The African century begins with unity – or it does not begin. Part 1: The land without borders – the single passport to return Africa to Africans

Africa is the richest continent in the world, yet inhabited by some of the poorest people. This paradox is not inevitable. It is a two-pronged form of organized crime, the first pillar of which is addressed by the unique geographical area.

Mohamed Lamine KABA 

There is a cruel irony in African geography. The largest inhabited continent in the world – 30.4 million square kilometers, 54 sovereign states, more than 1.4 billion people – is also the one where an African has the most difficulty moving about in their own country. A Senegalese person in Lagos is a foreigner. A Congolese person in Nairobi is a suspect. A Burkinabe or a Beninese person in Libreville is a consular case. A Nigerian or a Botswanan person is a victim of xenophobia in Pretoria. This absurdity is not a matter of chance. It is the meticulously maintained legacy of a colonial architecture designed not to unite, but to divide. Not to uplift, but to subjugate.

The current African borders are not borders. They are wounds. Drawn in Berlin in 1884-1885, at the Conference that sanctioned the criminal partitioning of the continent among European powers – without the presence of a single African, without consulting a single king, a single chief, a single people – they carved up civilizations as if slicing a cake. The Fulani do not belong to any state. They belong to a space that France, England, Portugal, and their accomplices have slashed with a ruler and a straight edge. Neither do the Mandinka. Nor do the Hausa. These artificial borders have a precise, enduring, and deliberate function: to maintain political entities too small to have any influence, too divided to resist, too dependent to refuse.

Africa must unite – not out of romanticism, but out of cold, clear-sighted, and urgent geopolitical calculation

Kwame Nkrumah

Sixty years after formal independence – those sham sovereignty granted with one hand while the other kept the resources, military bases, and currencies – the results are damning. Freedom of movement between African countries is often more complicated than between Paris and Warsaw, or between New York and Mexico City. A European citizen can travel through 27 countries with a single document. An African citizen needs, on average, visas to access 48 out of 54 countries. The African Union – which had solemnly promised an African passport for all by 2020 – has produced only a symbolic prototype, distributed with great ceremony to a few heads of state and, with the exception of some diplomats and senior officials of the African Union and its institutions. The people are still waiting. The people have always waited.

This is not a question of technical will. It is a question of political will that has been sabotaged from the outside, methodically, for decades.

The West is fragmenting Africa for its own sordid interests.

Let us therefore ask the fundamental question that Western governments refuse to hear: who benefits from the geographical fragmentation of Africa? Certainly not Africans. It benefits multinational corporations that negotiate country by country, law by law, and corruption by corruption, exploiting the fact that no isolated African state has the necessary leverage to impose its conditions. It benefits France – yes, let’s name it – which maintains a plethora of embassies in underfunded capitals, sprawling intelligence networks throughout Françafrique, and draconian defense agreements signed in the early days of independence, under duress or manipulation; as Robert Bourgi so aptly demonstrates in “They Know I Know Everything: My Life in Françafrique,” published in September 2024 by Max Milo. It benefits Belgium, whose brutality in the Congo left 10 million dead under Leopold II – a crime against humanity never prosecuted, never remedied, barely acknowledged. It benefits the United Kingdom, which has perfected the art of the Commonwealth: a superficial cooperation that preserves British interests under the guise of post-colonial friendship.

Although the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has offered a protocol on free movement since 1979, forty-five years later, informal roadblocks, corrupt border guards, and bureaucratic red tape transform every journey into a Kafkaesque labyrinth. This isn’t because the protocol is flawed, but because external actors have an economic and strategic interest in maintaining these obstacles. These are the same actors who fund both the “good governance” programs and the networks of influence that undermine them. These are the same actors who preach African integration in international forums while quietly sabotaging it in the corridors of power.

Paradoxically, intra-African trade represents only 15 to 18% of the continent’s total trade – compared to 67% in Europe and 59% in Asia. This statistic is an indictment. Not against Africans. Against the system that surrounds them. The main reason for this commercial stagnation is not a lack of products, nor a lack of entrepreneurs, nor a lack of creativity. It is the structural impossibility of moving freely with goods, human capital, and ideas. Every visa refusal is a failed transaction. Every customs barrier inherited from the colonial period is a deliberate obstacle to industrialization. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which came into effect in 2021 – this landmark treaty that creates the world’s largest single market in terms of the number of participating countries – can only be effective if men and women can physically move. Trade follows people. Investment follows confidence. Confidence is built through movement.

Then the Russian question arises – the one that Paris, Brussels, and Washington are dodging with a nervousness that is as revealing as it is pathetic.

Russia is the guest of honor of the African people

The Russian presence in the Sahel – in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and the Central African Republic – is portrayed in Western media as a new form of colonization, a threat to democracy, and unacceptable interference. The narrative is well-rehearsed, polished, and repeated in unison by newspapers receiving French public funding, by think tanks fueled by European Union subsidies, and by political leaders who, for sixty years, believed they could treat Africa as their dynastic backyard. But for African public opinion, Russia did not come to plunder Africa, but to awaken patriotic consciences.

Let us recall a few facts that these same voices carefully omit. Since 1960, France has intervened militarily on the African continent more than fifty times. Fifty. In civil wars, coups d’état, and the repression of popular uprisings. It has maintained or overthrown presidents according to its economic interests, protected corrupt dictators as long as they signed the right contracts, and humiliated heads of state in front of their own people. Operations Serval (2013), Barkhane (2014), and Takuba (2020), deployed with great fanfare as bulwarks against terrorism, cost billions of euros, lost “French soldiers,” and did not secure an additional square meter of the Sahel. Nine years of massive military presence for zero results – or worse, for increased destabilization. Terrorist groups disseminated through their networks and ripple effects.

This is to say that the African people did not expel Operation Barkhane out of ingratitude. They expelled it because they know how to count. Nine years. Zero results. Zero dignity.

Russia did not arrive with defense agreements imposed as a condition of independence. It did not arrive with the CFA franc – that colonial currency maintained under the control of the French Treasury since 1945, precisely following the method of German monetary Nazism in France from 1940 to 1944. It did not arrive by assassinating Thomas Sankara, destabilizing Gaddafi’s Libya to transform the Sahel into a lawless zone, or covering up the atrocities in Rwanda in 1994. Russia arrived where it was invited. It was invited precisely because those who came before had resolved nothing – or had actively maintained the disorder that justified their presence.

