Tuesday, September 22, 2026

Is America about to launch some devastating attack on Iran?

Because American authorities have said
– If there are any American citizens in Iran, they must leave Iran as quickly as possible.
On top of that, all American citizens and embassies across West Asia have been told to stay on maximum alert. Now the question is
– Why was this alert issued?
British Sky News geopolitical analyst Sean Bell has said
– There could be a major attack on Iran.
But here's the question: after dropping bombs nonstop for 40 days, America and Israel still couldn't do anything to Iran. So where will they strike now? And why, at this point, did Trump say again yesterday
– I will destroy Iran.
The answer is actually very simple. Just yesterday, Iran sent America a proposal. Do you know what it says? In it, Iran has said
– The war must be completely stopped to allow for negotiations with Iran.
Now you see where things stand. If America wants to talk with Iran, Iran has set conditions just for those talks. What are the conditions?
– The war must stop on every front.
– It's written in plain words: the war in Lebanon and G*za must stop.
– The Iranian money America has frozen must be returned.
In other words, Iran hasn't moved a single inch from its position. So why would Trump like that? Perhaps that's why he made the threat. American professor Mearsheimer has said
– Trump may have forgotten: America is running out of weapons.
But the interesting question was raised today by Tehran University professor Marandi. Appearing today on Norwegian professor Glenn Diesen's show, he said
– Fine, let's assume Trump will attack Iran. But where?
What he means is this: in the 40-day war, America has already struck every one of Iran's military installations. Trump himself has said
– Iran's navy, air force, and military have been destroyed.
Then he said
– So where will they strike now?
Then he asked himself
– At Iran's key facilities?
He gave the answer himself too. If they go after military installations, Trump has no option, because Iran's military installations are underground. That's exactly why America couldn't destroy them. But what if they hit the key oil and gas fields, or the power sector?
American military expert Colonel Daniel Davis has said
– Then within one hour, Iran may destroy every key installation in Israel, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan, and Kuwait.
Belgian journalist Elijah Magnier has offered an even more interesting piece of information. He has said
– Iran will attack American warships at sea first.
As I'm writing this, I can see American Fox News running a breaking story
– Trump Called Off strikes against Houtis.
The Saudi prince, slave of imperialist America, can't get America's help now even after begging for it. The whole world can see what happens when you become America's friend. France's English-language channel France24 published a report today. Its headline is
– Saudi Arabia left without US help against Houtis.
Trump knows very well that if he opens another front against the Houthis now, he won't get to remain President of America. His party, the Republicans, already has a very high chance of losing the November mid-term elections. If he starts another war on top of that, he may even get impeached. But what happens to the Iran war?
Could Trump and Israel together carry out a nuclear attack on Iran? Geopolitical analyst Trita Parsi said yesterday
– A major attack on Iran could come before the mid-terms or right after.
He also said
– Even if not Trump himself, he could use Israel to drop tactical nuclear bombs on Iran.
Yesterday, geopolitical analyst and University of Chicago professor Robert Pape said
– An October surprise is coming. Iran may test or declare that it has nuclear weapons.
Yesterday, after hearing Professor Robert Pape's analysis, I thought: nah, there's no chance of that happening. I couldn't fully agree with Professor Pape. But! Yes, but!
Today I see Al-Jazeera has run breaking news. It says
– Iran says, if we are attacked again. World will be astonishes by new weapons.
After reading this, I felt that maybe Professor Pape was right after all. Maybe the October surprise really is on its way. Bourgeois Trump and imperialist America no longer have any Exit ramp out of Iran.
Just think about it. What if, in October, Iran suddenly declares
– We have built the nuclear bomb.
Then what fate awaits Trump? Nothing less than this: it will be the end of Trump's career. Because he came to destroy Iran's nuclear capability, and instead he's turning Iran into a nuclear-armed nation! Every citizen of America will hate him then.
The geopolitical analyses have changed now. Seven months ago, when the war began, everyone was asking: how is Iran holding America back? And now analysts are saying that, using Iran's technology, the Houthis in Yemen have held Saudi Arabia back.
Yet even after buying millions upon millions of dollars' worth of American weapons, Saudi Arabia can't do anything. Why not? Because they have no education. They're nowhere near knowledge and science. They're busy with fun and pleasure. Iran, simply by cultivating its own knowledge and science, has today become a wonder of the world. A country that even America now fears.
#Geopolitics ©aminul-islam

Iran’s message to Washington: No retreat, no surrender, no return to the old order

 By Mahmoud Mahmoudian Ravi

TEHRAN — Iran has issued a series of increasingly explicit political, military and strategic messages to the United States and its regional partners, warning that any renewed US aggression would trigger sustained attacks on American positions and interests across the region, while making clear that Tehran does not regard military pressure and diplomacy as mutually exclusive.

