Monday, July 20, 2026

Planting the Tree: Continuing the Mission of Dr. Kalim Siddiqui

Zafar Bangash

There is a Prophetic hadith that Dr. Kalim Siddiqui was fond of quoting: if you are involved in planting a date palm tree and you see that the world is about to end, do not stop— complete the planting.

It is a hadith that arrests the mind precisely because it defies the logic of utility that governs so much of what passes for Islamic activism today. Its meaning is not about planting trees. It is about the obligation to act rightly and fully, regardless of outcome, regardless of circumstance, regardless of the time remaining. It is the hadith of civilizational commitment.

Dr. Kalim lived this principle not as rhetoric but as biography. He suffered his first heart attack in February 1974, during the early years of the Muslim Institute’s existence, and spent the remaining two decades of his life in steadily deteriorating cardiac health—yet he continued to write, to lecture, to organize, to travel, and to think at a pace that would exhaust men half his age.

Even as his health was failing in the final months of his life, he was simultaneously preparing Stages of Islamic Revolution for publication and planning his next project: a new approach to the study of the Seerah. He died on April 18, 1996, in Pretoria, South Africa, having just made wudu for Maghrib prayers. He was, to the very end, planting the tree.

It is now 30 years since his death. The ideas he propounded as early as the 1970s are not only still relevant but also necessary to extricate the Muslim world from its present predicament. Two institutions he either founded or decisively shaped—Crescent International and the Institute of Contemporary Islamic Thought (ICIT)—continue to carry the intellectual and organizational weight of his vision.

Understanding what they are, what they have attempted, and why they matter requires returning to the foundations: to Dr. Kalim’s analysis, his methodology, and the civilizational horizon he kept in view even as the world burned.

Diagnosis That History Has Confirmed

Dr. Kalim Siddiqui was born in British India in 1931, migrated to Pakistan in 1948 and then went to Britain in 1954, where he studied journalism and earned a PhD in International Relations. But the defining act of his intellectual life was the founding of the Muslim Institute in London in 1973 and the publication of its Draft Prospectus—a document that reads today not as a historical artifact but as an accurate map of the present.

He wrote that not a single Muslim country was truly independent. What was called “independence” was merely the handing over of power by the colonial masters to their Muslim agents: in Lord McCaulay’s words, “perfect Brown Englishmen”.

Dr. Kalim insisted that the imposed systems in Muslim societies were totally alien and had to be uprooted and replaced by systems rooted in the values of Islam. He further rejected the nation-state structure, as well as the political party approach, identifying both as western-imposed constructs that had produced not liberation but further fragmentation of Muslim societies.

These were not arguments fashionable among Muslim intellectuals at the time. They were, in fact, deeply unwelcome—to the ruling elites of Muslim-majority states, to the western-educated Muslim intelligentsia who had bought into the notion of secular modernity, and to the imperial powers whose entire strategy in the postcolonial Muslim world depended on precisely the structures Dr. Kalim identified as instruments of subjugation.

What he proposed in their place was neither romantic nor simple. The Draft Prospectus of the Muslim Institute set out that its primary task was to draw up detailed conceptual maps and operational plans for a Muslim civilization of the future—integrating the considerable storehouse of knowledge developed by great Muslim civilizations of the past with the work of contemporary Muslim scholars across all fields of human endeavor.

This was a project of civilizational scope, not of party politics. Its horizon was not the next election cycle or the next coup. It was the reconstruction of Muslim thought from its epistemological foundations upward.

In the foreword to the third volume of the annual anthology, Issues in the Islamic Movment: 1982-1983, Dr Kalim wrote: “Ideas make history. The religion of secularism, however, is based on the opposite proposition—that history makes ideas. The root of all struggle in the world today is between these two propositions and their adherents.”

Islamic Iran’s victory over the evil forces of imperialism and zionism in the 100-day war confirms what Dr Kalim had stated more than 40 years ago. This is now acknowledged—at least Iran’s victory—by many non-Muslims including most people in the US and zionist Israel as well.