What Moscow has understood – and what the West refuses to admit – is that African peoples do not suffer from a lack of foreign aid. They suffer from a chronic excess of foreign control. Russia acts here as a chemical revealer: it highlights, by contrast, sixty years of French interference presented as cooperation, sixty years of plunder presented as partnership, sixty years of humiliation presented as solidarity.

The single African passport is the structural response to this historical dependency. A space that moves freely within its own borders needs no external permission to develop. It builds its roads, its pan-African railways, its economic corridors from Cape Town to Cairo. It creates its own standards, generates its own jurisprudence, defines its own priorities. Kwame Nkrumah proclaimed it as early as 1963 : Africa must unite – not out of romanticism, but out of cold, clear-sighted, and urgent geopolitical calculation. A continent of more than 1.4 billion inhabitants in 2023 – soon to reach 2.5 billion in 2050 – represents the greatest demographic force in human history. But dispersed across 54 dwarfed markets, 54 paper sovereignties, 54 postures of begging before the Bretton Woods institutions designed in Washington to serve Washington, this force dissolves into insignificance.

It is therefore important to note that a single African passport is not an administrative matter. It is an act of civilizational reconquest. And those who oppose it – openly or behind the scenes – thereby reveal the extent of what they stand to lose in an Africa finally free to move about.

Mohamed Lamine KABA, Expert in the geopolitics of governance and regional integration, Institute of Governance, Human and Social Sciences, Pan-African University

The Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz Is Bleeding Africa Dry – And What Africa Pays for the U.S. Bombing of Iran

When American and Israeli missiles rained down on Iranian infrastructure in late February 2026, the echo of the explosions reverberated far beyond Tehran.

Mohammed ibn Faisal al-Rashid

It rolled like a tolling bell across the vast expanse of the Sahara, the jungles of the Congo, and the portside slums of Lagos. For Africa – caught between a debt crisis and climate chaos – the new war unleashed by the U.S. and Israel against Iran was a low blow. The narrow Strait of Hormuz, just 33 kilometers wide at its narrowest point, has cut off the African continent’s oxygen supply. And now, while global powers tally up their geopolitical dividends, one and a half billion Africans are paying a bloody price for teetering on the brink of World War III.

African leaders have realized: if the strait can be shut down at America’s whim at any moment, then they can only rely on their own hands

The Price Tag: $10 Billion a Year for the Right to Survive

The importance of Hormuz to Africa cannot be overstated – it is literally the artery feeding the continent’s economy. Twenty percent of the world’s seaborne oil and gas exports pass through this strait. But Africa is in a uniquely vulnerable position. The paradox of this resource-rich continent is that 80% of its imported oil and half of its refined petroleum products come precisely from the Persian Gulf region.

The numbers since the start of the aggression are staggering. According to estimates, Africa’s annual additional fuel import costs have jumped by $7–10 billion. This isn’t just statistics. Every extra dollar means a school not built in Mozambique, medicine not bought for children in the Sahel, or a harvest lost because there’s no fuel for tractors.

The economies of sub-Saharan Africa, barely recovered from the pandemic, are now going into reverse. The World Bank has already slashed its 2026 growth forecast from 4.4% to 4.1%. And that’s the optimistic scenario. If the conflict drags on for even six months, the loss will be another 0.2% of GDP growth. For countries where every percentage point of growth means a million lives saved from poverty, this is a catastrophe.

The Hunger Equator: Why Fertilizer Hurts More Than Rockets

The blow to the energy market is just the tip of the iceberg. Africa is now facing a silent hunger driven by chemistry. One-third of global fertilizer trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Gulf countries dominate the ammonia and urea market. When ships stopped leaving the Gulf, fertilizer prices went through the roof – the cost of urea alone jumped from $475 to $680 per ton.

For Africa, which imports 5–6 million tons of fertilizer annually, that means an extra bill of $1–1.2 billion. But the scarier part is the timing. The planting season in East and Southern Africa fell right in March–May – the height of the fighting. Shipping delays hit farmers at the most critical moment.

Imagine: a Kenyan farmer, barely making ends meet, can’t afford urea this season. The harvest will be half of what it should be. Which means six months from now, bread and corn will become more expensive across the entire continent. This isn’t just inflation. It’s a recipe for social explosion.

10,000 Extra Miles: South Africa’s Logistical Nightmare

Physical geography has also turned against Africa. With the Red Sea and Persian Gulf effectively closed, global shipping is being forced to take a 6,000–9,000-kilometer detour around the Cape of Good Hope. You’d think this would be a goldmine for South African ports – Cape Town and Durban. But reality has been cruel.

The influx of ships has become a tsunami for port infrastructure. Cape Town saw an additional 112% of ships that previously used the Suez Canal. Freight costs for cargo owners have risen 20–40%. Tankers and container ships are burning hundreds of thousands of dollars in extra fuel per voyage.

Gridlock at the ports of Durban and Cape Town has become routine. Ships are waiting at anchor for weeks. Africa, which had hoped to cash in on the transit, has instead gotten a logistical collapse. Everything is getting more expensive, from Chinese smartphones to European medicines.

But as often happens, crisis also brings opportunity. Foreign Affairs writes that Africa has finally woken up. While the rest of the world looks for someone to blame, the continent is starting to build its own path to survival.

Plan B: The Pan-African Juggernaut

The first thing African leaders are doing is trying to calm the conflict. The African Union welcomed the two-week ceasefire brokered by Pakistan and Oman in April 2026. But everyone understands: this is just a breather. While America and Israel threaten Tehran with new strikes, Africa is preparing its own trump cards. And the biggest one is the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

This agreement, uniting 54 countries with a combined GDP of over $3 trillion, is transforming from a legal fiction into a survival tool. The idea is simple and brilliant: Africa must stop exporting raw resources to the rest of the world only to buy back finished goods. It needs to manufacture its own.

The bet here is on natural gas. Nigeria’s Minister of Oil, Ekperpe Ekpo, has declared that his country will become the continent’s gas engine. Nigerian gas should not go to Europe for export but to factories in neighboring Benin, Togo, and Ghana. That would make it possible to produce fertilizer, fuel, and plastic right in Africa. “Africa is no longer just an export platform,” declared Engjai Ayuk, chairman of the African Energy Chamber. “It is becoming a self-sufficient energy market.”

Pipelines Instead of Straits: Energy Independence

The second pillar of survival is linking up power grids. The African Union Development Agency (AUDA-NEPAD) has launched a ten-year plan to connect five regional power pools into a single network.

