Moscow’s Middle East Strategy: Balancing Influence and Risk

Russia’s response to the Iran war reflects a pragmatic strategy of influence without military entanglement: Moscow supports Tehran diplomatically to preserve their strategic partnership while maintaining economic ties with the Gulf states, safeguarding its own interests, and avoiding confrontation with the United States and Israel.

Abbas Hashemite

The recent US-Iran war highlights a key feature of Moscow’s Middle East policy: it seeks influence and regional outreach without getting trapped in another conflict. Since the start of this war, Russia has shown strong diplomatic and political support for Iran, condemned the United States and Israeli actions, and defended Iranian interests at the United Nations. However, it avoided entering this war directly. In the past few years, Moscow and Tehran have enhanced their bilateral ties, especially since the start of the Western aggression against Russia through Ukraine.

A Strategic Partnership, not a Military Alliance

Moscow’s prudent and effective foreign policy helps it build relations with regional and international powers without becoming part of a bloc

The two states signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in January 2025, covering trade, energy, and security. Under this agreement, the two countries agreed to enhance military and technological cooperation, conduct joint exercises, and share intelligence. However, this agreement did not bind either side to a mutual defense commitment. Moscow and Tehran’s relations could be described as a form of ‘dynamic alignment’. The two sides have adopted a pragmatic approach that allows them to manage bilateral differences while pursuing cooperation in areas of shared strategic interest. Both countries have shared interests in Central Asia and Afghanistan, nuclear energy, and military technology.

The Evolution of Russia–Iran Strategic Cooperation

Russia and Iran also have a history of positive relations. Iran’s confidence in Moscow’s diplomatic role culminated in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the landmark nuclear agreement. Under this deal, Iran shipped more than 25,000 pounds (about 11,000 kg) of low-enriched uranium to Russia. The Western aggression against Russia through Ukraine further strengthened this relationship. Iran emerged as the primary supplier of Shahed drones before Russia localized the manufacturing of one-way attack drones.

This further deepened military and technological cooperation between the two sides. However, this cooperation cannot be called a NATO-style alliance as it does not coerce either side to subdue the other’s enemy. Their bilateral relations and agreements commit the two sides to share information and intelligence, and cooperate against common threats, but neither side is treaty-bound to fight a war on the other side’s behalf. Moscow, on its part, is prudently managing this relationship by standing with Iran while protecting Russian interests and preserving diplomatic flexibility.

Diplomacy as an Instrument of Russian Influence

Through the Ukraine conflict, the West seeks to entrap Russia in a war of attrition to drain its resources. However, Russia has always pursued a policy of maintaining working relations with all global powers. It has a history of managing ties despite having divergent views over international issues. It has been one of the strongest critics of Israeli war crimes and genocide in Gaza. Moreover, it strongly condemned the US and Israeli attacks on Iran. Russia also raised its voice in the UN Security Council against unjust and unprovoked US-Israeli strikes in Iran. Given its regional and international influence, Moscow also offered mediation between the United States and Iran, urging diplomacy.

Balancing Tehran and the Gulf States

Despite its strong ties with Iran, Russia has prudently managed its relations with the UAE and Gulf states. Western sanctions have enhanced the UAE’s economic significance for Russia, making it an increasingly important partner for trade, finance, and access to international markets. Over the past few years, bilateral trade has expanded, and Russian banks have established financial channels through the UAE. According to the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, bilateral trade volume reached approximately $12 billion in 2025. This demonstrates Moscow’s prudent, effective foreign policy, which helps it manage relations with regional and international powers without becoming part of a bloc. It also shows how Russia is leveraging diplomatic engagement to mitigate the economic impact of Western sanctions.

Iran, for its part, relies on Russian military and political support to counterbalance Western influence over many regional and international actors. Because of Western influence, most of the regional and international states have already turned against Iran. However, Russia is one of the few countries that have strongly supported Iran on international forums. Under the prevailing circumstances, Moscow pursues a pragmatic foreign policy, maintaining relations with competing regional actors while safeguarding its strategic interests and policy autonomy. Moscow’s role in the UN Security Council, its offer to mediate between the United States and Iran, and its management of diplomatic relations with all the major powers present it as a strategically autonomous actor seeking to preserve its influence while avoiding direct military confrontation. This approach helps Moscow to maintain its global stature without committing its resources and capabilities in any foreign military crisis.

Abbas Hashemite is a political observer and research analyst for regional and global geopolitical issues. He is currently working as an independent researcher and journalist

Beijing’s Diplomacy toward the United States; From Extending the Trade Truce to Maintaining the Balance in West Asia

SCFR Online – Opinion: The three-day visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Washington and his meeting with Donald Trump on September 24 and 25, 2026, accompanied by a ceremonial welcome at Andrews Air Force Base, was more a diplomatic display for managing the level of tensions than an indication of a breakthrough achievement in relations between the two powers.

Dr. Mohammad Mehdi Mozafari – University Professor

On the eve of this visit, a narrative emerged in some Western media outlets, such as Reuters, claiming that China had agreed to cooperate with the United States in pressuring Iran in exchange for concessions on the Taiwan issue. However, an assessment of the tangible outcome of this meeting shows that the achievement of the two sides was limited to extending the two-month “trade truce” until January 10, 2027, and that in numerous areas, such as artificial intelligence technology and regional security arrangements—with the exception of an initial agreement on establishing a preliminary working dialogue channel in the field of artificial intelligence—no comprehensive and breakthrough agreement was reached.

