Monday, November 28, 2016

In memory of Fidel Castro, a friend of Iran


Iranian Diplomacy|Kaveh L. Afrasiabi: Fidel Castro, the iconic leader of the Cuban revolution and a giant of post-WWII global politics, was a true friend of the Iranian people and an avid admirer of the Islamic Revolution, who like Iran’s spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ruhallah Khomeini, was credited with chasing a corrupt US-backed dictator out of his country and for over a half century was a constant thorn in the side of US.  Fidel put the resources of his nation in the service of liberation struggles around the world, especially Africa, and was admired by the late Nelson Mandela for his tireless efforts against Apartheid.
Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani, who met the ailing Castro at his residence in Havana recently, aptly described the common ground of Iran and Cuba as symbols of resistance to coercive Western sanctions and hegemony.  Indeed, the list of commonalities between the two countries is a long one: both have led the Non-Aligned Movement, have confronted US interventionism and Washington’s “roll back” strategy and have also dealt with similar tragedies, like the terrorist downing of a Cuban passenger airplane similar to the Iranian plane that was shot down in cold-blood by an American missile. And while Cuba had to deal with the CIA-engineered Bay of Pigs invasion, Iran has had the similar US infiltration that was shut down by the sandstorm in Tabas.   But, above all, the thread of solidarity running between Havana and Tehran is cemented forever by the heroic resistance of both nations against decades of coercive sanctions, which in Cuba’s case meant a total blockade that has only been partially lifted as a result of the recent diplomatic detente between Havana and Washington.
How will history judge a man who in his own trial as a young revolutionary confidently asserted that history will absolve him?  History is, of course, often written by the victorious powers and, therefore, it is hardly surprising that Western historiography on Castro and his revolution is largely negative, focusing on the shortcomings of his rule, the human rights violations, the Cuban dependency on Soviet Union etc.  Alternatively, Cuban history seen through the prism of Third World nations presents a glowing image of Fidel as a brave nationalist who dedicated his whole life to various Third World causes and whose turn to Moscow’s assistance began after the American embargo and refusal to buy Cuban sugar, aiming to cripple the young post-revolutionary political order at its infancy.

We can safely assume that if Washington had not engaged in a thousand shades of conspiracy against the Cuban revolution, such as by plotting to assassinate Castro dozens of times and sponsoring a proxy invasion of Cuba under JFK’s watch in 1961, then chances are the Cuban democracy would not be subjected to the limitations of an state of emergency that gripped the island nation for decades.  Intent on safeguarding the social, political, and economic human rights of Cuban people striving for self-sovereignty and independence, Castro, who nationalized the US-owned companies, earned the volcanic wrath of Uncle Sam that not only failed to dislodge him but also saw the replication of Cuban revolution in a number of Central and Latin American countries such as Nicaragua and Venezuela.  The struggle for the hemisphere’s independence, which began with Jose Marti two centuries ago, is still on-going and experiencing the tumults of changing times.
Like Mandela, Cabral, Lumumba, Che, and other Third World revolutionaries, Fidel will be always remembered as a larger-than-life charismatic leader who empowered his nation and raised their stature in world affairs, irrespective of the various flaws of the Cuban revolution, many of which were imposed from the without — by an intrusive Western superpower.

Wednesday, November 23, 2016

Future Outlook for the Strategic Triangle of Iran, China, US

Mohsen Shariatinia
Assistant Professor, Shahid Beheshti University
China’s Defense Minister General Chang Wanquan paid an official visit to Iran recently at a time that international politics is surrounded by ambiguities more than any time before during the past two decades and under conditions when some analysts maintain that the West has reached the finish line. Americans have held an election, which has turned into a problem for other countries, including Iran and China. During his Iran visit, General Wanquan, China’s minister of defense, met and conferred with his Iranian counterpart, Brigadier General Hossein Dehqan, and their negotiations led to the signing of a defense and military agreement between the two countries. However, under present conditions, the issue, which is considered as more important than the details of the trip and the agreement reached during it, is the future outlook for the strategic triangle among Iran, China and the United States. Relations between Iran and China are both old and new. During more than four decades, which have passed since establishment of new relations between the two countries, the United States has been playing a key role in shaping those relations. In other words, the modern ties between Iran and China have been always trilateral, not bilateral. Before the Islamic Revolution, the United States acted as a catalyst and played a key role in shaping and early strengthening of these relations. Following the revolution and especially during the past decade, the United States has played multiple roles in this regard, the most important of which has been aimed at restricting these relations and creating important impediments on the way of their development, especially in all fields that would go beyond exporting “Chinese goods” to Iran.
Following the conclusion of Iran’s nuclear deal with the P5+1 group of countries, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), this triangle underwent some change. As a result, during the past year, the strategic pressure exerted by the United States on Iran’s relations with China has decreased and Iran has been treading the path toward desecuritization. Apart from that and in a rare course of events, Iran, China, and the United States were expected to rebuild Iran’s Arak nuclear reactor in cooperation with one another, though this project is still far from the beginning. This is why the highest ranking Chinese official traveled to Iran immediately after signing of the JCPOA and following a hiatus of 14 years and even talked about the necessity of promoting the strategic partnership between Tehran and Beijing. In other words, during the post-JCPOA era, gradual signs have emerged showing that interactions between Iran and China are becoming bilateral and returning to normal track.
However, now and a relatively short while after implementation of the JCPOA started, the third side of this triangle has changed and this change has posed a key question as to the future outlook for interactions between Iran and China. In the United States, a man has been elected as president whose fame, more than anything else, is owned to his odd remarks and is so unaware and defiant of the international politics that – as put by the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker – he thinks Belgium is a village somewhere in Europe! Iran and China have been two main targets of his harsh remarks. On the one hand, he has threatened that he will rip the JCPOA, while on the other hand, he has accused China of trade invasion against the United States, noting that his administration will consider 45-percent tariffs on China’s exports to the United States, which amount to about 500 billion dollars a year. Of course, it goes without saying that the exigencies of election rhetoric in a clamorous society like that of the United States are totally different from exigencies of governing the same society. Another point is that in the United States, the ruling system evidently outdoes any person, though some people like the former US secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, have noted that the election win of president-elect, Donald Trump, would mean the collapse of the social contract in America. However, if Trump makes practical efforts to put in action even part of his harsh promises, the United States will once more enter the context of relations between Iran and China and will be potentially able to cause some form of “back to the future” in these relations. The question is how will China react if Trump starts by focusing on the JCPOA?
It is clear that China will find itself at a difficult crossroads where it will have to choose between interests and responsibility and it is very difficult to predict how it will behave under these conditions. If Trump does not rip the JCPOA, but try to once more securitize the Iran issue and define Iran within such conceptual frameworks as the so-called Axis of Evil and the likes of that, interactions between Iran and China will probably slow down and become difficult and complicated. What would happen to planned cooperation among Iran, China and the United States for the reconstruction of Iran’s Arak nuclear reactor under such hypothetical future conditions? Another scenario, however, which can be thought of is one in which foolhardiness (as an indispensable part of politics) would cause the United States’ foreign policy to go astray and this would provide such reformist countries as Iran and China with unprecedented opportunities across the world. On the other hand, the combination of foolhardiness and power would make international politics more prone to catastrophe than any time before. If foolhardiness becomes a feature of the center of the world’s power, its catastrophic effects may afflict Iran and China before and more than others.
In short, relations between Iran and China are on the verge of a profound paradigmatic alteration as a result of this profoundly vague change in the United States. At present, both countries have to hope for the best and plan for the worst. What is clear now is that not only Iran and China, but also the rest of 194 world countries are studying and speculating about this rare phenomenon in international politics; a phenomenon, which takes place but once in several decades.

Thursday, November 17, 2016

Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Mistakes in Confrontation with Iran








Hossein Kebriaeezadeh and Kayhan Barzegar


As the Middle East is consumed by war and tensions, Saudi Arabia, which has a claim to be the leader of the Islamic world and the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, is beating the drums of war with its Muslim brethren. The country, which has taken an overtly hostile approach toward its regional rivals under its new monarch, King Salman, has gone as far as using religion as a tool to deprive Iranian Hajj pilgrims from taking part in the religious ceremony of Hajj, which is one of the most important rituals in Islam.

The fact that Saudi Arabia launches a military war on Yemen or, at domestic level, issues death sentence for such an influential cleric as Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, indicates that Riyadh is shifting its strategy from proxy war to direct confrontation with Iran.

Saudi Arabia’s failures in the region and the pursuit of a confrontational foreign policy with Iran should be considered among those strategic mistakes part of which stems from the country’s political order and its foreign policy, which lacks adequate support base. Another part of these measures has its roots in Saudi Arabia’s miscalculations with regard to its allies in the region and, in general, is due to Riyadh’s inability to correctly differentiate friend from enemy.

The roots of conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia are often assigned to ideological Shia-Sunni rivalry or geopolitical competition over each country’s role in the region. These were escalated by the Hajj incident last year in which hundreds of Iranian pilgrims died.

But one should not ignore another significant factor in the equation: the two states’ conflicting views on the presence of the US in the region and the security challenges which flow from it.

The Saudis have traditionally perceived the US presence in the region as supporting their interests and for regional security. From their perspective, such presence is essential for containing Iran’s growing regional role. They complain that, by overthrowing the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, the US changed the regional balance of power in favour of Iran. They fear that Barak Obama’s engagement policy in light of the nuclear deal means that Washington has embarked on the the path of accepting Iran’s dominant role in the region.

