From brother to brother

Abu Dharr

The Ikhwan al-Muslimun have suffered greatly in Egypt but they have also made some terrible mistakes none of which match the “exclusivist” bug that has infected the thinking of some of their leaders.

Thinking about al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (The Muslim Brotherhood) in today’s rapidly changing global environment evokes two divergent sentiments. One of them is commiseration; the other is indignation. This is the first Islamic movement to have taken the initiative to bring “Islam back to Muslims” and “Muslims back to Islam” after the fall of the Ottoman State and what it represented of an “Islamic centrality.” The Ikhwan inspired and sired other Islamic movements: Jamaat-e Islami in the Indian subcontinent, Refah in Turkey, along with its antecedents and subsequent incarnations. It suffered from “breakaway” and “breakout” political groups and philosophic tendencies: Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (in the Levant), al-Jama‘ah al-Islamiyah, al-Jihad (in Egypt), al-Nahdah (in Tunisia), al-Islah (in Kuwait), etc.

With almost 90 years of uphill struggle you would think you are looking at a true and tried Islamic movement. The sad fact is that this sometimes-overstretched organization with its leadership tending toward a sort of elitism...

There are many other offshoots or affiliates of the Ikhwan in practically every Muslim country and on every continent of the world. With almost 90 years of uphill struggle you would think you are looking at a true and tried Islamic movement. The sad fact is that this sometimes-overstretched organization with its leadership tending toward a sort of elitism has been taking two steps forward and two steps backward throughout its checkered history. The sacrifices are there, no doubt. The problem is that the decision makers have not been on par with those sacrifices to break new ground.
Take the past several years or the past few decades as an example of how the Ikhwan have put themselves in the pickle they are in today. Let us look at some of their mental failures and deficits of willpower in the course of the near past.

You pity the Ikhwan because they have been beaten up by their own government. Many of them endured the worst forms of torture and persecution. Many of them were exiled. Some of them went into hiding. And, generally speaking, they did not lose sight of their Islamic objective, at least in theory.

Firstly, the Ikhwan could not, at the time of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, bring themselves together and acknowledge the historic breakthrough that the Islamic Revolution under the leadership of Imam Khomeini in Iran represented. The Ikhwan — before anyone else in the world — should have helped and contributed to the consolidation of the Islamic State in Iran. But they were unable to do that then, and they still seem unable to do so now. It is very hard to ask this, but is there a type of “Israeli bug” in the Ikhwan? And what is meant by an Israeli bug is not a Zionist Israeli presence within the Ikhwan leaders; tangibly no such thing exists. The Israeli bug is the one mentioned in the Sirah of the Prophet (pbuh) when these Israeli people of scripture who were anticipating the advent of a prophet refused to accept Muhammad (pbuh) because he was not one of them! Regrettably, in the body language of the Ikhwan, there is that type of underlying notion: the Islamic Revolution in Iran is “not one of us.” What happened to the brotherhood that is in their very name: the Muslim Brotherhood? You pity the Ikhwan because they have been beaten up by their own government. Many of them endured the worst forms of torture and persecution. Many of them were exiled. Some of them went into hiding. And, generally speaking, they did not lose sight of their Islamic objective, at least in theory.

One can’t help but sympathize with the poor and impoverished Egyptian, who belongs to the social underclass and seeks the Ikhwani way out with honor, only to find himself back to where he was in the underclass because of some slow-witted decisions made by a few moneyed or detached Ikhwani leaders.

Let us be more specific. After 9/11, the Saudi and other Arabian regimes came down hard on the Ikhwan who had assumed Arabia as their second homeland — after being expelled or exiled from Egypt. These Ikhwan were told that they had to find greener pastures elsewhere, and to forget about the hospitality of the 1960s and 1970s. At this point, any rational person would think the natural place to look to would be Islamic Iran. But no! They sent out feelers and even contemplated moving their center of activity to Libya! But, then, the erratic megalomaniac of Libya could not brook any type of Ikhwani self-direction and freedom of movement. So, the Ikhwan swallowed their pride, and kept a relatively low profile in their Arabian sanctuary.

The election of Hamas buoyed their spirit for a while. Then came the “Arab Spring.” In this new phase the Ikhwan felt that the long anticipated day of breakthrough had arrived. They were led to believe through their Khaliji and Arabian interlocutors that the future now is going to be an Ikhwani future without reservations. The Ikhwan mounted the seats of power in Tunisia. Then the Ikhwan climbed the pyramid of power in Egypt. The Egyptian president and the majority members of the Egyptian parliament were of the Islamic trend. Libya’s demonic dictator was overthrown. Libya, sandwiched between an Ikhwani Tunisia and an Ikhwani Egypt, was being grilled slowly for becoming an Ikhwani Libya. Add to this apparent domino effect was the Ikhwani political cousins in Turkey. How times had changed! Or did they?

The first cracks in the Ikhwani rank and file is now appearing with Hamas re-evaluating its relationship with both Tehran and Damascus.

This whole Ikhwani entanglement came to a head when — flushed with triumphalism — the Ikhwan were prompted to make their next move in Syria. With Qatar and Turkey firmly behind them, they lunged into Syria. And they have been mired in the Syrian civil war now for more than two years with no end in sight. During the past year the rise of the Ikhwan quickly turned into the fall of the Ikhwan. The first cracks in the Ikhwani rank and file is now appearing with Hamas re-evaluating its relationship with both Tehran and Damascus. The Qatari government is removing itself from center stage. And the Saudi family regime is moving in to fill the vacuum. And when the Saudi clannish and client regime is calling the shots you might as well figure it is the US and Israel who are now in charge — in the open.

Behind closed doors, the Ikhwan are crying foul. They have the harshest words for the Saudi monarchy — but only in their hush-hush meetings. The Saudi regime now is grandstanding. As of this writing it has refused to sit on the ten-member, two-year rotating term of the United Nations Security Council.