Statements by U.S. officials about setting a red line for Beijing regarding Iran, and, in contrast, Xi Jinping’s official emphasis solely on the “need to de-escalate the crisis and the necessity of returning to diplomacy and dialogue,” indicate that Beijing is not prepared to accept Washington’s agenda toward West Asia, and that any claim regarding a “Beijing–Washington deal over Iran” lacks an evidentiary basis.

China’s Objectives toward the United States and Iran’s Place in Beijing’s Calculations

To understand Beijing’s conduct, its objectives must be carefully distinguished along the two interconnected dimensions of the United States and Iran:

China’s objectives toward the United States: China’s first and fundamental objective is to contain Washington’s unilateralism, buy time to complete strategic value chains, and avoid direct economic or military confrontation. Beijing prefers to manage trade tensions in order to consolidate the position of the “Belt and Road Initiative” and its dominance in the technology market. Therefore, China will never sacrifice its vital interests to Washington’s unilateral demands, because it knows that retreating in the face of U.S. pressure will increase Washington’s appetite for excessive demands.

China’s relations with Iran; a strategic but asymmetric and functional partnership: Although Tehran and Beijing have signed the “25-Year Comprehensive Cooperation Plan” (strategic partnership agreement), Beijing’s operational approach shows that this document is still far from full realization and implementation, and China’s approach to relations with Iran is based on an “asymmetric and functional partnership.” The volume of China’s official trade with the countries bordering the Persian Gulf, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, is far greater than with Iran, and China has always sought to maintain a balance between its relations with Tehran and the Arab capitals. Nevertheless, Iran is considered one of China’s important suppliers of crude oil outside the dominance of the dollar, and as an actor opposed to U.S. unilateralism, it makes it more difficult for the Trump administration to advance its hegemonic and expansionist policies in West Asia and throughout the world. Therefore, under current circumstances, China does not turn Iran into a direct instrument for bargaining with the United States and seeks to prevent the weakening and complete defeat of Iran vis-à-vis the United States. At the same time, however, it will not sacrifice its security or economic relations with the United States to Iran’s expectations and demands, and it is pursuing a cautious, interest-driven and equivocal policy.

Roadmap and Recommendations

At a time when the United States has responded negatively to Iran’s peace plan for reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and given the continuation of the maritime and economic blockade, banking sanctions, and instability of conventional trade routes, Iran can place the following measures on its agenda:

Strengthening and formalizing non-governmental financial and settlement mechanisms (stabilizing barter channels and CIPS):
Given Iran’s complete loss of banking access to the dollar system and SWIFT, one proposed approach is to use non-Western systems in which the United States has no role. In this regard, China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System, known as CIPS, is a relatively low-risk solution for increasing Iran’s financial and commercial interactions with other countries. The Central Bank, with the support of the diplomatic apparatus, should consolidate the stability of special financial mechanisms (dedicated financial channels) and small financial institutions with no dealings with the United States, such as intermediary platforms and non-governmental settlement systems like CIPS based on the yuan, within the framework of direct institutional agreements with China.

Converting oil revenues into barter credits to procure essential goods, medicines, parts, and intermediate goods should be transformed from a temporary measure into a sustainable and institutionalized directive equipped with a diplomatic support umbrella.

Focusing on land and rail transit instead of high-risk maritime and air routes:
Under conditions in which air transport and conventional maritime trade are subject to close monitoring and pressure, Iran should prioritize the immediate completion and utilization of land corridors (through the China–Central Asia–Iran route). Activating Central Asian rail lines and road transit would make it possible to exchange goods away from the reach of Western interventionist fleets in open waters.

Proactive diplomacy ahead of the Shenzhen (APEC) and Miami (G20) summits:
In the final months of the current year (November 2026), China will host the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit for the third time. Given China’s hosting of this summit, as well as China’s participation in the G20 summit in Miami (December 2026), the diplomatic apparatus should, before these meetings, conduct the necessary consultations with the Chinese side through intensive diplomatic consultations at an appropriate level, so that Iran’s security, political, and economic conditions are clearly communicated and Beijing does not enter into a deal over Iran in its de-escalatory engagement with Trump.

Countering the Western psychological war and realistically managing domestic public expectations:
The public diplomacy apparatus should, through precise positions, explain to public opinion the reality that, despite the strategic partnership agreement, under the country’s current circumstances, expectations of China as an interest-driven actor in the international arena should remain realistic.

Accurately explaining this issue will simultaneously neutralize rumors and the psychological warfare of Western media regarding an “East–West deal over Iran” and prevent the emergence of “protracted political disputes” or “unwarranted turmoil and false excitement in the domestic market.”

An Analysis of Saudi Arabia’s Behavior toward the Triangle of Iran, America, and Yemen

SCFR Online - Opinion: Riyadh, amid the Iran war, Yemeni pressure, and ambiguous Washington guarantees, has turned to flexible balancing in order to both preserve its security and increase its bargaining power.