To counter this, the Saudis have adopted a two-pronged policy. First, they have embarked on an independent and offensive policy in the region, known as the Salman Doctrine, which is aimed primarily at containing Iran everywhere in the region and the world by all available political, military and economic means. Second, they are using intensive lobbying in the US Congress and US think-tanks in order to challenge the positive results of the nuclear deal between Iran and the US

Saudi Arabia took measures in Syria, Yemen and Iraq beyond its political capacities the main result of which was the growth of a phenomenon known as Daesh. Recently leaked emails sent by former US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, clearly prove that Saudi Arabia has been providing financial and arms support to Daesh and other Sunni extremist groups. However, the empowerment of this Takfiri group not only gave Iran an upper hand in the region, but led to a strategic alliance between Iran and Russia in Syria through a change in goals and strategy of this terrorist group.



One of the most important reasons behind Saudi Arabia’s regional failures and the sense of threat it feels from Iran should be sought in Riyadh’s special viewpoint to the region. This country does not believe that regional equations are multidimensional and when formulating its aggressive foreign policy approach toward Iran, considers regional equations as only containing a single variable. As a result, Riyadh believes that its dwindling influence in the Middle East region is the result of the increasing clout of Iran in regional countries. This oversimplification of developments in the complicated Middle East region forces Saudi Arabia to choose the easiest way in its confrontational approaches toward its rivals. This comes while it is clear that in any geographical region from Latin America all the way to the Middle East, there are always at least two countries, which are rivals, but at the same time, they always prevent their rivalry from taking an aggressive and confrontational turn.

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia lacks a correct and purposive viewpoint and strategy for rivalry with Iran. The policy of isolating Iran in the region is pursued by Saudi Arabia due to the spiritual influence that Riyadh sways among Islamic countries. However, apart from a few cases, which have proved successful through Saudi Arabia bribing those countries, this policy has generally failed in all other cases. At the same time, the nuclear deal that Iran clinched last year with the P5+1 group of world powers has practically removed obstacles in the way of Iran’s integration into the international community. On the other hand, developments in Syria have fared in Iran’s favor, as said before, after they led to closer cooperation among Iran, Russia and China.

Riyadh does not take advantage of suitable tools in its rivalry and confrontation with other countries. Supporting and organizing Takfiri groups has caused those groups to be a more serious threat to the international community and the West than being a threat for Iran and its allied countries, and has led to the establishment of  a global anti-Daesh front.

In the meantime, inefficiency of the Saudi-led Arab coalition in its war on Yemen has prevented it from changing the balance of power in favor of Riyadh as Saudi officials expected. On the other hand, diplomatic moves made by Saudi Arabia in the Middle East, especially in the Persian Gulf region, to convince its regional allies and create a coalition among all Sunni states against Iran have proven futile. Domestic tensions and differences between Persian Gulf littoral states and Saudi Arabia in addition to extreme weakness of these countries in military terms will practically render any possible military coalition among them ineffective. This is especially true taking into account that such militarily powerful countries as Pakistan and Turkey have not gone beyond lip service in their support for Riyadh.

After Saudi Arabia suffered frequent failures in the face of Iran, it could only take revenge on Iran, which had gotten rid of restrictions that were imposed on the country over its nuclear program, through a faceoff within the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). However, due to overreliance of Saudi Arabia’s economy on oil revenues and a budget deficit amounting to 98 billion dollars, this ageing tool cannot be a secure means for confrontation with Iran. Under conditions of sanctions, Iran learned that due to global economic conditions and the sway of political motivations over the international community, the policies of the Economy of Resistance must be pursued for transition from an oil-based economy.

The conditions, however, are different for Saudi Arabia due to its monocultural economy and high reliance on oil revenues. As a result, the first field to be affected by militarization of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy is the Saudi society. At domestic level, delineating the country’s geopolitical strategy on the basis of threatening and having tension with neighboring countries has made it difficult for Saudi Arabia to achieve its vision goals for 2025, according to which Riyadh was supposed to promote its standing in the Middle East in terms of domestic welfare and economic achievements.

On the other hand, focusing on confrontation in relations with Iran has had untoward consequences for this country. Increasing domestic and regional costs and absence of balance in purposive and smart relations with neighboring countries in addition to political passivity have been major outcomes of Saudi Arabia’s effort to define Iran as an enemy. In line with this policy, Saudi Arabia’s unfortunate alignment with Israel, which is the black sheep in the eyes of Muslim nations, has been among those factors, which have served to tarnish the prestige of Riyadh among regional states.

At present, there are two perspectives in Iran for how to deal with Saudi Arabia’s offensive policies. One view maintains that Iran should take a tougher stance towards Saudi Arabia because it will otherwise send a wrong message to the US about Iran’s role and strength in the region and this might dismay Iran’s regional allies, subsequently weakening Iran’s regional stances.

But the other perspective, and this is the dominant one, supports a policy of patience towards the Saudis. From this perspective, Saudi Arabia is currently acting beyond its strategic capability and national strength and since the US is not in favour of getting involved militarily in Syria and Yemen, the Saudis’ current offensive and warmongering policy in these countries will not last long.

In fact, Iran’s continued policy of avoiding tension and conflict with Saudi Arabia is aimed at defusing the Saudis’ bid to involve or commit the US militarily in the region. The reality is that Obama’s non-intervention policy in Syria, along with stressing the necessity for all actors, especially Iran, to take part in any regional peace talks, is a strategic development toward enhancing multilateral diplomacy in the region.

This is the only way to reduce tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The next US president, whether it is Clinton or Trump, should continue this policy and thereby pave the way to sustainable peace and security in the region.

Wednesday, November 09, 2016

Tapping into anger of white ignorant Americans, Trump rides into the White House

Crescent International

Donald Trump’s stunning victory has left not only the American establishment but the rest of the world also shell-shocked. This is not how it was supposed to have worked out.

The establishment had already given Hillary R. Clinton the presidency. She was the quintessential insider who would keep the system running for the corporate thieves and robbers.

On Election Day, the New York Times gave Ms. Clinton 84 percent chance of clinching the presidency becoming the first woman to occupy White House (it should be remembered that she acted as virtual president during her husband Bill Clinton’s tenure as president from 1993-2000).

The ambitious former Secretary of State had probably already prepared her victory speech and early in the evening on Tuesday November 8, as media pundits reported on voting patterns, the mood at Clinton’s New York headquarters was upbeat.

In Trump’s camp a few blocks away, the mood was much more subdued. As election results started to come in, it zeroed in on five states that would prove decisive: Florida, Michigan, New Hampshire, North Carolina and Pennsylvania. The Clinton camp was confident they had a good chance in Florida, Michigan and Pennsylvania where they had invested immense resources and manpower.

So how did Trump pull it off when few ‘experts’ gave him a fleeting chance of winning because of his unorthodox campaign style and refusing to abide by any rules? He took shots at his own party establishment, reveled in talk that he groped women and said a lot of nasty things about immigrants, Muslims and a host of others. None of these seem to affect his campaign.

He presented himself as a friend of the common people although he has nothing in common with them. Trump is a billionaire who lives in a marble-wrapped three-story penthouse apartment on Fifth Avenue. He successfully tapped into the resentment of white uneducated Americans telling them that the Washington establishment was corrupt—it is—but they bought into his line that he would fix it. Whether he would does not really matter.

Not surprisingly, 60 percent of white uneducated American men and 52 percent of white American women voted for him.

“The forgotten men and women of our country will be forgotten no longer,” Trump told supporters around 3 am early day (Nov. 09) at a rally in New York City, just after Mrs. Clinton called to concede. And departing from his usual crude remarks about Hillary Clinton whom he said he would “lock up” once he became president, he praised her for her services to the country.

“Now it’s time for America to bind the wounds of division,” he said. “It is time for us to come together as one united people. It’s time.” That, he added, “is so important to me.”

He even promised to seek common ground with others abroad but insisted America would come first. He promised to make “American great” again. How he would do it remains a mystery but some of his outlandish campaign assertions that he would build a wall along the Mexico border (and even make them pay for it) seem far-fetched. He even threatened to shut out all Muslims from the US. It remains to be seen how he would do that when about 10 percent of all University professors and 7 percent doctors in US hospitals are Muslims.

On the flip side, Hillary Clinton was not able to connect with her support base the way Trump did. She remained aloof and disconnected. Hillary who earned the epithet Killary because of her belligerent policies when was Secretary of State in President Barack Obama’s first term, was seen by many people as being corrupt and in the pocket of Wall Street especially Goldman Sachs.

The angry white American has delivered a tight slap on the face of the establishment. Whether this will translate into any meaningful change in their lives is debatable. America is definitely entering uncharted territory and while it is on its way down, it remains danger.

When an elephant is about to fall, it is best to get out of the way.

Welcome to Donald Trump’s America: angry, brash and against everyone!

Donald TrumpHillary ClintonUS ElectionsUnited States

Monday, November 07, 2016

WAHHABISM: UNDERSTANDING THE ROOTS AND ROLE MODELS OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM

by Zubair Qamar* 
condensed and edited by ASFA staff

Introduction 

The most extremist pseudo-Sunni movement today is Wahhabism (also known as Salafism ). While many may think that Wahhabi terror is a recent 
phenomenon that has only targeted non-Muslims, it will surprise many to know that the orthodox Sunni Muslims were the first to be slaughtered in waves of Wahhabi massacres in Arabia hundreds of years ago. One only has to read the historical evolution of Saudi Arabia to know the gruesome details of the tragedy - a tragedy in which thousands of Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims 
perished at the hands of Wahhabi militants. 

