Monday, March 30, 2026

DAYS 25-29: WAR ON IRAN — Remaking the Middle East

Iranians and Saudis see historic opportunity from the war to remake the region. Iran wants the U.S. and Gulf monarchies out, while Saudis want control. Israel has its own ideas, writes Joe Lauria.

President Donald Trump with Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, or MbS, then the deputy crown prince of Saudi Arabia, in March 2017. (White House/Shealah Craighead)

Tuesday, March 24 to Sunday, March 29

By Joe Lauria
Special to Consortium News

The war in the Middle East after the first month has evolved into a battle between nations with conflicting visions of how to remake the region.

Saudi Arabia seeks to influence if not dominate Arab governments from North Africa to the Gulf.

Iran wants the United States military out of the region altogether and security guarantees for Lebanese, Palestinians, Yemenis, Bahranis and themselves.

Meanwhile, Israel conspires to the run the entire region. 

Back in Washington, Donald Trump scrambles for a way out of the disaster he created, while the Saudis, Iranians and Israelis, for their own reasons, want the war to go on. 

Saudis to Trump: Keep Fighting

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler, has been pushing Trump to keep fighting Iran because of an “historic opportunity” for Saudi Arabia to remake the Middle East, The New York Times reported on Tuesday.

The paper said:

“In a series of conversations over the last week, Prince Mohammed has conveyed to Mr. Trump that he must press toward the destruction of Iran’s hard-line government, the people familiar with the conversations said.

Prince Mohammed, the people familiar with the discussions said, has argued that Iran poses a long-term threat to the Gulf that can only be eliminated by getting rid of the government. […]

Prince Mohammed has argued that the United States should consider putting troops in Iran to seize energy infrastructure and force the government out of power, according to the people briefed by U.S. officials. […]

Some [U.S.] government intelligence analysts have told other officials that they think Prince Mohammed sees the war as an opportunity for him to increase Saudi Arabia’s influence throughout the Middle East, and that he believes Saudi Arabia can protect itself even if the war continues. […]”

The Saudi Vision

President Trump and the Saudi Crown Prince at the White House. (White House/Shealah Craighead/Wikimedia Commons)

That bin Salman wants the war to go on, despite Trump’s erratic talk about supposed “peace talks,” would confirm a Washington Post report that bin Salman was influential in pushing Trump to attack to begin with. 

The oil-rich Saudis have for decades sought influence over the region, beginning with efforts to counter the secular, republican movement of Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser following Nasser’s seizure of power in 1952. The 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine backed the Saudis and other regional monarchies against Nasserism and supposed Soviet influence.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia clashed directly in the 1970s Yemen civil war between the monarchists and republicans. After Nasser’s death in 1970 Saudi-Egyptian ties normalized under pro-U.S. Anwar el-Sadat. Throughout the 1970s the Saudis extended their influence under the U.S. umbrella and normalized relations with Egypt and the Shah’s Iran.

But after the 1979 Iranian revolution relations deteriorated. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini called the Saudis “American lackeys” and “Wahhabi deviants.” Thus Iran was seen in Riyadh as the obstacle to Saudi regional influence.

Destroying the Iranian revolution was the Saudi goal. It helped arm and finance Saddam Hussein’s Iraq to invade Iran in 1980 with the aim of  crushing the one-year old revolution.

In the 1980s the Saudis backed the Mujahideen in its war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. In this decade, the Saudis extended their influence across the region and abroad with its well-financed project to spread its brand of austere, Wahhabi Islam. 

The rivalry with Shia Iran led to proxy wars across the region particularly after 2011 in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. In these places Saudi (and other Gulf)-backed Sunni terrorist groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda and their offshoots battled Iranian-backed militia in Iraq and Yemen and the government in Syria. Iranian and Saudi interests also clashed in Lebanon and Bahrain. 

‘The Head of the Snake’

After the U.S. overthrow of Saddam in 2003 (with Saudi backing) led to Iran’s increased influence in Iraq, Saudi intentions for Iran were revealed in a widely-cited 2008 WikiLeaks U.S. cable release:

“[Saudi ambassador to the U.S. Adel] Al-Jubeir recalled the [Saudi] King [Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz]’s frequent exhortations to the US to attack Iran and so put an end to its nuclear weapons program. ‘He told you to cut off the head of the snake,’ he recalled to the Charge’, adding that working with the US to roll back Iranian influence in Iraq is a strategic priority for the King and his government.” 

