Promises, pressure, pullout: Why US nuclear talks with Iran were never about a deal

By Mohammad Molaei

For over two decades, US-Iran nuclear negotiations have been wrapped in secrecy and sold as a mechanism for reducing tensions. Yet a closer examination reveals a far different reality.

Negotiations were never intended to deliver a just or lasting solution. As the evidence suggests, they were simply a tool, a mechanism for the United States to maintain pressure on Iran while preserving the facade of diplomacy.

From the early 2000s through the signing of the nuclear deal in 2015 and its eventual unraveling three years later, the nuclear negotiation process has been defined by a single, consistent reality: the United States has never been a trustworthy or reliable partner at the table, and the negotiations have never produced the outcomes that were initially expected.

Roots of the crisis

The roots of the crisis, according to the evidence examined by this writer, trace back to 2002, when peaceful energy-centric nuclear facilities were unveiled in the central Iranian cities of Natanz and Arak. Western governments seized on these as evidence of so-called “military ambition.”

Yet Iran made clear from the very beginning that its nuclear program was peaceful and fully within its rights under Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). What began as a technical issue concerning safeguards compliance soon metastasized into a broader geopolitical confrontation.

This transformation did not occur because of any real diversion in Iran's program. Rather, the nuclear dossier offered the United States and its allies a convenient pretext to sustain strategic pressure against a state that refused to submit to Western domination in West Asia.

This pattern emerged early in the negotiations with the so-called EU-3 – France, Germany, and the United Kingdom – culminating in the Saadabad Declaration of 2003.

Seeking to prevent escalation, Iran voluntarily halted uranium enrichment and, as a counterpart, accepted the Additional Protocol, granting the IAEA expanded access to nuclear sites. These steps went well beyond Iranian legal requirements and were widely regarded as a significant act of goodwill.

Yet rather than reciprocating with tangible concessions or normalization, Western powers seized on the suspension to demand even more radical measures. The voluntary and provisional nature of Iran's commitments was gradually reframed by European negotiators into open-ended constraints.

Iran resuming parts of nuclear program

The asymmetry of expectations became impossible to ignore, and the fragile trust that had been built soon evaporated. By 2005, it was clear that the West's objective was not transparency but permanent restriction.

In defense of its sovereign rights, Iran resumed parts of its nuclear program. That dynamic would define the next two decades: every Iranian show of restraint was answered not with reciprocity, but with escalating demands and mounting pressure.

The next turning point came in 2006, when Iran's nuclear file was referred to the United Nations Security Council. The crisis was now internationalized.

Over the following years, successive resolutions imposed escalating sanctions on Iran's nuclear and missile programs, arms transfers, and froze the assets of individuals and organizations.

Alongside these multilateral measures, the United States intensified its unilateral sanctions regime – particularly between 2010 and 2013 – when comprehensive financial and energy sanctions effectively amounted to a total embargo on Iran.

Legislation such as the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA), combined with sanctions targeting Iran's central bank and oil exports, succeeded in isolating the Iranian economy from global finance.

By this stage, the nuclear issue had clearly ceased to be a technical file. It had become an instrument of economic warfare, designed to coerce Iran into altering not only its nuclear policy but its entire strategic orientation.

JCPOA and how it materialized

It was against this backdrop of relentless pressure that the JCPOA was reached in 2015, today hyped as one of the most comprehensive nonproliferation agreements in diplomatic history.

Under the controversial deal, Iran accepted unprecedented restrictions on its nuclear program: stringent caps on enrichment levels, a dramatic reduction of its uranium stockpile, and full IAEA surveillance. These were not hollow concessions but a verifiable rollback of Iran's nuclear capabilities, offered in exchange for sanctions relief and economic integration.

Moreover, successive IAEA reports from 2016 to 2018 confirmed Iran's full compliance – a fact that vindicates Iran's consistent claim that its nuclear program was always peaceful.

Nevertheless, despite Iran's full cooperation, the expected benefits of the JCPOA never materialized in any meaningful way. Structural barriers within the US sanctions architecture deterred international businesses and financial institutions from engaging with Iran, even after some restrictions were formally lifted.

This systematic failure to deliver tangible outcomes pointed to a deeper problem: the United States had no intention of providing genuine economic relief, preferring to maintain its sanctions leverage despite being a signatory to the deal.

Trump’s withdrawal from JCPOA

The truth became undeniable in May 2018, when the US administration unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA – even as Iran remained in full compliance – and reimposed comprehensive sanctions under the banner of so-called "maximum pressure."

