Serious Discussions About Leaving the NPT: International Security and Iran’s Nuclear Future

Iranian officials have confirmed top-level discussions about the country’s potential exit from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). What does this mean for the Middle East and for the world?

Ksenia Muratshina

Essence of the Matter

Iran, as Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei noted at a briefing, continues, as before, to faithfully fulfill all its obligations under the NPT. At the same time, however, it has not only come under attack, i.e. aggression by the US and Israel, but has also experienced and continues to experience absolutely unfounded and undeserved “pressure and jabs”. The Iranian diplomat rightly emphasized that the countries party to the NPT must be able to enjoy its benefits and exercise their rights. Nevertheless, as everyone remembers, in recent years Iran, even in relatively peaceful times (during periods when the US and Israel were not bombing and shelling it), was continuously under fire from criticism, slander, and criminal acts (recall the brutal, treacherous killings of leading Iranian nuclear scientists by Israeli intelligence services with US support) and shameless information and psychological warfare. “Hot” war, with numerous casualties among the civilian population and destruction, was also unleashed by external aggressors repeatedly and, moreover, arbitrarily, without even the slightest pretext for it.

The fundamental point is that security in any region of the world becomes truly achievable and durable when its countries themselves determine their own agenda, their own boundaries of what is acceptable, their own mutual rights and obligations, rather than following rules imposed from the outside

Currently, the question of withdrawing from the NPT is being discussed at the highest levels of the country’s leadership and may be submitted for consideration to the Majlis (the Iranian parliament). In that case, a decision on it will be made by the lawmakers in an accelerated, urgent manner, since they have had more than enough time to study the issue. A comment by a representative of the Majlis presidium, Abbas Goudarzi, has also circulated in the media. He called Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT “a very real and easily achievable step”. Parliamentarian Ali Nikzad added that in Tehran they have already begun studying the possible international consequences of such a scenario.

What Next?

Withdrawing from the NPT is in itself a fairly complex and time-consuming procedure, in accordance with the terms of the treaty binding all its participants. However, if Iran, after a thorough analysis of the situation and weighing all the pros and cons, firmly resolves to go through with it, then it will undoubtedly achieve its goal. In that case, the restrictions imposed by the treaty will remain in its past, and the country will be able to take steps in whatever direction it deems necessary.

Or is it not that simple?

Russia has repeatedly called on all participants in international affairs to heed the ideas of the Greater Eurasian Partnership put forward by President Vladimir Putin. The main feature of the very concept of security in this paradigm is its unified and indivisible character. The implementation of policy and the maintenance of peace, in the most general terms, are ensured by the coordinated activity of international associations with a network structure, based on the principles of multilateral diplomacy, equality, responsibility, and mutual respect, such as BRICS, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Eurasian Economic Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations etc. Regional organizations of the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America could act in the same vein.

The fundamental point is that security in any region of the world becomes truly achievable and durable when its countries themselves determine their own agenda, their own boundaries of what is acceptable, their own mutual rights and obligations, rather than following rules imposed from the outside, someone else’s “morality” (but really its absence), the postcolonial diktat of the West, and the military pressure it exerts on any- and everyone it can reach.

A country’s withdrawal from the NPT, with all the ensuing consequences, risks, and the small number of possible scenarios (which, by and large, is clear to any level-headed specialist and can be counted literally on the fingers of one hand), is, needless to say, an extraordinary undertaking. If we are talking about a serious understanding of the world order that has fundamentally changed in recent years and of the relations of the global majority within it, of the multipolar world, then such an event should probably be preceded not only by consideration of the matter by the Iranian Majlis itself, but also by consultations with allies.

The multipolar world has, in effect, accepted the relatively new (on the scale of history) nuclear status of three powers: India, Pakistan, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. No one questions them about their status, except for the American satellites who are used to yapping away at the DPRK. It must be said that all three behave quite responsibly in this regard and implement the possibilities of nuclear deterrence with dignity.

As is well known, the thing that has evoked the most attacks, distortions and sanctions in the Western part of the world is North Korea’s acquisition of a nuclear shield. Russia has repeatedly noted that the DPRK’s de facto nuclear status is already a closed and settled matter. Moreover, as Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov emphasized, “we respect the actions of the DPRK; we understand the reasons why they are pursuing their nuclear program”. The leadership of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as the head of the Russian foreign policy agency rightly noted, “drew the relevant conclusions long before the Israeli-American strikes on the Islamic Republic of Iran. And it is precisely because these conclusions were drawn in a timely manner that no one even thinks of using force against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, although military buildup around the DPRK with the participation of the US, South Korea, and Japan is underway”.

Security Dilemma or a Lack Thereof?

Whether Iran will follow the path of the DPRK, given all the organizational complexities of withdrawing from the NPT, the ongoing state of war with Israel and the US, and the differing points of view among Iranian political figures of different generations on the prospects of possessing nuclear weapons, is premature to say for now. What is important here is to grasp the very essence of the problem and honestly answer the questions that arise for ourselves. The main one is the following: if –let’s call things what they are – Iran ever becomes a nuclear power, how will that affect international security? Not in the speculative, hypothetical sense of the shouting of paid-off Western media and NGOs, but in terms of real policy, deterrence, and the balance of power?

It would seem that the answer to this question will have to be found not only by Iran itself, but also by its allies, its comrades in the multipolar world, in the emerging new security system involving BRICS and the SCO. And what about the international organizations of the Middle East? Here, on the contrary, the question of the independence of action of regional multilateral associations and the risks of influence on their decision-making by extra-regional Western and pro-Western actors arises. So whether they will consider themselves safer with a single nuclear and hostile-to-its-entire-surroundings Israel for the whole region, or whether they will start thinking about Iranian prospects for a nuclear balance, is a question that also concerns their own sovereign thinking and survival.

And what about the International Atomic Energy Agency? Ali Nikzad stated outright that Iran does not trust the IAEA and its current director. Well, we know perfectly well that this organization under the leadership of Rafael Grossi behaves in a biased and dishonorable manner; there is no longer any doubt about that. Therefore, the opinion and possible actions of the IAEA with regard to Iran, which is already under all kinds of sanctions and has nevertheless found the strength and the ability to leave no stone unturned of the myth of US military superiority, is perhaps the very last thing worth talking about at all in this context.

For now, we can only wait for events to unfold. The question is truly serious and, perhaps, could become an important test both for Eurasian and for international security as a whole, at least in the form in which it is conceived by the existing centers of power of the global majority, the non-Western multipolar world.

Ksenia Muratshina, PhD in History, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and Culture Editor of “New Eastern Outlook”

Why Marco Rubio Is Bringing the Clash of Civilizations Back: When Propaganda Is Dressed Up as a Civilizational Crusade

Marco Rubio’s Athens speech presented American global dominance as the noble defence of Western civilization, but behind the historical scenery lies a cruder political order — restore Western supremacy and make Europe follow Washington.