Back in the late-1970s and early-1980s the Ikhwan were dragged into a Syrian conflict by the same Saudi prodding. And they came out of that with eggs on their faces and blood on their hands. Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me. The Ikhwan have been fooled by the Saudi royals twice in Syria alone, not to mention the shenanigans the Ikhwan have suffered in such countries as Yemen, Lebanon, the Khalij, etc.

It strains credulity to see how mistake-prone and bullheaded the Ikhwan are. Their back channels of understanding with the US and the West have come to naught. They have virtually flash-frozen their relations with Arabia’s regimes. They could not build bridges with other Islamic trends and parties. Their decades-old cultivation of relations with petro-sheikhs were of no use when they needed financial assistance to run their country. President Mohamed Mursi reckoned he was in the process of becoming the long-awaited grand khalifah of the Sunnis! The Ikhwan were some of the last segments to join the revolt against Mubarak, and now they are some of the first to be expelled from their elected positions by Mubarak’s military.

The Ikhwan had an unparalleled chance to cement an Islamic political will in the Muslim East. They were uniquely positioned to consolidate the Islamic popular will in Egypt, Turkey, and Iran. These are all — to one degree or the other — Islamic political kindred souls. But the hubris of power was something they could not conquer within their own selves. We doubt that the Ikhwan have awoken from the multiple blows that came down on them like thunderbolts in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Syria, etc.

A word of brotherly advice: the Ikhwan came under the influence of Arabian wealth since the 1970s and have not liberated themselves from that correlation. They will not be able to successfully liberate others when they themselves are not liberated.

The Islamic Republic of Iran with its senior decision makers has offered them an extended hand at times when the Ikhwan were desperate and at times when the Ikhwan were better off, at times when the Islamic Republic itself was in need, and at times when it was affluent. But, still, it is the Ikhwan who cannot defeat their own ego and join hands with their own brothers and prove that they are a Muslim Brotherhood.

No one is trying to make the difficult condition the Ikhwan are in more difficult. Everyone should know they need help. They have been targeted by the Zionists and imperialists, they have been persecuted by the military and business class in Egypt, they have been cut off by kith and kin in Arabia, they have been shunned by seculars and salafis here and there, and they have been abandoned by some of the closest people to them. Some of the Ikhwan may be turning paranoid in these difficult circumstances. They may look around and think that there is some type of grand conspiracy against them as would happen to others who are in their predicament. Maybe, just maybe, this ibtila’ (trial and tribulation) will raise their awareness, open their eyes, and cause them to identify their true friends as well as their real enemies.

This is the time of year when conscientious Muslims recall the lessons of ‘Ashura’ and Karbala’. Imam al-Husayn lived through times that were demanding, disconcerting, and obstreperous. We don’t have a hint from history that he was ever paranoid. We don’t find any trace of information that he came under the sway of foreign influence. We don’t know of any time when he parted with principle for the value of money.

A word to the wise: it may be worth the time and effort for the Ikhwan after 14 centuries of scant information about Imam al-Husayn to revisit his life, his struggle, and his sacrifice, and do so from “Sunni” sources, if some are allergic to Shi‘i sources. You may be surprised at what you learn.

But for those who struggle hard in Our cause —We shall most certainly guide them to Our [proven] ways: for, behold, Allah is indeed with those who seek to do better (29:69).

Ikhwan al-MuslimunEgyptIslamic movementClarity of Thought

The ignorant man is dead even if he is breathing

Abu Dharr

The Khilafah was not abolished in 1924. When Muawiya declared himself king in early Islamic history, he abolished the Khilafah at that time. Muslims must get a better understanding of their history before they can take the steps to rectify the damage.

Mainstream Islamic writers and thinkers tell us that Dawlah al-Khilafah (the Khilafah State) ceased to exist in 1924 when Mustafa Kamal Ataturk — the Masonic-Dunmeh, crypto-Muslim, military general — became the first person to secularize a Muslim country. He did it by overthrowing the Khilafah Devlet and give the world “modern Turkey.” Many otherwise enlightened Muslims, especially those belonging to Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami, assert — in their articles and literature — this as an incontrovertible fact. We beg to differ. And in so doing, we beg them to think.

The Khilafah State was subverted by King Mu‘awiyah ibn Abi Sufyan. When some thinking Muslims try to state this fact, other unassuming Muslims think that the whole Islamic attempt at governance was a failure! Once again, we beg to differ. The fact that King Mu‘awiyah won a military power struggle with the consensual Islamic imam and khalifah, ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib, does not mean that Islamic governance came to an end even though it did in that particular position. More precisely, it meant that Islamic governance was to begin a steep historical decline until it eventually culminated in the disappearance of the last vestiges of Islamic rulership, which was the termination of the Ottoman rulers in an official way in 1924.

Some aspects of history are better understood in light of current events. The Muslims in Egypt last year* elected a leader in a free and fair election. No one ever contested the election’s freedom and fairness. So far so good. Then that election — representing the will of most of the people — was overturned by a military general in a manner that has gagged most people into silence where they dare not call al-Sisi’s power-grab a military coup. And here we are: Egyptians and non-Egyptians, Muslims and non-Muslims living a tug-of-war between those who are standing for the legitimacy of an elected president and those who are rooting for the fait-accompli ruler and his coterie.

Relying heavily on the readers’ understanding of early Islamic history, and skipping many details, what is happening in Egypt currently is what happened when Mu‘awiyah ibn Abi Sufyan snatched power from Imam ‘Ali. Every Muslim who has read his history properly knows that Imam ‘Ali was the consensual leader, all the regions from Egypt to Yemen, Iraq to Arabia, and other parts of north Africa and west Asia were in agreement as to the leadership of Imam ‘Ali. The only area contesting it was al-Sham, with its breakaway ruler Mu‘awiyah.

