Tuesday, May 05, 2026

Amal Khalil wrote the final report with her own blood

 By Maedeh Zaman Fashami

TEHRAN – The martyrdom of Amal Khalil once again draws the attention of regional and global public opinion to one of the most significant dimensions of the recent wars in Lebanon and the occupied Palestinian territories: the systematic targeting of journalists on the battlefield.

We view this incident not as an isolated case, but as part of an ongoing and analyzable pattern in which journalists standing on the front lines of truth-telling have themselves become targets in the war conducted by Israel. In this context, the martyrdom of Amal Khalil must be understood within a broader reality: an effort to restrict, control, or eliminate narratives emerging directly from the field of conflict.

Under established rules of international law, particularly the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, journalists and media workers present in conflict zones are considered civilians and are entitled to full legal protection. This principle is one of the most fundamental pillars of media freedom and the right to access information in wartime conditions.

From the perspective of many media observers in the region, what is taking place in southern Lebanon and Gaza cannot be understood merely as a conventional military confrontation. This war is simultaneously a war of narratives. In this arena, the journalist is not only a transmitter of news but also a carrier of truth.

It is on this basis that many regional analysts believe the targeting of journalists in these areas—particularly in southern Lebanon and the Gaza Strip—does not occur in a vacuum. Rather, it happens within a framework in which the expansion of independent, on-the-ground reporting is seen as costly by the party seeking to control global public opinion.

Within this critical perspective, which is also reflected in a significant portion of independent regional media, Israel is seen as attempting to limit access to the real image of the war, thereby preventing the full exposure of its human and legal dimensions. In other words, concern over the internationalization of war crimes and violations of international law is viewed as one of the factors intensifying pressure on journalists in the field.

The killing of Amal Khalil cannot be separated from this framework. She was not only a field reporter, but also part of a network of southern Lebanon correspondents who for years sought to present a direct and unmediated account of reality. Such presence in a complex war environment has always involved high risk, one that, unfortunately, in multiple cases, has cost journalists their lives.

In recent years, numerous cases of journalists being targeted in Lebanon and Palestine by Israeli forces have been documented. Among them are Ali Shaib, Fatima Fotuni, and other journalists who were struck while covering events in border areas or conflict zones. In Gaza, as well, dozens of journalists have been killed in recent wars, an issue that international human rights and media organizations have repeatedly expressed concern about.

In addition to the loss of life, media infrastructure has also been damaged in these conflicts. Media offices, broadcasting centers, and even press-related emergency teams have, in some cases, come under direct fire from Israeli forces. This situation raises serious questions regarding Israel’s compliance with the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law, particularly the protection of civilians and media workers.

The martyrdom of Amal Khalil represents for her colleagues at Al-Akhbar and other active media outlets in southern Lebanon not merely a personal loss, but a sign of increasing professional risks in this domain. She embodied a generation of journalists who blurred the line between observer and witness.

Media analyses in the region have repeatedly emphasized that in modern warfare, control over narrative is as important as control over territory. In such a context, journalists operating in the field are directly involved in this battle of narratives, even if their primary intention is merely to document reality.

In this framework, the removal of the narrator can be interpreted as an attempt to narrow the world’s visibility of what is happening on the ground.

At the same time, the role of local media structures cannot be overlooked. In southern Lebanon, journalists like Amal Khalil did not operate in isolated media environments, but within communities directly affected by the consequences of war. This proximity gave their reporting depth and credibility, while also exposing them to direct danger.

It must also be emphasized that the collective memory of the region will preserve the martyrdom of these journalists as part of its contemporary history. Every name, every report, and every image becomes part of this memory, one that cannot be erased by the physical elimination of individuals.

Amal Khalil, in this sense, remains not only a journalist but part of this collective memory. Alongside other martyred journalists, she represents a generation that chose to witness the truth up close, even at a great cost.

In conclusion, we at Tehran Times, while expressing full solidarity with the newspaper Al-Akhbar and all journalists active in Lebanon, firmly believe that the responsibility of the regional media community today is more than ever the precise documentation of these realities and the prevention of their erasure.

The killing of Amal Khalil is a reminder of the painful fact that in certain war zones, even truth itself becomes a target. Nevertheless, as long as narration continues, efforts to silence the voice of truth will ultimately fail.

Has Merz faced reality after mindless remarks against Iran?

TEHRAN – After one year in office, it seems that German Chancellor Friedrich Merz is gradually coming to his senses or facing the realities on the ground by seeking to correct himself regarding his surprisingly repetitive and reckless remarks about Iran.

In the June 2025 war against Iran by Israel, which was later joined by the U.S., Merz, who was participating in the G7 summit in Canada, said Israel is “doing the dirty job for all of us.”

His thoughtless remarks drew sharp criticism from international law experts and senior analysts. Critics said the German leader’s statement further erodes international law and the rules-based order established in the wake of World War II, promoting a “law of the jungle” at the cost of global stability.