Ricardo Martins

Marco Rubio chose his setting carefully. Standing in Athens, with the Acropolis and the Parthenon behind him, the US Secretary of State delivered a speech designed to look like a historic appeal to save Western civilization. Ancient Greece supplied the grandeur, Christianity provided the moral justification, and the promise of Western decline created the sense of urgency.

But remove the theatrical scenery and the message becomes remarkably crude. Rubio declared that the West must maintain its place “at the head of the world” and celebrated the “unapologetic pursuit of national power” under Donald Trump. This was not principally a philosophical reflection on civilization, history or shared values. It was a political argument for restoring American-led Western dominance.

The idea of a unified West with an unbroken historical mission is not an eternal truth; it is a political construction that has served different purposes at different times

The irony is that Rubio appears to believe that dressing an imperial ambition in the language of civilization makes it intellectually sophisticated. It does not. His speech revived an old geopolitical strategy: portray the interests of a dominant power as the universal interests of an entire civilization, then present resistance to that dominance as a threat to its culture, values and historical survival.

The question is not whether Western societies possess important intellectual, scientific and cultural traditions. Of course, they do. The question is why these achievements should entitle Washington to lead the world indefinitely—and why other societies should accept a subordinate position.

The Imperial Ambition Behind the Civilizational Rhetoric

Rubio’s speech belongs to a familiar tradition of geopolitical thinking associated with Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations, although he had academic sophistication in his arguments – Rubio, none. In the post-Cold War era, Huntington argued that cultural and civilizational identities would become major sources of international conflict. The Trump administration is reviving this framework, presenting Western Christendom as a political bloc threatened by China, Russia and the Muslim world.

Yet, Rubio’s own language exposes the real objective. He warned that the West risked losing its position at the head of the world and called for renewed national power. The concern is not simply that Western traditions might disappear. It is that Western governments – Rubio has above all the United States in mind — might lose their ability to determine international outcomes.

There is a considerable difference between defending cultural heritage and defending geopolitical supremacy. The former is a legitimate objective for any society. The latter is a claim to power that other countries have every right to challenge.

China’s economic and technological rise, Russia’s resistance to Western strategic pressure, and the growing international ambitions of countries such as India, Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia reflect a world in which power is distributed less exclusively than before. These developments do not automatically constitute an assault on Western civilization. They challenge the assumption that Washington and its allies should remain the principal architects of the international order.

Rubio’s civilizational narrative turns that challenge into an existential struggle, bringing in Christianity to justify a supposedly moral superiority of the West. Economic competition, disputes over resources, access to markets and technological rivalry become secondary to an alleged confrontation between fundamentally different civilizations. Such framing is politically convenient: it makes compromise look like weakness and strategic competition look like a moral crusade.

The pretended sophistication is largely theatrical. Under it lies a blunt proposition: the West should dominate because it is the West and Christian.

Ancient Greece Was Not Born Christian

The historical foundations of Rubio’s argument are deeply problematic. In Athens, he traced European Christendom back to Ancient Greece, presenting Greek philosophy, science and religion as foundations that ultimately gave rise to Christian civilization.

But Ancient Greece was polytheistic, not Christian. Its intellectual traditions developed centuries before Christianity emerged. Greek philosophy subsequently influenced Christian theology through the tradition kept by the Muslims, but intellectual influence is not the same as civilizational identity. To collapse these distinct historical periods into a single Christian Western tradition is to replace history with mythology.

Rubio’s treatment of science reveals another contradiction. He celebrated the achievements of Galileo, Copernicus and Newton as expressions of the Western intellectual inheritance while presenting Christianity as a central source of scientific progress. However, Galileo was tried by the Roman Inquisition in 1633 and forced to deny his support for heliocentrism. The history of science includes profound contributions from religious thinkers, but it also includes conflicts between scientific inquiry and religious authority. A serious historical account must acknowledge both.

Civilisation Did Not Begin and End in the West

During Galileo’s lifetime (1564–1642) there was a continuation of intellectual and scientific work in the Muslim world, China preserved a highly developed system of bureaucratic administration, and the Mughal Empire in the Indian subcontinent established refined structures of imperial administration. India’s intellectual traditions go back much further: Kautilya’s Arthashastra, an influential treatise on statecraft, diplomacy, economics and the organisation of government, is part of the political thought tradition which flourished in ancient India long before Galileo was born.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the Aztec Empire had built a powerful state centred on Tenochtitlan (today’s Mexico City), a major urban centre with extensive markets, organised government and impressive infrastructure. When Hernán Cortés arrived in 1519, he did not step onto a continent that had no civilization – according to Rubio; instead, he entered a world which already had established societies, political institutions and cultural achievements. The Spanish conquest, which was achieved through warfare, partnerships with Indigenous peoples and the siege of Tenochtitlan in 1521, led to the establishment of a colonial system; it was not an attempt to bring civilisation to an uncivilised world.

What we should not do is to idealise these societies or overlook the conflicts, inequalities and conquests that existed within them. Instead, we must oppose the historical view that presents the expansion of Europe as automatically amounting to the spread of civilisation while ignoring or downplaying the achievements of other societies. When Rubio refers in Athens to Cortés as a carrier of civilisation, the question that arises is: whose civilisation is it, and at what cost to whom?

The omissions extend beyond Europe. During the Islamic Golden Age, scholars working in Arabic helped preserve, translate, develop and transmit important works of ancient Greek philosophy and science. Muslim intellectual traditions contributed to mathematics, astronomy, medicine and philosophy. In any case, the history of European intellectual development cannot be understood without these Muslim contributions.

None of this diminishes the achievements of Ancient Greece, Christian thinkers or European science. It simply rejects the childish notion that Rubio wanted to pass on that one civilization independently generated the intellectual achievements of the whole of humanity.

Rubio’s narrative needs a seamless inheritance from Athens to Christian Europe to modern America because that lineage gives Washington a prestigious historical pedigree. But civilizations are not genealogical certificates granting permanent rights to global leadership. They develop through exchange, conflict, borrowing and reinvention. Anyone serious about history should know better.

Heroes for Us, Barbarians for Them

The most revealing contradiction in Rubio’s speech is its double standard on conquest.

He praised the imperial ambitions of Alexander the Great and celebrated European expansion through figures including Christopher Columbus and Hernán Cortés. He presented the colonisation of the Americas as an expression of exploration, ambition and the expansion of Western civilization. The lands conquered by Europeans became an “open and wild land” awaiting transformation.

What happened to the peoples who already lived there? Their societies, political institutions, knowledge systems and cultures largely disappear from this heroic narrative. So do the violence, dispossession, human slaughter and destruction that accompanied European conquest. The historical experience of Indigenous peoples becomes an inconvenient detail in a story about Western greatness.

Now consider Rubio’s account of the Persian invasion of Greece. The campaigns of Xerxes are presented as aggression against the foundations of Western civilization to justify present day American-Israeli war against Iran. Persian imperial expansion is condemned, while the imperial expansion of Alexander, European conquistadors and their successors becomes an admirable expression of historical ambition.

