Thursday, March 12, 2026

Pakistani cleric declares Ayatollah Khamenei a martyr

A leading Islamic scholar and a member of Pakistan’s National Assembly, Moulana Fazl ur Rehman, declared Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei a martyr, signalling a major moment in Sunni–Shia geopolitical relations.

By SAYED RIDHWAAN MOHAMED

Moulana Fazl ur Rehman (second from right), the leader of Pakistan’s Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam-F, holds a high-level meeting with the Iranian Ambassador to Pakistan, Reza Amiri Moghadam (left), to express solidarity with the Iranian people. During the discussion, the Moulana called for unity within the Muslim world and urged that the Ummah confront Zionism collectively rather than turning against one another. (Photo: Facebook/ @MoulanaOfficial)
In a landmark diplomatic event that has redefined Sunni–Shia geopolitical relations, Moulana Fazl ur Rehman, the world-renowned Islamic scholar and president of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI-F), declared the late Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, a martyr (shaheed).

The declaration took place on Tuesday, March 3, 2026, during a high-level visit to the Iranian Embassy in Islamabad. The visit followed the death of the Supreme Leader on March 1 during a US–Israel military attack. As a Member of the National Assembly and the khalifah of the late Hadhrat Moulana Yusuf Ludhyanwi (RA), Moulana Fazl ur Rehman’s use of the title ‘shaheed’ carries significant theological and political weight, effectively bridging a centuries-old denominational divide in the face of a common external threat.

The JUI-F solidified this stance through its official social media channels, which published a message mourning the ‘martyrdom’ of Ayatollah Khamenei. The declaration signals a strategic shift for the party, moving from traditional diplomatic courtesy to a full ideological embrace of the Iranian ‘Resistance Front’.

During the visit, Moulana Fazl ur Rehman was received by Iranian Ambassador Reza Amiri Moghadam. In a moment of high symbolic value, the Moulana sat before a framed portrait of the late leader while recording his reflections in the official condolence book. He described the death as a sacrifice for the liberation of Al-Quds and asserted that Iran is currently serving as the ‘front line’ for the defence of Palestine against ‘Zionist-European aggression’.

Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam-F leader, Moulana Fazl ur Rehman, records his sentiments in the official condolence book at the Iranian Embassy in Islamabad following the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Standing before a portrait of the late leader, the Moulana formally recognised the Supreme Leader as a martyr and strongly condemned the foreign military aggression. (Photo: Facebook/ @MoulanaOfficial)

The Moulana offered a sharp critique of the current geopolitical climate, labelling the military strikes a ‘second wave of aggression’ targeting Iran for its support of Hamas. He further questioned the validity of peace efforts led by the US administration, characterising President Donald Trump and his cabinet as ‘criminals’ whose involvement in the region remains a ‘stain on the name of peace’.

This forward-thinking leadership style prioritises the sovereignty of the Muslim Ummah over historical sectarian disputes, an effort to neutralise the ‘sectarian card’ often utilised by foreign powers to divide the region.

The South African tour and regional divergence

The Moulana’s global influence was previously highlighted during his tour of South Africa earlier this year. Addressing many ulama, students, leaders and media in Johannesburg and Durban, he urged the community to ‘look beyond their borders’ and understand the interconnected nature of global Islamic struggles.

However, a distinct factual divergence remains. While the Moulana was hosted with immense respect by senior South African figures, no major Sunni Muslim organisation in the country has followed his lead in adopting the title of martyr for the Iranian leader. While South African bodies have condemned the ‘murderous acts’ of foreign regimes, they have maintained a policy of traditional theological caution.

In fact, the Jamiatul Ulama KwaZulu-Natal issued a statement emphasising a ‘principled approach’, noting that while they condemn foreign aggression, they do not grant the status of ‘martyr’ or ‘hero’ to the late Iranian leader, citing Iran’s regional policies. This contrast underscores Moulana Fazl ur Rehman’s unique position as a leader willing to bypass traditional theological caution in favour of a unified ‘Resistance Front’ on this matter.

Following his embassy visit, Moulana Fazl ur Rehman called for an in-camera session of the Pakistani Parliament to fundamentally rethink the nation’s security doctrine. His leadership suggests that the future of the Muslim world depends on a unified front that transcends sectarian labels in favour of strategic resistance against external military intervention.