That bin Salman would have told Trump last week to keep the war going because of an historic opportunity to essentially cut the snake’s head off in Tehran is totally in line with this history.  Here is the best chance the Saudis may ever have to crush their major obstacle to leadership of the region. 

Iran’s Vision

The destroyed E-3 Sentry AWACS at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. (Air Force amn/nco/snco/Facebook)

Iran wants to prolong the war too because it believes it is winning and has an historic opportunity to remake the region by demanding U.S. troops leave. That would be a monumentally historic change that would transform the region similar to when the French and British left direct control of the Middle East in the early and mid-20th century. 

Iran has already caused significant damage to the U.S. bases and equipment in the Gulf. Even The New York Times admits,

“Many of the 13 military bases in the region used by American troops are all but uninhabitable, with the ones in Kuwait, which is next door to Iran, suffering perhaps the most damage.” 

Iran continues to hit those bases having taken out hugely expensive U.S. radar systems needed for missile interceptors. On Saturday it destroyed a flying radar, E-3 Sentry AWACS plane on the ground at Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. Cost: $540 million.  It was replacing the radar Iran had already destroyed.

Repairing all this damage to U.S. bases would would cost billions of dollars so far. 

After this debacle would it be worth it for the U.S. to rebuild the bases?  Would the Gulf Arab states want them back after housing them brought disaster upon them rather than protection?

U.S. troops are dislocated now, living in hotels that Iran is targeting. U.S. forces are already leaving Iraq. The only U.S. troops remain in the autonomous Kurdish north, which is being attacked by Iranian-allied Iraqi militia. 

Israel’s Vision

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, with President Donald Trump holding the phone, during a meeting on Gaza, Sept. 29, 2025, in the Oval Office. (White House /Daniel Took)

Bin Salman’s desire coincides with Netanyahu’s to prolong the war. Out of fear that it might end soon, Haaretz reports that Netanyahu is stepping up Israel’s bombing campaign.   

Netanyahu said he had been trying for 40 years to get the U.S. to join Israel’s attack on Iran, but every president had refused because they were told what the consequences would be: ruined U.S. bases, devastation of parts of Israel and the Gulf states, and a global economic crisis of historic proportions when Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz. 

Then Netanyahu found Trump. The results are just what all the presidents had been warned about. 

But this is the moment of greatest historic opportunity for an Israel that — since the days of first prime minister David Ben Gurion — has envisioned building a Biblical Greater Israel, stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates.

With the extremists he gathered in his cabinet, Netanyahu has been going for broke, beginning with the ethnic cleansing and genocide in Gaza, then the anti-Palestinian pogroms on the West Bank, and now the unprovoked aggression against Iran and the invasion of Lebanon. 

Just seven months ago, Netanyahu was asked on Israeli television if he adhered to a “vision” for a “Greater Israel.” Netanyahu said, “Absolutely.”

Asked if he felt connected to the “Greater Israel” vision, Netanyahu said: “Very much.” His answers sparked an outcry in the region. But he had put them on the record. 

In his now infamous interview with Tucker Carlson, Mike Huckabee, the U.S. ambassador to Israel, presumably speaking for the United States, said it would be “fine if they [Israel] took it all” when asked by Carlson about biblical claims to territory from the Nile to the Euphrates.

To conquer Greater Israel, Tel Aviv needs the United States to fight for it. For the United States, the Middle East is a vital part of its global empire that Israel can manage for it in overlapping regional and world empires. 

But there are differences. Trump would need to prevent further destruction of energy facilities of both Iran and the Gulf states if he wants to stabilize oil prices — which have risen 50 percent in a month — and to seize Iran’s deposits. 

He told the Financial Times on Sunday that he wants to “take the oil in Iran” and that his “preference would be to take the oil” the way he took Venezuela’s.  

But why would Netanyahu care about the destruction of the Gulf Arabs’ spectacular, oil-based wealth when Israel’s desire since the 1982 Yinon Plan and the 30-year old, 1996 policy paper, “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm” has been to reduce surrounding Muslim lands to ruin, the better to project Israeli dominance over the entire Near East and its resources? 

