Thursday, November 19, 2026

Three paths, one truth: Ibn Arabi, Allama Tabataba’i and Imam Khomeini’s dialogue of mysticism, reason and action

Ibn Arabi, Allama Tabataba’i and Imam Khomeini embody three complementary dimensions of Islamic thought – mysticism, reason and action – united by their pursuit of divine truth and deeper understanding of the Almighty.

This week, the world commemorates two legendary thinkers and theologians who passed away six centuries apart and thousands of kilometres from one another, yet seemed as though they were both working on the same unfinished mission.

One was born in twelfth-century Andalusia and breathed his last in present-day Damascus; the other was born in twentieth-century Tabriz and passed away in the Iranian holy city of Qom.

Neither ever met the other. Yet, when one looks closely at the depths of their thought, one finds an endless dialogue between them: a debate over how human beings can “know God”—through spiritual unveiling or rational demonstration.

The anniversaries of their deaths provide an occasion to raise a more profound question: How can human beings move beyond the outward appearance of the world and attain a deeper understanding of truth, themselves and God?

This dialogue is neither merely a conversation nor simply a historical debate. It is a mirror reflecting questions that continue to occupy the minds of Muslims and non-Muslims alike: the relationship between reason and spiritual intuition, the boundaries of interpretation, and the meaning of life in an increasingly complex world.

When we speak of Islamic civilisation, our minds usually turn towards conquests and dynasties. Yet, behind all that tumult, there is a quiet and profound current that has kept Islam alive from within for centuries: the tradition of mysticism and wisdom.

At the heart of this tradition shine two names who, despite being separated by centuries and thousands of kilometres, seem to be part of an eternal conversation with one another: Muhyiddin Ibn Arabi, the “Greatest Master” of Andalusia, and Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’i, the “Allama” of Iran.

Ibn Arabi was born in 1165 CE in Murcia, Andalusia. The world in which he grew up was one of vibrant dialogue between religions and schools of thought. Andalusia in those days was a place where Muslims, Christians and Jews lived alongside one another, and Greek philosophy intermingled with Islamic theology.

From an early age, Ibn Arabi demonstrated that he was different from others. He travelled extensively, from North Africa to Mecca and from there to Damascus, associating with mystics and philosophers in every city he visited. These journeys resulted in works, some of which, such as Al-Futuhat al-Makkiyya (The Meccan Revelations), extend across several volumes.

Yet, more important than the sheer volume of his writings was his vision of existence.

Ibn Arabi is widely regarded as the founder or systematiser of the doctrine of Wahdat al-Wujud (the Unity of Being): the idea that true existence is one, and multiplicity is merely a manifestation of that one eternal reality. To some, this idea appeared heretical; to others, it represented the most profound expression of divine oneness. Ibn Arabi passed away in Damascus in 1240 CE, but the debate over his intellectual legacy has never subsided.

On the other side of the Islamic world, in northern Iran’s Tabriz city, a child was born in 1281 in the Solar Hijri calendar, whose destiny was different but equally profound: Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’i.

He was orphaned at a young age, but his thirst for knowledge took him from Tabriz to Najaf, where he studied philosophy under renowned scholars such as Sayyid Husayn Badkubai and learned mysticism under Sayyid Ali Qadi – not merely from books, but through practical spiritual discipline.

Allama Tabataba’i was primarily known as a Quranic exegete, and his commentary, Al-Mizan, is no ordinary interpretation of the Holy Quran. In this enormously valuable work, which took him twenty years to complete, Allama Tabataba’i established the method of “interpreting the Quran through the Quran” – that is, grounding the understanding of verses not in isolated narrations, but in the Quran's own interconnected framework.

This approach was a methodological revolution that breathed new life into Islamic exegesis. Allama Tabataba’i passed away on 24 Aban 1360 in the Iranian calendar, and his anniversary is commemorated in Iran every year with different events.

This is where the dialogue between the two takes shape around the very concept of Wahdat al-Wujud. Ibn Arabi advanced a theory according to which true existence belongs to God alone, while all created beings are His manifestations.

For many jurists and theologians, this theory appeared to tread dangerously close to the concepts of incarnation and union between God and creation.

Allama Tabataba’i, however, neither rejected Ibn Arabi outright nor accepted him unconditionally. With philosophical precision, he distinguished between Wahdat al-Wujud as understood by Ibn Arabi and what he himself had learned from the school of Mulla Sadra's philosophy.

Tabataba’i believed that a clear distinction between the Creator and creation must be maintained, even if all existence is a manifestation of Him. Without this distinction, the language of religion and the moral responsibility of human beings would lose their meaning.