US-Israeli strikes can raze buildings, but they cannot extinguish Iranian identity

The lessons of 1953 resonate now more than ever, as regional escalation risks triggering decades of unintended consequences

Seyed Hossein Mousavian

Protesters gather with Iranian national flags during a demonstration in support of the government and against US and Israeli strikes, in Tehran on 28 February 2026 (Atta Kenare/AFP)
The new round of coordinated military attacks by the United States and Israel against Iran marks a dramatic escalation in an already volatile confrontation. 

The strikes, capping months of tensions since a previous wave of attacks in 2025, have pushed the region into one of its most dangerous moments in decades. 

At a time when diplomatic channels had reportedly shown signs of progress, the renewed use of force has raised urgent questions about legality, legitimacy and the long-term consequences for regional and international security.

There is a broad global consensus that the US-Israeli military campaign constitutes a clear violation of the United Nations Charter and international law

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, except in cases of self-defence or with Security Council authorisation. No such authorisation was granted, and international legal scholars have long emphasised that preventive or regime-change wars fall outside the Charter framework.

This is not the first time that Washington has faced accusations of undermining international legal commitments in relation to Iran. In 2018, the US withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal, despite the agreement’s endorsement by the UN Security Council. The withdrawal was widely criticised by European governments and other signatories, including Russia and China

Now, through direct military strikes against Iran, Washington has been accused of violating core principles of the UN Charter - particularly those related to sovereignty, the prohibition on the use of force, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.

Political consciousness

History weighs heavily on current events. In 1953, the US, in collaboration with the UK, orchestrated a coup that overthrew Iran’s democratically elected prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh

The consequences of that intervention shaped Iranian political consciousness for decades and directly affected bilateral relations. The 1979 revolution, and the subsequent occupation of the US embassy in Tehran and hostage crisis, cannot be understood without that context. 

More than seven decades on, the shadow of 1953 still looms over US-Iran relations. But this time, the stakes appear even higher. The US has officially called for regime change. In the course of the operation, Iran’s supreme leader and several top military commanders were assassinated

The choice now is stark: continue down a path of open-ended confrontation, or halt the escalation and return to diplomacy - before the damage becomes irreversible

The targeting of a sitting head of state marks a profound escalation. It moves beyond deterrence or limited military objectives, and enters the realm of overt regime-change policy. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the negative consequences of this action could be broader and more far-reaching than those of the 1953 coup.

Both the US-Israeli military strikes on Iran in June 2025, and the attack that began this weekend, occurred at moments when negotiations had achieved significant progress, according to Oman’s foreign minister.

Oman was a key mediator, facilitating indirect talks. The chain of events suggests that military action coincided with diplomatic momentum. From this perspective, diplomacy has effectively been sidelined, perhaps indefinitely. 

Many are convinced that the US pursued negotiations not as genuine diplomacy, but as cover, allowing it to prepare for war. When bombs fall at the height of talks, trust collapses.

The consequences of assassinating Ayatollah Ali Khamenei go far beyond the killing of an Iranian political leader. As one of the leading religious authorities in the Shia world, he held both political and theological significance. Some Shia clerics have already issued calls for retaliation, with Grand Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi in Qom, Iran, saying revenge for Khamenei’s killing was the “religious duty of all Muslims in the world to eradicate the evil of these criminals from the world”.

Attacks have already occurred against US diplomatic missions in Pakistan and Iraq, resulting in casualties. Washington may now have to confront the prospect of long-term ideological hostility among segments of the global Shia population - a dynamic that cannot be addressed through military means alone.

Immense strategic costs

The collapse of a government because of a military attack does not produce a simple or controllable outcome. Even if Washington and Tel Aviv were to succeed in bringing about a political transformation in Tehran, the strategic costs could be immense. 

For the first time since World War II, major US military bases across the region have come under sustained attack. The reputational impact on American prestige could surpass even the symbolic damage inflicted by the 1979-81 hostage crisis.

At the same time, Israel and Iran have entered what can only be described as an existential phase of conflict. Iran has sustained severe military damage, while Israel has faced the most intense strikes on its territory since its founding in 1948. 

Iran’s heavy missile attacks have exposed vulnerabilities in Israel’s security architecture, despite its advanced defence systems. The perception of invulnerability - central to deterrence - has been shaken on both sides.

Yet within hours of Khamenei’s assassination, a three-member leadership council was formed to steer the process of transition, signalling that expectations of immediate state disintegration might have been misplaced.

The US-Israeli approach is troubling for several reasons. Firstly, by assassinating Iran’s supreme leader, they crossed a red line within Iran’s governing structure. Secondly, by officially declaring that its objective is regime collapse, the US framed the conflict as existential. Iran’s response is thus perceived domestically as a defence of national survival. 