In an op-ed published by the Guardian, the Sydney-based international law professor Ben Saul said support for Israel’s war had no legal grounding and set a dangerous precedent. He described Israel’s attack on Iran as “part of a pattern of unlawful ‘anticipatory’ violence against other countries.”

The statement by Merz, whose country had always adopted a conciliatory approach toward regional and international conflicts since World War II, came as a shock to the world.

Again, when unrest erupted in Iran in early January 2016 over price increases, which were the result of Western-led illegal sanctions on the country, Merz made another hostile remark, saying that the Islamic Republic’s “days are numbered.”

Also, two days after the U.S. and Israel jointly started a war of aggression against Iran on Feb. 28, Merz claimed that appeals to international law had failed to achieve the purpose of Tel Aviv and Washington.

Contrary to Merz’s claims, both before the June and Feb. wars, Iran was negotiating with the U.S. for resolving differences over Tehran’s nuclear program with the mediation of Oman. Two days before the new war, negotiators from the two countries held talks in Geneva and were going to meet again. They also agreed on a meeting of nuclear experts in Vienna next week, where the International Atomic Energy Agency is based.

To justify the war on Iran, Merz claimed that Iran threatens Israel's very existence and bears responsibility for the acts carried out by groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, adding, "Together with the United States and Israel, we share the goal of ending the terror of these regimes."

Now, noticing that the U.S. is being caught in the Iran quagmire and his country is feeling the economic pains of the war because of the disruption in the oil market due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, coupled with the failure of the U.S. in the war in which its president had vowed to bring Iran into submission in a matter of a few days, the German chancellor feels hopeless and has changed his tone, at least expediently.

For example, on April 27, in an unusually abrupt rebuke over the conflict, the chancellor admitted the U.S. entered the war without a "truly convincing" plan for an exit or for negotiations.

“The Iranians are obviously very skilled at negotiating, or rather, very skillful at not negotiating, letting the Americans travel to Islamabad and then leave again without any result," Reuters quoted Merz as saying.

He added, "An entire nation is being humiliated by the Iranian leadership, …. And so I hope that this ends as quickly as possible."

Without going into the details of his talks, it seems the chancellor is naïve enough when it comes to politics. It is quite understandable that resolving the disputes between Iran and the U.S. in a single meeting, especially after 40 days of war, cannot be resolved in one session. Add to this a set of problems accumulated over more than four decades, coupled with Iran’s mistrust of the U.S., which has been gravely deepened by the United States’ illegal and surprise war on Iran. This issue, even if the U.S. shows goodwill, will take weeks or months to resolve in a calm atmosphere.

By comparing the war on Iran to previous U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Merz has come to recognize Iran's resilience against foreign invasion. It took Merz nearly two months to acknowledge that "the Iranians are obviously stronger than expected."

Though initially made a huge gaffe by claiming that Israel and the U.S. could not achieve their goals legally and thereby they attacked Iran, in an informal European Union summit in Cyprus on April 25, he said the war on Iran was “completely unnecessary”.  His critique centered on the belief that the hostilities serve no justifiable purpose and are causing avoidable global instability.

To analyze Merz’s unsubstantiated claims about the war on Iran, there is no evidence that Iran was aware of the October 7 attacks or that Iran was supporting Hamas. Iran’s support for Hamas has been just moral. How had it been possible for Iran to help Hamas, which has been under siege from the air, sea, and land since 2007?

Furthermore, beyond Merz’s assessment that the Trump administration lacks a “truly convincing” strategy, the reality is that Iran is proactively setting the agenda and dictating the course of events. While Trump seeks an exit from the Iranian quagmire, he has found himself unable to do so. To extricate himself from his war of choice, Trump must now be prepared to meet specific demands, chief among them to give credible guarantees that the U.S. will never attack Iran again and that all sanctions on Iran are lifted forever.

Israel lacks troops and ammo for a prolonged war

 By Wesam Bahrani

TEHRAN – The Israeli military is depleted and overstretched, unable to sustain multi-front warfare without American support.

A deep gap exists between what the Zionist regime says politically and the reality on the ground. The Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF) are dangerously weak at their core. They face severe shortages of both manpower and ammunition, and it is fully dependent on America. This stops the regime’s military from achieving decisive wins on several fronts at once.

Field and logistical data from recent military operations, specifically the 12-day war in June 2025 and the one that began on Feb. 28, show this deep strategic gap. On one side, the political discourse of the Israeli regime claims it can operate on seven fronts at the same time. On the other side, the operational reality reveals critical limits in manpower, specialized ammunition, and the ability of the IOF to spread intelligence attention across different arenas.

Today, the regime is not fighting a traditional war. Instead, it is running a harsh policy of rationing resources. Depleted stockpiles and declining military readiness force the IOF to follow engagement rules that were never part of its original plans.

The IOF has entered a period of human attrition never seen before since its founding. The reserve forces have turned into a regular army by force. Entire brigades within the IOF have been serving their seventh round of duty since October 2023. Individual soldiers have logged more service days than an ordinary soldier would have done over several decades.