This does not require a “Sunni” or “Shi‘i” education or brainwashing to understand or misunderstand. The raw information is available in the majority of “Sunni” and “Shi‘i” sources and references. The difficulty in both these hardened schools of tradition is that neither wants to take away the word “khalifah” from Mu‘awiyah. And in sticking to their unrefined and chafed positions they are unable to learn from their own common history.

The heartache in this struggle lies between Muslims wanting free and fair elections, and the power elites, classes, and power mongers denying them any opportunity at exercising that human and civil right by the use of brute force.

When Mu‘awiyah seized power in a civil war following a military coup he did not demean the Ummah; he demeaned himself. The struggle of the Muslim peoples continued, and continues to this day. The heartache in this struggle lies between Muslims wanting free and fair elections, and the power elites, classes, and power mongers denying them any opportunity at exercising that human and civil right by the use of brute force.

If Muslims were keenly aware of their own history, a general al-Sisi in Egypt would not have been able to withstand a popular backlash that carries with it the weight of 14 centuries of a conscience-laden political struggle against usurpation of power, which began with Mu‘awiyah and has not yet ended. If we, the committed Muslims, were thinking through our history, turning it page by page, scrutinizing it event by event, focusing on its political and military ups-and-downs, we would have enough intellectual muscle to spare us the void that we find ourselves in today. This whole affair has hit rock bottom in the Arabian mind and in the Arabian environment.
Some Muslim intellectuals who are trying to think their way through this morass would be well advised to make that rational and reasonable leap, defy the traditional odds, and look at their own history and their own contemporary world in an objective and non-sectarian way. This scribe would humbly pose the question to anyone willing to put mind before heritage: why don’t we trace our centenary decline to the British collateral control of Makkah and Madinah via their Saudi political clients, and then trace our millennial decline to the Umayyad strong-arming of the Ummah? In both of these parallel developments the Muslim masses were and are excluded from expressing their political will.

If the two billion Muslims of the world exercised their minds they would not have the most politically unstable countries in the world. The absence of Muslims thinking through their political history and their political present has given us today’s divisive nation-states, cut-throat sectarianism, and an impotent Makkah.

Instead of responding to problems with their minds and intellect, the Muslims of today are responding with mindless violence and anti-intellectual sermons. Fourteen centuries of non-ijtihad and obscurantism is catching up with unfortunate populations here and there. The type and amount of turbulence and aggression building up and breaking out in many regions of the Muslim East are frightening. The salafi contagion is spawning the deadly takfiri types. And these are scooped up by the thousands to fight imperialist and Zionist wars of national interest. Saudi, Emirati, and Kuwaiti establishments pay them to kill other Muslims. The takfiris have equated the “other” with the “kafir.” It is that fast, simple, and deadly. The Muslims in the Arabian realm are living — without any exaggeration — an intellectual crisis at a psychological juncture.

The speed of Zionist and imperialist advances have left them complacently or inanely foolish. They stand out as stage harlequins. Bombs are being dropped on their homes, poison gases are being used in their neighborhoods, millions of them don’t have a place to call home, their holy places are occupied from Makkah to al-Quds, and in all this their leaders — traceable to the Saudi financial empire — are telling them to take refuge in a history that they never thought through and are forbidden to think through. In other words: You Muslims! Dwell in ignorance and be killed in ignorance. All this would have been hard to accomplish without the “Islamic” cover provided by Arabia’s Saudis.

Our Islam today has ceased to be the tried and true Islam of togetherness, inclusiveness, and unity. How, then, would one explain the explosive bursts of takfiris, salafis, and sectarians whose first and foremost enemy is the “other” Muslim?

The way the average Muslim is programmed to reckon and believe (and this has been well thought out in imperialist and Zionist circles via their Saudi couriers) is that the word kufr applies to a toiling Muslim who they disagree with on matters pertaining to Islamic customary observances and practices. This can eventually be “fine-tuned” to killing “others” because while performing wudu’, they wipe rather than wash their feet. This simple and legitimate understanding of Islamic fiqh turns into a takfiri issue! Meanwhile, the disagreement with Zionists and imperialists who steal the land on which Muslims trek with their feet, take away the jobs to which Muslims walk to with their feet, make it impossible for many fathers and mothers to buy shoes for their baby’s feet, and poison the bodies in the millions (think Iraq and Afghanistan) who no longer can use their feet, well the Saudi school of non-thought deems these Zionists and imperialists to be Ahl al-Kitab!! Would these Saudi cretins be generous enough to give other Muslims the honorific of Ahl al-Kitab? Of course not.

It is this Muslim political absentmindedness that cannot see that al-Sisi did a Mu‘awiyah on Mursi. If Muslims were straight and fearless thinkers they would be able to say with one voice from Makkah to begin with: al-Sisi is a Mu‘awiyah… Ataturk is a Mu‘awiyah

We believe if you have got this far in reading this article, you would have gotten the drift. It is this Muslim political absentmindedness that cannot see that al-Sisi did a Mu‘awiyah on Mursi.

If Muslims were straight and fearless thinkers they would be able to say with one voice from Makkah to begin with and from there to reverberate all over Asia and Africa: al-Sisi is a Mu‘awiyah… Ataturk is a Mu‘awiyah… the Islamic movement in Egypt and the Islamic movement in Turkey are on the side of Imam ‘Ali… But how would you know that when our thoughts are fragmented and our history is the victim of our ignorance, 

“And they will say, ‘O our Sustainer! Behold, we reconciled ourselves to our masters and our paramounts, and it is they who have led us astray from the right path’ ” (33:67).

Khilafah1924TurkeyIslamic history

(This article was first published on 1st October 2013)

Reminding Muslims of the deliberately ignored duty at Hajj: bara’ah min al-mushrikin!

Abu Dharr

It is that time of the year again. Muslims from far and near prepare themselves for the lifelong journey to Ibrahim’s (a) final destination, to the emigre home of Hajar, to the life-threatened birth of Isma‘il (a), to the expatriate city of Muhammad (pbuh) and to the cradle of Islam — to Makkah al-Mukarramah.

