New Arab View of Post-war and Post-agreement Iran

Alwaght- Field developments across West Asia region, particularly after a period of inflamed tensions and the subsequent push toward an Iran-US agreement, have revealed clear signs that Arab states in the region are recalibrating their perspectives.

In the post–Iran-US conflict era, Arab policymakers and elites are now weighing political-security proposals and making decisions with far greater caution, expecting guarantees backed by verifiable mechanisms to prevent a repeat of past damages.

This shift is no sudden about-face; it is the accumulated result of a decade’s worth of security, economic, and geopolitical lessons. Those lessons have made one thing abundantly clear: the notion of a "removable Iran" was never realistic.

Over the past several years, the dominant strategy among Persian Gulf Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, rested on containing Iran through coalition-building with the US and relying on Western security umbrellas. But drawn-out proxy conflicts, the vulnerability of energy infrastructure, and spiraling security costs have pushed these countries to rethink that approach. Attacks on oil facilities, repeated threats in the Strait of Hormuz, and volatility along energy routes all drove home the same message that sustained confrontation and conflict do not so much undermine Iran as they expose the entire region to escalating risk.

In this context, a potential Iran-US deal acts as a geopolitical catalyst, not because differences will disappear, but because the framework for managing them is changing. Persian Gulf monarchies are now arriving at a conclusion more clearly than ever before that they must pivot from a model of "security against Iran" to one of "security alongside Iran", even if that transition remains gradual, cautious, and fraught with hesitation.

This is a crucial point: on the ground, over the past few years, communication channels between Tehran and several Arab capitals have grown noticeably more active. From security talks to the revival of diplomatic ties, signs of a new approach are unmistakable. This new approach is aimed at de-escalation, crisis management, and avoiding costly surprises. Even during the 40-day war, these countries resisted Washington's expectations and pressure to sever diplomatic relations, keeping those lifelines open to prevent further regional destabilization. This trend began well before any formal U.S. deal; the agreement will only accelerate it.

On the security front, Arab states are moving toward what can only be described as "strategic diversification." While maintaining their ties with the United States, they are actively working to reduce total dependence on it. Instead, they are building a multi-layered balance through dialogue with Iran and its allies, particularly the Axis of Resistance, while also deepening relations with powers like China and Russia. This approach reflects a new understanding: regional security can no longer be outsourced.

Economically, too, the view to Iran is shifting. A vast market, immense energy reserves, and Iran's geostrategic position as a transit corridor hub make it a potential opportunity. But that opportunity comes with competition. The southern Persian Gulf ports, especially in the UAE and Qatar, have already cemented themselves as commercial hubs, and Iran's reintegration into the global economy could upend that balance. The economic relationship with Iran, then, will be a mix of cooperation and rivalry.

Politically, we are witnessing a growing pragmatism. Ideological discourses that once emphasized confrontation are gradually giving way to cost-benefit calculations. Regional crises, from Yemen to Iraq, are increasingly being managed through dialogue. This shift, while neither complete nor irreversible, signals a clear new direction in Arab foreign policy.

Finally, it must be said that in the post-agreement era, Iran will neither be an "absolute enemy" nor a "full partner" for Arab states, but rather an "inescapable reality", one that should be contained, managed, and, in certain areas, engaged with cooperatively. This is precisely where a new regional order is taking shape, not one built on eliminating players, but on recalibrating the relationships among them.

Armenian Genocide: New Israeli Card in Geopolitical Contest with Turkey

Alwaght- The age-old strategy of "divide and rule" has long been a staple of diplomacy, particularly wielded by colonial powers to expand their spheres of influence. And in today's era, this tactic is alive and well, just as it was in the days of empire. The Israeli cabinet's recent decision to recognize the Armenian genocide committed by the Ottoman Empire between 1915 and 1923 fits squarely into that playbook. To view this merely as a historical, moral, or human-rights gesture would be naive.

The regime's foreign ministry has hailed the move as "historic," and Israeli officials are framing it as a stand for historical truth and justice for the victims. But the timing of the decision, the regional upheavals of recent months, and Armenia's notably tepid response all point to a different reality: Tel Aviv is weaponizing the Armenian genocide file as a geopolitical bargaining chip and a tool for settling regional scores.

Though the cabinet greenlit the plan only days ago, and it still needs final Knesset approval to become official policy, the political will to go down this road had been taking shape for months. The clearest signal came back in late August 2025, when Benjamin Netanyahu broke new ground by explicitly labeling the massacres of Armenians, Assyrians, and Greeks under the Ottoman Empire as genocide.

Growing confrontation with Turkey: When history is weaponized

This latest decision by Tel Aviv should be seen as the next link in a chain of upheavals triggered by the collapse of Israeli-Turkish relations after the Gaza war, and the emergence of a new geopolitical order stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean and the Levant all the way to the South Caucasus. In this new order, even historical grievances are being repurposed as tools in security and political rivalries.

Over the decades, the two countries' relationship had seen its share of ups and downs, but never fully ruptured. That changed after the Gaza war, pushing ties into uncharted territory. The Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan did not just accuse Tel Aviv of committing genocide in Gaza, he branded the regime a "terrorist state." Ankara went on to claim it had halted a significant portion of its economic and trade ties with the Israeli regime and closed its airspace to Israeli aircraft.