In pursuit of his grand vision of a new emerging civilization of Islam, Dr. Siddiqui synthesized classical scholarship with modern analysis. He drew on medieval jurists and modern Islamic thinkers alike, and rejected narrow sectarian or party-political frameworks.

This combination of intellectualism and activism was rare, and Dr. Kalim envisioned his ideas as guiding not a faction but a movement—a movement for global Islamic change rooted in Qur’anic epistemology rather than in borrowed western ideological forms.

The Islamic Revolution in Iran

When the Islamic Revolution triumphed in Iran in early 1979, Dr. Kalim recognized its significance almost instinctively—not because he had been closely following Iranian affairs (he acknowledged Iran as a “blind spot” in his earlier works), but because the Revolution fitted precisely into the understanding of contemporary history he had already developed.

Here, at last, was the “model society in one geographical area” that the Draft Prospectus had anticipated: true, it was imperfect, embattled, and fragile, but real. The Islamic state was no longer a theoretical aspiration. It existed. The question became how to understand it, defend it, and learn from it—and how to extend the light of its example to the rest of the Muslim world.

This function was and is being performed by Crescent International that we will discuss in a separate article.

Dr. Kalim Siddiqui

Zionists’ Genocidal attacks on Lebanese civilians continue

Ayman Ahmed

The zionists are so addicted to killing civilians that despite a Qatari-brokered ceasefire in Lebanon that theoretically went into effect on June 19, the Israeli army killed 47 civilians the same day in Nabatieh, Southern Lebanon. The following day, the zionist murdered 29 more civilians.

Lebanon’s Health Ministry said that Israeli attacks across the country have killed at least 3,980 people and injured 12,001 others since March 2. These figures represent casualties until June 19 and will certainly be surpassed in the remaining days of the month when this story is uploaded.

Israeli attacks have continued despite Article 1 of the US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) clearly stipulating that there will be a ceasefire on all fronts, including Lebanon.

Apart from issuing vacuous statements, US President Donald Trump has not reined in the indicted war criminal and arch-terrorist, Benjamin Netanyahu and his equally criminal-minded cabinet members that have issued blood-curdling threats against Lebanon.

Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir said: ‘All of Lebanon must burn.’ Other Israeli ministers, such as Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, called on Israel to “open the gates of hell” on Lebanon in a social media post on June 19. Neither statement calling for mass murder has been blocked by the media platform providers.

The blood-curdling threats were issued afer a battalion commander and three soldiers were killed in a Hizbullah strike on their tank in South Lebanon. The battalion commander was one Lt. Col. Dor Gedalia Ben Simhon, 32, from Beit HaShita and commander of the 52nd Battalion of the 401st Brigade.

He gained notoriety because his battalion was involved in the gruesom murder of 6-year-old Hind Rajab on January 29, 2024 in northern Gaza. More about Hind Rajab shortly but first, let us consider the mindset of the majority of Israelis.

The overwhelming majority comprises mass murderers. They have called for the extermination of Lebanese and Palestinian civilians. These include senior Israeli officials who have openly said that troops will remain in southern Lebanon indefinitely.

These calls were made after the killing of Ben Simhon and three other soldiers in South Lebanon. Death is an occupational hazard for soldiers. The zionists kill civilians while Hizbullah fights Israeli soldiers. When an Israeli soldier is killed, the zionists go berserk.

While Ben Simhon is not the first battalion commander to be killed, the brigade’s notoriety because is the result of its involvement in the horrific murder of 6-year-old Hind Rajab.

Together with her cousin, 15-year-old Layan, Hind was trapped in their family car after other members of the family were murdered by the zionists.

