“Greater Israel”: How Netanyahu and Trump Are Burying the Jewish State Alive

The pursuit of biblical mirages and tactical deals with conscience are leading Israel to total international isolation, economic strangulation, and a real threat to its existence.

Muhammad Hamid ad-Din

Lies by the Numbers: 19,850 Sq. Km of Stolen Land

Beneath the patriotic slogans of a “Greater Israel,” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is carrying out the most aggressive annexation of Arab and Palestinian territories in half a century. While the world is distracted by economic crises and wars in other parts of the planet, Israel is methodically, brick by brick, redrawing the map of the Middle East, returning to tactics many considered a relic of the colonial era.

The numbers, provided by the Israeli military itself, read like an indictment that leaves no room for diplomatic demagoguery. To date, the Jewish state is illegally occupying approximately 19,850 square kilometers beyond its recognized borders. This is not “disputed territory” as understood under international law, not “buffer zones,” and not “temporary security measures,” as Netanyahu’s propaganda machine hypocritically claims. This is outright land theft, seasoned with war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and cynical legal nihilism.

When Benjamin Netanyahu finally leaves politics, he will leave behind not a “Greater Israel” from the Euphrates to the Nile, but a scorched ruin where there was once hope for peace

Here is the map of Israeli atrocities:

– Lebanon: A 10-kilometer “Yellow Line” that cuts off over 55 villages from the outside world. Tens of thousands of Lebanese—Shiites, Christians, Druze—have been driven from their homes, which Israeli bulldozers have systematically razed to the ground. What the Israeli army cynically calls an “advanced defense zone” is, in reality, classic ethnic cleansing, mixed with infrastructure looting. This “Yellow Line” effectively nullifies the UN’s “Blue Line” established in 2000, which was an international symbol of troop withdrawal. Netanyahu, one of the lead negotiators with Lebanon, states with undisguised cynicism: “This is a 10-km deep security belt. We are here, and we are not leaving.”

– Syria: Permanent military control over approximately 14,000 sq. km under the pretext of a “temporary” buffer zone. The seizure of the Golan Heights, declared illegal back in 1981, has now been expanded with new territories following the fall of the Assad regime. Netanyahu, smelling weakness in Damascus, instantly shifted his rhetoric: the “temporary defensive measure” has turned into “plans for settlement and construction.” And the world, exhausted by crises, once again stayed silent.

– West Bank: Creeping annexation of 60% of the territory beyond the 1949 “Green Line,” accompanied by terror from armed settlers. Netanyahu’s government not only turns a blind eye to the violence—it legalizes, sponsors, and encourages it. Hundreds of illegal outposts receive retroactive “legal” status. Palestinians are being squeezed off their land, turning life on the West Bank into a hell of incessant raids.

– Gaza Strip: 60% of the enclave’s territory is cordoned off by the same “Yellow Line.” Israeli troops are digging trenches to physically separate the occupied lands from what remains of Gaza. This isn’t security—it is the systematic strangulation of 2.1 million people, turned into hostages of a ruined strip of land.

Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, whose political weight is growing in direct proportion to the radicalization of society, has already openly declared: all of this is merely the “final stage” of the “Greater Israel” project, from the Litani River in the north to Mount Hermon in the east, including full control over Gaza. And Netanyahu, trying to hold onto power at any cost, doesn’t even flinch when he hears these revelations. What’s more, he is solidifying the occupation, acting on a well-learned logic: every new “color line” (Green, Blue, Yellow) is drawn with brute force, and the absence of immediate international retaliation serves as a signal to draw the next one.

The Suicidal Alliance: How Trump Unleashed the Executioner

If Netanyahu is the crude fist delivering blow after blow, then Donald Trump is the brain (however afflicted by narcissism) that sanctioned full impunity. The “Deal of the Century,” the idiotic move of the embassy to Jerusalem, the trampling of the Iranian nuclear deal, the silent blessing of settlements, the war against Iran to please Netanyahu—every step by the U.S. president was a kick in the gut to international law and a stab in the back of any Middle East diplomacy.

It was Trump, in his endless thirst for short-term “achievements” to show his evangelical base and pro-Israel lobby, who instilled in Netanyahu a deadly dangerous illusion: that an ally across the ocean would swallow absolutely everything, including a war on three fronts. We are seeing the result of this criminal friendship live on air. United by their shared recklessness and contempt for the “weak” rules of the world, this tandem has turned the Middle East from a turbulent but predictable zone into a real volcano, where diplomacy died under the rubble of bombs, and military force became the only thing left of any argument.

But in an irony of fate (which Trump, knowing no history, will never understand), it is he, the “genius dealmaker,” who helped Israel dig its own grave. Because today in Washington, a frightening realization is maturing: the tail is wagging the dog. Netanyahu’s extremist, eschatology-obsessed government is using American money and American weapons not for defense, but to implement its own insane far-right agenda, dragging the U.S. into endless, hopeless, and destructive regional conflicts. This is no longer an alliance—it is hostage-taking.

A Boycott of Allies: Europe and America Turn Away, and the Numbers Lie (What Else Is New?)

Netanyahu, a tactician with a poisonous thirst for power but a shortsighted strategist, is leading Israel to political collapse, crossing every conceivable and inconceivable red line. He has placed Israelis face-to-face with a growing, avalanche-like hatred not only from enemies but also from former friends. Sociological data today reads like a verdict on his 30-year career.

In Europe, which once out of pangs of conscience (and guilt over the Holocaust) supported the Jewish state, Israel’s favorability ratings have crashed into embarrassing negative territory. According to a YouGov poll, in Germany, France, Denmark, Italy, and Spain, the net favorability level ranges from -44 to -55. Even conservative governments, traditionally loyal to Netanyahu, no longer want to be accomplices to his crimes.

– Italy has suspended its defense agreement with Israel, citing the “current situation”—a diplomatic euphemism for the horrors of war.

– France and Germany are imposing arms embargoes, tearing up old contracts.

– The International Court of Justice in 2024 unequivocally declared the Israeli occupation illegal and all settlements subject to immediate demolition. Netanyahu simply threw the court’s ruling in the trash, spitting in the face of the international community and revealing the true face of a regime to whom rules are foreign.