In other words, he engaged in a dialogue with Ibn Arabi but did not allow the fascination of the Greatest Master to lead him away from philosophical precision and his religious commitments.

And this is where a third name enters the conversation: Imam Ruhullah Khomeini.

He is the link that brings the two great thinkers together, although he himself never claimed such a role. Imam Khomeini, who was a student of the mystical school of Najaf and deeply familiar with Ibn Arabi's works, demonstrated in his commentary on Fusus al-Hikam (The Bezels of Wisdom) that one could be a mystic, a jurist and a political leader at the same time.

He viewed the Unity of Being not merely as an abstract theory, but as a practical truth capable of liberating human beings from self-centredness. The important point, however, is that Imam Khomeini's approach to Ibn Arabi was critical rather than imitative.

While referring to Ibn Arabi as a “mystical master” and a “great man” and expressing deep affection for his works, Imam Khomeini also engaged in scholarly criticism whenever he disagreed with his views.

This complex relationship – profound respect and constructive criticism – is precisely what characterised Allama Tabataba’i's approach to Ibn Arabi as well.

The fascinating point is that these three figures represent three layers of the Islamic school of thought, all rooted in the Quran, yet each approaching it differently in practice.

Ibn Arabi represents an Islam that attaches importance to dreams, inspiration and the unseen world; an Islam that breaks through the boundaries of reason and soars towards infinity.

Allama Tabataba’i represents an Islam that remains faithful to reason, rational demonstration and textual interpretation, while accepting mysticism as a deeper dimension alongside reason.

And Imam Khomeini represents an Islam that brings both into the realm of action; an Islam that can weep in the solitude of mystical devotion and stand firm in the political arena.

These three are, in fact, three layers of a single truth. Without any one of them, the picture remains incomplete. The history of Islam has shown that whenever one of these dimensions has been eliminated, either rigid religious formalism or superstition has prevailed.

Ibn Arabi, Allama Tabataba’i and Imam Khomeini all stood against these two afflictions, albeit with different weapons: one through spiritual unveiling, another through interpretation, and the third through action.

Today, in a world where Muslims need to re-examine and rediscover themselves more than ever, the legacy of these three thinkers can offer valuable guidance.

For Western audiences, whose dominant image of Islam is often associated with violence and exclusivism, these figures present a different picture: an Islam in which reason and love sit side by side, and truth is not something monopolised by a single sect, but a horizon from which everyone can draw according to their own capacity.

In Al-Mizan, Allama Tabataba’i repeatedly emphasises that differences among schools of thought, when rooted in the pursuit of truth, are a mercy; but when they turn into struggles for power, they become a calamity for society.

Ibn Arabi, too, writes in Al-Futuhat that the heart of a mystic is the dwelling place of all forms: it is neither confined to a single form nor imprisoned by a single prejudice.

And Imam Khomeini, in his historic letter to Mikhail Gorbachev, demonstrated that this mysticism could also speak the language of politics – a language that shook the world, but whose roots lay in the very heart that Ibn Arabi and Tabataba’i had refined.

Perhaps the greatest lesson these three have to offer the world today is precisely this: truth is one, but the paths leading to it are many.

Ibn Arabi, Allama Tabataba’i and Imam Khomeini were all searching for the same single truth, but they followed three different paths. One came from Andalusia, another from Iran, and the third travelled from Najaf to Paris to Tehran.

And along these paths, all three arrived at the same destination: submission to God, who is “the Most Compassionate” and “the Just”. This submission is what is called Islam.

Perhaps the best way to introduce it to the world today is not by shouting about it, but by demonstrating this very living and internal dialogue within Islamic civilization, a dialogue initiated by Ibn Arabi and Allama Tabataba’i and brought into the world of politics and action by Imam Khomeini, the architect of the Islamic Revolution.

In Islamic tradition, the anniversary of a death is a day of remembrance, not merely mourning. Ibn Arabi is said to have stated that those who truly know God do not die; rather, they move from one abode to another.

Whether one accepts this belief or not, studying the works and worldviews of these great men invites us to undertake a quiet challenge: to read more slowly, think more deeply, listen more attentively to divine traditions, and expose our souls to the radiance of divine light.

If one wishes to take up this challenge, several doors are open. Begin with an English selection from Ibn Arabi's Fusus al-Hikam or Al-Futuhat; volumes of Al-Mizan translated into English; the short and accessible book Shi'ite Islam; or the published conversations with Henry Corbin.

