Tuesday, September 01, 2026

Iran slams US attack on Larak as war crime, tells UN it will hit back

Gholamhossein Darzi, Iran’s ambassador and chargé d’affaires at the United Nations
Iran has formally demanded that the UN Security Council act after a US military strike on Larak Island in the Persian Gulf, calling the assault a blatant act of aggression, a war crime and a direct assault on the country’s sovereignty.

In a letter dated Monday to UN Secretary-General António Guterres and the president of the Security Council, Gholamhossein Darzi, Iran’s ambassador and chargé d’affaires at the United Nations, said US forces attacked the Iranian island on the evening of Sunday, August 30.

The strike, he wrote, led to the martyrdom and injury of Iranian defenders of the homeland as well as civilians and caused damage to public and private property.

Tehran called the raid a clear violation of Iran’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity and a flagrant breach of Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.

Darzi said the Islamic Republic “strongly condemns this unlawful act of aggression.”

He added that Iran’s armed forces, exercising their inherent right of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter, carried out defensive and proportionate attacks against US military bases in Jordan that had been used in Washington’s “criminal attacks and aggression” against Iran.

The letter placed the Larak strike in a broader pattern of hostility that began with a large-scale and unjustified US military attack on February 28.

Over the following six months, Tehran said, Washington and the Zionist regime have pursued an unlawful naval blockade, unilateral coercive measures amounting to “economic terrorism,” and other provocative and interventionist acts.

Those actions, Darzi wrote, constitute grave violations of international humanitarian law and amount to state terrorism, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The United States bears international responsibility for them, he said, and individuals who ordered, directed or carried out the attacks may face individual criminal responsibility.

Iran also held accountable any party that assists, facilitates, supports or takes part in the preparation or execution of such aggression, including for the extensive damage inflicted on the Iranian people.

Darzi stressed that the only source of insecurity for freedom of navigation and maritime security in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz is “the unlawful and aggressive conduct of the United States and the Zionist regime and their destabilizing adventurism.”

He called on the secretary-general and the Security Council to take all necessary measures to address the violation of Iran’s sovereignty, ensure accountability for the unlawful use of force, and prevent further escalation that threatens international peace and security.

Iran specifically asked the UN to demand that the United States immediately halt its attacks and end actions that endanger navigation and maritime safety in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

The letter noted that Iran has shown restraint and acted in accordance with international law. At the same time, it warned that the Islamic Republic will take all necessary measures to protect its people, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

“The Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran will not hesitate to exercise the inherent right of self-defense and will respond decisively and proportionately to any military aggression,” Darzi wrote.

Iran requested that the letter be issued and circulated as an official Security Council document.

Explainer: As US-Canada trade war heats up, what do tariffs and counter-tariffs mean for friends-turned-foes

By Mina Mosallanejad

Canada has announced retaliatory measures against the latest round of US tariffs, announcing duties of 15, 25 and 50 percent on a wide range of American products as its trade dispute with Washington enters a new and potentially more damaging phase.

The Canadian counter-tariffs, covering about $27.6 billion worth of US imports, are scheduled to take effect at 12:01 a.m. on September 8.

They will target products in sectors including steel and aluminum, dairy, appliances, agricultural equipment, pulp and paper, plastics and electronics. Canada says the measures are designed to match the latest US tariffs “dollar for dollar” and “rate for rate.”

The measures are the latest escalation in a trade war between two of the world’s most closely integrated economies, after days of negotiations between Washington and Ottawa collapsed last week.

The dispute is no longer limited to steel mills, factories and large corporations. The latest tariff lists reach into everyday products, from clothing and household goods to paper products and electronics, raising the prospect of higher costs for businesses and consumers on both sides of the border.

How did the trade war reach this point?

The latest escalation followed the collapse of US-Canada trade negotiations in Washington on Friday.

Canadian officials said the two sides had negotiated intensively and in good faith in an effort to reach a broader trade agreement.  

But Ottawa said Washington ultimately presented terms that were unacceptable to Canada, describing them as an attempt to “ask too much of Canada, and offer too little in return.”