This pressure has worn down motivation among many soldiers. This drop in morale is fueled by infighting over who should carry the burden, the drafting of those who dodged service, and the high cost of wages paid to reserve soldiers (reaching 1.5 billion shekels in just two weeks). More importantly, this pressure has hit the core of readiness and deployment. 

The severe shortage of qualified combat personnel now limits how the IOF General Staff can move forces between fronts. The IOF has to pull units from one front to support another. This explains why the regime has pulled back from some secondary battlefields to focus on the north, for example, or why the IOF has had to rebuild brigades, divisions, and units using volunteers who are past retirement age.

The regime's air force, long seen as the unbeatable long arm of the IOF, now faces a tough choice between flight hours and the lifespan of its aircraft. In one single month, pilots flew more hours than they would in an entire year of warfare. This has put the fleet under huge maintenance pressure and limited the number of planes able to keep fighting over time.

The biggest limit shows up in how intelligence and operational attention are spread. Facts on the ground have proven that the IOF cannot keep the same momentum going in Lebanon and Iran at the same time. The air force had to stop flights over Iran 24 hours before starting large operations in Lebanon (as happened during the war in Lebanon). This is a clear admission that building a target list and finishing strikes properly requires the IOF to focus on one front at a time. When attention is divided between two fronts, both operations suffer.

This forced division of attention gives the Axis of Resistance an advantage in timing and freedom to maneuver. Every minute of attention aimed at the north is a pure gain for Tehran, allowing it to strengthen its positions or finish its specialized programs. The same is true in reverse.

Looking at how the IOF uses up ammunition shows a shocking fact: the Zionist regime entered the war with a stockpile of 15,000 munitions, according to Hebrew reports citing a senior IOF officer. But the IOF ended up using 150,000 munitions. This turned reliance on American military supply flights from a backup option into a necessity for survival.

Reports from the regime indicate that the IOF has used up critical categories of its specialized missiles at rates that cannot be sustained:

Air defense: Use of Arrow-2 and Arrow-3 missiles reached about 81%. If the battle had continued at the same speed, IOF stocks would have run out completely within a few days.

Offensive weapons: Missiles like the Rampage and Blue Sparrow saw consumption rates above 50%. This forces the military leadership of the Zionist regime into painful choices: either cut back on precision strikes or accept greater risks to aircraft by using “dumb” or less accurate bombs, which is exactly what happened.

This industrial weakness is also tied to global supply chain problems and shortages of basic materials. This means that replacing what the IOF lost in just 16 days, as noted in reports, could take years. This explains why the IOF is moving more toward offensive defense with fewer resources and lower risks.

Even though the Zionist regime has five layers of protection, the limits of its defensive umbrella showed up clearly in its failure to stop drones and missiles from hitting strategic targets. The problem is no longer about technology but about the economics of war. Using interceptor missiles that cost millions of dollars each to shoot down cheap drones is a path to financial and logistical collapse for the IOF.

Putting defensive resources where they matter most (protecting gas platforms and bases like Palmachim) has left the home front and the north relatively exposed. The IOF has adopted a flexible interception policy, which in practice means letting missiles fall in some areas to save stock for the most vital targets.

Resource depletion is no longer limited to smart bombs and defensive systems. It has now hit the core of ground forces through a desperate practice: the IOF is forced to strip usable parts from old, decommissioned vehicles (such as Achzarit carriers) to keep newer ones running. This is a clear admission that the IOF cannot get spare parts and tank drive systems because global production is slow and supply chains are strained.

This reality has forced the regime to shift into emergency measures. These include extending the life of worn-out equipment by an extra ten years and recycling old explosives stored for years to use on the battlefield. Tank companies within the IOF operate with incomplete units due to engine shortages, while crews extend the life of mortar barrels by hand. 

All this proves that the IOF, once seen as a high-tech army, has resorted to a patchwork policy to make up for resource gaps. This sharply lowers the quality of military performance, raises the risk of technical breakdowns during combat, and turns the idea of fighting a long war on several fronts into a series of gambles filled with deadly risks.

The current battle in Lebanon against Hezbollah and the deeper battle against Iran have shown that the Israeli regime is fundamentally weak in its basic resources. For the Zionist regime, spreading resources around is no longer a tactical choice. It is the result of the IOF being unable to cover all battlefields with the same strength.

Hezbollah, by keeping an active second front during the illegal war on Iran, succeeded in draining resources that were meant for Tehran. This turned the war for the Zionists from a fight for military victory into a test of logistical endurance. 

The predicted timeline for when IOF ammunition will run out has become the real limit. This limit forced the Israeli regime to set a schedule, one that, as in the war against the Islamic Republic, did not go beyond 40 days before it started looking for diplomatic exits or lowering its goals, for fear of hitting a zero hour with empty warehouses and a depleted IOF.

UAE acting as Israel’s shadow enforcer

 By Adil Farooqui

The UAE is betraying Pakistan, fracturing the Ummah, and selling out Muslim solidarity for Zionist gold

ISLAMABAD – The United Arab Emirates once posed as Pakistan’s “brotherly” partner in the Persian Gulf – pouring in investments, hosting millions of Pakistani workers, and talking up Islamic brotherhood. That facade has shattered.