Why should conquest acquire a different moral meaning depending on who conducts it?

The same question applies to contemporary geopolitics. Rubio’s language portrays Iran as a civilizational threat while placing Western power within a narrative of historical defence. But no government acquires moral immunity by invoking Christianity, democracy or a supposedly superior civilization. The legitimacy of military action must be judged by its circumstances, conduct and consequences—not by the identity of the power undertaking it.

The point is not that every empire or historical conflict is identical. It is that the standards used to evaluate them should not change according to geopolitical convenience.

This is precisely where the civilizational narrative becomes propaganda. Western conquest is transformed into historical achievement; non-Western resistance is portrayed as barbarism. The result is not a serious account of history, but a hierarchy of moral legitimacy explicitly constructed to excuse the powerful.

Europe’s Choice: Intellectual Honesty or American Vassalage?

Rubio’s speech in Athens is directed not only at America’s rivals but above all at Europe. Washington wants European governments to renew their commitment to a common Western bloc, increase military spending and support a more confrontational international posture. European countries are constantly warned (by Marco Rubio, J.D. Vance and Donald Trump) that immigration, particularly Muslim immigration, threatens their civilizational identity.

The implication is unmistakable: Europe must defend a narrowly defined vision of Western civilization while aligning itself more closely with American strategic priorities.

This is where the narrative becomes especially contradictory. Latin America is geographically part of the Western Hemisphere, and Christianity is deeply rooted across the region, yet Latin American societies are not placed within the political concept of the West. Their exclusion exposes the limits of the claim that the West is simply a cultural or religious community, but above all a political category, shaped by power and strategic alignment.

Rubio’s emphasis on his European ancestry, rather than the broader complexity of his Cuban-Latin American background, reinforces the symbolic appeal of a transatlantic identity. But ancestry cannot settle the question of who belongs to a civilization. Nor should European governments accept a definition of their identity that makes loyalty to Washington the ultimate test of belonging.

Europe should also be wary of the consequences of this political script. If defending civilization becomes synonymous with permanent confrontation, escalating military expenditure and hostility towards entire populations, the result may be greater insecurity rather than greater strength. A Europe that simply repeats Washington’s rhetoric risks surrendering its capacity for independent strategic judgment.

The irony is that Europe’s own history should make it particularly suspicious of grand narratives that sanctify power. European empires justified conquest and slaughter of indigenous populations in the language of religion, progress and civilization. The twentieth century then witnessed European powers devastating one another in two world wars. The idea of a unified West with an unbroken historical mission is not an eternal truth; it is a political construction that has served different purposes at different times.

Rubio is now attempting to mobilise that narrative for a new era of strategic rivalry. The language has changed, but the hierarchy remains: Washington leads, Europe follows, and the rest of the world is expected to accept the arrangement.

The answer is not to replace Western chauvinism with an equally simplistic celebration of other civilizations. It is to reject the premise that international order should be organised around civilizational superiority in the first place.

The world does not need another crusade dressed up as philosophy. It needs international relations grounded in sovereignty, historical honesty, mutual respect and the recognition that no country possesses a permanent entitlement to supremacy.

In sum, Rubio’s speech in Athens was presented as a defence of Western civilization. Its most revealing feature was its insistence that the West must remain at the head of the world. That is not a defence of civilization. It is a defence of hierarchy—and no amount of historical theatre can make the distinction disappear.

Ricardo Martins – Doctor of Sociology, specialist in European and international politics as well as geopolitics

Why is Israel maneuvering to shift the Middle East conflagration to Africa?

From David Ben-Gurion—the architect of a state whose foundations remain a subject of debate—to Benjamin Netanyahu, a master of maintaining constant tension, the “periphery doctrine” has remained a cornerstone of Israeli foreign policy.

Mohamed Lamine KABA

Its essence lies in forging alliances with states that surround hostile neighbors. Israeli authorities operate on the premise that secure borders do not exist, implying that Israel’s own borders cannot be fixed. Is this not the exact opposite of peace?

In strategic studies, words matter. In March 2023, in Paris, Bezalel Smotrich speaks in front of a map that includes Jordan. On July 18, 2024, the Knesset votes against any Palestinian state. On August 12, 2025, on i24NEWS, Netanyahu declares his strong commitment to the vision of Greater Israel and speaks of a “historical and spiritual mission.”

Strangely, events unfolded as expected. Gaza ravaged. The West Bank nibbled away. Southern Syria occupied. Southern Lebanon dotted with positions. Somaliland is added to the list, not as a conquest, but as a strategic depth.

East Africa categorically refuses to serve as a security doormat for the criminal operations of Mossad

On December 26, 2025, Netanyahu signed the recognition of Somaliland. Israel became the only state in the world to have done so. On December 29, the Security Council met in emergency session. Fourteen out of fifteen members opposed it. Washington alone broke ranks. The African Union (which even called for the immediate revocation of this recognition), the IGAD, the Arab League, the OIC, and the GCC denounced it as a violation. Beijing did as well.

Mogadishu’s rage in the face of Tel Aviv’s desperate hubris

Mogadishu is now thundering with unprecedented doctrinal vehemence. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud refuses to cloak his political pronouncements in the swaddling clothes of diplomatic compromise. Indeed, Somalia’s swift and decisive response to the clandestine negotiations sealed between Tel Aviv and the separatist faction in Hargeisa is swift, acerbic, uncompromising, and devastating: Somalia will not accept an Israeli military presence in Somaliland, asserting that such an intrusion will “under no circumstances” occur on its territory. Israel is clearly attempting to transpose the geopolitical conflagration of the Middle East onto the sovereign soil of Africa. This nefarious maneuver has brutally crossed the Gulf of Aden to strike the Horn of Africa. Mogadishu categorically rejects this imperialist interference, insisting that these maneuvers “will not succeed.” Somali sovereignty thus becomes the last continental bastion against the onslaught of Zionist disorder.

Consequently, the vital port of Berbera is being transformed into the epicenter of a highly deadly spiral. Benjamin Netanyahu is desperately seeking to break the suffocating maritime stranglehold imposed in the Red Sea by the asymmetric forces of the resistance. Specifically, Israel wants access to the port and airport of Berbera and to establish a major naval base there. However, this cynical calculation is a purely suicidal doctrinal gamble. East Africa categorically refuses to serve as a security doormat for the criminal operations of Mossad. Mogadishu therefore denounces a blatant aggression against its territorial integrity. The Somali response is swift and decisive. It exposes the legal nullity and utter illegitimacy of Israel’s hegemonic ambitions.

Moreover, this desperate attempt at naval expansion poorly masks a major doctrinal collapse within the Zionist command. The Jewish state acts like an overexposed and vocal vassal of the White House; a cancer on humanity that must be prevented from taking root in your country at all costs. Tel Aviv is struggling to restore a military reputation tarnished by the crushing defeats suffered in Gaza and southern Lebanon. However, the illusion of regional omnipotence is violently shattered by the continent’s unassailable geopolitical realities. East Africa will never be the safety valve for a colonial regime on its last legs.

