Tuesday, August 25, 2026

The Mouse that Wants to Be an Elephant: Israel and the Steroids of US Aid

By Jeremy Salt

The United States and Israel share an unbreakable bond. (Photo: James Emery, via Wikimedia Commons)

Whoever wins, this is not going to affect the slow and steady degradation of Israel’s standing in the US, accompanied by ultimately steady and increasing cuts in the steroids of arms supplies and economic aid.

The obese, sweaty Ben-Gvir, physically more repulsive than Goering, more bloodthirsty than Himmler, is now demanding that 30-40 Palestinians be killed every day because they are “not worthy of life,” a phrase that comes out of Nazi Germany and, in reality, sums up the genocide in Gaza.

In Israel’s case, the Palestinians are not worthy of life because they are human animals or the insects and snakes that Zionist rabbis, politicians and generals have described them as being over decades. Once put in that category, it is easier to kill them, to squash them, to bury them beneath tons of concrete so they die unseen and alone in the dark.

Bishop Desmond Tutu used to say that Zionism was worse than apartheid, but no one should hesitate in going further and comparing it to Nazism. Many of the Nazis were gentlemen compared to murderous trash like Ben Gvir and the gangsters around him in the cabal known as the ‘government’ of Israel.

Zionism is a fanatical ideology, more akin to a cult, it might be said, but it still has its own extreme, which is the even more murderous beliefs and behavior of the West Bank settlers, of Netanyahu, Ben-Gvir, Smotrich, and others like them. Their Zionism shares with Nazism and the Islamic state the same characteristics of extreme violence, sectarian hatred, persecution of a targeted group, and rejection of all laws but their own.

The parallel lines between Nazism and Zionism, ideologically and in their mass violence, are clear for those prepared to look at them and put up with the shrill cries of ‘anti-semitism.’

Who are the true Semites anyway? Not Jewish Israelis of European stock. They have no living or genetic connection with the ancient Middle East.

The Semites, if one wants to use the word, are the Palestinians, living in the Mediterranean basin of ancient civilizations for countless generations. DNA research shows that they are overwhelmingly of Bronze Age Canaanite/‘Levantine’ stock.

Palestinian Jews have the same ancient lineage, but the Zionists don’t. They came to Palestine as European intruders who had no living or genetic relationship with Palestine, with the geography of Palestine, the people of Palestine, and even the Jews of Palestine, whom they looked on with contempt. They were cultural and historic aliens on Palestinian soil.

The Crusaders were backed by the resources of European kings, princes, popes, and cardinals; the Zionists by European governments, but the outcome was the same. Both got their hands on Palestine. The Crusaders lasted from the 11th to the 13th century; the duration of the Zionist ‘crusader state’ remains to be seen.

The Mediterranean basin has been a conflict zone for thousands of years, but these have been wars and not genocide. One side wins, soldiers die on the battlefield, civilians are killed and exploited by having their property seized or by being enslaved, but they are not wiped out and neither is there the intention to wipe them out.

‘Carthago delenda est’ was the cry that went up in the Roman Senate two centuries BCE – ‘Carthage must be destroyed ’-but it never was, not totally. Go to Carthage today and you can walk among the ruins in this outer suburb of Tunis.

Compare that to Gaza, of which 90 percent has been wiped out. If Israel has its way, the rest will soon be totally destroyed, as Israel wants nothing left of Palestine, so that in time, no matter how much time it takes, it will be entirely gone and the lie that it was always Jewish will be easier to sell.

Carthage was a Phoenician city; its mother lode was what is now Syria, Palestine, and Lebanon. Gaza is now Carthage, only much worse and destroyed with far greater loss of life, not as the unavoidable consequence of war (because Gaza is not a war but a genocide), but because the destruction of the civilian population was an aim from the start. Like 1948, the ‘war’ was a necessary means to this end.

In all the massacres in and around the Mediterranean basin over thousands of years, nothing compares with the horrors of what the Zionists have done. No strip of an ancient civilization has been so completely destroyed.

Gaza will be remembered in history thousands of years from now. It will never be forgotten. Zionism is a stain on Jewish history which can only be expunged by complete rejection of the parasitic growth that it is.

Like the Crusades, Gaza was not a massacre of locals by locals but by outsiders, in their ethnic origins and where they came from.

They were secular and used religion only as a weapon to further their cause, hijacking its symbols and turning the Star of David into a symbol of menace and forthcoming destruction. There is possibly only one greater danger to Judaism in its long history and that is Nazism, but whereas Nazism threatened the lives of Jews and the symbols of Judaism, its libraries and houses of worship, Zionism is a dagger driven towards its spiritual heart. No anti-semites could be a more dangerous enemy.

As the evidence is being bulldozed out of the way as quickly as possible, it will never be known how many people have been slaughtered in Gaza so far. They are still being killed every day, so it is not over yet but the current figure of close to 80,000 is based only on the bodies that could be counted and is nowhere near what the real figure would be, possibly hundreds of thousands.

Even on the basis of the minimal figure, nowhere in and around the Mediterranean basin in its thousands of years of recorded history has there been such slaughter, not wanton slaughter in the heat of war but the cold, calculated, ruthless aim to kill off the people and disperse the survivors beyond Gaza’s borders. This is what Zionism has brought to the central lands of the Middle East.

Where, during this history, were civilians, even women and children, regarded as no different from soldiers, to be killed without compunction? Civilians are often killed or massacred in the heat of war or in acts of revenge or retribution, but never in the tens of thousands.