In recent months, the Turkish leader and his AK Party officials have repeatedly framed Zionist ideology as a threat to Turkey's national security. Erdoğan even declared that the fight against Zionism is not just about defending Palestine, it is part of a broader struggle for the survival of the Turkish nation.

Into this volatile mix steps the Armenian genocide file, now effectively weaponized as a historical and political pressure lever for Israel against Turkey. It is an issue Ankara has been hypersensitive about for over a century, treating any formal recognition by foreign governments as a hostile act.

Turkey's Foreign Ministry fired back swiftly, accusing Israel of using the Armenian genocide recognition to whitewash its genocide against the people of Gaza. Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz echoed that line, calling the cabinet's move a desperate attempt to cover up its own crimes.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar has insisted the decision is not "retaliatory" against Turkey. But coming at a moment of peak tensions between the two sides, and given the blunt language Israeli officials have been using about Turkish policy, the political calculus behind this move leaves little room for doubt.

Seen through this lens, Tel Aviv is sending Ankara a clear and unmistakable message: just as Turkey wields the Gaza file and genocide allegations against Israel on the international stage, Israel can just as easily turn Turkey's most sensitive historical wound into a political pressure point of its own.

Boosting Israeli foothold in Caucasus and Central Asia 

The second dimension of this decision lies in the geopolitical contests playing out across the South Caucasus, and Israel's calculated push to expand its footprint there.

In recent years, Tel Aviv has been pursuing a two-pronged strategy: on one hand, breaking out of its regional isolation through normalization deals with neighboring states; on the other, reinforcing its security posture by building influence along the geopolitical periphery of the Islamic Republic, which it views as the single greatest existential threat. Within that framework, Israeli regime has trained its sights on Central Asia and the Caucasus, looking to open new channels of engagement.

The developments of the past few years, particularly since the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, have turned the South Caucasus into one of the most contested arenas for regional and extra-regional powers. Russia, Turkey, Iran, the United States, the EU, and Israel are all jockeying to lock in their positions.

Yet the hostile dynamic between Azerbaijan and Armenia, coupled with Baku's strategic alliance with Ankara, makes this recognition move a delicate and potentially disruptive gambit within Israel's existing regional alliances.

Over the past two decades, Tel Aviv has built a deep strategic partnership with Azerbaijan, including military, intelligence, and energy cooperation that has become a cornerstone of Israel's regional policy. But the Israelis know that relying solely on the Baku axis won't secure a lasting presence in the Caucasus. Opening parallel channels with Armenia could give Tel Aviv far greater geopolitical flexibility, especially as Yerevan gradually drifts away from Russia and actively scouts for new security and political partners.

Seen in this light, recognizing the Armenian genocide may well be part of a broader Israeli effort to pry open doors in Yerevan, strengthen its hand in the emerging calculus of the Caucasus, and perhaps even extend its reach into Central Asia down the line.

Grouping in Palestinian case

Another likely objective behind this decision is Israel's attempt to claw its way out of the international isolation it now faces over Gaza.

Tel Aviv is currently reeling under a avalanche of global accusations that include war crimes, genocide, you name it. Governments, human rights organizations, UN rapporteurs, and perhaps most critically, world public opinion, especially in the West, have leveled unprecedented criticism against Israel.

In such climate, recognizing the Armenian genocide could be a bid to rehabilitate Israel's moral image: to cast the regime as a champion of genocide victims, a nation that refuses to stay silent in the face of historical atrocities.

But there may be a deeper geopolitical calculus at play here, one tied to the Israeli right's long-standing ambition to bury the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative once and for all. That initiative, it's worth recalling, promised the creation of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. The Netanyahu-led hardline cabinet is determined to erase even the faintest trace of that blueprint. And one of the most effective ways to entrench that erasure is to secure international legitimacy for moving Israel's capital from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, a move already greenlit by the US during Trump's first term. So, by formally recognizing the Armenian genocide, and by extension, drawing closer to Yerevan, Israel may well be laying the groundwork for a similar push: leveraging that moral and political capital to eventually gain broader acceptance for Al-Quds (Jerusalem) as its capital.

When Yerevan reads Israel's mind

Perhaps the most telling sign that this decision is politically driven lies in Armenia's conspicuously tepid response.

Contrary to Yerevan's usual practice of enthusiastically welcoming foreign recognition of the Armenian genocide, this time Armenian officials have held back. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan had even warned earlier, explicitly, that the issue must not be turned into a "geopolitical bargaining chip."

This Armenian position is driven in several hard realities.

First, Armenia knows full well that Israel has been one of Azerbaijan's key arms suppliers in recent years. A significant chunk of Baku's military edge in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War was built on Israeli technology and equipment.

Second, Yerevan sees the timing of this move as driven less by historical or moral conviction and more by the escalating rift between Israel and Turkey.

Third, Pashinyan's government has been pursuing a normalization track with Turkey over the past few years. With the recent breakthroughs between Baku and Yerevan, the prospect of reopening borders and restoring diplomatic ties between Armenia and Turkey is more tangible than ever. The last thing Yerevan wants is for the genocide file to be dragged back into the arena of regional power rivalries.

And fourth, from the perspective of a large swath of Armenia's political class, a country accused of committing widespread atrocities against civilians in Gaza simply lacks the moral standing to pose as a defender of genocide victims.

Regional consequences for Tel Aviv

This decision by the Israeli cabinet carries implications that reach far beyond bilateral tensions between Tel Aviv and Ankara.