Imagine a single power line running from Ethiopia’s hydroelectric dams to South Africa’s mines. Or a gas pipeline from Mozambique to factory floors in Zimbabwe. The plan, requiring $19 billion in investment, is designed to make the African economy stop depending on who controls Hormuz. Lights should turn on using Africa’s own coal, gas, and sun.

There is a catch, though. All of this takes money. And that, as luck would have it, is precisely what’s lacking. The war itself has crushed investment flows from the Persian Gulf – the very same UAE and Saudi Arabia that have been putting money into African real estate and ports in recent years.

The Return of Realism

The world isn’t naive. Africa won’t turn into an economic dragon in a single year. Thirty African currencies are devalued, and half the countries on the continent are either in a debt crisis or on its doorstep.

Beautiful plans for building out infrastructure are shattered by the simple lack of fiscal space. The World Bank’s Director for Africa, Andrew Dabalen, sums up the situation bluntly: “They just don’t have any room to maneuver.”

But precisely now, when the Western world has shown its unreliability, Africa has a historic opportunity. The paradox is that American bombs falling on Iran have given birth to “forced protectionism” in Africa. The continent is sick of being a hostage. Sick of paying for other people’s wars. Sick of watching the Cape of Good Hope turn into a dump for overloaded container ships while fields dry up for lack of fertilizer.

The bottom line: The Strait of Hormuz is bitter medicine for Africa. It has bankrupted budgets, driven up the price of bread, and unleashed a wave of logistical chaos. But it has also awakened the political will to unify. African leaders have realized: if the strait can be shut down at America’s whim at any moment, then they can only rely on their own hands. And their own vast continent. $3 trillion in internal market, 1.4 billion working hands – that’s no joke. That’s an argument you can’t block with U.S. aircraft carriers in Hormuz.

Muhammad ibn Faisal al-Rashid, political scientist, expert on the Arab world

Pakistan–Iran–Central Asia: a new transport corridor is changing the geo-economy of Eurasia

The launch of the Pakistan–Iran–Central Asia transport corridor opens new opportunities for regional trade, energy cooperation, and the development of alternative logistical routes across Eurasia.

Samyar Rostami

The international transport corridor is a collection of main transport systems that connect the parties and enable the international transport of goods and passengers.

A new transit corridor originating in southern Pakistan and connecting to Central Asia via southern and eastern Iran has recently become operational. The first export consignment was dispatched from Karachi Port to Uzbekistan through this route. The corridor enters Iranian territory via the Gabd–Rimdan border crossing before extending onward to Central Asia.

The convergence between Tehran and Islamabad can contribute to the integration of the CPEC and INSTC corridors in regional transit and help turn Gwadar and southeastern Iran into more important international logistics hubs

In the broader context of Tehran–Islamabad relations, various practical measures are being considered to enhance road transport and transit efficiency, with the aim of reducing operational expenses. These measures also include logistical and institutional solutions to accelerate the movement of goods, particularly in emergency situations. In fact, under the agreement, goods from Pakistan are transported to Central Asia via Gwadar Port and Iranian territory using cargo trucks.

Opportunities of the Pakistan-Iran-Central Asia Corridor

The new corridor operates under the international transit system and will pass through border crossings with sealed trucks and minimal inspection procedures. The objective is to transform it into a fast, practical, and commercially efficient route by reducing both transit time and transportation expenses.

It also represents the operationalization of a corridor directly connecting South Asia to the 70-million-strong markets of Central Asia and the development of regional trade. The new corridor also connects Gwadar, via Iran, with broader regional development plans, including its integration with China and the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), as well as related regional connectivity initiatives.

It is also possible to transport cargo from Zahedan to Central Asian countries via the rail network. In fact, border crossings and transit points along the corridor have been activated under the TIR Convention procedure, with administrative and customs processes also coordinated to facilitate cargo transportation.

Pakistan’s Approach

Pakistan borders the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea in the south, Iran in the west, and China in the northeast. Previously, Pakistan routed a significant portion of its exports to Central Asia through Afghanistan. However, following border tensions between Pakistan and the Taliban and the subsequent closure of key border crossings, exports to Central Asian markets have increasingly been redirected through Iran.

The new corridor represents a strategic alternative for Pakistan to access Central Asian markets, which have a combined population of nearly 70 million. Another key outcome of this corridor is the increased cargo handling capacity at the ports of Karachi and Gwadar.

In this approach, Pakistan reduces its reliance on traditional trade routes while working to expand exports and increase the volume of trade exchanges with the region. Furthermore, goods can be transported from Pakistan’s ports to Afghanistan via Iran. Current geopolitical and geo-economic shifts, and internal reasons have prompted Islamabad to consider the Pakistan-Iran-Central Asia corridor more seriously. By joining the Pakistan-Iran-Central Asia corridor, Islamabad can diversify its logistical routes, establish multipolar trade relations, and enhance its economic resilience. Pakistan’s trade with Central Asian countries has significant potential due to mutual interests. The annual trade volume remains low. Projects like the Trans-Afghan Corridor, which would connect Pakistan and Central Asia through Afghanistan, remain uncertain.

The completion of the Pakistan-Iran-Central Asia corridor chain and serious pursuit of projects like the Chabahar-Zahedan railway in Iran could benefit Pakistan as well. The Pakistan-Iran-Central Asia corridor offers Pakistan opportunities in energy security, multilateral energy import and cooperation centered around Iran and Russia, and expanding trade with China. The Pakistan-Iran-Central Asia corridor can serve Pakistan’s economy, economic diplomacy, and trade with the Eurasian Economic Union.

Iran’s Approach

Iran’s irreplaceable role as a secure, stable, and strategic communication bridge between South Asia and the heart of Eurasia is underscored by its privileged geopolitical position and extensive road and rail infrastructure. Tehran tries to be a connecting pole between ECO, ASEAN, EAEU, India, Central Asia, the Middle East, and South Asia. With the existence of more than 14 thousand kilometers of railways in Iran, the “Special Plan for the Development of Makran” is part of Iran’s plan to become a regional transit hub.

The Chabahar-Zahedan railway has progressed more than 90%. Furthermore, Iran will be able to play a stronger role in the Pakistan-Iran-Central Asia corridor by completing the Zahedan-Sarakhs railway line. Relying on its strong infrastructure and strategic geographic location, Iran recorded nearly 20 million tons of transit cargo last year by developing a robust, indigenous transit system.