Abbas Daraei – Expert on West Asian Affairs

Saudi Arabia’s behavior cannot be explained merely by a fixed alliance with America or a possible direct confrontation with Iran. The US and Israeli regime war against Iran and the intensification of the conflict in Yemen have compelled Riyadh to strike a balance between sole reliance on Washington’s military power, protection of vital infrastructure, prevention of the war’s expansion, and preservation of its own economic development programs. Saudi Arabia still needs America, but at the same time it seeks to reduce the cost of complete dependence on a single foreign patron.

Saudi Arabia’s economy; resilient but vulnerable

One of the outcomes of the recent crisis has been the exposure of the gap between Saudi Arabia’s financial capacity and the physical vulnerability of its economy. The Atlantic Council report, in a hypothetical stress test, has examined a complete halt of Saudi oil exports until the end of 2026. According to this scenario, approximately 75 billion dollars of oil export revenue and 203 billion riyals of the Saudi government’s oil revenues would be lost; however, financial reserves, foreign assets, borrowing capacity, and the relatively low ratio of government debt to GDP can prevent the immediate transformation of the shock into a financial crisis.

But the same report warns that Saudi Arabia’s economy may face an “infrastructure and geopolitical shock” before “financial failure.” Oil production has declined from about 10.9 million barrels per day in February to 6.2 million barrels per day in August, and the east-west pipeline, designed to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, had an operational capacity of about 4 to 5 million barrels per day before the September 10 and 11 attacks; therefore, Riyadh has the financial resources to withstand part of the shock, but it cannot fully replace a damaged refinery or pipeline with money.

Yemen and Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability chain

The intensification of Ansarullah’s attacks has increased this vulnerability further. Published reports speak of the expansion of missile and drone threats against Riyadh, Yanbu, Taif, and southern areas, as well as increased pressure on shipping in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb. The International Crisis Group report also considers the US and Israeli regime war against Iran as one of the factors behind the renewed intensification of the conflict on the Yemen front and emphasizes that Ansarullah’s attacks have increased pressure on Saudi oil exports and shipping.

As a result, the Persian Gulf, Saudi territory, the east-west pipeline, and the Red Sea have become a single security chain. The alternative route to Hormuz is also not immune, and the “Responsible Statecraft” website argues that attacks on oil facilities, pipelines, and export routes have shown that Saudi Arabia’s sole reliance on American power does not necessarily mean Washington’s ability to prevent any attack.

Washington’s guarantee; real support or ambiguous?

In these circumstances, Marco Rubio’s statements about America’s adherence to defense commitments toward Saudi Arabia are important for Riyadh, but the scope of this commitment is not clear. Rubio said Washington “will fulfill its commitments,” but did not say that in the event of the crisis’s escalation, America would enter the war directly. Analyses by the Persian Gulf Studies Center and Chatham House also distinguish between military support and direct entry; US support can include equipment, intelligence, satellite imagery, operational planning, and defense reinforcement.

Here, the gap between “reliable security” from Riyadh’s perspective and “sufficient support to maintain the balance” from Washington’s perspective becomes apparent. On the other hand, “Responsible Statecraft” believes that the “America First” approach drives regional partners toward reducing dependence on a foreign power.

Saudi Arabia between Washington, Ankara, Islamabad, and Beijing

The establishment of the Makkah Joint Defense Pact among Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey is important in this same framework. This pact is not a substitute for the security alliance with America, but it can add a complementary layer to Riyadh’s security. The International Crisis Group also considers the Red Sea arrangements and the R4 group, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan, as part of a more diverse security structure around the Red Sea.

China is another complementary option. “Responsible Statecraft” argues that the pressure of war can bring Riyadh and Beijing closer; but this does not mean a complete replacement of America, rather it is because China simultaneously has relations with Iran and the Persian Gulf countries and can play a complementary role in economy, technology, and diplomacy. In this way, Saudi Arabia can create a kind of “security multilayering” in which America remains the main source of military support, Pakistan and Turkey remain regional partners, and China remains an economic and diplomatic partner.

Iran’s diplomatic opportunity

For Iran, this situation can create an opportunity to redefine relations with Riyadh. The common point of the two countries is the necessity of preventing the war from spilling over into energy facilities, shipping routes, and the regional economy. Therefore, dialogue about the security of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, protection of energy infrastructure, non-targeting of civilian facilities, and crisis management can, alongside geopolitical competition, become an area of common interests.

This approach is more important in circumstances where Saudi Arabia is assessing the limitations of the US security guarantee. Riyadh may still rely on Washington, but the experience of attacks on its territory and infrastructure has shown that the deterrent power of a foreign ally is not necessarily identical to the ability to prevent all war costs for a regional partner.

Ultimately, Saudi Arabia’s behavior must be understood within the framework of a multifaceted policy: maintaining the alliance with America, developing regional security arrangements, preventing the Yemen war from becoming attritional, protecting the economic program, and expanding ties with China and other powers. This approach does not necessarily mean distancing from Washington, but rather an attempt to reduce the risk of complete dependence.

