Wednesday, April 29, 2026

Lebanon: ’Israel’s’ ’Ecocide’ Campaign Ongoing Since 2023

By Al Ahed Staff, Agencies

Lebanon: ’Israel’s’ ’Ecocide’ Campaign Ongoing Since 2023

Lebanon’s environment minister said the "Israeli" occupation forces [IOF]committed “an act of ecocide” in the foreword to a report documenting damage to the country’s natural resources during the 2023–2024 invasion.

The IOF aggression “reshaped both the physical and ecological landscape” of southern Lebanon, according to the report, which does not consider the impacts of "Israel’s" latest barrage of attacks this spring.

Published amid a patchy ceasefire, as refugees from "Israel’s" latest invasion return to shattered homes and communities, the 106-page report outlines how southern Lebanon has suffered profound ecological disruption and the loss of essential ecosystem services.

In her foreword, Tamara el Zein said: “The scale and intentionality of the damage to forests, agricultural lands, marine ecosystems, water resources, and atmospheric quality constitute what must be recognized as an act of ecocide, with consequences that extend far beyond immediate destruction.

“The environmental damage we face is not simply ecological – it is a matter of public health, food security, livelihoods, social fabric, and national resilience.”

According to the report, "Israeli" strikes caused extensive environmental and agricultural damage in Lebanon, including 5,000 hectares of forest loss, destruction of $118 million in agricultural assets, and $586 million in lost production.

The attacks also devastated orchards and plantations, contaminated soil with high phosphorus levels—especially in the South and Bekaa—and triggered widespread air pollution releasing toxic compounds far beyond strike zones.

"Israel’s" critics argue that it is currently repeating “the Gaza playbook” in southern Lebanon by issuing the civilian population with expulsion orders, targeting hospitals and medical staff, demolishing entire villages, destroying water infrastructure and killing media workers.

Within months of beginning its war on Gaza in 2023, the IOF had destroyed about 38-48% of tree cover and farmland, with olive groves and farms reduced to packed earth and groundwater contaminated by munitions and toxins, and air polluted by smoke and particulate matter.

According to the new report, prepared by Lebanon’s National Council for Scientific Research [CNRS-L] and covering the period between October 2023 and December 2024, southern Lebanon was similarly treated by the IOF.

“The environmental footprint of the war is evident in the destruction of forests and woodlands, many of which served as biodiversity hotspots and carbon sinks, and in the burning of agricultural lands, including high-value orchards and staple crop fields, undermining both livelihoods and national food security,” the report states.

In total, it estimates the monetary cost to the country amounts to an estimated $25bn [$18bn], comprising $6.8bn in physical damages, $7.2bn in economic losses and $11bn in recovery and reconstruction needs.

“Lebanon cannot carry this burden alone,” El Zein said. “We call for international solidarity and support to share the responsibility of environmental recovery. The scale of the damage and the costs of restoration demand collective action and long-term partnerships.”

Doug Weir, the director of the Conflict and Environment Observatory, which studies the environmental impact of war, said: “The report’s focus on building back better, and on strengthening national environmental monitoring capacities, are welcome recognition of two critical priorities for any conflict-affected state.

“Sadly, elements of the report’s findings are already out of date due to the devastation wrought by 'Israel' since the study period, particularly in the area it is illegally occupying south of the Litani River,” he added.

Iraq's Shia bloc picks newcomer as PM amid US pressure to 'compromise'

The nomination comes weeks after US President Donald Trump threatened to ‘cut off’ Iraq if Nouri al-Maliki was chosen as premier

News Desk - The Cradle 

Iraq’s Shia-led Coordination Framework (CF) has nominated businessman Ali al-Zaidi for the premiership, after withdrawing support for Nouri al-Maliki following opposition from Washington. 

Zaidi has received full support from caretaker Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, following a meeting between the two on 28 April. The UK, France, and Germany also welcomed his nomination on Tuesday. Iraq’s President Nizar Amedi tasked him with forming a government.

The CF announced the nomination after a meeting at the Iraqi government palace on 27 April. 

It thanked both Maliki and Sudani for their “historic and responsible positions” in withdrawing their candidacies to break the recent political stalemate. 