Israeli tank fire killed Layan while she was speaking on the phone to the Palestinian Red Crescent Society dispatcher. Young Hind, scared and crying, then pleaded for help on the phone after Layan’s murder. The zionists murdered the ambulance driver and the volunteer sent to rescue Hind. Soon thereafter, a burst of bullets killed Hind as well.

An investigation by Forensic Architecture later found that a total of 335 bullets had been fired at the car and that the tank operators had a clear view of the two children inside the vehicle. What possible threat did a young child pose to an Israeli tank or its crew members?

True, there are some courageous people in the zionist entity that have openly criticised Israeli policies toward the Palestinians and Lebanese. These include journalists like Gideon Levy and Amos Harel of Ha‘aretz, Yuval Abraham of +972 Magazine, and Oren Persico of The Seventh Eye.

And then there are political commentators like Ilan Pape, who have consistently criticized Netanyahu’s policies. He is the son of former general of the Israeli army. Such voices, however, are rare.

The illegal squatters from Eastern Europe and Russia are genocidal maniacs who have no regard for human life. They are absolute racists and bigots and consider non-Jews, especially Palestinians and Lebanese, as sub-humans. Killing them and other Muslims is routine for them.

There is also a specific reason for Israel’s genocidal policies, or more accurately Netanyahu’s barbaric policies. He faces a slew of corruption and bribery charges. He is also wanted on war crimes charges by the International Criminal Court (ICC). While nothing is expected to come out of the ICC, it is the charges against Netanyahu at home that worry him.

He has managed to postpone his trial on the plea that Israel is involved in multiple wars and all his attention is consumed by them. Thus, endless wars act as insurance policy for Netanyahu to delay his trial and potential jail term.

He sees peace as a one ticket to jail. This explains why he is so desperate to wreck the proposed peace deal between the US and Iran. While the first article of the MoU clearly states that war must end on all fronts, including Lebanon, Netanyahu insists it does not include Israel.

Iran has maintained that there must be a comprehensive ceasefire and the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from all of Lebanon. Naturally this includes South Lebanon. Far from adhering to this requirement for peace, Netanyahu is busy expanding military attacks in South Lebanon.

While Hizbullah fighters engage Israeli troops in defence of Lebanese civilians, the zionists have intensified bombardment of people’s homes in the south. Entire villages and towns have been wiped out.

These include Tyre, Nabatieh and the Bekaa Valley. Towns such as Harouf, al-Duweir, Haboush, Arab Salim, Tal Abyad near Baalbek, al-Sharqiyah, Kfarsir, al-Qatrani, Deir al-Zahrani, Kfar Rumman, Kfar Jouz, Jebchit, Qaqaiyat al-Jisr, Adshit, al-Rayhan, Abba, al-Abbasiya and Ain Bourdai have all been bombed with scores of people have been killed.

Given Netanyahu’s bloody-mindedness and Trump’s inability to constrain him, when Iranian officials went to Switzerland for indirect negotiations on the MoU, they insisted on implementing article 1. It calls for a complete ceasefire on all fronts, and not issues related to Iran’s nuclear program or the dilution of its enriched uranium.

Given Israel’s continued violation of the first article of the MoU— ceasefire—Iran feels under no onligation to keep the Strait of Hormuz open. It stressed that the US must stop Netanyahu’s genocidal war on Lebanon or there will be no deal. Statements by Trump and vice president J D Vance have criticised Netanyahu but it has yet to be seen whether the indicted war criminal will change his atrocious behaviour.

LebanonZionist IsraelHizbullah

The Persian Gulf countries have officially become colonies of the Americans

: Mamosta Molla Mohammad Mahmoudi in an interview with TNA

The Friday Prayer Leader of Ravansar County said: "My words are addressed to the countries of the region – countries that have no will of their own and today officially take positions, and even intervene militarily against Iran, as colonies of America."