The latest statements, delivered by senior Iranian military and political officials on Sunday, came amid continued tensions over the Strait of Hormuz, the future of Iran-US negotiations and the country’s nuclear policy. Together, they point to an Iranian strategy that seeks to combine military deterrence, control over the strategic waterway and diplomatic leverage while keeping a range of options open.

Iran warns of “painful” regional response

The Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, the command center responsible for coordinating Iran’s military operations, warned the US and regional countries against any further hostile action against the Islamic Republic.

In a statement released Sunday, the headquarters accused the United States of seeking to conceal failures in its campaign against Iran and to manufacture “false gains” from the conflict.

It said that, based on information available to Iranian authorities, the United States had decided to resume action against Iran following a meeting in a European country and with the “green light” of some regional states.

The headquarters issued an unambiguous warning that any US military action against Iran would be met with sustained attacks on American positions and interests throughout the region.

“If the US makes any mistake against the Islamic Republic of Iran, all its positions and interests in the region will be targeted by sustained, effective and painful attacks,” the statement said.

The warning was also directed at regional states that might cooperate with Washington. The Iranian command said countries that aligned themselves with US aggression against Iran would be regarded as participants in that action and should not expect restraint from Iran’s Armed Forces.

The statement represents a continuation of warnings previously issued by Iran over possible US attempts to intervene in the management or security arrangements of the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian military authorities have repeatedly said that Washington cannot unilaterally determine the conditions governing navigation through the strategic waterway.

Hormuz becomes central to Iran’s negotiating position

The military warning came as Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf reiterated that Iran’s position on the Strait of Hormuz is closely linked to the broader political and security dispute with Washington.

Addressing parliament on Sunday, Qalibaf said Iran’s messages and conditions had already been conveyed to the United States through intermediaries.

He stressed that 'the Strait would not return to its previous operating conditions until Iran’s legitimate rights were recognized, and US commitments were implemented.'

“The path of deception and unilateral imposition is closed,” Qalibaf said, adding that there would be no return to the previous framework of negotiations or reopening of the Strait until Iran’s conditions were met.

His remarks are consistent with Tehran’s position in recent months that 'the reopening of Hormuz cannot be treated as a unilateral decision by Washington or any other outside power.' Iran and the United States had previously reached an interim arrangement in June involving a halt to military operations and navigation arrangements, but that understanding subsequently collapsed amid US violations. 

The significance of Hormuz extends well beyond the immediate Iran-US confrontation. The Strait is one of the world's principal energy chokepoints, connecting the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. Recent shipping data reported by Reuters showed traffic through the waterway remained substantially below its recent average, underscoring the extent to which the conflict has disrupted regional maritime commerce. 

For Tehran, therefore, the issue is not simply whether commercial vessels can physically pass through the waterway. The dispute also concerns who determines the security architecture, operating conditions and rules governing navigation in a waterway located on Iran’s immediate southern flank.

Qalibaf rejects “war or negotiations” as a choice

Qalibaf also rejected the idea that Iran must choose between military confrontation and diplomacy. “We believe that the dichotomy of war or negotiations is not real; rather, we must both fight and negotiate,” he said.

He argued that Iran should use military power when necessary to repel attacks and then employ diplomacy at an appropriate moment to consolidate 'battlefield gains.'

The formulation places diplomacy within a broader deterrence strategy rather than presenting negotiations as an alternative to military resistance.

Qalibaf further argued that the regional balance of power was undergoing a fundamental transformation, saying the previous US-led order in West Asia had collapsed and calling for Muslim countries in the region to participate in shaping a new regional order.