First, it is likely to escalate political and diplomatic friction between the two sides, though history suggests Ankara tends not to fully sever ties even with countries that have formally recognized the Armenian genocide.

Second, it could upset the delicate balance in the South Caucasus and complicate Israel's relationship with Azerbaijan, especially if Baku interprets the move as Tel Aviv backpedaling on its longstanding strategic alignment.

Third, this episode underscores a broader trend: in the emerging regional order, historical grievances are no longer relics of the past, they have become live ammunition in geopolitical rivalries.

Ultimately, the Israeli cabinet's recognition of the Armenian genocide is less a historical or moral statement than a reflection of the profound geopolitical shifts reshaping a region that stretches from the South Caucasus to the Eastern Mediterranean.

That is why, today more than ever, the Armenian genocide case is not merely a historical question, it is a strategic battleground, woven into the very fabric of a reordering region where even the historical memory of nations is now fair game in geopolitical competitions.

New Security Arrangements in Strait of Hormuz: Why’s Oman Cautious?

Alwaght- After signing the MoU between Iran and the US, vessel transit in the Strait of Hormuz has taken a rising trend. According to the deal, Tehran commits to cooperate for freedom of navigation in the key waterway and will not charge tolls on the ships transiting in at least 60 days.

However, Iranian officials have said that the 60-day timeframe is temporary and onve it ends, Tehran will execute its new security arrangements in the Strait. According to the new arrangements, Iran will receive tolls from the vessels in return to provided security and navigation services.

Iran-Oman cooperation: Unavoidable necessity

Any security mechanism in the Strait of Hormuz will be difficult to implement without cooperation from Iran and Oman. The two countries are the Strait's only littoral states, each holding sovereignty over parts of its territorial waters. Accordingly, coordination on maritime security, shipping safety, search-and-rescue operations, and vessel traffic management falls within the shared responsibility of Tehran and Muscat.

Within this framework, Iran and Oman announced in their recent joint statement the formation of a working group to examine the "future of navigation management in the Strait of Hormuz," stressing the need to uphold maritime security and ensure the continued safe passage of ships in accordance with international law.

Here is a question: Is Oman willing to fully cooperate in implementing the security arrangements Tehran envisions?

Muscat's conservative positions

Recent remarks by the Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi showed that Muscat is cautious about some of the terms of Iran's plan. On Thursday, he said: " Future arrangements for the Strait of Hormuz will not include any tolls or fees for transit."

That stance suggests that while Oman supports security cooperation with Iran, it does not necessarily agree with every aspect of Tehran's proposal, particularly the idea of charging passing vessels. In other words, Oman's cooperation is more focused on safeguarding shipping security and regional stability, rather than fully aligning with all of Iran's positions.

Why is Oman circumspect?

With a look at the views of analysts and media reports, we can decide that the caution shown by Oman regarding exercising sovereignty over Strait of Hormuz is driven by several factors:

1. Legal limitations

One of the biggest reasons for Oman's caution is its legal obligations. The Omani outlet Muscat Daily has reported that Oman is a signatory to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982 and believes any legal or security regime in the Strait of Hormuz must comply with its provisions, especially the principle of safe and free passage for vessels. As a result, Muscat is reluctant to take part in any action that many countries would view as a violation of international law.

Iran, by contrast, is not a party to UNCLOS. Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi has stressed that Tehran, based on its sovereign rights, can take whatever measures it deems necessary to counter security threats in the Strait of Hormuz and blames US policies for any instability there.

That is precisely why Tehran does not consider itself bound by UNCLOS commitments when enforcing security policies in the strait, while Oman, as a state party to the treaty, faces far more legal constraints.

2. Maintaining its mediator role

Another reason is Oman's traditional place in the regional foreign policy. Over the past decades, Oman has tried to maintain its role as a mediator between Iran and the US and the Persian Gulf Arab states. Actually, one of the main diplomatic assets of Oman is this mediator role, and if it leans to Iran in the current dispute, it will lose a major part of this diplomatic credit. 

In addition to close ties to Iran, Oman has major security, economic, and political ties with the US, Britain, and the Persian Gulf monarchies. So, it tries to walk a tight role between the two sides. 

3. Difference in exercising sovereignty 

This combination of legal constraints and political considerations has pushed Oman to adopt a markedly different approach from Iran when it comes to exercising its sovereign authority over the Strait of Hormuz.

Iranian officials, for their part, have made it clear that if cooperation with Oman falls through, Tehran will press ahead with its plans regardless. Kazem Gharibabadi has stated that while reaching an understanding with Oman remains Iran's priority, if Muscat for any reason proves unwilling to establish a joint framework for managing the Strait's future, Iran will move forward unilaterally. 

Is charging tolls legal?

Charging tolls on passing vessels is one of the most consequential legal questions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz.

Hadi Atazadeh, an energy law researcher, argues that while customary maritime law and UNCLOS 1982 generally prohibit levying fees solely for passage through territorial waters, Article 26 of the convention does allow coastal states to charge for services rendered, such as security, navigation assistance, search-and-rescue, and other maritime services.

In his view, Iran could therefore argue that the proposed fees are payment for security and navigational services, not a toll for mere transit through the strait.