The extremist interpretations of Wahhabism, although previously confined to small pockets of people in Arabia, has survived to this day underthe protection, finance, and tutelage of the Saudi state religious organs.This has transformedWahhabism - and related Salafi groups that receive inspiration and support from them - fromaregional to a global threat to be reckoned withbythe world community.To a Wahhabi-Salafi, all   those who differ with them, including Sunni Muslims, Shi'ite Muslims, Christians,and Jews,are infidels who are fair targets. 

Do the majority of Sunnis support Wahhabism ? Are Sunnis and Wahhabis one and the same? 

What is a Wahhabi? 

Because Wahhabis claim to be "true Sunnis," it is difficult for one who is unfamiliar with Wahhabism to distinguish it from orthodox Sunni   Islam.
 
If a Wahhabi is asked if he/she is Sunni,he/shewill always reply in the affirmative.When askedif they are Wahhabis,they reply with an emphatic "no" as they consider it an insult to what they believe and stand for: "Purity of worship and reverence to God alone. The authentic carriers of Islam from the time of the Prophet (s)[l] until now." Calling them Wahhabis implies that 
they learned ideas from a man - Muhammad ibn   Abdul-Wahhab - instead of the Qur'an and Sunnah-the two great sources of Islam. Irrespectiveof what they think, they are not following the Islamic sources authentically, but the wrong interpretations of the founder of the Wahhabi      movement who appeared in the 1700s. Sunnis and otherWahhabi detractors have labeled them as   Wahhabis to differentiate them from orthodox   Sunnis. 

Wahhabis as Salafis : deceptive semantics 

Wahhabis differentiate themselves from orthodoxSunnis by labeling themselves Salafis, which   refers to the word salaf- the time period in   which the early Muslims lived in the first 300 years after the Hijra, or emigration, of Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in 622. The Companions (Sahaba), those who followed the Companions ( Tabi'een ), and those who followed thosewho followed the Companions (Taba ai-Tabi'een) who lived in the time period of the Salaf are  exemplars par excellence of what Muslims shouldbe, as Prophet Muhammad (s) had praised these Muslims as being the best of Muslims. Therefore,it has been the aim of every Muslim since the 
time of Prophet Muhammad(s) to adhere to and tofollow the footsteps of the adherents of the salaf. This means that when a Wahhabi calls himself a Salafi, he claims to be a genuine followerof pristine Islam. This, however, is far from  the truth. 

OrthodoxSunni Muslims believe that they are thetrue bearers of pristine Islam since the timeperiod of the Salaf. Because there were time gapsbetween the noble period of the Salaf and      centuries that followed, the authentic positions of the early Muslims were passed by scholars in those 
times and afterwards to later generations via meticulous, systematic, and 
methodological means of preservation. The knowledge was passed from 
qualified scholars to other qualified scholars through the centuries, who 
passed it to the masses. This uninterrupted chain of knowledge from the 
time of the Salaf until now has been authentically preserved by the orthodox 
Sunnis. Orthodox Sunnis, therefore, have roots in the Salaf, and are 
represented today by the four surviving authentic schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence: Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki, and Hanbali schools ( madhahib ). 

The Wahhabis, by calling themselves Salafis, not only claim to follow the 
footsteps of the early Muslims, but also use semantics to fool and allure 
less informed Muslims into accepting Wahhabism. Wahhabis say, "You must 
follow the Muslims of the Salaf." (This is undoubtedly true.) Then the Wahhabi 
semantics: "Therefore you must be a Salafi and nothing else. Following 
anything else means you're following a path that is different from the Muslims 
of the Salaf." By such deceptive semantics, the less informed Muslims believe 
that Salafis must truly represent the pristine interpretations of the early 
Muslims of the Salaf. After all, the word Salafi sounds like Salaf, so it must 
truly be representative of it. Far from it. When the less informed goes beyond 



semantics and blind faith and investigates what a Salafi believes, the truth 
unveiled is that the understanding of Salafis (Wahhabis ) is different and 
contradictory to the understanding and positions of the pious Muslims who 
lived in the Salaf - and the majority of Muslims who have ever lived (Sunnis). 


Wahhabi-Salafi variety 


The Wahhabi-Salafis believe that Sunnis have been vehemently wrong for 
the past 1,000+ years and aim to bring the Muslims out of a state of 
ignorance (Jahilliyya ) that has existed, in their minds, since the time of the 
pious adherents of the Salaf. Even if the majority of orthodox Sunni Muslims 
were strong today, indeed if they ruled an empire that stretched far to 
every corner of the globe, it would still be a failure to Salafis because to 
them the foundations of such a political system would have been based on 
reprehensible innovation ( bid'a ) and blasphemy ( kufr ). 

To the Salafi, the presence and power of Sunni orthodoxy, in all of its 
manifestations as illustrated throughout Islamic history, is just as impure as 
the rising European hegemony in all of its manifestations since the demise 
of the Muslim Ottoman Empire. To the Salafis, a minority in this world, the 
world is an abode of blasphemy, ruled and occupied by infidels that demands reformation through both non-violent and violent means to bring about a supposedly pure Islamic world system. 

Wahhabi-Salafis come in various strains, some being more extreme than others. The variety in strains is due to differences in approach of bringing the Muslims back to a state of strengthened belief based on the example of the pious ancestors. It must be emphasized that although allWahhabis are called Salafis, all Salafis are   not purely Wahhabi."Salafi Muslims" include    those like Syed Qutb who wish to eradicate the supposed current state of ignorance (jahiliyya )and bring Muslims back to a state of purity - a purity reminiscent of the purity of Muslims  who lived in the time period of the Salaf. 
However, all Salafi Muslims, whether they are  Wahhabi or Qutbi, admire with exaggeration the role models Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhab and AhmadIbn Taymiyah, whose hard-line interpretations  have inspired revolutionaries today. Therefore,although all Salafis are not Wahhabis, they    admire many of the same role models - role models who have been rejected and condemned by masses of orthodox Sunni scholars for their unauthentic representations of pristine Islam. It can also be said that all Wahhabis consider themselves to be Salafis and prefer to be called by   this name (instead of Wahhabi ), even though differences exist between Salafi groups. 



Although there are differences in approach among Salafis, they have nonetheless allied themselves in an attempt to make the Salafi vision a  reality by both non-violent and violent means. 

An example of this are the Sa/a/7-oriented Deobandis and their alliance with the Wahhabis. The alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood (and its various factions and offshoots) and the Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia was strengthened during the 1950s and 1960s in the struggle of the MuslimBrotherhood against Egypt's Nasserist regime.  Saudis had provided refuge for some leaders of 
the Brotherhood, and also provided assistance  to them in other Arab States. 

The Wahhabi-Salafi alliance was further strengthened as a response to the growing threat of   Shi'ah power when the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeiniof Iran revolted and overthrew the U.S-alliedShah in 1979. 

Lastly, the alliance made itself manifest in the holy struggle {jihad ) against the atheist/Communist Soviets in Afghanistan. Salafis of all strains worked together as the "righteous Sunnis" to counter the Shi'ah- Communist threat, 
from proselytizing to killing to make their Salafism prevail. Indeed, Salafis have used both proselytizing and revolutionary means to expresstheir message using both political and apolitical approaches.So-called "Sunni terrorism" todayis perpetrated by radical Salafis who desire toreplace "infidel" governments with myopic "scholars" who adhere to their fanatical interpretations and ideologies. Their tentacles are spreadto all corners of the globe, including Bosnia, Albania, Indonesia, Philippines, Uzbekistan, England, Malaysia, South Africa, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Salafis have demonstrated the havoc they are capable of wreaking in recentdecades. 

Wahhabis as neo-Kharijites 








The Wahhabis are especially notorious for reviving the ways of the Khawarij (or Kharijites). They originated in the time of the caliphates ofUthman and Ali, among the closest companions toProphet Muhammad. 


They were the earliest group of fanatics who separated themselves from the Muslim community. They arose in opposition to Ali-Prophet Muhammad's son-in-law - because of his willingness to arbitrate with Mu'awiyah, governor of Damascus at that time, over the issue of the caliphate. The Khawarij, meaning "those who exited," slung accusations of blasphemy against Ali and Mu'awiyah - and those who followed them -saying that the Qur'an, and not them, had the ultimate authority in the matter. Ibn al-Jawzi, an orthodox Sunni scholar, in his book Talbis Iblis (The Devil's Deception) under the chapter heading "A Mention of the Devil's Delusion upon the Kharijites," says that Dhu'l-Khuwaysira al-Tamimi was the first Kharijite in Islam and that "[h]is fault was to be satisfied with his own view; had he paused he would have realized that there is no view superior to that of Allah's Messenger."Furthermore, the orthodox Sunni scholar ImamAbdal-Qahir al-Baghdadi discusses the Kharijite rebellions and their bloody massacres of tens of thousands of Muslims in one of his books. He explicitly mentions the Azariqa, one of the most atrocious Kharijite movements led by Nafi' ibn al-Azraq from the tribe of Banu Hanifa- the same tribe where the heretic Musaylima the Prevaricator (or Liar) who claimed prophethood alongside Prophet Muhammad came from. Just as the Khawarij threw accusations of blasphemy on Ali and Mu'awiya, Wahhabis throw accusationsof blasphemy against Sunnis and Shi'ites. 