Thirdly, as anticipated, the conflict has become regional. Iran has launched missile strikes against US facilities in neighbouring countries, broadening the theatre of confrontation. The trajectory is deeply alarming: escalation breeds counter-escalation, as each side justifies its actions as defensive. 

The risks of miscalculation grow with every exchange. Energy markets are destabilised. Regional actors are drawn in. Diplomatic space shrinks.

It would be wiser for US President Donald Trump to push now for an immediate ceasefire, to prevent further catastrophe. The longer this conflict continues, the harder it will be to contain. 

Military force can destroy infrastructure and eliminate individuals, but it cannot extinguish national identity, religious conviction or historical memory. The lessons of 1953 still resonate. If history teaches anything, it is that interventions intended to secure stability often produce decades of unintended consequences.

The choice now is stark: continue down a path of open-ended confrontation, or halt the escalation and return to diplomacy - before the damage becomes irreversible.

Seyed Hossein Mousavian
is a Visiting Research Collaborator with Princeton University and a former Chief of Iran’s National Security and Foreign Relations Committee. His books: “Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace” was released in May 2014 by Bloomsbury, “A Middle East Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, published in May 2020 by Routledge. His latest book, “A New Structure for Security, Peace, and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf,” was published in December 2020 by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

'Boogeyman mullahs': How decades of anti-Iran hysteria set us on the path to war

Western portrayals of the Islamic Republic as irrational and one-dimensional, devoid of political complexity, have helped ingrain prejudice and normalise a once-unthinkable war

Nura Hossainzadeh

A man sits beside portraits of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei during a burial ceremony for a person killed in recent US-Israeli strikes, in Tehran on 9 March 2026 (Atta Kenare/AFP)
The unthinkable has happened: the United States and Israel have launched a war on Iran, now in its second week.

More than 1,300 people have reportedly been killed by American taxpayer-funded munitions, and some 100,000 displaced, while hospitals, schools, playgrounds and other civilian infrastructure have been destroyed.

The assassination of Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in the opening US-Israeli strikes on 28 February was intended to decapitate the country's leadership and advance the regime-change goals openly declared by the Trump administration.

Instead, large crowds have gathered in squares across Iran to mourn Khamenei and denounce the attack, even as the country continues to come under bombardment. Over the weekend, his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, was named the country's new supreme leader in what officials described as a show of "dignity and strength", despite threats from Israel and the US that any successor would become a target.

For many observers, this is simply the latest example of an unhinged Donald Trump leading the US down a dangerous and self-destructive path.

But the story goes beyond Trump.

The road to this war was paved long ago by people who refused to see Iranian politics as anything more than one-dimensional. This flat and uncomplicated picture has persisted in the public imagination for decades.

The war feels especially tragic to me because I spent years doing work that I hoped might prevent it.

I contended that in Khomeini's vast corpus of writings and statements he was often, put simply, a democrat

As a political science graduate student at UC Berkeley, I wrote my dissertation on Ruhollah Khomeini, leader of Iran's 1979 revolution. As a political theorist, I hoped to encourage greater understanding of, and critical engagement with, the political theory of the Islamic Republic's founding father and the political system he shaped.

The experience taught me just how deeply ingrained prejudices about Iran are in western discourse, even among many left-leaning academics who pride themselves on open discussion of controversial ideas.

My argument was certainly not one they were used to hearing. I contended that in Khomeini's vast corpus of writings and statements he was often, put simply, a democrat. His opposition to the two 20th-century Pahlavi monarchs was based in part on the way they gained political power - by force, through a coup.

Rethinking Khomeini

In 1979, Khomeini insisted that the legitimacy of Islamic government rested upon the popular referendum in which people voted in favour of creating an Islamic republic.

Khomeini made an argument, in other words, for government by the consent of the governed.

Indeed, Khomeini envisioned a strong role for Islamic legal scholars in government, ensuring that national law did not violate the shari'a. But he also said that even the most powerful legal scholar in government - the "supreme leader", as it is often rendered in the western press - must be criticised and assessed by ordinary people.

On 7 November 1979, for example, he said in a speech that the leader "is a person whose ethics, religiousness, devotion to the nation, knowledge, and action, in all of their dimensions, have been established [as commendable] in the view of the people".

This principle was incorporated into Iran's constitution. The Assembly of Experts, a popularly elected body with the power to oversee and dismiss the leader, remains in place to this day - although reformists argue it has not exercised this authority forcefully enough.