The Iranian researcher also points out that half of the Strait of Hormuz lies within Iran's territorial waters and the other half within Oman's. He notes that Iran has never accepted the theory of "transit passage" and continues to operate under the principle of "innocent passage", a stance that, in his assessment, gives Tehran wider leeway to exercise sovereign authority within its own territorial waters.

In general, Tehran and Muscat share thought on the principle of cooperation for security of the Strait of Hormuz, but they are divided over the security arrangements, especially charging tolls. It seems that the future of this case is contingent on the result of the Iranian-Oman joint commission talks, as well as on political and security developments in the region. 

What’s the Agenda of Iraqi PM’s Tehran Visit?

Alwaght- Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaydi’s trip to Tehran today is far more than a routine diplomatic visit between neighbors. Scheduled in the first months of Baghdad’s new government, in line with Iraqi political tradition, the visit underscores that Iran remains a decisive factor in Iraq’s strategic calculations, and that no administration in Baghdad can stabilize its foreign policy without first recalibrating ties with Tehran.

Even as the Trump administration and its special envoy Thomas Barrack deploy a mix of political pressure, security leverage, and economic inducements to curb Iranian influence in Iraq, al-Zaydi’s decision to place Tehran at the top of his foreign trips signals that the new Iraqi government fully grasps the geopolitical realities and Iran’s undeniable weight in the country’s security, economic, and political equations.

Against that backdrop, it is certain that the visit is under the influence of the military tensions of the US and Iran as the two main actors of the Iraqi developments. According to informed sources, al-Zaydi is expected to propose in Tehran that Baghdad host direct talks between Iran and the US. These unconfirmed reports also suggest that during his last week to Washington, he advised President Trump to halt strikes against Iran and pivot toward negotiation.

From Baghdad’s perspective, continued American-Iranian tensions threatens Iraq’s security and economy more than any other country’s. Mediation, then, is not merely a diplomatic initiative but a necessity for preserving domestic stability in Iraq. 

Echoing that view, Iraqi political analyst Mashaal al-Tamimi said: “Al-Zaydi will underscore his government’s commitment to a policy of geopolitical balance, a strategy aimed at maintaining simultaneous ties with neighbors, regional powers, and international actors.” That approach, in effect, continues Baghdad’s yearslong effort to prevent Iraq from becoming an arena for great-power confrontation.

Economy, the main element of bilateral relations

But the significance of al-Zaydi’s Tehran visit does not stop at the mediation case. Iran and Iraq are old partners with a deep and multifaceted bilateral relationship, and high-level diplomatic meetings routinely address that breadth, particularly in the economic arena.

A major chunk of the talks will focus on expanding economic, trade, energy, and transit ties, areas where current capacity still falls far short of what both countries actually need.

Iran has long ranked among Iraq’s top trading partners. According to Yahya Al Eshaq, head of the Iran-Iraq Joint Chamber of Commerce, “Official two-way trade stood at about $12 billion last year. This year, the figure has dipped slightly, mainly due to a drop in Iran’s gas exports.”

Given the vast potential between the two neighbors, the current volume remains well below the proper level. That is why officials in Tehran and Baghdad have repeatedly set a target of boosting annual trade to $20 billion.

With the longest shared land border with Iran, Iraq is one of the Islamic Republic’s most vital export destinations. Of Iran’s total foreign trade, roughly $110 billion in the past fiscal year, nearly $12 billion came from exchanges with Iraq.

Iraq also accounts for more than 17 percent of Iran’s non-oil exports, making it the second-largest destination after China. Hundreds of product categories flow across the border, from construction materials, agricultural goods, and food and pharmaceutical products to industrial equipment and engineering and technical services.

Logistical advantages and strong trade potential aside, economic relations still face headwinds: U.S. sanctions, intensifying regional competition for a slice of the Iraqi market, and Iraq’s own political and security volatility. Still, many experts believe Iraq could play an even more significant role in sustaining and expanding Iran’s foreign trade in the years ahead.

That is precisely where al-Zaydi’s own background could make a difference. Unlike many of his predecessors, who came from security or political careers, Iraq’s current prime minister brings an economic lens to the job, and that could unlock long-neglected opportunities for cooperation. Joint projects in trade, investment, transport, banking, and industrial partnerships may finally gain real momentum under his watch.

Cooperation potentials in energy sector

Energy is one of the most critical pillars of Tehran-Baghdad cooperation. Iraq still relies on imports of Iranian gas and power to meet a portion of its electricity needs, and Iran's gas exports feed several major Iraqi power plants, playing a vital role in preventing widespread blackouts during peak demand periods.

Under a five-year deal renewed in 2024, Iraq imports up to 50 million cubic meters of natural gas per day from Iran, with an estimated annual value of $4 billion to $5 billion. Iraq's Electricity Ministry has stated that more than 30 percent of the country's generated power depends on Iranian gas, and that a cutoff would take roughly one-third of national production offline.

Beyond gas, Iran also exported electricity to Iraq until recent years' restrictions, further underscoring Tehran's primacy in meeting Iraqi energy needs.

Though Washington has pressed Baghdad to seek alternatives, technical and economic realities suggest no short-term option can fully replace Iran's energy partnership. Alongside gas and electricity exports, Iran's engineering and technical capabilities offer another major avenue for cooperation.

The 40-day US aggression against Iran demonstrated that the country, despite the difficulties, was able to meet its own needs in power generation, transmission, and grid maintenance, as well as oil, gas, and refining, without relying on foreign companies. That indigenous expertise, delivered at a fraction of the cost of Western firms, could prove equally valuable in rebuilding and expanding Iraq's energy infrastructure.

