On a Shaky Ground: Where Will Newly-inked US-Saudi Nuclear Agreement Head?

Alwaght- The agreement that was supposed to initiate a new chapter of civilian nuclear cooperation between the US and Saudi Arabia has faced serious questions less than a day after being inked.

On Wednesday, the US Energy Secretary Chris Wright signed with his Saudi counterpart a civilian nuclear deal with the online presence of officials of the two countries. The deal was described as one of the key gains of recent years of a close relationship between the two allies.

However, the erratic US President Donald Trump was fast to frustrate the Arab kingdom. He tied implementing the agreement to Riyadh joining the Arab-Israeli normalization, officially called Abraham Accords. He also denied that Washington gave the Arab kingdom the right to develop its own local uranium enrichment program, a standing that not only raised questions about terms of the agreement, but also sent its future into a dark path.

As a result, two competing narratives now frame this agreement. Washington’s version ties the nuclear deal directly to normalizing ties between Riyadh and Tel Aviv. Saudi officials, however, insist on a very different story: no normalization with Israel unless a independent Palestinian state is established along the lines of UN resolutions.

The condition missing in text of the agreement

The biggest open question hanging over the deal is a condition that Trump introduced after the signing. With the full text still unpublished, it remains unclear whether normalization with Israel was written into the agreement itself, or whether the president tacked it on afterward as a prerequisite for implementation.

The deal is not yet final and, by law, must go to Congress for review. That window gives the Trump administration room to negotiate new terms with Riyadh—or even stall the rollout altogether.

Trump has also said the agreement will not grant Saudi Arabia uranium enrichment rights, though he offered no details. The American officials, meanwhile, have described the deal as including only a two-year study period to assess the economic and technical feasibility of a Saudi nuclear fuel cycle. Some informed officials held Washington could delay Riyadh’s enrichment capability for several years, but there is no guarantee of a permanent block.

On the other side, many analysts doubt that the Saudi king-in-waiting Mohammed bin Salman will walk away from his long-standing demand for a domestic nuclear fuel cycle. Nor, they note, has Riyadh ever readily embraced the sweeping, short-notice inspections that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would require, a sticking point that has long divided the two capitals.

Agreement struck by crisis before birth 

What followed the deal after 24 hours pushed even some American media outlets to the notion that the nuclear deal suffered a crisis before its official implementation.

In a report for CNN, Kevin Liptak and Kristen Holmes wrote that the deal, rushed into existence, hit roadblocks almost as fast. According to their account, Trump was furious that the announcement went forward without his full sign-off, with some sources saying the Energy Secretary never even briefed the president on the timing before the rollout.

The backlash only grew as conservative media outlets, including Fox News and the Wall Street Journal editorial board, piled on with sharp criticism. Their central complaint was why to sign a nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia that was not explicitly tied to normalizing ties with the Israeli regime. 

Compounding the confusion, the administration has refused to release the full text or technical annexes, deepening suspicions. And in a telling snub, Trump himself was absent from the signing ceremony, a move that many observers read as the White House deliberately keeping its distance from the very deal it had just sealed.

Concerns in Washington and Tel Aviv

The negative reactions were not limited to the White House and some politicians have warned about strategic fallout of this deal with Riyadh.

Ex-Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman warned that a civilian nuclear program in Saudi Arabia risks initiating a very dangerous nuclear race in the region.

In the US itself, some Democratic lawmakers viewed the deal pessimistically. Congressman Ro Khanna, of California, told the BBC that this was a "one-way privilege" to the Arab kingdom, warning that such a deal will only cause further instability in West Asia region.

Strategic message of deal to the Israelis

Whatever the deal’s ultimate fate, many experts see Saudi Arabia’s move toward a nuclear fuel cycle, even under a civilian guise, as a signal that could redraw the West Asia’s balance of power.

Imran Bayoumi, a fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former Pentagon adviser, argues that the agreement builds the very infrastructure and know-how that could one day smooth Riyadh’s path to a more advanced nuclear capability.