It is that time of the year again. Muslims from far and near prepare themselves for the lifelong journey to Ibrahim’s (a) final destination, to the emigre home of Hajar, to the life-threatened birth of Isma‘il (a), to the expatriate city of Muhammad (pbuh) and to the cradle of Islam — to Makkah al-Mukarramah. This is the time of year when Muslims from all corners of the earth embark on a mission to express their equality among each other and their humbleness and subordination to the might and majesty of Allah (swt). One of the most important, if not the most important aspects of the Hajj is the bara’ah min al-mushrikin (exoneration from the mushriks).

All Muslims should know, contrary to Saudi official and educational acculturation, that the Prophet of Allah (pbuh) instructed both Abu Bakr (as) and ‘Ali (as), in the year prior to his final Hajj (Hajjah al-Wada‘), to proclaim the first 29 ayat of Surah Bara’ah (al-Tawbah) within which is a declaration to sever all dependency or expedient political and military ties with mushrik power centers. The public mind in Makkah during the Hajj and the ‘Umrah should be one that reiterates and reaffirms this bara’ah min al-mushrikin. Alas, today’s Saudi controlled Hajj is void of this Qur’anic and Prophetic component — or should we call it faridah (obligation)? To the delight and advantage of the mushriks, the Saudi manipulated Hajj has been void of this bara’ah ever since the Saudi royals themselves hitched their security and their rule upon the very mushriks that are mentioned in the ayat of Surah Bara’ah.

This all brings us to a more fundamental question: why have the Muslims themselves accepted such an omission to their Hajj? To spare ourselves a PhD thesis we summarize it briefly: the Muslim public has been de-programmed by the royals in power ever since Mu‘awiyah, the son of Abu Sufyan, to omit anything approaching an Islamic public political mind in matters that pertain to the governance; especially in the area of power acquisition and power distribution. This historical erosion of the Islamic political mind winds up today with a Hajj that has no bara’ah min al-mushrikin component to it.

The popular Muslim mind, though, is catching up. The Saudi-American royals will soon be having their own nightmares knowing that Makkah and Madinah are only years away from becoming what they were intended to be: the Islamic twin-cities of liberation, liberty, and justice for all. Watch out Aal Saud! The Muslims are coming.

If we the Muslims had a healthy and robust Islamic public mind or a culture of confidence, in these history making days we would energetically declare our political, economic, and military distance from the mushriks of the world. As these words are penned, for the first time since the bloody coup d’etat of King Mu‘awiyah some 14 centuries ago, we see with our own eyes the political progeny of Mu‘awiyah either scramble for their lives or retain lawyers-for-hire in their court battles, or face the executioner, or prepare for a life of infamy somewhere in the world that will accommodate their excellencies and their highnesses.

The military clone of Mu‘awiyah, who rode roughshod over his people, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, his chilling execution, as well as his perilous last minutes have definitely sent shock waves through the mushrik-maintained rulers of Arabia and Arabdom. The disease-riddled bodies of their highnesses in Arabia paralleled with their toxic notions of Islam — more rituals than deeds, more customs than ideology, and more sin than sacrifice — are beginning to disintegrate. Crown Prince Sultan ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, a day or two after Qaddafi’s pictures were going viral, could not take it any longer, so he joined his fellow usurper of power.

For the first time since Mu‘awiyah, we have another Muslim country — Tunisia — expressing itself without a sword and a security system smothering its socio-political soul. This is truly history in the making: for the first time in 1,400 years an Arabic-speaking people are going to the ballot boxes and electing the decision makers for their whole country. In Tunisia and certainly in Libya the mushriks are there to try to divert the political future of these two countries — Islamists or no Islamists — to serve their imperial national interests.

The mother of all mushriks — the United States government — is trying hard to co-opt these populations who are breaking away from dictatorships and autocracies that were in the span of their own terms of office the clients and agents of imperialism and Zionism. It does not surprise us that the mushriks do not want their former political couriers and economic brokers to be brought to a court of law where the Muslim citizens can take a look at what was really happening between slave and master, between imperial powers that dictate and client regimes that implement. Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qaddafi owe their people an explanation and a detailed account of their reign. But the mushriks will not allow it.

Never has there been anger and odium against the mushrik imperialists among the Muslims of the world as there is nowadays. From the most deprived rural areas to the most sophisticated metropolises in Asia and Africa the US government is public enemy number one. Can anyone blame them? Some of them are occupied by hundreds of thousands of US military forces, others are victims of a new form of US warfare: drones in the sky. Still more are subjected to economic terms and conditions that serve the US and do disservice to the Muslims, while the remainder are living with American military bases scattered all over: on land and sea, as well as orbiting satellites above. The mushriks (and the word mushrik does not mean polytheist or unbeliever) in corporate America cannot contain ordinary (non-Muslim) Americans from declaring their bara‘ah. The Occupy Wall Street Movement might be the harbinger of a worldwide rebellion against the mushriks: the rebellion of the world’s 99%.

Our Hajj, by imperialist design and by Saudi enforcement, does not have a bara’ah element associated with it; but the world — without Islamic rituals — is expressing this forcefully hushed-up bara’ah. More courageous than many Muslims who do not want to be arrested in the Hajj for this bara’ah, many non-Muslims are being arrested in the US and around the world because they have the kind of political mind and thinking that has been taken away from the Muslims by illegitimate rulers in all these years.

Can anyone do the math? In the US, it is said, 1% of the population has 25% of the wealth, and 5% of the population have around 45% of the wealth; that leaves more than 90% of the American population with less than half the wealth. In Arabia, we are sure the contrast is even sharper and more severe. Yet, we have a people’s movement in America but we do not have a people’s movement in Arabia. Why? Because you can comfortably say that America has never had its Mu‘awiyahs, its Saddams, and its Qaddafis. This is not to say that the US does not have its own evil rulers; it does. But they are more sophisticated and more subtle about their injudiciousness and tyranny. They know how to manage their colonial and imperial projects well. But it appears like they do not know how to manage their decline.

