Saudi Arabia vs. Ansarullah: The Neutralized Saudi Conventional Power

Alwaght- Comparison of the Saudi military strength with that of Yemen's Ansarullah resistance movement reveals a considerable gap in the weaponry power and the power to win in the war. Enjoying advanced warplanes supplied by the US and Europe, modern tanks, air defenses, and multibillon military budget, the Arab kingdom has the superiority when it comes to conventional military equipment, but years of Yemen war have shown that air superiority and expensive arms necessarily do not mean certainly realizing political and military goals.

First part: Saudi Arabia enjoys well-equipped and modern army

Saudi Arabia ranks among the world's largest arms buyers, sourcing a critical share of its military muscle from American and European suppliers. By 2026 estimates, its defense budget sits at roughly $83 billion, a figure that dwarfs the financial and industrial capacity of Ansarullah.

1. The air force : A stark advantage in fighter jets 

Saudi Arabian air force is built around advanced multirole fighters. Global Military's 2026 database pegs the kingdom's military aircraft inventory at about 915 air frames, spanning combat aircraft, helicopters, transports and trainers, with roughly 384 listed as combat aircraft.

Its most consequential air assets are its American F-15s, European Eurofighter Typhoons and Tornados. The F-15 forms the backbone of its air combat power, deployed for air-superiority missions and ground strikes. The Typhoon is an advanced multirole fighter engineered for both air and strike missions.

Beyond fighters, Riyadh fields combat and transport helicopters, reconnaissance aircraft and aerial support systems. Advanced radars, guided munitions and foreign technical support further sharpen the force's operational reach.

2. The army: Nearly a thousand main battle tanks

According to 2026 Global Firepower data, Saudi Arabia holds about 1,085 tanks. Global Military, a specialized database, puts the number of active tanks at roughly 945, placing the kingdom's inventory at somewhere between 950 and 1,100.

American M1 Abrams tanks anchor Saudi armor. Riyadh also operates armored fighting vehicles, personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery, multiple rocket launchers and military support vehicles.

The website estimates about 22,000 vehicles across a broad equipment classification, a diverse range of armored, support and logistics vehicles that should not be conflated with tank or heavy combat vehicle counts.

3. Artillery and rocket launchers 

Estimates of Saudi Arabia's ground arsenal include about 380 self-propelled artillery pieces, more than 400 towed artillery pieces and roughly 250 to 330 multiple rocket launcher systems.

4. Missiles and air defense: A costly shield 

Saudi Arabia shields its cities, military bases, airports and oil facilities with a network of air defense systems. The American Patriot system is a cornerstone of that network, and Riyadh is also building out its high-altitude defense capability with the THAAD system.

No single reliable public figure exists for the kingdom's ready-to-fire interceptors, air-to-air missiles and offensive munitions. Despite its advanced systems, defending against simultaneous, massed attacks by ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones can prove difficult.

Second part: Yemen's military power

Ansarullah's army is nothing like that of Saudi Arabia with conventional structure and equipment. Rather, it fights using a combination of old weapons of the previous armed forces, war spoils, offensive drones and missiles, and the capacity for domestic production and assembling. In its report on Ansarullah's missile and drone power, Reuters says that this movement has become an influential player in the regional security equations. 

1. Manpower: Advantage of massive mobilization and war experience

Estimates of Ansarullah's troop strength vary widely. The Middle East Institute has put the group's fighters at roughly 350,000 in recent assessments, while some media reports cite official figures from Sanaa pointing to more than 200,000 personnel tied to the Ansarullah's military structure.

What matters is that years of war have given Ansarullah hard-earned expertise in mountain defense, ground operations, drone and missile strikes, and countering forces backed by advanced air power, an experience that can matter on the battlefield as much as hardware.

2. Ballistic missiles: The main long-range strike tool

Over the past years, the resistance movement has deployed short- and medium-range ballistic missiles of various types. Known systems in the group's arsenal include the Burkan, Hatem, Palestine and Tufan missile families.

Some of these missiles are designed to hit distant targets, and its military statements tout them as part of the group's deterrent capability.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies, examining the Ansarullah's arsenal, notes that some short-range missiles are likely produced or assembled inside Yemen, while more sophisticated medium-range systems depend more heavily on foreign technology and components. The precise number of intact, operational, ready-to-fire Yemeni missiles is not known from independent public sources.