Canada therefore suspended the negotiations rather than accepting what Prime Minister Mark Carney’s government described as “uneconomic” and “unfair.”

US President Donald Trump, meanwhile, has repeatedly accused Canada of taking advantage of the United States and has said that American trade policy needs to become more aggressive.

When the negotiations broke down, Washington moved ahead with a new 50 percent tariff on a broad range of Canadian goods.

The new duties took effect at 12:01 a.m. Eastern Time on August 22. The US measure covers about $27.6 billion worth of Canadian products, according to the Canadian government.

Canada responded by promising to match the tariffs. Carney has defended the response as necessary to protect Canadian businesses and workers, while stating that Canada did not choose the trade war.

“Canada did not choose this trade conflict, but we need to respond to provide a level playing field to our businesses,” he said.

Ontario Premier Doug Ford, whose province is at the center of Canada’s manufacturing sector, has gone even further, warning that Canada could consider restricting exports of electricity and critical minerals if the dispute continues.

“Everything is on the table” in terms of retaliation, said Ford.  “I’ll cut them off,” he added, referring to critical minerals. “You won’t get a grain of sand out of Ontario.”

Trump quickly responded to Ford’s comments, writing on social media, “Someone should get these clowns to ‘fall in line’ or, the consequences for Canada will be far WORSE!”

What exactly is the US tariffing about?

The latest US measure imposes a 50 percent tariff on hundreds of Canadian products. The list includes a surprisingly broad range of goods. Among the products affected are clothing, cosmetics, food products, household goods, sporting equipment, furniture and construction-related products.

Hockey sticks – an unmistakably Canadian product – have become one of the more recognizable examples of the new duties.

The measure is significant because it reaches beyond the traditional targets of the US-Canada trade dispute, such as steel, aluminum and automobiles.

According to the Canadian government, the latest US tariffs affect about $27.6 billion in Canadian goods. That represents only a fraction of Canada’s overall exports to the United States, but the impact can be much greater in specific industries and regions.

Canada, meanwhile, has structured its response around the US tariff lists.

What is Canada targeting?

Canada’s counter-tariffs will cover approximately $27.6 billion worth of American imports and will take effect on September 8.

The Canadian government has grouped the products into several major sectors, including steel and aluminum, dairy products, appliances, agricultural machinery, pulp and paper, plastics and electronics. The tariff rate on individual products will generally correspond to the US rate imposed on comparable goods.

The official Canadian list runs to hundreds of tariff lines. Some steel and aluminum products will face tariffs of up to 50 percent. Dairy products are also among the targets, with some milk and cream products subject to a 50 percent tariff. A range of clothing, sporting goods, electronics, and household products are also included.

The list is designed to put pressure on US exporters while avoiding, at least for now, the most economically disruptive response available to Canada: restricting exports of energy and other critical inputs.

That distinction matters because the US economy depends heavily on Canadian resources. Canada accounts for 60% of total US crude oil imports, according to Canadian government data.

Why does Canada still matter to the US economy?

Despite Trump’s claim that the US does not need Canada, the two economies are deeply intertwined.

Canada ranks as the third-highest source of US imports. In 2025, more than $380 billion worth of goods were brought over the border, according to US Census Bureau data.

Canada supplies the US with enormous quantities of crude oil, aluminum, potash, and auto parts.

Roughly four million barrels of Canadian crude enter the US every day, accounting for nearly one-fifth of US petroleum consumption. Canada is also a major supplier of aluminum and potash, both of which are important to American manufacturing and agriculture.

This creates a basic problem with tariffs: the country imposing the tariff is not necessarily insulated from its consequences.

A US manufacturer that imports a Canadian component may pay the tariff when the component crosses the border. That additional cost can then be passed along the supply chain – from the importer to the manufacturer, from the manufacturer to the retailer and ultimately to the consumer.

The same process works in the opposite direction when Canada taxes American goods.

In other words, tariffs are not simply a penalty paid by foreign governments. They are taxes collected at the importing country’s border, with the economic burden potentially shared among importers, businesses, workers and consumers.