For Iran, the most important message of this development is that the gap between “America’s security commitment” and “Saudi Arabia’s real security” can become an arena for diplomacy. The recent crisis has increased Riyadh’s incentive for security diversification and maintaining a communication channel with Tehran; in such circumstances, the sustainable security of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea has become more dependent than ever on regional mechanisms and dialogue among the main powers.

Tehran’s Preparedness for Peace or Multi-Front Warfare

Amid ongoing military-political and economic pressure from the US and Israel, Iran is demonstrating full readiness for fierce resistance and a protracted multi-front war, while simultaneously keeping the door open for a diplomatic settlement on its own terms.

Samyar Rostami

US decision-makers have placed a multi-layered approach toward Tehran on their agenda, encompassing threatening rhetoric, economic pressure, military movements, accusation-mongering, and psychological-media manipulation.

Washington is seeking to simultaneously place on its agenda the policies of “crisis escalation,” “security surprise,” “deceptive diplomacy,” and “surprise action.”

Washington’s Multidimensional Pressure

Many in Iran believe there is a large-scale campaign of psychological and intelligence operations. This targets Iran, the Axis of Resistance, and Iranian public opinion.

Several main goals are being pursued: Instilling a sense of defeat, intimidating society, reducing resilience to new shocks, deepening divisions and eroding trust in the establishment, fomenting insecurity, strikes, unrest, discord, and tension in Iran.

Moreover, Iran’s position is that it will not enter nuclear negotiations as long as the Strait of Hormuz issue remains unresolved

The US also uses psychological warfare against Iran. This includes a multi-faceted campaign of historical claims, terrorism accusations, and unfounded allegations aimed at Tehran.

While Iranian civilization has remained one of the influential sources of human civilization. Marco Rubio’s recent comments in Athens reference Xerxes’ campaign from 480 BC. He mentioned the destruction of Greek cities. This seems like an effort to create hostility toward Iran’s rich history.

Washington has increased economic pressure on Iran. It aims to isolate the country and has tightened land route closures in and out of Iran. Its approach is designed to use economic pressure to compel Iran to capitulate.

Meanwhile, while Donald Trump talks about a quick end to the war with Iran, Washington keeps up its military actions against Tehran.

The United States and Israel are in an ‘unfinished war.’ So, both Washington and Tel Aviv see continuing the conflict and weakening Iran’s power as a key strategy.

Washington is boosting its military forces and readiness to restart the war soon. It plans to deploy warships and add about 9,000 to 10,000 American troops.

The Pentagon appears to have also drawn up plans to attack Iran’s drone and missile arsenal, energy facilities, and other military targets.

Currently, the sole diplomatic engagement between Iran and the United States is based on Iran’s seven-day proposal. However, the sequencing of actions—namely, which of the two countries takes the first step—the scope of issues, and how to end the dispute remain the main challenges to reaching an agreement.

Tehran’s Readiness for Peace or Multi-Front War

Donald Trump said the U.S. won’t take military action against Iran until after the congressional elections on November 3, 2026. However, in the past phases of the war, Iran faced military strikes even while diplomatic talks were happening.

Messages from Iranian officials indicate that Tehran is prepared for any scenario—war or diplomacy.

Moreover, more and more people in Iran are embracing the idea that, If you want peace, prepare for war. Tehran sees a big win for the Axis of Resistance. They view the expulsion of American forces from Iraq as a success. Also, Ansarallah is making strides. Meanwhile, the crisis is growing in Gaza, Lebanon, the West Bank, and Syria.

In fact, what is happening in Yemen, Iraq, and other fronts of the Axis of Resistance constitutes a major geopolitical development in Iran’s favor. Emerging forces will change the region’s politics and security. They will also boost the resistance efforts in the area. Plans aim to protect the political structure and social order. They also include steps to counter future threats. Washington seems to have missed how much Iranians cherish their homeland and its independence. Many Iranians, regardless of their political views, think the United States wants to destroy Iran or make it submit.

Economic pressures on the Iranian people are clear. However, Iran’s history shows strong resilience. Their experience in facing external pressures and sanctions has definitely grown. Therefore, despite differences in preferences between officials and political currents, they effectively do not accept Washington’s extensive pressure.

Tehran says the Strait of Hormuz can reopen if the naval blockade on Iran is lifted. They also want Washington to return to its signature in the Islamabad Understanding. From Tehran’s perspective, it will not reopen the Strait of Hormuz until the seven conditions under the Islamabad Understanding are fulfilled.

Iran emphasizes reciprocal actions and an end to unilateral demands; therefore, it does not accept a process based solely on Washington’s demands. From Tehran’s view, it is unacceptable to include the nuclear issue in the upcoming negotiations. From Iran’s perspective, the security of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz is indigenous and regional, and no extra-regional power has the right to threaten, maintain a hegemonic presence in, or intervene in these waters.

Moreover, over the past months, Iran has become more resilient. The strengthening of targeting, military tactics, the indigenization of the defense industry, the production of strategic weapons,, and Iran’s navy and defense capabilities have enabled it to confront a protracted war.

In the concept of defense in depth, defenders make efforts to subject the attacker’s combat power to pressure and attack before it reaches the point of effectiveness. In any conflict, Iran may consider U.S. military bases, logistics centers, airports, and support infrastructure in the region as valid targets. Deployed warships could also be included. In fact, while Washington seeks to keep more military pressure options at its disposal, Iran will seek to raise the cost of using those options.