The motive is also entirely different. Israel has identified its enemy as the entire population of Gaza, not the civilians trained in guerrilla warfare, manufacturing their own weapons, and facing up to the enemy in T-shirts, jeans, and sneakers. The enemy is the children as well as the adults. No one is left out.

The Israelis claim revenge as a motive. After October 7, no doubt this is true. Suddenly the tables had been turned. It was not the thousands of Gazans the Israelis had been killing in their ‘mowing the lawn’ operations over decades, but several hundred Jewish settler civilians, along with hundreds of soldiers and armed settlement guards.

Revenge was certainly one motive but a lesser motive in the minds of politicians and military commanders planning the Gaza operation. The destruction of Gaza and its people and the Jewish settlement of Gaza and its eventual annexation to Israel were their deeper motives and aims.

Like occupied Syria and southern Lebanon, the goal is more ‘living space’, Lebensraum, the Nazis called it, as they looked towards Poland. The phrase fits precisely into the junction between Nazi and Zionist ideology.

‘Steroids’ is a word repeatedly frequently in recent Israeli discourse. There are many steroids, but the one that is meant is the muscle-building anabolic steroid.

It has many iterations: Netanyahu’s Hamas as “ISIS on steroids”; Naftali Bennett’s attack on Qatar and Erdogan’s involvement in the Gaza ‘peace’ board proposals as “Oslo on steroids”; Qatar’s role as ‘soft power’ on steroids; a Palestinian colloquium in New York as ‘anti-zionism’ on steroids; sanctions relief for Iran as terror on steroids; Israel’s next attack on Iran as ‘Operation Rising Lion’ on steroids; and British propagandist Melanie Phillips’ “libels” against Israel as “gaslighting on steroids.”

This is one omission from the list that has more weight than any of the others. This is Israel on steroids, first the steroid of British support and then the anabolic steroids of unending arms, political and economic support of the US for more than 70 years. This is what has enabled Israel to be what it is, to conquer all of Palestine and devastate surrounding countries.

The potential consequences of using steroids to build muscle mass in the human body are well known. No matter how impressive the muscles in the first place, the constant use of steroids can lead to shrunken testicles, liver disease, liver tumors, heart attacks and strokes ending in death, and mental problems. The out-of-control body that is Israel shows the same symptoms of disease.

The bodybuilder addicted to steroids can’t stop. Someone has to stop him, and then he has to make do with a shrunken life. In the same way, in its own best interests, the supply of dangerous steroids to Israel should have been stopped decades ago.

Without the artificiality of steroid strength, it would have been reduced to the dimensions of the small state that it is. Steroids turned it into the mouse that wants to be an elephant. Without the steroids of US arms and economic assistance, it would not have been able to bully its neighbors, to invade, occupy, plunder, assassinate and eventually commit open, flagrant, advertised-in-advance genocide. It would have been forced to deal with the Palestinians and its erstwhile neighbors as equals.

Even by Zionists, too much reliance on the US has been seen as dangerous, but to be what it is and wants to remain, Israel has to rely on someone. The problem is that no one is lining up to fill the role of endlessly indulgent uncle, to the ruin of the nephew.

What happens if the US decides to stop supply, which seems to be the direction it’s heading? Amnesty International was among 111 organizations calling on US senators to support a resolution by Bernie Sanders to block arms sales to Israel.

The vote was lost, but a dozen senators who had previously voted for arms sales voted against them. In the House, in June, 98 Democrats voted for an amendment cutting aid to Israel, compared to 103 against it. The votes are still being lost, but these figures were unimaginable just a few years ago.

The warning signs are there, but Netanyahu is vigorously biting the hand that has fed him and Israel, specifically Donald Trump’s hand. He seems intent on making life as difficult as he can for him before the midterms, probably to blackmail him into another full-scale war on Iran, while letting him do what he wants in southern Lebanon. They are diametrically opposed, but he is playing his electoral needs against Trump’s.

Whoever wins, this is not going to affect the slow and steady degradation of Israel’s standing in the US, accompanied by ultimately steady and increasing cuts in the steroids of arms supplies and economic aid.

– Jeremy Salt taught at the University of Melbourne, at Bosporus University in Istanbul and Bilkent University in Ankara for many years, specializing in the modern history of the Middle East. Among his recent publications is his 2008 book, The Unmaking of the Middle East. A History of Western Disorder in Arab Lands (University of California Press) and The Last Ottoman Wars. The Human Cost 1877-1923 (University of Utah Press, 2019). He contributed this article to The Palestine Chronicle.

ஒரே நிலம், இரண்டு தேசியவாதங்கள்: இஸ்லாமியம் vs. சியோனிசம்

(தமிழ் மொழிபெயர்ப்பு)

டாக்டர் எம். ரேசா பெஹ்னம்

அமெரிக்க இராணுவவாதிகளும் அவர்களது சியோனிசக் கூட்டாளிகளும் ஆயுத வெற்றி மற்றும் இனப்படுகொலை மூலம் மத்திய கிழக்கு முழுவதும் தங்களுக்கான நிலப்பிடிப் புகளையும் பாதுகாப்பான தளங்களையும் உருவாக்க முயன்றுள்ளனர்.

பல தசாப்தங்களாக, மத்திய கிழக்கின் அரசியல் நிலப்பரப்பு ஒரு முக்கியத்துவம் வாய்ந்த கருத்தியல் மோதலால் வடிவமைக்கப்பட்டுள்ளது. ஒரு புறம் சியோனிசமும், மறுபுறம் இஸ்லாமிய அரசியல் செயற்பாடான இஸ்லாமியவாதமும் நிற்கின்றன.