His comments suggest that Tehran views the present confrontation not only as a bilateral dispute with Washington but also as part of a wider contest over the future security architecture of West Asia. 

Iranian commander invokes legacy of “Sacred Defense”

At a separate ceremony marking Iran’s Sacred Defense Week, Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, deputy chief of the Iranian Army for Coordination, framed the current confrontation within the historical experience of the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq War.
Sayyari stressed that modern warfare increasingly depends on intelligence, communications, weapons technology, and changing battlefield tactics, indicating the Army’s emphasis on adapting its military capabilities to a rapidly evolving security environment.

NPT withdrawal enters Iran’s strategic debate

At the same time, the confrontation with Washington and the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program have pushed another previously sensitive issue closer to the center of Iran’s strategic debate: possible withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Ebrahim Azizi, chairman of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, said the possibility of leaving the NPT was now “on the table.”

In an interview with Mehr News Agency, Azizi sharply criticized the International Atomic Energy Agency, arguing that it had moved away from its technical and professional role and had become subject to political pressure from major powers.

He said legislative proposals concerning withdrawal from the NPT had been drafted and submitted to the Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission as well as the its legislative office.

At the same time, Azizi added that withdrawal would require concrete measures, coordination among the different branches and institutions of government, and a unified decision within Iran’s political establishment.

That distinction is significant: the existence of parliamentary proposals does not mean that Iran has decided to withdraw from the treaty. Rather, the issue has entered the political and strategic debate as one of the options being considered.

Under Article X of the NPT, a state has a right to withdraw if it determines that extraordinary events related to the treaty have jeopardized its supreme national interests. The treaty requires three months’ advance notice to the other parties and to the UN Security Council, accompanied by an explanation of the extraordinary circumstances cited. 

Nuclear policy increasingly linked to security calculations

The growing discussion over the NPT is unfolding against a broader Iranian argument that international nuclear safeguards and security guarantees have failed to adequately protect Iran’s nuclear facilities and rights.

Iranian lawmakers had already called for a review of the country’s NPT membership in a September 15 statement, arguing that recent developments had demonstrated the inability of existing international mechanisms to protect Iran’s legal rights and nuclear infrastructure.

The debate also reflects a broader shift in Tehran’s calculation of the relationship between nuclear commitments and national security. For Iranian officials advocating a review of NPT membership, the central question is increasingly whether continued adherence provides sufficient security and diplomatic benefits in circumstances where Iran argues that its nuclear facilities have come under military attack.

A broader Iranian strategy takes shape

Taken together, the statements by the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, Sayyari, Qalibaf and Azizi reveal several interconnected strands in Iran’s current strategic messaging.

First, Tehran is emphasizing deterrence. The military leadership is warning that any new US attack would not remain confined to Iran’s territory but could expose American positions and interests across the region to retaliation.

Second, Iran is treating the Strait of Hormuz as a strategic lever. Qalibaf’s remarks indicate that Tehran links the waterway’s reopening to broader political and security arrangements rather than viewing navigation as an issue separate from the conflict.

Third, Tehran is keeping diplomacy open while rejecting negotiations under unfavorable conditions. Qalibaf’s formulation that Iran must “both fight and negotiate” reflects an attempt to combine military pressure with diplomatic engagement.

Fourth, the nuclear issue is increasingly being considered through the lens of national security. The NPT withdrawal debate remains a political discussion rather than a confirmed policy decision, but its emergence among senior lawmakers indicates the depth of the strategic reassessment underway in Tehran.

The immediate trajectory of the confrontation will therefore depend not only on developments on the battlefield but also on whether Washington and Tehran can establish a framework that addresses the issues Iran has identified as prerequisites for renewed negotiations and changes in the status of the Strait of Hormuz.

For now, Tehran's message is that military deterrence, control over its strategic maritime environment, and diplomacy are being pursued simultaneously rather than sequentially—with Iranian officials presenting these elements as interconnected components of the country's response to continued US pressure. 

Conflicting interpretations of alleged UAE president’s warning to Netanyahu on Oct. 7 attack

TEHRAN – A UAE official has declined to explicitly confirm or deny reports that President Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) warned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of an imminent Hamas attack before October 7, 2023.