The Al-Sa ' ud and Muhammad ibn ' Abdul- 
Wahhab - the founder of Wahhabism 

Wahhabism is named after the its founder, Muhammad ibn ' Abdul-Wahhab (1703-1792), and has its roots in the land now known as Saudi Arabia. 
Without this man, the al-Sa'ud ?, one of many clans spread over the Arabian peninsula, would not have had the inspiration, reason, and determination to consolidate the power that they did and wage ’jihad" on people they perceived to be "polytheists" - those who attribute partners in worship to Almighty God. How intimately close was al-Sa'udi's association with Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhab? Robert Lacey eloquently illustrates this association: 

Until [Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhab's] coming the Al Sa'ud ? had been a minor sheikhly clan like many others in Nejd, townsmen and farmers, making a comfortable living from trade, dates and perhaps a little horse-breeding, combining 
with the desert tribes to raid outwards when they felt strong, prudently retrenching in times of weakness. Modestly independent, they were inno way empire builders, and it is not likely that the wider world would ever have heard of them without their alliance with the Teacher. [2] 

The al-Sa'ud are originally from the village ofad-Diriyah, located in Najd, in eastern Arabia situated near modern day Riyadh, the capital ofSa'ud?i Arabia. Ancestors of Sau'ud Ibn Muhammad, whom little is known about, settled in the area as agriculturists and gradually grew in number over time into the clan of al-Sa'ud ?. 

Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhab was raised in Uyainah, an oasis in southern Najd, and was from the  Banu Tamim tribe. He came from a religious      family and left Uyainah in pursuit of Islamic knowledge. He traveled to Mecca, Medina, Iraq, and   Iran to acquire knowledge from different teachers.When he returned to his homeland of Uyainah,he preached what he believed to be Islam in itspurity - which was, in fact, a vicious assault on traditional Sunni Islam. 

The orthodox Sunni scholar Jamil Effendi al-Zahawi said that the teachers of Ibn ' Abdul-Wahhab, including two teachers he had studied with in Medina - Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Su lay man al-Kurdi and Shaykh Muhammad Hay at al- Sindi - became aware of his anti-Sunni Wahhabi creed and warned Muslims from him. His shaykhs, including the two aforementioned shaykhs, used to say: "God will allow him [to] be led astray; but even unhappier will be the lot of those misled by him. "[3] 

Moreover, Ibn ' Abdul-Wahhab's own father had warned Muslims from him, as did his biological brother, Sulayman Ibn 'Abdul-Wahhab, an orthodox 
Sunni scholar who refuted him in a book entitled al-Sawa'iq al-Ilahiyya fi al- radd 'ala al-Wahhabiyya ["Divine Lightnings in Refuting the Wahhabis"]- Ibn 'Abdul-Wahhab was refuted by the orthodox Sunni scholars for his many ugly innovations. Perhaps his most famous book, Kitab at-Tawheed (Book of Unity of God) is widely circulated amongst Wahhabis worldwide, including the United States. His book is popular in Wahhabi circles, although orthodox Sunni scholars have said that there is nothing scholarly about it, both in terms of its content and its style. 

Ibn Taymiyah: the Wahhabi founder's role model 

It is worth giving an overview of a man named Ahmed Ibn Taymiyah (1263-1328) who lived a few hundred years before Muhammad ibn 'Abdul- Wahhab. The Wahhabi founder admired him as a role model and embraced many of his pseudo-Sunni positions. Who exactly was Ibn Taymiyah and what did orthodox Sunni scholars say about him? Muslim scholars had mixed opinions about him depending on his interpretation of various issues. His 
straying from mainstream Sunni Islam on particular issues of creed (' aqeedah) and worship (' ibadat) made him an extremely controversial 
figure in the Muslim community. 

Ibn Taymiya has won the reputation of being thetrue bearer of the early pious Muslims, especially among reformist revolutionaries, while the majority of orthodox Sunnis have accused him ofreprehensible bid'ah (reprehenisible innovation), some accusing him of kufr (unbelief). {4} 

It behooves one to ask why Ibn Taymiyah had received so much opposition from reputable Sunni scholars who were known for their asceticism, 
trustworthiness, and piety. Some of Ibn Taymiyah's anti-Sunni and controversial positions include: 


(1) His claim that Allah's Attributes are "literal", thereby attributing God with created attributes and becoming an anthropomorphist; 

(2) His claim that created things existed eternally with Allah; 

(3) His opposition to the scholarly consensus on the divorce issue; 

(4) His opposition to the orthodox Sunni practice of tawassul (asking Allah for 
things using a deceased pious individual as an intermediary); 

(5) His saying that starting a trip to visit the Prophet Muhammad's (s) invalidates the shortening of prayer; 

(6) His saying that the torture of the people of Hell stops and doesn't last forever; 

(7) His saying that Allah has a limit ( hadd ) that only He Knows; 

(8) His saying that Allah literally sits on the Throne ( al-Kursi ) and has left space for Prophet Muhammad (s) to sit next to Him; 

(9) His claim that touching the grave of Prophet Muhammad (s) is polytheism (shirk)-, 

(10) His claim that that making supplication atthe Prophet Muhammad's grave to seek a better  statusfrom Allah is a reprehensible innovation; 

(11) His claim that Allah descends and comparing Allah's "descent" with his, as he stepped down from a minbar while giving a sermon (khutba) to Muslims; 

(12) His classifying of oneness in worship of Allah ( tawheed ) into two parts:Tawhid al-rububiyya and Tawhid al-uluhiyya, which was never done by pious adherents of the salaf. 

Although Ibn Taymiyah's unorthodox, pseudo-Sunni positions were kept away from the public in Syria and Egypt due to the consensus of orthodoxSunni scholars of his deviance, his teachings were nevertheless circulating in hiding. 

An orthodox Sunni scholar says: 

Indeed, when a wealthy trader from Jeddah brought to life the long-dead 'aqida [creed] of Ibn Taymiya at the beginning of this century by financing the printing in Egypt of Ibn Taymiya's Minhaj al-surma al-nabawiyya [italics mine] and other works, the Mufti of Egypt Muhammad Bakhit al-Muti'i, faced with new questions about the validity of anthropomorphism, wrote: "It was a fitna (strife) that was sleeping; may Allah curse him who awakened it." 

It is important to emphasize that although manyof the positions of Ibn Taymiyah and Wahhabis are identical, they nonetheless contradict each 
other in some positions. While Ibn Taymiyah accepts Sufism ( Tasawwuf) as a legitimate science of Islam (as all orthodox Sunni Muslims do), Wahhabis reject it wholesale as an ugly innovation in the religion. While Ibn Taymiyah accepts the legitimacy of commemorating Prophet Muhammad's birthday (Mawlid ) - accepted by orthodox  Sunni Muslims as legitimate - Wahhabis reject  it as a reprehensible innovation that is to be repudiated. 

Ibn Taymiyah is an inspiration to Islamist groups that call for revolution.
 
Kepel says, "Ibn Taymiyya (1268-1323)-a primaryreference for the Sunni 



Islamist movement - would be abundantly quoted to justify the assassination of Sadat in 1981...and even to condemn the Saudi leadership and call for its overthrow in the mid-1990s". [5] 

Sivan says that only six months before Sadat was assassinated, the weekly Mayo singled out IbnTaymiyya as "the most pervasive and deleterious 
influence upon Egyptian youth." Sivan further says that Mayo concluded that "the proliferating Muslim associations at the [Egyptian] universities, where Ibn Taymiyya's views prevail, have been spawning various terrorist groups." Indeed, a book entitled The Absent Precept, by 'Abd al-Salam Faraj - the "spiritual" leader of Sadat's assassins who was tried and executed by the 
Egyptian government - strongly refers to Ibn Taymiyya's and some of his disciples' writings. Three of four of Sadat's assassins willingly read a lot of Ibn Taymiyya's works on their own. [6] 

Ibn Taymiyah is also noted to be a favorite of other Salafi extremists, including the Muslim Brotherhood's Syed Qutb. Ibn Taymiyyah's student, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, is also frequently cited by Salafis of all colors. 

Ibn Taymiyah's "fatwa" of jihad against 
Muslims 


What is also well-known about Ibn Taymiyah is that he lived in turbulent times when the Mongols had sacked Baghdad and conquered the Abassid 
Empire in 1258. In 1303, he was ordered by the Mamluk Sultan to give a fatwa (religious edict)legalizing jihad against the Mongols. Waging a holy war on the Mongols for the purpose of eliminating any threat to Mamluk power was no easy matter. The Mongol Khan Mahmoud Ghazan had converted to Islam in 1295. Although they were Muslims who did not adhere to Islamic Law in practice, and also supported the Yasa Mongol of code of law, they were deemed apostates by the edictof Ibn Taymiyah. To Ibn Taymiyah, Islamic Law  was not only rejected by Mongols because of    their lack of wholesale adherence, but the "infidel" Yasa code of law made them legal targets of extermination. The so-called jihad ensued   and the Mongol threat to Syria was exterminated. Wahhabis and other Salafis to this day brand the Mongol Mahmoud Ghazan as a kafir (disbeliever). Orthodox Sunni Muslims, however, have praised Mahmoud Ghazan as a Muslim. Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani writes: 

In fact, Ghazan Khan was a firm believer in Islam. Al-Dhahabi relates that he became a Muslim at the hands of the Sufi shaykh Sadr al-Din Abual-Majami' Ibrahim al-Juwayni (d.720), one of  Dhahabi's own shaykhs of hadith....During his  rule he had a huge mosque built in Tabriz in addition to twelve Islamic schools (madrasa), numerous hostels (khaniqa), forts (ribat),a schoolfor the secular sciences, and an observatory. He supplied Mecca and Medina with many gifts. He followed one of the schools (madhahib) of the Ahl al-Sunna [who are the orthodox Sunnis] and was respectful of religious scholars. He had 
the descendants of the Prophet mentioned before the princes and princesses of his house in the state records, and he introduced the turban as the court headgear. [7] 

Muhammad ibn 'Abdul-Wahhab would later follow  Ibn Taymiyah's footsteps and slaughter thousands of Muslims in Arabia. 