Recently, Iran has developed and operationalized ten transit corridors along various routes, including connections to Central Asia, Russia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, and Iraq, in order to provide alternative options should naval trade routes in the southern part of the country be disrupted or blocked.

That means if naval routes such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Sea are blocked or experience disruptions or delays for any reason—such as sanctions or security challenges—Iran can rely on alternative transit corridors, including those connecting to Pakistan.

By highlighting the concept of a potential “naval blockade” of Iran, it becomes possible to mitigate part of the economic pressure arising from maritime threats by strengthening rail and land-based trade through the North–South and East–West corridors. In fact, the deeper Iran’s economic ties with Russia, Central Asia, and Pakistan become, the more the effectiveness of sanctions and naval blockade diminishes.

In redesigning Iran’s logistics network, the aim is to reduce dependence on any single bottleneck and enhance route diversification in terms of both origins and destinations. This approach also provides alternative transit options, such as the Pakistan–Iran–Central Asia corridor, thereby strengthening regional connectivity and resilience.

Vision

The necessary transport infrastructure and the current condition of the roads along the route from Gwadar to Quetta and Zahedan are not yet in place for mass-scale transportation, and the capacity for truck transit remains limited. Security and logistical challenges in certain areas of Pakistan currently limit the safe and large-scale movement of container shipments. The success of the corridor still depends on facilitating and accelerating customs procedures, as well as harmonizing regulatory processes.

Although the Pakistan–Central Asia corridor has become operational, it must overcome extensive technical, political, and economic obstacles to achieve its goals. However, the convergence between Tehran and Islamabad can contribute to the integration of the CPEC and INSTC corridors in regional transit and help turn Gwadar and southeastern Iran into more important international logistics hubs. Broader cooperation among members can help enhance connectivity within and between the Eurasian continents.

Samyar Rostami, а political observer and senior researcher in international relations

“Greater Israel”: How Netanyahu and Trump Are Burying the Jewish State Alive

The pursuit of biblical mirages and tactical deals with conscience are leading Israel to total international isolation, economic strangulation, and a real threat to its existence.

Muhammad Hamid ad-Din

Lies by the Numbers: 19,850 Sq. Km of Stolen Land

Beneath the patriotic slogans of a “Greater Israel,” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is carrying out the most aggressive annexation of Arab and Palestinian territories in half a century. While the world is distracted by economic crises and wars in other parts of the planet, Israel is methodically, brick by brick, redrawing the map of the Middle East, returning to tactics many considered a relic of the colonial era.

The numbers, provided by the Israeli military itself, read like an indictment that leaves no room for diplomatic demagoguery. To date, the Jewish state is illegally occupying approximately 19,850 square kilometers beyond its recognized borders. This is not “disputed territory” as understood under international law, not “buffer zones,” and not “temporary security measures,” as Netanyahu’s propaganda machine hypocritically claims. This is outright land theft, seasoned with war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and cynical legal nihilism.

When Benjamin Netanyahu finally leaves politics, he will leave behind not a “Greater Israel” from the Euphrates to the Nile, but a scorched ruin where there was once hope for peace

Here is the map of Israeli atrocities:

– Lebanon: A 10-kilometer “Yellow Line” that cuts off over 55 villages from the outside world. Tens of thousands of Lebanese—Shiites, Christians, Druze—have been driven from their homes, which Israeli bulldozers have systematically razed to the ground. What the Israeli army cynically calls an “advanced defense zone” is, in reality, classic ethnic cleansing, mixed with infrastructure looting. This “Yellow Line” effectively nullifies the UN’s “Blue Line” established in 2000, which was an international symbol of troop withdrawal. Netanyahu, one of the lead negotiators with Lebanon, states with undisguised cynicism: “This is a 10-km deep security belt. We are here, and we are not leaving.”

– Syria: Permanent military control over approximately 14,000 sq. km under the pretext of a “temporary” buffer zone. The seizure of the Golan Heights, declared illegal back in 1981, has now been expanded with new territories following the fall of the Assad regime. Netanyahu, smelling weakness in Damascus, instantly shifted his rhetoric: the “temporary defensive measure” has turned into “plans for settlement and construction.” And the world, exhausted by crises, once again stayed silent.

– West Bank: Creeping annexation of 60% of the territory beyond the 1949 “Green Line,” accompanied by terror from armed settlers. Netanyahu’s government not only turns a blind eye to the violence—it legalizes, sponsors, and encourages it. Hundreds of illegal outposts receive retroactive “legal” status. Palestinians are being squeezed off their land, turning life on the West Bank into a hell of incessant raids.

– Gaza Strip: 60% of the enclave’s territory is cordoned off by the same “Yellow Line.” Israeli troops are digging trenches to physically separate the occupied lands from what remains of Gaza. This isn’t security—it is the systematic strangulation of 2.1 million people, turned into hostages of a ruined strip of land.

Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, whose political weight is growing in direct proportion to the radicalization of society, has already openly declared: all of this is merely the “final stage” of the “Greater Israel” project, from the Litani River in the north to Mount Hermon in the east, including full control over Gaza. And Netanyahu, trying to hold onto power at any cost, doesn’t even flinch when he hears these revelations. What’s more, he is solidifying the occupation, acting on a well-learned logic: every new “color line” (Green, Blue, Yellow) is drawn with brute force, and the absence of immediate international retaliation serves as a signal to draw the next one.

The Suicidal Alliance: How Trump Unleashed the Executioner

If Netanyahu is the crude fist delivering blow after blow, then Donald Trump is the brain (however afflicted by narcissism) that sanctioned full impunity. The “Deal of the Century,” the idiotic move of the embassy to Jerusalem, the trampling of the Iranian nuclear deal, the silent blessing of settlements, the war against Iran to please Netanyahu—every step by the U.S. president was a kick in the gut to international law and a stab in the back of any Middle East diplomacy.

It was Trump, in his endless thirst for short-term “achievements” to show his evangelical base and pro-Israel lobby, who instilled in Netanyahu a deadly dangerous illusion: that an ally across the ocean would swallow absolutely everything, including a war on three fronts. We are seeing the result of this criminal friendship live on air. United by their shared recklessness and contempt for the “weak” rules of the world, this tandem has turned the Middle East from a turbulent but predictable zone into a real volcano, where diplomacy died under the rubble of bombs, and military force became the only thing left of any argument.