Responding to a recent query from The National, the official said, “The UAE discusses security matters with other countries through the relevant entities, and does not discuss such details at the level of national leaders.”

The response has prompted different and seemingly contradictory interpretations of whether MBZ personally warned Netanyahu about the planned attack.

The National, an Abu Dhabi-based newspaper, is owned by International Media Investments, a media group controlled by MBZ’s brother.

With Israeli elections approaching, the issue has gained political significance, particularly in debates over the government’s handling of security threats before October 7.

Middle East Eye published a report titled “UAE dodges question on pre-October 7 warning to Netanyahu,” interpreting the Emirati response as an evasion rather than a denial.

The controversy stems from a report by Haaretz, which stated that Netanyahu had been personally warned by MBZ approximately 10 days before Hamas’s attack. According to The Times of Israel, a source familiar with the conversation confirmed that MBZ had warned Netanyahu that Hamas was preparing a major offensive.

The reported 45-minute conversation allegedly included a specific warning that Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was preparing a large-scale operation. The report further claimed that Netanyahu failed to inform Israeli security officials or take action based on the warning.

The Times of Israel offered a different interpretation of The National’s report. According to the Israeli newspaper, the UAE did not confirm or deny the allegations but issued a statement emphasizing that the two countries maintained “open lines of communication” through which “all relevant intelligence has been and continues to be communicated.”

This wording was interpreted as leaving open the possibility that intelligence had been shared, without confirming that MBZ had personally warned Netanyahu.

Netanyahu has denied the allegations and threatened to sue Haaretz, but has yet to officially file a lawsuit.

Meanwhile, the Hebrew-language outlet Ynet reported that the Emirati statement followed days of Israeli pressure on the UAE to deny the contents of the Haaretz report.

The Jerusalem Post, however, offered a more direct interpretation of the UAE response, reporting that the Emirati official had rejected claims that MBZ personally spoke with Netanyahu about a possible Hamas attack.

The conflicting accounts leave a central question unresolved: Was the UAE’s statement intended to avoid confirming a reported conversation between the two leaders, or did it amount to a rejection of the allegation that MBZ had personally warned Netanyahu?

Iran's Chalabi

 By Atrin Eskandari

TEHRAN - The missiles began to fall on the morning of 28 February, and those who had planned that morning expected the Islamic Republic to be gone within days, or at the outside within a matter of weeks. This is what the fragments now surfacing in Western sources suggest, and it is perhaps the most consequential fact about this war: not that it was fought, but that it was fought upon a forecast which proved to be worth nothing at all. Forecasts of that kind do not compose themselves, and it is worth asking who supplied this one.

Washington has stood in this place before. Ahmed Chalabi, the Iraqi politician who spent the years preceding 2003 briefing the American capital's most hawkish factions on what was supposedly taking place inside Iraq, furnished intelligence concerning Saddam's weapons of mass destruction and his alleged connections to al-Qaeda, none of which withstood examination, and he promised that Iraqis would greet American soldiers with flowers. The outcome is known: a catastrophic war, hundreds of thousands dead, a country in ruins, and the ground prepared for the emergence of ISIS. Chalabi would later concede that his information had been mistaken, though it is difficult to accept that he had not known this from the beginning, and by the time of that concession it was in any case far too late.

His usefulness had never rested upon the quality of the intelligence he provided; it rested upon his passport. He was the Iraqi who could tell Americans what Iraq was, and what he supplied to them was not information at all but permission.
What is a native informant?

The role carries a name in the scholarly literature. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak draws the term native informant from colonial ethnography, in which such a figure provided the raw cultural material that the colonial power would then interpret, translate into policy, and act upon. The informant himself was never the interpreter; he was an instrument rather than an agent, and above all, by offering the outside power a portrait of "the inside," he furnished the legitimacy required for intervention, even where that portrait was partial, wishful, or entirely fabricated. The structure requires no liar. It requires only a man whose interests run parallel to those of a foreign power, and who is prepared to describe his own country in the terms that power already wishes to hear.