In the view of analysts, even if Saudi Arabia never pursues an actual bomb, acquiring fuel-cycle technology and infrastructure would, in itself, give Riyadh a potent deterrent and a political lever against regional rivals, a prospect that has already deepened unease in Tel Aviv. More troubling still for Israel is that a Saudi fuel cycle would become a permanent source of anxiety. And should anti-Western or anti-Israeli factions ever gain influence within Saudi governance, Tel Aviv could find itself sandwiched between two nuclear-capable powers: Tehran and Riyadh.

Trump's shift in American nuclear policy

If finalized, the deal can mark, many observers agree, a turning point in the US nuclear policy regarding Saudi Arabia. 

President Barrack Obama administration had sought to limit nuclear cooperation with West Asian countries to the "gold standard", a model that barred recipient nations from enriching uranium or reprocessing plutonium.

The Biden administration, while supportive of civilian nuclear cooperation with Riyadh, had tied it to normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israeli regime, along with progress on the Palestinian case, a condition that ultimately prevented a final deal.

Trump's approach, however, appears to be different. He first cleared the path for the nuclear agreement, then dangled normalization with Tel Aviv as a condition for its implementation, a sequencing shift that many analysts attribute to intensifying US strategic competition with China and Russia.

In their view, Washington's overriding fear is that any American hesitation could push Saudi Arabia toward Beijing or Moscow for its nuclear development. So the Trump administration has chosen to lock in the nuclear framework first, and only then bargain over other political demands, including the normalization push with the Israeli regime.

However, until the deal text is published and reviewed by the Congress and Saudi Arabia has its final say on the new conditions of Trump, one question remains up: Will Washington-Riyadh nuclear deal be concluded or just turn into one of Trump’s unfinished agreements? 

Have Arab Rulers Finally Woken Up from Deep Sleep to Reality?

Alwaght- For four decades, the US security strategy in the Persian Gulf has rested on a promise telling the Arab monarchies that if they align with Washington, accept American military bases on their soil, buy billions in arms from its companies, and partner to the project of "containing Iran", it guarantees their security.

The recent war, however, collided head-on with a hard reality. Not only did the US fail to deliver absolute security; for many Persian Gulf states, it was the first time they realized that being part of the US security umbrella does not guarantee immunity from the fallout of war, and that, under certain circumstances, it can even turn them into part of the battlefield.

In this context, Oman’s Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi’s recent essay in Le Monde should be read as more than just a political statement. He openly challenged one of the most fundamental assumptions of US policy in the region: that Iran is the primary threat to the Persian Gulf security and must be contained through sanctions, pressure, and the threat of military force.

 He asserted that he recent war proved that Iran is not the root cause of regional insecurity, and that four decades of containing Tehran have not only failed to bring stability, but also they have actively fueled the very crises they were meant to prevent. His words carry weight because they come from a senior official of a country that has long played the mediator and the balanced actor in Persian Gulf politics, one that has watched security dynamics up close, from the inside.

The containment doctrine, born in the wake of Iran's 1979 revolution, rested on a single premise that the Islamic Republic, which ousted the corrupt pro-Western monarchy in Iran under Imam Khomeini, posed the gravest threat to regional order and Western interests. On that basis, the US built a sprawling network of Persian Gulf military bases, inked billions in arms deals with Arab states, cobbled together security coalitions, and turned economic sanctions into a permanent cudgel against Tehran. In short, the Iranian threat was not just a security assessment, it was the very backbone of the American-designed order in the Persian Gulf.

Today, however, the region's realities have drifted far from that narrative, and Persian Gulf Arab capitals are waking up to the costs of years of uncritical adherence to such an unrealistic strategy. What we are seeing now in Arab states' behavior is less a matter of choice than a forced reckoning. The latest war shattered decades of security assumptions, confronting Persian Gulf monarchies with facts they can no longer brush aside.

The first hard truth is crumbling faith in the US security guarantees. For years, they were told that the Fifth Fleet, the missile defense systems, the thousands of US troops, the sprawling bases, all of it would repel any threat. But the recent war laid it bare that this vast military infrastructure not only failed to deliver genuine security, but also it became a threat vector in its own right. When Iran made clear that any US base used to strike its territory would become a legitimate military target, many Arab governments realized for the first time that the American military footprint could become not a shield, but a lightning rod, one that could drag the war onto their own soil.