3. Drones: A cheaper weapon against a better-equipped enemy 

Drones are one of the most important components of Yemeni military power. The movement has used reconnaissance and attack drones in ground operations, long-range strikes and threats to shipping.

Known systems include the Samad, Qasef and Wa'id families. Some are designed for one-way attacks on targets, while others fly reconnaissance and support missions. A number of the more advanced systems rely on foreign technology and components.

Reporting by Al Jazeera and the International Institute for Strategic Studies on Ansarullah's military capabilities shows the movement has gained significant operational experience with drones over the war years.

The drone advantage in this confrontation is not merely destructive power: the relatively low cost of some models, their ability to be used in repeated attacks and the need to detect and intercept every target can drive up the cost of defense for the other side.

4. Tanks, armored vehicles and artillery 

No comprehensive, independent data exists on the Ansarullah's operational tanks, personnel carriers and heavy artillery. The force uses equipment left behind by the Yemeni army, captured armored vehicles, and light vehicles and armed pickup trucks.

Field reports from operations have noted the presence of tanks, artillery, anti-armor weapons, heavy machine guns and military vehicles.

5. An Asymmetric navy: A threat to vital routes 

Ansarullah has no conventional fleet rivaling Saudi Arabia's, but its naval power is not limited to warships. Anti-ship missiles, naval drones, fast boats, explosive vessels and sea mines are among the tools cited in reporting on the movement's power.

The significance of this equipment stems from Yemen's geography. Access to the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and Bab-el-Mandeb lets Sana'a pressure shipping security and part of the region's trade and energy export routes.

The Wall Street Journal and other international media outlets, examining Yemeni maritime attacks, have pointed to the role of anti-ship missiles, drones and attack boats in upending Red Sea security calculations. Still, the precise number and operational status of this equipment remain publicly unknown. 

Third part: Why has Saudi Arabia failed to make gains despite noticeable arms superiority over Yemen?

To answer this question, several points need to be taken into account:

1. Yemen's geography: Defense advantage of mountains

Parts of Yemen's north and west have rugged and mountainous regions. This geography makes ground operations complicated, allowing the defenders to use terrain, comflouge, and dispersal to reduce effects of the enemy's air superiority. 

Advanced fighter jets can bomb specific targets, but destroying sporadic and moving targets or controlling mountainous regions for a long time requires ground operations, precise military data, and constant boots on the ground. An analysis of Al Jazeera data about Yemen war describes the mountainous terrain of Ansarullah-controlled regions as one of the factors giving the movement a defense superiority. 

2. Missiles and drones: imposing costs on advanced air defense systems

Saudi Arabia relies on costly Patriot systems and other defenses against air threats, but shielding against multiple, simultaneous attacks demands enough interceptors, active radars, trained personnel and wide geographic coverage. The kingdom's sheer size, its long border with Yemen and the scattered placement of oil facilities, airports and sensitive infrastructure make protecting every point at once difficult. Under such conditions, even an advanced air defense system cannot indefinitely shield every target from every kind of attack.

3. A War of attrition

Ansarullah has fought for years, gaining operational experience in using weapons, moving forces and countering air attacks. Saudi Arabia, for its part, must manage financial costs, munitions consumption, equipment maintenance and the security fallout from strikes on its soil. The longer the war drags on, the higher the price of a decisive victory climbs.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies, examining the Yemeni arsenal, has shown that beyond imported weapons, the group has developed some domestic production and assembly capacity for drones and simpler missiles.

4. The vulnerability of Saudi economic infrastructure

Saudi Arabia's dependence on oil exports, energy infrastructure and maritime transport routes leaves it exposed to missile and drone threats. By threatening that infrastructure, Ansarullah can impose significant security and economic costs on Riyadh, even without a conventional air force.

To wrap up, comparison of Saudi Arabia and Ansarullah shows that arms superiority in the war matters, but it is far from being a sole determining factor. The kingdom has the upper hand in terms of jets, tanks, armored vehicles, air defenses, and military spending, but Ansarullah, in the opposite side, with its reliance on missiles, drones, asymmetrical warfare, operational experience, and rugged regions has become a hard counterweight for the Saudis. In other words, Ansarullah and the Yemeni army have made Saudi conventional superiority impossible to convert into a decisive, low-cost victory.