1948ஆம் ஆண்டு இஸ்ரேல் நிறுவப்பட்டதன் மூலம் நடைமுறைக்கு வந்த இன-தேசியவாதத் திட்டமான சியோனிசம், இராணுவவாதம், பிராந்திய விரிவாக்கம், கட்டாய இடம்பெயர்வு மற்றும் மேற்கத்திய ஆதரவு ஆகியவற்றின் மூலம் தனது பௌதிக இருப்பைத் தொடர்ந்து விரிவுபடுத்தி வருகிறது.

20ஆம் நூற்றாண்டில் தோன்றிய அரசியல்/மத நிகழ்வான இஸ்லாமியவாதம், மத்திய கிழக்கின் பூர்வீக மக்களுக்கு, குறிப்பாக பாலஸ்தீனியர்களுக்கு, நீதி பெற்றுத் தருவதில் மதச்சார்பற்ற அரபு அரசாங்கங்களும், வளைகுடா முடியாட்சிகளும், சர்வதேச அமைப்புகளும் தோல்வியடைந்த நிலையில் உருவெடுத்தது.

முழுமையான ஒழுக்க நம்பிக்கையைக் கட்டுப்பாடான அமைப்பு கட்டமைப்புகளுடன் இணைத்ததன் மூலம், சியோனிசத்தின் மேலாதிக்க நோக்கங்களுக்கு நேரடியாக எதிராக நிற்கும் முதன்மையான கருத்தியல் சக்தியாக இஸ்லாமியவாதம் வெளிப்பட்டது.

ஊடகங்களில் பொதுவாக ஏற்படுத்தப்படும் ஒரே மாதிரியான பிம்பங்களுக்கு மாறாக, பெரும்பாலான இஸ்லாமியவாதிகள் ISIS (ஈராக் மற்றும் சிரியாவின் இஸ்லாமிய அரசு), ISIL (ஈராக் மற்றும் லெவாந்தின் இஸ்லாமிய அரசு), அல்லது அரபு உலகில் பொதுவாக அழைக்கப்படும் Daesh போன்ற குழுக்களை அவதூறானவை என நிராகரிக்கின்றனர் என்பதை குறிப்பிட வேண்டும்.

1979ஆம் ஆண்டு ஈரானியப் புரட்சியும் ஈரான் இஸ்லாமியக் குடியரசு நிறுவப்படும் வரை, இஸ்லாமியவாதத்தின் தாக்கம் குறைவாகவே இருந்தது. அதன் பின்னர், அது முஸ்லிம் உலகம் முழுவதும் மிகவும் சக்திவாய்ந்த கருத்தியல் சக்தியாக மாறியுள்ளது. இஸ்லாமியவாத இயக்கங்கள் எதிர்ப்புக்கான அமைப்பு கட்டமைப்பை வழங்கியுள்ளன; அவற்றின் சமரசமற்ற அரசியல் சித்தாந்தம் சியோனிசத்துக்கும் மேற்கத்திய ஏகாதிபத்தியத்துக்கும் எதிரான மாற்றுச் சக்தியை உருவாக்கி, அதனைச் செயல்படுத்துவதற்கான வழியையும் வழங்கியுள்ளது.

இப்பிராந்தியத்தில் இஸ்ரேல் ஏற்படுத்திய மிக முக்கியமான, ஆனால் அரிதாகவே ஒப்புக்கொள்ளப்படும் தாக்கம், மதச்சார்பற்ற அரசியலின் வீழ்ச்சியையும் போர்க்குணமிக்க இஸ்லாமியவாதத்தின் எழுச்சியையும் துரிதப்படுத்தியதில் அதன் பங்காக இருக்கலாம்.

இஸ்லாமியவாதம் ஏன் எதிர்ப்பின் முதன்மையான ஊடகமாக உயர்ந்தது என்பதைப் புரிந்துகொள்ள, காலனித்துவத்திற்குப் பிந்தைய மத்திய கிழக்கின் புவிசார் அரசியல் கட்டமைப்பை மீண்டும் பார்வையிடுவது முக்கியம்.

அத்துடன், இன்று இப்பிராந்தியத்தை வரையறுக்கும் பிளவையும் போர்க்குணத்தையும் தீவிரப்படுத்துவதில் இஸ்ரேல் வகித்த முக்கிய பங்கையும் அங்கீகரிப்பது அவசியம்.

குறுகிய காலகட்டமான 1945–1970இல், அரபு உலகின் புவிசார் அரசியல் எதிர்காலம் முற்றிலும் வேறுபட்டதாகத் தோன்றியது.

எகிப்திய அதிபர் கமால் அப்துல் நாசர் (1954–1970) தலைமையில், அந்தக் காலம் நவீனமயமாக்கல், சோசலிசச் சீர்திருத்தங்கள், பான்-அரபு (Pan-Arab) தேசியவாதத்தின் துணிச்சலான அரசியல் மொழி மற்றும் பாலஸ்தீனத்தை விடுவிப்பதற்கான வாக்குறுதி ஆகியவற்றால் தனித்துவம் பெற்றிருந்தது.