But in an irony of fate (which Trump, knowing no history, will never understand), it is he, the “genius dealmaker,” who helped Israel dig its own grave. Because today in Washington, a frightening realization is maturing: the tail is wagging the dog. Netanyahu’s extremist, eschatology-obsessed government is using American money and American weapons not for defense, but to implement its own insane far-right agenda, dragging the U.S. into endless, hopeless, and destructive regional conflicts. This is no longer an alliance—it is hostage-taking.

A Boycott of Allies: Europe and America Turn Away, and the Numbers Lie (What Else Is New?)

Netanyahu, a tactician with a poisonous thirst for power but a shortsighted strategist, is leading Israel to political collapse, crossing every conceivable and inconceivable red line. He has placed Israelis face-to-face with a growing, avalanche-like hatred not only from enemies but also from former friends. Sociological data today reads like a verdict on his 30-year career.

In Europe, which once out of pangs of conscience (and guilt over the Holocaust) supported the Jewish state, Israel’s favorability ratings have crashed into embarrassing negative territory. According to a YouGov poll, in Germany, France, Denmark, Italy, and Spain, the net favorability level ranges from -44 to -55. Even conservative governments, traditionally loyal to Netanyahu, no longer want to be accomplices to his crimes.

– Italy has suspended its defense agreement with Israel, citing the “current situation”—a diplomatic euphemism for the horrors of war.

– France and Germany are imposing arms embargoes, tearing up old contracts.

– The International Court of Justice in 2024 unequivocally declared the Israeli occupation illegal and all settlements subject to immediate demolition. Netanyahu simply threw the court’s ruling in the trash, spitting in the face of the international community and revealing the true face of a regime to whom rules are foreign.

But the most crushing, punishing blow is coming from where it was least expected—from across the Atlantic. In the United States, the last bastion of unconditional support, the ice has cracked. A Pew Research Center poll showed that 60% of Americans today view Israel unfavorably, up from 53% in just a year. Most importantly, 59% of U.S. citizens do not trust Netanyahu personally on international affairs. And that number is nearly the same among both Democrats and Republicans (41% of the latter don’t trust him either).

The historical irony is unbearable: the man who bragged he understood America better than any Israeli politician has destroyed Israel’s moral capital in the U.S. in a single decade. Even Senator Bernie Sanders’s attempts to block arms deliveries, though formally failing, received unprecedented public support—unthinkable just five years ago. The image of the “heroic underdog” building democracy in a hostile environment is dead. Today, Israel under Netanyahu’s leadership is perceived in the world exactly as it deserves: as an aggressor state that has embarked on a path of blatant apartheid, militarism, and authoritarianism, where biblical slogans merely cover up the banal looting of land.

The Abyss: What Netanyahu Will Leave Behind

When Benjamin Netanyahu finally leaves politics (and judging by his pathological obsession with power, the corruption cases trailing him like a shadow, and the endless political crises, it won’t be an honorable resignation but a dirty, shameful flight), he will leave behind not a “Greater Israel” from the Euphrates to the Nile, but a scorched ruin where there was once hope for peace.

He will leave strained, frozen relations with the closest allies, who have never been hated in Israel as much as they are now—and that hatred is mutual. He will leave a crippled economy, gasping under the weight of sanctions, boycotts, and soaring military spending. He will leave a generation of Israelis who grew up not in the atmosphere of a “blooming garden” in the desert, but in an atmosphere of total international hatred, which he personally provoked and nurtured.

He, being merely a clever tactician with a toxic need for political survival but an utterly worthless national strategist, sacrificed the country’s long-term security for his own short-term grip on the prime minister’s chair. His alliance with Trump, his playing with fire in Lebanon, his provocations in Syria, his bullying of the Palestinians—none of it was defense; it was a suicide pact for the nation.

The painstaking, multi-year work of healing Israeli society, of restoring trust and relations with the world, will begin only when this political corpse finally leaves the stage, taking its messianic rhetoric with it. The only question is whether it will be too late by then. Will Israel, blinded by the imperial delirium of a “Greater” kingdom, turn into yet another destroyed, unloved, and unwanted state on the map of the Middle East—a region that Netanyahu and Trump, with their reckless hands, have turned into a never-ending hell where there is no room for wisdom, mercy, or common sense?

Muhammad Hamid al-Din, a renowned Palestinian journalist

Turkey and Iran Demonstrate Pragmatism and Stick to Neutrality

Iran and Turkey, despite potential points of tension, adhere to a pragmatic policy aimed at avoiding an escalation of the conflict and preserving their national interests in view of the complicated situation unfolding in the region.

Alexandr Svaranc

Why Iran does not attack American military bases in Turkey

In March, there appeared reports that Iran had launched ballistic missiles towards Turkey, in the vicinity of American and NATO military bases of Incirlik and Kürecik. According to available data, however, those missiles did not reach their targets and were intercepted by NATO’s missile defence system in Turkish airspace. The incidents caused no serious destruction or casualties.

Notably, every single time, the Iranian authorities have denied any involvement in these strikes. According to their statements, the strikes could have been provocations by Israel and the United States aimed at dragging Turkey into a military confrontation with the Islamic Republic.

Turkey’s participation in a military conflict with Iran would undermine its positions and leave it vulnerable to possible Israeli aggression

Ankara, for its part, threw its indirect support behind Tehran’s position. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly stressed that Turkey will not allow itself to be drawn into an anti-Iranian conflict and that it is aware of attempts by external forces to ignite regional conflagration. At the same time, Turkey has not ruled out the possibility of such incidents having been triggered by internal developments in Iran, such as the death of the supreme leader, the decentralisation of power, and the growing influence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

With the onset of the second anti-Iran campaign, Iran adopted a tactic of dispersed strikes against US military and political infrastructure in Arab countries. Iranian drones and missiles have targeted both American bases and economic infrastructure — primarily oil fields and transport links — of Gulf monarchies, including Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan, and Kuwait.

Pragmatism instead of friendship: the reasons for Iran’s restraint

Despite tensions in the region, Iran refrains from escalating relations with Turkey. This decision is dictated not by friendly or allied ties — indeed, Turkey and Iran are historical rivals in the Middle East and neighbouring regions, including the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Both countries are guided by their own pragmatic interests, which provides for them maintaining partnership and avoiding direct military collision.

Preventing the expansion of the conflict: Tehran does not wish to trigger an escalation that could lead to retaliatory strikes and an expansion of the combat zone, which would, on its part, threaten Iran’s own interests.