The US government officials do not appear as confident in front of the cameras as their predecessors. They look edgy, troubled, and sometimes undiplomatic, scrambling for the appropriate words. You only have to look closely at Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, the kid to know what is being talked about.

For all of those politically naive Muslims who were happy with Obama’s election, or the other Muslims who said that a “brother” has been elected to the White House — to all these callow Muslims: do you now know why Obama was elected to be Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief? It is because the mushriks needed a black man in the White House to give them a grand publicity head-start on the war(s) they have been plotting against Africa and against the Muslims. How does Obama, the political slave of mushriks, appear to you today? There is not the slightest fiber of integrity in the occupant of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. His impresarios and handlers now have him reading a scripted diatribe against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The US, Saudi Arabia, and Israel are all working in tandem against the Islamic Republic of Iran. If only now 99% of Christians could see the destructive foreign policy of the US, and if only 99% of Jews could see the calamitous foreign policies of Israel, and if only 99% of Muslims could see the ruinous foreign policies of Saudi Arabia, the world would certainly have reached its age of maturity and rid itself of the evil 1% that has divided humanity into ethnic conflicts, race wars, and corporate conflagrations.

The US and Israel (with Saudi connivance) are trying to instigate majority versus minority wars in Muslims countries. And as Providence would have it, they themselves are beginning to realize that their 1% “majority” is beginning to face off with the 99% “minority”. The US decision makers are trying to divert American and worldwide attention away from their banking failures and economic problems to what they call the “Arab Spring”; and the way things are going the Arab Spring is turning into an American Winter.

How many more poor Americans are needed to kill poor Muslims after which all economic potentials are drained and the warmongers wake up and realize that nothing much has been accomplished or that the whole policy is coming back to haunt them?

If only we could put the justice seeking minds of Americans on the ritualistic inhibited body of Muslims we would come up with a bara’ah min al-mushrikin extending from Makkah to New York and from the Haram to Wall Street,

“Bara’at from Allah and His Rasul [is herewith declared] to those mushriks with whom who have accords [and treaties]…” (9:01).

HajjIslamic historyIsma‘il (a)Makkah al-MukarramahState of the Ummah

(First Published in 1st November 2011)

Continued Review Of ‘Uthman’s Rule And How His Relatives Were Appointed

Abu Dharr

It took some time but as the months and years went by, it became clear that ‘Abdullah ibn Sa‘d ibn Abi Sarh (‘Uthman’s brother by breast feeding) was less than a reformed and rehabilitated person as ‘Uthman and others had thought. Islamic public opinion became dissatisfied with him. He had been one of those who had formerly criticized and some would say even ridiculed the Prophet (ﷺ) in earlier times. Islam, however, annuls all offenses committed before a person becomes a Muslim.

The Quran’s ayats had previously revealed his true contrarian character when he had claimed that he could receive revelation as the Prophet (ﷺ) did! This is the ayah that unmasked him in his jahiliyah along with Musailimah al-Kadh-dhab and al-Aswad al-‘Ansi:

And who could be more offensive than the one who attributes untruths to Allah, or says, “This has been revealed to me,” the while nothing has been revealed to him; or the one who says, “I, too, can confer from on high the like of what Allah has bestowed”? If you could see [how it will be] when these offenders find themselves in the inundating anxieties of death, and the angels stretch forth their hands [and call], “Let go of yourselves (accept the inevitability of death)! Today you shall be requited with the suffering of humiliation for having attributed to Allah something that is not true, and for having persistently scorned His [miraculous] messages in your arrogance!” (Surat al-An‘am, verse 93)

The Prophet (ﷺ) sought to punish him on the day Makkah was liberated but ‘Uthman managed to escort him to the Prophet (ﷺ) to proclaim his Islam. Thus, he was amnestied from a plausible death sentence.

‘Abdullah’s political behavior in Egypt was not popular among the people there. He burdened the local population by imposing runaway levies as ‘Amr ibn al-‘As pointed out. It appears that ‘Abdullah projected a public image of self-importance and condescension towards non-Quraishi Arabs in Egypt which, of course, resulted in a backlash against him.

It grew so much that the Egyptians complained about him to ‘Uthman. Thus, ‘Uthman was compelled to write to him to warn and tell him to diffuse the popular resentment building up against him. ‘Abdullah, however, paid no heed. Instead, he punished those who had reported him to ‘Uthman. He even went so far as to execute one of them.

The repercussion of these developments went beyond Egypt. The Prophet’s companions became incensed with these occurrences. They put so much pressure on ‘Uthman that he had to relieve ‘Abdullah of his position. He assigned the governorship of Egypt to Muhammad, the son of Abu Bakr.

Accordingly, ‘Uthman dispatched a taskforce of Muhajireen and Ansar with Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr to look into the tense relationship between the people of Egypt and ‘Abdullah ibn Abi Sarh. Beforehand, Imam ‘Ali had urged ‘Uthman to terminate ‘Abdullah ibn Abi Sarh and to investigate ‘Abdullah’s execution of an Egyptian opposition figure. If it turned out that the execution was extra-judicial, then ‘Abdullah would have to bear the lawful consequences of such an illegal act.

With hindsight, it became clear that ‘Uthman’s choice of ‘Abdullah to be the governor of Egypt was not appropriate and a bad omen. It was from Egypt that the first rebellious opposition to ‘Uthman began, to be augmented by protesters and objectors from ‘Iraq.