In 2026, Abu Dhabi stands exposed as a willing vassal of Israel, weaponizing economic leverage, visa crackdowns, and outright expulsions to punish Pakistan for daring to mediate peace between the United States and Iran. Israel wanted the war finished on its terms; Pakistan stepped in as the unlikely bridge-builder, hosting talks and shuttling messages to secure ceasefires. 

The UAE’s response: Retaliation dressed up as “routine policy.” This isn’t neighborly friction. It’s calculated revenge from a regime that has bent over backwards to accommodate Tel Aviv, normalizing ties via the Abraham Accords, deepening security pacts, and now treating Pakistan’s 1.7 million expatriates as collateral damage in its pro-Israel crusade. The human and financial toll is staggering: thousands deported, visas frozen, billions demanded back overnight, and long-overdue payments to Pakistan withheld. Worse, Abu Dhabi’s zeal has even strained its once-ironclad alliance with Saudi Arabia, proving that pleasing Israel trumps Muslim unity. The UAE isn’t just allied with Israel; it’s actively sabotaging Muslim-majority states that refuse to toe the Zionist line.

Economic strangulation

Abu Dhabi’s financial warfare against Islamabad is textbook coercion, timed precisely with Pakistan’s mediation efforts in the U.S.-Iran conflict. In early April 2026, the UAE abruptly demanded the immediate repayment of $3.5 billion in central bank deposits – funds originally extended years earlier to stabilize Pakistan’s reserves and pave the way for IMF support. This wasn’t a quiet rollover negotiation; it came with days’ notice, threatening to drain nearly a fifth of Pakistan’s $16 billion forex holdings and torpedo its IMF program. Pakistan scrambled, repaid the full amount (including a final $1 billion tranche on April 23), and leaned on Saudi inflows to avoid default. 

Analysts widely viewed it as punitive: punishment for Pakistan’s deepening ties with Riyadh, its “meek” response to Iranian strikes on American military bases hosted by Persian Gulf Arab states, and its role as peacemaker between Washington and Tehran. Israel, which had pushed for decisive strikes on Iran, saw the mediation as interference. The UAE, ever the loyal partner, delivered the economic gut punch.

This isn’t isolated. The UAE-based Etisalat, which snapped up a 26% stake in Pakistan’s state-owned PTCL telecom giant in 2006 for $2.6 billion, still owes Islamabad around $800 million from the original deal – a sum ballooned by interest and penalties to claims of $6 billion after two decades of stalling. Etisalat claims Pakistan failed to transfer thousands of properties; Pakistan calls it a blatant default. Transparency International Pakistan has urged the government to recover every cent, yet Abu Dhabi drags its feet while squeezing Pakistan on deposits. The message is clear: play ball with Israel’s regional designs, or watch your economy hemorrhage. Remittances from the UAE, a lifeline exceeding $13 billion annually in recent years, now face disruption as deportations mount. Pakistani families back home feel the pinch, their breadwinners booted out amid frozen accounts and arbitrary detentions. The UAE’s actions don’t just hurt Pakistan; they signal to every Muslim nation: align against Iran (and by extension, support Israel’s security blanket), or face the same financial noose. It’s dollar diplomacy in service of Tel Aviv, not Islamic solidarity.

Expulsion machine

The human toll exposes the UAE’s zealotry most brutally. In 2025 alone, the UAE deported roughly 6,000 Pakistanis on charges of visa violations, begging rackets, and petty crimes as part of a GCC-wide crackdown. By early 2026, the numbers swelled: over 10,000 in 16 months, with another 5,800 for criminal offenses. New visas for ordinary Pakistani passport holders were effectively halted in November 2025, with officials citing “criminal activities” like smuggling and overstays. Transit visas were suspended, too. Pakistani senators heard testimony that Abu Dhabi came close to a full passport ban before opting for this near-total freeze. Official denials of a blanket policy ring hollow against the scale.

Worse, social media and reports from Pakistani expats are flooded with accounts of arbitrary arrests and deportations targeting those with Shia-associated names – Ali, Hussain, Hassan, Reza, Mehdi, Syed, Naqvi, or Rizvi – regardless of actual sect. Sunnis with such names report the same treatment. A senior Shia cleric declared an “organized campaign” in the post-Iran war, with thousands affected, including frozen assets. Reports detailed arbitrary detentions without charges, often linked to alleged “Iran-backed cells.” UAE security videos urged residents to report “suspicious” activity tied to Iran. 15 Etihad Airways Pakistani employees were fired abruptly in April 2026 and given 48 hours to leave. While the UAE insists these are routine enforcement for public security, the pattern aligns too neatly with Abu Dhabi’s post-Abraham Accords pivot: neutralize any perceived Iranian influence, even if it means purging loyal Pakistani workers who built modern Dubai. Pakistan’s mediation, which frustrated Israel’s war aims, provided the pretext. Expats who attended Muharram gatherings or simply bore “Shia-sounding” names found themselves detained alongside Iranians. This isn’t border control; it’s sectarian profiling to appease Israel’s anti-Iran obsession, turning the UAE into a deportation factory against fellow Muslims. Remittances dry up, families shatter, and Pakistan’s economy wobbles – all while the UAE hosts Israeli business delegations and security cooperation.

