Spain as a “Pioneer” of Opposition to War: An Inspiration for Europe

SCFR Online – Interview: "No to War" is a slogan that has recently transformed into a practical strategy in Spain's foreign policy—an approach that, according to Iran's Ambassador to Madrid, has made this country one of the most explicit opponents of military intervention in West Asia.

Reza Zobib, Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Spain, in an interview with the SCFR Online website, examined the reasons for Spain’s non-participation in the US war against Iran, the status of Tehran-Madrid relations, and this European country’s position in recent developments in the West Asian region.

At the outset of this interview, Zobib, while commemorating the martyrs of the third imposed war—particularly the late Leader of the Islamic Revolution, as well as Dr. Seyyed Kamal Kharazi and his wife—elaborated on the Spanish government’s positions regarding this war.

Continuity of the “No to War” Policy in Spain

Referring to the approach of Spain’s left-leaning government, he emphasized that this country has refrained from participating in the war based on a principled policy grounded in the principles of “continuity and coherence” in foreign policy.

According to Zobib, the experience of Madrid’s right-wing governments’ participation in the Iraq war and its consequences—including terrorist attacks within the country—has been one of the influential factors in shaping this approach.

Iran’s Ambassador added: “From the outset, the current Spanish government declared its opposition to US military intervention in West Asia under the slogan ‘No to War’ (No a la guerra), and subsequently operationalized this policy by refusing to grant the United States access to military bases and airspace. Ultimately, it was announced that Madrid would not participate in any military operations.”

He also considered the role of public opinion decisive in advancing this policy, stating: “Spanish society strongly opposes this aggression, and this very issue has helped consolidate the government’s position—just as public opinion influenced governmental stances on the Gaza issue.”

Persistence of Iran-Spain Relations Despite Ups and Downs

In another segment of this interview, referring to “over four centuries” of relations between Iran and Spain, Zobib described them as based on friendship and mutual respect, stating: “This atmosphere, despite certain fluctuations that are natural in interstate relations, prevails over the relations between the two countries.”

He added: “The best evidence of this is that last year, under the most challenging sanction conditions with Europe, Iran’s exports to Spain not only did not decline but experienced significant growth.”

Iran’s Ambassador also referred to recent developments, stating: “Following the ceasefire announcement, the Spanish Embassy was practically the first European embassy—and perhaps the first embassy overall—to resume its work in Tehran. Furthermore, last week’s contact between the two countries’ foreign ministers took place in a positive atmosphere, indicating the continuation of the upward trajectory of relations.”

This senior Iranian diplomat simultaneously emphasized: “Spain’s opposition to the extremist policies of the US regime and the divergence of political positions between the two countries—including regarding the aggressive war waged by the US and Zionist regimes against Iran—constitutes a separate matter that can be evaluated beyond the scope of Tehran-Madrid relations.”

Spain: A Pioneer in Defending International Law

In response to a question regarding Spain’s role in strengthening the existing order based on international law, and referring to this country’s left-leaning government’s approach, Zobib stated: “Pedro Sánchez, Spain’s Prime Minister, was among the first leaders to take a position and declare his opposition to war in light of recent developments.”

Iran’s Ambassador described Spain as a “pioneer” in this regard and added: “On issues such as protesting the Zionist regime’s genocide in Gaza, Spain has consistently emphasized adherence to the principles of international law and international humanitarian law—a stance that aligns completely with the positions of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”

Will Spain Become a Model for Europe?

Regarding the possibility of other European countries emulating Spain’s policies, Iran’s Ambassador stated: “Madrid’s approach is defensible and worthy of emulation from a principled perspective; however, in practice, one must consider the disagreements and political diversity within Europe.”

Zobib concluded by emphasizing in this regard: “Within Europe’s diverse political landscape, Spain’s conduct can serve as an appropriate model for certain countries—particularly those in the center and left spectrum—just as Spain’s pioneering role in recognizing an independent Palestinian state prompted countries such as Ireland, Norway, and others to follow suit. However, extending this assessment to all of Europe requires taking into account the disagreements and political differences among governments, as right-wing governments naturally pursue their own political trajectories and considerations.”