Tehran’s response may be comprehensive. It aims to deter countries from participating in or facilitating military operations against Iran. This reaction could extend beyond the Middle East. That is, the next war may spread to a broader geography. Even if Europeans participate in the war against Iran, they will not be immune. In diplomacy, Tehran has clearly stated its terms for ending the war. This comes from many logical reasons, America’s history, and distrust of Washington.

Hassan Qashqavi, spokesman for the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Parliament, recently emphasized the persistence of Iran’s seven conditions in the seven-day plan. He stated, “These conditions have been determined by the highest authorities of the system. They cannot be changed or violated at various levels of decision-making.” Therefore, maintaining Iran’s seven conditions is both logical and decisive. Moreover, Iran’s position is that it will not enter nuclear negotiations as long as the Strait of Hormuz issue remains unresolved.

Iran and Oman have successfully concluded their consultation process about the geographical coordinates for safe inbound and outbound routes in the Strait of Hormuz.

Outlook:

Even if the United States postpones action on Iran until after its own elections, Tehran might see this as a tactic to buy time for further military preparations. If three aircraft carriers were simultaneously present in the Middle East, with more than 20,000 sailors and Marines deployed at sea and hundreds of aircraft in the region, it would be the first such situation since 2003.

Therefore, the option of a high-intensity war, the possibility of employing high-intensity means, the destruction of facilities, and even mass killing against Iran undoubtedly exist. But the scenario of aggressive, high-intensity action by the United States and Israel to strike at Iran’s leaders or its nuclear and strategic facilities is more likely. In a situation where the United States and Israel possess the necessary motivation for confrontation with Iran, Iran has also placed strategic contingencies for countering the aggressive policy on its agenda.

Although Iran is bearing a high economic cost, in the view of many Iranians, enduring economic hardships to defend Iran is necessary. Any attempt to occupy or dismember the country will be met with resistance. Iran’s potential response—combining missile capability, defense readiness, multi-front warfare, and national will—will entail high and long-term costs and consequences for any anti-Iranian military action. One likely scenario is that maintaining the status quo—naval blockade and economic pressure—costs the opposing side less than going to war. In contrast, Tehran’s strategy will likely be to compel Washington to end its policy of containing Iran. However, the opportunity for diplomacy still exists. ‘Decisions in progress’ are not final; they change, are revived, and keep the situation in flux.

In practice, there is no military solution or one based on more sanctions. A resolution based on negotiation, justice, fairness, and diplomacy is the only win-win option. Thus, the final agreement between Iran and the United States may closely resemble the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding.

Samyar Rostami, а political observer and senior researcher in international relations

London’s Gamble with Military Support for Actions against Yemen

SCFR Online - Opinion: London's decision to provide military support to Saudi Arabia in the Yemen file, beyond a limited aerial mission, could confront Britain with broad legal, security, economic, and strategic consequences.

Hamid Khoshayand – Expert on Regional Affairs

Although the British government has sought to downplay the issue of dispatching a Voyager refueling aircraft to the region as merely responding to Saudi Arabia’s request for “defensive and temporary support,” this action cannot be assessed merely within this limited framework. Such a decision will, in practice, increase the level of London’s involvement in one of the most complex and attritional regional wars. Let us not forget that Saudi Arabia has for years faced serious difficulties in managing the consequences of this war.

At the same time, the question arises whether London can, through limited missions, both maintain its position among the countries of the southern littoral of the Persian Gulf and remain distant from the consequences of deeper involvement in the Yemen file? Considering that Washington has also not given a direct commitment to extensive military entry into this file, an increased British role could broaden the scope of responsibility and risks of this decision for that country.

Historical and strategic dimensions of Britain’s presence in Yemen

Britain’s role in Yemen cannot be examined only from 2015. Aden and the southern coasts of Yemen were, from the nineteenth century, part of the communication and maritime structure of the British Empire between India, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Suez Canal. Bab el-Mandeb is also not merely a regional strait; it is the chokepoint of communication between the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea and the Suez route, and its security is linked to the commercial and maritime interests of foreign powers, including Britain.

The record of Britain’s presence in Yemen over the past 15 years has also continued from managing the political transition after 2011 to direct military presence on Yemeni soil and now support for Saudi air capability. Official British parliamentary documents show that London, in addition to selling weapons to Saudi Arabia, accelerated the delivery of guided bombs after the war began in 2015, increased training in targeting and the use of weapons, and deployed its liaison officers at Saudi headquarters. In the first year of the war alone, an export license for approximately 3.3 billion pounds of weapons to Saudi Arabia was issued.

This record shows that Britain’s role has not remained limited to political support and has in parts approached operational cooperation; an issue that can increase London’s political and legal responsibility.

Legal and reputational consequences

From a legal perspective, British military support can have considerable consequences for that country. Published documents show that British Royal Air Force refueling aircraft supported US attacks on Yemen in 2025, and the Pentagon assessed that these attacks “very likely” led to 281 civilian casualties.