Berbera as a strategic node and tectonic obsession of “Greater Israel”

Certainly, the messianic project of “Greater Israel” already extended beyond the historical borders of occupied Palestine. However, it is now expanding with unprecedented ferocity far beyond the Levant. Military and naval control of the strategic chokepoint of Bab el-Mandeb constitutes the new imperative of Tel Aviv’s security doctrine. This is an uncontrolled imperialist drift that, de facto, directly threatens the global geopolitical balance. This slide is proving fatal.

By ardently coveting the Berbera harbor in Somaliland, Israel intends to establish a global maritime pincer movement. The objective is to control the Gulf of Aden to the south while dominating the Red Sea to the north, thereby drawing closer to the Gulf States and Iran in order to better threaten them. This maneuver aims at the systematic suffocation of the Axis of Resistance, striking Ansarallah in Yemen through its Afrotropical flank, neutralizing Iranian influence in the Indian Ocean, and securing the maritime arteries of Western capitalism.

Moreover, the historical facts remain irrefutable. Since the Abraham Accords emerged in September 2020, Tel Aviv has been increasing its covert incursions into East Africa. The unilateral recognition of Hargeisa paves the way for the installation of listening posts and nuclear submarines. Furthermore, the population of Somaliland opposes an Israeli presence on its soil, rejecting this settlement. This flagrant violation of international law tramples on Somali sovereignty. Mogadishu thus shatters the illusion of an easy and costless Zionist conquest.

The aircraft carrier, dislocated, facing the CRIC block

In reality, Israel no longer functions as a sovereign and autonomous state. It is merely a military appendage of Washington, a land-based aircraft carrier embedded in the Middle East. The strategic function of this outpost is inexorably waning. Yesterday, it served to contain Arab nationalism. Today, everyone can see how Israel is destabilizing the entire region with its belligerent hubris, failing miserably to stem the emergence of a multipolar world. Collapse is inevitable.

CRIC coalition – China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea – is observing this unrest with sovereign calm. The Israeli offensive of October 2023 has turned into a strategic disaster. The war of attrition is destroying the Jewish economy from within. Tel Aviv’s forces are suffering devastating tactical setbacks. The so-called invincible army has been definitively debunked by highly determined fighters.

Curiously, the diplomatic posturing in Berbera reflects this profound disappointment. Washington is using its Israeli proxy to obstruct Chinese and Russian access to African maritime routes. Nevertheless, the American pawn appears discredited. The military humiliations suffered in 2024, 2025, and 2026 seal the decline of the American tutelary power in the region. Israel now finds itself adrift in a geopolitical vacuum.

The end of proxy hyperpower

Moreover, the predictive projections for the Horn of Africa are unequivocal. The presence of Israeli infrastructure in Berbera will catalyze systemic destabilization. Faced with this threat, the Houthis’ warning rings out clearly: any Israeli military presence in Somaliland would become an immediate target for their strikes. As a knock-on effect, this presence will unite Somali factions against the Zionist invader. Paradoxically, it will strengthen the logistical foothold of the Resistance Axis in the Indian Ocean basin. The trap is thus closing inexorably.

Meanwhile, Iran and its allies will tailor their asymmetric responses with surgical precision. The Gulf of Aden will become a logistical graveyard for Tel Aviv’s naval ambitions. The attempt at encirclement will backfire mercilessly on its instigator. The diplomatic isolation of the Zionist entity will reach a point of no return within international institutions.

Thus, history will remember the Berbera episode as the death throes of a fallen empire. Israel thought it could export its internal security crisis; it has only succeeded in importing its own vulnerability to Africa. Netanyahu’s frantic posturing offers no salvation. On the contrary, it seals the definitive humiliation of the Zionist expansionist project on the African continent. That much is certain.

Ultimately, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud embodies the sovereign refusal of an entire continent. Africa refuses to be the substitute theater for Israeli colonial wars. Mogadishu draws an inviolable red line against Tel Aviv’s maritime conspiracies.

The expansionist maneuver in Berbera exposes the intellectual bankruptcy of the Israeli regime. By attempting to counter the CRIC bloc and the Axis of Resistance, Israel is accelerating its own global geopolitical decline.

The mirage of “Greater Israel” shatters against the wall of multipolarity. The illusion of controlling the straits collapses. Global history is now being written without the obsolete dictates of Tel Aviv and Washington. Absolutely.

Mohamed Lamine KABA, Expert in the geopolitics of governance and regional integration, Institute of Governance, Human and Social Sciences, Pan-African University

Bombs for Tel Aviv, Promises for Riyadh

The Gaza Ceasefire Is Falling Apart. And So Is the American Plan to Expand the Abraham Accords.

Muhammad Hamid ad-Din

The Gaza Ceasefire That Is Killing Palestinians

The ceasefire in Gaza, which took effect on October 10, 2025, was supposed to stop a two-year war. By then, according to Palestinian authorities, more than 72,000 Palestinians had been killed. A year after the document was signed, the picture was no more peaceful. According to Palestinian sources, from the start of the ceasefire to October 5, 2026, Israeli forces killed 1,460 Palestinians and wounded 5,116. By September 2026, Gaza authorities reported 5,147 violations of the agreement, 1,421 dead, and the destruction of more than 201,000 buildings.

The second phase of negotiations—the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the enclave and the disarmament of Palestinian factions—stalled almost immediately. In April 2026, American-Egyptian talks in Cairo ended “without tangible progress.” Hamas links disarmament to the end of the occupation. Israel demands disarmament as a precondition for any further step. Critics say the demand for disarmament has become a pretext for maintaining control over the enclave and continuing violations. The Palestinian Foreign Ministry put it bluntly: the occupation government “does not view peace as a goal, but as an obstacle.”

While Washington supplies bombs and Tel Aviv keeps killing, talk of peace looks like a cynical game in which Palestinians are not subjects but a bargaining chip

Diktat Instead of Diplomacy

Against this backdrop, the Trump administration is forcing the expansion of the Abraham Accords. In May 2026, the U.S. president publicly demanded that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey join the accords. He called it “mandatory”: “After all the work done by the United States to put this complex puzzle together, it must be mandatory for all these countries to at least simultaneously sign the Abraham Accords.” Pakistan publicly refused. The others remained silent.

Washington’s main interest is Saudi Arabia. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said at the White House in November 2025: “We want to be part of the Abraham Accords. But we also want to be sure that we secure a clear path to a two-state solution.” Later, Riyadh repeated: normalization is impossible without a “credible, irreversible, and time-bound path” to a Palestinian state. The Israeli government rejects this prospect. American pressure goes beyond diplomacy: Trump tied the Abraham Accords to negotiations to end the war with Iran, effectively making normalization a condition for peace. According to Axios, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Pakistan were “caught by surprise.”