UAE’s Zionist embrace alienates Saudi Arabia 

The UAE’s Israel alignment isn’t a side deal; it’s the core of its foreign policy, and it’s poisoning the Persian Gulf. Abraham Accords ties have blossomed into tech, defense, and intelligence pacts, with Israel viewing the UAE as its gateway to the Arab world. Abu Dhabi joined I2U2 (India-Israel-US-UAE) and pursued projects that sideline Palestinian rights – the very issue Pakistan refuses to ignore. This zeal has backfired spectacularly on the UAE’s closest partner: Saudi Arabia. Riyadh now openly critiques Abu Dhabi’s “Zionist Trojan horse” role, with Saudi academics and editorials accusing the UAE of betraying Arab unity for Tel Aviv’s ambitions. Tensions flare in Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, and the Red Sea, where the UAE’s support for certain factions clashes with Saudi priorities. One Saudi Shura Council veteran labeled UAE actions as a calculated bid for hegemony at Saudi expense, enabled by Israel. Abu Dhabi’s eagerness to indulge Israeli strikes and regional fragmentation has Riyadh rallying anti-UAE coalitions across the Horn of Africa.

Pakistan’s mediation exposed the rift further. By facilitating U.S.-Iran talks and ceasefires, Islamabad thwarted the decisive blow Israel (and by extension the UAE) sought. The UAE’s retaliation – financial demands, expulsions – isn’t brotherly; it’s treachery that isolates it from the broader Muslim world. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and others who prioritize Palestinian justice or regional peace now see the UAE as an outlier: a petro-state that traded ummah solidarity for Zionist tech and arms. Even within the GCC, the UAE’s overreach creates enemies where allies once stood.

Its actions against Pakistan, a nuclear-armed Muslim nation with deep historical ties, send a chilling signal: loyalty to Israel trumps everything, even if it means deporting Sunnis and Shias alike, starving remittances, and demanding billions back to punish peacemaking.

In the end, the UAE’s behavior reveals a regime hollowed out by its Israel obsession. It has become the enemy of Muslim countries not by accident, but by design, fracturing Saudi ties, punishing Pakistan’s mediation, and enforcing anti-Iran purges that echo Tel Aviv’s playbook. Pakistan paid the $3.5 billion, absorbed the deportations, and kept mediating anyway. The real loser is Abu Dhabi’s credibility. When a supposed “fraternal” Persian Gulf Arab state acts as Israel’s enforcer, it doesn’t just harm Pakistan but erodes the very foundations of Islamic solidarity. 

The Ummah is watching. History will record the UAE not as a beacon of progress, but as the Persian Gulf’s most eager accomplice in dividing Muslims to serve foreign masters.

US must be willing to make uncomfortable concessions to Iran: analysis

The US will have to acknowledge that Tehran is entitled to develop nuclear technology for energy, health care, and other peaceful purposes

TEHRAN - In a May 1 article for Foreign Affairs, former U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Tom Pickering; conflict resolution expert Gabrielle Rifkind; and nuclear policy specialist Paul Ingram argued that the U.S. “must be willing to make uncomfortable concessions to Iran” to end the hostilities between Washington and Tehran.

The following is an excerpt of the article titled “The price of peace with Iran”: 

Despite days of both indirect and direct negotiations, including a dramatic, 21-hour high-level summit in Islamabad, a lasting deal between Iran and the U.S. remains far away.

Part of this failure has to do with Washington’s misplaced expectations. President Trump believes that the United States holds all the cards and can force Tehran into buckling, regardless of months of evidence to the contrary. But part of the problem is mutual mistrust. This deep wariness has not just persisted; it has deepened. Washington has now spurned Tehran repeatedly in negotiations. It forged a nuclear deal in 2015, only to abandon it three years later. It entered new talks with Iran in 2025, and then bombed Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. And when talks picked up again at the beginning of this year, the United States launched its latest military campaign. As a result, most Iranians have little faith that the current negotiations will work or that the cease-fire will hold. 

To overcome this mistrust, the United States will need to prove that the current negotiations are fundamentally different from past ones—which is to say that they will result in a viable and durable agreement. That can begin by Washington finally accepting that Iran has fundamental rights as a sovereign state, including to enrich uranium for civilian, peaceful purposes. The United States will also need to help Iran reconstruct by letting states along the Persian Gulf, Iran included, impose surcharges for certain petroleum-related goods that depart from ports in the Persian Gulf and transit south through the Strait of Hormuz, which Tehran has proven it can choke off. The resulting funds can help finance the region’s reconstruction in accordance with needs, and Iran, obviously, requires the broadest support. Finally, the United States needs to ensure that Israel will refrain from attacking Iran and help the two countries forge stable, if still unfriendly, relations. Tehran, in turn, will have to agree to new limits and severe oversight of its nuclear program so that Washington can be sure it will never build a nuclear weapon. Iran will also need to accept that it cannot extract funds for the very passage of ships through the strait, in contravention of international law.