Though Khomeini sought to empower legal scholars, he also described Islamic law as "progressive and evolving" and parliament as the "highest station" in government, responsible for applying Islamic law to contemporary issues.

On several occasions after the revolution, he said publicly that elected representatives have a better sense of the country's needs than clerics and can pass necessary laws, even if doing so suspends certain provisions of shari'a law. Often, in his writings, it was unclear who - parliament or legal scholars - had the final word when it came to matters of the law.

He spent the rest of his life working out the respective powers of legal scholars and representatives.

But for many audiences, even suggesting that Khomeini's thought was more complex than commonly portrayed, and open to different interpretations, provoked hostility.

Some listeners seemed unable to see him as anything more than a caricature. I recall the angry questions, raised voices, flushed faces and hysterical denials of Khomeini's human complexity, as well as accusations that I must surely have a political agenda. 

Their reaction was, in many ways, unsurprising. The English-language literature on Khomeini's thought was itself rife with distortions. One prominent author claimed that Khomeini believed clerics should rule "on behalf of God", while another described his ideas as part of an agenda for "restructuring consciousness". Such portrayals were reinforced by media coverage and in popular culture.

By accepting this depiction of Khomeini, many academics also misread Iranian politics. They failed to see that reform in Iran might emerge within the broad framework of Islamic republicanism, and that change did not require overturning the political system.

In fact, one needed to look no further than the Islamic Republic's own founding father to find arguments for reform.

Internalised caricatures

The same misrepresentations of Iran are resurfacing in this crucial moment.

Even liberals who oppose American and Israeli military aggression can scarcely say a word in opposition to the war without first reminding us that Iranians are also suffering at the hands of their own government.

In doing so, they reveal how far caricatures of Iran have been internalised. The result is a discourse that ultimately reinforces the very imperial aggression they claim to want to contain.

This is not to say that the Islamic Republic - like any state - should not be subject to criticism, that protesters do not have the right to take to the streets, or that the state has not violated legitimate freedoms.

But simplified claims that the Iranian people are merely muzzled and oppressed gloss over the ongoing struggles within Iran for political reform. They also erase reformist voices seeking to strengthen the Islamic Republic's democratic credentials - figures such as Ahmad Zeidabadi and Mostafa Tajzadeh - who continue to speak, even if they have faced imprisonment. Reformists are weakened and persecuted, but they have not disappeared.

Reducing Iranian politics to a struggle between tyranny and resistance forecloses the possibility that Iranians may resolve their political struggles internally. It also plays directly into the hands of warmongers who claim military intervention is the only solution.

Liberals who denounce both the Islamic Republic and imperial aggression in the same breath have helped construct precisely the image of the "boogeyman mullahs" that now underpins the war on Iran.

It is no wonder that the Islamic Republic, born out of resistance to American hegemony and to a shah installed by a CIA-backed coup, has long been vilified in the centres of power it opposes.

Ayatollah Khamenei maintained his predecessor's anti-imperialist stance until he was killed by the same "bully" powers he had openly condemned for decades.

As he said in a speech last October: "Why has the US established all these military bases in various countries throughout West Asia? What are you doing here? What does this region have to do with you?"

Opponents of imperialism would do well to remember this defining feature of the Islamic Republic's politics and recognise the connection between the war now being waged on Iran and the country's refusal for nearly half a century to capitulate to hegemonic power.

Instead, Iran is once again depicted as nothing more than a force for evil in the world.

Preparing the ground

The characteristic flattening of Iran's politics was evident in media coverage of the January unrest, when Iranian protesters were killed in large numbers.

Even left-leaning outlets often depicted the events in simplistic terms, helping to condition public opinion for confrontation with the Islamic Republic.

Another factor largely ignored in western coverage was the intentional role of American sanctions in fuelling economic anger

What received far less attention was evidence suggesting the involvement of foreign actors in the unrest. 

Israeli media reported that on 29 December 2025, the Mossad Farsi account on X posted that its agents were "literally physically" present with protesters on the ground. Right-wing Israeli television presenter Tamir Morag further proclaimed that Israeli intelligence played a role in the violence, which Israel has yet to deny. 

On X, former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo brazenly posted: "Happy New Year to every Iranian in the streets. Also to every Mossad agent walking beside them." That Israeli and American intelligence agencies were sowing chaos with the aim of spilling blood and blaming the Iranian government was hardly secret

Iranian security forces certainly bear responsibility for the violence, but the situation was far more complex than had been portrayed. 