In other words, what shifted in many Arab leaders' minds was not a sudden embrace of a new world order, but it was a deep crack in their confidence in the existing one. They watched, firsthand, as even the most sprawling network of US bases failed to insulate them from crisis. Washington's security pledges, they now realize, are nowhere near as ironclad or cost-free as four decades of messaging had led them to believe.

The second blow is the containment doctrine flat-out failed in practice. The whole strategy assumed that ramping up political, economic, and military pressure would gradually weaken Iran and erode its deterrent power. But the latest war, regardless of how different capitals spin its outcome, made one thing unmistakably clear: Iran still retains the capacity to shape the region's security calculus.

This reality raises a question: If after decades of sanctions and American military presence in the region there is still possibility of such crisis erupting, was the very strategy of containing Iran resting on right pillars?

From this lens, stepped up diplomatic moves by Arab countries and welcoming mediation is more a reaction to failure of a security calculations and less about an ideological shift. They, actually, have found out that continuing logic of confrontation is likely to impose heavier costs directly on them. That explains why in the 40-day war and the current clashes, the Arab countries have chosen diplomacy and mediation to end the war rather than encourage Washington for escalation. 

This shift, of course, does not mean an imminent US exit from the region. Arab states will continue to maintain broad strategic and military ties with Washington. But the critical difference is this: their perception of that presence is no longer what it used to be.

Where American bases were once seen as symbols of security, today a new question has emerged: In a moment of crisis, could those very bases become amplifiers of the threat instead?

That is why the future of Gulf security now hinges, more than ever, on a fundamental reassessment of four decades' worth of assumptions. What is changing is not merely a political alignment, but is the unraveling of the notion that security can be built on foreign power while remaining insulated from the blowback.

Perhaps one of the most crucial outcomes of the recent war came not in the battleground but the security calculations of the Arab capitals. The dream of containing Tehran which for years was sold to Arab rulers as the defenite security prescription in the Persian Gulf has for the first time faced a serious doubt.

Al-Busaidi’s essay is, thus, about gradual wakeup of the Persian Gulf rulers to the reality that security cannot be bought by lavish arms purchases, hosting foreign bases, and setting hopes on guarantees made by trans-regional powers, especially that the same mechanisms and promises can turn the region into a conflict scene.

The Ahlul Bayt: The Family of the Prophet and the Long Road of Persecution

By Salim Mohamed Badat

In Sahih Muslim, narrated by Zayd ibn Arqam رضي الله عنه. The Prophet ﷺ said:

وَأَنَا تَارِكٌ فِيكُمْ ثَقَلَيْنِ، أَوَّلُهُمَا كِتَابُ اللَّهِ، فِيهِ الْهُدَى وَالنُّورُ، فَخُذُوا بِكِتَابِ اللَّهِ وَاسْتَمْسِكُوا بِهِ… وَأَهْلُ بَيْتِي، أُذَكِّرُكُمُ اللَّهَ فِي أَهْلِ بَيْتِي.

“I am leaving among you two weighty things. The first is the Book of Allah, in which there is guidance and light; so hold firmly to the Book of Allah… And [the second is] my Ahl al-Bayt. I remind you of Allah regarding my Ahl al-Bayt.”

He repeated:

أُذَكِّرُكُمُ اللَّهَ فِي أَهْلِ بَيْتِي

“I remind you of Allah regarding my family,” three times.

This is Sahih Muslim 2408

I The story of the Ahlul Bayt is not merely a chapter in Islamic history. It is the story of truth confronting power, of righteousness standing before tyranny, and of a family who paid the highest price for preserving the moral conscience of the Ummah.

Their virtues are recorded in our books, their sacrifices echo through our history, and their honour belongs to the entire Ummah.

Yet it must also be acknowledged that many Muslims have not told their story with the honesty and depth it deserves. Political rulers who governed in the name of Islam often viewed the Prophet’s family not as the spiritual heart of the Ummah but as political rivals whose immense popularity threatened dynastic power.

From the Umayyads to the Abbasids, successive rulers monitored, imprisoned, exiled, and poisoned members of the Ahlul Bayt. Their followers were harassed, imprisoned, executed, and driven into silence simply because of their devotion to the Prophet’s household.

Perhaps the clearest symbol of this hostility was the official Umayyad policy of publicly cursing Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib (RA) from the pulpits throughout much of the empire.