The Strategy of Exhaustion: Uncovering the Mechanics and Implications of the War of Attrition in West Asia

Muslim Mahmood

In the volatile landscape of modern geopolitics, the term “war” often conjures images of decisive battles and swift territorial conquests.

However, a more insidious and grueling form of conflict is currently shaping the future of West Asia: the war of attrition.

Derived from a Latin term meaning “to rub something away,” attrition is a military strategy where the primary objective is not a quick victory but the gradual erosion of the opponent’s strength, resources, and morale.

As an investigative look into this phenomenon reveals, the implications of this strategy extend far beyond the battlefield, threatening the economic stability and survival of states across the region.

The Historical Blueprint: 1967–1970

The concept of attrition was formally defined in the context of West Asia by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser during the late 1960s. Following the humliating defeat of Egypt in the June 1967 Six-Day War, Nasser adopted the principle that “what was taken by force must be regained by force,” launching a prolonged campaign against Israel.

This conflict, which lasted from 1968 to 1970, was characterized by artillery duels, aerial warfare, and commando raids along the Suez Canal.

Nasser’s strategy was inherently cynical; it assumed high casualties on both sides, operating on the belief that with a population more than ten times that of Israel, Egypt could endure such losses more effectively.

During this period, the Soviet Union played a critical role, re-equipping Egyptian forces and deploying fighter squadrons to assist their ally.

Although a ceasefire was eventually brokered in August 1970 via the Rogers Plan, the conflict resulted in over 10,000 Egyptian and 1,400 Israeli casualties without significant territorial changes.

This period demonstrated that attrition is often a test of endurance and resource management rather than tactical brilliance.

The Modern Framework: the US-Israel war on Iran

Today, analysts suggest a similar pattern is emerging in the confrontation involving the US, Israel and Iran.

Given the overwhelming conventional military strength of the US and Israel, Iran appears to have shifted its strategy toward survival and the imposition of unsustainable costs on its adversaries.

In this framework, the goal is to prolong the conflict until it becomes too expensive—politically, economically, and militarily—for the opposing side to continue.

Investigative findings indicate that the current conflict is entering an intense phase of missile strikes and air raids.

Military experts note that attrition can take two forms: static engagements, where forces establish flexible front lines or lay siege to an opponent, and guerrilla tactics, involving targeted strikes against an enemy’s weak points.

In the present context, Iran’s strategy relies on its ability to outlast the pressure of sanctions and military strikes while threatening the vital infrastructure of its neighbors.

Energy Infrastructure as Battlefield

A central discovery in this investigation is the potential for the conflict to escalate into the systematic destruction of regional energy infrastructure.

Credible reports suggest that Iran has been explicit about the consequences of continued aggression.

Iranian leaders have warned that they are prepared to target oil and gas facilities across Persian Gulf Arabian states, specifically mentioning the Jubail complex and Ras Tanura refinery in Saudi Arabia, the Al-Hasbah gas field in the UAE, and the Mesaieed complex in Qatar.

The logic behind these threats is grounded in a “cause and effect” relationship: if Iran’s ability to derive income from its energy sector is permanently damaged by Israeli or US strikes, it will ensure that no other country in the region remains unscathed.

This is not merely a “tit-for-tat” exchange; the objective is to “terminate the energy production capacity” of the entire region to force a global realization of the costs of war.

The impact of such a move would be catastrophic, with immediate ramifications for powers like China and India, which rely heavily on West Asian energy.

The Desalination Threat: A War for Survival

Perhaps the most alarming insight uncovered is the potential targeting of desalination plants.

In many parts of West Asia, particularly in the Gulf states and Israel, desalination is not just a utility but a necessity for human survival.

Israel, for instance, is reportedly dependent on desalination for more than 75% of its water supply.