Orthodox Sunni scholars who refuted Ibn 
Taymiyah's pseudo-Sunni positions 

Ibn Taymiyah was imprisoned by a fatwa (religious edict) signed by four orthodox Sunni judges in the year 726 A.H for his deviant and unorthodox positions. Note that each of the four judges represents the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence that Sunni Muslims belong to today. This illustrates that Ibn Taymiyah did not adhere to the authentic teachings of orthodox Sunni 
Islam as represented by the four schools of Sunni jurisprudence. There is no evidence to indicate that there was a "conspiracy" against Ibn Taymiyyah to condemn him, as Wahhabis and other Salafis purport in his defense. The names of the four judges are: Qadi [Judge] Muhammad Ibn Ibrahim Ibn Jama'ah, ash-Shafi'i, Qadi [Judge] Muhammad Ibn al-Hariri, al-'Ansari, al- Hanafi, Qadi [Judge] Muhammad Ibn Abi Bakr, al-Maliki, and Qadi [Judge] Ahmad Ibn 'Umar, al-Maqdisi, al-Hanbali. 

Some orthodox Sunni scholars who refuted Ibn Taymiyya for his deviances and opposition to the positions of orthodox Sunni Islam include: Taqiyy-ud-Din as-Subkiyy, Faqih Muhammad Ibn 'Umar Ibn Makkiyy,Hafiz Salah-ud-Din al-'Ala'i, Qadi,Mufassir Badr-ud-Din Ibn Jama'ah, Shaykh Ahmad 
Ibn Yahya al-Kilabi al-Halabi, Hafiz Ibn Daqiq al-'Id, Qadi Kamal-ud-Din az-Zamalkani, Qadi Safi-ud-Din al-Hindi,Faqih and Muhaddith 'Ali IbnMuhammad al-Baji ash-Shafi'i, the historian al-Fakhr Ibn al-Mu'allim al-Qurashi, Hafiz Dhahabi, Mufassir Abu Hayyan al-'Andalusi, and Faqih and voyager Ibn Batutah. 

Najd - A place not so holy 

Najd, in Saudi Arabia, is where the founder of Wahhabism came from.
 
It was a mostly barren and dry land inhabited by Bedouins who used to graze animals. With sparse water, it is not the most comfortable of places since its climate has extremes of heat and cold in the summer and winter seasons. Najd has a notorious reputation in the orthodox Sunni community for originating seditions ( fitan ) long before Muhammad ibn ' Abdul-Wahhab came. Indeed, it is known to have harbored many trouble mongering individuals who challenged the Muslims both spiritually and physically. The orthodoxSunni Iraqi scholarJamal Effendi al-Zahawi says: 

Famous writers of the day made a point of noting the similarity between Ibn 'Abdul- Wahhab's beginnings and those of the false prophets prominent in Islam's intial epoch like Musaylima thePrevaricator, Sajah al-Aswad al-Anasi, Tulaiha al-Asadi and others of his kind [14]. 

Fenari says that although Najd is closest to tothe holy cities of Mecca and Medina, it has    only been dispraised by Prophet Muhammad (s) inauthentic traditions. He raises another interesting point that while many Arabian tribes were praised by Prophet Muhammad, the Banu Tamim - the most well known tribe of Central Arabia where Muhammad ibn 'Abdul Wahhab was from-ispraisedonly once. Moreover, authentic traditions that "explicitly critique" the Banu Tamimites are far more numerous. Ibn al-Jawzi, an orthodox Sunni scholar, documents the evolution of the Kharijite movements and illustrates how the tribe ofBanu Tamim played a leading role in it. Imam Abd al-Qahir also states that the Tamimites - and the Central Arabians in general - were intimately involved in the Kharijite rebellions against the Muslims, contrasting their immense contribution to the minimal contribution of members of the tribes of Medina and Yemen. It is from Banu Tamim where a man name Abu Bilal Mirdas came from, who, although being a relentless worshipper, turned out to be one of the most barbaric Kharijite fanatics. "He is remembered as the first who said the Tahkim - the formula 'The judgment is Allah's alone'- on the Day of Siffin, which became the slogan of the later Kharijite da'wa." 

It is reminiscent of what Wahhabis say today - that they strictly adhere to nothing but the Qur'an and Sunnah - although it is merely a jumble of words without coherent meaning. Najda ibn Amir of the tribe of Banu Hanifa was a Kharijite whose homeland was Najd, and the best known woman among the Kharijites was a Tamimite named Qutam bint ' Alqama. It is fascinating to see 
that fanatics of all types came from a region where the fanatic Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhab camefrom. 


The Wahhabi assault on graves and the massacre of Muslim communities in Riyadh and Karbala 

With the ferocious zeal of a "divine" mission, aimed at terminating what they perceived as the filthy polytheistic scum of Arabia, the Wahhabi army led by Muhammad ibn Sa' ud ? first destroyed graves and objects in Najdi towns and villages that were used for what they condemned as 
"polytheistic practices." The Wahhabi movement mustered supporters who rallied behind their cause, increased the size of their army, and successfully united most of the people of Najd under the banner of Wahhabism by 1765. 

The assault and "jihad"of Wahhabism did not stop after the death of Muhammad ibn Sa' ud ? in  1765, but continued with unrelenting and barbaric force under the leadership of his son, Abdul-Aziz, who captured the city of Riyadh in 1773. Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Wahhab died a year earlier but left four sons who continued spreading Wahhabism and strengthened the Wahhabi family's alliance with the Al-Sa 'ud ?.£8] 

Later, in 1801, the Wahhabi army marched to Karbala with a force of 10,000 men and 6,000 camels. [9] Upon reaching Karbala, they mercilessly and indiscriminately attacked its inhabitants for eight hours, massacring about 5,000 people. Moreover, they severely damaged Imam Hussein's mosque, looted the city, and left the carnage-laden city with its treasures on 200 camels. £10] This holocaust won the Wahhabi criminals theunforgiving hatred and wrath of the Shi'ite and Sunni Muslims, who, until this day, curse them 
passionately. The Shi'ite Muslims consider ImamHussein, a grandson of Prophet Muhammad (s), one of the most sacred figures and his tomb one of the most sacred sites on earth. Every year, thousands of Shi'ites gather at the site to commemorate the death of Imam Hussein. 

Visiting Karbala one is indeed filled me with awe and spiritual strength even as a devout Sunni. Shi'ite wrath, of course, didn't mean much to the Wahhabis. The Shi'ites, along with the Sunnis, had already been labeled as "blasphemers"for practicing tawassul and tabarruk. What are these practices? Are they part of Sunni Islam or not? 


Tawassul and Tabarruk 

Nuh Keller, an orthodox Sunni scholar, defines tawassul as "supplicating Allah by means of an intermediary, whether it be a living person, dead person, a good deed, or a name or attribute of Allah Most High". I remember doing tawassul in 1989 at Imam Abu Hanifah's tomb, the noble and renowned Islamic scholar whose ijtihad the majority of Sunni Muslims follow. Although I hadnot studied much about Islam and the practices of tawassul at that time, I had been told by trustworthy Muslims that using pious individuals as 
intermediaries when asking Allah for something was a blessed opportunity that I couldn't afford to miss. I had also visited the tomb of the great sufi and saint Abdul-Qadir Jilani and performed tawassul over there. An example of tawassul is: "Oh Allah, I ask you to cure my illness by means of the noble status of Imam Abu Hanifah (s)." 

When doing tawassul, the source of blessings ( barakah ) when asking Allah through an intermediary is Allah - not the intermediary. The intermediary is simply a means to ask Allah for things. Although it is not necessary for a Muslim to use a pious intermediary when asking Allah, it is recommended because it was a practice of Prophet Muhammad (s), the Companions (ra), and of the great scholars of Islam (ra). It is not only prophets and saints (in their graves) that are used as means to asking Allah. A Muslim can also ask Allah 
through relics ( tabarruk) that belonged to pious people, and may even use amulets with verseson the Qur'an on them as a means of asking God for protection from evil. It is not the means that provides protection, but Allah. 


Wahhabis reject a type of tawassul accepted 
by orthodox Sunni Muslims 

Although Sunnis, Shi'ites, and Wahhabis believethat tawassul by one's good deeds, a name or attribute of God, or intercession by someone who 
is alive and present is permissible, Wahhabis accuse Sunnis (and Shi'ites )of committing shirk(attributing partners in worship to God) when  doing tawassul through an intermediary who is not alive or present (in the worldly life). Thatis,to a Wahhabi,tawassul through anintermediarywho has died and is in his grave is ugly blasphemy. This is critical to know because thisis 
the primary reason why Muhammad ibn ' Abdul-Wahhab and the Al-Sa'ud ? 
criminals that collaborated with him massacred many Muslims in the Arabian peninsula. Muslims had been doing this form of tawassul for over 1,000 years but the Wahhabis believed it was blasphemy that had to be exterminated by the sword. What Wahhabis were doing in actuality was massacring orthodox Sunni Muslims, even though they foolishly believed they were fighting against evil blasphemors that didn't deserve to live. Wahhabis were not following the footsteps of the pious Salaf, but the footsteps of Ibn Taymiyyah who a couple of hundred years before them denounced that particular form of tawassul as 
sinful. Wahhabis today forbid Muslims from doing tawassul through Prophet Muhammad, and have enforced strict rules around his grave in Medina, Saudi Arabia. It is for this reason that Wahhabis forbid Muslims from visiting the graves of pious Muslims, and have destroyed markings on graves to prevent Muslims from knowing the specific spots where saints are buried. Yet, it is 
interesting to note the hypocritical nature of the Wahhabis when they had refused the demolishing of the grave of Ibn Taymiyah in Damascus, Syria to make way for a road. Somehow, this is not "polytheism" to them, but it is "polytheism"for the majority of the Islamic community. 


