former Prime Minister Thorbjørn Jagland is under investigation for aggravated corruption, while celebrated diplomat Mona Juul was suspended after it was revealed Epstein willed $10 million to her children.

These revelations paint a grim picture of a transatlantic elite bound by Epstein’s intelligence-led “honeytraps” and the exploitation of geopolitical chaos.

Perhaps most damning are the connections to Israeli intelligence assets.

The documents detail Epstein’s role as a “fixer” for Mossad-linked ventures, involving figures like former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak in sophisticated surveillance and influence operations.

These files suggest Epstein exploited geopolitical flashpoints, from Libya to Ukraine, treating war-torn regions as “resources” for both human trafficking and disaster capitalism.

“As you probably know, I represent the Rothschilds,” Epstein wrote in a 2016 email to Peter Thiel.

As the UK government teeters and the public demands the full release of vetting documents, the Epstein archive stands as a definitive ledger of a collapsing Western moral order.

The sacrificial lambs currently being purged may only be the beginning of a total dismantling of the entrenched networks of power that have long shielded these predators.

Smuggling, sovereignty, and transitional power: The Lebanese–Syrian border after Assad

 By Sondoss Al Asaad 

BEIRUT — The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government did not bring an end to smuggling between Syria and Lebanon. Instead, it transformed its logic, scale, and actors.

What was once a highly organized, protection-based system tied to entrenched security networks has gradually morphed into a fragmented, semi-individualized activity shaped by price arbitrage, institutional uncertainty, and weak border governance on both sides.

Fuel smuggling offers a particularly revealing case; in the immediate aftermath of government collapse, the disparity between fuel prices in Lebanon and Syria created powerful incentives. 
At one point, gasoline prices in Syria reached more than double those in Lebanon, allowing smugglers to secure profits exceeding 100 percent almost instantly.

This dynamic thrived amid security disarray, porous borders, and the temporary absence of a coherent enforcement apparatus. However, as sanctions were partially eased on the new Syrian authorities and fuel availability improved domestically, these incentives sharply declined.

Today, the price difference between the two countries is marginal, eroding the profitability that once sustained large-scale smuggling operations.

This economic convergence has fundamentally altered smuggling practices. Large tanker-based operations—previously viable due to political cover, bribery networks, and predictable security hierarchies—have become increasingly risky.

In their place, small-scale fuel transport using jerrycans has proliferated. These activities no longer require sophisticated coordination or institutional protection; familiarity with unmonitored rural routes often suffices. 

Ironically, the very weakness of the de facto government —characterized by rapidly changing security units and unclear chains of command—has made bribery less effective and predictability harder for smugglers to manage.

Yet the persistence of smuggling is no longer driven by scarcity alone. Interviews with smugglers and consumers indicate declining demand for Lebanese fuel inside Syria, due both to improved availability and to deteriorating quality. 

Fuel adulteration, contamination, and profit-driven dilution have damaged trust in smuggled gasoline, undermining one of its former competitive advantages. The result is a shrinking informal market sustained more by habit and opportunity than necessity.

Parallel to these developments, Syria’s de facto authorities have moved decisively to reassert sovereignty over commercial transit.

The recent decision to restrict non-Syrian trucks from entering Syrian territory—with the exception of regulated transit vehicles—signals a broader strategy to reclaim control over borders, logistics, and customs revenue. While framed as a technical regulatory measure, the decision carries significant political and economic implications, particularly for Lebanon.

Lebanese transport unions have criticized the move as unilateral and harmful, warning of disruptions to perishable goods, increased costs, and asymmetric treatment given the continued access of Syrian trucks to Lebanese territory. 

Others within Lebanon’s logistics sector, however, acknowledge that the decision reflects a vacuum created by the Lebanese state's inaction—specifically the failure to establish joint coordination mechanisms in line with Arab transit agreements.

Beyond fuel and freight, recent judicial cooperation agreements—most notably the transfer of convicted Syrian prisoners from Lebanon to Syria—underscore the emerging contours of bilateral relations in the post-Assad era. 

These agreements suggest a pragmatic recalibration: sovereignty, reciprocity, and institutional rebuilding have replaced the personalized, security-driven arrangements of the past.

Ultimately, the Lebanese–Syrian border today reflects neither normalization nor collapse, but transition. Smuggling persists not because states are absent, but because they are incomplete. 