Experts argue that destroying these facilities would represent the “eraser of a state,” as there is no “Plan B” for water in these arid regions.

For the Arabian Gulf states, many of which are monarchies with military forces largely composed of mercenaries, the loss of water and energy would lead to a total collapse of their society.

The luxury infrastructure that has come to define cities like Dubai would be eroded away as expatriates and foreigners flee a region that can no longer guarantee basic stability.

Role of Regional Players and the US

The investigation highlights a deep-seated tension between the Iranian government and the various Gulf monarchies.

Critics argue that states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE have compromised their security by allowing the US to use their territory for attacks against Iran, effectively becoming complicit in the conflict.

There is a growing sense of panic among these rulers, as evidenced by emergency diplomatic meetings in Riyadh.

The reliance on American-made missile defense systems has also come under scrutiny.

While countries like the UAE claim high interception rates, the sustainability of these defenses is questionable.

The expenditure of limited interceptor missiles to counter low-cost Iranian drones and missiles creates a math problem that favors the attacker in a long-term war of attrition.

Furthermore, there are concerns that the US would prioritize its own stockpiles or those of Israel over its Gulf allies in a sustained conflict.

Economic Consequences and Global Ripple Effects

The economic implications of this attrition strategy are already being felt by the public.

For example, fluctuations in global oil prices are a direct reflection of the perceived risk to West Asian supplies.

If Iran were to execute its threat to shut down the Strait of Hormuz completely, the impact on global trade would be unprecedented.

Iran’s control over this strategic chokepoint allows it to dictate what traffic passes through, a card it has yet to play fully but remains a potent tool of economic warfare.

For countries like China, which is currently navigating its own economic future, a disruption in West Asian energy would cause a significant “hiccup” that Russia alone may not have the capacity to mitigate through increased output.

This interconnectedness ensures that a war of attrition in West Asia is never a localized affair; it is a global crisis in the making.

The High Cost of Endurance

The “War of Attrition” in West Asia is a stark reminder that the battle is not always about winning on the field, but about outlasting the opponent over time.

Whether it is the historical precedent of the 1967–1970 conflict or the modern-day struggle between iran, Israel and the US, the strategy remains the same: to degrade the enemy’s strength until they can no longer fight.

The findings of this analysis reveal a dangerous trajectory.

The shift from targeting military assets to targeting the very foundations of human life—energy and water—marks a shift toward total war where the costs are born by entire populations.

As the states involved continue to test each other’s endurance, the world watches a high-stakes game where the ultimate prize is not territory, but survival in a region that is increasingly becoming a “test of resource management”.

In a war of attrition, there are no clear winners, only survivors who are willing to pay a higher price.

Islamic Republic of Iranvaliant resistanceWar of AttritionStrait of HormuzPersian GulfArabian potentatesUS imperialismIran retaliates against zionist crimesChinaRussia

The Consequences of Militarizing Artificial Intelligence and Great Power Competition in This Domain

SCFR Online – Note: The militarization of artificial intelligence has eroded the boundaries of ethics and responsibility in warfare, transforming contemporary conflicts into arenas where human decision-making has become increasingly marginalized.

Seyyed Javad Mohammadi – Artificial Intelligence Expert

From Technological Revolution to the Transformation of Warfare’s Nature

In recent decades, technological developments have fundamentally altered the nature of warfare. If military power in the twentieth century was defined by heavy weaponry and industrial capacities, in the twenty-first century, algorithms, data, and intelligent systems have become determining elements.

Analyses published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) indicate that competition among great powers is increasingly shifting toward the domain of military artificial intelligence. This trend encompasses not only the development of autonomous weapons but also the integration of AI across all levels of military operations—from target identification to tactical decision-making.

In this regard, reports from Foreign Policy on recent conflicts, particularly in Ukraine, demonstrate that the use of algorithms in guiding drones and analyzing battlefield data has become a critical element. This transformation has increased the speed and precision of operations but has simultaneously widened the gap between decision-makers and the human consequences of their actions.