Mainstream news outlets either ignored reports of foreign agents being involved or referred to them only briefly and without serious investigation. Many also repeated an uncorroborated statistic claiming that 30,000 people had been killed, even though those reporting the figure offered no evidence to support it.

Meanwhile, estimates cited by groups such as the US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), place the toll far lower, at around 6,000, while the Iranian government puts the death toll closer to 3,000. The president's office even launched a website inviting citizens to report additional casualties.

The failure to investigate foreign-instigated violence, combined with the uncritical repetition of unverified death tolls, helped reinforce a simplistic "boogeyman" narrative, preparing hearts and minds for war.

An image grab from Iranian state television shows the site of US-Israeli strikes that hit the Shajareh Tayyebeh girls' elementary school in Minab, in Iran's southern Hormozgan province, on 28 February 2026 (IRIB TV/AFP)
An image grab from Iranian state television shows the site of US-Israeli strikes that hit the Shajareh Tayyebeh girls' elementary school in Minab, in Iran's southern Hormozgan province, on 28 February 2026 (IRIB TV/AFP)

Another factor largely ignored in western coverage was the intentional role of American sanctions in fuelling economic anger.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated openly that Washington had "engineered a dollar shortage" in order to push Iranians into the streets. Protesters undoubtedly had legitimate grievances about corruption and political freedoms, but many were also reacting to the government's inability to alleviate economic hardship caused by sanctions.

Yet coverage of the protests in The New York Times and The Guardian, like that of many other outlets, did not include a single mention of US sanctions.

To quote Bob Dylan, "And the newspapers, they all went along for the ride."

Journalists who should have the integrity and professionalism to examine issues in all their complexity were unwilling to do so when it came to Iran, just as my academic audiences could not stomach it when discussing Khomeini and the Islamic Republic.

Subduing the 'monster'

When a country is portrayed as an irrational, raging monster of a regime, what do you do with it? You subdue it.

Americans who have been fed this distorted story for decades are unlikely to object.

Ordinary people are already paying the price for Washington's refusal to pursue dialogue and diplomacy. As usual, American and Israeli bombs care little for civilian life.

War Secretary Pete Hegseth even boasted that US forces were delivering "death and destruction from the sky all day long", romanticising the sadistic violence that claims innocent lives.

That death and destruction includes 168 girls and boys killed when a strike hit the Shajareh Tayyebeh girls' elementary school in Minab on 28 February - an attack Unicef condemned as a "stark reminder of the brutality of war and violence on children".

What is the lesson here?

The road to this moment was paved by our own prejudices. When the politics of other countries are reduced to simple narratives, it becomes easier to make the case for war and wage it without meaningful opposition.

For decades, Iran has been depicted in popular discourse and academia as a regime of "mullahs" - a term often spoken with Islamophobic disdain.

Even the most educated among us struggle to see it any other way.

How can it come as a surprise that we are now at war with Iran? Do Americans know that Iran's constitution allows the Assembly of Experts to dismiss the supreme leader? Or do we prefer to drop bombs instead?

We often hear that reform candidates are prevented from running for office. But do western audiences know that Iran's constitution does not explicitly grant any institution the authority to vet candidates based solely on their political leanings?

When key aspects of Iran's political system - its constitution, reform discourse inside the country and Khomeini's own theory of Islamic government - remain unfamiliar to western audiences, why should it surprise us that we dismiss the possibility of reform and instead seek, in what will almost certainly be a futile effort, to resolve political problems with bombs?

Shamefully, in our violent and arrogant attempt to impose political reform in Iran, we stand in the way of homegrown change

Shamefully, in our violent and arrogant attempt to impose political reform in Iran, we stand in the way of homegrown change.

I say this as an American who wrote about Khomeini in the belief that showing his theory is not one-dimensional might open space for dialogue, including with conservative Iranians whose voices are rarely heard in the media and who still believe in his ideas. 

I hoped it could help prevent the horrors we are witnessing today.

At this point, all that can be done is to resist the narrative the warmongers will continue to repeat: that America and Israel are doing what needs to be done to rid the earth of an evil regime, and that Iranian and American blood must be shed for this cause.

But the truth is rarely so simple. We must oppose this war and advocate for a path forward that recognises the sovereignty of the Iranian nation and the right of its people to determine their own political future.

We must sharpen our minds and see through opportunistic portrayals of political systems beyond our borders. Our ability to live at peace - now and in the future - depends on it.

Nura Hossainzadeh
is a research fellow in the Department of Political Science at San Francisco State University. She received her PhD in political theory from UC Berkeley in 2016, and she has taught courses in political theory at UC Berkeley, Georgetown, and Princeton, as well as a course in the “great books” at Stanford.