Such a comprehensive deal would provide both Tehran and Washington with what diplomats call a “golden bridge”—or an arrangement that allows adversaries to retreat from maximalist positions while still claiming victory. It would inevitably disappoint the United States’ many Iran hawks, who are averse to letting Tehran notch any kind of win. But the reality is that coercive diplomacy is not effective. It hardens resistance, constrains room for compromise, and increases the risk that disputes repeatedly escalate into more violent conflicts. It is thus time for U.S. and Iranian officials to shift their language and strategy away from maximalism and embrace compromise instead.

The road to U.S.-Iranian peace begins with some on-the-ground basics—such as a pledge to maintain the present cease-fire and not attack critical infrastructure. That means the two countries must agree to a carefully defined extension of the cease-fire, one that explicitly prohibits such strikes.

Next, the two sides will need to resolve some of their deeper disputes—particularly over Iran’s nuclear program. That clearly remains a central challenge for Americans who want the Iranians to give up any technology that could enable the development of a nuclear weapon. Iran could blend down its nearly 1,000 pounds of 60 percent enriched uranium to below 3.67 percent of U-235 and place strict limits on the introduction and the number of more efficient centrifuge technology. The United States and the UN Security Council could devise and employ a regional monitoring and control regime to make sure that Tehran makes good on its word. As part of doing so, Iran might ratify the Additional Protocol to the NPT and again subject itself to intensive IAEA inspections, as it did after ratifying the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

But for Iran to agree to such measures, the U.S. will have to acknowledge that Tehran is entitled to develop nuclear technology for energy, health care, and other peaceful purposes. Its right to do so is supported by the NPT, which it has ratified. So far, however, the Trump administration has refused to make this concession. Instead, it has stuck to demands that Iran forgo all enrichment.

Yet Washington might be willing to budge if Tehran agreed to embed its enrichment in a multinational commission featuring U.S. partners in the region. The UN Security Council would also revise, freeze, suspend, or end resolutions levied against Iran for its nuclear program. 

TAKING CHARGE

Should Tehran and Washington agree to a nuclear deal, the path to durable peace would get easier. But Iran’s nuclear program is not the only point of dispute. The two governments are also locked in a battle over whether Iran should control the Strait of Hormuz—a battle that is perhaps just as essential. And resolution of that issue is closely related to resolving the nuclear one.

To resolve the issue, the two sides will need to get creative. What the U.S. can do is have exporting states in the Persian Gulf levy a transportation surcharge on petroleum-based goods—oil, gas, and fertilizer—that are departing from their ports and transiting southbound through the strait. Such a surcharge might, for example, include $5 per barrel of oil, 20 cents per 1,000 cubic feet of gas, $25 per ton of sulphur, and $30 per ton of urea and anhydrous ammonia. These products form a heavy percentage of the trade that goes through the waterway and affect the world’s current price of commerce. Such surcharges are distinct from tolls because they are imposed by the exporting states at the port of origin, rather than by a single state for passage through an internationally guaranteed open waterway. The surcharges could raise similar revenues to tolls, an estimated $80 billion a year, according to the best estimates. The surcharge revenue would, in turn, go to a new UN agency that would be in charge of distributing the funds.

The resulting funds would be earmarked, in part, for the purpose of rebuilding Iran, helping fulfill Tehran’s demand for wartime reparations. The remainder of the money could go to repairing civilian war damage in regional Arab states. The funds could meet the region’s immediate humanitarian relief needs and repair broader, wartime damage. The money could also go to helping the region address its environmental challenges. The funds would complement whatever the United States, the European Union, and affluent Arab states and others contribute to reconstruction. The fund’s duration would be open-ended. But it would be subject to periodic review and, if needed, renewed by the parties: the states levying export surcharges, as well as Oman, which has suffered damage from the war. 

A deal on the strait would first be worked out between Iran and the United States. The two countries should, in fact, set up a working group dedicated to the issue. (They should also set up a working group to handle nuclear challenges.) But the United Nations would have an essential role to play, as well. A fee arrangement would need explicit UN Security Council support and broader UN monitoring to ensure that the surcharges are not used for unauthorized purposes. The Security Council would have to set up the new UN organization, perhaps called the Persian Gulf Cooperation Agency, that would be charged with distributing the funds and tracking them. It must be run by effective and competent personnel appointed by the UN secretary-general under a careful and appropriate process of evaluating and approving candidates. In addition to Iran and the regional Arab states, the UN Security Council’s permanent members—China, France, Russia, the UK, and the U.S.—would participate in the agency by providing a nexus of a board of directors, as would Brazil, India, Indonesia, Japan, and Malaysia. These countries might also provide funds, training, and personnel. The UN General Assembly would settle disputes involving the agency using a majority vote. The agency could also coordinate other international assistance in rebuilding Iran and other Persian Gulf states.