As Syria’s de facto authorities consolidate power and Lebanon continues to struggle with governance paralysis, the border remains a contested space—where economics, security, and sovereignty intersect, and where informal practices endure until formal structures prove capable of replacing them.

The boomerang of division: Israel's fractured leadership and Gaza's unbroken will

 By staff writer

TEHRAN – The Hamas attack on October 7, 2023 exposed serious failures in Israel’s security system and laid bare deep divisions within the Israeli political and military leadership. 

Recent statements by former defense minister Yoav Gallant and opposition leader Yair Lapid reveal an establishment fractured by internal conflict, competing narratives, and long-standing policy failures. Rather than presenting a coherent response to the crisis, Israel’s leaders have turned on one another, highlighting a system struggling to account for its own actions.

Gallant’s public attack on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is striking in both tone and significance. When a former defense minister describes a sitting prime minister as a “liar,” it signals a profound breakdown within the system’s leadership. Gallant accuses Netanyahu of deliberately shaping a misleading account of October 7 to avoid responsibility for what he calls a major failure. According to Gallant, while Israeli soldiers and security officials were engaged in fighting, Netanyahu was working politically to undermine those same institutions by turning government ministers and public opinion against them. The charge suggests that internal power struggles took precedence over accountability at a critical moment.
Gallant also challenges Netanyahu’s explanations for key military decisions made before and during the Gaza war. He rejects claims that operational delays or battlefield outcomes were caused by fear within the army or by external pressure, arguing instead that Netanyahu consistently claimed credit for successes while shifting blame for failures onto others. This depiction points to a leadership style focused on self-preservation rather than a serious reckoning with the political and strategic decisions that preceded Israel’s worst security breakdown in decades. That such criticism comes from a senior figure formerly aligned with Netanyahu underscores the depth of division within Israel’s ruling circles.

Lapid’s comments add a broader political dimension to this crisis. While Gallant concentrates on Netanyahu’s conduct after October 7, Lapid draws attention to policies that shaped the context in which the attack occurred. He argues that Netanyahu ignored repeated intelligence warnings in the months leading up to the attack and later attempted to distance himself from responsibility. More importantly, Lapid accuses Netanyahu of pursuing a deliberate strategy aimed at weakening the Palestinian Authority by allowing Hamas to grow stronger in Gaza. According to Lapid, this approach involved permitting large flows of Qatari money into Gaza despite warnings about how the funds were being used.

If Lapid’s account is accurate, October 7 was not a sudden failure or intelligence mistake—it was the predictable result of a political strategy in which Israel deliberately fueled divisions among Palestinians for its own benefit, while ignoring the underlying conditions and grievances that drive resistance. 

Lapid argues that Netanyahu’s efforts to shift blame onto security officials and political rivals are a way to cover up this deliberate policy failure and evade accountability for Israel’s actions.

Israel’s war on Gaza following the Hamas attack has further highlighted the limits of this approach. Israel has destroyed much of Gaza and killed nearly 72,000 people, yet it has not achieved a clear political resolution. Gaza’s civilian population has endured immense loss and devastation, but it has not been erased or silenced. Rather than restoring stability, the war has intensified international criticism and deepened Israel’s internal political crisis. Within Israel, senior figures continue to accuse one another of deception, manipulation, and reckless decision-making, reflecting a leadership consumed by internal disputes.

Taken together, the statements by Gallant and Lapid expose an Israeli establishment in open disarray. The image of unity that Israeli leaders often seek to project during wartime has given way to public conflict over responsibility, truth, and long-term strategy. October 7 revealed not only the collapse of Israel’s security system but also the failure of a political model built on deliberately dividing Palestinians, ignoring their rights, and pursuing short-term advantage at the expense of human life

Somali president vows military confrontation over Israeli base in Somaliland

TEHRAN — Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has issued a warning against Israeli “interference” in the Horn of Africa, vowing to militarily “confront” any attempt by Israel to establish a foothold in the breakaway region of Somaliland.

In an interview with Al Jazeera broadcast on Saturday, Mohamud characterized Israel’s recent diplomatic maneuvers as a “reckless and illegal” assault on Somali sovereignty that threatens to dismantle the fragile international order.

The tensions stem from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s decision in December to formally recognize Somaliland—a territory that seceded from Somalia in 1991 following a devastating civil war.