Petrochemicals represent another promising frontier. According to reports from the Petrochemical Industry Employers' Association and customs data, Iraq is one of the top destinations for Iranian petrochemical exports, with a share estimated at $1.5 billion to $2 billion.

Geographic proximity, low transport costs, and the complementary nature of both countries' industrial needs make this one of the most lucrative areas for joint cooperation. In addition to exports, joint ventures in downstream petrochemical industries could generate significant added value for both economies.

Beside economic cooperation, transit occupies a special place in bilateral ties. The disruptions in recent months to tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz have laid bare Iraq's vulnerability more starkly than ever. The bulk of Iraq's oil exports flow through the Persian Gulf and the Strait, and any insecurity along that route hits Baghdad's revenues directly.

While Iraq is exploring alternative routes via Turkey and Syria, those projects face security and infrastructure hurdles that will take years to resolve. For Baghdad, then, dialogue with Iran on energy route security and maritime passage facilitation is of strategic importance, and al-Zaydi is expected to raise the issue with senior Iranian officials.

For Iran, meanwhile, Iraq is not just a neighbor or an export market; it is a strategic link in east-west transit corridors. Completing the Shalamcheh-Basra railway and connecting it to Iraq's rail network would tie Iran's transit corridors to Mediterranean ports, bolstering Tehran's position in China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 

In this context, Iraq is not only the gateway for Iranian goods into the Arab world and the Mediterranean; it is also a strategic bridge that could transform Iran into a hub for east-west transit. That potential could generate billions of dollars in transit revenue for both countries and raise their geopolitical standing in the calculations of China and other Asian economic powers.

Regional matters

Perhaps the most sensitive part of al-Zaydi’s Tehran talks will center on security and regional developments.

The prime minister’s trip comes just days after his meeting with Trump, a clear sign that Iraq’s new government is scrambling to walk a tight rope in its ties with both Iran and the US amid the region’s escalating tensions. Baghdad knows all too well that any further escalation between Tehran and Washington could have direct consequences for Iraq’s internal security and stability.

That concern has taken on added urgency given Iran’s repeated warnings about the potential US use of Iraqi territory as a staging ground for operations against Iran, joint US-Israeli exploitation of Iraqi airspace, and efforts to foment insecurity through separatist groups. Seen through that lens, al-Zaydi’s visit to Tehran looks very much like an attempt to manage those sensitivities and keep Iraq from becoming an arena for great-power confrontation.

Separately, the massive funeral processions for the martyred Iranian Supreme Leader Sayyed Ali Khamenei in the two holy cities of Najaf and Karbala were, in many observers’ eyes, far more than a religious ritual. They were a stark display of the social and political weight of the resistance movement in Iraq, and of the depth of popular solidarity and support among a significant segment of the country’s political forces. Those scenes sent a clear message to Baghdad’s politicians: any decision on national security or foreign policy must inevitably reckon with on-the-ground realities and Iraq’s internal balance of power.

Al-Zaydi’s government, which emerged from the Shiite Coordination Framework (SCF) coalition and the resistance factions, is acutely aware that if the US-Israeli aggression on Iran expands, Iraqi resistance groups, driven by their ideological and political commitments, will join the fray alongside other Axis of Resistance actors. Baghdad is therefore trying to walk a fine line: preventing Iraq from being pulled into direct confrontation while also keeping internal disputes from spiraling into a full-blown security crisis.

Therefore, Iran can provide a reliable path to al-Zaydi’s government to evade a trap the US government has set for it to bring it face to face with the home resistance groups through raising the idea of disarming.

The resistance groups want the end of the American occupation and interference in Iraq's internal affairs and pressure for disarming, and if the new Iraqi government further yields to these pressure disregarding the home dynamics, it will certainly find itself in front of challenges. 

Why Are the US Casualties in the Iran War Rising?

Alwaght- The death of two American soldiers at a American military base in Jordan has once again thrown the spotlight on a troubling question: Why is US casualty count in the war with Iran so striking compared to other conflicts? Since the war began later February, the US has officially reported 16 dead, one missing, and hundreds wounded.

While past wars have seen far higher overall US fatalities, it should be taken into account that those 16 deaths have come in under six months, whereas heavy American losses in other conflicts were spread across years.

Experts point to the sheer intensity and scale of Iranian attacks as a major factor driving these casualties, but they also highlight a host of military, geographic, and operational challenges in the region that have seriously undermined American defensive capabilities. Together, these factors, they argue, have made US losses in the war against Iran notably high.

1. Distribution of US bases: Iran has many targets

Experts point to the sheer breadth of American military footprint across West Asia as one of the primary drivers behind rising casualties in the war with Iran. The US operates dozens of military bases and facilities spread across Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. Reuters, in a recent analysis, notes that this very geographic dispersion hands Iran a wide array of targets to strike at US forces. At the same time, defending such a vast network of installations simultaneously, even with advanced air-defense systems, proves immensely difficult, forcing Washington to spread its defensive assets thin across multiple fronts. That dilution of capability, in turn, has left certain bases dangerously exposed and vulnerable. 