The CF decided to shift candidates in recent days as a compromise – weeks after US President Donald Trump threatened to “cut off” Iraq entirely if Maliki – known to be close to Iran – was selected as premier. The Shia-led political coalition, which includes several Iran-backed resistance groups, initially rejected the US pressure.

In a statement after being nominated, Zaidi promised to make Iraq “a balanced country, regionally and internationally,” adding that the appointment “comes at a sensitive time that requires concerted efforts from all political and social forces.”

Washington has yet to issue an official statement responding to the nomination of Zaidi. Yet reports say his selection was a direct result of US pressure

According to an Iraqi political source cited by AFP, the CF endorsed Zaidi “after checking” with US representatives. 

The Sadrist Movement, led by Moqtada al-Sadr, said its relationship with Zaidi was good but that it would not support him. 

The Sadrists pulled out of the government in 2022, after winning a plurality in elections the year before. The movement withdrew after the CF blocked a Sadrist attempt to form a “national majority government.”

“The movement and its leadership are still committed to the decision to boycott political work, and there are no secret political dialogues with any political party regarding the next stage or arrangements for forming the new government,” the Sadrist movement said in a statement after Zaidi was chosen.

The nomination comes days after the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that Trump’s administration has frozen security cooperation programs with Baghdad and blocked dollar shipments from reaching Iraq in a bid to pressure the government to dismantle Iran-backed resistance organizations. 

Lebanon’s Berri: No Talks Without Lebanon Ceasefire

By Al Ahed Staff, Agencies

Lebanon’s Berri: No Talks Without Lebanon Ceasefire

Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri said Tuesday that political talks are on hold until a genuine ceasefire is reached, ruling out any near-term presidential meeting.

Berri told visitors who met him at his residence in Ain al-Tineh that “everything is on hold, and no matters will be discussed before a ceasefire is reached,” stressing that the current priority is to halt the war.

Asked about the Lebanese president’s remarks calling for a ceasefire before negotiations, Berri deferred the question to the president, asking, “Where is the ceasefire today”

Addressing reports of a potential government reshuffle discussed with a Saudi envoy, Berri reiterated that “the priority is a ceasefire,” adding that government matters remain on hold until the ceasefire in Lebanon is officially settled.

According to the visitors, Berri indicated that hopes remain tied to the possibility of serious progress in ongoing US-Iran negotiations in Islamabad.

He also warned against any attempts to manipulate the Lebanese pound’s exchange rate, cautioning that such actions could have catastrophic consequences on the country.

Meanwhile, confrontations continue along the Lebanese-Palestinian border, where the Resistance in Lebanon is confronting ongoing aggressive attacks by the "Israeli" occupation.

Violations of the ceasefire agreement by the "Israeli" occupation have also persisted, with airstrikes targeting towns and villages across southern Lebanon, resulting in casualties and extensive destruction, including the demolition of homes and buildings.

Against this backdrop of stalled diplomacy and continued escalation on the ground, Lebanon’s top leadership has sought to present a unified position on the conditions for any future talks.

In the context of the Lebanese president's remarks yesterday, President Joseph Aoun reaffirmed that Lebanon’s position on engagement with “Israel” remains unchanged, stressing that “a ceasefire is a necessary first step for any subsequent negotiations,” a stance conveyed to the American side and reiterated in April talks.

He added that a US statement reflected a “clear commitment” that “'Israel' will not carry out any offensive military operations including civilian, military, and other state targets on Lebanese territory by land, sea, and air," —something yet to materialize as strikes continue in the South and Bekaa.

Aoun stressed this remains Lebanon’s official stance, saying it is “not concerned with any other statements” and has not endorsed them.

What if the West has been misreading Iran for 40 years?

by Kurniawan Arif Maspu


Iranians gather at Enqelab Square to protest against the United States and Israel in Tehran, Iran, on April 12, 2026. [Fatemeh Bahrami – Anadolu Agency]
The enduring temptation in Western strategic thinking is to treat Iran as a problem to be managed rather than a civilisation to be understood. That misreading has proven costly. Beneath the daily churn of sanctions, proxy skirmishes, and nuclear brinkmanship lies a far deeper story—one of continuity, identity, and power that predates the modern state system by millennia.