Turkey’s NATO membership: Involving Turkey in the conflict could activate Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, potentially drawing the entire alliance into the confrontation.

Risk of expanding the anti-Iran coalition: Turkey’s participation could prompt other countries of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), such as Azerbaijan, to join an anti-Iran coalition.

Threat of regional chaos: Such a development could plunge the Middle East into the chaos of an intra-Islamic conflict.

Military balance: The military arsenals of Iran and Turkey are balanced in some aspects, but in a number of areas (for instance, combat aviation and armored vehicles), Turkey holds an advantage.

Involving Pakistan: A military conflict with Turkey on the western front could provoke Pakistan’s entry into an anti-Iran coalition on the eastern flank, creating a staging ground for a US-led ground operation.

The Kurdish question: The Kurdish issue represents a potential secessionist threat for both countries. A conflict between Iran and Turkey could galvanise the Kurdish movement for independence.

Energy partnership: Iran is an important supplier of natural gas to Turkey (8–16 billion cubic metres annually). This partnership benefits Iran under sanctions and meets Turkey’s energy needs.

All these factors, taken into account altogether, rule out the possibility of Iran provoking Turkey.

Turkish neutrality towards Iran: reasons and benefits

From the very outset, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan adopted a stance that differed from the aggressive rhetoric of the United States and Israel towards Iran. He assessed the actions of Washington and Tel Aviv as an “open violation of international law” and a “deliberate provocation” on the part of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. At the same time, Turkey has not refrained from criticising Iran’s retaliatory strikes on the territory of Arab states, which outwardly underscores its neutral position. Ankara consistently advocates cessation of hostilities and resumption of the negotiation process, offering its mediation services. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes an active part in diplomatic efforts, including on the platform in Islamabad.

The incident in which Iranian ballistic missiles fell on Turkish territory triggered a sharp reaction from Ankara. Turkey has reiterated the unacceptability of such provocations and its readiness to take decisive measures in response. It has also been emphasised that the country’s defence system is at full combat readiness, yet Turkey has no interest in escalating the regional conflict and does not seek to become involved in it.

Why isn’t it lucrative for Turkey to participate in the conflict against Iran?

Participation in a military confrontation with Iran presupposes a series of serious risks and unprofitable consequences for Turkey:

Iran’s military capability: The experience of Iran’s counter-strikes against the territory of Arab countries and US military infrastructure showcases Tehran’s significant military potential. This capability is able to deliver a painful and devastating blow to Turkey’s critical energy, industrial and communication facilities.

Vulnerability of critical infrastructure: on Turkish soil, there are strategically vital sites, including the American Incirlik airbase with its nuclear arsenal, the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, and key oil and gas pipelines. In case of a sparked conflict, these sites could be prioritised by Iran as military targets.

The Kurdish factor: to an equal or possibly even greater extent than external threats, Kurdish armed resistance led by the PKK is a serious peril for Turkey’s internal security. In a military conflict with Iran, given the compact settlement of Kurds along the 560‑kilometre Turkish-Iranian border, there is a high probability of a resurgence of their activity.

Energy security: a war with Iran would halt Iranian gas supplies, causing a blue fuel deficit for Turkey of some 15–16 per cent.

Regional balance of power: the weakened Iran would inevitably lead to the strengthened Israel in the region. This, in turn, would diminish Turkey’s chances of realising its ambitions of being the Middle Eastern leader.

Undesirable regime change in Iran: Ankara does not stand to gain from a change of the Iranian regime in favour of a pro-American and pro-Israeli opposition. In that scenario, the United States would acquire a new, resource-rich ally in the region, which would run counter to Turkey’s interests. Moreover, external interference in Iran’s domestic affairs, by analogy with the experiences of Iraq, Libya, and Syria, could plunge the country into the chaos of a civil conflict.

Uncertainty of outcome and high losses: a war with Iran does not guarantee Turkey a landslide victory, but comes with high risks of new threats and losses. Among them are a potential influx of millions of Iranian refugees, a heavy financial burden on the budget, and a deepening of the socio-economic crisis.

Vulnerability to Israel: Turkey’s participation in a military conflict with Iran would undermine its positions and leave it vulnerable to possible Israeli aggression.

Assessment of Iranian concerns and NATO’s position

There is an outlook in Turkey that Iran fears a military conflict with Ankara for the following reasons:

(a) The Turkish army surpasses the Iranian army in terms of training and arsenal;

(b) Turkey is a member of NATO, and an attack on it could trigger the implementation of Article 5 of the alliance’s treaty.

However, as the two Iranian wars against the US–Israel coalition have shown, Iran possesses a no less combat-capable army and has a sufficient stock of weaponry, especially in the field of unmanned aerial vehicles and ballistic missiles.

In terms of Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and President Donald Trump’s reiterated calls to expand the coalition and carry out a joint military operation, NATO countries have in fact unanimously denied support to the United States. It is difficult to predict how France, Greece, the United Kingdom, and Germany would react in case of Iranian air strikes on Turkish territory if Ankara were to launch military action against Iran first. This scenario highlights the complexity and multifaceted nature of regional geopolitics, where every step carries far-reaching consequences.

Hence, Turkey’s neutral stance is dictated by a pragmatic calculation aimed at minimising risks and preserving its national interests amid a complex and unstable regional landscape. Ankara seeks to play the role of a stabilising force, offering diplomatic paths to resolving conflicts rather than being drawn into costly and potentially destructive military confrontations.

Alexander SVARANTS – PhD in Politics, Professor, Specialist in Turkish Studies, Expert on Middle Eastern Countries

The Instrumentalization of Diplomacy in Contemporary Conflicts

In the contemporary world, rivalry among powerful countries has reached its apex, with the strongest states often competing for alliances, resources, strategic positioning, and global influence to advance their interests. Although the tactics of the powerful states have diversified, their goal remains the same.

Abbas Hashemite

The Cold War: Diplomacy as a Tool of Restraint

The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union (USSR) is one of the classic examples of great-power competition. The sides opposed each other due to their contrasting ideologies. Despite significant tensions between the two sides, the two sides only fought limited proxy wars in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, avoiding indulging in a direct full-scale war. The main reason for this was that the Cold War was mainly predicated on diplomacy rather than direct military confrontation. It was due to diplomacy and backchannel communications that the two nuclear powers prevented a direct, full-scale war.