Selling dreams as a strategy

Reza Pahlavi has for some years, and particularly across the past decade, sought to revive the political role of the Pahlavi household. Since the latter part of the 2010s, a period that opened with Trump's withdrawal from the nuclear agreement and inaugurated a long crisis which has still not closed, he has repeated a single message in the political circles of Washington, in the neoconservative think tanks, and subsequently in his meetings with Israeli officials: that the Iranian people stand ready to rise, that the Islamic Republic is rotten from within, and that one further push, whether economic or military, will bring it down. That message grew louder at every moment of unrest, in 2009, in 2019, in 2022; and each time the system endured, what followed was not a revision of the analysis but a promise concerning the next occasion.
The parallel with Chalabi is not a loose one. Both men derived their standing from a claim to knowledge of the inside, both were seeking to recover a power they had lost, and both offered a portrait of their country which corresponded to what the capitals they were addressing wished to hear rather than to what lay upon the ground.

The construction of nostalgia as a strategy

A native informant requires an audience prepared to believe him, and it is here that Manoto entered the equation. The channel presented itself from the outset not as a political outlet but as a cultural and entertainment one, and this positioning was itself strategic, since politics delivered directly repels the viewer, whereas music, films of the Pahlavi era, and the reconstruction of an unreachable image of "Iran before 1979" reach him without his noticing that a political message has been delivered at all.

What Manoto constructed was an emotional archive, and its omissions were the whole of the design. The celebrations of the 2,500th anniversary glittered upon the screen, while SAVAK, whose methods of torture were documented internationally at the time, was nowhere to be seen. Tehran appeared as the cosmopolitan capital of the region, without its poverty and without its prisoners. There was talk of progress and of invention, but not of SAVAK's own invention, the apparatus its interrogators named the Apollo. The channel produced the Pahlavi myth not through direct propaganda but through the grammar of longing.

The connection between this and Pahlavi's own narrative is structural rather than incidental. In Washington he told the political elite that Iranians were waiting for change; Manoto documented the very same claim at the level of sentiment. The one spoke the language of lobbying, the other the language of manufactured nostalgia, yet both advanced a single story. A portion of Manoto's audience, people genuinely exhausted by conditions in Iran, became without knowing it so much data in the hands of the same structure: possessed of no voice of their own and of no one to represent them, yet serviceable as evidence of a public yearning.

The agency behind the informant

Pahlavi did not act in a vacuum, and the greater agency in this equation belongs to Israel. Over recent years the Netanyahu government has invested heavily, in political and in intelligence terms alike, in injecting a single proposition into Washington and the European capitals: that Iran is weak and ready to fall. The strategy served two parallel purposes, foreclosing any diplomatic understanding between the United States and Iran while preparing the ground for American support of military action.

Much of the labour of constructing the internal collapse narrative fell to Iran International. Unlike Manoto, which passed itself off as an entertainment channel, Iran International presented itself as a news organisation, and it states that it employs seven hundred people worldwide.
Its finances have drawn scrutiny. The Financial Times reported in May that Volant Media UK, the channel's parent company, had carried out a previously undisclosed debt-for-equity swap on 13 December 2025, relieving it of some  650 million in debt. The channel states that no new funds entered the company and that it has never received funding from any government; it also declines to identify its investors.

What the filings show is that 648 million shares were issued upon that date, and that on the same day Volant's original fifty thousand shares passed from the British-Saudi executive Adel Abdulkarim Alabdulkarim to an offshore entity registered in the Cayman Islands, Info-Cast Cayman Limited, whose sole director bears the same name as a senior executive of the Saudi Research and Media Group. Volant had by then lost more than  410 million across five years and owed related entities in the region of  482 million. Whoever it was who wrote off that debt, the channel's output in the months preceding the war was indistinguishable from an argument for fighting it.

Within this framework Pahlavi served as an asset, though an asset who chose the role. In April 2023 he spent five days in Israel as the guest of the intelligence minister Gila Gamliel, met Netanyahu and Herzog, and declared at a press conference in Tel Aviv that Iranians and Israelis were prepared to become strategic partners once more; negotiation over the nuclear file, he argued in the same period, was a waste of time, and the swiftest route to removing the threat lay in investing in an alternative to the regime itself. A man who claims to represent the Iranian people, meeting a government openly committed to regime change in Iran, presents a contradiction which requires no commentary.