Iran is not merely a Middle Eastern actor reacting to pressure; it is an inheritor of Persian statecraft that has survived conquest, revolution and isolation, and has repeatedly adapted its instruments of influence to shifting global orders.

From the Achaemenid Empire in the sixth century BCE—stretching from the Indus Valley to the Balkans and governing an estimated 44 per cent of the world’s population at its peak—Iran’s strategic DNA has been shaped by scale, diversity, and administrative sophistication. That legacy persists. Even today, Iran’s political culture reflects a deeply embedded sense of civilisational entitlement and resilience.

It is a nation that has been invaded by Greeks, Arabs, Mongols and modern great powers, yet has never been erased. That continuity matters in a geopolitical contest increasingly defined by patience rather than speed.

By contrast, the United States and its allies often operate within compressed political timelines. Electoral cycles, media narratives, and alliance cohesion impose constraints that favour immediacy over endurance. Iran plays a longer game. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, it has faced layers of economic sanctions—some estimates suggest over 1,200 separate measures imposed primarily by the United States—yet it has not only endured but expanded its regional footprint.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has evolved into a hybrid force blending military capability with ideological projection, supporting non-state actors across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. This networked model of influence is comparatively low-cost yet strategically potent.

Data underscores this asymmetry. While Iran’s official defence budget hovers around US$25 billion—dwarfed by the United States’ US$800 billion—it leverages proxies and asymmetric warfare to offset conventional inferiority. Hezbollah alone is estimated to possess over 150,000 rockets and missiles, creating a deterrent architecture that complicates Israeli and US military planning.

Meanwhile, Iran’s ballistic missile programme, the largest in the Middle East, continues to expand despite international pressure. The International Institute for Strategic Studies notes that Tehran has prioritised precision and survivability, enhancing its ability to project power without direct confrontation.

Energy geopolitics further amplifies Iran’s strategic weight. Holding the world’s second-largest natural gas reserves and the fourth-largest proven oil reserves, Iran sits astride the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20 per cent of global oil trade passes.

Even under sanctions, it has maintained crude exports—often through opaque channels—estimated at over 1 million barrels per day in recent years.

This capacity to operate in the shadows reflects a broader adaptability: Iran has cultivated economic ties with China, deepened strategic alignment with Russia, and pursued regional détente with Gulf neighbours, including the Saudi–Iran rapprochement brokered by Beijing in 2023.

Analysts have noted that this diplomatic recalibration signals a shift from ideological confrontation to pragmatic balancing. Iran is not abandoning its revolutionary identity, but it is refining its methods. The restoration of ties with Riyadh, for instance, reduces the risk of direct conflict in the Gulf while allowing Tehran to consolidate influence elsewhere. It is a classic Persian manoeuvre: stabilise one frontier to advance on another.

Western strategy, by comparison, has often oscillated between maximalist pressure and cautious engagement. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015 briefly demonstrated the potential for diplomatic alignment, with Iran agreeing to significant restrictions on its nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief.

Yet the US withdrawal in 2018 and subsequent ‘maximum pressure’ campaign not only unravelled those gains but reinforced Iranian scepticism about Western reliability. The result has been a steady expansion of uranium enrichment, with the International Atomic Energy Agency reporting stockpiles enriched up to 60 per cent purity—dangerously close to weapons-grade.

This is not merely a technical issue; it is a strategic signal.

Iran is calibrating its nuclear threshold to maximise leverage without triggering outright war. It understands its adversaries’ red lines and operates just beneath them. That calibrated ambiguity is a hallmark of its broader approach: assertive yet restrained, provocative yet calculated.

For global strategists, the enduring error is not miscalculation but mischaracterisation. Iran is too often reduced to a disruptive variable in a Western-designed order, when in reality it is operating within a far older strategic grammar—one shaped by imperial memory, encirclement anxieties, and a cultivated tolerance for hardship. Washington and its allies tend to interpret Tehran’s actions through the lens of revisionism; Tehran, by contrast, perceives itself as resisting a prolonged continuum of external intrusion, from the Iran–Iraq War—where chemical weapons were used with impunity—to the dense lattice of US military infrastructure stretching from the Gulf to Central Asia.