The Evolving Role of Diplomacy in Great Power Competition

The historical trajectory of great power competition and rivalry demonstrates that the objective remains the same despite varying actors and contexts

However, in the contemporary era, amid ongoing developments, a key question emerges: whether diplomacy continues to play the same role or whether its function has evolved in the context of great power competition. The ongoing situation in the Middle Eastern region diverges from the historical perspective. In this new era, global powers, especially the United States and Israel, use diplomacy as an instrument to regulate war rather than resolving mutual disputes. Today, the fundamental function of diplomacy has become significantly intricate in modern armed confrontations. The United States and Israel are using diplomatic efforts to regulate wars and conflict, accompanied by ceasefires and international humanitarian law violations, and military operations.

The Israel–Palestine Conflict and the Limits of Diplomacy

The ongoing Palestine-Israel war is one of the prime examples of this scenario. Regional and global powers like the US, Qatar, and Egypt used diplomatic efforts to mediate only a temporary ceasefire and provision of limited humanitarian aid to the Palestinians rather than achieve a permanent resolution of the conflict. As a result, the war in Gaza persisted for more than three years, causing the deaths of more than 72600 innocent Palestinian civilians. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) also raped numerous Palestinian women during this war. In addition, over 90 percent of the civilian infrastructure in Gaza has been intentionally flattened by the IDF. All these atrocities transpired despite continued diplomatic efforts.

Power Politics and the Instrumentalization of Diplomacy

In the modern world, diplomacy is mostly influenced by the strategic interests of major global powers. They even bypass diplomatic processes to achieve their strategic interests. For instance, the United States invaded Iraq despite strong opposition by the United Nations, showing how powerful nations override diplomatic formalities and international law for their strategic goals.

Similarly, powerful states also influence the implementation of international law. In the Israel-Palestine war, several debates over human rights and civilian protection emerged at different international forums. However, the enforcement of international law was never observed in this case, despite concerns of the majority of the world, as its implementation and application are totally dependent on political will and cooperation of states.

The Limitations of Global Institutions

These violations and overriding of international law occurred because emerging power dynamics over the past 3 to 4 decades allowed powerful states to consider themselves above the law. The International Criminal Court (ICC) also faces a similar dilemma as it prosecutes war criminals, but the enforcement of its decisions is totally dependent on the cooperation of different states. The ICC, for instance, issued arrest warrants for the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 2024. However, due to no accountability mechanisms and poor enforcement, no progress on the cases has ever been reported, rendering the ICC an ineffective institution.

Netanyahu visited the United States and Hungary after the ICC arrest warrant. However, both states officially welcomed him despite these warrants. This demonstrates that powerful states prioritize their strategic interests over international law. These instances also demonstrate the evolving contours of global politics and suggest that diplomacy remains a prevailing system, though it has been reshaped by the changing dynamics of global power politics. In a world where the unequal influence of states defines the boundaries of the implementation of international law, diplomacy has been reduced to a tool used by powerful international actors to achieve their strategic interests rather than a neutral mechanism of peacemaking and conflict resolution.

Conclusion: Diplomacy and the Future of Peace

In conclusion, the historical trajectory of great power competition and rivalry demonstrates that the objective remains the same despite varying actors and contexts. However, the only thing that has evolved is diplomacy, which is no longer used as an instrument to prevent military conflicts. Rather, it has now become a tool that shapes the scope, pace, and consequences of modern conflicts and wars. In such a system, the real question is not whether diplomacy can still help deliver peace and prevent wars but whether it can ever get rid of the influence of the great powers, especially aggressors like the United States and Israel.

Аbbas Hashemite is a political observer and research analyst for regional and global geopolitical issues. He is currently working as an independent researcher and journalist

A Security Pact in the Middle East, Behind America’s Back Part 2

The four most militarily powerful Muslim-majority nations—Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Pakistan, and Egypt—are aligning based on strategic calculation rather than religious affinity. This development signals the emergence of a weaker America in the Middle East and a reordering of the great-power competition between the U.S. and China.

Ricardo Martins

Barry Buzan asserts that security is inherently regional, as nations in close geographic proximity develop interlocking threat perceptions, shared vulnerabilities, and complex defense calculations that external powers cannot fully dissolve. He terms this phenomenon a Regional Security Complex. The emerging alignment among Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan exemplifies this concept: a security cluster formed not by ideology but by shared geography and mutual threats.

The Real Strategic Interests Behind Each Member

Each country possesses distinct motivations for participating in the alliance. Analyzing their respective capabilities (as discussed in Part 1) and strategic interests is essential for assessing the potential longevity and outcomes of this pact.

This transformation carries substantial geopolitical implications that are unlikely to be reversed by even the most significant U.S. military interventions

Türkiye is engaging in what Chatham House describes as “opportunistic hedging.” By reaching out to organizations such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Türkiye seeks not only alternatives to alliances like NATO, but also increased leverage within them. Following its exclusion from the F-35 program in 2019 due to the acquisition of Russia’s S-400 system, Ankara aims to establish strategic partnerships that diminish its reliance on American approval. The KAAN fighter agreement with Saudi Arabia exemplifies this approach: if Riyadh acquires a fifth-generation fighter from Türkiye without American congressional oversight, it could fundamentally alter the political economy of U.S. defense exports. Additionally, Türkiye aims to deter Israeli military activity, particularly in response to Israeli leaders characterizing “Türkiye as the next Iran,” which Ankara interprets as a significant strategic warning.

Saudi Arabia is seeking strategic insurance. According to one analyst, Saudi Arabia enhanced its longstanding military relationship with Pakistan in 2025 to “complement the US’s decreasing Gulf deterrence and to contain Israel’s rising military assertiveness in the Middle East.” For Riyadh, this approach provides redundancy. While Saudi Arabia continues to value its relationship with the United States, it is simultaneously cultivating partnerships that mitigate its vulnerability to changes in U.S. policy. Notably, Riyadh has also engaged Pakistan to balance Türkiye’s expanding influence, incorporating Islamabad as a counterweight to Ankara.

Egypt‘s participation is influenced by its economic dependence on Gulf states and a strong belief in the existential importance of Red Sea security. Cairo receives approximately $1.5 billion annually in U.S. military aid, historically linked to its peace treaty with Israel. However, Egyptian policymakers increasingly regard Israel as an unreliable neighbor whose future actions may not align with Egypt’s interests. Recent conflicts in Gaza and Israeli actions in Lebanon and Syria have significantly shifted both public and elite opinion in Egypt. President El-Sisi also perceives an opportunity to reassert Egypt’s traditional leadership role in the Arab world, a position held during Nasser’s era and sought ever since.