பல தசாப்தங்களாக நிலவிய உள்நாட்டு ஊழல் மற்றும் சர்வாதிகார ஆட்சிக்குப் பின்னர், பகிரப்பட்ட மொழி மற்றும் கலாச்சார அடையாளத்தின் அடிப்படையில் கட்டமைக்கப்பட்ட இறையாண்மை கொண்ட தேசிய அரசுகளின் கனவு, 1967ஆம் ஆண்டு அரபு–இஸ்ரேல் போரில் அரபு இராணுவங்கள் தீர்மானகரமானதும் அவமானகரமானதுமான தோல்வியைச் சந்தித்ததைத் தொடர்ந்து சிதைந்தது.

அரபு உலகின் கூட்டு உணர்வும் தன்னம்பிக்கையும் மேலும் சிதைந்தது; ஏனெனில் அதன் தலைவர்கள் இஸ்ரேலுடன் சமரசங்களைச் செய்து ஒருதலைப்பட்சமான சமாதான ஒப்பந்தங்களில் கையெழுத்திட்டனர்—எகிப்து 1979ஆம் ஆண்டிலும், ஜோர்டான் 1994ஆம் ஆண்டிலும் அவ்வாறு செய்தன.

அரபு நாடுகள் மோதலைவிட தங்களது ஆட்சிகளின் உயிர்வாழ்வுக்கு முன்னுரிமை அளித்த நிலையில், ஒரு கருத்தியல் வெற்றிடம் உருவானது. துன்பப்பட்டும், பிராந்திய அழிவைக் கண்டு கொண்டும் இருந்த மக்களுக்கு, அரசுகளால் முன்னெடுக்கப்பட்ட இந்த இயல்பாக்க முயற்சிகள் சரணாகதியாகவே தோன்றின.

மதச்சார்பற்ற தேசியவாதத்தின் மீதான நம்பிக்கை இழப்பு, நம்பிக்கையை அடிப்படையாகக் கொண்ட தேசிய அரசியல் அடையாளம் உருவாக வழிவகுத்தது. மேற்கத்திய நாடுகள் வரைந்த எல்லைகள், காலனித்துவத்திற்குப் பிந்தைய அரசுகளின் மீதான விசுவாசங்கள் மற்றும் மேற்கத்திய சித்தாந்தம் ஆகியவற்றிலிருந்து முற்றிலும் சுயாதீனமான ஒரு உலகக் கண்ணோட்டத்தை இஸ்லாமியவாதம் முன்வைத்தது.

மதச்சார்பற்ற ஆட்சிகளுக்கு எதிர்கொள்வது கடினமான ஒரு பார்வையை இந்த இயக்கங்கள் வழங்கின. மதச்சார்பற்ற தேசியவாதத்திலிருந்து மத அடிப்படையிலான ஜிஹாத்—முஸ்லிம் சமூகமான உம்மாவைப் பாதுகாப்பதற்கான ஆயுதப் போராட்டம்—என்ற புதிய அணுகுமுறைக்கு முன்னுதாரணத்தை மாற்றியதன் மூலம், இஸ்லாமியவாதம் மக்களைத் திரட்டுவதற்கான புதிய கட்டமைப்பை வழங்கியது. பாலஸ்தீனியர்களின் நிலப் பறிப்பு மற்றும் இராணுவ அவமானங்கள் தொடர்பான நீடித்த விரக்தியையும் ஏமாற்றத்தையும் அது நாடுகளைக் கடந்து செல்லும் ஒற்றுமைக்கான எரிபொருளாகவும் மாற்றியது.

வெளிப்புறப் போராட்டத்தின் பொறுப்பு ஹமாஸ், பாலஸ்தீனிய இஸ்லாமிய ஜிஹாத் மற்றும் லெபனானின் ஹிஸ்புல்லாஹ் போன்ற அரசு சாராத இஸ்லாமியவாதக் குழுக்களிடம் சென்றது. அமெரிக்க–இஸ்ரேல் மேலாதிக்கத்திற்கு எதிரான அவர்களின் எதிர்ப்புக்கு ஈரானின் புரட்சிகர அரசாங்கம் ஆதரவளித்தது.

அரசியல் கோட்பாட்டாளர்களும் ஆதரவாளர்களும், மதச்சார்பற்ற தேசியவாதத்தைப் போலல்லாமல், சியோனிசத்தை எதிர்கொள்வதில் இஸ்லாமியவாதத்திற்கு தனித்துவமான கட்டமைப்பு சார்ந்த முன்ன advantages உள்ளன என்று வாதிடுகின்றனர். அவற்றில் முக்கியமானவை:

  • செயற்கையான எல்லைகளைக் கடந்து நிற்றல்: ஐரோப்பிய காலனித்துவத்தால் உருவாக்கப்பட்ட பிளவுபடுத்தும் எல்லைகளைக் கடந்து, உம்மா என்ற நாடுகளைக் கடந்த அடையாளத்திலிருந்து இஸ்லாமியவாதம் தனது செல்வாக்கைப் பெறுகிறது. மறுபுறம், பிராந்திய அரபு நாடுகள் அமெரிக்கா மற்றும் மேற்கத்திய நாடுகளுடனான பொருளாதாரத் தொடர்பு மற்றும் இராணுவச் சார்பு, அத்துடன் பலவீனமான உள்நாட்டு அரசியல் கூட்டணிகள் ஆகியவற்றால் கட்டுப்படுத்தப்பட்டுள்ளன.