The New Geoeconomics; Energy, BRICS, and the Erosion of the Bretton Woods Structure

SCFR Online - Opinion: Competition over energy, minerals, and supply chains has expanded geoeconomic instruments and highlighted the role of BRICS and alternative paths in the world economic order.

Sareh Bayati – Economic affairs expert

The post-World War II economic order has come under pressure from great power competition, sanctions, tariffs, and state industrial interventions. Trade, investment, and access to resources are no longer merely economic issues, but have become instruments for exerting pressure and increasing bargaining power. However, the erosion of the Bretton Woods structure should not be equated with its sudden collapse. What is observed most of all is the dispersion of decision-making centers and countries’ efforts to reduce financial and trade dependencies.

In this process, BRICS is considered an important framework for political coordination and pursuing reforms, but it is not yet an integrated actor with a common financial policy. The expansion of relations with ASEAN and other emerging economies also shows that countries are seeking to increase cooperation options; although differences in interests, economic structures, and security relations limit joint action. As a result, the importance of BRICS in the current circumstances stems more from creating alternative options and increasing bargaining power than from completely replacing the dollar or existing financial institutions.

The outlook for global growth

The outlook for the global economy in 2027 still depends on a set of factors. Continued investment in artificial intelligence can support economic growth, and the decline in energy prices from the peak of the crisis can also limit inflationary pressures. However, prolonged disruption in energy routes can increase transportation and production costs, re-intensify inflation, and place central banks between containing prices and supporting growth; therefore, the relative resilience of the global economy does not mean the absence of risk, and energy shocks, tariffs, and policy uncertainty can affect countries unequally.

The experience of the energy market also shows that geopolitical competition does not necessarily eliminate economic dependencies. Even during periods of tension and trade restrictions, market needs, refining capacity, and production costs can create unexpected trade routes; as the sale of Russian fuel to America has also been cited as an example of this contradiction. Therefore, a policy of energy independence or economic decoupling must be measured against the reality of supply and demand and infrastructural constraints.

Minerals and the redefinition of West Asia’s position

West Asia’s geoeconomic power is no longer determined only by oil and gas. The energy transition, the development of data centers, batteries, power grids, and defense industries have increased demand for rare minerals and their processing capacity. As a result, countries possessing energy and mineral resources can strengthen their strategic position by linking the supply of raw materials, industrial investment, and transit routes.

This development has two consequences. First, oil revenue still matters, but by itself does not guarantee future competitive advantage; processing, chemical production, and participation in technology chains are also of increasing importance. Second, foreign investment in energy and minerals, under conditions of US-China competition, can become a lever for political bargaining; although dependence on a single market or supplier also carries its own risks. The sustainable strategy is for natural resources to be transformed into infrastructure and industrial capacity, not for the economy to remain in the cycle of raw material exports.

US economic policy has also moved away from the free-market model with limited government intervention. The increased role of the state in investment, support for industries, imposition of tariffs, and direction of strategic sectors shows that global competition is shaped more than ever by control of supply chains and attraction of capital. In these circumstances, governments do not only regulate market rules, but also intervene to expand domestic production and reduce dependence on their rivals.

BRICS faces a dual challenge; its members want more space for development policies and a reduction of unilateral pressures, but they do not have identical trade and security interests. ASEAN countries, while welcoming market and capital opportunities, also try not to become trapped in great power competition; therefore, financial and trade cooperation will be sustainable when it is based not merely on the slogan of multipolarism but on clear interests and executive mechanisms.

OPEC and the necessity of adapting to the energy market

OPEC’s traditional influence has been limited by the growth of producers outside the organization, new technologies, and changing demand patterns. War can increase the importance of supply coordination in the short term, but in the long term it also intensifies price volatility and the difficulty of reaching collective agreement.

OPEC’s future depends on more transparent supply management, cooperation with non-member producers, and understanding the growing role of gas, electricity, and minerals in energy security. The reinvention of this organization does not mean abandoning oil, but requires adapting production policy to a market that regards energy simultaneously as a commercial commodity, security infrastructure, and an instrument for the exercise of power.