This dependency is not a novelty within the family. His father was a monarch who could seldom bring himself to act without foreign endorsement. In August 1953, when Mohammad Reza Shah's first move against Mossadegh miscarried, he did not remain in the country to contest his throne but fled to Baghdad and then to Rome, returning only once a coup organised by the CIA and Britain's SIS had accomplished the task on his behalf. A quarter of a century afterwards, as the revolution gathered around him, the same reflex reappeared, and he turned repeatedly to the American and British ambassadors, William Sullivan and Anthony Parsons, to ask what he ought to do, which is not a question a sovereign puts to foreign envoys. The son has inherited the reflex, keeping his positions aligned with Israel's and awaiting its cues as his father awaited those of London and Washington. This does not absolve him. A man who lays claim to the mantle of leadership assumes the historical responsibility that accompanies it, and weakness of character has never constituted a defence.

In Washington, Pahlavi spoke of "the Iranian people." Yet the Iranian people, meaning not those who watch television in Los Angeles and who constitute a small fraction even of the diaspora, but those who live within the country, never granted him such a mandate. That distance between the claim to representation and its reality lies at the heart of Spivak's critique. Iranians exhausted by incompetence and by sixteen years of crippling sanctions have not on that account sought deliverance beyond their borders, and least of all from those who would have a foreign army bring it.

The bill settled in Iranian blood

This war was launched, as the invasion of Iraq was launched, upon a false account of a population waiting to welcome it and a regime prepared to give way, and the historical responsibility for that account is not difficult to assign. Israel pursued its strategic interests, which is comprehensible even where it is open to criticism; the United States fell once more into the logic through which it had already passed in Iraq. But Reza Pahlavi, a man who professes to act out of concern for Iran and for Iranians, performed a role structurally at odds with the interests of the people he claims to represent. His father and his grandfather each owed a throne to a foreign power, to the United States and to Britain respectively, and it would be strange indeed if that inheritance had left no mark upon him.

Iraq’s security risks amid US withdrawal

 By Ali Minabi

TEHRAN – There is intense debate in Baghdad over whether the anticipated U.S. military withdrawal will close one chapter or mark the beginning of another.

The new reality is both simple and harsh: an international military force led by the United States is anticipated to withdraw from Iraq by the end of September. What remains afterward is not some theoretical vacuum to be debated in coffee shops. 

It is a concrete reality on the ground, one that began the moment the withdrawal process was set in motion.

The question that deserves to be asked without ambiguity is this: who will actually fill this vacuum? The Iraqi state and its institutions? Or external powers that rely on domestic proxies and have been waiting for years for precisely such a moment to rearrange Iraq’s geography and future according to their own interests?

The answer will be determined by what actually happens along the borders, internal negotiations over weapons, and in the positions taken by regional powers known not simply to observe events but to help shape them whenever the opportunity arises in order to settle their sectarian and ideological scores.

A vacuum to be exploited

The security lesson established by Iraq’s experience since 2003, from sectarian violence and al-Qaeda, through the Daesh period, to the fallout from the Gaza genocide and the illegal war against the Islamic Republic is clear: a security vacuum does not remain empty for more than the first moments of shock.

When one force withdraws from a position, other forces do not wait for permission to occupy it. The quickest to move are usually groups already prepared and operating under the banner of “sectarianism,” “factions,” or “mercenaries” skilled in working both covertly and openly. 

There is a vast difference between these labels in form and in ideological and military substance.

The expected scenario is not arbitrary. It involves attempts to manufacture scattered security incidents, carefully timed leaks, warnings of an economic collapse, and border crises deliberately engineered to appear as natural consequences of state weakness and political dysfunction. 

In reality, however, they would be the product of a calculated operation carried out by those with a direct interest in keeping Iraq dependent on permanent external protection.

Consider this pattern, which has been repeated more than once across the region: clandestine bases, lone wolves, and recruited local cells operating in complete silence before carrying out an operation that throws the internal balance into confusion or creates tensions between neighbors that had no genuine dispute in the first place. 

Then begins the search for “Who did it?” while the real beneficiary is obvious to anyone who reads the scene beyond official statements. Who benefits from setting Iraq’s borders with its neighbors ablaze, straining its relations with its Islamic surroundings, and exhausting it in internal conflicts that are perilously close to becoming sectarian?