Militarization of Artificial Intelligence: A Threat Beyond Nuclear Weapons

Unlike nuclear weapons, whose use has been constrained due to their catastrophic consequences, military artificial intelligence is rapidly expanding and faces fewer legal and ethical barriers. Moreover, AI-based weapons can operate without direct human oversight, a characteristic that creates new dangers.

Some experts believe that artificial intelligence could evolve into weapons even more dangerous than nuclear arms. The reason lies not in their destructive power but in their potential for widespread deployment, lower costs, and a reduced threshold for use.

Reports from Stanford University also highlight the regulatory challenges of this technology and demonstrate that the gap between technological development and the formulation of legal frameworks is rapidly widening. This gap exacerbates the risk of unregulated use of artificial intelligence in warfare.

From Testing Ground to Human Catastrophe: The Minab School Incident

The application of artificial intelligence in military operations, when coupled with incomplete data or algorithmic biases, can have catastrophic consequences. In recent attacks against Iran, reports have emerged regarding the use of AI-based systems for identification and targeting, indicating that decision-making in certain instances has been delegated to algorithms.

One of the most tragic examples of this trend is the attack that resulted in the martyrdom of 168 students in Minab. This catastrophe demonstrates how reliance on automated systems, without adequate human oversight, can lead to fatal errors.

Under such circumstances, the fundamental question arises: who bears responsibility for these errors? Can an algorithm be held accountable, or should this responsibility be attributed to its designers and users? This question represents one of the foundational challenges of international law in the age of artificial intelligence.

The Erosion of Ethics in Warfare: From Human to Machine Decision-Making

One of the profound consequences of militarizing artificial intelligence is the gradual erosion of ethics in warfare. In traditional conflicts, decisions regarding the use of force—however pressured—were ultimately made by humans. This ensured at least a minimum degree of moral responsibility.

With the advent of artificial intelligence, this relationship has been disrupted. Algorithms operate based on predefined data and patterns and lack human understanding of concepts such as suffering, dignity, and proportionality. This characteristic increases the risk of transforming warfare into a purely technical process devoid of human considerations.

The development of new technologies without regard for human rights can lead to widespread violations of these rights. In the military domain, this risk is significantly greater, as decisions made are directly linked to human lives. In such an environment, the concept of responsibility also becomes ambiguous. When an attack is conducted by an automated system, determining who should be held accountable becomes a complex challenge. This situation can lead to a form of structural irresponsibility in which no actor is fully answerable.

Conclusion

Future warfare has become, more than ever before, an arena in which technology and military power are completely intertwined. Artificial intelligence, as one of the most significant of these technologies, has not only altered methods of warfare but has also challenged fundamental concepts such as responsibility, ethics, and legitimacy.

Recent experiences, including the Minab School atrocity, demonstrate that unregulated use of these technologies can have catastrophic human consequences. Under such circumstances, the necessity of formulating new legal and ethical rules is more pressing than ever. However, the reality of the international system suggests that competition for technological superiority may override these considerations. Consequently, the future of warfare will be shaped less by ethical principles and more by algorithms and the logic of power.

Europe and the War Against Iran That Led to a Transatlantic Rift

SCFR Online – Note: Europe's refusal to align with the United States in the war against Iran is not a temporary tactic, but rather a sign of strategic divergence and a move toward forced autonomy.

Hadi Zivari – Expert on European Affairs

Strategic Divergence on the Western Front

The transatlantic order, established after World War II on the basis of security convergence between Europe and the United States, has faced growing fractures in recent decades. Successive crises—from Iraq to Ukraine—have gradually revealed the reality that the strategic interests of the two sides of the Atlantic no longer fully overlap. The war against Iran has also elevated this rift from the level of tactical disagreements to that of structural divergence.