Dependence on limited export routes makes energy producers vulnerable to political crisis, sanctions, and infrastructural disruption. Diversification of routes, investment in ports and pipelines, insurance risk management, and cooperation with various partners can reduce this vulnerability. For the Caspian littoral states and Iran as well, geography becomes power when it is connected to secure routes for export, transit, and access to markets.

Linking the North-South and East-West corridors can reduce transit costs and create interdependence; but sanctions and financing constraints show that transit resilience also requires economic diplomacy.

Iran; from economic pressure to geoeconomic resilience

External economic pressure has a lasting effect when the target country cannot diversify its trade, revenue, and financial paths. From this perspective, assessing the possibility of the collapse of Iran’s economy solely in light of sanctions is not sufficient, and domestic production capacity, access to markets, transaction costs, and economic adaptability capacity must also be considered.

For Iran, the practical response to geoeconomic competition is the expansion of export markets, development of industrial capacity, completion of transit corridors, and reduction of dependence on a single partner or export product. The effective linkage of energy and minerals with domestic processing and technological investment can also create greater value added.

The world economic order is moving toward polycentricity, but this process neither means the immediate end of dollar dominance nor guarantees the success of BRICS. The power of countries will depend more than ever on the ability to manage dependencies, finance projects, preserve trade routes, and transform natural resources into industrial capacity. For Iran as well, the criterion of success is not merely presence in multilateral mechanisms, but transforming them into investment, sustainable trade, and economic maneuverability.

From Mecca Pact to Tehran: Iran Hosting New Regional Security Equations

Alwaght- The meeting in Tehran between senior officials from the member states of the "Mecca Pact" and Iranian officials ranks as one of the region's most heated diplomatic developments amid the military crisis in West Asia.

At the talks, senior security and military officials from Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan sat down with Iranian officials to discuss the future of regional security, de-escalation, and diplomatic pathways to ending the crisis.

The significance of the meeting extends well beyond a ceremonial encounter: it demonstrates that Iran, despite mounting military and political pressure from the United States and the Israeli regime, remains a central player in any security arrangement in West Asia, an actor whose positions and interests cannot be ignored if lasting stability is to be achieved.

The meeting was held in Tehran on Monday. The delegation from the Mecca Pact states included Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman, Pakistani Army Chief Asim Munir, and Ibrahim Kalin, head of Turkey's intelligence service. On the Iranian side, President Masoud Pezeshkian, Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi took part in the consultations. The meeting concluded with a commitment to continue talks aimed at strengthening cooperation among the four countries on regional peace and security.

Tehran's diplomacy and Iran's undeniable place

The meeting's first political message is the very presence of high-ranking representatives from three major regional powers in Iran's capital, at a time when the region is grappling with the fallout of the US and Israeli regime's aggression against Iran, fears of a widening conflict, and disruptions to energy and shipping security.

Many experts see the visit as an opportunity to cement a strategic principle: that West Asia's security cannot be shaped solely by decisions made in Washington, Tel Aviv, or by a handful of regional governments without Iran's effective participation.

The presence of Saudi, Turkish, and Pakistani military, defense, and intelligence officials in talks with Iranian counterparts shows that the regional diplomatic track still requires dialogue with Tehran.

Reuters has reported that the consultations covered a regional non-aggression framework, the resumption of Iran-US negotiations, de-escalation, and the disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. Such an agenda makes clear that the issues under discussion are not merely bilateral, but they are directly tied to strategic security, trade, and energy at both the regional and global levels.

Why did Mecca Pact members come to Tehran?

The Mecca Pact, signed in August 2026 by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, emphasizes defense cooperation among its members, yet recent developments have shown that building a defense framework among a handful of countries is not, on its own, enough to contain the region's sprawling crises.

Al Jazeera reported, citing Reuters, the trip by the three countries' delegations to Tehran was part of efforts to reduce tensions and support Qatari and Pakistani mediation. Experts believe the circumstances put three key objectives on the meeting's agenda:

Preventing the war from spreading: establishing a direct channel of communication between Tehran and key regional countries to avert miscalculation and a wider conflict.