The history of Iraq’s post-2003 enemies is known and documented: when the territory of states with weak security structures is used as a launchpad for operations that the perpetrators do not want directly attributed to them, the affected parties are left trading accusations among themselves while the real actor watches from a distance and, at times, pulls the strings itself.

Iraq’s geography leaves no room for complacency on this particular issue. From the western border with Syria, where the situation remains fragile and capable of igniting, to the strip bordering Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and all the way to the Iranian east, every point along this expanse could become a testing ground for everyone’s patience. 

Any cleverly engineered incident could ignite a pointless conflict between Iraq and a neighboring state, one that serves neither side but benefits a third party whose name never appears in any statement. The incident involving the bombing of the Saudi Petroline pipeline may be a telling example.

Tel Aviv and Washington do not want stability in the Persian Gulf and Iraq simultaneously: an Iraq that regains its geopolitical role as a bridge to regional stability rather than remaining a permanent arena of conflict; an Iran that does not need direct confrontation to consolidate its regional influence; and Persian Gulf states reconsidering their calculations away from complete alignment with Washington. 

From the perspective of those planning for a turbulent rather than stable region, such a scenario is entirely unacceptable.

But if the region were to descend into a comprehensive regional war, or even into a series of internal crises or conflicts spilling across neighboring borders and keeping everyone in a state of permanent tension, the matter would be entirely different.

Borders would evaporate, the balance of power would be redrawn, and states such as Iraq, with its structural weaknesses, which there is no point denying, would shift from entities capable of making their own decisions into arenas where the calculations of Zionist lobbies are played out. 

To ignite such a scenario, the party concerned would need little more than a hidden launchpad on a third country’s territory, an incident that could serve as a pretext, and an already-charged regional context in which every side is primed to believe that its neighbor was the one who attacked it. 

Given Iraq’s geographical position and its multiple open fronts, it is perpetually at risk of becoming that launchpad, whether its leaders recognize it or not.

China slams ‘unilateral’ US sanctions law targeting Russia, Iran

TEHRAN – The Chinese Ministry of Commerce has issued a sharp rebuke against Washington’s latest legislative maneuvers, condemning the newly enacted US law that seeks to tighten sanctions on Russia and broaden trade restrictions against Iran.

The legislation, signed by President Donald Trump late Friday, has been met with immediate disapproval from Beijing. A spokesperson for China’s Commerce Ministry stated on Saturday that China has “consistently opposed” the implementation of unilateral sanctions and the extraterritorial application of secondary sanctions, which critics argue violate the foundational principles of international relations.

In a formal statement, the spokesperson underscored that Beijing remains firmly against any coercive economic measures that lack authorization from the United Nations or any grounding in established international law.

The US law, which authorizes the imposition of tariffs on nations purchasing Russian petroleum products, has drawn scrutiny for its potential to destabilize global energy markets and disrupt diplomatic efforts. The measure, viewed by observers as a thinly veiled tool of economic warfare, threatens to impact several major economies, including China, India, and Turkey, as well as several European Union member states that continue to engage in energy trade with Russia.

“China will closely monitor Washington’s next steps,” the spokesperson said, emphasizing that Beijing “reserves the right to take all necessary measures to safeguard its sovereignty, development interests, and the legitimate rights and interests of its companies.”

Analysts observe that this latest aggressive move by the White House marks yet another chapter in Washington’s deteriorating approach to global diplomacy. By weaponizing the global financial system and dictating the economic policies of sovereign nations, the United States is further eroding the trust of its own allies and isolating itself from the emerging multipolar order.

Critics argue that such measures are not aimed at fostering international security, but are instead designed to maintain American hegemony at the expense of global economic stability. By targeting independent nations like Iran—a key partner in China’s global development initiatives—the US is signaling an intensified effort to obstruct the sovereign economic development of the Global South.

The statement further reiterated China’s commitment to the stability of global trade, urging the United States to abandon its policy of economic coercion in favor of dialogue and mutual consultation.

As Washington continues to utilize its domestic legislation to project power globally, Beijing’s response signals a hardening stance against what many international observers describe as an increasingly erratic and unilateralist US foreign policy.