The flawed Wahhabi understanding of tawassul : 
confusing the means with the Giver 



Wahhabis wrongly accuse orthodox Sunnis of committing shirk (polytheism) when asking God for something using an intermediary, whether the means is a pious human being in his grave, objects(tabarruk), or seeking protection from God using amulets with verses of the Qur'an written on them (ruqya). 

The Wahhabi believes that asking God for something through a means is the same as worshipping the means itself. That is, for people who do t awassul through a pious saint in his grave is asking the pious saint - and not God-for things.People who do tabarruk through a relic of Prophet Muhammad (s) are asking the relic - and not God - for blessings, and people who wear ruqya are asking the ruqya itself for protection - and not God. When a Muslim visits the Prophet Muhammad's (s) grave and calls on the Prophet (s),"Oh Prophet," ( Ya Rasulullah), the Wahhabis accuse such a person of worshipping the Prophet (s) and refuse to accept the understanding that the Prophet himself is a means to asking God for things. Such an act to Wahhabis drives a Muslim out of the realms of the religion of Islam. In sum, the Wahhabis believe that such people are worshipping creation alongside God, and are 
therefore guilty of polytheism - attributing partners in worship to God. 

The now deceased former Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Abdul-Aziz ibn Abdullah Ibn Baz, defends Ibn Abdul-Wahhab's accusation of polytheism that he had heaped on the Muslim masses and his resorting to "jihad" by saying that Muslims had gone astray because they had "worshipped" things are than God: 

The people of Najd had lived in a condition    that could not be approved of by any believer. Polytheism had appeared there and spread widely. People worshipped domes, trees, rocks, caves or any persons who claimed to be Auliya (saints) though they might be insane and idiotic. 

There were few to rise up for the sake of Allahand support His Religion. Same was the situation in Makkah and Madinah as well as Yemen where building domes on the graves, invoking the saints for their help and other forms of polytheism were predominant. But in Najd polytheistic beliefs and practices were all the more intense. 

In Najd people had worshipped different objectsranging from the graves, caves and trees to the obsessed and mad men who were called saints. 

When the Sheikh [Ibn Abdul-Wahhab] saw that polytheism was dominating the people and that no one showed any disapproval of it or no one was ready to call the people back to Allah, he decided to labour singly and patiently in the field. He knew that nothing could be achieved withoutjihad (holy fighting), patience and suffering  [italics mine].[l 1] 

Orthodox Sunnis, however, have never claimed toworship the means, but only God. Because Wahhabis didn't tolerate this, they massacred thousands of Muslims who they saw as being "polytheists" in Arabia. In actuality, they were Sunni Muslims who were following Islam in its purity as taught by the pious ancestors that lived in thetime period of the Salaf. 

Wahhabis attribute a place and direction to Allah 

While accusing the masses of Muslims of being polytheists, Wahhabis themselves have differentiated themselves from other Muslims in their understanding of creed. Due to the Wahhabis' adherence to an unorthodox, grossly flawed literal understanding of God's Attributes, they comfortably believe that Allah has created or human attributes, and then attempt to hide their anthropomorphism by saying that they don't know 'how' Allah has such attributes. For example, Bilal Philips, a Wahhabi author says: 

Fie has neither corporeal body nor is Fie a formless spirit. He has a form befitting His majesty [italics mine], the like of which no man hasever seen or conceived, and which will only be seen(to the degree of man's finite limitations)by the people of paradise. 

Discussing each part of his statement will shedlight into his anthropomorphic mind. Bilal Philips says that "Allah has a form befitting His majesty..." What he confirms in his mind is that Allah definitely has a form. He even specifies the kind of form by saying: "He [Allah] has neither corporeal body..." meaning that Allah has a form that is not like the forms of creation, and then says, "nor is He a formless spirit. Then he says, "He has a form befitting His majesty..." 

The problem with such statements to a Muslim isthat they express blatant anthropomorphism. What Bilal Philips is doing here is foolishly attributing a "form" to God that, in his mind, nobody has ever seen. Therefore, Bilal Philips 
believes that God has some type of form, or non-corporeal body. No orthodox Sunni Muslim scholar has ever said such a perfidious thing. 

Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, one of the greatest mujtahid Sunni imams ever to have lived, refuted such anthropomorphic statements over a thousand years before Bilal Philips was born. The great Sunni Ash'ari scholar, Imam al- Bayhaqi, in his Manaqib Ahmad relates with an authentic chain  that Imam Ahmed said: 

A person commits an act of disbelief ( kufr) ifhe says Allah is a body, even if he says: Allah is a body but not like other bodies. 

Imam Ahmad continues: 

The expressions are taken from language andfrom Islam,and linguists applied 'body' to a thing that has length, width, thickness, form, structure,and components. The expression has not beenhanded down in Shari'ah. Therefore, it is invalid and cannot be used. 

Imam Ahmed is a pious adherer of the time period of the Salaf that was praised by Prophet Muhammad (s). How can Bilal Philips claim to represent the pious forefathers of the Salaf? He not only contradicts them but is vehemently refuted by them. The great pious predecessors had refuted ignoramuses like Bilal Philips in their times long ago. 

Blatant anthropomorphism is also illustrated by the Wahhabi Ibn Baz's commentary on the great work of Imam Abu Ja'afar at-Tahawi called 
"Aqeedah at-Tahawiyyah” (The Creed of Tahawi), a work that has been praised by the orthodox Sunni community as being representative of Sunni 
orthodoxy. The now deceased Ibn Baz was Saudi Arabia's grand Mufti. 

Article #38 of Imam Tahawi's work states: 

He is beyond having limits placed on Him, or being restricted, or having parts or limbs. Nor 
is He contained by the six directions as all created entities are. 

Ibn Baz, in a footnote, comments: 

Allah is beyond limits that we know but has limits He knows. 

In another footnote, he says: 

By hudood (limits) the author [referring to Imam Tahawi] means [limits] such as known by humans since no one except Allah Almighty knows His limits. 

Ibn Baz deceptively attempts to represent the noble Sunni Imam al-Tahawi as an anthropomorphist by putting his own anthropomorphic interpretation of Imam Tahawi's words in his mouth. It must be emphasized that not a single orthodox Sunni scholar understood Imam Tahawi's statement as Ibn Baz did. 

Ibn Baz's also shows anthropomorphism in a commentary by the great Sunni scholar Ibn Hajar al-'Asqalani. Ibn Baz says: 

As for Ahl ui-Sunna - and these are the Companions and those who followed them in excellence - they assert a direction for Allah, and that isthe direction of elevation, believing that the Exalted is above the Throne without giving an example and without entering into modality. 

Another now deceased Wahhabi scholar, Muhammad Saleh al-Uthaymeen, blatantly expresses his anthropomorphism. He says: 

Allah's establishment on the throne means that He is sitting 'in person' on His Throne. 

The great Sunni Hanbali scholar, Ibn al-Jawzi, had refuted anthropomorphists who were saying that Allah's establishment is 'in person' hundreds of years ago: 

Whoever says: He is established on the Throne 'in person' (bi dhatihi ), has diverted the sense of the verse to that of sensory perception. Such a person must not neglect that the principle is established by the mind, by which we have come to know Allah, and have attributed pre-eternity to Him decisively. 
If you said: We read the hadiths and keep quiet, no one would criticize you; it is only your taking them in the external sense which is hideous. Therefore do not bring into the school of this pious man of the Salaf - Imam Ahmad [Ibn Hanbal]-what does not belong in it. You have clothed this madhab [or school of jurisprudence] with an ugly deed, so that it is no longer said 'Hanbali' except in the sense of'anthropomorphist' 

Sulayman ibn 'Abdul Allah ibn Muhammad ibn 'Abdal-Wahhab, the grandson of the Wahhabi movement's founder, says: 

Whoever believes or says: Allah is in person (bi dhatihi ) in every place, or in one place - , he is a disbeliever (kafir). It is obligatory to declare that Allah is distinct from His creation, established over His Throne without modality or likeness or exemplarity. Allah was and there was no place, then He created place and He is exalted as He was before He created place 

Just as Bilal Philips affirms a form to Allah in his mind, and Ibn Baz confirms limits to Allah in his mind, al-Uthaymeen confirms that Allah is literally sitting 'in person' on the Throne in his mind. All of them have loyally followed the footsteps of Ibn Taymiyyah and Muhammad ibn ' Abdul-Wahhab - the two arch-heretics who were instrumental in causing tribulation (fitna) and division among the Muslim masses because oftheir reprehensible, unorthodox interpretations of the Islamic sources. 

Wahhabi anthropomorphists say: Allah is in a direction, Allah has limits, Allah is literally above the Throne, and that Allah is sitting 'in person' on the Throne. To a Muslim, the fact is that the Throne is located in a particular 
direction and a certain place. By understandingAllah to be above the Throne literally as the Wahhabis do, they are attributing Allah with created attributes and, as a result, are implying that a part of the creation was eternal with Allah. This opposes what the the Qur'an and the following hadith authentically related by al-Bukhari says: 

Allah existed eternally and there was nothing  else [italics mine]. 

Sunni orthodoxy clears Allah of all directions and places. To a Sunni, Allah has always existed without the need of a place, and He did not take a place for Himself after creating it. Orthodox Sunni scholars have said exactly what was understood by Prophet Muhammad (s) and his Companions (ra). Imam Abu Hanifah, the great mujtahid Imam who lived in the time period of the 
Salaf said: "Allah has no limits...", period. And this is what Sunni orthodoxy 
represents. 