Consolidating a regional security mechanism: exploring the possibility of arrangements in which regional countries discuss their own security rather than relying solely on trans-regional powers.

Opening a diplomatic path: backing mediation efforts to end the crisis and examining the conditions for resuming Iran-US negotiations.

Against this backdrop, the simultaneous presence of Saudi Arabia's defense chief, Pakistan's army commander, and Turkey's intelligence head carries particular weight. The lineup shows that the talks were not confined to an exchange of political messages, but the military and security dimensions of the crisis were squarely in focus.

Saudi Arabia: From security confrontation to the need for talks with Tehran

One of the most consequential dimensions of the meeting is the presence of Saudi Arabia's defense minister in Tehran, a country that for years stood on the opposite side of Iran in many of the region's security equations, and that has now turned toward Tehran to help contain regional crises.

Political observers suggest that Riyadh now faces conditions in which continued regional tensions could impose heavy security and economic costs on the kingdom. In its statement on the Mecca Pact delegation's trip, Saudi Arabia's foreign ministry stressed de-escalation among the parties to the crisis, encouragement of dialogue and diplomatic solutions, and support for Qatari and Pakistani mediation.

Turkey and Pakistan, two key actors in Iran's calculations

The presence of Turkey and Pakistan also gives the Tehran meeting dimensions that go beyond Iran-Saudi relations. Turkey, by virtue of its geopolitical position, military capacity, and ties to Western and regional countries, can play a role in shaping future security arrangements. For Ankara, too, a widening war on its southern and eastern periphery carries economic and security risks.

Pakistan, given its relationships with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the US, is well positioned to play a mediating role. Reuters reports that Islamabad has taken part in diplomatic efforts to bring Tehran and Washington closer together, and that proposals for narrowing differences were floated in the recent consultations.

For Tehran, cooperation with these two actors could open the way to diversifying its diplomatic channels, particularly at a time when the Iranian-American relations are marked by deep mistrust and disputes over sanctions, anti-Iranian sea and air blockade, and the nuclear program.

Damaged Tankers and Lasting Wound of Energy Market

Alwaght- While the US is trying to choke off the alternative routes Iran is using to continue its oil exports and trade, Iranian armed forces over the past seven months have shown that they do not allow the foreign powers to decide the fate of the strategic Strait of Hormuz without considering the security and interests of Iran.

In such conditions, one of the key impacts of heightened maritime insecurity in the Strait of Hormuz concerns the oil and gas tankers.

Iran announced that just on Friday, seven oil tankers were struck over one night. Also, United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) recorded 12 attacks on vessels in the seven days leading to October 16.

The question is no longer simply whether a handful of ships can pass through the Strait of Hormuz or must turn back. It is how much lost capacity the global economy can absorb if the war drags on and the damage to the tanker fleet widens.

Hormuz is one of the world's most critical oil transit chokepoints. According to US Energy Information Administration data, roughly 20.9 million barrels a day of crude, condensate and refined products moved through the waterway in 2025, about one-fifth of global liquid fuel consumption.

Hormuz matters for more than oil. A significant share of Qatar's liquefied natural gas exports also depends on the route. A prolonged disruption there could squeeze oil markets, gas markets, power-plant fuel and the petrochemical industry all at once.

The Bab-el-Mandeb strait, meanwhile, has already been disrupted by fighting between Yemen's Ansarullah resistance movement and Saudi Arabia. It, too, is a vital energy corridor, and insecurity there in recent years has pushed shipping companies onto the longer Cape of Good Hope route.

Therefore, if the Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb crises escalate in tandem, tankers will have ever fewer routes to choose from. Rerouting lengthens voyages, burns more fuel and raises crew costs, cutting the number of trips each tanker can make in a year. The result is that effective energy transport capacity can shrink even without a single ship being destroyed.

Building ships a multi-year process

Even if security is restored to the sea lanes and some trade flows resume, the sinking or crippling of a significant number of tankers, damage requiring lengthy repairs, would make a return to normalcy painful.

Every large tanker represents a slice of the global market's operating capacity. Pulling one ship out of circulation not only removes its direct capacity but can also scramble loading schedules, cargo deliveries and the timetables of other vessels. If this happens at massive scale, even countries whose oil production continues may find themselves short of ships or facing sharply higher freight costs to move their cargoes.