Withal ‘Abdullah ibn Sa‘d ibn Abi Sarh showed his notable soldierly credentials as he was triumphant in his military campaigns. To his credit, he pushed back and defeated the Roman Empire in North Africa, he participated in the deliverance of Cyprus and vanquished the Roman fleet in the maritime battle of Dhat al-Sawari. Despite these battlefield achievements, he turned out to be more “world-centric” than “God-centric.”

Describing and analyzing ‘Uthman’s time in office would be incomplete without explaining two other prominent figures who played a part in what was to become the bloodstained revulsion and revolt against ‘Uthman himself. These two public figures were Muhammad ibn Hudhaifah and Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr. The former became visible as a noble young man—the grandson of a recognized figure among Quraish, ‘Utbah ibn Rabi‘ah. This latter person was the father of Hind, the wife of Abu Sufyan and the mother of Mu‘awiyah. ‘Utbah was killed by Hamza in the battle of Badr.

Abu Hudhaifah (Muhammad’s father) was one of the few primary followers of the Prophet (ﷺ). He became a muslim prior to the Prophet (ﷺ) choosing to assemble his followers in Dar al-Arqam. He, along with his wife Sahlah bint Suhail ibn ‘Amr, were among those who escaped the persecution in Makkah to find refuge in al-Habashah (the Greater Horn of Africa).

Later, he joined the Muhajireen who were forced out of Makkah to settle in al-Madinah. In addition to all that, he proved his mettle and demonstrated his strength of character, courage, and ability to perform well, especially when faced with difficult or challenging circumstances.

He was a distinguished veteran of the battle of Badr. He even confronted his own kafer father on the battlefield. He also joined all the other major Islamic military campaigns alongside the Prophet (ﷺ). He achieved martyrdom during the confrontation known as Mawqi‘at al-Yamamah when Abu Bakr was the Khalifah.

His son Muhammad was born during his hijrah to al-Habashah. Muhammad was relatively young when his father passed on. He must have been in his mid-teens when ‘Uthman personally began looking after him and took care of him.

When ‘Uthman became the Khalifah, Muhammad believed that he would gain an official position on par with the other family members from the Umayyad branch of Quraish. Some narrators mention that Muhammad was not one who was particularly steadfast or unwavering in his Islamic commitment.

One such news item says that he consumed alcohol and ‘Uthman had to administer the Islamic punishment for that. How reliable this news item is, we may never know for sure. Unfortunately, the writing of our early Islamic history got bifurcated by a deep sectarian bias.

He requested ‘Uthman to favor him with some high ranking position, but ‘Uthman refused. ‘Uthman told him that he saw no particular qualifications that would make him eligible for an important position. Then he asked ‘Uthman to help him climb the ladder of eligibility.

‘Uthman helped him financially and permitted him to travel to wherever may prove to be to his advantage. So this young man traveled to Egypt. It appears that he quit ‘Uthman’s company in a state of exasperation and resentment either because ‘Uthman had punished him for consuming alcohol, if that is truly what happened, or because ‘Uthman did not give him preferential treatment as ‘Uthman did with al-Walid and Sa‘id and ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Amer.

Once Muhammad reached Egypt he joined the opposition against ‘Uthman’s policies and went up against ‘Abdullah ibn Sa‘d ibn Abi Sarh, ‘Uthman’s second-in-command in Egypt.

Al-Walid ibn ‘Uqbah was ‘Uthman’s appointed ruler in al-Kufah (he was ‘Uthman’s maternal brother). Sa‘id ibn al-‘As was ‘Uthman’s maternal uncle and at one time the governor of al-Kufah, and ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Amer was ‘Uthman’s appointed governor in al-Basrah – also his maternal uncle.

The power-grab that began to take hold during ‘Uthman’s leadership is reproachable. The Prophet (ﷺ) said:

إنا لا نولي هذا من سأله ولا من حرص عليه (We do not delegate this [official position] to anyone who is asking/demanding it or who is bent on having it.) –Bukhari and Muslim.

Islamic history

Abdullah Ibn Saba’: Between Myth And Reality

Abu Dharr

There is another shabby chapter pertaining to the time period ‘Uthman was in office. It has been overworked and overplayed by latter day historians to such an extent that some would say it is central to understanding the dilemma of ‘Uthman and the destabilization of Islamic governance with all the divisiveness and divisions that followed and continue up until this very day.

This chapter has to do with a person named ‘Abdullah ibn Saba’ who is referred to by some as Ibn al-Sawda’ (the black lady’s son). Some chroniclers identify him as a Yahudi hailing from San‘a’, Yemen whose mother was Abyssinian (East African) and became a muslim during ‘Uthman’s time in power.

This person, we are told, began traveling from one region to the other spending most of his time instigating public opinion against ‘Uthman. He spread rumors and propaganda in a way that disturbed and spoiled public opinion in matters pertaining to religious faith, practice, experience and governance.

It is said that he traveled to al-Basrah, and when he arrived there, the governor ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Amir forced him out. Then Ibn Saba’ went to al-Sham (the Levant) where he met Abu Dharr. Ibn Saba’ took issue with Mu‘awiyah about whether public wealth belongs to Allah (swt) or to the muslim population. It is alleged that Ibn Saba’ had an effect on Abu Dharr who also took issue with Mu‘awiyah.

Then Ibn Saba’ met ‘Ubadah ibn al-Samit and approached him with the same rhetoric that he expressed to Abu Dharr. Thus did Mu‘awiyah expel Ibn Saba’ from al-Sham. Then Ibn Saba’ travelled to Egypt where he found a receptive audience for his claims and “conspiracy theory.”

Now let us get a better understanding of the assertions reportedly pedaled by Ibn Saba’. First, he claimed that Prophet Muhammad (ﷺ) is more deserving of a second coming than Prophet ‘Isa ibn Maryam (ﷺ). And to corroborate his assertion he quotes the ayah: Verily, He who has mandated this Qur’an upon you [O Muhammad] will certainly bring you back to where you [rightfully] belong (Makkah, and eventually the hereafter). [al-Qasas, 85]

Ibn Saba’ also asserted that for every Prophet there is a wasiy (administrator, executor, regent), and that the wasiy (substitute/proxy) for Prophet Muhammad (ﷺ) is ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib. ‘Ali is the last wasiy in the same sense that Prophet Muhammad (ﷺ) is the last Prophet.