Human Rights Watch has also warned that British participation “may make this country complicit in war crimes.” Undoubtedly, the continuation of this path can provide the ground for international legal cases, diplomatic pressures, increased public criticism, and damage to Britain’s credibility in the field of human rights. From this perspective, the reputational blow of supporting military operations is one of the most important consequences London will face.

Economic and security consequences for Britain

British officials have declared the purpose of this action to be preserving maritime routes and preventing an increase in the cost of living in Britain. However, the continuation of military support for one side of the war can also work against this goal; because the intensification or prolongation of the conflict increases insecurity on maritime routes.

Any disruption in Bab el-Mandeb can increase energy prices, shipping insurance costs, and the price of goods, and intensify inflationary pressure in Europe and Britain. As a result, a policy pursued with the aim of protecting trade and containing domestic costs can, if maritime insecurity continues, increase part of those very costs and place greater pressure on households and the British economy.

The risk of expanding the conflict and eroding Britain’s capability

British support, even if limited and indirect, can be effective in the continuation of military operations against Yemen and increase the risk of further expansion or attrition of the war. Ansarullah officials have also considered this action a sign of London’s direct participation in military operations against Yemen. The formation of such a perception can expose Britain’s interests in the region, from ships and bases to companies and its nationals, to retaliatory actions.

On the other hand, Britain’s simultaneous entry into several military arenas, including Ukraine and East Asia, also raises the issue of strategic overreach and intervention beyond this country’s capacity. Increasing military commitments can put London’s financial, military, and political resources under pressure; especially in circumstances where Washington’s support for direct and extensive entry into the Yemen file is not certain.

Also, the continuation of this policy can intensify domestic debates about mission transparency, legal responsibility, and its costs in the British Parliament and public opinion; therefore, the consequences of supporting Saudi Arabia in Yemen are not limited to the battlefield and can also affect Britain’s regional position and foreign policy capacity.

Britain’s military support for Saudi Arabia in the war against Yemen can be analyzed within the framework of London’s long-term effort to maintain regional influence and secure trade and energy routes, but the expansion of this role can create new costs and responsibilities for Britain. Legal and reputational consequences, increased security risks, pressure on trade and energy routes, and the possibility of erosion of military and political capability are among the most important of these consequences.

From this perspective, continuing the current path can involve London further in a war from which exit will not be easily possible and whose costs may exceed the expected short-term benefits. Accordingly, the extent and continuation of British support for operations related to Yemen will become one of the important issues in assessing the future role of this country in West Asia.

The Doctrine of “Cognitive-Technological Deterrence” Against the Coalition of Soft War of the West and the Israeli Regime

SCFR Online - Opinion: The expansion of artificial intelligence and influence operations has drawn the field of conflict from physical space to the perceptual and algorithmic environment and has turned cognitive deterrence into a strategic necessity.

Younes Alizadeh – Artificial intelligence expert

The future war will not only be over land and sky, and the main battlefield may be the human mind and the algorithms that shape his information, narratives, and choices. Recent developments in information warfare indicate that the boundary between psychological operations, strategic communications, cyber warfare, and artificial intelligence technology is becoming blurred. If in the past the main objective of cognitive operations was to disseminate a narrative or false news, now the more important issue is influencing the environment in which humans receive, validate, and interpret information.

Artificial intelligence has provided the possibility of producing, personalizing, distributing, and reproducing content at a speed and scale with which traditional information defense mechanisms can hardly keep pace. The Atlantic Council’s recent study on the “multilateral cognitive warfare defense network” also shows that in the assessment of American policymakers, cognition has become an arena independent of security competition, and AI tools have made influence operations faster and more extensive.

From psychological warfare to engineering the perceptual environment

The difference between cognitive warfare and traditional psychological warfare lies in its level of targeting. The goal is not necessarily to convince the audience of a specific proposition, but can be the erosion of trust, increasing confusion, intensifying polarization, and creating doubt toward information sources. In such circumstances, even if the audience does not accept a particular narrative, widespread distrust of media, institutions, and official information can itself become a strategic outcome.

The Atlantic Council, in a report on US-Japan-Taiwan cooperation, has proposed with this same understanding the creation of a joint cognitive defense network; a network relying on shared threat identification, early warning, information exchange, and coordination among government, the private sector, and civil society. This report uses the term “brain control” to describe a new level of cognitive competition and warns that individual and merely reactive responses lag behind the speed of AI-based operations. However, this report is a policy study from the perspective of US security and its allies and should not be considered a neutral assessment of all parties to the dispute.

The Valdai Discussion Club website also argues in an article that Cold War-era geopolitical models are insufficient to explain power in the age of artificial intelligence; because algorithmic influence operations, AI-enhanced cyberattacks, and automated information campaigns can affect markets, public opinion, and political decision-making without a soldier crossing a border.

The Israeli regime and transferring the battle into algorithms

The importance of artificial intelligence in cognitive warfare becomes more apparent when generative platforms and chatbots themselves become part of the competition arena. A Wired Middle East investigative report tells of a specific example: the American company “Clock Tower X,” which provides services to the Israeli regime’s government, had a contract worth 46.5 million dollars in 2026, whose stated purpose in documents registered under “FARA” was “influencing the framing results” of GPT conversations. This company has also created a collection of websites to offer favorable narratives on political and security issues.