Mamosta Molla Mohammad Mahmoudi, in an interview with the Taghrib News Agency (TNA), referring to the aggressions of the terrorist American regime against Iran's southern provinces, stated: "From the very first days when talk of an understanding and ceasefire began, it was clear that the Americans would use this opportunity to regroup, strengthen their weak points, and attack Islamic Iran again."

The Friday Prayer Leader of Ravansar County said: "With their double-tongued and false statements, the Americans once again showed that they have no commitment to any resolution or memorandum of understanding, and the only thing that satisfies them is massacre and aggression against other countries."

He further noted: "Today, unfortunately, alongside the aggressor America, we are witnessing the participation of Persian Gulf countries in the attack on Iran's southern provinces. Unfortunately, today the Gulf countries, with complete recklessness and lack of proper recognition of friend and foe, have placed their territory at the disposal of the number one enemy of Muslims – the Americans – and undoubtedly, sooner or later, they will taste the consequences of this recklessness and incompetence."

Mamosta Mahmoudi emphasized: "The terrorist American army has carried out many attacks on residential and urban areas as well as communication routes in the past week, and many of our compatriots have been killed and wounded in these attacks. Yet in the face of all this aggression, we witness the silence of the United Nations, which seems to be a kind of green light for the continuation of American crimes against Iran."

The Friday Prayer Leader of Ravansar County, referring to the authority of Iran's armed forces in confronting the American army, noted: "Fortunately, Iran's defense power and the authority of its armed forces are such that the Americans become disappointed and desperate with every effort they make. Therefore, it must be said that the Americans will not only achieve no result from this war, but will also record a historic defeat in their country's record."

This Sunni scholar continued: "But my words are addressed to the countries of the region – countries that have no will of their own and today officially take positions, and even intervene militarily against Iran, as colonies of America."

The Friday Prayer Leader of Ravansar noted: "Undoubtedly, the final victor of this unequal confrontation is Islamic Iran, and the countries that will lose their political credibility in this war and confrontation are the very Gulf states. They have shown how shaky they are and, to cover up their weaknesses, have clung to criminal America."

Sunni Scholars’ Opposition to the Concept of Walayat al-Faqih – Part III

Mohamed Ousman

Unfortunately some—perhaps many—Sunni scholars have not been able to rise above their sectarian prejudices to endorse the concept of Walayat al-Faqih as a legitimate form of Islamic governance model. This is all the more depressing since many of these scholars are otherwise quite knowledgeable about Islam.

Below is a list of Sunni scholars who are publicly known to be critics of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s state system, policies, or leadership.

1. Strong, explicit critics of the Islamic Republic in Iran

The late Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi (Egypt/Qatar) was one of the most influential Sunni jurists of modern times. He criticized Islamic Iran repeatedly over perceived Shi‘i sectarian expansion proselytization concerns, Syrian war alignment with Bashar al-Asad and other regional interventions.

He strongly opposed Islamic Iran’s regional policies and ideological export and unwittingly supported the zionist Sunni-opposition movements against Islamic Iran-aligned governments.

Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leadership e.g., Ali Sadr al-Din al-Bayanuni criticized Islamic Iran for perceived support of the Asad regime, its alleged sectarian influence in Syria and regional Shi‘i political expansion.

Prominent pro-zionist Saudi Salafi establishmentarian clerical voices have historically criticized Islamic Iran as “Safavid expansionism” (ideological framing) and opposed Islamic Iran’s influence in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. These court ulama have had little to say about the Arabian regimes’ embrace of zionism and its occupation of Palestine.

2. Moderate but clear critics of Islamic Iran’s regional role

Abdullah bin Bayyah (Mauritania/UAE-based scholar) promotes interfaith and Sunni-Shi‘i dialogue but has criticized sectarian conflict driven by regional powers and instability caused by Iranian–Saudi rivalry.

He is not anti-Iran ideologically but is critical of Islamic Iran’s regional policies and escalation dynamics.

Sunni scholars from Iraqi Sunni institutions (post-2003 Iraq) criticized Islamic Iran’s influence in Iraqi politics and concerns about anti-imperial militia dominance aligned with Islamic Iran.