The biggest difference right now between Israel and the U.S. is that Trump wants out of the mess he created while Netanyahu needs the U.S. to continue attacking Iran if it wants to reach its expansionist goals, even though Israeli defensive missiles dwindle and damage to Israel from Iranian missiles and drones multiplies daily. 

Three Scenarios 

There are several ways this might play out. First, Iran wins as it continues to press its apparent missile advantage to wreak continuing damage on Israel, the Gulf states and U.S. bases.

It seems impossible to imagine, but if Israel and the U.S. do not opt for total war out of frustration at being unable to overthrow the Iranian government and at running out of interceptor missiles, Iran could achieve an almost unthinkable victory by getting the U.S. military to leave the Middle East. 

There could be a further Iranian victory if Israel is pushed out of Lebanon and if some or all of the Gulf monarchies collapse. 

Second, Saudi Arabia can come out on top if Iran is overwhelmed, its government and economy collapses and a pro-U.S. regime is installed. It would help if Saudi Arabia sustains less damage than Israel and the other monarchies.

But the collapse of Iran is also what Israel wants. So the two U.S. allies could wind up vying for control of the region. The difference is that Saudi Arabia fears a destabilized Iran broken into ethnic enclaves, while that is what Israel apparently seeks. 

Third, Iran and the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, are shattered, Hezbollah is defeated and Israel escapes major damage. With U.S. backing, Israel emerges as the predominant force in the Middle East, establishing a Greater Israel over a devastated region.

But there is a fourth possibility.

Total War 

In this scenario, no one emerges a clear winner with utter devastation all around. This can come about by the United States and Israel unleashing a sustained, all-out aerial offensive against Iran’s civilian infrastructure until its institutions are smashed and Iran is no longer a functioning society.

Armed Kurds, Azeris, and Baluchis could seek to take control of their areas. But in the process, Israel and the Gulf states would be also be devastated by Iran.

If Iran does not demonstrate that it has developed a handful of deliverable nuclear warheads by then, Israel could deploy a nuclear weapon against Iran — if Israel thought its existence was at stake.

Where We Stand: U.S. ‘Negotiating With Themselves’

The stakes keep getting higher. The Houthis entered the war over the past five days and threaten to shut down the Bab al-Mandab at the bottom of the Red Sea through which as much as 12 percent of the world’s seaborne trade exits, having passed through the Suez Canal. 

Trump has extended his very flexible deadline to April 6 before he decides whether to hit Iranian power plants and energy infrastructure. Iran has threatened to respond in kind against energy facilities in the Gulf and also to hit desalination plants, which could produce a humanitarian catastrophe. 

That would be the road towards total war.

At this point no one knows what to believe about what an increasingly unhinged Trump says. He claims the U.S. is in direct talks with Iran but the Iranians say the U.S. is negotiating with themselves.  Only messages are being passed back and forth through the Pakistanis. 

The U.S. is rushing more ground troops to the Gulf region, but Secretary of State Marco Rubio says there’s no need for a ground invasion. There doesn’t seem to be anywhere the U.S. could invade without facing a bloodbath.

Despite the bravado of Trump and War Secretary Pete Hegseth claiming victory at Thursday’s cabinet meeting — boasting that Iran’s navy and missile stockpiles and launchers have been destroyed — Iran continues its barrages against U.S. military installations and Israel, again striking Dimona. 

Trump tries to laugh when he nervously tells the camera at the cabinet meeting, “I read a story today that I’m desperate to make a deal. I’m not. I’m the opposite of desperate. I don’t care. … They [the Iranians] have been just beat to shit. They are begging to make a deal. Not me. They’re begging to work out a deal.”

An Easter Truce 

There is another option for the desperate Trump to get out of this without a humiliating exit from the war, which would be seen as defeat by everyone but himself and his cronies.

That would be to announce that the war is not over, but that the U.S. will begin a unilateral pause — an Easter truce — during which Washington will reassess where the war stands.

Iran may continue to attack for a day or two, but its immediate objective has been all along, to cause the other side enough pain so they stop the aggression against it. 

If the aggression is put on hold, space could open for genuine talks to find a compromise out of this extreme danger for everyone.

Next Sunday is Easter.