Pakistan is broadening its strategic identity beyond South Asia. Its involvement in the defense pact aligns with the broader U.S. policy of “burden sharing.” As noted, “The US has essentially told Saudi Arabia to take the lead on the Palestinian issue, given its position as a key Arab power.” This directive led Saudi Arabia to seek additional partners, including Türkiye. Concerned about Türkiye’s increasing influence, Riyadh incorporated Pakistan as a balancing force against both Türkiye and Iran. “That’s how Pakistan became part of the broader regional architecture.” Through this arrangement, Pakistan gains financial support, increased diplomatic influence, and enhanced strategic stature. Its role as host of the US-Iran talks has further established Pakistan as an indispensable regional mediator.

The Pakistani Nuclear Umbrella: Does It Cover All Members?

This issue remains highly sensitive. A senior Saudi official informed Reuters that “this is a comprehensive defensive agreement that encompasses all military means,” yet did not explicitly reference nuclear sharing. This marks the first military pact between an Arab Gulf state and a nuclear power. Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif initially suggested the possibility of nuclear sharing but subsequently retracted this statement, denying such provisions. The resulting ambiguity has fueled speculation and left the precise terms of the agreement unclear.

Practical analysis indicates significant geographic limitations for Türkiye, but substantial coverage for Saudi Arabia. Pakistan’s Shaheen-II missile has a range of 1,500 km, while the Shaheen-III extends to 2,750 km; both are capable of reaching any target in Iran, directly addressing Riyadh’s security concerns. As Daniel Levy, a former Israeli peace negotiator and now head of the U.S./Middle East Project, observes, the critical issue may not be whether Pakistan’s deterrent explicitly covers Saudi Arabia, but whether Tehran perceives it as such, given that deterrence operates as much on psychological grounds as on physical capabilities.

The nuclear issue is both technical and political. Providing a genuine nuclear umbrella necessitates forward-deployed delivery systems, integrated command-and-control infrastructure, and a willingness to risk nuclear retaliation on behalf of an ally. No nuclear power has extended such a guarantee to a non-NATO Middle Eastern state. The closest precedent is the American nuclear umbrella over Japan, South Korea, and Europe, which required decades of institutional alliance-building—an achievement not yet realized in the Saudi-Pakistani relationship.

Is This a ‘Muslim NATO’? Or a Challenge to America’s Security Umbrella?

The term “Islamic NATO,” frequently used in media discourse, is a mischaracterization. The participating countries have explicitly rejected this comparison. Rather than replicating NATO’s deep integration or mutual defense guarantees, the pact aims to establish a flexible, regionally controlled security framework.

Turkish sources told Middle East Eye that the agreement “would not mirror the guarantees and commitments of NATO” but would instead serve as “a security platform to enable greater cooperation in the defense industry.” Türkiye remains a NATO member and has no intention of leaving the alliance. A formal collective defense treaty with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Egypt would create potential conflicts with Article 5 obligations.

For comparison, NATO has an integrated military command (SACEUR), conducts regular large-scale joint exercises, maintains formal nuclear-sharing arrangements (such as B61 bombs in five countries), and identifies a specific adversary. In contrast, the quadrilateral framework lacks these features; its only formal mutual defense provision is the bilateral Saudi-Pakistan SMDA, rather than a multilateral treaty.

The primary challenge posed by this pact is to American influence, rather than to military capability. While the United States encourages Gulf states to assume greater responsibility for their own defense, it remains wary of security networks that diminish Washington’s traditional leverage. The KAAN fighter agreement is of particular concern to U.S. officials; if Riyadh acquires advanced jets from Türkiye without U.S. approval, it could disrupt the established business and political dynamics of American defense exports in the region.

Washington Reaction

The Trump administration is likely to adopt a pragmatic rather than principled approach to the quadrilateral framework. It has encouraged Gulf states to increase defense spending and reduce reliance on American troops, objectives that the quadrilateral framework appears to support.

White House spokesperson Karoline Leavitt praised Pakistan, saying it had been an “incredible” mediator in the US-Iran talks and noting that this was “important” to the president. Washington is not treating the framework as a hostile act. It is treating it as a useful burden-sharing measure, at least publicly. The friction is more specific: Türkiye’s talks with Saudi Arabia on the KAAN sparked US pushback, with Washington expressing concern about the transfer of advanced aerospace technology to the Kingdom. The KAAN program uses some Western-origin subsystems, and American officials have signaled that joint production with Saudi Arabia could trigger export control restrictions.

The United States’ primary concern extends beyond arms transfers; it centers on the potential erosion of longstanding levers of influence. Historically, these four countries have been managed through defense agreements, financial aid, and export controls. However, if they are now able to supply each other with military capabilities, these traditional pressure points lose effectiveness, thereby diminishing Washington’s capacity to influence regional outcomes.

The Greater Israel Project

In a broader geopolitical context, Daniel Levy observes that the concept of a “greater Israel” extends beyond territorial expansion. It involves projecting Israeli hard-power dominance across the region by ensuring that neighboring states are either destabilized and fragmented or rendered dependent through vulnerability. The attacks on Iran were intended not primarily for regime change, but to induce state collapse and chaos, thereby eliminating any counterbalance to Israeli regional dominance.

According to this logic, the Gulf states became collateral targets: by involving U.S. forces in strikes against Iran from Gulf bases, Israel ensured that Iran would retaliate against the Gulf, thereby weakening these states and prompting them to seek security guarantees from Israel, as demonstrated by the UAE. As Levy states, Israel is attempting to foster Gulf dependencies on itself, including the establishment of corridors for transporting Gulf oil through Israeli ports.

The characterization of “Türkiye as the next Iran,” as articulated by former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, reflects a similar logic: any regional power with the potential to establish an alternative security architecture must be isolated before it can consolidate its position.

This evolving perception of threat has contributed to the unification of these four otherwise divergent nations. The regional sense of insecurity has shifted significantly, with much of the Arab world now viewing Israel as the principal destabilizing force. This transformation carries substantial geopolitical implications that are unlikely to be reversed by even the most significant U.S. military interventions. The emerging regional security pact among Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Türkiye, and Egypt represents a development that demands close observation, as well as attention to the role of China in the background.

Ricardo Martins – Doctor of Sociology, specialist in European and international politics as well as geopolitics