Orthodox Sunni scholars oppose Wahhabism 

I end this article with a selected list of orthodox Sunni scholars who have refuted Wahhabism and warned Muslims from its poison. The list ofscholars, along with names of their books and related information, is quoted from the orthodox Sunni scholar Muhammad Hisham Kabbani[l2]: 

Al-Ahsa’i Al-Misri, Ahmad (1753-1826): Unpublished manuscript of a refutation of the Wahhabi sect. His son Shaykh Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn'Abd al-Latif al-Ahsa’i also wrote a book refuting them. 

Al-Ahsa'i,Al-Sayyid'Abd al-Rahman:wrote a sixty-seven verse poem which begins with the verse: 

Badat fitnatun kal layli qad ghattatil aafaaqa 
wa sha ' 'at fa kadat tublighul gharba wash    sharaqa 

[A confusion came about like nightfall coveringthe skies and became widespread almost reaching the whole world] 

AI-'Amrawi, 'Abd al-Hayy, and 'Abd al-Hakim Murad (Qarawiyyin University, Morocco): Al-tahdhir min al-ightirar bi ma ja'a fi kitab al-hiwar 
["Warning Against Being Fooled By the Contents of the Book (by Ibn Mani') 
A Debate With al-Maliki (an attack on Ibn 'Alawi al-Maliki by a Wahhabi writer)"] (Fes: Qarawiyyin, 1984). 

'Ata' Allah al-Makki: al-sarim al-hindi fil 'unuq al-najdi ["The Indian 
Scimitar on the Najdi's Neck"]. 

Al-Azhari, 'Abd Rabbih ibn Sulayman al-Shafi'i (The author of Sharh Jami' 
al-Usul li ahadith al-Rasul, a basic book of Usui al-Fiqh: Fayd al-Wahhab fi 
Bayan Ahl al-Haqq wa man dalla 'an ai-sawab, 4 vols. ["Allah’s Outpouring in 
Differentiating the True Muslims From Those Who Deviated From the Truth"]. 

AI-'Azzami, 'Allama al-shaykh Salama (d. 1379H): Al-Barahin al-sati'at 
["The Radiant Proofs..."]. 

Al-Barakat al-Shafi'i al-Ahmadi al-Makki, 'Abd al-Wahhab ibn Ahmad: 
unpublished manuscript of a refutation of the Wahhabi sect. 

al-Bulaqi, Mustafa al-Masri wrote a refutation to San'a’i’s poem in which 
the latter had praised Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab. It is in Samnudi’s "Sa'adat al- 
Darayn" and consists in 126 verses beginning thus: 

Bi hamdi wali al-hamdi la al-dhammi astabdi 
Wa bil haqqi la bil khalqi lil haqqi astahdi 

[By the glory of the Owner of glory, not baseness, do I overcome; 

And by Allah, not by creatures, do I seek guidance to Allah] 

Al-Buti, Dr. Muhammad Sa'id Ramadan (University of Damascus): Al- 
Salafiyyatu marhalatun zamaniyyatun mubarakatun la madhhabun islami 
["The Salafiyya is a blessed historical period not an Islamic school of law"] 
(Damascus: Dar al-fikr, 1988); Al-lamadhhabiyyaakhtaru bid'atin tuhaddidu al-shari'a al-islamiyya ["Non-madhhabism is the most dangerous innovation presently menacing Islamic law"] (Damascus: Maktabat al-Farabi, n.d.). 

Al-Dahesh ibn 'Abd Allah, Dr. (Arab University of Morocco),ed. Munazara'ilmiyya bayna ' AH ibnMuhammad al-Sharif wa al-Imam Ahmad ibn Idris 
fi al-radd 'ala Wahhabiyyat Najd, Tihama, wa 'Asir ["Scholarly Debate Between the Sharif and Ahmad ibn Idris Against the Wahhabis of Najd, 
Tihama, and 'Asir"]. 

Dahlan, al-Sayyid Ahmad ibn Zayni (d. 1304/1886). Mufti of Mecca and Shaykh al-Islam (highest religious authority in the Ottoman jurisdiction) for the Hijaz region: al-Durar al-saniyyah fi al-radd ala al-Wahhabiyyah ["The Pure Pearls in Answering the Wahhabis"] pub. Egypt 1319 & 1347 H; Fitnatal-Wahhabiyyah ["The Wahhabi Fitna"];Khulasat al-Kalam fi bayan Umara' al-Balad al-Haram["The Summation Concerning the Leaders ofthe Sacrosanct Country"], a history of the Wahhabi fitna in Najd and the Hijaz. 

al-Dajwi, Flamd Allah: ai-Basa'ir li Munkiri al-tawassul ka amthal Muhd. Ibn 'Abdul Wahhab ["The Evident Proofs Against Those Who Deny the Seeking of Intercession Like Muhammad Ibn 'Abdul Wahhab"]. 

Shaykh al-Islam Dawud ibn Sulayman al-Baghdadi al-Hanafi (1815-1881CE): al-Minha al-Wahbiyya fi radd al-Wahhabiyya ["The Divine Dispensation 
Concerning the Wahhabi Deviation"]; Ashadd al-Jihad fi Ibtal Da ' wa al-Ijtihad ["The Most Violent Jihad in Proving False Those Who Falsely Claim Ijtihad"]. 

Al-Falani al-Maghribi, al-Muhaddith Salih: authored a large volume collating the answers of scholars of the Four Schools to Muhammad ibn 'Abdal- Wahhab. 

al-Habibi, Muhammad 'Ashiq al-Rahman: 'Adhab Allah al-Mujdi li Junun al-Munkir al-Najdi ["Allah’s Terrible Punishment for the Mad Rejector From Najd"]. 


Al-Haddad, al-Sayyid al-'Alawi ibn Ahmad ibn Hasan ibn al-Qutb Sayyidi 'Abd Allah ibn 'Alawi al-Haddad al-Shafi'i: al-Sayf al-batir li 'unq 
al-munkir 'ala al-akabir ["The Sharp Sword for the Neck of the Assailant of Great Scholars"]. Unpublished manuscript of about 100 folios; Misbah al- anam wa jala 1 al-zalam fi radd shubah al-bid' i al-najdi al-lati adalla biha al- 
'awamm ["The Lamp of Mankind and the Illumination of Darkness Concerning the Refutation of the Errors of the Innovator From Najd by Which He Had Misled the Common People"]. Published 1325H. 


Al-Hamami al-Misri, Shaykh Mustafa: Ghawth al-'ibad bi bayan al-rashad 
["The Helper of Allah's Servants According to the Affirmation of Guidance"]. 

Al-Hilmi al-Qadiri al-Iskandari, Shaykh Ibrahim: Jalal al-haqq fi kashf ahwal ashrar al-khalq ["The Splendor of Truth in Exposing the Worstof People] (pub. 1355H). 

Al-Husayni, 'Amili, Muhsin (1865-1952). Kashf al-irtiyab fi atba' Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab ["The Dispelling of Doubt Concerning the Followers of Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab"]. [Yemen?]: Maktabat al-Yaman al-Kubra, 198?. 

Al-Kabbani, Muhammad Hisham, Encyclopedia of Islamic Doctrine, vol. 1-7, As-Sunnah Foundation of America, 1998. 

_, Islamic Beliefs and Doctrine According to Ahl as-Sunna - A 

Repudiation of "Salafi” Innovations, ASFA, 1996._, Innovation and True Belief: the Celebration of Mawlid According to the Qur'an and Sunna and the Scholars of Islam, ASFA, 1995. 

_, Salafi Movement Unveiled, ASFA, 1997. 

Ibn 'Abd al-Latif al-Shafi'i, 'Abd Allah: Tajrid sayf al-jihad 'ala mudda'i al-ijtihad ["The drawing of the sword of jihad against the false claimants to ijtihad"]. 

The family of Ibn ' Abd al-Razzaq al-Hanbali inZubara and Bahrayn possess both manuscript and printed refutations by scholars of the Four Schools from Mecca, Madina, al-Ahsa', al-Basra, Baghdad, Aleppo, Yemen and other Islamic regions. 

Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Najdi, 'Allama al-Shaykh Sulayman, elder brother of Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab: al-Sawa'iq al-Ilahiyya fi al-radd 'alaal- Wahhabiyya ["Divine Lightnings in Answeringthe Wahhabis"]. Ed. Ibrahim Muhammad al-Batawi. Cairo: Dar al-insan, 1987. Offset reprint by Waqf Ikhlas, Istanbul: Hakikat Kitabevi, 1994. Prefaces by Shaykh Muhammad ibn Sulayman al-Kurdi al-Shafi'i and Shaykh Muhammad Hayyan al-Sindi 
(Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab’s shaykh) to the effect that Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab is "dalI mudill" ("misguided and misguiding"). 

Ibn 'Abidin al-Hanafi, al-Sayyid Muhammad Amin:Radd al-muhtar 'ala al-durr al-mukhtar, Vol. 3, Kitab al-Iman, Bab al-bughat ["Answer to the 
Perplexed: A Commentary on "The Chosen Pearl,"" Book of Belief, Chapter on Rebels]. Cairo: Daral-Tiba'a al-Misriyya, 1272 H. 

Ibn 'Afaliq al-Hanbali, Muhammad Ibn 'Abdul Rahman: Tahakkum al-muqallidin bi man idda'a tajdid al-din [Sarcasm of the muqallids against 
the false claimants to the Renewal of Religion].A very comprehensive book refuting the Wahhabiheresy and posting questions which Ibn 'Abdul Wahhab and his followers were unable to answer for the most part. 