And if one wishes to see how this dialogue became intertwined with action in the twentieth century, pick up Imam Khomeini's Sharh-e Chehel Hadith (Commentary on Forty Hadith), a work in which the mysticism of Ibn Arabi and the interpretative precision of Allama Tabataba’i are brought together in a framework for everyday life.

This short book has been translated into English and demonstrates how a mystic who was also a political leader read Hadith not merely to understand, but to transform himself.

You will discover, as many others have, that autumns, even when separated by centuries, can illuminate the same horizon – and perhaps there is a place for you on that horizon, too.

Explainer: How Iran seeks to turn ECO into a platform for regional self-reliance, security and economic cooperation

The latest ECO ministerial meeting in Islamabad, attended by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, offered important insights into Tehran's vision for the organization's role in the evolving regional landscape.

The 30th meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), held in Islamabad on November 16, highlighted Tehran's efforts to strengthen regional self-reliance and collective security alongside economic integration, transport connectivity and energy cooperation.

This approach has gained greater significance in the aftermath of US-Israeli aggression against Iran.

The latest ECO ministerial meeting in Islamabad offered an important indication of how Iran views the organization's potential role in the evolving regional landscape.

Addressing the gathering, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi called for trade, transportation and energy to serve as the three strategic pillars of cooperation among ECO member states. He noted that stronger regional connectivity could help countries reduce their vulnerabilities to external pressures.

"Our region needs not only an independent security framework but also a reliable and sustainable regional energy mechanism to safeguard energy flows, ensure stable supplies, reduce external vulnerabilities and enhance collective resilience against geopolitical shocks and disruptions," he said.

His remarks reflected Iran's broader approach to regional cooperation, which has gained greater urgency following the unprovoked and illegal US-Israeli war of aggression.

Tehran maintains that the imposed war exposed the vulnerability of regional economic and energy infrastructure to external military aggression, underscoring the need for neighboring countries to strengthen their own mechanisms of cooperation.

In this context, Tehran increasingly views the ECO as a platform through which economic cooperation can contribute to a broader regional framework of self-reliance and collective resilience, rather than remain confined to commercial exchanges.

Why does ECO matter to Iran?

Established in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) expanded in 1992 to include Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

Its ten member states span West, South and Central Asia, giving the organization a geographical reach that links several important economic and transportation corridors.

Iran is not only a founding member but also hosts the organization's headquarters in Tehran.

For Tehran, this geographical dimension is particularly significant. Iran occupies a strategic position connecting the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman with the Caucasus, Central Asia and Turkey.

Stronger cooperation within the ECO could therefore help Iran expand its role as a regional transit hub, facilitate access to neighboring markets and deepen its economic ties with surrounding countries.

The importance of this approach has become more pronounced in the aftermath of US-Israeli aggression against Iran. Strengthening regional connectivity is therefore not merely an economic objective but also part of Tehran's broader effort to build resilience against external pressures and reduce dependence on vulnerable external routes and networks.

This is also why Araghchi's emphasis on transportation goes beyond infrastructure development. Improved transport links, more efficient customs procedures and coordinated transit arrangements could make regional trade less dependent on routes and commercial arrangements outside the region.

The importance of this approach was reflected in the Islamabad Communiqué, which called on member states to fully implement the ECO Transit Transport Framework Agreement (TTFA) to improve connectivity and facilitate trade. It also underscored the strategic importance of the organization's Sustainable and Resilient Transport Strategy for 2026–2035.

The communiqué further called for increased investment, the development of free economic zones, joint manufacturing ventures and regional value chains.

These proposals suggest that the ECO agenda is intended to move beyond diplomatic declarations towards more practical forms of economic integration.

How is it moving from economic cooperation to regional security?

Perhaps the most significant aspect of Iran's position at the latest ECO meeting was its effort to link economic integration with regional security.

The US-Israeli war of aggression has further reinforced Tehran's longstanding argument that economic development and regional stability cannot be separated from security arrangements independent of external military intervention.

Speaking at the summit, Araghchi called for the establishment of a security framework led by regional countries themselves, stressing that regional security should not depend on the involvement of outside powers.

"One principle speaks loud enough: the territories, airspace and facilities of the regional countries must not be used as platforms for launching attacks against each other," he said.

He also called for an “inclusive and regionally owned dialogue on security arrangements, particularly based on non-aggression and preventing any third party from using one country's territory or facilities to commit aggression against another.”

This position reflects a recurring element of Iran's foreign policy, which is an emphasis on regional ownership of security arrangements and opposition to external military intervention. Tehran maintains that regional countries should take collective responsibility for their security rather than rely on arrangements shaped by outside powers.