What about the USMCA?

This is where the dispute becomes particularly complicated.

The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, or USMCA, is a trade agreement designed to allow qualifying goods produced in the three North American countries to move across their borders with preferential, and in many cases zero, tariffs.

The agreement is still in effect. In July, however, the Trump administration declined to simply renew the agreement for another 16 years.

Instead, Washington said it wanted to address what it considers shortcomings in the agreement and negotiate better terms. The US Trade Representative’s office stressed that USMCA remains in force while the United States seeks changes.

The current tariff dispute therefore does not mean that USMCA has disappeared. Rather, it means that USMCA is operating alongside a growing collection of tariffs and special trade measures.

That distinction is particularly important for steel, aluminum and automobiles.

But being covered by USMCA does not mean a product is automatically protected from every tariff imposed by the US government.

The reason is that the Trump administration is using several different legal authorities to impose tariffs, and those measures operate separately from the normal tariff preferences provided by USMCA.

What is Section 232?

One of the most important is Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. It allows the US president to restrict imports when the administration determines that they threaten US national security.

The Trump administration has used Section 232 extensively against strategic industrial products, most notably steel and aluminum.

In other words, the US government is not treating steel and aluminum simply as ordinary imports. It argues that maintaining domestic production of these materials is a national-security issue because they are important to industries such as construction, manufacturing, defense and infrastructure.

That is why steel and aluminum have been subject to a separate tariff regime from many of the other Canadian products caught by the latest measures.

The important point is that USMCA does not automatically cancel a Section 232 tariff. A Canadian steel product can satisfy USMCA’s rules of origin and still face a US national-security tariff if Washington has decided that the relevant Section 232 measure applies to it.

Canada has therefore included some US steel and aluminum products in its own retaliatory tariff list.

Are cars exempt or not?

Automobiles are even more complicated. Cars and auto parts were not simply swept into the new August 22 50 percent tariff on the same basis as the hundreds of other products.

Instead, Trump has threatened to raise US tariffs on Canadian-made automobiles and auto parts from 25 percent to 50 percent starting January 1, 2027.

That threat followed the collapse of negotiations that had raised hopes that auto tariffs could instead be reduced to 15 percent.

For automakers, the prospect is particularly alarming because the North American auto industry is not organized around national borders.

A vehicle can cross the US-Canada border multiple times during the manufacturing process, with parts produced in one country assembled in another.

Canadian-built vehicles accounted for about 6 percent of US vehicle sales in 2025, while major companies including Ford, General Motors, Stellantis, Toyota and Honda have significant manufacturing operations connected to the Canadian market.

A 50 percent tariff could therefore raise costs not only for Canadian exporters but also for American manufacturers that depend on Canadian plants and components.

How is the switch from factories to toilet paper?

The economic consequences of the trade war could eventually become visible in products that have little to do with geopolitics, according to watchers.

Paper products are one example. Canada is a major source of the raw materials used by the US paper industry, thanks in part to its enormous forestry sector.

The US imported $328m worth of toilet paper from Canada in 2024, according to the World Bank, making it by far the largest exporter of the product to the US. Retailers including Costco source much of their paper products from the country.

The US accounts for more than 20 percent of global tissue consumption despite having only 4% of the world’s population. The average American uses 141 rolls of toilet paper per year.

Tariffs on paper and related products can therefore affect an industry that is deeply integrated across the border. The same logic applies to many other goods.

A tariff on an imported component can increase the cost of a finished American product even when that final product is manufactured in the United States.

This is why economists and businesses worry about tariffs disrupting supply chains rather than simply reducing imports.

The effects can also spread geographically. A Canadian factory facing lower demand from the United States may cut production or employment, while an American company relying on Canadian inputs may face higher production costs.

Economist Trevor Tombe of the University of Calgary estimated before the latest tariffs took effect that prolonged 50 percent US tariffs on selected Canadian exports could eventually put nearly 90,000 Canadian jobs at risk.

He also stressed that the overall macroeconomic effect could appear relatively small because the affected goods represent only a portion of Canada’s total exports, while the effects could be much more severe in particular industries and communities.