  • கருத்தியல் உறுதியின் சக்தி: மதச்சார்பற்ற போர்க்குணமிக்க இயக்கங்களை வழக்கமான போர், உயரடுக்கினரைத் தம்வசப்படுத்துதல் அல்லது அரசியல் சமரசம் ஆகியவற்றின் மூலம் பலவீனப்படுத்த முடியும். இதற்கு மாறாக, இஸ்லாமியவாத இயக்கங்கள் உயர்ந்த அளவிலான உறுதியையும் அமைப்பு ரீதியான நிலைத்தன்மையையும் வெளிப்படுத்துகின்றன. இதற்கு பெருமளவில் தெய்வீக நீதி, தியாகம் மற்றும் ஒழுக்கக் கடமை குறித்த அவர்களின் பகிரப்பட்ட இறையியல் நம்பிக்கைகளே காரணம். ஒரு விசுவாசியைப் பொறுத்தவரை, நிலப்பறிப்புக்கு எதிரான போராட்டம் வெறுமனே அரசியல் குறைபாடல்ல; அது ஒரு புனிதக் கடமையாகும். எனவே, உறுதிப்பாடு அவர்களின் அடிப்படைக் கோட்பாடாகிறது.

  • ஒழுக்க மற்றும் மக்கள் ஆதரவு சார்ந்த சட்டபூர்வத்தன்மை: அரசியல் எதிர்ப்புடன் மட்டுமல்லாமல், இஸ்லாமியவாத இயக்கங்கள் பெரும்பாலும் சமூகங்களின் ஆதாரத் தூண்களாகவும் செயல்பட்டு, தேவையான சமூக சேவைகளை வழங்குகின்றன. அடக்குமுறை அல்லது அலட்சியமான மத்திய அரசுகளால் புறக்கணிக்கப்பட்ட மக்களுக்கு உதவி வழங்குவதன் மூலம், இந்தக் குழுக்கள் வலுவான அடிமட்ட ஆதரவை உருவாக்குகின்றன. இது அரசின் இராணுவ அழிப்பிலிருந்து அவர்களைப் பாதுகாக்கிறது.

இறுதியில், இஸ்லாமியவாதத்திற்கும் சியோனிசத்திற்கும் இடையிலான மோதல் என்பது ஆழமாக வேரூன்றிய, முழுமையான இரண்டு நம்பிக்கை அமைப்புகளுக்கு இடையிலான போராட்டமாகும். பாலஸ்தீன நிலத்தின் மீது தனித்துவமான இன-மத ஆதிக்கத்தின் மூலம் முழுமையான கட்டுப்பாட்டை நிலைநாட்ட சியோனிசம் முயல்கிறது. அதற்கு எதிராக, அந்த மேலாதிக்கத்தின் சட்டபூர்வத்தன்மையை முற்றிலுமாக நிராகரிக்கும் ஒரு பார்வையை இஸ்லாமியவாதம் முன்வைக்கிறது; நம்பிக்கையை அது கவசமாகவும் ஆயுதமாகவும் பயன்படுத்துகிறது.

சர்வாதிகார ஆட்சிகள், தோல்வியடைந்து வரும் சர்வதேச சட்டங்கள் மற்றும் பல தசாப்தங்களாகத் துன்பத்தையும் நில இழப்பையும் ஏற்படுத்திய தோல்வியுற்ற மதச்சார்பற்ற இராஜதந்திரம் ஆகியவற்றால் சூழப்பட்ட நிலையில், பாலஸ்தீனியர்களின் முறையான அழிப்புக்கும் பிராந்திய இறையாண்மையின் இழப்புக்கும் எதிராகத் தளராத பாதுகாப்பை இஸ்லாமியவாதம் தனது ஆதரவாளர்களுக்கு வழங்குகிறது.

அமெரிக்க இராணுவவாதிகளும் அவர்களது சியோனிசக் கூட்டாளிகளும் ஆயுத வெற்றி மற்றும் இனப்படுகொலை மூலம் மத்திய கிழக்கு முழுவதும் தங்களுக்கான நிலப்பிடிப்புகளையும் பாதுகாப்பான தளங்களையும் உருவாக்க முயன்றுள்ளனர். இந்த அதிகாரப் போட்டியில், நாடுகளும் எல்லைகளும் சதுரங்கப் பலகையில் உள்ள காய்களாகக் கருதப்பட்டுள்ளன; மேற்கத்திய நாடுகளுக்கான அடிமைத்தனத்தை உறுதிசெய்வதற்காகப் பிராந்திய ஆதிக்கத்திற்கும் வலிமைக்கும் அதிக முக்கியத்துவம் அளிக்கப்பட்டுள்ளது. இருப்பினும், இராணுவ வன்முறை, வஞ்சகம் மற்றும் பயனற்ற சமாதான முயற்சிகள் ஆகியவற்றால் வரலாறு, கலாச்சாரம் மற்றும் நம்பிக்கையில் ஆழமாக வேரூன்றியுள்ள ஒரு நிலப்பரப்பில் பகைமையான வெளிநாட்டு சித்தாந்தத்தையோ இருப்பையையோ நிலைநிறுத்த முடியாது.

இதற்கு முற்றிலும் மாறாக, இஸ்லாமியவாதக் குழுக்கள் பிராந்தியங்களை ஆட்சி செய்வதோ அல்லது தேசிய அரசாங்கங்களின் மீது தனிப்பட்ட கட்டுப்பாட்டை வைத்திருப்பதோ இல்லை. அவர்களின் பிராந்திய வலிமையும் நீடித்திருக்கும் திறனும் கருத்தியல் எதிரொலியின் மூலம் பெறப்படுகின்றன.

