Muslims Urged to Follow Holy Prophet’s Example in Maintaining Unity

IQNA – A senior cleric stressed that the Holy Prophet (PBUH) did not turn differences of opinion into conflicts and divisions in the Ummah, urging Muslims to follow the example of the last messenger of God in maintaining unity.

Speaking in an interview with IQNA about the place of unity in the Prophet’s (PBUH) governance style, Hojat-ol-Islam Hassan Akhtari, the head of the central headquarters for the celebration of Islamic Unity Week, said unity does not mean eliminating differences of opinion.

Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) accepted natural differences of opinion and prevented these differences from turning into conflicts, divisions and divisions in the Islamic society, he said.

Asked what principles should officials, elites and the media pay attention to in order to emulate the example of the Prophet (PBUH) in maintaining unity, he said the model and example of the Prophet (PBUH) in the field of unity have been followed and implemented since the beginning of the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and in the Islamic Republic’s establishment.

The issue of unity was of concern to Imam Khomeini (RA) since the beginning of the Islamic movement, and after him, this path was followed during the leadership of the martyred Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, he stated.

In this regard, the World Forum for the Proximity of Islamic Schools of Thought was formed to bring Islamic denominations closer to each other, he noted.

Hojat-ol-Islam Akhtari said the formation of the WFPIST was practically an action aimed at bringing followers of different Islamic schools of thought closer to each other, and this issue was strengthened by holding various programs and creating unifying and proximity programs and movements in various countries that had relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Referring to the martyred Leader’s emphasis on the issue of unity, he said his numerous messages on various occasions, especially the messages of Unity Week, the beginning of the new year, and the Hajj ceremonies, showed his constant emphasis on the unity of the Islamic Ummah.

“In many of his speeches, the issue of unity was also emphasized, and Muslims were called to maintain unity, convergence, and avoid division.”

Referring to the enemies’ efforts to create divisions among Muslims, the cleric said the necessity of maintaining unity has always been emphasized in the face of the sedition, division, and investments of the United States, the Zionist regime, and their allies in the region to create sedition among Muslims.

There are many examples of such attempts by enemies, and one of them is the formation of terrorist groups such as Daesh (ISIL or ISIS) and Al-Qaeda, he noted, adding that the martyred Leader emphasized many times in various speeches that these movements are factors that colonialism has chosen and launched to create differences and divisions among Muslims.

Imam Khomeini (RA) had also warned about this issue from the very beginning of the Islamic movement, not only after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, but also years before the victory of the Revolution, he went on to say.

Evolution of the Persian architectural 'squinch'

Squaring the Circle 

In the cities of pre-Islamic Sasanian Persia, where towering palaces and sacred spaces rose from the sun-scorched earth, architects grappled with a puzzle as old as their craft: how could they place a grand, round dome atop a rigid, square base? The dome, with its smooth, curving elegance, seemed at odds with the sharp, unyielding corners of the square beneath it.

The story begins with a practical dilemma. A dome’s circular foundation couldn’t simply rest on a square—its edges would overhang awkwardly, and the corners of the square would protrude, leaving gaps that defied both structure and beauty. But necessity, as it often does, sparked brilliance.

The Sasanid Persian Solution

The pre-Islamic Sasanian Persian architects devised a clever trick: the squinch. With deft hands and sharp minds, they built small arches across each corner of the square, turning its four-sided form into an eight-sided octagon. This new shape, closer to a circle, became the perfect perch for the dome, bridging the gap between square and round with grace and strength.

Yet, the tale doesn’t end there. What started as a simple solution soon transformed into something far greater. Over generations, Persian architects turned their squinches into a masterpiece of design: the muqarnas/ahooyeeh. Picture it—a cascade of tiny, niche-like forms, layered and stacked like the delicate cells of a honeycomb or the dripping stalactites of a hidden cave. The muqarnas didn’t just support the dome; it wove the square base and the curving roof together in a dance of geometry and light, creating a transition so seamless it seemed almost magical.