Some canvassers trace all the dissimilarities and disagreements among the muslims during ‘Uthman’s rule to Ibn Saba’. Some would even go as far as to say that Ibn Saba’ was so conniving and conspiring that he set up “secret societies” that worked together to reach a common objective of undermining Islamic governance. These “secret societies” and conclaves kept on chipping away at the legitimacy of Islamic governance until the day when “all hell broke loose” and ‘Uthman was assassinated.

It appears that there is quite a bit of embellishment in some of our history books about the extent and ability of Ibn Saba’, if ever there was such a person. The first observation is that Ibn Saba’ is not mentioned in the reliable Islamic reference books that focus on the conflicting issues that erupted during the reign of ‘Uthman.

The historian Ibn Sa‘d does not mention Ibn Saba’ when he chronicled the events leading to and surrounding the assassination of ‘Uthman. The historian al-Baladhuri does not mention Ibn Saba’ in his book Ansab al-Ashraf, which is one of the most important if not the most important and detailed historical account of that time period. Ibn Saba’, though, is mentioned in the chronicle of al-Tabari but on the authority of Saif ibn ‘Umar who turns out to be suspicious and dubious.

We can’t say for sure whether an Ibn Saba’ was a threat to ‘Uthman or not; if Ibn Saba’ was a threat it was petty and inconsequential. The early muslim public during the reign of ‘Uthman was not as small-minded and mean-spirited as to fall for the outrageous shenanigans attributed to a recent and inexperienced Yahudi convert to Islam as Ibn Saba’.

Ibn Saba’s record tells us that he began to agitate against the legitimacy of Islamic leadership all over the Islamic domain since the first day he became a muslim! We don’t find in our history books either ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Amir nor Mu‘awiyah communicating with ‘Uthman about what to do with such a “troublemaker” as they did with others.

‘Abdullah ibn Sa‘d ibn Abi Sarh, the governor of Egypt is not documented to have treated or punished Ibn Saba’ the way he treated his two opposition figures Muhammad ibn Abi Hudheifah and Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr knowing that Ibn Saba’ appears to be much more confrontational and offensive against ‘Uthman and the legitimacy of Islamic governance in al-Madinah.

If Ibn Saba’ is the conspiratorial figure that some make him out to be, then why didn’t Ibn Abi Sarh write to ‘Uthman to permit him to “bring down the power of the state” on Ibn Saba’ the way he wrote to ‘Uthman to permit him to “bring down the power of the state” on the two Muhammads and ‘Ammar ibn Yasir? These governors appointed by ‘Uthman were keen on sniffing out any opposition figure but when it comes to Ibn Saba’ they are strikingly absent in doing so!

One of the most eye popping claims in these pages of history about Ibn Saba’ is that he was the one who coached and inculcated into Abu Dharr the belief that wealth belongs to Allah (swt) and not to muslims. Further, that Abu Dharr learned from Ibn Saba’ how to take issue with tyrannical rulers, the superrich… that these types who hoard and monopolize gold and silver will have their foreheads, backs and bodies burned and branded with hot irons.

This stands out to be one of the most outrageous allegations. Abu Dharr who had been a committed Muslim since the early years of the Prophet’s mission in Makkah was in no need of a neophyte ex-Yahudi who had recently become a muslim to teach him about the rights that poor people have over affluent people, and that severe punishment awaits those who control and cartelize wealth rather than spending it for the cause of Allah (swt) and as outlined by Allah (SWT) in His Qur’an.

Abu Dharr was not as ignorant as to have such a person teach him that legitimate war proceeds, the zakat money, the relevant dues and levies paid into the treasury by citizens of the Islamic ummah is money that belongs to and should be circulating among the people and inhabitants of the ummah. These ABCs of Islam were well known to Abu Dharr who needed no tutor like an Ibn Saba’ to give him a grounding in. As a reminder, Abu Dharr preceded all of the Ansar and many of the Muhajirin in becoming a committed muslim.

He was a very close companion of our dear Prophet (ﷺ) for decades before this so called Ibn Saba’ popped up on the pages of some reporters. Abu Dharr had memorized the Qur’an and behaved Qur’anically. He was one of those who recounted and related the statements of the Prophet (ﷺ).

Abu Dharr was a confidant of the Prophet (ﷺ) and the two successors to him (Abu Bakr and ‘Umar) as they managed the Islamic treasury. Abu Dharr was aware and sensitive to what is halal and what is haram; just like his colleagues the companions of the Prophet (ﷺ) were.

Those who claim that Abu Dharr was influenced and guided by an Ibn Saba’ are fooling themselves and degrading Abu Dharr while uplifting and dignifying Ibn Saba’, an ex-Yahudi turned amateur muslim and raising his status incorrectly and erroneously.

The following ayahs were understood and cherished by Abu Dharr for many years before this ostensible Ibn Saba’ showed up:

O you who are firmly committed [to Allah]! Behold, many of the rabbis and reverends do indeed wrongfully devour people’s wealth and [by doing so] divert [others] away from the path leading to Allah. And for those who hoard gold and silver and do not spend them for the sake of Allah give them [ironically] the clear news of grievous suffering [in the life to come]: on the Day when that [hoarded wealth] shall be heated in the fire of Hell and their foreheads and their sides and their backs branded therewith, [those religious sinners shall be told,] “These are the treasures you have amassed for yourselves! Taste, then, [the evil consequences of] your hoarded treasures!” [al-Tawbah, 34-35]

Abdullah ibn Saba’Islamic history

The Echo Of Salahuddin: Iranian Strategy And The Crusaders

Muslim Mahmood

In the contemporary geopolitical landscape of West Asia (aka the Middle East), history is not merely a record of the past but a living, breathing blueprint for the present. This sentiment is at the core of a provocative discourse currently circulating within intellectual and religious circles, most notably articulated by Sheikh Ahmad Gumi, a medical doctor who served in the Nigerian army, and later became a leading religious scholar. His father was also a well-known religious scholar in Northern Nigeria.