Wired’s experiment on six chatbots, including ChatGPT, Claude, Perplexity, Copilot, Gemini, and Grok, showed that some of these systems incorporated their content into their responses without the user mentioning the websites’ names. In one case, three systems reflected in their responses a figure that a website affiliated with this campaign was promoting. Of course, the report itself emphasizes that “influencing chatbots” is not the same as “influencing public opinion,” and evidence of the two must be assessed separately.

The importance of this experiment for Iran lies in the fact that cognitive operations are no longer necessarily limited to social networks or media and may be transferred through the path of search engines, content bases, and then a chatbot’s response to the user. As a result, the war has moved from the stage of “message production” to “engineering the path of the audience’s access to information.”

The cognitive-technological deterrence doctrine for Iran

Against such an environment, Iran’s cognitive defense should not be limited merely to denying news or responding after the publication of a narrative. The logic of cognitive deterrence is that the country can identify the source of the operation, monitor the scope of its dissemination, recognize social vulnerabilities, and quickly provide the audience with narratives based on data and documentation.

The first component of such a doctrine is the creation of an indigenous cognitive defense network that analyzes media information, social network data, search trends, AI-generated content, and algorithmic behaviors in a shared structure. The goal of this network should not be controlling public opinion, but rather increasing society’s ability to recognize influence operations and distinguish news, analysis, propaganda, and fake information.

The second component is technological resilience. Complete dependence on foreign platforms and chatbots in crisis conditions can create a strategic vulnerability. Developing indigenous language models, independent search engines, domestic cloud infrastructure, archiving and fact-checking systems, and Persian language processing capabilities increases the possibility of independent analysis of the information environment. Artificial intelligence here is not merely a content production tool, and analyzing massive data and discovering coordinated patterns is also part of cognitive defense.

The third component is the regional network. Cognitive warfare does not stop at national borders, and narratives cross multiple languages and multiple platforms. Cooperation among Iran and aligned countries in exchanging information alerts, fact-checking, media literacy, and developing AI tools can increase the cost of influence operations, without turning into a one-sided military system for narrative production.

Ultimately, cognitive deterrence becomes sustainable when it is based on trust, transparency, and the credibility of information. Successful cognitive operations often feed on information vacuums; therefore, the speed of informing, providing verifiable data, accepting error, and transparent explanation of ambiguities are also part of national power. From this perspective, cognitive-technological deterrence is not the digital version of traditional propaganda warfare, but an effort to make society, information infrastructure, and AI systems resistant to manipulation. In an environment where hard war is intertwined with cyber, spatial, and cognitive warfare, maintaining fact-checking, public trust, and decision-making independence also becomes part of the deterrence equation.

Mutual Support on International Platforms: Russia and Iran on the Path to a Multipolar World

Russian-Iranian relations long ago moved beyond the framework of ordinary good-neighborliness.

Viktor Mikhin

Today this is a strategic partnership, cemented by the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signed in January 2025. The preamble of this document directly records the parties’ desire to “promote the objective process of forming a new just and sustainable multipolar world order based on the sovereign equality of states, good-faith cooperation, and mutual respect for interests.”

This is not just a diplomatic formula. Behind it lies concrete joint work at key international platforms — the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS — as well as implementation of one of Eurasia’s largest infrastructure projects: the International North–South Transport Corridor.

SCO: From Observer to Full Member

Iran’s history of participation in the SCO spans almost two decades. Since 2005, the Islamic Republic had observer status, but full membership remained impossible for a long time because of UN sanctions that restricted the country’s participation in international organizations until 2016.

Multipolarity is not a polite formula from a communiqué. It is a redistribution of power, and it does not happen without resistance

The situation changed after the sanctions restrictions were lifted. Russia consistently supported Tehran’s desire to become a full member of the organization. In July 2023, Iran officially became the ninth member of the SCO — an event difficult to overestimate from the standpoint of regional security architecture.

Russia and Iran actively coordinate their positions within the SCO. As Konstantin Kosachev, deputy speaker of the Federation Council, noted, Moscow supports Tehran’s initiatives to institutionally strengthen the organization. In particular, Iran proposed creating an SCO Parliamentary Assembly — a permanent body that would unite the legislative bodies of member states. The Russian side assessed this initiative positively, and it is not ruled out that during Russia’s chairmanship in 2027 the topic will receive further development.

SCO member states have repeatedly confirmed support for Iran’s sovereignty and advocated resolving differences exclusively by diplomatic methods. This indicates that the organization is becoming not merely a discussion platform but a real instrument for protecting the interests of its participants.

BRICS: New Opportunities for Iran

No less significant was Iran’s accession to BRICS. Russia was among the countries that “actively helped facilitate Iran’s accession to BRICS.” Today the association includes ten states: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Iran, the UAE, Indonesia, and Ethiopia. In addition, Saudi Arabia holds the status of an invited country, although it has not officially confirmed its membership.

BRICS also has a category of partner countries that can participate in certain meetings but do not hold the same status as full members and do not sign the group’s declarations. This category includes Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

The scale of BRICS is impressive: the countries of the association account for almost 45% of the planet’s population, more than a third of global GDP, and about 40% of world industrial production. For Iran, which has been under years of sanctions pressure, participation in such a structure opens fundamentally new economic opportunities.