What appears outwardly as expansionism is, in Iranian doctrine, a form of forward defence—buffer-building through proxies, partnerships, and precision deterrence. This inversion of intent is where policy repeatedly falters. Deterrence frameworks calibrated for rational state actors struggle when confronted with a state that has normalised siege conditions and weaponised patience. Iran does not simply react to pressure; it metabolises it, converting constraint into strategic depth.

Resilience, in this framing, is no longer passive endurance but disciplined statecraft under pressure. Iran has refined the ability to convert constraint into leverage, bending without fracture while quietly redrawing the geometry of power around it. What appears as containment from the outside is, from within, a slow and deliberate expansion of strategic possibility.

That paradox is not an anomaly to be corrected but a reality to be understood, demanding a level of intellectual humility often absent in great power statecraft.

Across the transatlantic alliance and its Indo-Pacific partners, there remains a tendency to treat Iran as a tactical file—nested within non-proliferation agendas, maritime security concerns, or counterterrorism matrices—rather than as a civilisational actor with a coherent, if contested, worldview. This narrowing of perspective produces policies that are episodic, reversible, and ultimately unconvincing to a system that prizes continuity above all else.

The oscillation between engagement and coercion—most visibly in the rise and unravelling of the nuclear agreement—has reinforced a strategic narrative in Tehran that Western commitments are transient, while Iranian endurance is structural.

Meanwhile, Iran has expanded its geopolitical bandwidth, embedding itself in Eurasian frameworks, deepening energy and security linkages with China and Russia, and recalibrating regional relations with a pragmatism that often goes under-acknowledged. The result is not a rogue state on the margins, but a node in an emerging multipolar architecture. Engaging Iran at this level does not require concession; it requires recognition of its historical depth, its strategic discipline, and its capacity to operate simultaneously within and against the prevailing order.

Without that shift, policy will remain reactive, and the distance between perception and reality will continue to widen at precisely the moment the global system can least afford it.

The emerging multipolar order further complicates the equation. As China and Russia contest US dominance, Iran finds itself less isolated and more integrated into alternative power structures. Its accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and its application to BRICS signal an ambition to embed itself within non-Western institutions.

These platforms offer not only economic opportunities but also political legitimacy, diluting the impact of Western sanctions.

There is an emotional dimension to this story that is often overlooked. Iran’s narrative is one of dignity under siege, a nation that sees itself as unfairly targeted yet historically vindicated. That sentiment resonates domestically and informs its foreign policy posture. It is a reminder that geopolitics is not solely about material capabilities but also about identity and perception.

Strategic miscalculations often arise from underestimating an adversary’s sense of self. Iran’s power does not lie in conventional metrics alone; it resides in its ability to endure, adapt, and project influence through unconventional means. Comparing it to the United States and its allies is not a question of parity but of contrast. One represents scale and immediacy; the other, continuity and patience.

In an era where global order is increasingly fluid, dismissing Iran as a peripheral actor is no longer tenable. Its civilisational depth, strategic adaptability, and regional entrenchment position it as a pivotal player in shaping the Middle East and beyond. The question is not whether Iran will remain influential—it will—but whether global policymakers are prepared to engage with it on terms that reflect its historical and strategic reality.

Netanyahu’s War on Lebanon Disguised as a ’War on Hezbollah’

By Al Ahed Staff, Agencies

Netanyahu’s War on Lebanon Disguised as a ’War on Hezbollah’

French politician Mathilde Panot has denounced "Israeli" Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, asserting that the so-called “war on Hezbollah” is merely a pretext masking a broader war against the Lebanese people.

Speaking to Franceinfo, Panot rejected the narrative that the war targets Hezbollah, stressing instead that civilians are bearing the brunt of "Israeli" aggression.

She pointed to the killing of journalists, including a recently killed reporter, the ninth to be killed, as evidence that those targeted have no connection to Hezbollah.