Mutual Influence: Gaza as Leverage and as an Obstacle

Gaza and the reshaping of alliances are directly connected. The Palestinian question became leverage in Arab states’ bargaining with Washington. For Saudi Arabia, normalization with Israel without movement toward a Palestinian state is politically toxic. Riyadh is using the fragile ceasefire to postpone an unpopular step. Qatar, a key mediator, took an equally tough position. Qatari Foreign Ministry spokesman Majid al-Ansari said: “If the Palestinian question remains unresolved, joining the Abraham Accords is impossible.” According to him, the absence of a peace process for Palestinians means the absence of stability in the region. Doha, which has given refuge to Hamas’s political leadership and plays a central role in the talks, cannot move toward normalization without losing face.

There is also a reverse dependency. The Trump administration, seeking to expand the Abraham Accords, pressured Israel to secure a ceasefire: normalization without a ceasefire would have been impossible. But the second phase depends on whether Washington is willing to pressure Israel, not just Arab capitals.

Bombs Instead of Peace

The result of U.S. and Israeli policy looks increasingly contradictory. Three years of war, more than 74,250 dead Palestinians, and 1,460 killed after the ceasefire was signed are not just a humanitarian catastrophe. They are a verdict on America’s strategy in the Middle East. Trump tried to push through the expansion of the Abraham Accords by linking unrelated issues: normalization with Israel, a nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia, and ending the war with Iran. In July 2026, he stated directly that a U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear agreement “will depend entirely on Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords.” Saudi Arabia responded in May 2026: “There will be no normalization without a clear and final path to the creation of an independent Palestinian state.” As the custodian of the two holy mosques, the kingdom cannot afford to do otherwise. Qatar refused. Pakistan publicly rejected it. Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey remained silent.

Criticism of Washington goes far beyond diplomatic missteps. The U.S. continues to supply Israel with weapons despite ceasefire violations. In September 2026, the Trump administration proposed a $2.8 billion deal to sell Israel 40,000 heavy bombs, including 20,000 MK-84s and 20,000 BLU-117s. Senator Chris Van Hollen vowed to block the transfer: “Trump is sending $2.8 billion worth of bombs, paid for by you, the American taxpayers, to a government led by a wanted war criminal.” Congressman Gregory Meeks, the ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, also vetoed it: “The Trump administration has not provided sufficient assurances that these weapons will be used in accordance with American and international law. Therefore, I will not approve this sale.” Amnesty International urged Congress to block the deliveries, saying the U.S. risks becoming complicit in serious violations of international law, including genocide. New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani accused Washington of “complicity with every arms shipment” to Tel Aviv.

What Next: The Results of U.S. and Israeli Policy Against the Arab Region

Washington’s paradox is that it wants to expand the Abraham Accords but continues to support the Israeli occupation, which makes normalization politically impossible for Arab states. The U.S. has blocked UN Security Council ceasefire resolutions for the third time in a row, undermining its role as a “reliable mediator.” Public opinion in the Arab world is sharply opposed to normalization. Polls show that 89% of Moroccans oppose recognizing Israel. Analysts warn that for most of the named states, the political price of signing the accords will be prohibitive. The war in Gaza has strengthened this sentiment, not weakened it.

The main question is whether the ceasefire will hold. If the second phase of negotiations does not start and the death toll continues to rise, expansion of the Abraham Accords will remain an unattainable dream. Saudi Arabia will wait. Qatar will mediate. The UAE will increase oil production. Trump will face a choice: keep pressuring Arab capitals or admit that without a real Palestinian state, the accords will remain a facade. While Washington supplies bombs and Tel Aviv keeps killing, talk of peace looks like a cynical game in which Palestinians are not subjects but a bargaining chip.

Muhammad Hamid ad-Din is a well-known Palestinian journalist

Washington Tried to Isolate Russia. Now It Needs Russian Oil

Four years after Washington set out to cripple Russia’s energy economy, America’s war with Iran has forced it to seek relief from the very country it tried to isolate, encircle, and defeat.

Salman Rafi Sheikh

The Sanctions Strategy Meets Its Limits

On October 9, US President Donald Trump announced an extraordinary agreement with Russian President Vladimir Putin: Moscow would immediately release more than 300,000 tonnes of diesel into American and international markets, followed by another 500,000 tonnes in November and one million tonnes thereafter. Trump also envisaged larger deliveries, depending on Russia’s refining capacity. The announcement came alongside Washington’s decision to temporarily relax restrictions on Russian diesel exports. The reversal was striking. A country subjected to years of American economic coercion was suddenly being asked to help alleviate an energy crisis confronting the United States itself.

The agreement exposes a contradiction at the heart of American geopolitical strategy since February 2022. Washington sought to diminish Russia’s capacity to finance its war in Ukraine by restricting its access to Western markets, financial institutions, and energy revenues. Yet, the effectiveness of that strategy depended on an assumption that increasingly looks questionable: that Russia could be economically constrained without significantly compromising the stability of the international energy system on which Western economies themselves depend.

Washington’s willingness to make exceptions for its own energy requirements complicates its ability to demand uncompromising compliance from others

The original sanctions architecture was meant to use them as a weapon. The G7 price-cap mechanism, introduced in December 2022, sought to keep Russian oil flowing while reducing Moscow’s earnings. Nevertheless, successive restrictions, including American sanctions against major Russian energy companies, reflected a broader determination to limit Russia’s economic influence. Washington’s latest decision demonstrates how difficult it has become to reconcile that objective with the immediate requirements of energy security.

The reversal is institutional as well as political. On October 9, the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control issued General License 135, authorizing transactions involving Russian-origin diesel. This was not a wholesale abandonment of sanctions, but a targeted exception. Its significance lies precisely in that distinction: Washington is preserving its coercive framework while selectively suspending parts of it to manage the consequences of another geopolitical confrontation. For Moscow, this creates an opening. Russia’s economic relevance has not disappeared despite extensive Western restrictions. But the more consequential development is Washington’s acknowledgment, through its own actions, that geopolitical isolation and economic interdependence cannot always be pursued simultaneously.

How the Iran War Changed the Equation

The immediate explanation lies thousands of kilometres from Ukraine, in the Middle East. The US–Israeli war against Iran has disrupted energy production, refining and maritime transportation across a region indispensable to global petroleum supplies. The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of internationally traded oil normally passes, has become a focal point of uncertainty. Higher crude prices, constrained refining capacity and shipping disruptions have intensified pressure on fuel markets, particularly diesel.

The consequences have reached American consumers. On October 5, Trump publicly attributed rising gasoline prices partly to Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries, even as the Iran war continued to destabilize energy markets. Washington was confronting an uncomfortable reality: military operations intended to weaken Russia’s war economy were aggravating the economic consequences of America’s confrontation with Iran.

