By Mona Hojat Ansari
TEHRAN - The Tehran Times often sits down with foreign ambassadors to get updates on their countries' bilateral ties with Iran, as well as their take on the latest global and international issues. In the latest such interaction, the Tehran Times spoke with the Japanese Ambassador to Tehran, Tamaki Tsukada.
Ambassador Tsukada assumed his post in Tehran in October 2023. Prior to this, he held senior positions at Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and spent three decades as a diplomat. Inside Iran, he has become known for promoting cooperation on the restoration of Lake Urmia in northwestern Iran.
But during our interview with him, we focused more on his experience working here as a diplomat throughout two waves of U.S.-Israeli aggression, how the war has affected his country, and how he believes Iran and Japan can grow closer in the coming years.
Below is the full text of the interview, edited for clarity and conciseness:
Since the Tehran Times last spoke with you, the United States and Israel have twice launched war against Iran. As someone living and working here through both confrontations, what has that experience been like for you personally and for your mission?
The war has undoubtedly had a profound impact on both our work and our personal lives. On a personal level, I have been haunted by a strange curse: whenever I am back in Japan—whether on leave or holidaying in a neighboring country—a crisis seems to erupt in Iran. Earlier this year, it appeared the curse would strike again. I was in Japan over the December–January period for my annual leave when the demonstrations began. I cut my holiday short and returned to Tehran to monitor the situation. In hindsight, that marked the beginning of a long and very difficult process of conflict involving Iran, the United States, and other regional countries.
For our embassy collectively, it has also been an exceptionally hard time. Given the level of risk, we decided to raise our travel advisory to the maximum level, which meant advising immediate departure from the country. Consequently, we had to ask all embassy dependents to leave. Currently, only our diplomats and essential staff remain in Tehran; no family members are here. At the height of the heightened situation, particularly during March and April, we were even forced to evacuate some of our diplomats. At that point, we were operating at roughly 50% of our normal staffing levels. Since July, however, we have recovered almost 100% of our activities and are now functioning at near-normal levels, although a few staff members continue to work online from Japan. Staffing has seen many ups and downs, and our dependents remain in Japan. Bilateral activities have been seriously constrained by the war, making this an extraordinarily difficult period—not just for us, but for everyone. For our embassy, it has been an abnormal situation, to say the least.
The most vivid experience I had was during a meeting with my counterpart at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the midst of our conversation, we suddenly noticed a cruise missile flying just outside the window. My counterpart, the Director General, grabbed my arm and urged me to lower my body to avoid any danger. It was an immediate and very real experience of being in a war zone. Literally, it was a once-in-a-lifetime experience to hear the noise and reverberation of a cruise missile passing so close. It was terrifying, yet it also brought a stark realization of the gravity of our situation and a conviction that we must do our utmost, in our respective capacities, to contain it. I sincerely hope none of us ever have to experience that again.
War inevitably complicates cooperation—especially between countries that did not already share extensive ties. With that in mind, how would you assess the evolution of Iran-Japan relations over the past year?
Frankly speaking, our bilateral relationship has been severely constrained by the external situation. Nevertheless, despite these limitations, we have managed to maintain dialogue at all levels, including the highest. Most recently, just a few days ago, there was a very productive telephone conversation between our Prime Minister and President Pezeshkian. At the foreign ministerial level, our Foreign Minister, Mr. Motegi, and his counterpart, Dr. Araghchi, have held eight telephone conversations since the onset of the 40-day war. We are doing our utmost to sustain dialogue at all levels, ensuring that we clearly understand each other’s thinking. Where necessary, we remain ready to offer our help to ease the situation.
Of course, it would be unrealistic to expect economic and commercial ties to recover overnight; that will take some time. However, we hope that thanks to our traditional relationship of trust, we are in a better position than many countries to restart our activities when conditions become ripe.
How have the Japanese government and the Japanese public reacted to these wars—both in terms of official policy and popular sentiment?
You may recall that at the very early stage of the military operations, the Government of Japan was among the first to publicly denounce the military action. Throughout the crisis, we have continuously called upon all parties—not only the primary protagonists but also neighboring countries—to do their utmost to contain the situation and de-escalate. While we are not a direct party to the conflict, we consider it our duty, as a responsible member of the international community, to play our own role in bringing reason and a sense of restraint to the warring parties. That has been our consistent effort at the governmental level.