Step inside one of these Persian marvels, and you’d feel the wonder. The square walls rise around you, solid and firm, only to melt into a symphony of intricate patterns overhead. The muqarnas catches the eye, drawing it upward through its mesmerizing layers until, at last, you behold the dome—perfectly round, hovering as if weightless above the earth. It was more than engineering; it was art born from necessity.

This Persian solution didn’t stay confined to their lands. The muqarnas spread across to nthe Byzantine world and later through further Persian innovation and elaboration across the Islamic world, gracing mosques, tombs, and palaces with its elegance. It became a hallmark of creativity, a testament to how the Persians turned a structural problem into a symbol structural and aesthetic beauty.

The holy and not‑so‑holy sides of the Mecca pact

From left: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif holding copies of the Mecca Pact after they signed the joint defence agreement in Mecca and August 7. Credit: Facebook/Shehbaz Sharif

As tensions continued to build in West Asia, history was made on the Muslim holy day of Friday, August 7, 2026, in the sacred city of Mecca, where three of the most powerful Islamic nations signed what most analysts have since described as a deal for a Muslim NATO.

The choice of Mecca as the venue for the leaders of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan was both significant and deliberate, for the holy city symbolises the Qur’anic call for Muslim unity — a call that has remained elusive since the passing of the Prophet Muhammad 1,437 Hijri years ago.

If Muslim unity is what the ‘Mecca Joint Defence Agreement’ represents, does the accord between the three Sunni‑majority countries portray Sunni solidarity while excluding Shiites, who comprise 15 per cent of the world’s two billion Muslims? The three countries, however, have rejected attempts to frame the deal in sectarian terms.

Now rewind history to the early 20th century, when World War I broke out. There was no Saudi Arabia then. Ottoman Sultan Mehmed V declared jihad, or holy war, calling on the world’s Muslims to join his empire’s fight against the Allies, led by Britain. Instead of responding to the call, many Arabs rebelled. Wahhabi imams such as Sulaiman ibn Sahman from the Najd province in present‑day Saudi Arabia issued fatwas to justify the rebellion in religious terms. Ibn Sahman’s fatwa declared the Muslim Ottomans kafirs (infidels) and hailed the British as Ahl al‑Kitab (People of the Scriptures), urging Muslims to join the Britain‑led Allies.

In another blow to the Ottomans, (Turks), Wahhabi forces from Najd attacked northern Arabia’s Rashidi tribes, whose support the Ottomans relied on to prevent the British forces from capturing Palestine, including Jerusalem. The end result was that the Ottomans lost Jerusalem, and the Arab Middle East was carved into nation‑states, weakening Arab unity and enabling the Zionists to establish Israel — the root cause of many of the region’s problems, including the current war of aggression against Iran.

From the post–World War I division of the Middle East to August 7, 2026, much blood has flowed under the bridge. In the interim, Saudi Arabia’s King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud met President Roosevelt in 1945 to establish a defence partnership; the secular Turkish Republic joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in 1952; and Pakistan threw its weight behind the Western bloc during the Cold War, later siding with a rising China, and now seeks to balance between China and Donald Trump’s United States.

An attempt at unity after a century of division is indeed a welcome move.

Some have called the August 7 deal a ‘Muslim NATO’ because it contains an Article 5‑like clause warning any aggressor that an attack on one will be regarded as an attack on all. This raises serious security concerns with global implications, since all three nations face unresolved disputes ‘ Pakistan with India and Afghanistan; Saudi Arabia with Iran, the Houthis in Yemen, and other regional rivals; and Türkiye with Greece.

Aside from the comparison to NATO’s Article 5, the deal does not resemble NATO in its structure or function. It does not include provisions for a NATO‑style organisational structure with a headquarters, a secretary general, and a supreme commander. Cynics also view it as an alliance of Sunni Muslim nations that have not fought Israel, directed against a nation — Iran — that has. The three signatories, however, insist the agreement is defensive in nature and intended to strengthen collective security and promote regional stability, not to target any specific country.

Iran has welcomed the agreement.

Signed by Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, the Mecca agreement underscores the emerging security realities of the Middle East after Iran demonstrated its ability to withstand both the United States and Israel.