Joe Lauria is editor-in-chief of Consortium News and a former U.N. correspondent for The Wall Street Journal, Boston Globe, and other newspapers, including The Montreal Gazette, the London Daily Mail and The Star of Johannesburg. He was an investigative reporter for the Sunday Times of London, a financial reporter for Bloomberg News and began his professional work as a 19-year old stringer for The New York Times. He is the author of two books, A Political Odyssey, with Sen. Mike Gravel, foreword by Daniel Ellsberg; and How I Lost By Hillary Clinton, foreword by Julian Assange.

Ayatollah Khamenei hails ‘explicit’ stance of Iraqi top clerics, nation on Iran war

Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei
Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei has expressed his gratitude to Iraq’s religious authority and nation for their “explicit” stance on the unlawful war by the United States and the Israeli regime against the Islamic Republic.

In a message on Sunday, Ayatollah Khamenei commended support of top Iraqi religious clerics and nation for Iran in the face of the US-Israeli war of aggression, which began on February 28 by assassinating then-Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei and several senior commanders.

Iran’s Ambassador to Baghdad Mohammad Kazem Ale Sadeq handed over the Leader’s message to Head of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq Shaikh Humam Hamoudi.

In a statement, which was read out during the Eid al-Fitr prayers on March 21, the top Muslim Shia cleric in Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Sayyed Ali al-Sistani, strongly condemned the ongoing US-Israeli war on Iran.

Ayatollah Sistani said in the statement that the flames of fire were raging over homes in Iran and Lebanon while the two Muslim countries were under military aggression.

“We use the strongest words to condemn this oppressive war and call on all Muslims and freedom-seekers of the world to condemn it and show solidarity with the oppressed nations of Iran and Lebanon,” the statement said.

Ayatollah Sistani, a source of emulation for tens of millions of Shias in Iraq and around the world, also called on influential countries and actors in the world as well as Muslim states to do their utmost to help stop the aggression.

Meanwhile, following Ayatollah Sisitani’s call for providing aid to the Iranian and Lebanese nations, the first convoy of the Iraqi people’s help was sent to Iran.

Imperial Decline in the Strait of Hormuz

By exploring the geopolitical implications of Washington’s latest intervention in Iran, Alfred McCoy says it’s possible to imagine how Trump’s war of choice might well become Washington’s very own version of the Suez crisis. 

View of the Strait of Hormuz connecting the Gulf of Oman with the Persian Gulf from the International Space Station as it orbited 262 miles above, Aug. 14, 2023. (NASA Johnson/Flickr/CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

By Alfred McCoy
TomDispatch.com

In the first chapter of his 1874 novel The Gilded Age, Mark Twain offered a telling observation about the connection between past and present: “History never repeats itself, but the… present often seems to be constructed out of the broken fragments of antique legends.

Among the “antique legends” most helpful in understanding the likely outcome of the current U.S. intervention in Iran is the Suez Crisis of 1956, which I describe in my new book Cold War on Five Continents.

After Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in July 1956, a joint British-French armada of six aircraft carriers destroyed Egypt’s air force, while Israeli troops smashed Egyptian tanks in the sands of the Sinai Peninsula. Within less than a week of war, Nasser had lost his strategic forces and Egypt seemed helpless before the overwhelming might of that massive imperial juggernaut.

But by the time Anglo-French forces came storming ashore at the north end of the Suez Canal, Nasser had executed a geopolitical masterstroke by sinking dozens of rusting ships filled with rocks at the canal’s northern entrance. In doing so, he automatically cut off Europe’s lifeline to its oil fields in the Persian Gulf.

By the time British forces retreated in defeat from Suez, Britain had been sanctioned at the U.N., its currency was at the brink of collapse, its aura of imperial power had evaporated, and its global empire was heading for extinction.

Historians now refer to the phenomenon of a dying empire launching a desperate military intervention to recover its fading imperial glory as “micro-militarism.” And coming in the wake of imperial Washington’s receding influence over the broad Eurasian land mass, the recent U.S. military assault on Iran is starting to look like an American version of just such micro-militarism.

Even if history never truly repeats itself, right now it seems all too appropriate to wonder whether the current U.S. intervention in Iran might indeed be America’s version of the Suez Crisis.

And should Washington’s attempt at regime change in Tehran somehow “succeed,” don’t for a second think that the result will be a successfully stable new government that will be able to serve its people well.

70 Years of Regime Change

Let’s return to the historical record to uncover the likely consequences of regime change in Iran. Over the past 70 years, Washington has made repeated attempts at regime change across the span of five continents — initially via C.I.A. covert action during the 44 years of the Cold War and, in the decades since the end of that global conflict, through conventional military operations.