But the most crushing, punishing blow is coming from where it was least expected—from across the Atlantic. In the United States, the last bastion of unconditional support, the ice has cracked. A Pew Research Center poll showed that 60% of Americans today view Israel unfavorably, up from 53% in just a year. Most importantly, 59% of U.S. citizens do not trust Netanyahu personally on international affairs. And that number is nearly the same among both Democrats and Republicans (41% of the latter don’t trust him either).

The historical irony is unbearable: the man who bragged he understood America better than any Israeli politician has destroyed Israel’s moral capital in the U.S. in a single decade. Even Senator Bernie Sanders’s attempts to block arms deliveries, though formally failing, received unprecedented public support—unthinkable just five years ago. The image of the “heroic underdog” building democracy in a hostile environment is dead. Today, Israel under Netanyahu’s leadership is perceived in the world exactly as it deserves: as an aggressor state that has embarked on a path of blatant apartheid, militarism, and authoritarianism, where biblical slogans merely cover up the banal looting of land.

The Abyss: What Netanyahu Will Leave Behind

When Benjamin Netanyahu finally leaves politics (and judging by his pathological obsession with power, the corruption cases trailing him like a shadow, and the endless political crises, it won’t be an honorable resignation but a dirty, shameful flight), he will leave behind not a “Greater Israel” from the Euphrates to the Nile, but a scorched ruin where there was once hope for peace.

He will leave strained, frozen relations with the closest allies, who have never been hated in Israel as much as they are now—and that hatred is mutual. He will leave a crippled economy, gasping under the weight of sanctions, boycotts, and soaring military spending. He will leave a generation of Israelis who grew up not in the atmosphere of a “blooming garden” in the desert, but in an atmosphere of total international hatred, which he personally provoked and nurtured.

He, being merely a clever tactician with a toxic need for political survival but an utterly worthless national strategist, sacrificed the country’s long-term security for his own short-term grip on the prime minister’s chair. His alliance with Trump, his playing with fire in Lebanon, his provocations in Syria, his bullying of the Palestinians—none of it was defense; it was a suicide pact for the nation.

The painstaking, multi-year work of healing Israeli society, of restoring trust and relations with the world, will begin only when this political corpse finally leaves the stage, taking its messianic rhetoric with it. The only question is whether it will be too late by then. Will Israel, blinded by the imperial delirium of a “Greater” kingdom, turn into yet another destroyed, unloved, and unwanted state on the map of the Middle East—a region that Netanyahu and Trump, with their reckless hands, have turned into a never-ending hell where there is no room for wisdom, mercy, or common sense?

Muhammad Hamid al-Din, a renowned Palestinian journalist

The Instrumentalization of Diplomacy in Contemporary Conflicts

In the contemporary world, rivalry among powerful countries has reached its apex, with the strongest states often competing for alliances, resources, strategic positioning, and global influence to advance their interests. Although the tactics of the powerful states have diversified, their goal remains the same.

Abbas Hashemite

The Cold War: Diplomacy as a Tool of Restraint

The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union (USSR) is one of the classic examples of great-power competition. The sides opposed each other due to their contrasting ideologies. Despite significant tensions between the two sides, the two sides only fought limited proxy wars in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, avoiding indulging in a direct full-scale war. The main reason for this was that the Cold War was mainly predicated on diplomacy rather than direct military confrontation. It was due to diplomacy and backchannel communications that the two nuclear powers prevented a direct, full-scale war.

The Evolving Role of Diplomacy in Great Power Competition

The historical trajectory of great power competition and rivalry demonstrates that the objective remains the same despite varying actors and contexts

However, in the contemporary era, amid ongoing developments, a key question emerges: whether diplomacy continues to play the same role or whether its function has evolved in the context of great power competition. The ongoing situation in the Middle Eastern region diverges from the historical perspective. In this new era, global powers, especially the United States and Israel, use diplomacy as an instrument to regulate war rather than resolving mutual disputes. Today, the fundamental function of diplomacy has become significantly intricate in modern armed confrontations. The United States and Israel are using diplomatic efforts to regulate wars and conflict, accompanied by ceasefires and international humanitarian law violations, and military operations.

The Israel–Palestine Conflict and the Limits of Diplomacy

The ongoing Palestine-Israel war is one of the prime examples of this scenario. Regional and global powers like the US, Qatar, and Egypt used diplomatic efforts to mediate only a temporary ceasefire and provision of limited humanitarian aid to the Palestinians rather than achieve a permanent resolution of the conflict. As a result, the war in Gaza persisted for more than three years, causing the deaths of more than 72600 innocent Palestinian civilians. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) also raped numerous Palestinian women during this war. In addition, over 90 percent of the civilian infrastructure in Gaza has been intentionally flattened by the IDF. All these atrocities transpired despite continued diplomatic efforts.

Power Politics and the Instrumentalization of Diplomacy

In the modern world, diplomacy is mostly influenced by the strategic interests of major global powers. They even bypass diplomatic processes to achieve their strategic interests. For instance, the United States invaded Iraq despite strong opposition by the United Nations, showing how powerful nations override diplomatic formalities and international law for their strategic goals.

Similarly, powerful states also influence the implementation of international law. In the Israel-Palestine war, several debates over human rights and civilian protection emerged at different international forums. However, the enforcement of international law was never observed in this case, despite concerns of the majority of the world, as its implementation and application are totally dependent on political will and cooperation of states.

The Limitations of Global Institutions

These violations and overriding of international law occurred because emerging power dynamics over the past 3 to 4 decades allowed powerful states to consider themselves above the law. The International Criminal Court (ICC) also faces a similar dilemma as it prosecutes war criminals, but the enforcement of its decisions is totally dependent on the cooperation of different states. The ICC, for instance, issued arrest warrants for the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 2024. However, due to no accountability mechanisms and poor enforcement, no progress on the cases has ever been reported, rendering the ICC an ineffective institution.