The significance of raising this issue at an ECO meeting lies in the connection between security and the organization's economic mandate.

The recent aggression against Iran demonstrated how military confrontation can disrupt transportation corridors, energy supplies, investment and commercial exchanges, directly undermining the development objectives of neighboring countries.

In the final communiqué, participating ministers expressed concern over the regional geopolitical situation and emphasized dialogue, diplomacy and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

They also rejected unilateral coercive measures and sanctions, including their extraterritorial economic, financial and trade consequences.

How is it tied to energy security and the Strait of Hormuz?

Energy cooperation is another important dimension of Tehran's proposed approach to the ECO.

The organization brings together countries with substantial energy resources, major transit routes and growing energy needs. Cooperation in this sector could therefore create opportunities for more coordinated energy policies, infrastructure development and enhanced security of supply.

Araghchi's proposal for a regional energy mechanism is particularly relevant amid disruptions to energy markets and transportation routes. He explicitly linked the urgency of stronger energy cooperation to the consequences of US and Israeli aggression against Iran.

"Given the growing impact of US and Israeli regime aggression on regional energy security, strengthening energy cooperation has become an urgent strategic imperative," he said.

The Strait of Hormuz lends this proposal additional significance. As a major international energy transit route, developments surrounding the waterway have implications extending far beyond the countries bordering it. Disruptions to shipping and energy flows can affect regional economies, international markets and the economic interests of ECO member states.

By placing energy cooperation alongside trade and transportation, Iran is seeking to promote a more coordinated regional approach to protecting economic infrastructure and ensuring the continuity of supply chains.

This also helps explain why Tehran has repeatedly emphasized regional dialogue and cooperation in addressing developments in the Persian Gulf.

Its position is that countries in the region share a direct interest in preventing their territories and infrastructure from being used as instruments in conflicts involving outside powers.

How can ECO become a platform for diplomatic support?

One of the most consequential outcomes of the Islamabad meeting was the position adopted by ECO foreign ministers on the war of aggression against Iran.

The joint communiqué went beyond general calls for restraint and diplomacy, explicitly expressing support for Tehran's latest initiative to end the imposed war.

The communiqué stated that member states supported: "The recent initiative put forward by the Islamic Republic of Iran aimed at achieving a dignified resolution of the conflict and ensuring the complete and permanent termination of the current war."

This language is particularly significant because it places Iran's proposal within a collective regional diplomatic position.

Rather than limiting their statement to an abstract appeal for de-escalation, ECO members endorsed an initiative specifically put forward by Tehran to bring the US-Israeli war against the country to a permanent end.

The ministers also expressed support for mediation efforts undertaken by Pakistan and Qatar, while emphasizing the importance of dialogue, diplomacy, international law and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

They further recognized Iran's important role as a founding member of ECO and its contributions to the organization's development.

The communiqué therefore demonstrated that ECO's role is not confined to economic coordination. Its member states have also used the organization as a platform to articulate common positions on regional developments and support diplomatic initiatives concerning regional security.

The diplomatic dimension of the meeting was reinforced by Araghchi's consultations with Pakistani officials. On the sidelines of the summit, he met Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshal Asim Munir, Pakistan's army chief, discussing bilateral relations and regional developments.

Araghchi also addressed Pakistan's mediation efforts in an interview with Pakistani television, expressing Tehran's confidence in Islamabad's role.

"We trust Pakistan as a good friend," he said, adding that "Pakistan is doing its job. The issue is very complex and difficult."

Pakistan's foreign minister Mohammad Ishaq Dar, meanwhile, confirmed that Islamabad was awaiting Washington's response to Iran's latest proposal. He said the Iranian proposal had been accelerated from a seven-day plan to a two-day proposal.

"We have not given up hope or efforts," Dar said. "We are still doing our best (so) that the situation gets sorted out."

These developments illustrate how the ECO meeting provided an opportunity to advance diplomatic consultations alongside the organization's formal economic agenda.

Pakistan's mediation efforts, Qatar's diplomatic involvement and the collective position expressed in the Islamabad Communiqué all helped bring regional diplomacy to the forefront of the gathering.

What lies ahead for ECO?

Iran is preparing to host the organization's 18th Summit of Heads of State and Government in Tehran on December 4.

The upcoming gathering offers another opportunity for Tehran to advance its proposals and encourage member states to translate the commitments made in Islamabad into practical initiatives.

Ultimately, Iran's approach to the ECO reflects an effort to expand the organization's role beyond a framework for economic cooperation and turn it into a broader platform for regional coordination.