There was no nuclear threat. US-Israeli war on Iran is blind vengeance

This short-sighted strategy of miscalculation can only lead to a greater disaster for Iranians and the region as a whole

Abdelkader Abderrahmane

Smoke rises after a strike on the Iranian capital Tehran on 3 March 2026 (Atta Kenare/AFP)
The joint attack by the US and Israel on Iran has fuelled chaos and instability that neither Washington nor Tel Aviv will be able to control. 

Defying international law and putting their own interests before those of the region’s population, the two nations claim to be motivated by the need to halt Tehran’s nuclear programme.

The reality is diametrically opposite. As a nuclear power, Iran would present a counterweight to US and Israeli military hegemony in the region, and a stronger voice of the Global South at the United Nations - a prospect that is unacceptable to Washington and Tel Aviv. 

The pretext for the joint attack on Iran fell apart almost instantly.

Omani mediators have confirmed that Iran was willing to accept dramatic curbs on its nuclear programme, to the point that it would never have enough material to create a bomb.

Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi told CBS News that Iran’s existing stockpiles of enriched uranium would be “blended to the lowest level possible” and converted into fuel, a shift that would be “irreversible”. 

Iran was also willing to grant inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency “full access” to its nuclear sites to verify the terms of the agreement, Albusaidi said. 

'Historic mistake'

Furthermore, a nuclear deal signed in 2015 between Tehran and world powers was designed to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, but US President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew from this accord in 2018. He was likely convinced to do so by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who denounced the nuclear deal as a “historic mistake”.

It is also important to look at the other drivers behind the current conflict - especially the fact that Washington has always wanted Iran to be one of its satellites in the Middle East region. 

The 1953 US-British coup against Iran’s then-prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh - who was perceived as too close to the Soviets - cemented the rule of the western-backed shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who ruled until the 1979 revolution.

Israel and the US are pursuing geopolitical and economic hegemony at the expense of the peoples of the region

The shah was a perfect ally for the US and Israel, compliant and protective of western interests. But his installation fomented deep resentment among the Iranian people, leading to the revolt 47 years ago.

The revolution led to a U-turn in Iran’s foreign policy, especially vis-a-vis Washington and Tel Aviv. 

The dramatic assault on the American embassy in Tehran in November 1979, and the hostage-taking of dozens of Americans until their release in January 1981, is doubtless on the mind of Trump and his advisers today, as they remain eager to take revenge for this decades-old humiliation. 

Beyond their profound animosity towards the current Iranian leadership, another key driver of the conflict is Iran’s vast oil reserves - the third-largest in the world. Controlling these resources would also enable the US-Israeli axis to increasingly cut China out of the equation.

Weakest link

Indeed, China and Russia are the other key factors in this ongoing campaign against Iran. Alongside North Korea, the three nations form the new “axis of evil” that must be dismantled, in the view of Washington and its allies.

China closely cooperates with Iran, having become its largest buyer of oil, and it has also supplied the country with attack drones, as reported by Middle East Eye.

For its part, Iran has provided Russia with drones in its ongoing war against Ukraine - a matter of great concern for western nations.

But the US and Israel knew that it would be far too dangerous and destabilising to attack China or Russia directly, so they opted to target this axis via its weakest link, Iran - thus enabling them to weaken this tripartite alliance at a lower financial and military cost.

In a similar vein, before Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro was abducted by US forces, Beijing was a major buyer of the country’s oil. China was subsequently cut off, as Trump forced Caracas closer to Washington. His plan to dry up Iran’s oil exports to China would follow the same pattern.

For Israel, weakening Iran and achieving regime change is central to its strategy of remaining the sole regional military superpower. This plan also entails keeping Arab Gulf states as close partners, if not allies. Once again, Israel and the US are pursuing geopolitical and economic hegemony at the expense of the peoples of the region. 

Yet this short-sighted strategy of revenge and miscalculation can only lead to a greater disaster for Iranians and the region as a whole. Iraq stands as a clear example: two decades since the US-led invasion, the country remains unstable, its population still struggling to recover from long-lasting wounds. 

With regards to Iran, history shows that it would be a major mistake to believe that a civilisation dating back millenia will indefinitely bow to external pressure. The backlash will be painful - and this all comes at the cost of the next generation.

Abdelkader Abderrahmane
est chercheur en géopolitique et consultant international sur les questions de paix et de sécurité en Afrique