இஸ்லாமியவாதிகள் கருத்தியல் மற்றும் அடிமட்ட சமூக மட்டங்களில் செயல்பட்டு, மக்களின் ஆன்மிக, உணர்ச்சி மற்றும் சமூக மையத்தை நேரடியாக இலக்காகக் கொள்கின்றனர். வெளிநாட்டு ஆதிக்கத்தால் சோர்வடைந்த ஒரு சமூகத்தில், நீதி, அடையாளம் மற்றும் சேர்ந்திருத்தல் ஆகியவற்றை வலியுறுத்தும் ஒரு வலுவான கதையாடலை வழங்குவதன் மூலம், இஸ்லாமியவாதம் அன்றாட விசுவாசிகளின் இதயங்களையும் மனங்களையும் கவர்ந்துள்ளது.

One Land, Two Nationalisms: Islamism vs. Zionism

By Dr. M. Reza Behnam

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and UAE Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Zayed. (Photo: Composite. Design: PC)

American militarists and their Zionist allies have tried to carve out and secure footholds across the Middle East through armed conquest and genocide.

For decades, the political landscape of the Middle East has been shaped by a momentous ideological collision. On one side stands Zionism, and on the other, Islamic political activism, Islamism.

Zionism, an ethno-nationalist project that materialized through the establishment of Israel in 1948, has continued to expand its physical footprint through militarism, territorial expansion, forced displacement and Western backing.

Islamism, a 20th-century political/religious phenomenon, emerged as secular Arab governments, Gulf monarchs, and international organizations failed to secure justice for the indigenous populations of the Middle East, particularly the Palestinians.

By wedding absolute moral conviction to disciplined organizational structures, Islamism manifested as the primary ideological force standing in direct opposition to the hegemonic objectives of Zionism.

It should be noted that a majority of Islamists—a designation that often leads to media stereotyping —reject as blasphemous groups such as ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), or as it is often called in the Arab world, Daesh.

Until the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Islamism had limited impact. Since then, it has become the most powerful ideological force across the Muslim world. Islamist movements have provided the structural organization for resistance, and its uncompromising political ideology has enabled and provided a counter to Zionism and Western imperialism.

Perhaps Israel’s most consequential, yet rarely acknowledged impact on the region, has been its role in accelerating the death of secular politics and the rise of militant Islam.

To understand why Islamism has ascended as the primary vehicle of resistance, it is important to revisit the geopolitical architecture of the post-colonial Middle East,

and to recognize Israel’s crucial role in inflaming the fracture and militancy that defines the region today.

For a short-lived period (1945-1970), the geopolitical horizons of the Arab world looked radically different.

Led by Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser (1954-1970), the era was distinguished by modernization, socialist reforms and the bold language of pan-Arab nationalism and the promise to liberate Palestine.

After decades of internal corruption and authoritarian governance, the dream of sovereign nation-states—built on shared linguistic and cultural identity—collapsed following the decisive and humiliating defeat of the Arab armies in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.

The collective consciousness and confidence of the Arab world was further eroded as its leaders struck compromises and signed unilateral peace agreements with Israel; as Egypt did in 1979 and Jordan in 1994.

An ideological void emerged, as Arab states prioritized regime survival over confrontation. For populations suffering and witnessing regional devastation, these state-led efforts at normalization were viewed as capitulation.

The loss of faith in the ideology of secular nationalism cleared the way for the genesis of a national political identity based in faith. Islamism presented a worldview entirely independent of Western-drawn borders, post-colonial state loyalties, and Western ideology.

These movements offered a vision that secular regimes found difficult to counter. By shifting the paradigm from secular nationalism to religious jihad—armed struggle in defense of the Muslim community (the ummah)—Islamism provided a new framework for mobilization. It also turned the ongoing frustration and disappointment over Palestinian dispossession and military humiliations into fuel for transnational unity.

The mantle of external struggle fell to non-state Islamist groups such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Lebanon’s Hezbollah, supported in their resistance to US-Israel hegemony by the revolutionary government of Iran.

Political theorists and proponents argue that Islamism possesses unique structural advantages that make it, unlike secular nationalism, formidable in confronting Zionism; most notably:

  • Transcendence of artificial borders: Islamism derives its influence from its trans-national identity with the ummah, rising above the divisive borders carved by European colonialism. Regional Arab states, on the other hand, have been constrained by economic involvement and military dependence on the US and the West, as well as fragile domestic coalitions.
  • The power of ideological resilience: Secular militant movements can be degraded through conventional warfare, elite co-optation, or political compromise. In contrast, Islamist movements exhibit a high degree of resolution and organizational resilience, which is in large part due to their shared theological belief in divine justice, martyrdom and moral duty. To a believer, the struggle against territorial dispossession is a sacred obligation, not merely a political grievance, making resoluteness a core doctrine.
  • Moral and popular legitimacy: In addition to political resistance, Islamist movements also frequently act as community anchors, providing needed social services. Because of the help they provide to populations alienated by repressive or indifferent central governments, these groups build strong grassroots support that protects them from state military annihilation.

Ultimately, the conflict between Islamism and Zionism is a struggle between two deeply-rooted and complete belief systems. Zionism seeks absolute control through exclusive ethno-religious dominance over Palestinian land. Islamism counters with a vision that totally rejects the legitimacy of that supremacy, utilizing faith as both armor and weapon.

Amid a landscape of autocratic regimes, failing international laws and failed secular diplomacy that has yielded decades of suffering and territorial loss, Islamism offers its followers an unyielding defense against the systematic erasure of Palestinians and loss of regional sovereignty.