The US-Israeli aggression has reinforced this approach, making economic resilience, energy security and regional self-reliance increasingly urgent elements of Tehran's foreign policy.

By placing trade, transportation and energy at the center of its agenda while advocating regional ownership of security arrangements, Iran is seeking to deepen its economic and diplomatic engagement with neighboring countries.

Whether this approach produces tangible results will depend on the willingness of member states to implement their agreements and overcome the political and economic obstacles to integration.

Nevertheless, the latest Islamabad meeting has demonstrated that the ECO remains an important platform through which Iran can pursue its vision of stronger regional connectivity, deeper economic cooperation and greater collective independence in addressing shared challenges.

Written by

Press TV Website Staff

Staff members of the Press TV Website

Explainer: How AIPAC funding helped stall Hegseth’s impeachment and shield him from accountability

The US House stalled Peter Hegseth’s impeachment after 11 Democrats missed a decisive vote, exposing AIPAC’s financial influence, congressional complicity, and lawmakers’ continued support for Israel.

On November 10, the US House of Representatives blocked an effort to impeach Secretary of War Peter Hegseth, after 11 Democratic lawmakers missed a crucial vote that could have allowed the proceedings to advance.

The Republican-controlled chamber voted 211–204 to refer House Resolution 1655, introduced by Republican Representative Thomas Massie, to the House Judiciary Committee, effectively stalling the impeachment effort for the remainder of the current Congress.

Massie's 34-page resolution contained eight articles of impeachment, charging Hegseth with high crimes and misdemeanors over his handling of the US war against Iran, military aggressions against Yemen and Venezuela, and other violations of US law, including the protection of civilians.

Hegseth is a staunch supporter of the Israeli regime and his successful impeachment would have been a major blow to the regime’s standing within the Pentagon and Trump’s administration.

All 203 Democrats who participated in the vote opposed referring the resolution to the committee, joined by Massie, the only Republican to oppose the motion, while 210 Republicans and one independent supported it.

The 11 Democratic absences proved consequential, as just seven additional votes against referral would have produced a 211–211 tie and defeated the motion, allowing the impeachment resolution to advance rather than be stalled in committee.

The absences have also drawn scrutiny because 10 of the 11 lawmakers had received financial contributions through the American Israel Public Affairs Committee's (AIPAC) political action committee (PAC), according to a review of the Federal Election Commission (FEC).

The financial connection raises questions about the relationship between pro-Israel political financing and congressional decisions involving US military policy, particularly when lawmakers' attendance can determine whether senior Pentagon officials face scrutiny and potential impeachment.

Israeli regime premier Benjamin Netanyahu shakes hand with US War Secretary Peter Hegseth during a meeting at Blair House, July 29, 2026, Washington, US.
How much AIPAC-linked money did 11 absent democrats receive?

FEC records compiled by SignalData show that 10 of the 11 Democrats who missed the November 10 vote received approximately $2.36 million from AIPAC between January 2022 and October 14, 2026, covering three election cycles.

Representative Haley Stevens of Michigan received approximately $1.17 million, making her the largest recipient, followed by Representative Laura Gillen of New York with $467,000, Representative Marilyn Strickland of Washington with $291,000 and Representative Steven Horsford of Nevada with $186,000.

Representative Brittany Pettersen of Colorado received $72,000, Representative Julia Brownley of California $63,000, Representative Lou Correa of California $54,000, Representative Frederica Wilson of Florida $33,000, former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi of California $15,000 and Representative Jonathan Jackson of Illinois $13,000.

The exception was Representative Melanie Stansbury of New Mexico, for whom SignalData recorded no contributions through AIPAC PAC during the period, although the separate Track AIPAC database listed $57,000 in contributions from a broader range of pro-Israel political committees.

Stevens also benefited from approximately $14.37 million in independent spending by AIPAC-affiliated super PAC United Democracy Project (UDP), which separately financed advertising and other efforts supporting her campaign rather than transferring the money to her campaign account.

Democratic Congresswoman, Nancy Pelosi, speaks at an AIPAC-related congressional event, May 2022.

How have 11 absent Democrats supported Israel before?

The voting records of the 11 lawmakers show repeated support for measures backing Israel, including congressional resolutions expressing political support and legislation providing military assistance.

On October 25, 2023, the House approved H.Res. 771, formally titled “Standing with Israel as it defends itself against Hamas,” by 412 votes to 10.