Building VLCC supertankers requires specialized shipyards, heavy equipment, marine-grade steel, massive engines, pumping systems and skilled labor.

New VLCCs were priced at roughly $120 million to $132 million on the 2026 market, according to S&P Global, with carrying capacities typically in the 200,000–320,000-ton range. Delivery times depend on shipyard capacity, vessel specifications and order backlogs, and many large orders stretch over several years.

To grasp the economic scale of the crisis, we should know that replacing 100 supertankers at an average price of $125 million would cost about $12.5 billion in initial purchases alone, before repairs, insurance, financing, crew training and lost revenue are factored in.

Not all damaged ships are beyond use, of course, and buying secondhand tankers or repairing vessels can offset some of the lost capacity. But if the damage is extensive and countries rush to place new orders at the same time, the shipyards' limited capacity could become a crisis in its own right.

China accounted for about 54.6 percent of global shipbuilding output by gross tonnage in 2025, according to the UN Conference on Trade and Development's Review of Maritime Transport 2025. South Korea held roughly 28 percent and Japan about 12.6 percent, together, the three countries controlled more than 95 percent of world shipbuilding by that measure.

Nor is their shipbuilding capacity unlimited. Yards are already booked years out, and a sudden surge in tanker demand would mean reshuffling priorities, sourcing components and raw materials, and allocating new production capacity. Replacing a battered fleet at scale, even with the world's largest builders pitching in, would be a time-taking process.

Hard to return to normal

With this in mind, extensive damage to the fleet of tankers can have impacts going beyond the time of war, and even when security is restored to the maritime routes, it can keep the cost of energy transportation high for a long time. 

Also, countries depending on oil revenues will face crisis as the exports drop. Rallying oil prices in the global markets can increase the revenues per barrel, but if the countries find it difficult to sell their output, the income will not necessarily increase. Drop in hard currency flow can raise the expenses of governments, and make foreign commitment settlements and implementation of projects difficult. For example, Saudi Arabia had to scale down budget of its major projects with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb as well as drop of its oil and trade revenues. 

That same revenue collapse may leave some companies too cash-strapped to order new tankers, even as idle shipping firms keep paying for maintenance, crew wages, financial obligations and some insurance costs, piling up enormous losses.

On the other side, the halt in oil flows and the tanker shortage could put serious strain on global energy stockpiles. At their latest gathering in London, senior oil industry executives warned that the world's strategic and commercial oil inventories have fallen to historic lows. Against that backdrop, continued disruption to oil shipments would sharpen pressure on global markets and could send prices soaring, crude has already topped $117 a barrel.

Finally, disruption at the strategic straits can choke off a large share of the world's oil and gas flows. And if the crisis comes with widespread damage to tankers, even reopening the waterways will not be enough to return energy markets to normal and replacing lost transport capacity will take time and heavy investment.

The Role of USVs in the Fate of the Battle over Vital Waterways

SCFR Online - Opinion: The proliferation of smart unmanned surface vessels (USVs) in Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb shows that control of the sea is not possible solely with large warships, submarines, and carrier-based aircraft.

Abbas Younesian – Defense affairs expert

The Changing Nature of Sea Control

Naval power was long measured by large warships, submarines, carrier-based aircraft, and the ability to protect shipping lanes. But recent wars, from the Black Sea to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, have shown that unmanned surface vessels can perform reconnaissance, attack, deception, rescue, and logistical support missions at lower cost. A JINSA article on the expansion of war with unmanned military machines to the high seas reports that on September 14, a Ukrainian USV attacked a Russian vessel of the same type in the Black Sea. This analysis also reports America’s use of offensive unmanned vessels against submarine and naval installations in Iran in July.

These developments do not mean large warships have become useless, but they show that their monopoly over exercising sea control has diminished. Cheap and numerous vessels can force the defender to use expensive interceptors, radars, and costly manpower. However, the effectiveness of these vessels depends on identification, communications, guidance, and resistance to electronic warfare. Therefore, the main advantage lies in the combination of small systems, an information network, and manned platforms, and this does not mean the complete replacement of one technology by another.