This not only erased any economic gains Iran might have realized but also demonstrated that any agreement with Washington was structurally unreliable and could be undone at any moment based on political whim.

The US withdrawal only deepened the cycle. As sanctions escalated and pressure mounted, Iran began scaling back its voluntary commitments under the JCPOA after a year of strategic restraint, invoking provisions that allowed for remedial action in the event of non-compliance by the other party.

These steps, including increased enrichment levels and advanced centrifuge research, were presented by Tehran as reversible measures, contingent on the restoration of sanctions relief.

Yet the West, instead of addressing the root cause of the crisis – the US violation of the agreement – once again focused its rhetoric on Iran's nuclear activities. This inversion of cause and effect simply reset the familiar cycle of pressure and negotiation.

Limitations of the diplomatic process

The inherent limitations of the diplomatic process became clear during efforts to revive the deal through indirect Vienna negotiations starting in 2021. The core issues remained unresolved because talks focused merely on how to arrange a return to compliance.

Iran sought reasonable assurances that the US would not break its word again, along with economic compensation for its own compliance. Washington cited internal political and constitutional constraints as reasons such guarantees were impossible.

The resulting stalemate exposed a fundamental failure: the absence of any practical mechanism to ensure US promises are kept or prevent future violations, dooming any future settlement to the same cycle of disintegration.

The IAEA's role has also come under scrutiny. Technical safeguards issues have repeatedly been pushed to the edge of a political flashpoint. Impartial compliance monitoring should be the agency's mandate, yet on Iran, it has aligned with Western pressure, selectively raising issues at Iran's expense – especially when geopolitical tensions peak.

This has reinforced the perception that the nuclear file is not technical but part of a larger pressure architecture, where institutional mechanisms are weaponized to justify more investigations and punishment.

Lessons from two decades of negotiations

The past two decades leave no room for doubt. The pattern is unmistakable: Iran can negotiate, compromise, and open up, only to face new demands, new sanctions, and shifting goalposts.

Every diplomatic phase has been followed not by resolution but by the reorganization of pressure in another form. This is not about miscalculations or technical differences. It is a chain of political choices in which diplomacy serves not as an end but as a means to gain advantage over Iran. The nuclear issue has become a scapegoat, not a genuine concern, but a tool to coerce and constrain an independent regional power.

The conclusion is inescapable. The technical dimension of Iran's nuclear program has never been the real issue. Iran has submitted to one of the most invasive verification systems in history and has been repeatedly verified as peaceful.

The true obstacle is that the United States refuses to engage on terms of mutual respect, reciprocity, or long-term commitment. Washington always operates top-down, imposing conditions while reserving the right to walk away.

Under these conditions, nuclear negotiations with the US cannot produce a solution.

The process is fundamentally flawed and has been an absolute failure. And since Iran has already proven its program is peaceful, further talks are worthless – nothing more than pressure recycled as diplomacy.

The ongoing stalemate in the Islamabad talks is fundamentally due to Iran's refusal to be dragged into a vicious cycle again. After emerging triumphant in the 40-day war, Iran is not willing to accept any of the US maximalist and unreasonable demands.

The nuclear file is effectively off the negotiating table, as the talks underway for nearly two decades have never been about a nuclear deal. 

Shaheed Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei

And how the world will change after his martyrdom.

Dr Reza John Vedadi

Seyyed Ali Hussaini Khamenei was born in 1939 in Mashhad to a very religious family. His upbringing was steeped in poverty, but his father, a respected religious scholar, was surrounded by knowledge and books. Something he grew to love and became an expert in.

He supported Imam Khomeini’s revolution and became president in the 1980s. He would attend the front line during the Iran-Iraq war and demonstrated his bravery and devotion to the people and the Islamic Republic after assassination attempts by the MEK and another attack during one of his famous Friday sermons, where he continued his speech after the explosion.

He lived an austere life and did not permit any of his four sons to take up government positions or do business using government funds or contacts. He did not permit any government building or street to be named after him, nor did he permit his picture to be placed in school books or on the country’s currency.

He was fluent in Persian, Azeri, and Arabic literature, and he could read English. He loved novels, read extensively from international literature, and was an expert in history. His favourite novel was Les Misérables, which he viewed as a significant book: a book about divinity, kindness, compassion, and love.

His title is the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, commonly mistaken for the Supreme Leader. This is an inaccurate translation of his title. When Nelson Mandela visited him, he correctly said “My Leader” rather than “Supreme Leader.” On many occasions, he stated, “If you find someone insulting me or burning my picture, do not fight with them.”