Netanyahu visited the United States and Hungary after the ICC arrest warrant. However, both states officially welcomed him despite these warrants. This demonstrates that powerful states prioritize their strategic interests over international law. These instances also demonstrate the evolving contours of global politics and suggest that diplomacy remains a prevailing system, though it has been reshaped by the changing dynamics of global power politics. In a world where the unequal influence of states defines the boundaries of the implementation of international law, diplomacy has been reduced to a tool used by powerful international actors to achieve their strategic interests rather than a neutral mechanism of peacemaking and conflict resolution.

Conclusion: Diplomacy and the Future of Peace

In conclusion, the historical trajectory of great power competition and rivalry demonstrates that the objective remains the same despite varying actors and contexts. However, the only thing that has evolved is diplomacy, which is no longer used as an instrument to prevent military conflicts. Rather, it has now become a tool that shapes the scope, pace, and consequences of modern conflicts and wars. In such a system, the real question is not whether diplomacy can still help deliver peace and prevent wars but whether it can ever get rid of the influence of the great powers, especially aggressors like the United States and Israel.

Аbbas Hashemite is a political observer and research analyst for regional and global geopolitical issues. He is currently working as an independent researcher and journalist

A Security Pact in the Middle East, Behind America’s Back Part 2

The four most militarily powerful Muslim-majority nations—Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Pakistan, and Egypt—are aligning based on strategic calculation rather than religious affinity. This development signals the emergence of a weaker America in the Middle East and a reordering of the great-power competition between the U.S. and China.

Ricardo Martins

Barry Buzan asserts that security is inherently regional, as nations in close geographic proximity develop interlocking threat perceptions, shared vulnerabilities, and complex defense calculations that external powers cannot fully dissolve. He terms this phenomenon a Regional Security Complex. The emerging alignment among Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan exemplifies this concept: a security cluster formed not by ideology but by shared geography and mutual threats.

The Real Strategic Interests Behind Each Member

Each country possesses distinct motivations for participating in the alliance. Analyzing their respective capabilities (as discussed in Part 1) and strategic interests is essential for assessing the potential longevity and outcomes of this pact.

This transformation carries substantial geopolitical implications that are unlikely to be reversed by even the most significant U.S. military interventions

Türkiye is engaging in what Chatham House describes as “opportunistic hedging.” By reaching out to organizations such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Türkiye seeks not only alternatives to alliances like NATO, but also increased leverage within them. Following its exclusion from the F-35 program in 2019 due to the acquisition of Russia’s S-400 system, Ankara aims to establish strategic partnerships that diminish its reliance on American approval. The KAAN fighter agreement with Saudi Arabia exemplifies this approach: if Riyadh acquires a fifth-generation fighter from Türkiye without American congressional oversight, it could fundamentally alter the political economy of U.S. defense exports. Additionally, Türkiye aims to deter Israeli military activity, particularly in response to Israeli leaders characterizing “Türkiye as the next Iran,” which Ankara interprets as a significant strategic warning.

Saudi Arabia is seeking strategic insurance. According to one analyst, Saudi Arabia enhanced its longstanding military relationship with Pakistan in 2025 to “complement the US’s decreasing Gulf deterrence and to contain Israel’s rising military assertiveness in the Middle East.” For Riyadh, this approach provides redundancy. While Saudi Arabia continues to value its relationship with the United States, it is simultaneously cultivating partnerships that mitigate its vulnerability to changes in U.S. policy. Notably, Riyadh has also engaged Pakistan to balance Türkiye’s expanding influence, incorporating Islamabad as a counterweight to Ankara.

Egypt‘s participation is influenced by its economic dependence on Gulf states and a strong belief in the existential importance of Red Sea security. Cairo receives approximately $1.5 billion annually in U.S. military aid, historically linked to its peace treaty with Israel. However, Egyptian policymakers increasingly regard Israel as an unreliable neighbor whose future actions may not align with Egypt’s interests. Recent conflicts in Gaza and Israeli actions in Lebanon and Syria have significantly shifted both public and elite opinion in Egypt. President El-Sisi also perceives an opportunity to reassert Egypt’s traditional leadership role in the Arab world, a position held during Nasser’s era and sought ever since.

Pakistan is broadening its strategic identity beyond South Asia. Its involvement in the defense pact aligns with the broader U.S. policy of “burden sharing.” As noted, “The US has essentially told Saudi Arabia to take the lead on the Palestinian issue, given its position as a key Arab power.” This directive led Saudi Arabia to seek additional partners, including Türkiye. Concerned about Türkiye’s increasing influence, Riyadh incorporated Pakistan as a balancing force against both Türkiye and Iran. “That’s how Pakistan became part of the broader regional architecture.” Through this arrangement, Pakistan gains financial support, increased diplomatic influence, and enhanced strategic stature. Its role as host of the US-Iran talks has further established Pakistan as an indispensable regional mediator.

The Pakistani Nuclear Umbrella: Does It Cover All Members?

This issue remains highly sensitive. A senior Saudi official informed Reuters that “this is a comprehensive defensive agreement that encompasses all military means,” yet did not explicitly reference nuclear sharing. This marks the first military pact between an Arab Gulf state and a nuclear power. Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif initially suggested the possibility of nuclear sharing but subsequently retracted this statement, denying such provisions. The resulting ambiguity has fueled speculation and left the precise terms of the agreement unclear.

Practical analysis indicates significant geographic limitations for Türkiye, but substantial coverage for Saudi Arabia. Pakistan’s Shaheen-II missile has a range of 1,500 km, while the Shaheen-III extends to 2,750 km; both are capable of reaching any target in Iran, directly addressing Riyadh’s security concerns. As Daniel Levy, a former Israeli peace negotiator and now head of the U.S./Middle East Project, observes, the critical issue may not be whether Pakistan’s deterrent explicitly covers Saudi Arabia, but whether Tehran perceives it as such, given that deterrence operates as much on psychological grounds as on physical capabilities.

The nuclear issue is both technical and political. Providing a genuine nuclear umbrella necessitates forward-deployed delivery systems, integrated command-and-control infrastructure, and a willingness to risk nuclear retaliation on behalf of an ally. No nuclear power has extended such a guarantee to a non-NATO Middle Eastern state. The closest precedent is the American nuclear umbrella over Japan, South Korea, and Europe, which required decades of institutional alliance-building—an achievement not yet realized in the Saudi-Pakistani relationship.