The diplomatic implications are equally revealing. According to an Axios report citing an American official, Trump reached the diesel arrangement after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky resisted repeated American requests to halt attacks on Russian refineries. If this account accurately reflects Washington’s calculations, it suggests that American energy priorities are beginning to constrain the military options of its Ukrainian partner.

This is where the larger geopolitical contradiction becomes apparent. Since 2022, American strategy has involved simultaneously weakening Russia, containing China and sustaining its regional position against Iran. These objectives have frequently been pursued through sanctions, military assistance, technological restrictions and direct military force. Yet, the economic consequences of these confrontations are interconnected. Disruptions in one theatre alter the strategic calculations governing another.

The United States can possess military superiority without possessing equivalent control over the global economic consequences of exercising that superiority. Oil markets respond to aggregate supply, transportation risks, refining bottlenecks and expectations, not simply to the preferences of the world’s strongest military power.

Thus, the strategic significance of the arrangement cannot be measured solely in barrels. The willingness of Washington to negotiate sanctions relief while the Ukraine conflict continues creates diplomatic opportunities that would have appeared considerably less plausible when Western governments first intensified their economic campaign against Moscow.

From Economic Isolation to Strategic Bargaining

The central question now is whether this temporary accommodation can evolve into broader strategic bargaining. For Russia, the agreement offers an opportunity to demonstrate that its integration into global commodity markets remains a source of influence—and stability in the current scheme of things. For Washington, however, it introduces a potentially difficult precedent: sanctions imposed for geopolitical objectives can become negotiable when their economic consequences become sufficiently uncomfortable.

That precedent is already generating domestic opposition. On October 11, Republican and Democratic senators challenged the agreement, arguing that it conflicted with American legislation restricting Russian energy imports. Their objections illustrate a widening tension between the political commitment to pressure Moscow and the economic imperative to stabilize fuel markets.

There is also a wider international dimension. Countries such as India and China have resisted Western expectations that economic relations with Russia should be subordinated entirely to American geopolitical priorities. Washington’s willingness to make exceptions for its own energy requirements complicates its ability to demand uncompromising compliance from others.

None of this guarantees a lasting improvement in US–Russia relations. American sanctions remain extensive, disagreements over Ukraine are unresolved, and energy cooperation could disappear once market pressures subside. The more consequential possibility concerns the future organization of American power. If Washington continues confronting major energy-producing states while simultaneously attempting to reorganize global trade around geopolitical loyalties, similar contradictions could become increasingly frequent.

For Moscow, the strategic opportunity would lie in converting temporary economic relevance into sustained diplomatic leverage. That would require more than exporting additional diesel; it would depend on whether Russia can offer forms of economic cooperation that Washington finds difficult to replace.

The emerging question is therefore not whether America can continue sanctioning Russia, but how much geopolitical freedom Washington will retain if exercising that power increasingly threatens its own economic stability. The answer could shape not only the future of US–Russia relations, but also the limits of American coercive diplomacy in an increasingly fragmented international order.

Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs

MBS Needs to Decide: Israel or Turkey and Pakistan. Are We Seeing the Fall of the House of Saud?

The fact that Trump made a comment that Israel has been “very helpful” to Saudi Arabia reveals a strategic dilemma facing Mohammed bin Salman: either to align himself with Israel and thereby offend the Arab and Muslim worlds, or to embrace regional collective security and accept the prospect of a Middle East in which Washington ceases to have the final say.

Ricardo Martins

The House of Saud could be reaching what might be its most dangerous turning point in decades. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) is facing a strategic problem which goes well beyond the situation in Yemen: should Riyadh enhance its security ties with Israel under pressure from the United States, or should it instead reinforce its alliances with Pakistan and Turkey, whose governments have made it clear that their military commitments are defensive and not a licence for cooperation with Israel?

On October 16th, US President Donald Trump stated that Israel had been “very helpful” to Saudi Arabia and suggested that there was renewed momentum regarding the Abraham Accords. He gave no explanation of the kind of assistance Israel had provided. Yet, the comment did raise an uncomfortable question as to how far Israel’s security capabilities have already been incorporated into the defence of a country which has no diplomatic relations with Israel.

MBS has to decide on the type of regional order he would like to see Saudi Arabia part of

During a discussion involving the Indian defence analyst Pravin Sawhney and the Pakistani host Zulfiqar Ali, a former intelligence officer, the latter quoted Pakistani sources who stated that Israeli military and intelligence personnel had taken part in Saudi operational meetings. He also claimed that MBS had been faced with a choice between Israel and the developing security partnership between Pakistan and Turkey.

The strategic dilemma is certainly real, no matter what the exact details of the claims are. It is possible that the MBS is realising that American protection comes with political conditions, and Trump is clearly playing the Abraham Accord card, while the alternative options carry their own risks and put Israel’s cooperation as a red line. Should the security arrangements in Saudi Arabia break down, the consequences could spread across the entire Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), endangering regional stability, the energy markets and the other foundations of American influence in West Asia.

The Israeli Option: Security Today but Political Ruin Tomorrow

The appeal of Israel to MBS can be understood as he is cornered internally and externally. Although Saudi Arabia has huge financial resources and advanced Western military equipment, the high cost of weapons does not necessarily mean that they will result in effective combat capabilities, since intelligence integration, operational coordination and missile interception call for expertise which cannot be bought with another defence contract.

As Sawhney has assessed, Israeli troops have assisted in coordinating the Saudi missile-defence operations. If this is true, it would show a degree of practical security cooperation that goes well beyond what is normally seen in the diplomatic normalisation linked to the Abraham Accords.

Trump’s willingness to expand those agreements could thus offer MBS a deal in which he would become more aligned with both Israel and Washington in return for help concerning the immediate threats. But what would Saudi Arabia have to pay as compensation?

The political consequences are huge. For many Arabs and Muslims, normal relations with Israel without any real advance towards the establishment of a Palestinian state would amount to a betrayal of the Palestinian cause. For the Saudi monarchy, whose legitimacy is linked to its role as custodian of Mecca and Medina, this is not just a public relations issue since it affects the kingdom’s religious status and its broader regional identity.

Saudi Arabia is not merely another country in the Gulf aiming at commercial advantages; its political influence, its energy resources and its religious importance mean that its decisions have consequences throughout the Muslim world.

Although MBS could conclude that the capabilities of the United States and Israel provide the best means of securing his position, the very situation designed to protect his family could end up undermining the domestic and regional basis of its power. A Saudi leadership that appears to be dependent risks losing the support of its military allies, its tribal groups and the population who already reject the idea of partnering with Israel.

There is also a danger: Israel’s strategic interests do not coincide with those of Saudi Arabia. Israel aims at eliminating the threats posed by Iran and its regional allies, at safeguarding its enhanced territory and at influencing the security structure of the Middle East, whereas Saudi Arabia requires a stable neighbourhood, a secure energy infrastructure and protection from a conflict which could endanger the monarchy itself.

In the short term, the objectives may overlap, but they will not converge in the long term. A security partnership which enhances Israel’s position in the region does not automatically ensure the political survival of Saudi Arabia – on the contrary, it risks the reign of the Saudi family.