Even within NATO, there was no political readiness to enter a costly and high-risk war against Iran. This situation has been exacerbated, particularly under circumstances where the United States has faced domestic challenges and decision-making inconsistencies. Reports regarding disorder in Washington’s decision-making processes have further intensified European doubts.

On the other hand, Europe faces a set of internal crises that have limited its capacity and willingness to enter a new war. From political developments in Eastern Europe to instability in the Balkans and divisions within the Union, all indicate that Europe is not in a position to participate in a costly military adventure. Analyses from the European Council on Foreign Relations also emphasize that Europe’s strategic priorities have shifted toward economic issues, industrial policy, and geopolitical competition with emerging powers.

Geopolitical and Economic Considerations

One of the key factors in Europe’s refusal to enter the war has been geopolitical and economic considerations. Iran occupies a position wherein any extensive conflict with it would have direct consequences for global energy security and trade. The Strait of Hormuz, as one of the world’s most critical energy chokepoints, would become a crisis point in the event of war.

Studies published by the Chatham House institute indicate that even limited disruption in this region could significantly increase energy prices and confront European economies—which are still recovering from previous shocks—with crisis. Meanwhile, some analyses emphasize that Europe is still redefining its position in the global system and does not wish to become entangled in a war whose consequences would be beyond its control.

Alongside these considerations, concerns about the expansion of war and the involvement of other actors such as China and Russia have also played an important role. Such a war could transform into a multi-layered crisis that would severely impact the global balance of power. Europe, which is heavily dependent on the stability of the international system, has no desire to enter such a scenario.

Disagreements with the Zionist Regime and Divisions in Europe’s Middle East Policy

Europe’s refusal to align with the United States is not limited to disagreements with Washington but is also linked to this continent’s complex relations with the Zionist regime. In recent years, certain European countries have adopted more critical positions regarding Israeli regime policies. Countries such as Spain and Belgium have, at various junctures, criticized the Zionist regime’s policies toward Palestinians and have even, in some instances, called for a reassessment of relations with this actor. These disagreements, particularly in a wartime context, have become a deterrent factor against full alignment with this regime.

The European Union’s relations with the Zionist regime, contrary to common perception, are neither uniform nor without tension. This diversity of perspectives has prevented Europe from positioning itself uniformly alongside the United States and the Zionist regime. From a domestic policy perspective as well, public opinion in many European countries is sensitive toward entering a new war in West Asia. Past experiences, particularly the Iraq war, have caused governments to act with greater caution in this regard.

Forced Autonomy: From Choice to Necessity

Europe’s refusal to engage in war against Iran must be analyzed within the framework of a broader trend moving toward increased strategic autonomy. This concept, which has gained prominence in European foreign policy discourse in recent years, signifies reducing dependence on the United States and strengthening the capacity for independent decision-making.

However, what is observed in the recent crisis is, more than a conscious choice, a form of forced autonomy. Europe has found itself in a situation where it can neither fully follow the United States nor yet possess the necessary instruments to play an independent role.

The world is moving toward a multipolar order in which traditional alliances are being redefined. In such an order, Europe is compelled to balance maintaining relations with the United States and safeguarding its independent interests. This situation is particularly observable regarding Iran, which has been misrepresented through biased and baseless propaganda. Europe is concerned about Iran’s nuclear program on one hand, and on the other, has no desire to enter a costly war. This duality has led to the formation of a cautious yet independent approach.

The war against Iran, rather than leading to cohesion within the Western front, has made existing fractures more apparent. Europe’s refusal to align with the United States and the Zionist regime indicates profound changes in the structure of transatlantic relations. This transformation not only has short-term consequences for ongoing crises but could also influence the future of the international order. If this trend continues, the likelihood of a Europe with an independent strategic identity—albeit facing numerous challenges—will increasingly grow.