Alexey Efimov, a representative of Russia’s Trade Representation in Iran, emphasized that Tehran’s membership in the SCO and BRICS “not only changed the regional balance but also helped strengthen economic cooperation, reduce the impact of sanctions, and expand trade on the path toward a multipolar world economic order.” According to him, within these organizations meetings of finance, transport, and agriculture ministers are held regularly, making it possible to develop common approaches and implement joint economic projects.

Of particular importance is the transition to payments in national currencies. Today more than 90% of Russia’s trade transactions with BRICS countries are conducted in national currencies. Iran is also taking active steps in this direction, which directly reduces the damage from Western sanctions.

Russian Ambassador to Iran Alexey Dedov noted that Iran’s membership in the SCO and BRICS “serves to strengthen bilateral relations to a significant extent” and creates new mechanisms for multilateral interaction. Thus, Tehran’s participation in these structures is not merely a formality but an effective instrument of joint work to shape a fairer world order.

The North–South Corridor: A Bridge Between the Baltic and the Persian Gulf

If the SCO and BRICS form the political-economic framework of a multipolar world, then the International North–South Transport Corridor becomes its material artery. This project connects Russian Baltic Sea ports with India and the Persian Gulf countries through Iranian territory.

The economic effect of the corridor is impressive. According to Russian Deputy Prime Minister Vitaly Savelyev, delivery of cargo along the North–South route takes 15 to 20 days, whereas the traditional route through the Suez Canal requires 35–45 days. Thus, travel time is cut by more than half, and logistics costs fall by 30–40%.

Over the past year, 21.5 million tons of cargo were transported along the corridor. Rail shipments toward Iran, as well as to African and Middle Eastern countries, are growing especially dynamically: container traffic in this direction increased by 60%, and travel time was reduced from 33 to 16 days.

A key link in the project is construction of the 162-kilometer Rasht–Astara railway. This section will connect Iran’s railway network with Azerbaijan’s, providing a continuous “seamless route” from the Baltic to the Persian Gulf. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk reported that surveying work on this section has already begun, and construction is actively underway.

Infrastructure achievements are not limited to the railway. A new railway bridge has been built on the border of Azerbaijan and Iran, a four-lane road bridge has been created, and construction of a new transport and logistics center on Iranian territory will be completed in the near future.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has set ambitious tasks: to double cargo traffic along the corridor and, by 2030, to triple it. Implementation of these plans will turn the North–South corridor into one of the key routes of Eurasian trade, an alternative to sea routes controlled by Western countries.

Multipolarity Not in Words but in Real Deeds

Mutual support between Russia and Iran on international platforms is still perceived by many in the West as diplomatic etiquette — as a ritual exchange of pleasantries between two “outcasts” who have no one else to talk to. This is a dangerous misconception. Behind it lies a conscious, carefully calibrated, and consistently implemented strategy of two sovereign states aimed at building a multipolar world — a world in which decisions are made not by a narrow group of Western capitals but by a broad circle of participants representing all the main civilizations of the planet.

And most importantly, this strategy is already producing results. It is measured not by declarations but by numbers: shares of GDP, tons of cargo, kilometers of rails, percentages of payments in national currencies.

Sanctions, conceived as a noose, worked as a catalyst. It was not possible to isolate Iran and Russia — they were pushed toward each other, and then together — into the SCO, into BRICS, toward the North–South corridor. Those who counted on division got a linkage. Those who bet on blockade got alternative routes, alternative payments, and alternative institutions. This is perhaps the main geopolitical paradox of the last decade: the harder the pressure, the tighter the union became.

But institutions without infrastructure are a framework without a roof. That is why the North–South corridor is so important. Fifteen to twenty days instead of thirty-five to forty-five. Twenty-one and a half million tons of cargo in a year. A 60% increase in container traffic, a reduction in travel time from 33 to 16 days. One hundred sixty-two kilometers of the Rasht–Astara railway, which close the “seamless route” from the Baltic to the Persian Gulf. This is not an abstraction — it is concrete, steel, and railroad ties. It is a route that passes by Suez, by Malacca, by Hormuz — by all those narrow points where Western fleets have grown accustomed to feeling like masters. Eurasia is getting its own transport artery, and with it its own logic of trade and its own resilience to external pressure.

And here it is worth saying directly. Multipolarity is not a polite formula from a communiqué. It is a redistribution of power, and it does not happen without resistance. Those who for decades have grown accustomed to dictating the rules will not give them up voluntarily. But history does not ask permission. It simply goes — along the Rasht–Astara rails, through the summit halls of the SCO and BRICS, through payment systems in which there is less and less dollar and more and more yuan, rial, and ruble.

Russia and Iran are not asking for a place in the sun — they are taking it. They are not waiting for someone to let them into another’s house — they are building their own. And they are doing it together.

The new world order will not be announced from a podium. It is already being built — quietly, persistently, in concrete and steel. And Russia and Iran are among those holding these blueprints in their hands.

Viktor Mikhin, writer, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, specialist on the Arab countries of the Near and Middle East