By drawing a direct line from the 12th-century military triumphs of Salahuddin Ayubi to the modern-day maneuvers of Iran and its allies in the Axis of Resistance, a new narrative is being forged—one that rebrands current conflicts as a continuation of the Crusades and positions asymmetric strategy as the ultimate equalizer against western hegemony.

The central thesis of this analysis rests on a powerful historical metaphor: the Battle of Hattin. In 1187, Salahuddin Ayubi secured a decisive victory over the Crusader states by strategically denying them access to the water of Lake Tiberias. Thirsty and exhausted, the Crusader army was decimated.

Today, observers suggest that a similar strategy of attrition and resource denial is being employed by Iran against the United States and zionist Israel. This “dry-up” strategy is not necessarily about water per se, but about the strategic exhaustion of an adversary’s political will, economic resources, and regional alliances.

At the heart of this contemporary struggle is the figure of the indicted war criminal Benjamin Netanyahu, whose role is often viewed through a prism of historical recurrence. In certain circles, the Israeli prime minister is not merely a contemporary politician but a figure whose actions are compared to the most violent leaders of European history, including references that invoke the memory of Hitler.

This comparison serves to frame the current conflict in Gaza and the broader Levant—encompassing Syria, Jordan, and Palestine—as an existential battle of survival rather than a mere border dispute. The message being broadcast to the Muslim world is one of psychological resilience: “Do not weaken and do not grieve.”

This scriptural exhortation is used to counter the perceived technological and military superiority of the American-Israeli axis, suggesting that moral and spiritual high ground will ultimately translate into geopolitical dominance.

The role of the United States is framed as the modern “Crusader” force, an external power providing the “wall” behind which zionist Israel operates. However, the analysis takes a sharp, investigative turn when examining the internal dynamics of the Muslim world. There is a palpable sense of frustration regarding the hypocrisy, or nifaq, of various Arabian regimes.

The reliance of states like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on the American security umbrella is presented as a fundamental betrayal of the Palestinian cause. The discourse suggests a “gatekeeper” syndrome, where these despotic rulers believe there is “no door but the American door,” effectively ceding their sovereignty to a foreign entity in exchange for being allowed to stay in power.

In contrast to this subservience, the Iranian strategy is presented as a model of defiance that mirrors Salahuddin’s independence. But perhaps the most surprising element of this discourse is the call for a “Common Word” (Kalimatun Sawa) between the two leading Schools of Thought in Islam.

Traditionally, the perceived Sunni-Shi‘i divide has been a tool for regional destabilization. However, the current narrative, echoing the spirit of Jam‘iyat al-Azhar, suggests a radical rapprochement. The argument is that just as Salahuddin had to unify a fractured Muslim world before reclaiming Al-Quds (Jerusalem), modern resistance requires a bridging of the gap between Sunni and Shi‘i thinking.

By focusing on a shared adversary—the “Crusader” alliance—sectarian differences are framed as secondary to the liberation of Masjid Al-Aqsa.

This call for unity is not just theological; it is deeply political. It recognizes that Iran’s influence in the region, particularly its ability to challenge American hegemony, provides a template for what an independent Islamic foreign policy could look like. The strategy involves creating a landscape where the “Crusaders” find themselves in a desert of their own making—isolated from the local population, drained by perpetual low-intensity conflict, and ultimately forced to retreat.

The investigative lens must also focus on the psychological warfare at play. The discourse emphasizes that the current state of affairs, where Israel and its western backers appear invincible, is a fleeting “illusion” of power.

By citing religious texts that promise superiority to the faithful, the narrative seeks to dismantle the “defeatist” mindset that has characterized much of the Arab world’s response to western intervention. The comparison to Hitler is particularly potent here. It serves as a reminder that even the most formidable and aggressive powers can face total collapse when they overextend or violate fundamental humanitarian norms.

Furthermore, the involvement of regional players like Syria and Jordan is seen as pivotal. The geography of the resistance is expanding, and the rhetoric suggests that the “encirclement” of the zionist entity is a modern adaptation of Salahuddin’s tactical maneuvers. The goal is to make the cost of occupation and intervention so high that the “Crusader” presence becomes unsustainable.

However, the report must also acknowledge the inherent tensions in this worldview. While the appeal to Salahuddin’s legacy provides a sense of historical dignity and purpose, the alignment with Iranian strategy creates a complex dilemma for many Sunni-majority states. The “Common Word” remains a difficult goal in a region scarred by decades of sectarian proxy wars in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. Yet, the argument presented by figures like Sheikh Ahmad Gumi is that the urgency of the Palestinian crisis and the escalating threat of Netanyahu’s policies are forcing a realignment that was previously unthinkable.

In conclusion, the narrative of “The Echo of Salahuddin” serves as a powerful mobilization tool. It recontextualizes modern geopolitics as a spiritual and historical crusade, where Iran takes the mantle of the strategic liberator. It challenges the status quo of the Persian Gulf monarchies and demands a unified Islamic front. Whether or not this “dry-up” strategy will lead to a modern-day Battle of Hattin remains to be seen, but the rhetoric itself is already shifting the tectonic plates of political thought in the region.

The message is clear: the era of uncontested western dominance is being challenged by a strategy that prizes patience, religious conviction, and historical memory over the raw power of modern weaponry. The “Crusaders” of the 21st century may find that, like their predecessors, they are fighting an enemy that knows how to turn the very terrain—and the history of that terrain—against them.

Islamic Republic of IranArab countries