Although the methods have changed, the results — plunging the affected societies into decades of searing social conflict and incessant political instability — have been sadly similar. This pattern can be seen in a few of the CIA’s most famous covert interventions during the Cold War.

In 1953, Iran’s new parliament decided to nationalize the British imperial oil concession there to fund social services for its emerging democracy. In response, a joint C.I.A.-MI6 coup ousted the reformist prime minister and installed the son of the long-deposed former Shah in power.

Unfortunately for the Iranian people, he proved to be a strikingly inept leader who transformed his country’s oil wealth into mass poverty — thereby precipitating Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution.

The Shah leaving Iran, Mehrabad International Airport – Jan. 16, 1979. (Wikimedia Commons, Public domain)

By 1954, Guatemala was implementing an historic land reform program that was investing its mostly Mayan indigenous population with the requisites for full citizenship. Unfortunately, a C.I.A.-sponsored invasion installed a brutal military dictatorship, plunging the country into 30 years of civil war that left 200,000 people dead in a population of only 5 million.

Similarly, in 1960, the Congo had emerged from a century of brutal Belgian colonial rule by electing a charismatic leader, Patrice Lumumba. But the C.I.A. soon ousted him from power, replacing him with Joseph Mobutu, a military dictator whose 30 years of kleptocracy precipitated violence that led to the deaths of more than 5 million people in the Second Congo War (1998-2003) and continues to take a toll to this day.

In more recent decades, there have been similarly dismal outcomes from Washington’s attempts at regime change via conventional military operations. After the September 2001 terrorist attacks, U.S. forces toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Over the next 20 years, Washington spent $2.3 trillion — and no, that “trillion” is not a misprint! — in a failed nation-building effort that was swept away when the resurgent Taliban captured the capital, Kabul, in August 2021, plunging the country into a mix of harsh patriarchy and mass privation.

Taliban fighters patrolling Kabul in a Humvee on Aug. 17, 2021. (Voice of America, Wikimedia Commons)

In 2003, Washington invaded Iraq in search of nonexistent nuclear weapons and sank into the quagmire of a 15-year war that led to the slaughter of a million people and left behind an autocratic government that became little more than an Iranian client state. And in 2011, the U.S. led a NATO air campaign that toppled Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s radical regime in Libya, precipitating seven years of civil war and ultimately leaving that country divided between two antagonistic failed states.

When Washington’s attempts at regime change fail, as they did in Cuba in 1961 and in Venezuela last year, that failure often leaves autocratic regimes even more entrenched, with their control over the country’s secret police strengthened and an ever-tighter death grip on the country’s economy.

Why, you might wonder, do such U.S. interventions invariably seem to produce such dismal results? For societies struggling to achieve a fragile social stability amid volatile political change, external intervention, whether covert or open, seems to invariably be the equivalent of hitting an antique pocket watch with a hammer and then trying to squeeze all its gears and springs back into place.

The Iran War’s Geopolitical Consequences

By exploring the geopolitical implications of Washington’s latest intervention in Iran, it’s possible to imagine how President Donald Trump’s war of choice might well become Washington’s very own version of the Suez crisis.

Just as Egypt snatched a diplomatic victory from the jaws of military defeat in 1956 by shutting the Suez Canal, so Iran has now closed off the Middle East’s other critical choke point by firing its Shahed drones at five freighters in the Straits of Hormuz (through which 20 percent of global crude oil and natural gas regularly passes) and at petroleum refineries on the southern shore of the Persian Gulf.

Smoke rises from oil tanks beside the Suez Canal hit during the initial Anglo-French assault on Port Said, Nov. 5, 1956. (Fleet Air Arm, Imperial War Museums, Wikimedia Commons)

Iran’s drone strikes have blocked more than 90 percent of tanker departures from the Persian Gulf and shut down the massive Qatari refineries that produce 20 percnet of the world supply of Liquified Natural Gas, sending natural gas prices soaring by 50 percent in much of the world and by 91 percent in Asia — with the price of gasoline in the U.S. heading for $4 a gallon and the cost of oil likely to reach a staggering $150 per barrel in the near future.