Such measures would not totally resolve Tehran’s and Washington’s underlying disputes. But they would help stabilize ties and pave the way for negotiations that could eventually normalize relations. The two sides would need to engage in careful sequencing. 

Despite weeks of attacks, Iran remains open to negotiations. Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has repeatedly reaffirmed Iran’s right to uranium enrichment and control the Strait of Hormuz. Yet he has also said that Iran is open to talking further about how it can assure the world that it will not develop a nuclear weapon and called for a new regime to govern the strait. 

Tehran, after all, has demonstrated that it can resist two nuclear-armed states of significantly superior military capability in part by using the strait as leverage.

In parlous times, unexpected ideas emerge that open the door for diplomacy. This is one of those times. Coercion or bombings will not resolve the conflict between Iran and the United States. Instead, the two countries need a golden bridge so that the outcome of negotiations is not one of humiliation but cooperation and thus success.

Iran’s geography strikes back in the corridor war

By Garsha Vazirian

The strategic collapse of Washington’s attempt to bypass the heart of Eurasia

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TEHRAN – The global maritime order fractured in early 2026, not through a single explosion, but through a methodical reassertion of geological reality. When the U.S.-Israeli axis launched its kinetic campaign of aggression against Iran on February 28, the strategic assumption in Washington was that the world’s most critical energy artery would remain a mostly passive, obedient channel for Western commerce.

They were catastrophically wrong. Within weeks, daily vessel traffic through the Strait of Hormuz collapsed by more than 95 percent, falling from roughly 130 ships a day to fewer than 10.

The waterway has been transformed from a Western-policed highway into a sovereign space governed by the nation that lives on its shores.

This shift has exposed the West’s long-standing doctrine of freedom of navigation as a selective privilege, one granted to allies but violently denied to the disobedient.

By targeting Iranian infrastructure, the aggressors attempted to enforce a trade map that rewards cooperation with the U.S.-Israeli axis while isolating the sovereign heart of Eurasia, but they forgot a fundamental law of geoeconomics: security is indivisible.

The IMEC mirage

A casualty of this failed strategy is the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, better known as IMEC. Conceived as a deliberate bypass of Iran, IMEC was a geopolitical design built to reward Israel’s regional role and create a transit architecture that surgically excluded Iran.

Promoters once promised 40 percent faster transit times and a bold new commercial bridge between Asia and Europe. Today, however, IMEC is functionally dead.

Corridors do not survive on PowerPoint slides or summit photo-ops; they require stability, insurance, and the cooperation of geography.

No rational sovereign wealth fund or insurance firm will underwrite a railway running through a war zone ignited by the very powers that pitched the project.

With the port of Haifa heavily damaged and regional “normalization” with the regime in ruins, IMEC has devolved into a paper corridor. The war has exposed it as an Israeli-American mirage, and the desert of regional reality has swallowed it whole.

The sanction-proof spine

While exclusionary Western projects falter, a different architecture is accelerating on land. The International North-South Transport Corridor, which links India to Russia through Iran, is emerging as the true future of Eurasian trade.

It slashes freight time from Mumbai to St. Petersburg from 40 days via Suez to as little as 10 days, while cutting costs by roughly 30 percent.

Crucially, this corridor is a land-and-sea spine that the U.S. Navy cannot strangle. In a move that signals a deep multipolar shift, Russia and Iran agreed in late April 2026 to begin construction of the 164-kilometer Rasht-Astara railway, the final missing link in this resilient network. Even as bombs fell elsewhere, deals were being signed on the Caspian shore.

Furthermore, Pakistan’s recent authorization of expanded transit routes has opened land crossings that deliver cargo to the Iranian border in hours, rendering naval blockades increasingly irrelevant. These routes are a practical response to a world tired of being governed by naval coercion and financial blackmail.

The global war tax and the pivot of history

The economic blowback on the West has been immediate and merciless. The Hormuz shock has introduced a permanent risk premium into global markets, exposing the fragility of a Western economy that relies on a region it simultaneously destabilizes.

Brent crude has surged toward record highs, and insurance premiums have multiplied sevenfold. Washington’s desperate attempt to reroute trade around the Cape of Good Hope is an admission of defeat, as each detour adds up to 20 days and millions of dollars in fuel costs, driving global inflation.

This hidden tax falls on consumers and farmers far beyond the battlefield, turning the U.S.-Israeli war into a global tax on trade that hits the Global South the hardest.

Ultimately, the war’s strategic lesson is geological. Iran remains the irreplaceable bridge between the Persian Gulf, the Caspian, and the Mediterranean.

The global economy is now bifurcating into two zones: a high-cost, high-risk Western zone and a faster, sanction-proof Eurasian zone with Iran at its center. By attempting to exclude Iran, the U.S.-Israeli axis has only confirmed that the millennia-old civilization is too central to be bypassed by force.