The notion that Israel has a definite plan to dismantle Saudi Arabia or that the so-called Greater Israel project inherently demands the kingdom’s subordination should not be regarded as a settled fact. Instead, the more convincing argument is that a regional arrangement centred on Israeli security and American military power may leave Saudi interests in a dangerously vulnerable position.

Pakistan, Turkey and the Battle for a Post-American Middle East

The other option is not a straightforward decision between Israel and two Muslim states that are friendly to it: it is a struggle between different visions of regional security.

The Mecca Defence Alliance might provide Saudi Arabia with a means of cooperating with both Pakistan and Turkey and possibly Egypt. Its importance would not be merely in terms of military aid but rather in the opportunity to establish joint security arrangements that do not rely completely on the capabilities of Washington or Israel.

Pakistan is of special significance since its relations with Saudi Arabia have long contained political, religious and defensive elements. Turkey also has considerable military power and plays an important role in the region. Nevertheless, both countries have constraints as to what they are willing to do, and it would be wrong to assume that either one is ready to fight an offensive war on Saudi Arabia’s behalf.

This is important, as an alliance meant to defend Saudi territory does not necessarily imply a promise to protect MBS personally, no matter what political decisions he makes. The reported fact that he brought in Israeli intelligence officers made his two partners unhappy.

On 15 October, Vladimir Kolokoltsev, Russia’s Interior Minister, finished a four-day trip to Pakistan, during which he met a number of senior Pakistani officials, one of them being Field Marshal Asim Munir, and regional security was one of the topics covered.

The fact that this visit takes place does not show that Pakistan is giving up on Saudi Arabia or is replacing its relationships with the West by turning to a different arrangement led by Russia. On the other hand, it does show that Islamabad is interested in widening its strategic possibilities, since its ties with Russia, China, Iran and Turkey may become more important as the various regional powers think about how to handle security without depending entirely on American protection.

China’s position is especially important since Beijing has important economic interests in the Gulf’s energy supplies and in regional connectivity. It could help with reconstruction, infrastructure development and economic stabilisation should regional conflicts finally cease. However, economic influence must not be taken to mean that there will be military intervention.

The strategic opportunity for Saudi Arabia is to diversify its partnerships before the situation is forced into that position, which would involve pursuing a de-escalation with Iran, enhancing regional diplomacy and establishing credible collective-defence agreements rather than viewing each security issue as a reason to increase its dependence on Washington.

The other option is to continue being dependent on external patrons whose interests might differ exactly when the kingdom needs support the most.

Yemen: The Pressure Point That Could Break the Kingdom

The greatest immediate risk might not be due to the diplomatic actions taking place in Washington or in Riyadh, but rather from Yemen.

The Houthi movement, which is called Ansar Allah, has shown that it is capable of challenging Saudi interests and of making the situation in the region more complicated. The fact that there is a prolonged conflict exerts pressure on the kingdom’s military resources, damages confidence in its ability to deter attacks and threatens the kind of stability needed for its economic transformation.

A more serious possibility is that a successful Houthi offensive could at some point put Saudi territory at risk and lead to internal conflicts within the royal family. It likewise talks about the historical Yemeni complaints regarding the areas that were incorporated into Saudi Arabia when the kingdom was established.

These situations are still speculative. There is no solid reason to believe that the Houthis will definitely invade Saudi Arabia, regain three provinces or bring the monarchy down. Yet, the possibility of the conflict spreading should not be ignored merely because Saudi Arabia has much greater financial resources.

The way in which the monarchy is organised might be just as significant as its military powers. Should the leadership suffer a serious military defeat, disagreements between the princes, the loyalties of the various tribes and the way authority is distributed among the members of the armed forces could become destabilising. A struggle for the succession or a split within the ruling elite would have consequences that reached well beyond Saudi borders.

That is the reason why the question of MBS’s personal survival must be linked to the future of the kingdom; a weakened Saudi state might destabilise the other GCC monarchies, disrupt the energy markets and provide opportunities for competing regional powers to extend their influence.

If a political settlement eventually arises in Yemen, China might become an important partner in the country’s reconstruction and development. However, such a result would be based on the outcomes of negotiations, the state of security and the political decisions made by the Yemenis themselves, not on an inevitable realignment of the geopolitical landscape.

The main point is that military escalation cannot indefinitely take the place of a political settlement.

MBS has to decide on the type of regional order he would like to see Saudi Arabia part of. He can increase security cooperation with Israel and in that way hope that Washington will keep protecting his family. Alternatively, he can make a more serious investment in regional diplomacy, collective defence and in a wider network of partnerships which includes Pakistan, Turkey, China and possibly Iran too.

Neither of the two courses ensures certain protection, but one of them has the extra risk of making Saudi security depend on a foreign power whose interests may not match those of the kingdom’s survival.

Colonel Douglas Macgregor, a former US military officer, has maintained that it is well probable for American forces to pull out considerably from the Middle East, as they did from Iraq and Afghanistan. It is not certain when or how much such a withdrawal would take place. Yet Riyadh should not think that American military supremacy will last forever.

Even if Washington’s role decreases, Saudi Arabia will need more than just costly weapons and personal connections with American presidents; it will also need a sustainable regional security strategy.

It by no means follows that the House of Saud will fall, but nor is its survival assured by promises from the United States, Israeli intelligence, or the kingdom’s oil wealth.

The decisive question is whether MBS can distinguish between protecting his dynasty in the short-term and protecting Saudi Arabia in the long term. If he cannot, the consequences could reach far beyond Riyadh and redraw the strategic map of the entire Gulf.

Ricardo Martins – Doctor of Sociology, specialist in European and international politics as well as geopolitics

Turkey’s Approach to Yemen: Pragmatism or Offensive?

In 2026, Turkey’s policy in Yemen shifted from exclusive neutrality and mediation efforts to “the brink” of military intervention against the government in Sanaa and the Ansar Allah movement, yet a range of geopolitical, legal and domestic political factors makes this scenario being fully put into practice unlikely.

Samyar Rostami

A Brief Retrospective of Turkish-Yemeni Relations

Relations between Turkey and Yemen date back to the outset of the Ottoman Empire’s conquests in the Arabian Peninsula, taking in the Ottoman occupation of Yemeni territory, Yemeni uprisings, and periods of conflict and stability. The Ottoman occupation of Yemen, interrupted by temporary periods of Yemeni independence, carried on until 1918, when Yemen declared itself an independent state.

Modern relations between Turkey and Yemen began in 1990, after the unification of North and South Yemen. In the civil war that broke out in 2014, Turkey, while not intervening militarily against the Houthis, took an active part in the negotiating process with representatives of Yemen’s official government, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Summits were held in 2016 and 2017, in September 2022, in 2023, in April 2024 and in 2026.