Canada is particularly exposed because roughly 70 percent of its exports go to the United States. But the United States is hardly immune.

The two countries exchanged hundreds of billions of dollars in goods and services last year, while American manufacturers depend on Canadian energy, metals, minerals and industrial inputs.

That means a prolonged tariff war could create a classic lose-lose scenario: Canadian exporters lose access to their largest market while American companies and consumers pay more for imported goods and inputs.

Could the trade war hurt Trump in midterms?

That is one of the biggest political questions surrounding the ongoing and simmering trade dispute between the two countries. The 2026 US midterm elections are less than three months away, and the economy and cost of living are already major concerns for American voters.

A Reuters/Ipsos poll conducted in late July and early August found that 48 percent of Americans said the cost of living would be the most important factor in deciding how they vote in the midterms.

The same poll found that Americans trusted Democrats more than Republicans to handle the cost of living, 35 percent to 27 percent.

That creates a political vulnerability for Trump’s tariff strategy.

The US president has presented tariffs as a way to protect American workers, bring manufacturing back to the United States and force trading partners to offer better terms.

But if tariffs instead translate into higher prices for consumers, more expensive manufactured goods or disruptions at American factories, Democrats could use those effects to warn that Trump’s trade policies are worsening the already bad cost-of-living problem in the country.

The impact could be particularly important in states and congressional districts where manufacturing and cross-border trade are major parts of the local economy.

What is the issue related to Lake Ontario?

The dispute has also produced something far more unusual than tariffs: a fight over the name of a lake. As tensions with Canada escalated, Trump floated the idea of renaming Lake Ontario “Lake America.”

The proposal came amid the collapse of trade talks and Trump’s increasingly confrontational rhetoric toward Canada. The reaction in Canada was swift and largely dismissive.

Lake Ontario is one of the five Great Lakes and sits on the border between the United States and Canada. Its current name long predates both countries’ modern political relationship.

The proposal also echoed Trump’s earlier push to rename the Gulf of Mexico as the Gulf of America, a move that similarly generated political and cultural controversy.

For Canadians already angered by Trump’s repeated rhetoric about Canada becoming the 51st US state, the proposal became another symbol of what many see as an increasingly antagonistic relationship.

Trump on Thursday signed a directive changing the name of the lake and said the move would take place “effective immediately.”

The order signed by Trump said the Interior Department had 30 days to change the name in federal databases and materials.

Carney firmly stated that Lake Ontario will retain its original name, despite the executive order.

“The name Lake Ontario comes from the Wendat word Ontari’io, which, appropriately, means ‘the lake is beautiful, the lake is big,’” Carney posted on X. “The name is more than 400 years old, predating both the Confederation of Canada and the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America.”

New York Governor Kathy Hochul responded on social media: “New York won’t be calling it that.”

Phil ​Scott, the Republican governor of Vermont, which borders Canada and New York State, on Thursday called Trump’s decision “petty and disappointing” on the social media platform X.

Grand Chief Pierre Picard of the Wendat Nation in Quebec issued a statement condemning the change in name.

“President Trump is trying to erase our history,” he said. “Outraged, appalled, shocked: ‌there are no other words to express how I feel following President Trump’s decision to rename Lake Ontario ‘Lake America.’”

What happens next?

For now, the next major deadline is September 8, when Canada’s retaliatory tariffs are scheduled to enter into force.

But the tariffs could still be changed, delayed or withdrawn if Washington and Ottawa return to the negotiating table.

That possibility matters because neither country has much to gain from a prolonged trade war.

Canada is heavily dependent on access to the US market, while American industries rely on Canadian energy, minerals, metals, agricultural inputs and manufacturing components.

'De-dollarization' and 'economic integration' on Iran's agenda at SCO summit

TEHRAN— Iran is seeking to use the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s 2026 summit in Bishkek to deepen economic integration with Eurasian partners, advance de-dollarization and expand trade and transport links.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian arrived in the Kyrgyz capital on Monday for the two-day summit, accompanied by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. His visit includes participation in the SCO and SCO Plus meetings as well as a series of bilateral talks with leaders of member states.