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The hollowed arsenal of a fading empire

 By Garsha Vazirian

The campaign of aggression against Iran has left the American military-industrial complex in a state of kinetic bankruptcy

TEHRAN — The leak is worse than the official denial because it reveals something the White House cannot spin away: the United States has been fighting Iran with a magazine that is visibly thinning. After weeks of air and missile combat, the Trump administration is now confronting the oldest rule of warfare it spent years pretending technology had abolished: if you shoot faster than you can build, you eventually run dry.

The revelation’s sting is not simply that the U.S. used a lot of missiles. It is that it used the wrong missiles in the wrong quantities.

The U.S. squandered high-end missiles in a desperate, mismatched show of force for a war that was militarily effortless to ignite but remains an embarrassing political failure they can never truly justify.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) says the United States fired more than 1,000 Tomahawks, about 1,100 JASSM-ERs, and large shares of its Patriot, THAAD, SM-3, SM-6, and PrSM inventories during the 2026 campaign of aggression against Iran, with rebuilding to prewar levels likely taking one to four years or more.

CNN reported a “near-term risk” that the U.S. could run low in another war, and internal Pentagon assessments reportedly showed especially severe strain in air-defense stocks.

The depletion of these particular stocks is significant due to their unique roles in the U.S. arsenal. Tomahawks and JASSMs are the tools Washington reserves for standoff strike against hardened targets; Patriot, THAAD, SM-3, and SM-6 are the expensive shield that keeps bases, ships, and allies alive under missile fire.

When those stocks drop sharply in a short war, the challenge extends beyond immediate logistics into the realm of long-term strategy. A so-called superpower that cannot keep its magazine full must think twice before opening the next fight.

The cost trap

Iran understood the math better than Washington did. Tehran’s drones and missiles are comparatively cheap, localized, and easier to replace, while the U.S. answer is a cascade of million-dollar interceptors and high-end cruise missiles built through slow, fragile supply chains.

The economic imbalance has become almost obscene. One side can launch a swarm for the price of a single air-defense round on the other side. That is one of the reasons the war does not resemble a display of American strength but a live demonstration of American vulnerability.

The production ceiling

CSIS argues that replenishment is not a matter of simply approving more money.

The industrial base itself is the bottleneck, with lead times for critical components such as solid rocket motors and seeker electronics stretching into the 24-to-36-month range and total replacement cycles taking years.

The American military-industrial complex has operated similarly to a fragile boutique, even as its own relentless aggression creates a battlefield that demands the output of a factory.

In comparison, Iran’s missile and drone ecosystem is more localized and improvisational, while the U.S. depends on large contractors, nested suppliers, and just-in-time assumptions that break down under pressure.

Strategic cannibalization

The leaks are also about damage control abroad. Reports say the Pentagon has delayed or deferred deliveries to Ukraine, Japan, and parts of NATO’s eastern flank to prioritize war on Iran.

Japan’s Tomahawk order has reportedly been pushed back, even though those missiles are central to Tokyo’s new counterstrike doctrine against China. European allies have likewise seen delays.

If Taiwan needs anti-ship missiles, if Poland needs air defense, if Ukraine needs Patriots, every diverted round becomes a political message.

The issue is not merely that the U.S. is walking away from its so-called allies. It’s far worse: Washington is still clinging to the illusion of full-spectrum dominance even as its security guarantees have degenerated into worthless promises; bad checks written on an industrial base so eroded it cannot even pretend to cover them.

The logic of the leaks

The source of the leaks is probably mixed. Some insiders may be trying to force realism on a White House that prefers maximalist slogans to hard logistics. Others may be worried about the China file, where a Pacific contingency would require far more long-range strike and missile defense than the campaign of aggression against Iran has already burned away.

There is also bureaucratic self-protection: if the stockpiles are depleted, leaking the numbers is one way to make sure blame lands on political leaders, not the bureaucrats and planners.

There is a more cynical interpretation: the possibility of strategic deception. In the tradition of maskirovka or the “empty fort” strategy, Washington might be intentionally projecting an image of kinetic exhaustion to bait its adversaries. If the reported shortages are exaggerated, the leak serves as a sophisticated trap, inviting a strike that would be met with a far more robust response than the current narrative suggests. In this light, these are not confessions of weakness, but carefully curated lures designed to smoke out the intentions of rival powers.

It is also worth noting the pedigree of the institutions sounding these alarms. The CSIS is a central node in the American national security architecture, heavily funded by the very entities that benefit from a bloated military budget.

With financial ties to the Department of War, major defense contractors like Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Boeing, as well as allied partner governments, its reports serve a dual purpose.

While providing data on stockpile depletion, these assessments also function as a sophisticated lobbying effort for the next generation of multi-billion-dollar contracts. Their closeness to the Pentagon suggests that when CSIS speaks of an empty magazine, it is often a precursor to a demand for a much larger and more expensive one.

But the larger reason may be simpler. Leaks like these appear when an institution knows it’s being pushed past its limits and wants the world to see it before the next crisis hits.

They read as a warning shot from a system being ordered to fight tomorrow’s battles with yesterday’s ammunition; a desperate cry from a structure that knows it’s running on fumes and borrowed time.