Moreover, through the conversion of natural gas to fertilizer, the Persian Gulf is the source for nearly half the world’s agricultural nutrients, with prices soaring by 37 percent for urea fertilizer in markets like Egypt and threatening both spring planting in the northern hemisphere and food security in the global south.

The extraordinary concentration of petroleum production, international shipping and capital investment in the Persian Gulf makes the Straits of Hormuz not only a choke point for the flow of oil and natural gas but also for the movement of capital for the entire global economy. To begin with the basics, the Persian Gulf holds about 50 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves, estimated at 859 billion barrels or, at current prices, about $86 trillion.

Gas lines in Hanoi on March 10 after Iran blocked the Strait of Hormuz. (Baophucminh53G / Wikimedia Commons/ CC BY-SA 4.0)

To give you an idea of the scale of capital concentration in the region’s infrastructure, the national oil companies of the Gulf Cooperation Council invested $125 billion in their production facilities in 2025 alone, with plans to continue at that rate for the foreseeable future.

To keep the global oil tanker fleet of 7,500 vessels that largely serves the Persian Gulf afloat, it costs nearly $100 million for a single large “Suezmax” tanker — of which there are about 900 normally on the high seas, worth a combined $90 billion (with frequent replacements required by the corrosion of steel in harsh maritime conditions).

Moreover, Dubai has the world’s busiest international airport at the center of a global network with 450,000 flights annually — now shut down by Iranian drone strikes.

Despite all the White House media hype about the terrible swift sword of America’s recent airstrikes, the 3,000 U.S.-Israeli bombing runs against Iran (which is two-thirds the size of Western Europe) in the war’s first week pale before the 1,400,000 bombing sorties over Europe during World War II.

The striking contrast between those numbers makes the current U.S. air attacks on Iran seem, from a strategic perspective, like shooting at an elephant with a BB gun.

Moreover, the U.S. has limited stocks of about 4,000 interceptor missiles, which cost up to $12 million each and can’t be rapidly mass-produced. By contrast, Iran has an almost limitless supply of some 80,000 Shahed drones, 10,000 of which it can produce each month for only $20,000 each. In effect, time is not on Washington’s side if this war drags on for more than a few weeks.

Indeed, in a recent interview, pressed about the possibility that Iran’s vast flotilla of slow, low-flying Shahed drones might soon exhaust the U.S. supply of sophisticated interceptor missiles, Pentagon leader General Dan Caine was surprisingly evasive, saying only, “I don’t want to be talking about quantities.”

Whose Boots on the Ground?

March to stop the war in Iran in Philadelphia, March 10, 2026. The march ended at Philadelphia City Hall where a speaker criticized mainstream media for their willingness to spread imperialist propaganda. (Joe Piette, Flickr, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0)

While economic and military pressures build for a shorter war, Washington is trying to avoid sending troops ashore by mobilizing Iran’s ethnic minorities, who make up about 40 percent of that country’s population. As the Pentagon is silently but painfully aware, U.S. ground forces would face formidable resistance from a million-strong Basij militia, 150,000 Revolutionary Guards (who are well-trained for asymmetric guerrilla warfare) and Iran’s 350,000 regular army troops.

With other ethnic groups (like the Azeris in the north) unwilling or (like the Baloch tribes in the southeast, far from the capital) unable to attack Tehran, Washington is desperate to play its Kurdish card, just as it has done for the past 50 years.

With a population of 10 million astride the highland borders of Syria, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, the Kurds are the largest ethnic group in the Middle East without their own state. As such, they have long been forced to play the imperial Great Game, making them a surprisingly sensitive bellwether for larger changes in imperial influence.

Although President Trump made personal calls to the top leaders in Iraq’s Kurdistan region during the first week of the latest war, offering them “extensive U.S. aircover” for an attack on Iran, and the U.S. even has a military airbase at Erbil, Kurdistan’s capital, the Kurds are so far proving uncharacteristically cautious.

Indeed, Washington has a long history of using and abusing Kurdish fighters, dating back to the days of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who turned their betrayal into a diplomatic art form. After he ordered the C.I.A. to stop aiding the Iraqi Kurdish resistance to Saddam Hussein in 1975, Kissinger told an aide: “Promise them anything, give them what they get, and f… them if they can’t take a joke.”