The US propaganda machine, which includes media outlets, Washington think tanks, and academic elites, paints him in a completely inaccurate light. So be careful of what you read from them, as they are part of the economy of misinformation about Iran, and especially revolutionary Iran.

His views on Jesus Christ and the love he had for Prophet Jesus are demonstrated through his visitation of Iranian Christian families who had martyred sons during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s.

One of his tweets, 25 December 2025:

“#JesusChrist was sent to save humanity from ignorance and oppression and to guide them to the light of knowledge, justice and servitude to God. He never paused in his fight against evil and in invitation to goodness. This is a lesson for Christians and Muslims believing in his prophethood.”

His love for social justice could be seen in his admiration for religious figures and their stands against oppression. From an article in 2019:

“Today, many who claim to follow Jesus Christ take a different path than that of him. The guidance of Jesus, the son of Mary (peace be upon our Prophet and her) is guidance towards worshiping God and confronting the Pharaohs and tyrants.”

He worked tirelessly to unite Shia and Sunni Muslims because he knew that if these various groups of Muslims could work together, they would be more powerful and prevent the infighting that the US and Israel instigated for their own benefit and to promote the Zionist colonial project.

My late father had a Shia scholar friend who, in the 1990s, came to the UK for medical treatment. He was at one point a teacher of Ayatollah Khamenei. He had a dream of Ayatollah Khamenei before the Iranian Revolution, while Mohammad Reza Shah was at the height of his power. He dreamt that Ayatollah Khamenei was sleeping in the cradle of the Shah.

If it had been manifest destiny for Ayatollah Khamenei to become the most powerful political figure in Iran, it would not explain the emotional outpouring of the Iranian citizens at his loss in the last several days. When Mohammad Reza Shah died outside of Iran, the Iranians never mourned his death in such large numbers.

He demonstrated through his austerity, devotion to the Iranian identity, language, and people; his devotion to the safety and success of Iran and Iranians; his devotion to Muslims, especially the oppressed in Palestine; his promotion of education for men and women, enabling Iran to become the most published scientific country amongst the Muslim world, the top research country in nanotechnology, stem cells, drones, missile defence, and medical education.

The reason the Iranian people love him is that he helped make the Iranian nation into a mature democratic republic. We can see that clearly because the country did not fold but is working like clockwork, defending itself against 15 countries, some of which are nuclear powers, while maintaining the institutions that govern it. Before the 1979 revolution, Iran did not hold elections, and the country was mostly led by one man, the Shah, and its institutions of state were largely influenced by him. However, what Imam Khomeini did between 1979 and 1989, and what Ayatollah Khamenei did between 1989 and 2026, was to empower state institutions to operate within a constitutional framework that is not beholden to one man.

Even when the Iranian public elected a president he may not have preferred, he never protested that choice and always supported the choice of the people, even if it was people like Hassan Rouhani, who devastated the economy, relations with Russia and China, and enabled the worst deal for Iran, the JCPOA, to be agreed.

Moreover, finally, his prayer for martyrdom was answered. His prayer was for a martyrdom that would serve Islam. Even in his martyrdom, which is the highest honour for Muslims, especially Shia Muslims, he wished his death to serve the Islamic Ummah. Several months before his martyrdom, he visited the Jamkaran Mosque in Qom, which is closely associated with Imam Mahdi. I imagine he prayed there for guidance on what to do next.

Dr Abdul Majid Hakeem Ilahi - Ayatollah Khamenei's representative in India.

When his aides and security tried to take him to another city when the attack took place a few days ago, he said: “If you can relocate all Iranians, then come and relocate me.” They offered to take him to the basement or a bunker; he said the same thing: “If you can find a basement for every Iranian, then come and take me.” He died not hiding, but working in his office, where everyone knew where it was. The Israelis and CIA did have some amazing intelligence; they just bombed his home, and he refused to hide.

Because he was the Marja, or religious authority, for millions of Shias in and outside Iran, we can already see people in Pakistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Bahrain protesting against US embassies. His death may well be the spark that ignites public unrest in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain against their rulers there.

The Sepah (IRGC) will not stop military action until the US leaves all its bases in West Asia, especially the Persian Gulf region. The Iranian military has enough support from Iranian citizens and military hardware to accomplish this task. The Iranians will also inflict a harsh penalty on Western economies by closing the Strait of Hormuz for their support for the genocide in Palestine and their support for the many years of economic and military attacks and sanctions on Iran. The US and Israel have crossed a red line that only the use of nuclear bombs would be worse.

West Asia is going to change, and the US and Israel will be pushed out, which will empower Iran and whoever decides to be its allies: Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, Russia, and China.