At the popular level, the impact has also been tangible. Prices have risen—gasoline, gas station products, and other items such as plastics have all become more expensive. These increases have affected daily life across the board, allowing people to feel the consequences of the region’s difficulties. We are all interconnected, and our economies are interdependent. Japan, in particular, relies heavily on energy imports from the Middle East; roughly 90% of our oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz. In that sense, I believe Japan was one of the few countries that felt the war’s impact very keenly and acutely.
Japan has traditionally played a mediating role in international disputes. Given that history, and the fact that Iran's foreign minister has a special relationship with Japan, do you see any realistic opening for Tokyo to facilitate de-escalation between Iran and the U.S.?
Mediation is a very sensitive issue, so I must choose my words carefully to avoid being misquoted or misinterpreted. We greatly appreciate Dr. Araghchi’s special attachment to Japan and Iran’s expectations regarding a potential mediating role for Tokyo. However, realistically speaking, I think it is premature to say anything concrete about direct intervention in this conflict at this moment. This is my personal view, but for mediation to be meaningful and effective, there must first be a minimum level of trust between the conflicting parties—trust toward each other. Frankly, at this point, trust between Iran and the United States is very low—perhaps not zero, but certainly minimal. In such a low-trust environment, even a saint or a superhuman mediator would find it nearly impossible to succeed.
The first requirement, as I see it, is for both sides—and this will require tremendous political courage—to prepare their domestic audiences for the necessity of some sacrifice in order to make the first move. Currently, both sides seem to insist that the other must act first, with any reaction contingent upon that initial step. As long as this stalemate persists, I do not foresee any meaningful compromise.
I understand the domestic constraints on both sides: in the U.S., there are midterm elections and electoral considerations; in Iran, there is deep-seated grief over the loss of the Supreme Leader, along with significant anger and animosity toward the adversary. I fully appreciate these pressures. But unless political leaders on both sides find the courage to address their domestic constituencies and make the first move, mediation will remain exceedingly difficult.
Beyond the diplomacy, what has it been like for you to experience daily life here—engaging with ordinary Iranians, navigating local culture, and witnessing their day-to-day realities? How has that shaped your own perspective on this country and its people?
Roughly once a month, I visit my regular hairdresser, a young man in his mid-20s, and we have very pleasant chats. He has interesting opinions on everything—daily life, sometimes politics, even diplomacy. I greatly value this opportunity to gauge the mood of ordinary Iranians, especially the younger generation—what they feel and how they perceive the situation. For a diplomat, it is not only about conversing with government counterparts; engaging in small talk with ordinary people and understanding public sentiment is equally important. I cherish these conversations with this young man.
It has been particularly interesting to observe the evolution of his opinions from the very beginning of the war, through the height of the crisis, and now into this period of stalemate. I sense a strong mixture of emotions: frustration, patriotism, and also a degree of desperation. Through these conversations, I am able to empathize with the general public, and I believe that is an invaluable experience for diplomats—to have the opportunity to interact with ordinary citizens on the street.
Finally, looking ahead to the upcoming Asian Games in Nagoya, how do you think the event can impact cultural ties between Iran and Japan? Could you also update us on the current visa process for Iranian participants, and what broader opportunities do you see for expanding cultural and people-to-people exchanges between our two nations through the Games?
First, regarding visas and administrative procedures, everything is progressing smoothly this time. The Asian Competition Committee has made special arrangements for participating countries, including Iran, to dispense with the usual visa process. Instead, they are introducing a special accreditation system. Athletes will not need to go through the standard visa application; rather, they will be issued a dedicated entry card for the Games. This will dramatically reduce bureaucracy and shorten entry times, which we hope will greatly facilitate the movement of athletes and support staff from the Iranian delegation.
As for the broader impact on exchanges between Iran and Japan through the Asian Games, sports have always been a wonderful vehicle for uniting people across different cultures—and this time is no exception. Especially during this very difficult period of war, I believe sports can provide a positive and uplifting environment. Iran is a highly athletically advanced country, and we fully expect that it will win many medals and rank very high in the medal tally. We hope that such strong performances will boost morale and help restore a sense of national pride. More than that, I hope it will give people a chance to embrace and celebrate the country in a spirit of goodwill.
Overall, I have great hopes that the Asian Games will have a positive impact not only on the psychology of the Iranian people but also on the broader political and regional environment.