As Iraqi forces fought their way into Kurdistan, killing helpless Kurds by the hundreds, their legendary leader Mustafa Barzani, grandfather of the current head of Iraqi Kurdistan, pleaded with Kissinger, saying, “Your Excellency, the United States has a moral and political responsibility to our people.” Kissinger did not even dignify that desperate plea with a reply and instead told Congress: “Covert action should not be confused with missionary work.”

Last January, in an amazingly ill-timed decision, the Trump White House betrayedthe Kurds one time too many, breaking Washington’s decade-long alliance with the Syrian Kurds by forcing them to give up 80 percent of their occupied territory.

In southeastern Turkey, the radical Kurdish PKK Party has made a deal with Prime Minister Recep Erdogan and is actually disarming, while Iraq’s Kurdistan region is staying out of the war by respecting a 2023 diplomatic entente with Tehran for a peaceful Iran-Iraq border.

President Trump has called at least one leader of the Iranian Kurds, who constitute about 10 percent of Iran’s population, to encourage an armed uprising. But most Iranian Kurds seem more interested in regional autonomy than regime change.

Iranian Kurds celebrating the spring holiday of Newroz in Palangan, March 2017. (Fars Media Corporation/Wikimedia Commons/ CC BY 4.0)

As Trump’s calls upon the Kurds to attack and the Iranian people to rise up are met with an eloquent silence, Washington is likely to end this war with Iran’s Islamic regime only further entrenched, showing the world that America is not just a disruptive power, but a fading one that other nations can do without.

Over the past 100-plus years, the Iranian people have mobilized six times in attempts to establish a real democracy. At this point, though, it seems as if any seventh attempt will come long after the current U.S. naval armada has left the Arabian Sea.

From the Granular to the Geopolitical

If we move beyond this granular view of Iran’s ethnic politics to a broader geo-strategic perspective on the Iran war, Washington’s waning influence in the hills of Kurdistan seems to reflect its fading geopolitical influence across the vast Eurasian land mass, which remains today the epicenter of geopolitical power, as it has been for the past 500 years.

For nearly 80 years, the United States has maintained its global hegemony by controlling the axial ends of Eurasia through its NATO alliance in Western Europe and four bilateral defense pacts along the Pacific littoral from Japan to Australia.

But now, as Washington focuses more of its foreign policy on the Western Hemisphere, U.S. influence is fading fast along the vast arc of Eurasia stretching from Poland, through the Middle East to Korea that scholars of geopolitics like Sir Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman once dubbed the “rimland” or “the zone of conflict.”

As Spykman put it succinctly once upon a time: “Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world.”

Since the rise of Donald Trump’s America First foreign policy in 2016, major and medium powers along that entire Eurasian rimland have been actively disengaging from U.S. influence — including Europe (by rearming), Russia (by challenging the West in Ukraine), Turkey (by remaining neutral in the present war), Pakistan (by allying with China), India (by breaking with Washington’s Quad alliance), and Japan (by rearming to create an autonomous defense policy).

That ongoing disengagement is manifest in the lack of support for the Iran intervention, even from once-close European and Asian allies — a striking contrast with the broad coalitions that joined U.S. forces in the 1991 Gulf War and the occupation of Afghanistan in 2002.

With Trump’s micro-militarism in Iran inadvertently but clearly exposing the limits of American power, Washington’s fading influence across Eurasia will undoubtedly prove catalytic for the emergence of a new world order, which is likely to move far beyond the old order of U.S. global hegemony.

Just as Sir Anthony Eden is remembered ruefully today in the United Kingdom as the inept prime minister who destroyed the British Empire at Suez, so future historians may see Donald Trump as the president who degraded U.S. international influence with, among other things, his micro-military misadventure in the Middle East. As empires rise and fall, such geopolitics clearly remains a constant factor in shaping their fate –- a lesson I try to teach in Cold War on Five Continents.

In difficult times like these, when events seem both confused and confusing, Mark Twain’s “broken fragments of antique legends” can remind us of historical analogies like the collapse of the power and influence of Great Britain or of the Soviet Union that can help us understand how the past often whispers to the present — as it indeed seems to be doing these days in the Straits of Hormuz.

Alfred W. McCoy,TomDispatch regular, is the Harrington professor of history at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is the author of In the Shadows of the American Century: The Rise and Decline of U.S. Global Power and To Govern the Globe: World Orders and Catastrophic Change (Dispatch Books). His new book, just published, is Cold War on Five Continents: The Geopolitics of Empire & Espionage.