The decision was swiftly condemned by many, including the African Union, the Arab League, and the European Union, all of whom reaffirmed their commitment to Somalia’s territorial integrity and warned of a dangerous precedent for separatist movements across the continent.

Mohamud asserted that this recognition is not merely a diplomatic gesture but a strategic provocation, warning that a proposed Israeli military base in the territory could be used as a “springboard” for regional aggression.

The geopolitical stakes are heightened by Somaliland’s position along the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a critical maritime chokepoint. Analysts suggest an Israeli military presence there would provide a direct vantage point for offensive operations against Yemen’s Ansarullah.

Mogadishu’s fears are compounded by reports that Israeli officials have discussed using the territory as a site for the forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza—a claim that has fueled domestic and regional outrage.

Mohamud explicitly linked Israel’s conduct in Gaza to its actions in Somalia, suggesting both represent a shift toward a world where “might is right” replaces the rule of law.

While Somaliland’s leader, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, has embraced the partnership as “a path to international legitimacy,” the Somali government views it as a direct threat to its territorial integrity.

The U.S. has yet to formally alter its policy regarding Somalia, though the Trump administration has signaled a potential shift.

During an August 2025 news conference, President Trump—who has a history of disparaging Somalia and the Mohamud government—indicated his administration was “working on” a new approach.

Backed by the majority of African and Arab nations, Mohamud pledged a robust defense of Somali borders. “We will fight in our capacity,” he stated, emphasizing that Somalia will not stand by as foreign powers exploit internal divisions to secure a military presence in the Red Sea corridor.

Trump refuses to apologize for racist video depicting Obamas as apes

TEHRAN — U.S. President Donald Trump sparked a firestorm of bipartisan condemnation Friday after his official Truth Social account shared a video depicting former President Barack Obama and former First Lady Michelle Obama as apes.

While the president eventually condemned the imagery, he flatly refused to apologize, claiming he had not viewed the entire clip before directing aides to publish it.

The minute-long video, which focused on Trump’s persistent, unsubstantiated claims of 2020 election fraud, concluded with an AI-generated segment showing dancing primates with the Obamas’ faces superimposed.

The post remained online for twelve hours, garnering millions of views before its deletion.

Speaking to reporters aboard Air Force One, Trump maintained he was not at fault. “No, I didn’t make a mistake,” he said, adding that he had only watched the beginning of the “very strong” video.

When asked if he would apologize, he declined, asserting, “I am the least racist president you’ve had in a long time.”

The incident triggered a rare public rebuke from high-ranking Republicans. Senator Tim Scott of South Carolina called the footage “the most racist thing I’ve seen out of this White House.”

Meanwhile, the White House initially dismissed the controversy as “fake outrage” over a “Lion King” meme before pivoting to blame a staffer for the “erroneous” post.

Civil rights leaders warned that the incident reflects a normalization of dehumanizing rhetoric. NAACP President Derrick Johnson labeled the video “blatantly racist and despicable,” while former Obama advisor Ben Rhodes stated the imagery would serve as a “stain on our history.”

Why Iran still haunts Western strategy

By Xavier Villar

MADRID – Ghosts are terrifying not simply because they are powerful, but because they endure. They unsettle precisely because they refuse resolution. A ghost is defined by contradiction, a presence that signifies an absence, something that should no longer be there yet persists all the same. 

In the Western political imagination, the Islamic Republic of Iran has long occupied this spectral register. It is treated as a remnant of a past that should have expired, a political form defined less by what it is than by what it is presumed to lack: liberalism, secular modernity, strategic compliance. Its survival, in defiance of decades of confident forecasts predicting collapse, is what makes it so disquieting.

To engage with Iran is therefore to engage with a particular ontology, one that oscillates uneasily between recognition and denial. In Washington and across much of Europe, Iran has been conceptually relegated to history. The familiar signifiers are well rehearsed: clerical rule, revolutionary guards, anti-American slogans. The visual language is equally fixed, from murals of martyrs to ballistic missiles and veiling. These elements are rarely treated as components of a living political system that adapts, recalibrates, and learns. Instead, they are curated as relics, artefacts of an ideological museum devoted to political forms deemed archaic, pre-modern, and ultimately unsustainable.