The United States Strategy toward the Strait of Hormuz in Confrontation with China’s Interests

Strategic Council Online – Opinion: In the strategic geography of the global economy, certain regions attain such significance that they effectively become determining factors of the international order. The Strait of Hormuz is among these points; a narrow yet vital passage through which a considerable portion of the world’s energy transits, and whose stability is directly intertwined with the interests and economic security of many countries. However, the importance of the Strait of Hormuz is not limited solely to the volume of energy passing through it. This strait is also a stage upon which the limitations and challenges of great power politics are revealed. From China’s perspective, the policy of the United States regarding the security of this strategic chokepoint, rather than reflecting a stable order, demonstrates a set of contradictions and strategic difficulties that Washington faces in managing the regional order.

Abed Akbari – International Affairs Expert

Over past decades, the United States has consistently justified its role in the Persian Gulf with concepts such as guaranteeing energy security and protecting freedom of navigation. In practice, however, U.S. policies in the region have often been accompanied by a set of political tensions, security rivalries, and periodic crises. This situation, particularly from the perspective of actors such as China, which depend on the stable flow of energy from the Persian Gulf, has created a form of structural instability in the management of one of the most important arteries of the global economy.

From the viewpoint of many Chinese analysts, one of the fundamental challenges of U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf is the inability to establish a sustainable and inclusive security framework for the region. Washington’s presence and policies in the region have often been defined within the framework of limited alliances and geopolitical rivalries, rather than in the form of arrangements that could integrate the diverse interests of regional actors into a collective mechanism. The result of such an approach is the persistence of a level of mistrust and competition that itself has become a source of uncertainty for the security of chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz.

Another challenge is the linkage of energy policy and maritime security with broader geopolitical rivalries. In recent years, with the intensification of competition between Washington and Beijing, some discussions in U.S. strategic circles have referred to the possibility of employing economic and maritime pressures against China. Even if these views have not necessarily been transformed into official policy, the mere articulation of such ideas is, for a country like China that is highly dependent on energy imports, an indication of the fragility of the existing order in vital energy routes.

From this perspective, the issue for Beijing is not merely the security of the Strait of Hormuz; rather, a more fundamental question is raised regarding the nature of the global maritime order. If the security of vital chokepoints of global trade is, in practice, affected by geopolitical rivalries, then countries whose economies depend on the free flow of energy will inevitably seek alternative strategies to reduce their vulnerability.

China’s response to this situation has largely taken the form of a multidimensional strategy. First, Beijing has sought to create a network of mutual economic dependencies through expanding economic and energy relations with the countries of the Persian Gulf, which itself becomes a factor for stability. Today, China is one of the most important trading partners of many countries in the region, and this economic linkage creates a shared incentive for maintaining the stability of energy routes.

Second, China is interested, as much as possible, in contributing to the reduction of geopolitical tensions in the region through active diplomacy. Beijing’s mediation in the process of normalization of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in recent years has, from the perspective of many observers, been an indication of China’s effort to play a different role in managing regional tensions. For a country that secures a significant part of its energy security from the Persian Gulf, the reduction of tensions among key regional actors is directly linked to its strategic interests.

Third, at a broader level, China has sought to create more diverse routes for trade and energy through infrastructure projects and economic corridors. The Belt and Road Initiative can be regarded as part of this broader effort to reduce absolute dependence on specific maritime routes. Although the Strait of Hormuz will remain one of the vital routes for China’s economy, diversification of transit options can to some extent reduce strategic vulnerabilities, and these developments reflect the familiar logic of Chinese realism in the international system. Major powers always seek to reduce their structural vulnerabilities and to provide more options for securing their vital interests in the face of environmental uncertainties. Within such a framework, China’s response to existing uncertainties in the security of energy chokepoints can be regarded as an effort to manage these very vulnerabilities.

Ultimately, the Strait of Hormuz today is not merely an energy passage, but a mirror in which the challenges of the global order are also reflected. From China’s perspective, the most important issue is not competition over control of this chokepoint, but the creation of arrangements that can shield its stability from the fluctuations of geopolitical rivalries. If the security of such routes becomes excessively entangled in great power competition, the cost will ultimately be borne by the global economy. For this reason, for many energy-dependent actors, particularly in Asia, an approach that emphasizes cooperation with Iran for the reduction of tensions, economic cooperation, and comprehensive management of regional security appears to be a more realistic option for maintaining stability in one of the most vital arteries of the global economy.