Nine of the 11 lawmakers then serving in Congress — Brownley, Horsford, Jackson, Pelosi, Pettersen, Stansbury, Stevens, Strickland and Wilson — voted in favor, while Correa did not vote and Gillen had not yet entered Congress.

The resolution expressed support for Israel and its genocide in Gaza, and backed further US assistance, including emergency resupply.

On April 20, 2024, the House passed H.R. 8034, the Israel Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, by 366 votes to 58, approving billions of dollars in additional military and security assistance for Israel.

Nine of the 11 lawmakers then serving — Brownley, Correa, Horsford, Pelosi, Pettersen, Stansbury, Stevens, Strickland and Wilson — voted for the bill, while Jackson voted against it; Gillen had not yet taken office.

A further example came on July 18, 2025, when the House rejected an amendment introduced by then Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene that sought to remove funding for Israel's Cooperative Programs, including the Iron Dome, David's Sling and Arrow missile-defense systems.

All 11 Democrats voted against Greene's amendment, joining 207 other Democrats and 215 Republicans in opposing the proposed funding cut.

During their careers, these lawmakers have repeatedly supported House resolutions backing Israel, approved billions of dollars in additional military assistance and opposed amendments seeking to cut US funding for the Israeli regime.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu meets a bipartisan US congressional delegation led by House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries, including Representative Marilyn Strickland, Occupied al-Quds, Palestine, April 24, 2025.
How does AIPAC use campaign spending to influence Congress?

AIPAC has developed a major political financing network in Washington, combining lobbying activities with campaign contributions and large-scale spending through affiliated political committees.

AIPAC established its PAC in December 2021 and its affiliated super PAC (UDP) in January 2022, giving the organization additional means to support candidates who favor closer US-Israeli ties and oppose those seeking changes to Washington's policies toward Israel.

While AIPAC PAC can make direct contributions subject to federal limits, UDP can raise and spend unlimited amounts independently to support or oppose candidates, including through television advertisements and other election campaigns.

Federal Election Commission records show that UDP received approximately $112.8 million and spent $85 million during the 2025–2026 election cycle through October 14, 2026, including more than $53.6 million in reported independent expenditures.

This financial structure gives AIPAC and its affiliated network considerable capacity to reward political allies with campaign support and make electoral challenges more expensive for candidates who oppose its priorities, placing great pressure on lawmakers well beyond individual votes in Congress.

AIPAC announced in October 2026 that it would end direct candidate endorsements and contributions after the midterm elections, but UDP would continue operating, leaving its large-scale independent spending mechanism intact.

A visitor carries an AIPAC-branded folder inside the Rayburn House Office Building on Capitol Hill, Washington, District of Columbia, US, March 2024.
How far does AIPAC's political influence extend across Congress?

The 11 Democrats examined here represent only a small part of AIPAC's reach in Washington, with campaign-finance records showing that its political network extends across both major parties and into the newly elected Congress.

According to SignalData's review of Federal Election Commission filings, 415 of 533 sitting members of Congress had received money through AIPAC PAC since January 2022, including 166 Democrats, 247 Republicans and two independents, with the total reaching $108.69 million.

The network's reach was also evident in the November 3, 2026 midterm elections, when AIPAC announced that approximately 234 candidates it had supported from both parties had won their races.

The financial involvement went beyond direct campaign contributions: UDP reported spending $54.32 million on advertising and other political outreach in 2026 races, including $23.36 million supporting candidates and $30.97 million opposing others.

A separate analysis by Who Funds My Rep, which tracks AIPAC and other pro-Israel political committees, found that candidates backed by those groups won 368 of 410 called congressional races in the 2026 elections.

The figures also show why AIPAC's influence cannot be assessed solely through the contributions received by individual lawmakers.

Its political network combines direct donations, donor-earmarked contributions and independent spending on election campaigns, giving it several channels through which to support candidates and oppose their rivals.

Blind spot at Hormuz Strait: How Iran used advanced electronic warfare to seize US MQM-170 drones

The capture of several US MQM-170 drones in recent days exposes Washington’s attempts to map Iran’s air defenses and highlights Tehran’s growing ability to thwart American surveillance through advanced electronic warfare.

By Arman Shariati

The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), in a statement on Monday, said it has captured two more American MQM-170 reconnaissance drones over waters south of Qeshm Island, bringing the total number of such drones seized in recent days to four.

The drones were brought down using advanced electronic warfare systems, highlighting the growing role of electronic warfare capabilities in Iran’s efforts to counter aerial surveillance.

Before that, on October 30 and again on October 31, the IRGC Navy said it had intercepted and seized two American MQM-170 drones over Iranian territory.