2. Military bases within Iran's missile range 

Observers note that the bulk of US bases in the region sit within easy range of Iranian ballistic and cruise missiles, making strike time just minutes. That razor-thin window slashes the time available for detection, decision-making, and interception, pushing even the most sophisticated air-defense systems to their limits. Military experts argue that under such compressed timelines, no shield can adequately counter every incoming threat.

3. Iran's combined and saturation attacks

Western media have zeroed in on one of the most significant developments: Iran's use of combined-arms strikes. The AP reports that Tehran is simultaneously deploying ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and suicide drones, a tactic that forces US defense systems to engage threats coming at different speeds, altitudes, and trajectories all at once. Under that kind of saturation, the odds of some missiles and drones punching through the defensive shield rise sharply.

4. The inherent limitations of Patriot and THAAD batteries

Military experts stress that no missile defense system in the world can intercept 100 percent of incoming targets. The Patriot and THAAD batteries, while among the most advanced systems on the planet, hit a hard ceiling when faced with saturation-style attacks. Elias Hanna, a military affairs expert, made it clear in an interview with Al Jazeera that fielding these systems does not mean stopping every missile; there is always a percentage that will get through. And Iran's recent barrages have laid that limitation bare once again.

5. Iran missile technology upgrade

Media outlets in the US have openly acknowledged Iran's advancing missile capabilities. The Wall Street Journal reports that Tehran is now fielding high-velocity, maneuverable missiles capable of altering course in their terminal phase, making them significantly harder for systems like Patriot to track and intercept. The New York Times, citing US officials, adds that the scale of recent attacks suggests Iran still holds substantial missile reserves and has grown increasingly adept at breaching American air-defense networks.

6. Jordan growing more strategically significant

According to The New York Times, in the run-up to the war, the Pentagon relocated a portion of its forces and equipment from several Persian Gulf states to Jordan. Restrictions imposed by some US allies on the use of bases or airspace turned Jordan into one of the most critical staging grounds for American troops. That very concentration of forces has raised the operational value of these bases, and made them prime targets for Iranian strikes.

7. Erosion of the US defense capabilities in a lengthy war

Months of sustained war have placed immense strain on US defense systems, operational forces, and the entire support chain. Experts argue that round-the-clock alert status, the massive consumption of interceptor missiles, and the simultaneous need to protect dozens of bases have gradually eroded the effectiveness of America's defensive network, and raised the likelihood of more hits getting through.

8.Large number of forces, increased possibility of injuries

To protect its military bases, shipping lanes, and regional interests, the US has deployed tens of thousands of troops and a massive arsenal of equipment across the region. Military analysts argue that the larger a country's military footprint, the greater the likelihood its forces will come under fire. By that logic, US's sprawling presence in West Asia has become a liability in its own right, one that amplifies vulnerability and drives up casualties.

Taken together, the analysis emerging from Western media and military experts makes one thing clear: the rising US toll cannot be pinned on a single attack or any one factor. Rather, it is the product of a deadly convergence, a vast and exposed force posture, Iran's advancing missile prowess, saturation-attack tactics, the inherent limits of defensive systems, and the grinding attrition of a protracted war. All of it has combined to push the human cost of this conflict for the US military to strikingly new heights.

9. Iran's geographical and militarily upper hand

Michael Knights, a fellow at The Washington Institute, refers to Iran's geographic edge: seated at the heart of the Persian Gulf with sweeping command over the region's sea and air corridors. In his view, the vast majority of US bases sit squarely within missile range, and their proximity to Iranian soil compresses warning and reaction times to a razor-thin margin.

Fabian Hinz, a researcher at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), highlights Tehran's heavy investment in precision-guided, maneuverable solid-fuel missiles over recent years. He says that these projectiles, capable of last-minute course shifts and quick-launch readiness, have made interception significantly tougher for US air defenses. 

What Regional Facilities Are on Iran’s Hit List if Infrastructure War Begins?

Alwaght- Over the past few days, the American-Iranian military confrontation has elevated to new heights and the clashes that in the beginning were limited to trade of missile and drone strikes now developed to include viral infrastructures. 

Washington’s new strategy, executed through nighttime strikes on bridges, railway stations, and power and water networks in southern Iran, is designed to cripple the country economically and logistically, forcing Tehran to the negotiating table to extract maximum concessions.

While it is still too early to definitively call this an “infrastructure war,” Iran, relying on its doctrine of “mutual security,” has not only refused to back down but has also recalibrated the equation by striking back at US allies in the region, sending a clear message: security is either for everyone, or for no one.

In line with this policy, Iran’s armed forces launched their first retaliatory strikes against American infrastructure attacks by targeting critical facilities in several Arab countries. On Friday, Kuwaiti officials confirmed that a power plant and a desalination facility had been hit and damaged in Iranian missile strikes. Then on Saturday, Iran struck the northern terminal of Kuwait’s state-owned oil company (KNPC), which exports crude—a move that underscores the depth of Tehran’s reciprocal strategy.

Should American strikes continue and an all-out infrastructure war officially begin, Tehran has declared that every critical installation in Persian Gulf Arab states hosting US forces will be considered a legitimate military target. These warnings are no longer mere threats, and they have been transformed into an operational targeting database for Iran’s armed forces.

Iran's target bank

Persian Gulf Arab monarchies have invested heavily in recent decades on their energy, ports, refineries, petrochemical industry, power grid, and water desalination facilities. Economies of many of these countries is dependent on energy exports and oil routes and any disruption of the chain can hit the world energy markets. So, should tensions escalate, these infrastructures will be Iran's easy targets.