The Mecca pact also exposed the unreliability of the United States as a security partner. Saudi Arabia has bitter experience with Washington, which failed to respond to drone and cruise‑missile attacks on Saudi oil facilities in September, allegedly carried out by Iran. Saudi Arabia was shocked when Israel struck a residential facility housing a Hamas peace delegation in Qatar last year, with the US maintaining strategic ignorance, thus abandoning Qatar despite close defence ties. Moreover, when the Iran war broke out, Washington was unable to provide security cover to regional countries, even as it relied on bases and radar facilities in those countries to attack Iran.

Amid these concerns, Saudi Arabia saw its security liabilities rise. They include Iran’s emergence as a regional superpower; the ability of the pro‑Iranian Houthi militia in war‑ravaged Yemen to hit Saudi targets; the United Arab Emirates’ rogue behaviour destabilising the Red Sea region; and Israeli politicians — including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — publicly flaunting the ‘Greater Israel’ map that incorporates one‑third of Saudi Arabia. Another growing concern is Israel’s attempt to establish a base in Somaliland after recognising Somalia’s breakaway region overlooking Saudi Arabia’s strategic Red Sea coast.

The Mecca agreement follows a failed Saudi attempt between 2015 and 2017 to form a pan‑Islamic military coalition against the backdrop of Yemen’s civil war. The August 7 deal emerged after a top‑secret initiative by Ankara, which has not taken lightly Israel’s recent comments describing Türkiye as a security threat.

The Mecca security alliance is reinforced by Saudi Arabia’s financial strength and strategic geography, stretching east to west from the Strait of Hormuz to the Red Sea; Türkiye’s military weight as an advanced arms manufacturer; and Pakistan’s ability to provide the much‑needed nuclear umbrella.

The deal signals the formalisation of the close security relations that Türkiye and Saudi Arabia already had with Pakistan. It also expands on the agreement Islamabad and Riyadh signed in September last year.

As expected, the Mecca agreement has unsettled Israel and India. Israeli analysts view their country as the alliance’s main target, while India says it is committed to safeguarding its national interests and assessing the development. Both India and Israel are nevertheless expected to strengthen their already close security partnership — a partnership that prompted Amnesty International to accuse India of complicity in the Gaza genocide. Both countries are members of the Middle Eastern Quad, also known as I2U2 — comprising Israel, India, the United States and the UAE.

Regarded as the mother country of Sunni Islam, Saudi Arabia sits atop a military power mine it does not know how to harness or strategise. If Ray Klein’s formula is applied to measure Saudi Arabia’s power, what it lacks is strategic population strength and the political will to resist — elements that can come only through the Islamisation of security, as Iran has done. Iran’s security solutions are home‑grown and faith‑driven, whereas Saudi Arabia depends on Western solutions, particularly from the United States, which is certain to side with Israel should war erupt between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Islamisation of security offers Saudi Arabia a two‑billion‑strong global military force. Meanwhile, the Mecca security deal could emerge as a greater deterrent against Israel and ensure regional stability if it can bring Iran into the fold or establish a separate regional security pact with Tehran.

Vanunu: The Man Who Told the Truth About the Bomb Nobody Admits Exists

In 1986, a young technician named Mordechai Vanunu walked into a British newspaper office carrying photographs and knowledge that few outsiders had ever seen. He had spent nine years working inside Israel's most closely guarded facility, the nuclear complex near Dimona.

What he revealed forced the world to confront something long denied in public: Israel possessed a substantial, undeclared nuclear arsenal. The Sunday Times published the story in October 1986. Within days, Vanunu's life was taken from him.

Israeli agents lured him to Rome with a woman posing as an American tourist, drugged him, and smuggled him back to Israel by sea. A closed court convicted him of treason and espionage.

He received an eighteen-year sentence and spent more than eleven of those years in solitary confinement, a punishment his verdict never actually specified. Amnesty International named him a prisoner of conscience.

When the prison gates finally opened in 2004, a different kind of confinement began. Vanunu found sanctuary within the grounds of St George's Anglican Cathedral in East Jerusalem, and he remains there to this day, more than twenty years on. He is forbidden from leaving the country. He cannot speak freely to foreign journalists without risking arrest, and he has been detained more than once for doing exactly that.