Their opposition was to Islamic Iran’s political/military influence rather than theology.

Afghan Taliban-linked Sunni clerical voices occasionally criticized Islamic Iran on border issues, sectarian tensions and refugee treatment disputes. Although Afghanistan has maintained highly pragmatic relations with Islamic Iran post-2021.

3. Limited / indirect criticism of Islamic Iran

Taqi Usmani (Pakistan) generally avoids direct geopolitical confrontation. He has emphasized Sunni doctrinal independence and caution regarding sectarian state models.

Notably, he has refrained from major public anti-Iran campaigns or ideological critique but has also not endorsed the Islamic Republic of Iran’s system.

Tariq Jamil (Pakistan) focuses on spiritual preaching, unity discourse and avoids criticism of Islamic Iran as a state.

Hence, there are three distinct “types” of criticism:

  1. Ideological/political opposition where Islamic Iran is seen as a geopolitical rival or ideological project. This opposition is common among zionist Syrian opposition-aligned scholars and Gulf-state aligned clerical discourse.
  2. Regional policy criticism where the focus is on the Syrian war, Iraq influence, Yemen conflict. It does not necessarily reject Islamic Iran as a state system.
  3. Neutral/non-aligned distancing where sectarian politics is avoided and the emphasis is on unity rather than confrontation.

Explicit Sunni criticism of Islamic Iran exists mostly in geopolitical or regional conflict contexts, and to a lesser degree in theological rejection. Strong ideological opposition is more institutional (state-linked or movement-linked) than individual scholarly consensus.

Most globally known Sunni scholars either avoid direct confrontation, or focus on unity discourse rather than state criticism.

Thus, those who are “Pro-Islamic Axis of Resistance” represent issue-based alignment, not endorsement of Islamic Iran as a state. Scholars who support Palestinian resistance / anti-occupation struggle may acknowledge Islamic Iran’s role in that struggle but do not endorse Islamic Iran’s governance system and ideology of Walayat al-Faqih. This includes Palestinian-aligned Sunni scholars, Lebanon Sunni clerics like Ahmed al-Zain, conference participants in Islamic Iran unity forums and general Muslim unity scholars.

“Pro–Islamic Iran State Endorsement” means explicit endorsement of Iran’s leadership or support for the Islamic Republic’s governance model of Walayat al-Faqih. This Islamic responsibility is more than political solidarity. It demands Sunni and Shi‘i jurisprudential consensus.

Unfortunately it includes Sunni clerics inside Islamic Iran, Iranian Sunni institutional scholars and crisis-time coalitions endorsing Islamic Iran’s leadership.

The confusion occurs because many scholars sound “pro-Iran” when they are actually only “pro-resistance” and in Islamic discourse, resistance is an issue-based geopolitical stance whereas state endorsement is acceptance of Islamic Iran’s leadership and authority.

These overlap only in limited, mostly Islamic Iran-based institutional settings, not global scholarship.

For 47 years, the Islamic Republic of Iran has valiantly resisted US imperialism and zionist colonialism. It has made immense sacrifices to support the Palestinian cause and struggle.

Despite this, many Sunni scholars remain trapped in sectarian prejudices and are unable to realize that the concept of Walayat al-Faqih is as valid as the concept of Khilafah. In fact, they are one and the same with different labels.

Islamic Republic of IranVelayat-e Faqih (rule of the Jurist Consult)

Trump surrendered to Israel and dragged America into war with Iran

: American conservative host and analyst

Tucker Carlson, an American conservative host and analyst, strongly criticizing US President Donald Trump, accused him of surrendering to the Zionist regime and ignoring the national interests of the United States, and said: "This approach has dragged America into war with Iran."

According to the Taghrib News Agency (TNA), Carlson, who was one of the main supporters of Trump's return to the White House, said in an interview with the Bloomberg podcast: "Trump was not loyal to America; his loyalty was to a foreign country (Israel)!"