“Is she Hezbollah?” Panot asked, underscoring that such attacks deliberately strike at independent voices.

She further highlighted the targeting of emergency responders, noting that around 100 rescuers were hit while carrying out humanitarian duties in ambulances.

According to Panot, these actions clearly demonstrate that the campaign extends far beyond any military confrontation with Hezbollah and instead aims at dismantling the fabric of Lebanese society.

Panot also drew attention to the April 8 massacre, in which more than 300 Lebanese civilians were martyred in strikes she said were intended to spread terror among the population.

Such acts, she emphasized, “have nothing to do with Hezbollah.”

For Panot, these patterns expose the reality behind "Israeli" claims: The “war on Hezbollah” narrative serves as a cover for a wider assault on Lebanon and its people.

German Chancellor: US “Humiliated” By Iran’s Leadership

By Al Ahed Staff, Agencies

German Chancellor: US “Humiliated” By Iran’s Leadership

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said the US lacks a coherent negotiation strategy and is being “humiliated” by Iran.

Merz made the remarks as the vital Strait of Hormuz remains closed to most shipping, driving up global energy prices.

“The Iranians are clearly stronger than expected, and the Americans clearly have no truly convincing strategy in the negotiations either,” Merz said during a visit to a school in Marsberg, North Rhine-Westphalia.

“The problem with conflicts like this is always that you don’t just have to get in – you also have to get out again. We saw that very painfully in Afghanistan for 20 years. We saw it in Iraq,” the chancellor said, according to Deutsche Welle.

“At the moment, I do not see what strategic exit the Americans will choose, especially since the Iranians are negotiating very skillfully – or very skillfully not negotiating,” he added.

Merz argued that “an entire nation is being humiliated by the Iranian leadership, particularly by the so-called Revolutionary Guards.”

The New York Times and Reuters, citing US officials, reported on Monday that President Donald Trump was not satisfied with Iran’s most recent proposal to reopen the strait and end the conflict.

On Sunday, the president canceled his envoys’ trip to Pakistan for talks with Iran, arguing that he has “all the cards.”

The US and "Israel" began a war against Iran on February 28, with the stated goal of dismantling Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. However, despite intense airstrikes, the allies have been unable to stop Iran from launching missiles and drones at "Israel" and US bases in the region.

Trump has also failed to pressure Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, which Tehran closed to “hostile” shipping.

Trump Displeased with Iran’s Ceasefire Plan

By Al Ahed Staff, Agencies

Trump Displeased with Iran’s Ceasefire Plan

US President Donald Trump has voiced dissatisfaction with a recent Iranian proposal to end the ongoing war, Reuters reported citing a US official, further clouding prospects for a near-term resolution to a conflict that has shaken global energy markets and caused heavy losses.

The proposal reportedly calls for a phased approach to negotiations, beginning with an end to hostilities and addressing maritime tensions in the Gulf, before discussions over Iran’s nuclear program.

However, Washington has maintained that any diplomatic process must include nuclear issues from the outset, a point that remains a key obstacle.

A US official familiar with internal discussions said Trump rejected the framework during a meeting with advisors on Monday, citing its failure to address core US demands.

The White House reiterated its stance publicly, with spokesperson Olivia Wales stating that the United States “will not negotiate through the press” and remains firm on its conditions for ending the war launched earlier this year alongside "Israeli" forces.

Efforts to revive diplomacy have shown signs of faltering. A planned visit to Islamabad by Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff and senior advisor Jared Kushner was canceled, even as Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi intensified regional consultations.

Araghchi traveled between Pakistan and Oman before heading to Russia, where he met President Vladimir Putin and received support from Moscow.

Global oil markets are under pressure as the standoff drives volatility and pushes prices higher, with sharp disruptions reported in the Strait of Hormuz and a steep drop in shipping activity.

Several tankers carrying Iranian crude were reportedly turned back amid a US naval blockade, which Tehran has condemned as piracy, further straining global supply chains.

At the political level, Trump faces growing domestic scrutiny, while Iranian officials say their ceasefire proposal includes phased steps starting with a truce and reopening the strait, followed later by broader negotiations including the nuclear issue.