He converted to Christianity while in Australia in the 1980s and later married a Norwegian academic, Kristin Joachimsen. He has asked repeatedly to join her abroad. The answer has always been no. Israeli authorities maintain he still holds knowledge too sensitive to release into the world.

The timing of this unfinished story is difficult to ignore. Israel has spent months warning the world that Iran must never be permitted a nuclear weapon, and has now taken military action on that basis.

Yet the same state making that case has never signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, has never opened its own facilities to the inspection regime it insists Iran must submit to, and still keeps under tight restriction the one man who first documented the scale of its arsenal.

This is not a call to excuse Iran's nuclear ambitions, which raise genuine and serious concerns of their own. It is simply worth noticing how selectively the language of nuclear danger gets applied.

A state can spend decades demanding transparency from its neighbours while guarding its own secrets absolutely, and the world's attention tends to follow the demand rather than the double standard beneath it.

Vanunu has said, consistently and for decades, that he acted because he opposed weapons of mass destruction wherever they exist. Whether or not one accepts that as his full motive, the consequences for him have been lifelong.

He is now in his seventies.

The restrictions on him are renewed year after year, long after any information he once carried could plausibly still matter. The message Israel sends by continuing to hold him is a clear one: some secrets are considered too important to allow full freedom to the person who exposed them, no matter how much time has passed.

Vanunu, in his seventies, is still confined to a country that has never quite forgiven him for telling the truth. His story is not really about one man's decades of hardship, though that alone deserves remembrance. It is about the uncomfortable gap between the principles states demand of others and the ones they quietly exempt themselves from.

As the Middle East once again finds itself gripped by nuclear anxiety, his story is worth remembering, not as ancient history, but as an unresolved question still very much alive today.

If possessing nuclear weapons is dangerous enough that Iran must be stopped at nearly any cost, what does it say that the man who revealed Israel's own arsenal still cannot go home to his wife, more than two decades after he finished paying for it?

Sharp Rise in Palestinian Minors Held in “Israeli” Administrative Detention

Infographic by Abir Qanso

The number of Palestinian minors held in “Israeli” administrative detention rose from 103 in January 2025 to 191 in March 2026. Over the same period, the number detained for more than a year jumped from 6 to 50, while minors grew from roughly one-third to nearly half of all administrative detainees. By March 2026, 3,198 Palestinians were held in administrative detention, the vast majority from the occupied West Bank, according to the “Israeli” Prison Service [IPS].

Suicide in the Occupation Forces: Could It Lead to Its Collapse?

By Latifa Al-Hosseiny 

The phenomenon of suicide among the "Israeli" occupation forces [IOF]  is striking and deserves closer attention. The numbers have risen over the years, as have the underlying causes. Yet the common thread is depression, which can drive a soldier to make the decision to end their life.

Why would a serviceman-whom military leaders regard as the backbone of their field operations-take his own life? Does this indicate declining morale among members of the “Israeli” military establishment? More importantly, is the occupation facing a serious structural problem that threatens to erode its ability to wage war, with direct consequences for the effectiveness of its forces and the outcomes of its future military operations?

Suicide Rates Are Rising

Today’s discussion begins with figures reported in the Zionist entity in recent years. Fourteen suicides were recorded in 2022, followed by 17 in 2023, according to Knesset figures; 21 in 2024; and 22 in 2025- 12 compulsory-service soldiers, one career soldier, and nine reservists, according to IOF data.

According to IOF data presented to the Knesset in 2025:

●    About 50% of the suicides in 2025 involved combat soldiers.
●    About 85% were carried out using a weapon.
●    About 75% involved soldiers who had not previously received treatment or follow-up from a mental-health officer [“Kaban”].

279 Suicide Attempts Among IOF Personnel

A report by the Knesset Research and Information Center, published at the end of 2025, also found that 279 suicide attempts were documented among IOF personnel between January 2024 and July 2025.

16 Suicides Since the Start of 2026!

So far this year, although the “Israeli” military has not yet released a final figure, published reports indicate that 16 suicides have been recorded since the beginning of the year, according to Haaretz.