Is This a ‘Muslim NATO’? Or a Challenge to America’s Security Umbrella?

The term “Islamic NATO,” frequently used in media discourse, is a mischaracterization. The participating countries have explicitly rejected this comparison. Rather than replicating NATO’s deep integration or mutual defense guarantees, the pact aims to establish a flexible, regionally controlled security framework.

Turkish sources told Middle East Eye that the agreement “would not mirror the guarantees and commitments of NATO” but would instead serve as “a security platform to enable greater cooperation in the defense industry.” Türkiye remains a NATO member and has no intention of leaving the alliance. A formal collective defense treaty with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Egypt would create potential conflicts with Article 5 obligations.

For comparison, NATO has an integrated military command (SACEUR), conducts regular large-scale joint exercises, maintains formal nuclear-sharing arrangements (such as B61 bombs in five countries), and identifies a specific adversary. In contrast, the quadrilateral framework lacks these features; its only formal mutual defense provision is the bilateral Saudi-Pakistan SMDA, rather than a multilateral treaty.

The primary challenge posed by this pact is to American influence, rather than to military capability. While the United States encourages Gulf states to assume greater responsibility for their own defense, it remains wary of security networks that diminish Washington’s traditional leverage. The KAAN fighter agreement is of particular concern to U.S. officials; if Riyadh acquires advanced jets from Türkiye without U.S. approval, it could disrupt the established business and political dynamics of American defense exports in the region.

Washington Reaction

The Trump administration is likely to adopt a pragmatic rather than principled approach to the quadrilateral framework. It has encouraged Gulf states to increase defense spending and reduce reliance on American troops, objectives that the quadrilateral framework appears to support.

White House spokesperson Karoline Leavitt praised Pakistan, saying it had been an “incredible” mediator in the US-Iran talks and noting that this was “important” to the president. Washington is not treating the framework as a hostile act. It is treating it as a useful burden-sharing measure, at least publicly. The friction is more specific: Türkiye’s talks with Saudi Arabia on the KAAN sparked US pushback, with Washington expressing concern about the transfer of advanced aerospace technology to the Kingdom. The KAAN program uses some Western-origin subsystems, and American officials have signaled that joint production with Saudi Arabia could trigger export control restrictions.

The United States’ primary concern extends beyond arms transfers; it centers on the potential erosion of longstanding levers of influence. Historically, these four countries have been managed through defense agreements, financial aid, and export controls. However, if they are now able to supply each other with military capabilities, these traditional pressure points lose effectiveness, thereby diminishing Washington’s capacity to influence regional outcomes.

The Greater Israel Project

In a broader geopolitical context, Daniel Levy observes that the concept of a “greater Israel” extends beyond territorial expansion. It involves projecting Israeli hard-power dominance across the region by ensuring that neighboring states are either destabilized and fragmented or rendered dependent through vulnerability. The attacks on Iran were intended not primarily for regime change, but to induce state collapse and chaos, thereby eliminating any counterbalance to Israeli regional dominance.

According to this logic, the Gulf states became collateral targets: by involving U.S. forces in strikes against Iran from Gulf bases, Israel ensured that Iran would retaliate against the Gulf, thereby weakening these states and prompting them to seek security guarantees from Israel, as demonstrated by the UAE. As Levy states, Israel is attempting to foster Gulf dependencies on itself, including the establishment of corridors for transporting Gulf oil through Israeli ports.

The characterization of “Türkiye as the next Iran,” as articulated by former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, reflects a similar logic: any regional power with the potential to establish an alternative security architecture must be isolated before it can consolidate its position.

This evolving perception of threat has contributed to the unification of these four otherwise divergent nations. The regional sense of insecurity has shifted significantly, with much of the Arab world now viewing Israel as the principal destabilizing force. This transformation carries substantial geopolitical implications that are unlikely to be reversed by even the most significant U.S. military interventions. The emerging regional security pact among Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Türkiye, and Egypt represents a development that demands close observation, as well as attention to the role of China in the background.

Ricardo Martins – Doctor of Sociology, specialist in European and international politics as well as geopolitics

The UAE and the Unravelling of Gulf Consensus

The United Arab Emirates’ exit from OPEC is not a technocratic adjustment to oil policy; it is a geopolitical signal. Beneath the surface of production quotas and market strategy lies a deeper rupture: the erosion of Gulf unity as a guiding principle of regional order.

Salman Rafi Sheikh

Accelerated by wartime vulnerability, sharpened by diverging alliances, and rooted in long-standing tensions with Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi’s decision marks a decisive shift. What is ending is not just membership in a cartel but the illusion that the Gulf still acts as a cohesive strategic bloc.

The Limits of Security Guarantees

The ongoing confrontation involving Iran has exposed a critical contradiction at the heart of the UAE’s regional positioning: a state built on stability and economic openness remains deeply vulnerable to geopolitical shocks. Despite its sophisticated defense systems and strategic partnerships, the UAE found itself directly exposed to missile and drone threats in ways that unsettled its carefully cultivated image as a secure hub for global capital. Within just the first few weeks of the war, hundreds of billions of dollars were wiped out of the UAE. The issue is not simply material damage but reputational risk: vulnerability undermines the very economic model on which the UAE depends.

The UAE’s decision is best understood not as a rupture, but as a revelation. It exposes the extent to which the foundations of Gulf cooperation have already shifted

By contrast, Saudi Arabia appeared relatively insulated, not immune but better shielded diplomatically and strategically. Riyadh’s longstanding networks, including its ability to mobilize intermediaries and leverage broader geopolitical relationships, helped mitigate the scale and frequency of direct confrontation. This asymmetry did not go unnoticed in Abu Dhabi. It reinforced a growing perception within the Emirati leadership that collective security frameworks in the Gulf are uneven at best and unreliable at worst. Indeed, it led Abu Dhabi to punish Pakistan for helping the Saudis more than Islamabad could help the Emiratis. The implication is profound: if regional coordination cannot guarantee security in moments of crisis, then its value diminishes. Under such conditions, adherence to collective economic mechanisms like OPEC becomes harder to justify.