The 2026 summit, which marks the 25th anniversary of the SCO, brings together leaders from China, Russia, India, Iran, Pakistan, Belarus and the Central Asian member states. Turkey is also participating as a dialogue partner. The organization has expanded significantly since its establishment, with the combined GDP of its members rising from about $1.67 trillion in 2001 to approximately $25 trillion in 2025, according to figures cited in the accompanying reports.

For Tehran, however, the summit is about more than multilateral diplomacy. Iran is seeking to convert its membership in the organization into practical economic mechanisms that can reduce its exposure to sanctions and strengthen its access to regional markets.

De-dollarization on economic agenda

One of Tehran’s central proposals is the establishment of a Shanghai Development Bank, with its capital structure based on the national currencies of member states and supported by independent systems for trade and financial settlement.

The proposal was presented during discussions among finance ministers and central bank chiefs in Bishkek. Under the plan, the proposed institution could help finance infrastructure projects, particularly in the energy and transportation sectors and along major regional corridors.

Iranian officials view the initiative as part of a broader effort to reduce dependence on the US dollar and create alternative channels for trade and finance.

Hassan Qashqavi, spokesman for the Iranian Parliament’s National Security Commission, said continued dominance of the dollar remained a source of economic pressure on Iran but argued that sanctions did not leave Tehran without options.

The proposal is expected to be referred to SCO's interim secretariat for further consideration.

Energy and transit links with central Asia

Pezeshkian’s meeting with Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov highlighted Tehran’s effort to translate political ties into concrete economic projects.

The Iranian president welcomed Bishkek’s proposal to establish a joint oil refinery in Kyrgyzstan and said Iran was prepared to supply the crude required by the facility and share the resulting refined products with Kyrgyzstan.

Pezeshkian also proposed establishing a Kyrgyz logistics center at Iran’s Bandar Abbas port. The facility could provide Kyrgyzstan with a route to the Persian Gulf, the Indian subcontinent and East Asian markets while allowing other members of the Eurasian Economic Union to make greater use of Iran’s transport infrastructure and access to international waters.

Japarov welcomed the expansion of economic and energy cooperation and invited Iranian oil exploration companies to contribute their technical expertise to projects in Kyrgyzstan.

The discussions reflect Iran’s broader strategy of positioning itself as a transit and energy gateway between landlocked Central Asian economies and international maritime markets.

India emerges as a key economic partner

Pezeshkian’s talks with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi were particularly significant against the backdrop of sanctions and regional tensions.

The Iranian president emphasized the extensive potential for cooperation between Tehran and New Delhi in economic, political, scientific and cultural fields, arguing that closer bilateral ties could help mitigate the effects of sanctions.

The two leaders also discussed transportation and maritime cooperation, developments surrounding the Strait of Hormuz and progress at Iran’s Chabahar Port, one of the country’s key gateways to the Indian Ocean.

Pezeshkian thanked India for its cooperation with Iran during the recent U.S.-Israeli war and called for stronger diplomatic efforts to restore peace and stability in the region.

He reiterated Tehran’s position that Iran does not seek war and that regional disputes should be addressed through dialogue and negotiations. He also urged India to use its relations with different parties to encourage a shift away from confrontation and toward diplomacy.

Modi reaffirmed India’s commitment to strengthening its long-standing relationship with Iran and expressed readiness to expand and diversify bilateral trade. India’s Foreign Ministry described the meeting as “fruitful” and reiterated New Delhi’s position that outstanding disputes should be resolved through dialogue and diplomacy.

Broader Eurasian diplomacy

Pezeshkian also held talks with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, with both meetings focusing on strengthening bilateral cooperation and making greater use of existing economic and political capacities.

The meetings form part of Tehran’s broader diplomatic push across Eurasia, where Iran is seeking to expand trade, energy cooperation, transportation links and strategic partnerships.

Iranian officials have also emphasized that Tehran’s defense cooperation with other countries is intended to strengthen regional security rather than target neighboring states. Pezeshkian has described regional security as a collective responsibility and argued that greater cooperation among regional states is the most sustainable way to prevent external interference.