The data therefore confirm a further rise in suicides within the security and military establishment- a trend that began with the outbreak of the war on 7 October 2023. In the decade preceding the war, the IOF averaged 12 suicides per year. IOF data indicate that seven active-duty soldiers died by suicide between 7 October 2023 and the end of that year; 21 soldiers died by suicide in 2024; and last year the number reached 22- the highest figure in the past 15 years.

The Problem of Suicides Outside Active Service

IOF data provide only a partial picture of the scale of the problem, as they do not include soldiers who take their own lives while not on active duty. For years, the IOF avoided addressing this issue, arguing that soldiers who had completed their service were no longer its responsibility. However, a series of media reports about soldiers who took part in the war and later died by suicide after taking off their uniforms forced the IOF to change its policy, albeit only to a limited extent.

At the end of 2025, the IOF acknowledged that its review had identified 15 such cases up to that point. Haaretz reported at least nine additional cases since then.

Calls for Greater Support for Soldiers

The Ministry of War attributes the rise in suicides to the sharp increase in active reservists since the outbreak of the Gaza war and the events that followed.

Knesset member Ofer Cassif, who requested the Knesset Research and Information Center’s report on suicides, said plainly that what he described as a suicide epidemic- one that appears likely to worsen now that the war has ended- requires the creation of genuine support systems for male and female service members. Above all, he said, it requires ending the wars and achieving real peace. “A [government] that sends its soldiers to war and captivity and then abandons them is the one acting against them- not those who struggle against wars.”

Mental Health Takes Center Stage in the IOF

These figures come amid growing concern over mental health in the IOF. This prompted “Israeli” Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir to say: “The issue of mental health concerns me greatly. Today, thousands are receiving treatment. Commanders must remain alert, identify the scale of the problem in their units, and ensure that people receive care. Do not be ashamed to seek treatment- hundreds have received the appropriate care, and their lives were saved.”

The Phenomenon Predates 2023: Its Causes

In examining the reasons behind these suicides, a 2018 study by Ben-Gurion University’s research center stands out. It used psychological autopsy, one of the most widely used methods for studying suicide.

All cases of suicide among male soldiers [69 cases] in the IOF between 2009 and 2013 were analyzed using psychiatric records, military investigations, and interviews with people close to the soldiers.

The researchers found that depression was a major factor in a substantial proportion of cases, and that lower impulsivity played a direct role in the decision to die by suicide.

An earlier 2013 study by Geha Mental Health Center and "Tel Aviv" University’s Sackler Faculty of Medicine likewise identified three groups associated with suicide among the IOF:

●    Soldiers who had attempted suicide.
●    Soldiers receiving psychiatric treatment without having attempted suicide.
●    Soldiers not receiving psychiatric treatment.

According to the study, the factors that encouraged occupation soldiers to consider suicide at that time included:

●    A reduced ability to cope with stress.
●    Higher levels of psychological distress.
●    Lower levels of social support.
●    A reduced ability to solve problems.

Psychological Disorders

More recent data point to an Associated Press investigation from 2025, which found that more than 11,000 Zionist soldiers had been diagnosed with war-related psychological injuries. It also reported a marked increase in suicides and suicide attempts compared with the pre-war years.
The report stressed that the phenomenon is directly linked to the continued war and the repeated mobilization of reserve forces.

At the beginning of this year, Reuters- citing Ministry of War data and Zionist officials- reported an increase of nearly 40% in post-traumatic stress disorder cases among enemy IOF personnel since late 2023. Its mental-health treatment system has come under severe strain as the number of psychologically injured personnel has risen.

Internal Collapse of the IOF

The deteriorating psychological condition within the IOF aligns with a public warning issued by Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir before the security cabinet last March. He presented ten “red flags” threatening the IOF- warnings that, he said, could lead to internal collapse.

Zamir said at the time that the IO was facing a growing crisis in readiness and preparedness. He stressed the urgent need to pass a conscription law, legislation regulating reserve service, and an extension of compulsory service. He warned that “in the near future, the army will not be prepared to carry out its missions in routine times, and the reserve system will not endure.”