For decades, governors and preachers were ordered to insult the cousin, son in law, and beloved companion of the Messenger of Allah (saw) during Friday sermons.

Those who refused often faced dismissal or punishment. This policy continued until the Umayyad Caliph Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz abolished it, replacing those insults with the Quranic command to justice: “Indeed, Allah commands justice, excellence and giving to relatives.” (Quran 16:90).

History also records the persecution of those known for their love of Ali (RA) and his family. Men such as Hujr ibn Adi and his companions were executed after refusing to denounce Imam Ali publicly.

Under the governorship of al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf, countless people suspected of sympathy for the Ahlul Bayt were imprisoned, tortured, or killed. Loyalty to the Prophet’s family became, in many places, a dangerous crime.

Those who ruled in the name of Islam frequently persecuted the very household of the Prophet (saw). While the Shia community has kept the memory of these injustices alive, many Sunnis have spoken far less about them.

The political elite who had spent years opposing Prophet Muhammad (saw) only embraced Islam after the conquest of Mecca, when the balance of power had shifted. Their acceptance of Islam has long been the subject of historical discussion regarding political expediency and the preservation of influence.

It was from within this ruling class that the policies and actions emerged, resulting in the marginalisation, imprisonment, exile, poisoning, and killing of members of the Ahlul Bayt.

Sectarian scholars have attempted to absolve Yazid ibn Muawiyah of responsibility for the tragedy of Karbala because he was not physically present on the battlefield.

Such reasoning ignores a fundamental principle of leadership: rulers bear responsibility for the actions carried out under their authority. The massacre at Karbala was not an isolated act of rogue soldiers but the consequence of decisions taken within the structures of political power.

By the same logic, one could argue that because Benjamin Netanyahu is not physically present in Gaza, he bears no responsibility for the actions of the Israeli military. Very few would accept such an argument.

The story of the Ahlul Bayt is not merely a history of suffering. It is a testament to unwavering faith, moral courage, and resistance against oppression. Their sacrifice continues to challenge every generation of Muslims to stand for justice, regardless of who the oppressor may be.

Imam Hasan ibn Ali (RA)

After the martyrdom of Imam Ali (RA) , his eldest son Hasan (RA) sought peace rather than civil war. His treaty with Muawiyah was intended to preserve Muslim lives and prevent further bloodshed. It was an act of remarkable restraint and wisdom.

Yet peace did not spare him. Imam Hasan was poisoned, with many traditions alleging that his wife Jadah bint al-Ashath administered the poison after promises of reward. Most Historians place the blame on the ruling Ummayad involvement.

What is beyond dispute is that Hasan endured severe suffering before his death.

Even after he passed away, hostility continued. When the prophet (saw) family wished to bury him near his grandfather, the Messenger of Allah (saw) , armed opposition prevented it.

Instead, the beloved grandson of the Prophet was buried in Jannat al-Baqi. Even in death, political hatred denied him peace.

Imam Husayn ibn Ali (RA): The Eternal Voice of Karbala

If Imam Hasan (RA) embodied reconciliation, Imam Husayn embodied principled resistance. When Yazid demanded his allegiance, Husayn (RA) refused. He understood that pledging loyalty to tyranny would legitimize injustice and corrupt the moral foundations of Islam.

On the plains of Karbala in 680 CE, Husayn (RA) stood with a small group of relatives and companions against an army numbering in the thousands under the authority of the Umayyad governor Ubayd Allah ibn Ziyad.

The Euphrates flowed nearby, yet access to water was denied. For days, thirst afflicted the camp. Infants cried in exhaustion. Mothers watched helplessly as children weakened beneath the scorching desert sun. One after another, Husayn (RA) companions fell. His nephews were killed. His brothers were killed. His sons were killed. The family of the Prophet was systematically destroyed before his eyes.

Finally, Husayn himself stood almost alone. Refusing surrender, he was killed after a courageous final stand. His death shocked the conscience of the Muslim world and transformed Karbala into the universal symbol of resistance against oppression.

The tragedy did not end there.

The women and children of the Prophet’s household, including Sayyida Zaynab and the ailing Imam Ali Zayn al-Abidin, were taken captive and marched through Kufa and Damascus. Instead of allowing grief to silence them, they exposed the injustice they had witnessed, preserving the truth of Karbala for future generations.