American militarists and their Zionist allies have tried to carve out and secure footholds across the Middle East through armed conquest and genocide. In this jockeying, nations and borders have been treated as pieces on a chessboard, with heavy focus on territorial dominance and force to guarantee servitude to the West. Military violence, deceit, and futile olive branches, however, cannot anchor a hostile foreign ideology or presence in a landscape deeply rooted in history, culture, and faith.

In stark contrast, Islamist groups do not rule over territory or maintain exclusive control over national governments. Their regional strength and endurance is won through ideological resonance.

Islamists operate on an ideological and grassroots level, aiming directly at the spiritual, emotional and social core of the populace. In a community exhausted by foreign domination, Islamism has captured the hearts and minds of everyday believers by offering a compelling narrative of justice, identity and belonging.

– Dr. M. Reza Behnam is a political scientist specializing in the history, politics and governments of the Middle East. He contributed this article to The Palestine Chronicle.

The Search for a Decolonial Way Out: The Electoral Impasse Between the River and the Sea

By Awad Abdelfattah

The Palestinian Legislative Council building. (Photo: Magister/Wikimedia Commons)

The strategic question is whether Palestinians can enter these different electoral arenas without losing sight of the larger struggle: the struggle to dismantle the structures of colonial domination.

It is difficult, and even unacceptable, for a Palestinian to view the elections to be held separately in Israel and the 67-occupied territories in the coming months outside the context of the monstrous Zionist regime, especially following its ongoing genocidal crime.

These elections carry deep paradoxes, contradictions, and existential questions: how can Palestinians reconcile their understanding of the genocidal regime and the constraints it imposes on the electoral process with their immediate need for protection from an unprecedented level of barbarism being perpetrated—not as a reaction, but as a strategy to eliminate Palestinians politically and physically?

The approach of boycotting the elections, and potentially deepening Israel’s international illegitimacy, may have been valid and legitimate years ago. Today, however, it could seem to many Palestinians like a luxury—and even counterproductive. Participation in elections is driven by the fact that avenues for political mobilization have drastically shrunk, as the Israeli regime increasingly applies many of the repressive tactics routinely used against Palestinians in the West Bank to Palestinians inside Israel who hold Israeli citizenship since 1948.

So it is a deep paradox that Palestinians residing across the entire Palestinian geography find themselves engaged in elections within radically different institutional and legal systems, yet under one overarching structure of apartheid and settler-colonial rule. As Palestinians on both sides of the Green Line enter new electoral cycles, they therefore face a dilemma that goes far beyond the familiar question of whether to vote.

Can elections revive Palestinian politics without further institutionalizing the fragmentation of the Palestinian people? Can each Palestinian community respond to its immediate dangers and concrete needs without losing its consciousness of being part of one people? And can electoral participation be connected to a long-term strategy of liberation rather than becoming a substitute for it?

These questions are particularly urgent because the majority of Palestinian political parties and factions, as well as many independent activists and public figures, have decided to engage in the electoral process not out of a conviction that elections can dismantle the genocidal apartheid regime, or could bring a better alternative alternative government, but because they believe that the existing fascist Zionist coalition poses a real and existential danger and must therefore be ousted from power.

Even where there is no expectation that an alternative government would fundamentally alter the structures of domination, electoral participation is seen by many as a necessary means of confronting immediate threats. Other political options, including an electoral boycott, could theoretically have been pursued and mobilized more powerfully under different political circumstances.

At the same time, voices associated with one-state initiatives and campaigns have increasingly warned that political participation, if detached from a consciousness that transcends the reality of partition, risks further entrenching the fragmentation of the Palestinian people.

Without systematically educating the different Palestinian constituencies and communities about their common national identity, their connection to one another, and their shared liberation project across historic Palestine and the diaspora, electoral politics can become another mechanism through which colonial partition is reproduced.

The deeper dilemma, therefore, is not simply participation versus boycott, but between politics that manages fragmentation and politics based on strategic vision that seeks to overcome it in the long run. In other words, while engaging in elections, the strategic vision must be present, through education and analysis, of the nature of the zionist regime, and the necessity to replace it with a democratic polity where all could live equally.

About the Paradox

In Israel proper, Palestinian parties are preparing for another Knesset election, debating how to rebuild their fragmented political representation, how to confront the growing strength of the fascist Israeli far right, and how to protect Palestinian communities from escalating repression and material insecurity.

Currently, Arab political parties, along with independent activists and public figures, are also struggling to bring back a political party, ironically one with an Islamic ideology, from its involvement in a bizarre political course: rejoining a right-wing alternative government, a conduct that many have described as a betrayal.

Many Palestinians don’t cease wondering how a Palestinian party, a splinter Islamist party, could prefer cooperation and collaboration with Zionist right-wing settler parties to cooperating and joining a broad coalition of palestinan parties planning to run for election on one list. Therefore, multiple voices have been calling to excommunicate this party.

In the occupied Palestinian territories, the call for elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council has revived a different but related demand: political renewal, democratic representation, and an end to the prolonged stagnation of Palestinian political institutions.

The institutional circumstances are profoundly different. Palestinian citizens of Israel are voting within the political institutions of a state that declares itself a Jewish state, denies their collective national equality, continually incites against them—including, recently, against doctors and health workers in Israeli hospitals—and is committing genocide against their people. Palestinians in the West Bank are being asked to elect Palestinian institutions that operate under occupation and colonial rule and without sovereignty.