He also emphasized that Trump allowed the Zionist regime to influence his decisions, and stated that it is shameful for the US president to be directed by a small regime in the Middle East.

Carlson emphasized that he had repeatedly warned Trump about the consequences of entering into confrontation with Iran, but these warnings were ignored.

This American analyst, stating that the war with Iran had nothing to do with the country's nuclear program, said: "The main goal was to drag America into a war for regime change, and Washington has paid a heavy price for this policy."

In response to the question of whether Benjamin Netanyahu is more powerful than Trump, he said: "The main responsibility lies with the US president, because he did not resist external pressures." He emphasized: "Israel dragged America into this path, and Trump knowingly accepted this process."

Carlson also stated that America has paid the cost of supporting military operations and missile defense systems of the Zionist regime, and the Washington administration has in practice moved in line with securing the military interests of this regime.

He further revealed that he had previously warned Trump that continuing this policy would destroy his political legacy and tie his name to a disaster, just like George Bush after the Iraq war.

In another part of this interview, Carlson referred to his support for the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, and expressing regret over that stance, said: "At that time, I was influenced by propaganda, and I have learned from that experience not to repeat such a mistake."

The Islamic Revolution changed the arrogance's equations in the region

The interim Friday Prayer Leader of Ahvaz, referring to the role of martyrdom and the culture of sacrifice in shaping major cultural and political transformations, said: "The Islamic Revolution was able to neutralize the historical plan of arrogance to dominate the Middle East and the project of disintegrating Iran, and today the effects of this great transformation are visible in the region and the world."                      

Hujjat al-Islam Mir Ahmad Reza Hajati, on Friday night at the seventh-day commemoration ceremony for the martyr of Iran at the Imam Khomeini Prayer Ground in Ahvaz, stating that if the Islamic Revolution had not been victorious and this school had not spread in this country, Khuzestan, Ahvaz, and Khorramshahr would not exist, said: "The enemies have been pursuing a plan to disintegrate Iran for about 100 years, and they followed this program in the form of hegemonic projects for the Middle East, including the creation of Greater Israel."

Hujjat al-Islam Hajati, referring to the resistance of popular forces and the IRGC in Ahvaz, Khorramshahr, and other war zones, noted: "In those years, the blood of many fighters and commanders was shed on the ground, and the enemy imagined that with the martyrdom of commanders and bombings, the path of the revolution would be stopped, but once again the enemy failed."

He continued: "Today, the same logic of resistance continues, and after years of steadfastness on the southern coasts, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Persian Gulf, Iran has reached a level of authority that the Americans can no longer easily rely on their command and control center."

The interim Friday Prayer Leader of Ahvaz said: "Now, all the enemy's strategic bases and centers in the region are within the range of Iran's defense power, and this is the result of years of resistance."

In another part of his remarks, he referred to the events at the beginning of the war in Ahvaz and Khorramshahr, and said: "The people stood in the mosque, in the neighborhoods, and against bullets and bombing – including Hujjat al-Islam Seyyed Fakhruddin Tabatabai, who was targeted and martyred before the people's eyes. It was this steadfastness that prevented the realization of the hegemonists' dream of dominating Iran and the Islamic world."

Hujjat al-Islam Hajati, referring to the fact that "eight years passed" and despite the bombings, martyrdoms, and pressures, the people did not turn back from their path, said: "After 40 years, the result of this resistance is visible, and today, major world analysts admit that America's dream of dominating the region has faced defeat."

The seventh-day commemoration ceremony for the martyred leader of the revolution was held on Friday with the presence of hundreds of revolutionary people of Khuzestan province at the Mahdiyeh Prayer Ground of Imam Khomeini.

The people, chanting epic and revolutionary slogans, once again showed their anger and hatred towards the American-Zionist regime and renewed their allegiance to the new Leader of the Revolution.