This spectral framing performs an important psychological function. By classifying Iran as a ghost from a superseded era, Western actors reassure themselves that its influence is temporary and its resistance futile. A ghost, after all, cannot shape the future. It can only linger until it fades. The problem for them, however, is that Iran has shown no inclination to fade. On the contrary, it continues to act, negotiate, deter, and endure. Its persistence exposes the fragility of the narrative that sought to consign it to the past.

The talks currently unfolding in Muscat confront this contradiction directly. Initial reporting, particularly from Iranian media, suggests that negotiations are continuing and may do so for some time. This modest claim, that the talks go on, is in fact the source of the unease. A ghost that merely appears can be dismissed as illusion or nostalgia. A ghost that negotiates, that demonstrates strategic patience, institutional memory, and a disciplined calculus of interests, disrupts the entire logic of spectral dismissal. It forces a reckoning with the possibility that what was declared obsolete is in fact structurally resilient.

For Washington, this presents a deep conceptual challenge. For decades, U.S. policy has oscillated between coercion and conditional engagement, all underwritten by the assumption that the Islamic Republic is a temporary aberration. Sanctions, isolation, and pressure were not merely tools to change behavior, but instruments designed to accelerate an expected end. Negotiation, when it occurs, is often framed as a bridge to normalization, a pathway through which Iran might be coaxed back into the realm of “acceptable” statehood, meaning alignment with the norms of the liberal international order.

This approach misreads the nature of the Iranian polity. Iran’s system is not defined by an absence of modernity, but by a distinct and carefully defended synthesis of sovereignty, religious authority, and revolutionary legitimacy. It is a state that rejects certain premises of modern liberal governance, not because it is incapable of adopting them, but because doing so would undermine the ideological foundations upon which its authority rests. The expectation that negotiation should culminate in Iran’s transformation rather than accommodation ensures perpetual disappointment.

From Tehran’s perspective, the negotiations are not evidence of weakness or spectral decline. They are confirmation of presence. The language of haunting imposed from outside is sometimes embraced, sometimes ignored, but rarely internalized. To be labelled an anomaly is, in a sense, to have succeeded in resisting assimilation. Iran’s missile program, its regional alliances, and its nuclear capabilities are condemned by the West as destabilizing residues of an obsolete worldview. Within Iran’s strategic culture, they are understood as the material conditions of survival in a hostile environment. They are not symbols of absence, but of substance.

To come to Muscat is therefore not to seek absolution or reintegration into a system designed elsewhere. It is to assert that Iran must be dealt with as it is, not as others wish it to be. Negotiation is less an admission of vulnerability than a demand for recognition. Recognition not in a moral sense, but in a strategic one. Acknowledgement that Iran’s security concerns, deterrence logic, and regional role cannot be negotiated away by appeals to an imagined post-revolutionary future.

The continuation of talks thus represents more than a diplomatic process. It is a slow collision between two incompatible narratives. On one side, a spectral account that insists Iran is an anachronism awaiting resolution. On the other, a state that continues to operate with coherence, adaptability, and a clear sense of its red lines. Each round of negotiation erodes the plausibility of the first narrative. Each technical discussion, each procedural compromise, underscores the reality that Iran is not negotiating from the margins of history, but from within it.

This does not mean the talks are likely to succeed in the near term. The gaps remain wide. Trust is minimal. Yet the significance of the process lies less in its immediate outcomes than in what its persistence reveals. The West is gradually being forced to confront a reality it has long resisted. The Islamic Republic is not a temporary disturbance in the international system. It is a durable political actor with its own internal logic and strategic horizon.

The true discomfort of the ghost, in the end, lies not in its otherness but in its demands. The ghost does not exist to terrify. It exists to insist. It wants recognition, restitution, and a place in the story that excluded it. Iran’s sustained engagement in venues such as Oman expresses a similar insistence. It asks not for approval, but for acknowledgment of fact. That it exists. That it endures. That it will continue to shape the environment around it.

Whether these channels will eventually produce a breakthrough remains uncertain. What is clearer is that the haunting will not end through denial. The spectra cannot be wished away, sanctioned into irrelevance, or rhetorically buried. It must be confronted as a permanent feature of the geopolitical landscape. The negotiations continue not because the ghost is disappearing, but because those who once denied its existence are learning to speak to it. Coexistence, rather than exorcism, may be the only path forward. 