Using the electronic warfare (EW), they successfully detected and identified a US military reconnaissance and decoy drone west of the Strait of Hormuz before taking control of its guidance and control systems.

Photographs released alongside the announcement showed the drone's airframe largely undamaged, with a specialist beginning to dismantle it to retrieve and examine its onboard data.

A downed MQM-170 drone seized by IRGC Navy personnel

An IRGC specialist disassembling the American drone
What the MQM-170 is and why the Pentagon values it

The drone in question is the MQM-170C “Outlaw G2,” manufactured by Griffon Aerospace, a US company specializing in unmanned target aircraft.

It is an upgraded version of the Outlaw G1 and was designed primarily to simulate aerial threats, allowing military crews to train against realistic targets without putting manned aircraft at risk.

Its primary role is that of an aerial target, replicating the visual or radar signatures of cruise missiles and hostile drones so that air defense units can engage it and assess their readiness and capabilities.

According to the manufacturer's published specifications, the aircraft is approximately 3.3 meters long, has a wingspan of around 4.9 meters, can remain airborne for up to eight hours, and operates at altitudes exceeding 16,000 feet.

What sets the Outlaw G2 apart from conventional target drones, however, is its ability to carry payloads. The MQM-170 family can be equipped with cameras, sensors, and other electronic systems, potentially transforming a training platform into an intelligence-gathering asset.

US military procurement records lend further weight to this possibility. In June, the Pentagon awarded a contract worth approximately $68 million for the third generation of the drone.

Significantly, the initial contract announcement explicitly mentioned its use in support of offensive operations against Iran.

This reference is noteworthy, as it suggests that the aircraft is part of a broader US military planning framework directly linked to operations against the Islamic Republic.

The MQM-170 family was built to imitate hostile aircraft and missiles for training and testing. Its design allows it to carry sensors and other equipment in addition to serving as a target.”
Why a target drone is flown toward an enemy’s coast

To understand why such an aircraft might be sent along Iran’s coastline, it is important to understand how modern air defense networks reveal their capabilities.

Integrated air defense systems are not built around individual weapons; rather, they comprise interconnected networks of radars, command posts, surface-to-air missile launchers, electronic warfare systems, and communications links.

Many of these components are designed to remain inactive or emit as little as possible until they are needed. A radar that is switched off, for example, cannot be detected through conventional surveillance.

Similarly, passive sensors may remain difficult to locate unless they are activated or engaged.

Given Iran’s emphasis on passive air defense capabilities, US planners may therefore seek to prompt these systems to reveal themselves.

By monitoring their responses, they can potentially identify and map their locations, operating patterns, and capabilities.

The Iranian AD-08 “Majid” short-range defense system, which primarily relies on passive target acquisition.

A target drone can serve this purpose effectively. By flying a route along the coast that mimics the flight profile of a hostile aircraft or cruise missile, it can prompt the defending force to activate its sensors and bring its weapons systems onto alert.

This technique is commonly described as probing or stimulating an air defense network.

The objective is to determine which radars activate under particular conditions, how tracking information is shared between systems, how long it takes for a potential threat to move from detection to engagement, and which components rely on one another for targeting and fire control.

Even if the drone itself gathers little intelligence, the responses it triggers can be extremely valuable.

Electronic intelligence (ELINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) platforms operating nearby can monitor these reactions, record electronic emissions, identify transmitting sites, and help reconstruct the network’s operating logic.

The resulting picture can reveal active defense sites, operational bottlenecks, and the overall readiness of the defensive structure – information that military planners regard as essential when preparing for a major operation.

This helps explain why the drone’s presence may have alarmed Tehran. A reconnaissance flight of this kind is not necessarily an isolated provocation; it can form part of a broader preparatory effort to reduce the risks of future strikes by identifying where Iranian defenses are located and how they operate.

How an air defense force can defeat a drone without firing a missile

According to the IRGC’s account, Iran used electronic warfare rather than conventional weapons to counter the drone.

This approach can offer a less costly and less revealing alternative to firing a missile, while allowing a defending force to disrupt an aircraft without exposing the precise location of its units.

There are several ways electronic warfare can be used to disrupt or bring down a drone of this type. These methods can be employed individually or in combination, depending on the aircraft’s design and the electronic systems involved.

An American MQM-170 drone being monitored by an unidentified Iranian electrooptic system

An American MQM-170 drone being monitored by an unidentified Iranian electrooptic system

The first approach targets the command-and-control link between the drone and its operator. An aircraft of this class relies on a radio connection to receive instructions and transmit data to its ground station. If that connection is disrupted, the drone may follow one of two paths.