Towards Regional Dealignment

The UAE’s exit must also be situated within a broader reconfiguration of its regional alliances. Over the past decade, Abu Dhabi has steadily moved toward a model of strategic autonomy—prioritizing flexibility over alignment and bilateralism over multilateral consensus.

This shift is visible across multiple domains. The UAE’s normalization of relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords marked a clear departure from traditional Gulf consensus positions. Its engagement in conflict zones such as Yemen and Sudan has frequently diverged from Saudi priorities, revealing competing visions of regional order. Even within economic policy, the UAE has pursued aggressive diversification strategies that occasionally place it in competition—not coordination—with its neighbors.

Tensions with Saudi Arabia have been particularly consequential. Disputes over oil production quotas within OPEC+ have surfaced repeatedly in recent years, with the UAE pushing for higher baseline production levels to reflect its expanded capacity. These disagreements reached a visible peak in 2021, when negotiations nearly collapsed over Emirati objections. While temporary compromises were achieved, the underlying divergence persisted.

Beyond oil, the two states are increasingly competing as economic hubs. Saudi Arabia’s efforts to attract multinational headquarters to Riyadh—through policies such as requiring firms to base regional operations in the Kingdom—have been widely interpreted as a direct challenge to Dubai’s dominance. This competition extends to logistics, tourism, and investment, eroding the informal division of labor that once underpinned Gulf economic cooperation.

Within this context, the UAE’s decision to leave OPEC is less an isolated policy move than the culmination of a broader strategic trajectory. Emirati officials have indicated that the country is reassessing aspects of its multilateral engagement, emphasizing flexibility and national interest over institutional commitments. The message is clear: the era of automatic alignment is over. The more ‘flexible’ approach is a proxy term for what lies ahead: more dealignment, more divergence, and more conflict within the Gulf. The regional fault line is no longer between Iran and the GCC; it lies within the GCC as well. It is specifically targeting the Saudis.

The UAE’s exit from OPEC means that more oil will be available in the market. It also means oil prices would shift to decrease over time. Saudi Arabia needs high oil prices — around $90 (€77) per barrel —to fund government spending and its ambitious Vision 2030, a set of huge infrastructure projects to cut the Kingdom’s reliance on fossil fuels. Every extra barrel the country holds back means lost revenue, which hurts the country’s ability to grow its economy.

From Cartel Discipline to Competitive Energy Statecraft

At its core, OPEC represents a model of collective discipline, one in which member states coordinate production to influence global prices. For decades, this framework relied not only on shared economic interests but also on a degree of political cohesion among key Gulf producers. That cohesion is now eroding.

The UAE has invested heavily in expanding its oil production capacity, aiming to reach and sustain higher output levels in the coming years. Remaining within OPEC, however, would require continued adherence to quotas that constrain this capacity. From a purely economic perspective, the opportunity cost is significant, especially in a market environment characterized by volatility and shifting demand patterns.

More importantly, the logic of coordination itself is being questioned. As global energy markets evolve—with the rise of US shale, the energy transition, and increasing geopolitical fragmentation—the effectiveness of cartel-based management has diminished. States are increasingly prioritizing agility over discipline, seeking to maximize national advantage in a less predictable environment.

For the UAE, exiting OPEC offers several advantages: the ability to adjust production more rapidly, the freedom to pursue bilateral energy partnerships, and the flexibility to respond to market signals without institutional constraints. It aligns with a broader shift toward what might be called “competitive energy statecraft,” in which states act as independent players rather than coordinated members of a bloc.

This shift has significant implications for OPEC itself. The departure of a major producer like the UAE weakens the organization’s internal cohesion and raises questions about its future effectiveness. While OPEC Plus—which includes non-OPEC producers like Russia—has provided an expanded framework for coordination, its stability ultimately depends on the willingness of key actors to subordinate national interests to collective goals. The UAE’s exit suggests that such willingness is no longer assured.

Beyond Exit: A New Gulf Order

The UAE’s decision is best understood not as a rupture, but as a revelation. It exposes the extent to which the foundations of Gulf cooperation have already shifted. Looking ahead, this transformation is likely to deepen. Saudi Arabia will continue to assert leadership within OPEC, but with diminished authority. Other Gulf states may not follow the UAE’s path immediately, yet they too are navigating the tension between coordination and autonomy. The result may not be the collapse of regional institutions, but their gradual hollowing out.

At the same time, the move signals a broader trend in global politics: the decline of multilateral discipline in favor of flexible, state-centric approaches. In energy markets, as in security, the emphasis is shifting toward adaptability and unilateral capacity. For the Gulf, the stakes are particularly high. The region’s influence has long depended on its ability to act collectively, whether in managing oil markets or shaping geopolitical outcomes. As that collective capacity erodes, so too does the coherence of the “Gulf” as a strategic concept. It might exist as a geography, but not as a regional political alliance. The UAE has moved first, but it is unlikely to be the last to rethink the value of consensus. What emerges in its place will not be unity, but something more fluid—and potentially more unstable.

Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs

A Fractured World Order and the Xi–Trump Test of Strategic Coexistence

The Trump-Xi summit, coming amidst fragile international markets, intensifying US-China competition, and escalating Middle East conflict, will critically analyze whether the two sides can manage competition without escalating risks.

Abbas Hashemite

A Summit Amid Global Instability

The summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and his counterpart, US President Donald J. Trump, scheduled from May 13 to 15, comes at a critical moment, as the world appears increasingly besieged by conflict and precariously clouded by uncertainty. Continuing instability in Europe, growing competition among major powers, escalating tensions in the Middle East, and fragile international markets have cumulatively created an environment in which even a minor diplomatic engagement between the United States and China carries immense significance. The intense global atmosphere has further increased the significance of this summit by turning it from a regular diplomatic engagement into a test of whether the two global superpowers can still distinguish between strategic rivalry and outright recklessness.