Behind the Scenes of the Anti-Iran Narrative Factory Shaping Trump’s Calculations


When the U.S. president speaks of “protesters taking control of Iranian cities” and an “imminent collapse,” while on-the-ground data tell a different story, the issue is not merely a verbal slip. What is at play is a chain of narrative-making that runs through think tanks, media networks, and lobbying groups—eventually reaching the decision-making table.

Nournews: Imagine the scene: the U.S. president stands before the cameras and confidently claims that protesters in Iran have seized major cities—speaking of the “capture of Mashhad,” of millions flooding the streets, of a political system on the brink of collapse. He even suggests that a single pressure move or a limited strike could complete the process. Shortly afterward, these same claims fail to align with field data and independent reports. Images and statistics tell a different story. This is where the real question begins: where did this picture come from?

Not only during the recent unrest, but over the past several years and at various junctures, Trump has put forward narratives about Iran that later turned out to be exaggerated or based on incomplete data and unverified social-media reports—from the claim that protesters were holding his photograph during recent demonstrations, to descriptions of “full control of the streets” by opponents, or assertions of ongoing chaos and disorder in Iran that he reiterated only recently. The repetition of this pattern moves the issue beyond an isolated mistake and turns it into a question of an “information supply chain.”

In today’s political world, presidents rarely receive raw data. What reaches their desks is the product of multiple layers of processing: think-tank reports, rapid briefings, media analyses, social-media data, and advisers’ memos. On Iran, there exists a relatively coherent network of policy and pressure organizations that for years has focused on producing threat-centered narratives. At the heart of this network, two names are frequently repeated: UANI and FDD.

United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) is a U.S.-based nongovernmental organization that concentrates on economic and sanctions pressure against Iran, seeking—through reports and campaigns—to dissuade companies and international institutions from engaging with the country. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), meanwhile, is a Washington-based think tank active in national security and Middle East policy, known for its hardline positions on Iran. The reports and analyses produced by these organizations are widely circulated in the media and even make their way into official congressional sessions.

Surrounding this core is a circle of analysts and commentators who consistently produce content on Iran and are frequently cited in English-language media—figures such as Behnam Ben Taleblu, Ghasseminejad, Brodsky, and others. The key point is not merely their presence, but the narrative alignment of their outputs. A pessimistic assessment or a maximalist scenario is released through several channels in quick succession, giving political audiences the impression of an expert consensus.

The typical pattern works like this: an alarmist report is published; several high-profile accounts amplify it; Persian-language satellite channels abroad give it added weight; mainstream media outlets republish it; and eventually the claim turns into the “dominant perception.” Along the way, the distinction between “possibility,” “analysis,” and “fact” becomes blurred. When such a package reaches a policymaker who favors short briefings and simplified narratives, the risk of perceptual error rises sharply.

The consequence of such an error is not limited to a single incorrect statement from a podium. If a senior decision-maker concludes—based on this image—that the opposing side is on the verge of collapse, riskier options begin to appear rational: maximum pressure with the expectation of rapid breakdown, or even limited military action on the assumption of no effective response. At this point, a flawed narrative can translate into a costly strategic decision—one whose impact is not merely bilateral, but capable of affecting regional and international order.

In this context, Israel’s role in this narrative chain cannot be reduced to mere political positioning. Israeli officials, including Benjamin Netanyahu, have repeatedly spoken openly of “narrative-building” and “media operations” as components of power and national security.

Over recent years, a network of lobbying groups, research centers, media projects, and analysts close to Israel’s security discourse has consistently focused on highlighting the Iranian threat and the necessity of maximum pressure. The temporal and substantive overlap between this current and the output of some influential Washington think tanks suggests that we are not dealing with a set of scattered actors, but with a synergistic narrative-producing ecosystem. Within such a framework, it is plausible that some of the exaggerated or directional data entering the analytical cycle—and eventually the decision-making packages—are generated and reinforced within this network, ultimately shaping Trump’s perception of realities on the ground in Iran.

The key question, then, is this: what does the data flow map look like? Who produces the initial data? Who interprets it? Which media outlets lend it credibility? And how does it reach the president’s ear? Once this map is drawn, it becomes clear that some misleading narratives are not the result of random error, but the product of a narrative-making ecosystem—one capable of surrounding the decision-maker’s mind and altering the course of major decisions.