Difference Between Support for Muslim Unity and Endorsement of Walayat al-Faqih – Part II

Mohamed Ousman

Below is a conceptual map that shows why people confuse the idea of support for Islamic Resistance Axis and endorsement of Walayat al-Faqih. The two are very different in Islamic political discourse.

The ideas are: 1. “Pro Islamic Resistance Axis” (regional geopolitical alignment) and, 2. “Pro-Islamic Iran state endorsement” (political-ideological alignment).

The former idea represents support for a network of actors resisting western/Israeli aggression, commonly called the Islamic Axis of Resistance. It is commonly described as a loose network of state and non-state actors aligned against Israel and US influence.

It includes Islamic Iran and allied states and non-state groups. The Islamic Axis of Resistance includes Sunni and Shi‘i participants.

Its alignment is geopolitical and the focus is conflict resolution. It is a regional anti-hegemonic framework, not a theodology of Islamic governance.

The latter idea represents support for the Islamic Republic of Iran as a state, its system of governance and the legitimacy of Walayat al-Faqih.

This is state ideology endorsement, not just foreign policy agreement.

The key difference (simple model)

Dimension

Pro-Islamic Resistance Axis

Pro-Iran State Endorsement

What is supported?

Regional struggle

The Islamic Iran state system itself

Scope

Transnational

Country-specific

Islamic basis

“Ummah unity”, anti-oppression

Political legitimacy of Islamic Iran

Sunni participation

Common

Very rare

Typical language

“resistance”, “Palestine”, “anti-imperialism”

“leadership of Iran”, “Islamic governance model”

Implication

Tactical/geopolitical alignment

Ideological/political approval

The Islamic Axis of Resistance

How the Islamic Axis of Resistance actually works is best understood as a loose, decentralized network built around shared enemies (Israel / US influence); not a unified ideological bloc.

Members of the Islamic Axis of Resistance act independently with overlapping interests, not under strict command unity.

That Sunni scholars can support “resistance” but not the Islamic Republic of Iran is the core confusion. They can say: “We support resistance in Palestine”, “We oppose Israeli occupation”, “We support Muslim unity”. That is Islamic Axis of Resistance framing.

But Sunni scholars still cannot say: “We support Islamic Iran’s political system”, “We endorse Walayat al-Faqih”, “We accept the Islamic Republic of Iran’s governance model”.

That would be state ideology endorsement.

Both camps may agree on opposition to Israel, criticism of US foreign policy and support for Palestinian groups (eg, Hamas) but it also creates the false impression of ideological unity because the motivation differs.

The Sunni “resistance” supporter may be motivated by sectarian solidarity, political opposition to western policy or anti-occupation while the Islamic Iran-aligned supporter may be motivated by strategic depth and regional Islamic influence.

A useful test of where the boundary is actually drawn is that if a scholar says “We support Iran’s role in Palestine resistance” it is endorsing the Islamic Axis of Resistance.

If a scholar says “Iran’s Islamic Republic model is a legitimate governance system for Muslims” it is endorsing the Islamic Republic of Iran (which is rare among Sunnis). Most Sunni scholars who appear “pro-Iran” are actually only in the first category.

Think of it as two circles: where the big circle is “Resistance politics”. It includes anti-Israel, anti-western intervention, Palestine solidarity and includes Sunni, Shi‘i and secular actors.

A smaller, separate circle is “Iran state ideology support”. It includes the Islamic Republic of Iran’s governance model, the Leader and institutional alignment with Tehran.

The biggest misconception is that “supporting resistance equates with supporting Islamic Iran”.

In reality, support for the Islamic Axis of Resistance is issue-based (Palestine, anti-occupation, anti-intervention) whereas Islamic Iran state endorsement is ideological acceptance of its governance system.

These rarely overlap outside Islamic Iran.