Yet the political dilemma confronting both communities is connected by a deeper question: can elections become a means of reviving Palestinian politics without further entrenching the fragmentation of the Palestinian people?

This is the paradox that deserves to stand at the center of the Palestinian electoral debate.

For Palestinians in each part of historic Palestine, elections in their current form inevitably respond to immediate and concrete needs. Inside Israel, participation can provide a political space from which to confront discriminatory policies, defend land and housing rights, resist the far right, protect civic freedoms, and address the growing dangers facing Palestinian communities.

In the occupied territories, elections can offer a means of challenging political stagnation, renewing leadership, restoring accountability, and giving Palestinians a voice after years in which their political institutions have increasingly lost legitimacy and relevance to the liberation project.

There is a long-standing popular desire to get rid of the Palestinian Authority and generate an alternative Palestinian leadership capable of endorsing a liberation project instead of maintaining a subcontractor role for the colonial apartheid regime. The decision to engage in these elections comes, observers have noted, after the failure or inability of multiple attempts and initiatives to effect change from below through grassroots mobilization—to fight the occupation, change the function of the PA, reform or rebuild the Palestine Liberation Organization, and reinvent it as a representative umbrella for all Palestinians while retaining its liberationist role.

These needs, especially the urgent need to stop the genocide in Gaza and rehabilitate its population, cannot simply be dismissed in the name of a more distant national strategy. Communities living under different legal and political conditions experience the conflict differently and face different forms of danger. A politics that ignores these differences risks becoming detached from the realities of Palestinian life.

But the opposite danger is equally serious.

If every Palestinian community organizes its political life exclusively around its immediate circumstances, elections may reinforce precisely the fragmentation that has been imposed upon the Palestinian people. Palestinians in the 1948 territories may increasingly understand themselves primarily as an Israeli minority seeking protection and equality; Palestinians in the West Bank may increasingly see their political future through the narrow framework of the collaborating Palestinian Authority and its limited institutions; Gaza, Jerusalem, and the diaspora may be treated as separate political questions rather than as parts of one national struggle.

The central question, therefore, is not whether these communities have different needs. They clearly do. The question is how these needs can be addressed without sacrificing the political consciousness that they belong to one people, whose fragmentation is itself a central feature of the colonial order.

This creates a series of difficult questions that Palestinian politics can no longer avoid.

Can elections inside Israel and elections in the occupied territories help reconnect the Palestinian national movement—or will they deepen the institutional and political divisions between its different parts?

How can each Palestinian community use the political opportunities available to it to confront its immediate dangers while preserving a common national horizon?

How can Palestinians reconcile the need for practical political intervention with the need to maintain a long-term strategy aimed at liberation from the structures of settler colonialism, apartheid, and genocidal violence?

And, perhaps most importantly, how can electoral politics serve the reconstruction of Palestinian national politics rather than become another mechanism through which the Palestinian people are governed as separate populations?

These questions become even more urgent at a moment when the existing Palestinian political system is deeply fragmented and the Israeli state is becoming increasingly repressive. The genocidal war in Gaza, the expansion of settler violence in the West Bank, the intensification of political repression inside Israel, and the continued exclusion of millions of Palestinian refugees have exposed, with renewed brutality, the limits of a political framework that treats Palestinians according to separate geographical and legal categories.

Yet these same conditions make electoral politics more complicated, not less.

For Palestinians under immediate threat, political participation cannot simply be dismissed as collaboration or accommodation. There are circumstances in which voting, parliamentary representation, and political organization provide indispensable tools for defending communities and preserving political space.

At the same time, participation becomes politically dangerous when it turns into an end in itself—when Palestinians begin to measure political success by their ability to influence an Israeli coalition or administer limited Palestinian institutions rather than by their ability to challenge the structures that produce their dispossession and subordination.

The Palestinian electoral dilemma is therefore not adequately captured by the binary of participation versus boycott.

The deeper dilemma is between politics that manages fragmentation and politics that seeks to overcome it.

This distinction is particularly important because the apparent separation between Israeli and Palestinian electoral arenas conceals a single territorial reality. Between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, Palestinians live under different legal regimes, but within an overarching structure of Israeli power. They have been divided into citizens of Israel, residents of Jerusalem, Palestinians under occupation in the West Bank, a devastated and besieged population in Gaza, and millions of refugees outside their homeland.

The fragmentation is real. The differences between these communities are real. Their political needs and immediate dangers are real.

But so is the historical and national connection between them.

The challenge for Palestinian politics is therefore not to deny these differences in the name of abstract unity, nor to allow these differences to destroy the very idea of a common Palestinian people. It is to develop a political framework capable of doing both things at once: responding seriously to the particular conditions of each community while maintaining a shared national consciousness and a common strategic horizon.

This is the real test of the coming electoral cycles.

The question is not simply who wins seats, which parties form coalitions, or whether voter turnout rises or falls. The more consequential question is whether elections can become occasions to rebuild Palestinian political agency across the Green Line—or whether they will further institutionalize the fragmentation of Palestinian politics.

The ballot box may be necessary. It may sometimes be useful. But it cannot be allowed to define the limits of Palestinian political imagination.

The strategic question is whether Palestinians can enter these different electoral arenas without losing sight of the larger struggle: the struggle to dismantle the structures of colonial domination and to build a political future in which the Palestinian people are no longer divided into separate populations whose political horizons are determined by the system that fragmented them in the first place.

– Awad Abdelfattah is a political writer and the former general secretary of the Balad party. He is the coordinator of the Haifa-based One Democratic State Campaign, established in late 2017.