He also noted that these challenges could directly affect the IOF's ability to respond to security developments, amid ongoing pressure on its forces and an increasing dependence on reservists.

Based on IOF reports, Knesset committee findings, journalistic investigations, and public statements by military officials, the IOF—which has long displayed its capabilities and military superiority over other countries in the region- now appears to face an existential threat that can be summarized as follows:

●    The reserve force problem: the burden placed on the IOF’s backbone and its capacity to bear additional demands.
●    The erosion of the IOF’s image within “Israeli” society.
●    The impact of the psychological crisis on combat capability.
●    Psychological burnout among Zionist soldiers, which is increasingly leading them to suicide.

The Challenge of Human Sustainability

The IOF therefore faces a different challenge this time: human and psychological sustainability. A force whose operational doctrine depends on high readiness and the ability to withstand attrition requires, above all, personnel with a strong sense of confidence, motivation, and belonging. Yet rising signs of psychological breakdown, growing numbers of suicides and suicide attempts, and the expanding number of personnel sufferings from post-traumatic stress disorder all point to an accumulating internal cost of war-one that may gradually affect the military institution’s own effectiveness.

The most dangerous indicator, then, is not simply the number of soldiers who die by suicide, but what that number reveals about the institution’s eroding ability to maintain the cohesion of its personnel after repeated exposure to combat stress. A soldier who returns from the field with untreated psychological trauma, or who feels that the institution that sent him to war can no longer support him, shifts from being a source of strength to becoming an additional challenge for the IOF.

Strategic Attrition

Ultimately, the danger of this phenomenon lies not only in its being a mental-health crisis, but also in its potential to become a long-term source of strategic attrition. Wars are not decided by weapons alone; they also depend on an institution’s ability to maintain a cohesive human force that is ready to fight. If current indicators continue to rise, the IOF may face a dual challenge in the future: preserving its operational readiness on the one hand, and preserving its soldiers’ ability to bear the burden of that readiness on the other.

This contradiction- between the need for more fighting and the declining capacity of the human element to bear its cost- may become one of the most significant factors shaping the wars the occupation wages and their outcomes in the years ahead.

Iqbal’s Shikwa, Jawab-e-Shikwa, and the Crisis of the Muslim World.

By Salim Mohamed Badat

In an age of Muslim fragmentation, occupation, and moral disorientation, Allama Muhammad Iqbal speaks across a century with unnerving clarity. His Shikwa is not merely a poem; it is a civilizational outcry. His Jawab-e-Shikwa is not a consolation; it is a verdict.

Together, they form one of the most uncompromising interrogations ever directed at the Muslim Ummah, first allowing it to protest, and then forcing it to confront itself.

Iqbal’s relevance today lies not in poetic nostalgia but in political truth. He understood that a humiliated people often mistake suffering for righteousness and loss for entitlement. Shikwa gives voice to that mistake. Jawab-e-Shikwa demolishes it.

The Wound That Spoke: Context and Courage.

Iqbal wrote Shikwa in 1909, when the Muslim world stood defeated both externally and internally. Colonial rule dominated Muslim lands, the Ottoman Caliphate was collapsing, and Muslim elites were intellectually subdued. The confidence that once carried Islam from Andalusia to the Indus had been replaced with imitation, defensiveness, and spiritual lethargy.

What shocked Iqbal’s contemporaries was not merely the content of Shikwa, but its audacity. In its verses, the Ummah reminds Allah of its past sacrifices, how it shattered idols, challenged empires, crossed deserts and seas to establish divine unity. Iqbal invokes the memory of early Muslims who traded comfort for conviction, life for truth, and power for justice. He contrasts this legacy with the present humiliation of Muslims ruled by those they once surpassed.

The tone is not supplication; it is protest. Iqbal frames the Ummah as asking why those who once upheld tawhid now kneel before material power, while nations without revelation dominate the earth. The implication is dangerous: has history betrayed faith?

This is why Shikwa disturbed religious authorities. But Iqbal was not accusing Allah. He was exposing a psychological state within the Ummah, the confusion that arises when memory outpaces moral reality.