Below is the Sunni-majority states’ official (state-level) posture toward Islamic Iran, focusing on diplomatic alignment vs opposition, not public opinion or individual scholars:

Sunni states cooperative or aligned with Iran (pragmatic partners)

These countries maintain active diplomatic relations and structured cooperation, even if they disagree politically.

Pakistan maintains diplomatic relations with Islamic Iran and cooperates in border security, energy (pipeline discussions) and regional stability talks.

Periodic tensions occur over border militancy, but not ideological hostility. The relationship is one of pragmatic cooperation regarding security and economic cooperation despite friction.

Turkey maintains strong diplomatic and economic ties with Islamic Iran. Both cooperated in Syria negotiations (Astana process alongside Russia) and trade and energy imports.

Competing regional ambitions exist, but not formal hostility. The relationship is oddly one of strategic competitor and partner, i.e. “cooperate while competing.”

Qatar is one of Islamic Iran’s closest Gulf diplomatic partners. They share the world’s largest gas field (North Dome/South Pars) and maintain open dialogue even during GCC tensions.

The relationship is one of strong pragmatic alignment regarding energy interdependence and independent foreign policy.

Kuwait and Islamic Iran share moderate alignment where diplomatic relations are maintained. In the US-zionist war on Iran, Kuwait, like other Arabian regimes, allowed its territory to be used to launch attacks against the Islamic Republic.

Sunni states with mixed relations (cooperation and rivalry)

These countries are neither aligned nor openly hostile, but fluctuate.

Saudi Arabia is historically a major regional rival of Islamic Iran. Since the 2023 normalization, it restored diplomatic relations with talks on de-escalation ongoing.

Still, deep geopolitical competition (Yemen, Iraq, Syria influence) exists. The relationship is one of competitive détente characterized by rivalry and diplomacy simultaneously.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) normalized relations with Islamic Iran after years of tension. Yet security disputes, maritime tensions and frequent escalations occur. The UAE has been totally coopted by the zionist entity.

Malaysia maintains diplomatic ties and OIC cooperation. It is historically cautious due to sectarian sensitivity in its Sunni-majority domestic context.

It engages economically and diplomatically, but avoids alignment blocs. The relationship is oddly one of low-intensity engagement involving trade and multilateral cooperation with limited geopolitics.

Sunni states generally opposed or structurally adversarial to Iran

These states have had systemic geopolitical rivalry with Islamic Iran, though relations may fluctuate tactically.

Bahrain is one of the most anti-Islamic Iran states in the Persian Gulf. It accuses Tehran of political interference. It has strong alignment with Saudi Arabia. The relationship is one of intense hostility.

Jordan is politically aligned with the GCC and US security architecture. It views Islamic Iran as a regional destabilizing force, especially within Syria/Palestine dynamics. The relationship is one of strategic opposition.

Egypt has no stable strategic alliance with Islamic Iran. Relations remain limited and cautious. It competes regionally for influence in the Arabian order. The relationship is one of cold distance i.e. not active conflict, but non-alignment.

Sudan was historically aligned with Islamic Iran but later broke ties under GCC pressure. It is now generally aligned with the Saudi/UAE axis depending on government faction. The relationship is one of shifting alignment.

The big-picture structure and most important insight is that there is no “Sunni bloc” vs Islamic Iran.

Instead, the reality is cooperative Sunni states, (Pakistan, Turkiye, Qatar, Oman); swing/hedging states (Saudi Arabia, Malaysia); and adversarial or aligned with anti-Islamic Iran security posture (Bahrain, UAE, Kuwait, Jordan and sometimes Egypt).

The Sunni world is not unified against Iran. Some Sunni states cooperate closely with it (Qatar, Turkiye, Pakistan); some balance between rivalry and diplomacy (Saudi) while others are structurally aligned against it (Bahrain, UAE, Kuwait, Jordan).

Islamic Republic of IranVelayat-e Faqih (rule of the Jurist Consult)