The SCO summit therefore provides Iran with a platform that combines diplomacy, economics and security at a time of major geopolitical realignment.

The organization now represents a substantial share of the global population and economy, while its members have increasingly sought to strengthen economic cooperation outside Western-dominated financial structures.

For Tehran, the priority is to turn that emerging framework into tangible economic opportunities — from alternative payment mechanisms and infrastructure financing to energy partnerships and transit corridors.

As the SCO marks its 25th anniversary, Iran is positioning itself as an active participant in the organization’s evolving economic architecture, seeking to use multilateral cooperation to reduce the impact of sanctions, diversify trade and strengthen its role as a link between Central Asia, the Persian Gulf and the wider Asian market.

The summit is expected to produce the Bishkek Declaration and a series of agreements covering areas including security, energy, transportation and digital development, further underscoring the organization’s expanding role in the emerging Eurasian order.

Iran’s military and strategic options to thwart – and break – the illegal US naval blockade

By Yousef Ramazani

As the United States maintains its naval blockade of Iranian ports, now entering its second phase following the collapse of the June ceasefire, Tehran possesses a broad array of military capabilities and alternative trade routes that could make the blockade hard to sustain, forcing Washington to choose between escalation, prolonged confrontation, or retreat.

The US naval blockade of Iran, first imposed on April 13, 2026, and intensified from July 14 following the unraveling of a temporary ceasefire due to US military aggression and maritime banditry and piracy, is aimed at choking off Iran’s maritime trade.

The blockade’s two phases have shaped Iran’s response. The first phase, from April to June, was characterized primarily by Iranian efforts to preserve economic resilience through existing trade and supply channels. The second phase, beginning in July, has been marked by a more assertive Iranian posture, culminating in a warning that it could take decisive action to break the blockade.

The geography of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz favors the defender against the aggressor. Iran has spent decades developing a sophisticated, layered sea-denial strategy designed to make any sustained foreign naval presence in these strategically vital waters increasingly costly and difficult to maintain.

Yet the challenge to the blockade extends beyond the military domain. Iran has also developed alternative overland and maritime trade routes that can bypass the blockade, creating a parallel economic infrastructure capable of sustaining the country through a prolonged confrontation.

Now, as the US launches a new campaign to economically isolate Iran, Tehran has multiple options not only to neutralize the pressure campaign, but to emerge stronger.

Two phases of the US naval blockade

The US naval blockade of Iran was initiated on April 13, 2026, at the direction of President Donald Trump and under CENTCOM command, with the stated objective of encompassing Iran’s entire coastline. Washington warned that any vessel entering or departing the designated blockade zone without authorization would be subject to interception, diversion, and capture.

Within the first 24 hours, six commercial vessels reportedly complied with US orders and were redirected toward Iranian ports, while no vessels attempted to challenge the blockade.

By April 18, CENTCOM reported that 23 vessels had been intercepted, although Iranian vessels continued to successfully evade the blockade.

On July 7, 2026, Trump declared the interim deal terminated, and hostilities resumed, with Iran subsequently firing on vessels that attempted to transit the Strait of Hormuz along an unauthorized route, as it had previously and repeatedly warned.

This marked the beginning of the blockade’s second phase, defined by heightened tensions and the collapse of Pakistan-mediated diplomatic efforts to extend the ceasefire.

By August 2026, Iran had warned that, should diplomacy fail, it was prepared to adopt a fully offensive military posture aimed at breaking the blockade.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon had begun reassessing the US military presence in the Persian Gulf, acknowledging the vulnerability of fixed installations and the damage sustained by numerous American facilities during the war against Iran.

Iran's coastal anti-ship missiles

Iran's escalation options

Iran’s geographic position, particularly its firm and legitimate control of the northern coastline of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, provides a natural defensive advantage that underpins a sophisticated, layered sea-denial strategy.

At its narrowest, the Strait of Hormuz is approximately 33 kilometers wide, placing vessels transiting the waterway within range of Iran’s shore-based missile systems, radars, and observation posts.