Complaint as Mirror, Not Accusation.

Iqbal’s complaint is carefully constructed. It is rooted in the language of Quranic intimacy, where prophets questioned, pleaded, and argued, not out of arrogance, but out of existential urgency.

Like Job asking why he suffers, or Moses demanding clarity, Shikwa is the voice of a community that remembers covenant but cannot reconcile it with collapse.

The Ummah, through Iqbal, asks why its prayers echo unanswered, why its blood flows cheaply, and why falsehood marches confidently while truth retreats.

The complaint is not about wealth or territory alone; it is about dignity. It is the pain of being irrelevant in a world shaped by others.

That pain has only intensified today. Occupation, sanctions, proxy wars, and client regimes define Muslim geopolitics. Yet Shikwa does not end with despair. It ends suspended, awaiting an answer.

The Divine Response: From Comfort to Condemnation.

Jawab-e-Shikwa, written four years later, is Allah’s response, not in mercy alone, but in justice. The tone shifts immediately. The divine voice does not deny Muslim suffering, but it rejects Muslim innocence.

Iqbal structures the response as a reversal. Where the Ummah boasts of its ancestors, Allah points to its present. Where it claims loyalty, Allah exposes hypocrisy. Where it demands victory, Allah asks for worthiness.

The Ummah is reminded that divine help is tied to moral struggle, not historical memory. The response recalls Quranic principles: Allah does not side with names or lineages, but with those who uphold truth. Faith divorced from action is exposed as empty ritual.

The fire that once animated believers, the willingness to sacrifice, to resist injustice, to stand apart from falsehood, has been extinguished.

Iqbal’s Allah asks, in effect, how a people that fears death can complain about humiliation, how a community divided by sect, ethnicity, and nationalism can demand unity, and how those who imitate their enemies can expect divine distinction.

This is not spiritual abstraction. It is a political indictment.

Islam Reduced to Performance.

One of the sharpest critiques in Jawab-e-Shikwa is the exposure of Islam transformed into spectacle.

Iqbal points to prayer stripped of resistance, Quranic recitation disconnected from governance, and mosques full of bodies but empty of courage.

The Ummah has preserved form while abandoning substance.

The divine response condemns scholars who legitimize tyranny, leaders who invoke Islam while ruling through oppression, and communities more offended by criticism than by injustice. Islam, once a revolutionary force that shattered hierarchies, has been domesticated into cultural identity.

Iqbal is ruthless here. He implies that Muslims have not been defeated by the West alone, but by their own surrender to comfort, status, and fear.

Why This Message Terrifies Power.

If Jawab-e-Shikwa were read seriously today, it would unsettle palaces and pulpits alike. It leaves no room for victimhood without responsibility and no shelter for authority without accountability. It refuses to separate spirituality from politics or faith from justice.

Iqbal exposes the lie that Islam can coexist comfortably with tyranny, that neutrality in the face of oppression is piety, or that slogans can replace sacrifice. He reminds Muslims that Allah’s allegiance is not to flags, borders, or regimes, but to those who embody justice, even if they are few.

This is why Iqbal remains dangerous. He denies both despair and self-deception.

A Personal Reckoning.

Shikwa and Jawab-e-Shikwa are not museum pieces. They are mirrors. Each generation must locate itself within the dialogue.

Do we seek divine aid without moral struggle? Do we curse oppression while benefiting from silence? Do we invoke Islam as identity while living by its negation?

Iqbal teaches that complaint is allowed, but only when one is prepared for judgment. And the judgment is not abstract. It begins with the self.

From Protest to Awakening.

Shikwa allows the Ummah to speak honestly. Jawab-e-Shikwa forces it to listen truthfully.

Together, they chart a path from emotional protest to ethical accountability, from inherited pride to lived responsibility.

The crisis of the Muslim world is not merely geopolitical. It is a collapse of courage, clarity, and conviction.

Iqbal does not promise revival through sentiment or slogans. He demands transformation through struggle.

Allah’s response has already been given.

History waits to see whether the Ummah will answer.

Salim Mohamed Badat

Writer exploring the intersection of faith , politics and justice