China’s Strategic Messaging and Global Posture

The US seeks to preserve a US-led unipolar order, while China advances an alternative international system defined by rigid state sovereignty and diminished Western dominance, rendering coexistence within the same global framework increasingly difficult

For Beijing, the summit offers a great opportunity to bolster its cautiously crafted image as a global stabilizing force in international affairs. The Chinese state knows that the international system is transitioning into an era of prolonged conflicts and disorder. Military blocs are solidifying, geopolitical disruptions are multiplying, and economic nationalism is surging all together. In such an international climate, Beijing seeks to present itself as a disciplined state advocating strategic patience, continuity, and stability rather than a revolutionary power wishing for global disorder.

However, this international posture is not entirely altruistic. The actual ambition behind this posturing is that China’s economic ambitions are heavily dependent upon uninterrupted trade routes, stable energy supplies, and predictable international markets. Indeed, chaos may weaken the US and other Chinese rivals, but protracted international instability jeopardizes its long-term international standing as much as it imperils the West.

Washington’s Strategic Calculus and Global Rivalry

The US government views this summit from an entirely different perspective. Washington sees Beijing as one of the global powers capable of challenging its global hegemony across technological, economic, and military domains. For the US, its competition with China is no longer limited to trade wars and tariffs. It holds that this competition has evolved into a broader conflict over supply chain control, strategic influence, technological dominance, and the struggle for a new world order.

Even amid this ongoing rivalry, Washington acknowledges an uncomfortable truth that a limitless confrontation with Beijing is not in its interest. The international financial markets are sensitive, the global economy also remains interconnected in this era of globalization, and international security is also excessively vulnerable to sustaining an unchecked collapse of bilateral relations between the two sides. This strategic contradiction forms the foundation of the upcoming summit. The US-China relations are marked by mistrust, yet both sides acknowledge that a strategic breakdown could be equally jeopardizing for them. Therefore, the challenge for the two sides is not merely a reconciliation, but coexistence.

Multipolarity, Middle East Tensions, and the Taiwan Factor

The timing of the summit further increases its significance as it unfolds during the ongoing war between the US, Israel, and Iran, placing the Middle East at the heart of global instability. This conflict threatens global maritime security, trade routes, and global diplomatic alignments. China’s economic stability and survival heavily rely on Middle Eastern energy supplies and maritime trade routes, making it one of the most affected states due to this conflict. A prolonged war between the US, Israel, and Iran would place significant economic strain on global markets and threaten Beijing’s economic stability at this particular juncture.

China also recognizes the strategic opportunity created by Washington’s increasing entanglement in multiple conflicts, including the Middle Eastern theatre, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and the Indo-Pacific military deterrence. The US involvement in these military conflicts creates opportunities for its competitors, especially Russia and China. These geopolitical burdens have provided Russia and China with an opportunity to expand their global strategic and diplomatic influence.

However, China’s objectives are more sophisticated than mere opportunism. Its interests lie in the continuation of American influence. It merely seeks a gradual transition towards a multipolar world order with limited US influence. This is one of the key reasons why Beijing always positions itself as a mediator and advocate for economic stability in international conflicts. Nonetheless, Washington views Beijing’s increasing diplomatic activism with skepticism. US policymakers see China’s portrayal of itself as a mediator and advocate for peace as an effort to expand its influence among states frustrated by US military interventions and economic sanctions. This US suspicion gains validation by the fact that China cautiously deepened its diplomatic ties with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf States during the time Washington was involved in military conflict in the region.

The Taiwan issue will also influence the summit. For Beijing, Taiwan is a matter of its national identity and sovereignty. Meanwhile, the US views Taiwan as a bargaining chip essential for ensuring regional balance and an indispensable issue for the credibility of the US among its allies. Neither side is likely to compromise on this strategic issue. However, both sides understand that any miscalculation would lead to catastrophic consequences for the entire globe. That’s why the upcoming summit is not merely symbolic and has gained immense strategic significance. In contemporary, uncertain, and volatile international economic conditions, diplomacy itself has become a symbol of stability.

Rivalry Without Collapse: The Limits of Coexistence

However, the world still does not need to be too optimistic. A profound reality underlying this summit is that the two sides are no longer only competitors challenging for influence within the same international system. The actual competition between the two sides is over defining the contours of the international system. The US seeks to preserve a US-led unipolar order, while China advances an alternative international system defined by rigid state sovereignty and diminished Western dominance, rendering coexistence within the same global framework increasingly difficult.

Still, direct and complete confrontation serves neither side. Both sides acknowledge that any direct confrontation will be equally detrimental for them. Therefore, both states remain trapped in a paradoxical bilateral relationship marked by suspicion, rivalry, dependence, and necessity simultaneously. The upcoming Xi-Trump summit may not resolve these conflicts and issues. It may also not lead to historic breakthroughs, but its significance cannot be denied. At a time when the world is increasingly being driven by fragmentation, distrust, and escalation, even symbolic diplomatic engagement between the two sides carries immense significance. In the coming era, global economic stability and peace will entirely depend on the ability of the great powers to manage their competition rationally.

Аbbas Hashemite is a political observer and research analyst for regional and global geopolitical issues. He is currently working as an independent researcher and journalist

The effects of the Iran War and the future of the UAE’s role in the oil market

The UAE’s official withdrawal from OPEC and OPEC+ on the eve of May 2026 is a “turn” in energy geopolitics, from the “institutional convergence” model to “strategic autonomy”.

Samyar Rostami

In recent years, the UAE has invested heavily (approximately $150 million) in expanding oil production, increasing its maximum capacity to about 5–6 million barrels per day. The UAE’s new oil approach is a kind of “maximization of investment returns” and freedom from restrictions and coordination with its economic needs.

From another perspective, Abu Dhabi seeks to make the most of the remaining “opportunity” in energy transition by accelerating the extraction and production of oil.

With the UAE’s “divergence” from Saudi Arabia and the growing rifts in the GCC in areas such as competition for foreign policy and defining the role of regional leadership, the “Emirates First” policy and an independent player in the energy equation are being considered.