This geography fundamentally alters the nature of the naval contest. Iran does not necessarily need to defeat the US Navy outright; it only needs to make the maritime environment sufficiently hazardous to undermine Washington’s ability to guarantee safe passage and, over time, erode the sustainability of the blockade.

Iran possesses one of the region’s largest and most diverse inventories of anti-ship missiles. The Noor, Ghader, Ghadir, and Nasr families of coastal anti-ship cruise missiles provide a layered threat that any naval commander operating in the area must take seriously.

These weapons do not necessarily have to sink a vessel to serve their strategic purpose. Even an unsuccessful attack can force the enemy to expend costly interceptors, creating a cost-imposition dynamic in which a multimillion-dollar interceptor may be used to defeat a significantly cheaper attacking drone or missile.

Repeated engagements can therefore produce an unfavorable economic exchange for the US war machine, even when most incoming weapons are successfully intercepted.

Beyond subsonic cruise missiles, Iran has also publicly demonstrated anti-ship ballistic missile capabilities, including the Khalij Fars, Hormuz-1, and Hormuz-2, derived from the Fateh-110 family. With ranges of up to approximately 300 kilometers and terminal guidance capabilities, these weapons present a fundamentally different interception challenge.

Their faster trajectories can compress the detection, tracking, identification, and engagement timelines of the US military, complicating US naval planning and increasing the demands placed on defensive systems.

Iran also possesses a large inventory of naval mines, with estimates ranging from 5,000 to 6,000 mines of various types.

Naval mines are relatively inexpensive, difficult to detect and clear, and capable of imposing costs vastly disproportionate to their price. Ensuring safe navigation would require extensive mine-countermeasure operations, typically slow, resource-intensive, and operationally demanding. The US Navy has itself acknowledged significant challenges and limitations in its mine-countermeasure capabilities.

Hormuz-1 and Hormuz-2 missiles

This means mining could create a particularly difficult operational challenge, because the United States would have to conduct mine-clearance operations while simultaneously defending against missiles, drones, submarines, and other threats.

Mines could become one of the most consequential operational variables in a post-blockade environment. Even if a ceasefire were to hold, uncleared mines could remain a persistent threat to commercial shipping and continue to complicate efforts to restore normal maritime traffic.

Iran’s submarine force, while modest compared with that of the United States, provides another layer of sea-denial capability.

Its Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines, along with smaller submarines and midget-submarine systems, can operate covertly beneath the surface, forcing an opposing navy to devote substantial surveillance and anti-submarine resources to locating relatively small numbers of potentially dangerous platforms.

The emergence of relatively inexpensive unmanned surface vessels could further enhance swarm tactics, allowing Iran to impose additional risks without necessarily placing personnel directly in harm’s way.

The combination of shore-based missiles, UAV reconnaissance, unmanned surface vessels, fast attack craft, submarines, and mines creates a highly complex maritime environment in which US commanders cannot concentrate exclusively on any single threat.

Iran has also invested heavily in a distributed maritime surveillance network incorporating maritime patrol aircraft, UAVs, coastal radars, electronic intelligence, satellites, signals intelligence, and naval reconnaissance.

The effectiveness and survivability of this broader kill chain could ultimately matter more than the nominal number of missiles Iran possesses. Tehran could also seek to disrupt the information architecture supporting the blockade through electronic warfare targeting communications, navigation, radar, and other sensing systems, making it more difficult for blockade forces to identify and interpret activity in a crowded maritime environment.

The objective would not necessarily be to destroy the blockade force outright, but to increase uncertainty, forcing it to operate more cautiously and reducing its effectiveness.

Iran’s ability to escalate progressively – selective interdiction to missile attacks, mining, and broader regional pressure – could give Tehran multiple options for increasing costs without immediately triggering a full-scale conflict that neither side could easily contain.

Illustration of mine warfare

Layered strategy: Making the blockade unsustainable

The most plausible Iranian military objective would not be to destroy the US Navy’s regional infrastructure in its entirely, but rather to make the blockade operationally dangerous, economically costly, and ultimately politically unsustainable.