This text was translated using artificial intelligence and may contain errors. If you notice a clear error that makes the text incomprehensible, please inform the website editors.

Public Opinion Disappointment of the Zionist Regime Regarding Success in War with Iran

SCFR Online – Opinion: The internal situation of the Israeli regime during the 40-day war can be analyzed from several perspectives. The popularity levels of Benjamin Netanyahu, the Likud Party, and the ruling coalition led by Netanyahu until February 28, 2026, remained approximately the same as during the preceding year. The most recent factor that had somewhat increased Netanyahu's popularity was the advancement of the 2024 war with Hezbollah Lebanon. Subsequently, his popularity temporarily increased during the 12-day war with Iran, but after the war, it returned to its previous state.

Mansour Barati – Expert on Israeli Affairs

With the commencement of the 40-day war in late February, although Netanyahu’s popularity increased to some extent—with Likud Party seats rising from 25 to 28 in credible polls—this increase in Likud seats did not come from Likud’s rivals; rather, these seats shifted from Likud’s coalition partners toward Likud itself, particularly from the “Jewish Power” party led by Ben-Gvir, who belongs to the far-right faction and is considered Netanyahu’s ally. In other words, no new seats were added to the ruling coalition’s total; seats merely shifted within this coalition from Jewish Power to Likud. In subsequent days and weeks, no significant change occurred in this matter—i.e., the number of seats—and the coalition concluded the war in polls with approximately 51 seats. This situation has resulted in the second war with Iran producing virtually no positive effects for Netanyahu and the ruling coalition, leaving Netanyahu still trapped in the post-October 7 deadlock.

Another significant issue is that at the war’s outset, Israeli society’s expectations regarding war outcomes intensified considerably. In fact, polls conducted at the beginning of the war created a perception in Israeli public opinion that this war would result in the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the elimination of its nuclear and missile programs.

For example, examining polls by the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies (which conducted four polls during and after the war), approximately 78 percent initially believed that overthrowing the Islamic Republic of Iran through this war was fundamentally feasible. This poll, conducted on March 2—three days after the war’s commencement—reflected Israeli society’s hope for Iran’s definitive defeat in the war. However, when the second poll was conducted on March 15, this figure declined from 78 percent to 65 percent and gradually decreased further. By April 15, when the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies conducted its final poll, the proportion of those who initially believed the Islamic Republic of Iran could be eliminated through war had dropped from 78 percent to 30 percent—a remarkably significant change.

In other words, approximately 65 percent of those in Israeli society who believed the war would cause the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Iran have changed their views. Additionally, the number of individuals who believed serious damage would be inflicted on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs has sharply declined; today, only about 30 percent of Israeli society believes such damage has been inflicted on Iran. Throughout the years following October 7, 2023, Israeli society had largely reached the conclusion that this regime, through its military, intelligence, and technological power—and with American assistance—could achieve any objective in West Asia and transform the region in any manner it desired. However, during the 40-day war with Iran, this perception has significantly weakened, with many reaching the conclusion that they cannot achieve their objectives against powerful governments and countries like Iran, which possess large populations and robust structures.

Ultimately, although domestic protests and dissatisfaction with policies and economic conditions exist within Iran, the perception of overthrowing the Islamic Republic of Iran within Israeli society has significantly diminished under the influence of the 40-day war’s outcomes. Continuation of this situation does not benefit Netanyahu and will destabilize his political position, as he has repeatedly promised the overthrow of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the destruction of its nuclear and missile capabilities. Meanwhile, Iran has today succeeded in consolidating its power in West Asia.