In the energy sector, Iran’s armed forces have drawn up a comprehensive target bank that includes, if necessary, Saudi Arabia’s Ghawar oil field, the Abqaiq oil processing facilities, and the Ras Tanura terminal, Abu Dhabi’s energy installations and the UAE’s petrochemical and refining complexes, Qatar’s North Field and the Ras Laffan LNG facilities, Kuwait’s Burgan oil field and its export terminals, as well as Bahrain’s petrochemical plants and Oman’s Qarn Alam and Yibal oil fields.

Beyond oil and gas, a vast array of desalination plants and power generation facilities across the region are now within missile range, among them Saudi Arabia’s Shuaiba thermal power plant, the UAE’s Barakah nuclear plant, and Qatar’s Umm Al Houl power station.

Transportation infrastructure is also firmly in the crosshairs: the (Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council’s rail and road networks, particularly the King Fahd Causeway linking Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, the Sheikh Zayed Bridge in Abu Dhabi, Qatar’s Lusail Bridge, Kuwait’s Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah Bridge, and Oman’s Khor Al-Brimi Bridge are all considered legitimate targets in any infrastructure war.

Commercial and industrial ports are no exception either. Jebel Ali and Fujairah in the UAE, King Abdulaziz Port and Jubail Port in Saudi Arabia, Hamad Port in Qatar, Shuaiba, Shuaibah, and Mubarak Al-Kabeer ports in Kuwait, and Sultan Qaboos Port and Duqm Port in Oman, all vital nodes in global trade, are now part of Iran’s military targeting database.

Iranian officials have been unequivocal in recent months about their reciprocal response to any strikes on their infrastructure. In late remarks during the final stretch of the 40-day war, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf warned that Iran’s enemies, backed by one regional country, were preparing to occupy one of Iran’s islands, and that if they made any such move, all of that country’s critical infrastructure would face relentless, unrestricted retaliation.

Iran's IRGC has echoed these warnings in repeated statements, making clear that "the American enemy and the hosts of its bases in the region should know that crossing red lines and attacking civilian infrastructure will carry a devastating and crippling price." They have vowed that if the enemy persists, even more crushing responses are on the way, responses that will leave a lasting mark on history of wars.

The spokesman for the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Command, the core of Iran's military decision-making, recently cautioned that if Trump's threats to target Iran's infrastructure are carried out, "everything that has so far remained intact in the region out of Iranian restraint will be pounded to rubble."

Brigadier General Abolfazl Shekarchi, spokesman for Iran's armed forces, also weighed in on Trump's recent threats, stating flatly: "If the US strikes the Islamic Republic's infrastructure, then all regional infrastructure will become legitimate targets for the Islamic Republic."

Over recent months, Iran has largely confined its retaliatory strikes to US military bases in the region, deliberately avoiding hits on Arab countries' infrastructure, even though those nations are not blameless in Washington's aggression. But if Washington moves against Iran's vital infrastructure, those security and neighborly considerations will be cast aside, and a new "infrastructure-for-infrastructure" equation will become the defining reality of this confrontation.

Iran has proven in recent months that it possesses the capability to strike regional infrastructure at will. Advanced US air defense systems like Patriot and THAAD, despite massive investments and deployment across multiple bases, have consistently failed to intercept Iranian missiles and drones.

This technical failure exposes a stark truth, suggesting that despite Western boasts about their military prowess in direct confrontation, they are deeply vulnerable when it comes to defending themselves and their allies, and their defense technology falls short against Iran's modern warfare tactics. The Persian Gulf monarchies, therefore, should not pin their hopes on US air defenses to shield their facilities and infrastructure from Iran's armed forces.

Taken together, the trajectory of events shows that Trump's "maximum pressure" campaign, waged through infrastructure warfare, has not only failed to force Iran to its knees but has instead deepened the security crisis across the entire region.

Tehran's capability to strike vital infrastructure has shifted the deterrence dynamics in West Asia, leaving the US allies in the region face to face with the potential painful consequences of Washington-Tehran confrontation.

Now the Arab rulers in the region should understand that alignment with the US's warlike policies can cost their economy and security dearly, since any miscalculation risks bringing about a comprehensive and uncontrollable crisis in the region.

Iraq Crackdown on Corruption: Ex-officials Detained, Billions in Cash and Gold Recovered

Alwaght- Sunday morning, the Iraqi capital Baghdad woke up with the biggest security operation of recent years. The operation opened inside and around the Green Zone and a number of provinces with detention of a number of current and former members of parliament and previous government officials.

According to security and media resources, the operation was launched in the early hours of Sunday morning with the closure of all gates of the Green Zone. A convoy of armored vehicles operated by the Counterterrorism Service entered the Green Zone and tanks were deployed around it.

At the same time, tight security measures were enforced on the road leading to Baghdad International Airport, with passengers’ identities being meticulously checked. The situation was so bizarre and unprecedented that some media outlets initially floated the possibility of a coup unfolding in the capital. Hours later, however, it became clear that the crackdown was actually aimed at probing financial corruption cases and mismanagement of public funds.