Ansarullah and the Expansion of the Battlefield to the Waterways

Ansarullah’s attacks on shipping and Saudi infrastructure have exposed the link between coastal war and energy security and global trade. Eurasia Review, in two articles, emphasizes the connection between threats in Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb. Rising risk at either of these chokepoints, even if it does not lead to a halt in all traffic, can force shipping companies to choose longer routes, accept higher insurance costs, and readjust logistical plans.

JINSA researchers also argue that coastal advance and control of positions near Bab el-Mandeb can expand the threat from long-range missiles and drones to artillery and short-range rockets. The strategic point of this analysis is that the geographic proximity of the attacker to the ship transit route complicates naval defense and increases the need for continuous protection.

America’s Strategy and the Limits of Victory in Hormuz

The article “What Was Misunderstood About Victory in the Battle of Hormuz?” in the American Conservative critiques the simplistic notion of controlling the waterway by relying on naval superiority. Naval power can escort ships and target coastal positions, but guaranteeing commercial passage against mines, coastal missiles, drones, and information disruption requires many resources. Even military dominance over the route does not prevent higher insurance rates or the rerouting of ships due to remaining risks.

This difference between military superiority and economic security is of fundamental importance. The International Crisis Group’s report on factors affecting the energy market shows that the consequences of war, in addition to the volume of attacks, also depend on reserves, refining capacity, alternative routes, producers’ reactions, and market expectations. The Responsible Statecraft website also warns that increased tanker traffic through Hormuz does not necessarily mean a return to normal conditions; especially if prices remain high, reserves are depleted, and insecurity continues; therefore, America’s criterion of success is not only the temporary reopening of the route, but the creation of conditions in which trade continues with predictable cost and risk.

Vulnerability of Refineries and the Supply Chain

The article “The Refinery War and the Vulnerability of Modern Society” emphasizes the dependence of energy infrastructure on concentrated facilities and interconnected networks. Refineries, export terminals, pipelines, and storage tanks are large and identifiable targets, and full protection of all their components is difficult. A limited attack on one vital node can disrupt production and exports and, through increased transport and insurance costs, affect distant economies as well.

This vulnerability reinforces the logic of asymmetric warfare. An actor that does not possess a large fleet or equal air power can, through low-cost attacks, mining, unmanned vessels, and threats to coastal infrastructure, force the opposing side to spend far more on defense. However, prolonged disruption of trade also harms the economies of regional countries and may provide the ground for the formation of new coalitions to protect routes, although the success of such initiatives is entirely questionable.

Strategic Implications for Energy Security

The article by the American think tank the Center for Security Policy on the importance of USVs for Taiwan’s security shows that cheap and dispersed platforms can create deterrence and complicate amphibious operations. A similar logic in the Persian Gulf allows actors, alongside missiles and drones, to use low-cost naval tools as well. In contrast, America and its allies are compelled to move from point defense against every means to shared identification networks, distributed interception, and the use of defensive unmanned vessels.

These developments increase, for Iran, the importance of electronic warfare, coastal defense, maritime awareness, and risk management; but the ability to create disruption is not the same as the ability to sustainably control the waterway. Maritime pressure may create bargaining power, but converting it into a political outcome requires diplomacy. Otherwise, the likelihood of the formation of counter-coalitions and the imposition of costs on the regional economy will increase.

Ultimately, the battle of the waterways is not merely a competition of warships and drones, but a competition over preserving or disrupting a network of energy, trade, information, and market trust. Real superiority is formed when military power can guarantee the sustainable security of the flow of goods; a goal that is not easily attainable even for major naval powers.

Strategic Implications of the US Withdrawal from Iraq; from the Kurdistan Region to Baghdad

SCFR Online - Opinion: The US military withdrawal from Iraq does not mean the end of the security relationship between Baghdad and Washington, but rather constitutes a test of the Iraqi government's ability to manage internal threats and redefine foreign dependencies.

Sajjad Samani – Expert on West Asian affairs

The end of the coalition mission and the continuation of US influence

The withdrawal of the forces of the so-called international anti-ISIS coalition from Iraq should not be considered to mean the complete severance of Washington’s security relations with Baghdad; rather, it should be assessed merely as the end of this coalition’s military mission. The International Crisis Group, in its analysis of the future of the US military presence in Iraq, considers the main question to be the capability of Iraqi forces to independently manage operational, intelligence, and cross-border coordination gaps; especially in circumstances where ISIS remnants, Syria’s uncertain situation, and competition among armed groups remain challenging.