Trump and Divisions in the United States Regarding the Imposed War Against Iran

SCFR Online – Note: Following the resumption of the US and Israeli regime's war against Iran on February 28, certain divisions have emerged within the United States regarding this issue, both among the public and among political factions.

Amirali Abolfath – Expert on US Affairs

It must be noted that the US and Israeli regime’s war against Iran does not enjoy the support of American public opinion, as most polls indicate that a majority of Americans oppose the war. The general atmosphere in the United States in recent years has not shown support for warfare, given that America has endured over two decades of highly costly and futile wars.

Donald Trump himself has repeatedly spoken about the fruitlessness of the wars during George Bush’s era in Afghanistan and Iraq, and his electoral victory was largely attributable to this anti-war sentiment. Therefore, war with Iran lacks support from American public opinion, particularly since Iran is not a daily concern for most Americans; Iran has not undertaken actions that would be perceived as threatening by the majority of the American people.

Although discussions exist regarding the advancement of Iran’s nuclear program and opposition to the Israeli regime, these are not among the daily concerns of the American public. In reality, prior to the 40-day war, Iran posed no threat to the global economy. However, the US economic situation is now under pressure, gasoline prices have risen, and the effects of the Strait of Hormuz closure are gradually becoming apparent.

This pressure has gradually extended into the United States itself, further exacerbating dissatisfaction with the war, which continues to increase.

Within the US political sphere—and particularly among its political factions—a relative consensus exists regarding confronting Iran; that is, they believe Iran must be contained, as they view it as a genuine threat to the Israeli regime and a potential threat to the United States and the world. However, this issue has become somewhat factionalized today; since Democrats do not wish for Trump to register a victory by breaking Iranian resistance, they oppose this course of action.

Of course, they are not fundamentally opposed to confronting Iran, but they oppose whatever Trump undertakes, and from this perspective, reactions exist. Moreover, not all within the Democratic Party are unified; the progressive wing is entirely anti-war, while the moderate or core segment of the Democratic Party, although holding positions against Iran, does not wish to endorse Trump’s policies.

Regarding the Republican Party, it must be stated that the main and largest segment of Republicans—namely, the MAGA movement—supports Trump and confronting Iran. However, voices are also heard within the MAGA movement, and individuals such as Tucker Carlson are among those who oppose, stating that the United States should not enter into war with Iran and that if Iran poses a threat to the Israeli regime, that regime should confront Iran itself.

Nevertheless, this critical current within MAGA is not a powerful force and lacks sufficient influence to impose its view in a manner that would compel Donald Trump to reconsider his position regarding the war against Iran.

Another issue pertains to the presidential war powers and Congressional influence. According to the War Powers Resolution, the US President may undertake military actions abroad without obtaining Congressional authorization, albeit with several conditions: first, Congress must be notified, and once operations commence, the President must provide justifications.

Following the attack against Iran launched in Esfand, Trump wrote a letter to Congress explaining the reasons for this action.

Under the War Powers Resolution, the US President is authorized to conduct military operations for a maximum of 60 days. After the 60-day period concludes, the President must either seek Congressional authorization, halt operations, or utilize an additional 30-day period during which offensive actions are prohibited and only troop withdrawal is permitted. In other words, offensive operations may continue for 60 days, and within the subsequent 30 days, forces must be withdrawn from the combat zone.

According to US tradition, when disagreements arise regarding the continuation of war, the President’s position prevails. The last time Congress was requested to authorize military operations was for the 2003 invasion of Iraq; since then, such authorization has never again been sought from Congress.

Congress possesses limited power to restrain the executive branch, except regarding budgetary allocations; for example, Trump requested an additional $200 billion from Congress for the war with Iran. In this situation, Congress could refuse to approve the budget, thereby exerting pressure on the government and military to alter their policies.

Ultimately, if Democrats gain control of one or both chambers of Congress by January 3, 2027, they may potentially impose stricter constraints on the continuation of the war or establish limitations on Trump’s future actions. However, if Republican control of Congress persists or its seat composition remains unchanged, no significant change will occur.