Turkey cannot condemn Sanaa while backing a Yemeni-Yemeni political solution. As military ties with Riyadh and Aden grow stronger, balancing with Sanaa will become harder

On the whole, Turkey’s approach to the Yemeni civil war was marked by support for a peaceful settlement of Yemen’s problems, its unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty, and the importance of an inclusive political solution in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2216 of 2015 and the ceasefire agreement of 7 April 2022.

Turkey’s Current Approach to Yemen: The 2026 Adjustments

In 2026, Turkey’s policy on the conflict in Yemen ramped up further, driven by rising military and political tension in South Yemen, the escalation of the US and Israeli war against Iran, and the conflict between Sanaa and Riyadh, rooted in mutual airstrikes by the Houthis and Saudi Arabia — all of which weigh on Turkey’s capacity as an interested exporter to Asia and Africa.

Ankara carried on speaking out firmly on developments, offering its own foreign-policy assessments. In January 2026, Turkey described events in Yemen’s southern governorates as “a threat to Yemen’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and to the security of neighbouring countries.” Turkish officials regularly talk up the need for economic and humanitarian cooperation in Yemen, the role of indirect diplomacy and mediation potential. In May 2026, Ankara called the prisoner-exchange agreement between the two main parties in Sanaa and Aden “a source of satisfaction.”

Alongside rhetoric, Turkey has taken practical steps to step up coordination with regional countries. As early as 2025, the UAE and Turkey signed a series of defence agreements and continued to hold bilateral summits in 2026, at which Turkey confirmed its solidarity with the UAE’s position on the need for greater regional responsibility on security.

In addition to closer cooperation with the UAE, Turkey has also held strategic talks and meetings with officials from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Having condemned in July and September 2026 Sanaa’s attacks and threats against Saudi Arabia and shipping in the region, on 7 August Ankara, alongside Riyadh and Islamabad, signed the “Mecca Joint Defence Agreement.” Under its terms, an armed attack on any signatory is to be treated as an attack on all three. And although, from Ankara’s point of view, the agreement is not aimed at any particular party, Turkey lays responsibility on Sanaa for much of Yemen’s instability and the threat to maritime security in the region.

In this connection, some sources reported that Ankara even sent Turkish military equipment and personnel directly to Yemen to assist members of the group it backs, Islah — the main opposition party in Yemen — operating in Marib governorate.

This whole set of measures points not merely to a 2026 upsurge in Turkish policy on Yemen’s civil war and related regional security, but also to a shift from proclaimed “neutrality” to a “conditional security commitment” with Riyadh and Aden.

Main Challenges of Turkish Possible Military Intervention in Yemen

Among the main challenges to direct military participation by Turkish armed forces in the conflict, the following stand out.

First, with presidential elections scheduled for 2028, President Erdogan’s ruling party, whose Yemen policy is under active criticism from opponents over the potential damage to ties with Iran, needs to hold on to its electoral base. Since the conflict in Yemen poses no direct threat to Turkey’s borders, Turkey’s entry into the war through armed intervention — especially to defend and support Saudi Arabia under the Mecca Agreement — could run into active opposition from segments of public opinion, particularly among Turkey’s Alevi community, whose position and mood play no small part in Turkey’s domestic political agenda.

Second, implementing a military presence in Yemen runs up against constitutional and legal difficulties, namely the need to secure parliamentary approval. The Mecca Agreement, submitted to the Grand National Assembly under Articles 80 and 92 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, has yet to gain parliament’s approval and final ratification — in other words, parliamentary approval for Turkish military intervention in Yemen.

Third, a policy of military intervention, whether participation in military operations or the use of Turkish bases to strike against Yemen, will undoubtedly damage Turkish-Yemeni economic relations, hitting Turkey’s presence across various sectors of the Yemeni economy and its image as a neutral mediator, which it has maintained all along, turning Ankara into a direct enemy of Sanaa. Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, a senior member of Ansar Allah (the Houthis) and of the government in Sanaa, recently said: “If Turkey and Pakistan intervene, we will hit them with an iron fist.”

In other words, Turkey cannot condemn Sanaa while backing a Yemeni-Yemeni political solution. As military ties with Riyadh and Aden grow stronger, balancing with Sanaa will become harder.

Moreover, the Sanaa government, which controls almost 80% of Yemen’s population, has welcomed Turkey’s help in humanitarian work and political mediation, repeatedly asking Ankara to remain neutral and not enter the conflict. From this point of view, any strikes on the Yemeni people will ultimately be directed against the Turkish people as well.

Fourth, if Turkey provides armed support to Riyadh and Aden against the Houthis and regards its actions as part of the implementation of the US concept of “burden-sharing” among allies, this could negatively affect Ankara’s relations with China, Russia and Iran, since the latter resist the establishment of West-centric military dominance in the region. Relations with Iran, obviously, would be directly threatened, since supportive statements for Saudi Arabia do not yet mean direct entry into conflict with Iran, whereas armed intervention on its side — or rather against the Houthis — would be equated with a proxy clash with Iran.

Thus, Turkish military intervention in the conflict in Yemen against the Sanaa government, being at this stage not yet authorised by the Turkish parliament, would complicate both Turkey’s geopolitical and economic position in the region and could entail domestic political costs.

Turkey-Yemen: Room for Balancing and Prospects

Ankara views Yemen within a broader geopolitical and geoeconomic equation tied to Turkey’s national security. The crisis in Yemen looks to Ankara like a chance to strengthen its role in the future of the Middle East, despite the absence of direct operations there. Accordingly, in Turkish calculations Yemen appears to have moved from a “secondary file” to a more important link in Middle East policy.

The most likely scenario is that Turkey will act as Saudi Arabia’s security partner under the Mecca Agreement, avoiding direct involvement in the conflict. Even without parliamentary approval, Ankara may choose not to send troops to Saudi Arabia or areas close to Yemen, instead limiting itself to lower-risk actions — for example, supplying weapons and ammunition to Riyadh. Therefore, it is more likely that Turkey will strengthen Saudi Arabia’s defence and deterrence capabilities through careful planning, extensive training and intelligence-sharing, but without direct participation in the war.

A less likely scenario envisages Turkey expanding its security role and taking on broader military commitments, including support for Riyadh and its Yemeni allies. Such actions could provoke confrontation with Iran and the “Axis of Resistance.” Finally, another unlikely scenario is Ankara retreating to a pragmatic stance and passive observation.

Thus, in effect, Turkey’s approach — having signed the Mecca Agreement with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in August 2026 amid the escalation of the US-Israeli conflict against Iran, blockades in the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and finally the escalation between Riyadh and the Houthis — began to move away from the neutrality it had practised throughout the first quarter of the 21st century, putting Ankara “on the brink” of military intervention in Yemen. However, the upcoming 2028 elections, the need for parliamentary ratification and the risks of confrontation with Iran, China and Russia constrain Ankara. The most likely scenario is support for Riyadh without direct participation in the war, which makes Yemen an important link in Turkey’s Middle East policy.

Samyar Rostami, а political observer and senior researcher in international relations