In contrast, the “Responsible Statecraft” website, in an article titled “Despite the War, the US Army Leaves Iraq,” argues that the unlimited presence of several hundred American forces is not a substitute for internal institution-building. The end of the mission can provide the political space necessary to strengthen the Iraqi government’s accountability, although training, intelligence sharing, consultation, and remote cooperation remain possible.

Therefore, military withdrawal does not necessarily mean the end of American influence; rather, it can change its form from direct deployment to security, diplomatic, and economic instruments.

On the other hand, the American withdrawal can reduce direct military pressure on resistance groups in Iraq and increase the bargaining power of these forces. If the Iraqi government fails in managing borders, security control, and curbing sectarian violence, the security vacuum can give ISIS remnants an opportunity to resurge. Iraq’s chronic instability, given the region’s border and economic linkages, will not be in the interest of the national security of other regional countries.

Some experts in this regard recall that Washington can maintain its influence in Iraq through economic aid, banking and energy relations, intelligence cooperation, arms sales, and connection with political elites; therefore, post-withdrawal competition will depend, more than on the number of soldiers, on the ability of foreign actors to establish sustainable relations with Iraqi institutions.

Baghdad; between public legitimacy and governance constraints

The poll by the independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies, which the Atlantic Council published regarding the first hundred days of Ali al-Zaidi’s government, presents a dual picture of Iraq’s internal situation. According to the announced results, 77 percent of respondents were satisfied with al-Zaidi’s selection as prime minister, and 75 percent believed he had fulfilled his responsibilities. However, 60 percent considered corruption in Iraq to be widespread; a figure that reached 69 percent among Shiite respondents. Unemployment, especially among the youth, also remains a major concern.

These data indicate that the government’s initial legitimacy will depend on its performance in governance, employment, and combating corruption. The Al-Bayan Center’s analysis regarding the role of state banks and the limited capacity of private banks to finance the budget also highlights a structural problem: the government’s excessive reliance on the state banking network to fund public expenditures can limit the credit needed by the private sector and productive investment.

Therefore, Iraq’s stability does not depend solely on military capability; the quality of financial management, job creation, and combating corruption also have a direct effect on the government’s capacity to contain the crisis.

The situation of the Kurdistan Region after the reduction of US support

The American withdrawal is of particular importance for the Kurdistan Region, because cooperation with Washington over the past years has provided part of the training, support, and coordination of Peshmerga forces. The Eurasia Review think tank warns that the Region should not take the continuation of the current form of foreign support for granted. In these circumstances, internal political cohesion, relations with Baghdad, and the organization of security forces gain greater importance.

According to the Responsible Statecraft Institute’s analysis of Peshmerga unity, the Regional Government announced on September 21 the completion of a stage of integrating military forces. However, the command structure remains to some extent linked to the partisan dependencies of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Transferring the salaries of forces to the centralized account of the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs was an important step, but administrative unity does not necessarily lead to operational integration. The continuation of partisan divisions can, in a crisis, disrupt the chain of command and increase the Region’s dependence on external guarantees.

The Afghanistan lesson and post-withdrawal priorities

Comparing Iraq with Afghanistan is useful when it focuses not on equating the two countries but on the danger of institutional erosion and the gap between security assessments and political reality. Iraq possesses a different army, governing institutions, and revenue sources, but competition among armed groups, corruption, and the difficulty of converting military capability into political control remain dangerous. The presence of American forces alone was not a guarantee for solving these problems.

For the Axis of Resistance, the realistic approach is to use the reduction of the US military presence to expand regional cooperation, but it must be borne in mind that the instability of state institutions or the intensification of armed competition will be dangerous.

The strategic consequence of the withdrawal of coalition forces will depend on Baghdad’s ability to consolidate legal authority over weapons, the Kurdistan Region’s ability to reduce internal differences, and the capacity of foreign partners to strengthen Iraq’s national institutions. If these conditions are met, the end of the coalition’s military mission can help strengthen Iraq’s sovereignty; otherwise, the form of the American presence may change without its strategic influence coming to an end.