The UAE’s excess oil production capacity is only effective in conditions of security, stability, and peace in the Persian Gulf

The US-Israeli War Against Iran

The UAE has played a large direct and indirect role in facilitating and assisting the attack on Iran. Many in Iran believe that during the 40-day war, there was a lot of evidence and clues that showed that either the UAE attacked Iran or had visible cooperation with the aggressor and threatened Iran’s national interests.

In recent months, the UAE has suffered the most from Tehran’s retaliatory blow, and the UAE’s gas exports have stopped, and the UAE’s oil production (1.27 million barrels) has also decreased.

Also, the UAE is set to increase its daily production capacity to around 5 million barrels by 2027. But so far, the Iran war has disrupted energy supplies and supply chains through the vital Strait of Hormuz, damaging production facilities and slowing down the UAE’s national plans.

Crises and the Future of the UAE’s Role in the Hydrocarbon Market

The UAE’s decision-making on the future of its role in the oil market is certainly in line with the UAE’s production policy, current and future capacity, long-term strategic and economic outlook, the development of its energy sector, and the acceleration of investment in domestic energy production.

The future of the UAE’s role in the oil market depends on the pace of the energy transition. The UAE is also focusing on investing in increasing hydrocarbon capacity and developing other energy infrastructure.

In the future, the UAE’s role in the oil market is likely to be a combination of factors such as supply power and excess capacity to compensate for potential disruptions, production coordination, and the ability to influence supply quantities.

The UAE is redefining its economic geography to reduce its dependence on Hormuz and shift its economic rotation to the Sea of ​​Oman. Having two coasts is a major geographical advantage for the UAE and can completely change the route of crude oil exports to the Sea of ​​Oman.

The UAE, relying on infrastructure such as the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline, has a comparative advantage in bypassing Hormuz in peacetime. The port of Fujairah is the UAE’s most important ocean port and an alternative export route to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. However, in the event of a continuing crisis and war, Iran could blockade the UAE’s coasts. In any maritime blockade of the UAE, the country’s oil exports would face greater challenges.

Given the crisis in Iran-US relations, the security of energy transport routes in the event of a blocked Strait of Hormuz and tension in the Persian Gulf faces geopolitical risks.

Furthermore, the future role of the UAE will be determined by its production capacity, reserves, and spare capacity. The UAE could act as a “shock absorber” in the oil market due to its ability to increase production.

On paper, the UAE’s significant spare capacity is significant in a crisis-prone environment. The UAE could increase its production to more than 4.5 million barrels per day, while its quota was much lower. But if tensions or war disrupt supply or increase the risk of energy transport routes, the market usually searches for other options.

The continuation of the “Iran war” or any geopolitical crisis in the Persian Gulf could increase geopolitical risks and cause damage to the UAE oil regions, change the direction of energy flows, and form a risk premium in prices.

One of the most important tasks of OPEC and OPEC+ is to implement regulatory policies. Although the activation of unused capacities of the UAE and the ability to export independently and without quota restrictions have been highlighted by Abu Dhabi. However, cooperation with major producers within OPEC or in the form of OPEC+, especially Russia, is needed for broader coordination in supply, and market stability to maintain stability in the oil market.

The UAE’s move to withdraw from OPEC and OPEC+ is more of a political decision, influenced by the West, opposing Riyadh and reflecting a deep regional rift between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi or between two incompatible Arab views in the GCC. But it should be noted that Riyadh, as the largest OPEC producer, by using its power, may impose a heavy cost on the UAE.

The UAE moved closer to the US and Israel in the war against Iran. Many believe that the UAE, as one of the most important financial and military centers in the Persian Gulf, has increasingly expanded its security-weapons cooperation with Israel.

The UAE’s announcement of a “complete” review of its relationships, alliances, and reliance on specific partners (in the oil field) could be seen as a move towards closer alignment with the United States in regional policy. But the reality is that the UAE’s energy sector is particularly vulnerable to external attacks. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has shown how vulnerable its “visionary” plans and energy economic plans.

In the coming period, the UAE will join a number of independent oil producers, such as the United States. But the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC and OPEC+ will not weaken the overall influence of the other members.

The UAE will seek to reduce its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz by investing in alternative routes, such as its port of Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman. However, the Strait of Hormuz, a waterway through which much of the country’s oil and goods pass, could be a major variable in the future of the UAE’s role in the energy market.

Furthermore, the UAE’s excess oil production capacity is only effective in conditions of security, stability, and peace in the Persian Gulf.

Although the UAE wants to become an independent producer and be more flexible in the face of constant fluctuations in the oil market, frequent or prolonged wars and security and military disruptions in the region prevent the UAE from presenting itself as a stable hub for energy and oil trade.

Samyar Rostami, а political observer and senior researcher in international relations

The Strait of Hormuz Impasse: Why “Project Freedom” Doesn’t Solve the Problem and Where to Find a Way Out of the Crisis

The conflict over the Strait of Hormuz has evolved from a military duel into a geopolitical chess match, where the stakes are measured in percentages of global GDP, and the ceasefire hangs by a thread.

Mohammed ibn Faisal al-Rashid

The New Reality of a Double Blockade

What began as a military operation has turned into a protracted crisis that analysts are already comparing to the worst economic aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic for the global economy. The situation in the Strait of Hormuz — the narrow chokepoint through which about 20% of the world’s oil supply passes — has reached an impasse. A unique configuration has emerged, which experts call a “death grip”: Iran has blocked the strait in response to U.S. and Israeli strikes, while Washington has imposed its own naval blockade on Iranian ports.

The ceasefire announced by Donald Trump on April 7 is formally being observed, but it has only created an illusion of stability. More than 900 commercial vessels have accumulated in the Persian Gulf, unable to move forward or backward, and energy markets have been in a state of turbulence since April 2026.

The only way out is to abandon maximalist demands for regime change and accept an old but workable formula: a mutually beneficial compromise

While global powers search for a way out, Tehran has managed to demonstrate remarkable tactical ingenuity. Iranian tankers have found ways to circumvent the U.S. blockade by using unorthodox routes between the islands of Larak and Qeshm. This shows that the economic strangulation of Iran has its limits, and the country continues to adapt to pressure while maintaining control of the situation.