A senior official told the Iraqi News Agency (INA) that the campaign was triggered by confessions from Adnan al-Jumaili, a former deputy oil minister now facing extensive interrogation over graft and embezzlement charges. According to the source, al-Jumaili’s testimony has opened multiple cases against a host of deputies, officials, and even high-profile political figures, with authorities stressing that the investigations “are ongoing and no one will be exempt.”

Limited clashes following security deployment

Local sources reported that during the crackdown, a number of targeted officials clashed with security forces, leading to sporadic resistance to law enforcement forces. However, security forces managed to fast contain the situation and implement full control.

A number of the detainees, reports held, were immediately handed over to the Commission of Integrity. Their cases include the biggest of financial corruption in the country.

Prominent figures among the detainees, with huge amounts of embezzled public funds

Despite the sheer scale of the operation, Iraqi officials have yet to release official final figures on those detained. Initial estimates, however, suggest that around 47 officials, including deputies, ministers, advisors, and executive directors, have been arrested, though some media outlets put the total number of detainees as high as 140.

Among those rounded up are 12 current members of parliament, two deputy oil ministers, two former governors (Basra and Babel), and a number of provincial governors and local officials. Notable names on the list include Muthanna al-Samarrai, Mohammed al-Karbouli, Ali Naseef, Baha al-Nouri, Hassan al-Khafaji, Mudhar al-Karawi, Ibrahim al-Samidaie, and Mohammed al-Sayhoud.

Judicial sources indicate that the investigations have so far led to the seizure of vast sums, amounting to 98 billion Iraqi dinars and $11 million, alongside real estate, luxury vehicles, and gold bullion. Part of these assets were discovered in unusual locations, such as private homes or underground hiding spots.

According to unofficial data, the actual embezzlement figures dwarf these amounts dramatically; in just one case, the fraud attributed to Muthanna al-Samarrai is estimated at a staggering 2 trillion dinars, equivalent to roughly $1.5 billion.

Close security and judicial coordination 

Political sources hold that the operation was designed and executed under the direct coordination of the Prime Minister's office and the judiciary, overseen by Prime Minister Ali al-Zaydi and Supreme Judicial Council Chief Faeq Zaidan, with the explicit goal of rooting out corruption from state institutions.

The crackdown comes as reports indicate that the Iraqi government plans to soon submit a comprehensive anti-corruption dossier to Washington, aiming to redefine bilateral relations on new economic and security foundations.

As investigations continue, key questions remain unanswered: the full scope of the targeted networks, the extent of international coordination involved, and whether this marks the dawn of a new chapter in Iraq's political and security landscape, all still shrouded in uncertainty.

Rampant corruption in Iraq's structures

Iraq's economic, financial, and administrative structures are deeply ravaged by runaway corruption, so much so that, according to the latest Transparency International index for 2025, the country scored just 28 out of 100. Drawing on data from 13 international bodies including the World Bank and the World Economic Forum, the report shows that Iraq's average corruption score from 2003 to 2025 has been 19.26, hitting an all-time high of 28 in 2025 and a record low of 13 in 2008. The country also ranks eighth among Arab states with the worst corruption records.

This open acknowledgment of corruption woven into Iraq's economic fabric has, in recent years, pushed both public opinion and the supreme Shiite religious authority to name anti-graft efforts as a top priority for lawmakers and government officials alike. In parallel, anti-corruption pledges have come to dominate the electoral discourse of political parties and blocs, featuring prominently in their campaigns.

New government resolved to fight corruption: Al-Zaydi on test 

While the al-Zaydi government's latest crackdown was clearly aimed at projecting a firm anti-corruption stance to the public, Iraqis have a long memory, one filled with past administrations that, early in their terms, launched similar campaigns under various committee and agency banners. Those efforts often made a splash at first but ultimately fell far short of their lofty promises, never delivering the results the public expected. Even when arrests were made, the usual backroom deals would later secure the suspects' release, allowing them to slip away from accountability, often without a trace of where the stolen billions had actually gone. A classic case in point: the "heist of the century" involving Nouri Zuhair Jasim, which exploded during al-Kadhimi's premiership.

So, while the al-Zaydi government appears to be courting public approval to shore up support for its economic agenda and bolster the cabinet's legitimacy in these tough times, especially with the risk of fresh street protests and an early political crisis looming large, Iraqis are now waiting to see just how far this process will go, and whether these arrests will actually make a dent in corruption.

In a statement released by the PM's office on Sunday evening, al-Zaydi vowed to press ahead, declaring: "What has taken place in suppressing corruption is only the first phase. The government will continue its anti-corruption drive to recover public funds, and it has a duty to protect the interests of the Iraqi people, with no room for leniency in this responsibility." 

Suspicion of politically motivated arrests 

The vast majority of those arrested are affiliated with the "Reconstruction and Development" bloc, linked to former Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, and the Azm Alliance, led by Muthanna al-Samarrai. Several detainees are known to be close to al-Sudani, including an adviser and a cousin of his. In response to the crackdown, al-Sudani positioned himself as a supporter of accountability but warned the public to be wary of "distortions of reality."

Given that the last election's main race for prime minister was between al-Sudani and al-Maliki, unofficial chatter in both public and media circles has increasingly pointed to the possibility of political score-settling lurking behind this crackdown campaign. That said, the arrest of al-Samarrai, a former al-Maliki ally, does somewhat undercut that very suspicion.

However, one thing is clear: Al-Sudani, who in recent parliamentary elections managed to secure seats that put him nearly on top, will face essential challenges in the future elections.