Imam Ali Zayn al-Abidin

The only surviving adult male from Husayn’s household was too ill to fight at Karbala. He witnessed the slaughter of his father, relatives, and companions before enduring the humiliation of captivity.

Returning to Madinah, he abandoned political confrontation and rebuilt the spiritual life of the Ummah through worship, scholarship, and supplication. His famous prayers remain among Islam’s greatest spiritual treasures.

Despite his peaceful life, he lived under constant surveillance by the Umayyad authorities and, later died after being poisoned during the Umayyad period.

Imam Muhammad al-Baqir and Imam Jafar al-Sadiq

With open rebellion crushed, the next two Imams dedicated themselves to knowledge.

Imam Muhammad al-Baqir became one of the greatest scholars of Quran and Hadith, while his son, Imam Jafar al Sadiq, established one of the most influential centres of learning in Madinah.

Among those who benefited from his scholarship were leading figures associated with the Sunni legal tradition, including Imam Abu Hanifah and Imam Shafi who both regarded him as their teacher.

Yet even scholarship threatened rulers who feared the immense respect ordinary Muslims held for the descendants of the Prophet.

The Umayyads and later the Abbasids closely monitored their activities. Historical traditions record that both Imams ultimately died after poisoning.

The Abbasid Imams

Many Muslims assume the Abbasids championed the family of the Prophet because they overthrew the Umayyads while invoking the rights of the Ahlul Bayt.

Yet once established in power, many Abbasid caliphs viewed the Imams as political threats.

Imam Musa al-Kazim spent years imprisoned under Harun al-Rashid. Moved repeatedly between prisons, isolated from family and followers, he eventually died in confinement. His patience earned him the title al-Kazim, the one who restrains his anger.

Imam Ali al-Rida was named heir apparent by Caliph al-Mamun, a decision interpreted by historians as either reconciliation, political calculation, or both. Not long afterwards he too died of poison.

His successors, Imam Muhammad al-Jawad, Imam Ali al-Hadi, and Imam Hasan al-Askari, lived under relentless surveillance, restrictions on movement, limitations on teaching, and repeated intimidation. Each died during the Abbasid period, with poisoning.

Throughout these generations, the Imams possessed no armies, no palaces, and no worldly kingdoms. Their influence rested upon scholarship, piety, and the love people held for the family of the Messenger of Allah (saw) . Ironically, it was precisely this moral authority that frightened powerful rulers.

What Does This Mean for Us?

The story of the Ahlul Bayt is not one of defeat but of extraordinary moral victory.

Kings possessed armies. The Ahlul Bayt possessed truth. Dynasties built palaces. The Ahlul Bayt built hearts.

Empires eventually crumbled into dust, but the names of Hasan, Husayn, Zayn al Abidin, al-Baqir, al-Sadiq, al-Kazim, al , al-Jawad, al-Hadi, and al-Askari continue to inspire millions across the world.

Remembering their suffering simply requires honesty with our history and fidelity to our love for the Prophet (saw) and his family.

The Ahlul Bayt stood against corruption, oppression, hereditary abuse of power, and injustice, even when the cost was exile, imprisonment, or death.

Their lives remind every generation that political authority is never above moral accountability and that silence before oppression is never the legacy of the Prophet’s household.

In the end, we as Sunnis must ask ourselves a simple question: Am I a Hussaini Sunni, standing with Imam Husayn’s principles of justice, truth, and resistance to oppression, or a Yazidi Sunni, one who whitewashes Yazid’s role in Karbala and, today, continues to divide the Ummah through sectarianism while excusing or normalizing regimes that align with Israel?

A Hussaini Sunni will naturally stand with any people who resist oppression. Karbala is not merely a historical event; it is a timeless moral lesson that calls us to stand with the oppressed against the oppressor. The choice is ultimately between the path of Husayn (RA) and the legacy of Yazid.

May Allah be pleased with the Ahlul Bayt, elevate their rank, unite the hearts of the Ummah in love for them, and grant us the courage to stand for justice with the same dignity, patience, and unwavering faith that they displayed throughout their blessed lives.

Salim Mohamed Badat

Writer exploring the intersection of faith, politics and justice.