Negotiating in Time Trouble: Positions of the Parties and Tough Statements

The diplomatic front has been as hot as the military front in recent weeks. Iran, through Pakistani intermediaries, has sent Washington a detailed plan for resolution. According to Axios and confirmed by Iranian sources, Tehran’s new proposal involves a three-stage formula for peace.

The essence of the Iranian plan boils down to an “all or nothing” formula: Tehran is willing to discuss the nuclear program only after the blockade is lifted and a ceasefire is guaranteed. However, as correctly noted in the original points, for Tehran, the Strait of Hormuz today is not just a point on a map, but its main bargaining chip in negotiations for a comprehensive settlement.

The White House’s response has been dual and extremely nervous. On the one hand, President Trump made an unprecedented statement about the state of negotiations. “I am fully aware that my representatives are conducting very positive discussions with the country of Iran, and that these discussions could lead to something very positive for everyone.” — Donald Trump post on Truth Social.

On the other hand, this same rhetoric is accompanied by maximalist threats. In an interview with Fox News, Trump stated that if the Iranians try to attack U.S. ships participating in “Project Freedom” to escort the stranded vessels, they will be “wiped off the face of the Earth.” When asked by journalists about the possibility of new strikes, Trump threatened that if Tehran “behaves badly,” military action could resume at any moment.

Such dual communication — the carrot and the stick — is confusing even for America’s allies. Iran, for its part, is using symmetrical rhetoric. The IRGC command has stated that President Trump faces a choice between an “impossible operation or a bad deal for the U.S.”

The Israel Factor and the “Netanyahu Trap”

A key obstacle to progress is Israel’s position. As the provided materials suggest and political scientists confirm, Washington’s initial goals of “taming” Iran’s nuclear program were effectively dictated by Israel. While the Trump administration appears to be seeking a pragmatic way out of the crisis (opening the strait to save the economy), the Israeli leadership insists on the complete dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.

All experts without exception note that Israel is changing its rhetoric, becoming more hardline. Israeli strategists believe that since negotiations have stalled, it’s time to return to a military scenario to “deal with Iran once and for all.” This creates a conflict where Washington is forced to balance between the interests of the global economy (which needs an open strait) and its alliance obligations to Netanyahu.

Israel’s demands — to strip Iran of enrichment rights, dismantle facilities — make any compromise politically toxic for Tehran, which cannot agree to such a capitulationist scenario. If Tel Aviv and Washington fail to achieve this, it is highly likely that Tehran, as Jonathan Last argues in “ The Bulwark“, will emerge from this conflict as the victor, having withstood an attack by one of the world’s most powerful global powers and a state aspiring to regional leadership while retaining its strategic leverage. According to the author of the article, ‘this will look like a historic turning point, after which the idea of the US as a globally dominant country capable of imposing its own rules of the game on others will be definitively erased, and Washington’s image will be permanently undermined.’

“Project Freedom”: Humanitarian Gesture or Provocation?

Tensions peaked on May 3–4 with the launch of “Project Freedom.” Trump announced the start of an operation to escort the stranded ships, calling it a humanitarian gesture.

However, the assessments of military experts cited in the source material proved prophetic: the operation was called “dangerous and useless.” By the next day, reports emerged that ships were coming under attack, and the operation’s goals remained unclear to shipping companies. Moreover, Iran regarded “Project Freedom” as a direct violation of the ceasefire regime.

From a military standpoint, as noted in BESA analysis, such an operation risks falling into a “knife fight” — a tactic for which the Iranian navy (specifically the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) has been preparing for decades, using speedboats, mines, and coastal missile batteries.

Ways Out of the Impasse: A Regional Security Formula

Given that time is running out and military force has not led to the capitulation of either side, unconventional solutions must be sought. Analysis of Iran’s 14-point proposal shows that Tehran has already shifted to a strategy of “geopolitical swapping”: nuclear concessions like those in 2015 in exchange for broad regional security.

To break the “death grip” and avoid a new round of war, the following conditions must be met:

– Separate the Nuclear Dossier from the Shipping Issue

There is a rational core in Iran’s current proposal (according to Al Jazeera): postponing complex nuclear negotiations to a later stage. The parties need to agree to a “delayed solution.” First — unblocking the strait under international control and a mutual suspension of military actions. The nuclear issue must return to the purview of the IAEA and the P5+1, rather than being held hostage by immediate military threats.

– Create a “Pan-Persian Security Architecture”

This is the boldest but also most viable point of the Iranian plan. Neither the U.S. nor Israel can guarantee lasting security in the Gulf alone. It is necessary to return to the idea of dialogue among the littoral states (Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar). External powers (the U.S.) must make way for regional mechanisms of non-interference and freedom of navigation, taking on the role of guarantors rather than sole managers.

– Lift the Blockade Step by Step Using a “Synchronization” Principle

The current double blockade is mutual strangulation. Washington and Tehran need to agree on a step-by-step schedule: the withdrawal of U.S. ships from the immediate area of the strait in exchange for the Iranians clearing the shipping channel of mines. Only equal and synchronized steps will allow potential military incidents to be dismissed as “technical glitches” rather than aggression.

– Remove Israel from a “Veto” Role

As long as Israel’s prime minister has a say in U.S. decision-making regarding security in the Persian Gulf, peace is impossible. Israel’s security interests must be discussed on a separate track, not linked to the immediate unblocking of the strait for tankers from the Gulf states. Washington must show strategic independence from its ally if it is truly interested in ending the global energy crisis.

Diplomacy Must Step In

As long as Trump talks about “positive negotiations” but continues to threaten to “wipe off the face of the Earth,” and Iran finds ways around the blockade, the world teeters on the brink of a recession. The impasse in the Strait of Hormuz is a crisis of political will. The only way out is to abandon maximalist demands for regime change and accept an old but workable formula: a mutually beneficial compromise in which Iran gets its assets unfrozen and pressure relieved in exchange for transparency, and the U.S. regains stable oil prices and freedom of navigation.

If this doesn’t happen in the coming weeks, “Project Freedom” risks becoming “Project Apocalypse.”

Muhammad ibn Faisal al-Rashid, political scientist, and expert on the Arab world