It may continue autonomously along a pre-programmed route, or it may activate a flight termination procedure, potentially resulting in a controlled landing or a crash.

Jamming can take different forms. Broadband jamming floods the frequencies used for communication with interference, while more targeted techniques seek to identify and disrupt the specific signals or protocols on which the aircraft relies.

Once the connection is lost, the operator may no longer be able to control the drone directly, leaving it to respond according to its onboard programming. Its subsequent behavior may therefore become difficult for its handlers to predict.

The second approach targets the satellite navigation systems that determine the drone’s position. Modern unmanned aircraft rely on Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals for positioning, timing, and navigation, making interference with these signals potentially disruptive.

GPS jamming, for example, interferes with the frequencies used for navigation, preventing the aircraft from reliably determining its position. Depending on its design, the drone may respond by switching to an alternative navigation mode or activating a failsafe procedure.

GPS spoofing is more sophisticated. Instead of blocking genuine navigation signals, it uses counterfeit signals to mislead the aircraft about its location. In principle, this can cause a drone to follow an incorrect position estimate and deviate from its intended route.

Another technique, known as meaconing, involves receiving genuine signals and retransmitting them after a delay, potentially distorting the aircraft’s navigation calculations.

The regional dimension and the question of host states

The IRGC statement said the drone’s flight had “originated from the coast of one of the countries along the southern shore of the Persian Gulf,” without identifying the country.

That omission is significant. Several states along the southern Persian Gulf coast host American military forces, and any drone approaching Iran from that direction would likely have to operate from a location within the reach of Washington’s regional partners. The statement therefore appears to suggest that the aircraft was launched from the territory of a US ally.

The message seems directed at the Arab capitals of the Persian Gulf that host American forces: Tehran is signaling that it knows the drones conducting reconnaissance missions against Iran are operating from facilities on their territory.

The aircraft mapping Iranian air defenses is not necessarily taking off from a distant American base; it may be launched from an airfield just tens of kilometers from Iran’s coastline.

Iran’s apparent ability to monitor these flights and respond to them also carries a warning. The implication is that countries allowing US forces to use their territory for offensive operations against Iran could be held responsible for the consequences.

In other words, states hosting American military assets must consider not only their relationship with Washington but also the risks of living alongside an Iranian government that has demonstrated its willingness to respond to perceived threats.

A contest fought in the electromagnetic spectrum

The significance of the operation lies not only in the technology involved but also in the message it conveys. By relying on electronic warfare, Iran is signaling that it can challenge American reconnaissance without necessarily triggering a conventional missile exchange.

It is evidence that it can defend its airspace while limiting the exposure of its own capabilities.

The seizure of a relatively intact airframe could also provide Iranian engineers with an opportunity to examine the drone’s communications systems, onboard sensors, navigation equipment, and mission-planning capabilities.

Such information could help inform the development of electronic countermeasures and improve Iran’s understanding of how similar aircraft might be used in future operations.

The episode can also be viewed in the context of a recurring pattern in Washington’s assessments of Iran’s military capabilities. American planners have repeatedly underestimated the depth of Iran’s technical expertise, its organizational discipline, and its willingness to withstand pressure without responding on terms set by its adversaries.

Based on the information made public so far, the effort to gather intelligence on Iran’s air defenses along the Persian Gulf coast did not unfold as its planners had intended.

Iranian forces detected and identified the MQM-170 drones before disrupting their systems and taking control of the aircraft. This operation was a deliberate refusal to respond in the manner the reconnaissance mission was intended to provoke.

It remains unclear how much intelligence the drones collected or what information US monitoring platforms obtained from the Iranian response.

The use of electronic warfare rather than a missile interception may also have been intended to avoid the visible signatures associated with a conventional engagement.

A missile launch or other overt response could potentially reveal the positions and operating patterns of radars, launchers, and command systems to intelligence platforms monitoring the area. In that sense, the episode may illustrate an effort to deny an adversary the very information it was seeking to collect.

One of the most valuable things a military can reveal to an adversary is the timing and pattern of its responses. Restraint, therefore, can itself serve a defensive purpose.

Tehran has recognized the importance of controlling what its reactions reveal, and that dimension of the incident deserves attention.

As the United States continues its desperate attempts to gather intelligence and prepare for possible military contingencies, Iran is signaling that its forces remain alert to the prospect of another direct and full-scale military confrontation.

Written by

Arman Shariati

Arman Shariati specialises in defense matters, with a focus on aerospace developments.