Iran could pursue this through a layered sea-denial strategy that combines multiple forms of maritime pressure faster than US forces can neutralize them, creating a complex operating environment that steadily increases the costs and risks for the blockading force.

Each layer can reinforce the others: a minefield becomes significantly more challenging when mine-clearance vessels must simultaneously defend against missile attacks; missiles become more difficult to counter if electronic warfare degrades sensors and communications; and small attack craft become more dangerous when the hostile forces must also monitor drones and other aerial threats.

The broader strategy becomes even more consequential if commercial shipping companies conclude that the waterway is simply too dangerous to use. A sustained decline in commercial traffic could generate economic pressure that ultimately extends beyond the battlefield and onto the United States and its allies, as we are already witnessing.

The geographic and military contest is essentially defined by whether Iran can make the Strait of Hormuz too dangerous and expensive to enforce, while the United States attempts to keep enough of the maritime system functioning while neutralizing Iran's ability to impose unacceptable risk.

Strait of Hormuz

Alternative trade routes: the land bridge to Eurasia

Beyond its military options, Iran has developed a network of alternative trade routes that bypass the US naval blockade entirely, creating a parallel economic infrastructure that can sustain the country through a prolonged confrontation.

These routes, developed in cooperation with Russia, China, and other Eurasian partners, represent a pivot away from maritime chokepoints toward overland corridors that are immune to naval interdiction.

The International North-South Transport Corridor has emerged as the most significant of these alternative routes. The 7,200-kilometer corridor is designed to cut trade costs by 30% and reduce shipping time from 37 days to 19, almost half that of the Suez Canal route.

The Rasht-Astara railway line, described as the missing link in the corridor, is being constructed under a 20-year Russia-Iran partnership and is expected to revolutionize trade and help both countries circumvent Western sanctions.

Once complete, the corridor will handle up to 20 million tons of cargo annually through routes completely untouched by US naval power.

Unlike maritime chokepoints such as the Suez Canal or the Strait of Hormuz, this land bridge cannot be blockaded by American fleets or frozen by European banks.

Russia and Iran have also expanded their Caspian shipping network, transforming it into what officials describe as a sanctions corridor.

Roughly two million tons of Russian wheat are now flowing to Iran through the Caspian alone, underscoring the route's importance for both essential supplies and military logistics.

This entire supply line bypasses the Strait of Hormuz and the US-led naval cordon, moving instead through waters where American forces have no authority to interdict.

Russian trade figures reveal a sharp spike in cargo volumes along these routes, suggesting not a temporary workaround but a deliberate pivot toward the inland sea.

A 10,400-kilometer overland bridge from China to Tehran has also become central to this pivot. Starting from western China crossing the Khorgos Gateway, the train line enters Kazakhstan, moves through Tashkent, travels south through Samarkand and Bukhara, and finally completes its journey at Iran's spiritual capital of Mashhad.

Supported by Pakistan's transit order via the Karachi-Taftan and Gwadar-Gabd corridors, this route channels crude and petrochemicals toward Central Asia and China.

By denominating shipments in yuan, China has embedded this corridor within its broader Belt and Road routes and ensured an uninterrupted flow of hydrocarbons and strategic goods.

Strategic contest: Test of endurance

The fundamental contest between Iran and the United States over the naval blockade is ultimately a contest of will, where the side with the greater motivation and tolerance for cost will prevail.

For Iran, it is a matter of national survival and sovereignty; for the United States, it is a strategic choice.

Iran's ability to escalate progressively, combined with its alternative trade routes, gives it options to respond to American hostile actions effectively and decisively. 

The opening of the Strait of Hormuz depends more on US compliance to its commitments under the recently signed memorandum of understanding (MoU) than on a military aggression, and Iran has plausibly concluded that its control over the strait, combined with its alternative trade routes, provides sufficient leverage to bring the United States to the negotiating table on favorable terms.

The United States cannot change the geography of the Persian Gulf, and it cannot eliminate Iran's ability to create insecurity and instability in this waterway.