Ibn Dawud al-Hanbali, 'Afif al-Din 'Abd Allah: as-sawa'iq wa al-ru'ud ["Lightnings and thunder"], a very important book in 20 chapters. According to the Mufti of Yemen Shaykh al-'Alawi ibnAhmad al-Haddad, the mufti of Yemen, "This book has received the approval of the 'ulama of Basra, Baghdad, Aleppo, and Ahsa’ [Arabian peninsula]. It was summarized by Muhammad ibn Bashir the qadi of Ra’s al-Khayma in Oman." 

Ibn Ghalbun al-Libi also wrote a refutation in forty verses of al-San'ani’s poem in which the latter had praised Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab. It is inSamnudi’s Sa'adat al-darayn and begins thus: 

Salami 'ala ahlil isabati wal-rushdi 
Wa laysa 'ala najdi wa man halla fi najdi 

[My salutation is upon the people of truth and guidance And not upon Najd nor the one who settled in Najd] 

Ibn Khalifa 'Ulyawi al-Azhari: Hadhihi 'aqidatu al-salaf wa al-khalaf fi dhat Attahi ta'ala wa sifatihi wa af'alihi wa al-jawab al-sahih li ma waqa'a fihi al-khilaf min al-furu' bayna al-da ' in li al-Salafiyya wa atba ' al-madhahib 
al-arba'a al-islamiyya ["This is the doctrine of the Predecessors and the Descendants concerning the divergences in the branches between those who call to al-Salafiyya and the followers of the Four Islamic Schools of Law"] (Damascus: Matba'at Zayd ibn Thabit, 1398/1977. 

Kawthari al-Hanafi, Muhammad Zahid. Maqalat al-Kawthari. (Cairo: al- Maktabah al-Azhariyah li al-Turath, 1994). 

Al-Kawwash al-Tunisi, 'Allama Al-Shaykh Salih: his refutation of the Wahhabi sect is contained in Samnudi’s volume: "Sa' adat al-darayn fi al-radd' ala al-firqatayn." 

Khazbek, Shaykh Hasan: Al-maqalat al-wafiyyat fi al-radd 'ala al-wahhabiyyah ["Complete Treatise in Refuting the Wahhabis"]. 

Makhluf, Muhammad Hasanayn: Risalat fi hukm al-tawassul bil-anbiya wal- awliya ["Treatise on the Ruling Concerning the Use of Prophets and Saints as Intermediaries"]. 

Al-Maliki al-Husayni, Al-muhaddith Muhammad al-Hasan ibn 'Alawi: 
Mafahimu yajibu an tusahhah ["Notions that should be corrected"] 4th ed. 
(Dubai: Hashr ibn Muhammad Dalmuk, 1986); Muhammad al-insanu al-kamil 

["Muhammad, the Perfect Human Being"] 3rd ed. (Jeddah: Dar al-Shuruq, 1404/1984). 

Al-Mashrifi al-Maliki al-Jaza'iri: Izhar al-' uquq mimman mana'a al-tawassul bil nabi wa al-wali al-saduq ["The Exposure of the Disobedience of Those Who Forbid Using the Intermediary of the Prophets and the Truthful Saints]. 

Al-Mirghani al-Ta'ifi, 'Allama 'Abd Allah ibn Ibrahim (d. 1793): Tahrid al- aghbiya' 'ala al-Istighatha bil-anbiya 1 wal-awliya ["The Provocations of the Ignorant Against Seeking the Help of Prophets and Saints"] (Cairo: al-Halabi, 
1939). 

Mu'in al-Haqq al-Dehlawi (d. 1289): Sayf al-Jabbar al-maslul 'ala a'da' a\-Abrar["The Sword ofthe Almighty Drawn Against the Enemies of the  Pure Ones"]. 

Al-Muwaysi al-Yamani, 'Abd Allah ibn 'Isa: Unpublished manuscript of a refutation of the Wahhabi sect. 

Al-Nabahani al-Shafi'i, al-qadi al-muhaddith Yusuf ibn Isma'il 
(1850-1932): Shawahid al-Haqq fi al-lstlghatha bi sayyid al-Khalq (s) ["The Proofs of Truth in the Seeking of the Intercession of the Prophet"]. 

Al-Qabbani al-Basri al-Shafi' i, Allama Ahmad ibn ' Ali: A manuscript treatise in approximately 10 chapters. 

Al-Qadumi al-Nabulusi al-Hanbali: 'AbdAllah: Rlhlat ["Journey"]. 

Al-Qazwini, Muhammad Hasan, (d. 1825). Al-Barahin al-jaliyyah fi raf'tashkikat al-Wahhabiyah  ["The Plain Demonstrations That Dispel the 
Aspersions of the Wahhabis"]. Ed. Muhammad Munir al-Husayni al-Milani. 1st ed. Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Wafa’, 1987. 

Al-Qudsi: al-Suyuf al-Siqal fi A'naq man ankara'ala al-awliya ba'd al-intiqal ["The Burnished Swords on the Necks of Those Who Deny the Role of Saints After Their Leaving This World"]. 

Al-Rifa'i, Yusuf al-Sayyid Hashim, President of the World Union of Islamic Propagation and Information: Adillat Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jama'at awal-radd al-muhkam al-mani' 'ala munkarat wa shubuhat Ibn Mani' fi tahajjumihi 'ala al-sayyid Muhammad 'Alawi al-Maliki al-Makki ["The Proofs of the People of the Way of the Prophet and the Muslim Community: or, the Strong and Decisive Refutation of Ibn Mani'’s Aberrations and Aspersions in his Assault on Muhammad 'Alawi al-Maliki al-Makki"] (Kuwait: Dar al-siyasa, 1984). 

Al-Samnudi al-Mansuri, al-'Allama al-Shaykh Ibrahim: Sa'adat al-darayn fi al-radd 'ala al-firqatayn al-wahhabiyya wa muqallidat al-zahiriyyah ["Bliss in the Two Abodes: Refutation of the Two Sects, Wahhabis and Zahiri Followers"]. 

Al-Saqqaf al-Shafi'i, Hasan ibn 'Ali, Islamic Research Intitute, Amman, Jordan: al-Ighatha bi adillat al-istighatha wa al-radd al-mubin 'ala munkiri al-tawassul ["The Mercy of Allah in the Proofs of Seeking Intercession and the Clear Answer to Those who Reject it"]; Ilqam al hajar II al-mutatawil 'ala al-Asha'Ira min al-Bashar ["The Stoning of All Those Who Attack Ash’aris"]; 
Qamus shata'im al-Albanl wa al-alfaz al-munkara al-lati yatluquha fi haqq ulama al-ummah wa fudalai'ha wa ghayrihim... ["Encyclopedia of al-Albani’s Abhorrent Expressions Which He Uses Against the Scholars of the Community, its Eminent Men, and Others..."] Amman : Dar al-Imam al- 
Nawawi, 1993. 

Al-Sawi al-Misri: Hashlyat 'ala al-jalalayn ["Commentary on the Tafsir of the Two Jalal al-Din"]. 

Sayf al-Din Ahmed ibn Muhammad: Al-Albani Unveiled: An Exposition of His Errors and Other Important Issues, 2nd ed. (London: s.n., 1994). 

Al-Shatti al-Athari al-Hanbali, al-Sayyid Mustafa ibn Ahmad ibn Hasan, Mufti of Syria: al-NuquI al-shar'iyyah fi al-radd 'ala al-Wahhabiyya ["The Legal Proofs in Answering the Wahhabis"]. 

Al-Subki, al-hafiz Taqi al-Din (d. 756/1355): Al-durra al-mudiyya fi al-radd 'ala Ibn Taymiyya, ed. Muhammad Zahid al-Kawthari ["The Luminous Pearl: 
A Refutation of Ibn Taymiyya"]; Al-rasa'il al-subkiyya fi al-radd 'ala Ibn Taymiyya wa tilmidhihi Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, ed. Kamal al-Hut ["Subki’s treatises in Answer to Ibn Taymiyya and his pupil Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya"] (Beirut: 'Alam al-Kutub, 1983); Al-sayf al-saqil fi al-radd 'ala Ibn Zafil ["The Burnished Sword in Refuting Ibn Zafil (Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya)" Cairo: 
Matba'at al-Sa'ada, 1937; Shifa' al-siqam fi ziyarat khayr al-anam ["The healing of the sick in visiting the Best of Creation"]. 

Sunbul al-Hanafi al-Ta’ifi, Allama Tahir: Sima al-Intisar HI awliya' al-abrar ["The Mark of Victory Belongs to Allah's Pure Friends"]. 

Al-Tabataba'i al-Basri, al-Sayyid: also wrote areply to San' a’i’s poem which 
was excerpted in Samnudi’s Sa'adat al-Darayn.  After reading it, San'a’i reversed his positionand said: "I have repented from what I said    concerning the Najdi." 


Al-Tamimi al-Maliki, 'Allama Isma'il (d. 1248), Shaykh al-Islam in Tunis: wrote a refutation of a treatise of Ibn ' Abd al-Wahhab. 

Al-Wazzani, al-Shaykh al-Mahdi, Mufti of Fes, Morocco: Wrote a refutation of Muhammad 'Abduh’s prohibition of tawassul. 

al-Zahawi al-Baghdadi, Jamil Effendi Sidqi (d. 1355/1936): al-Fajr al-Sadiq fi al-radd 'ala munkiri al-tawassul wa al-khawariq ["The True Dawn in Refuting Those Who Deny the Seeking of Intercession and the Miracles of Saints"] Pub. 
1323/1905 in Egypt. 

Al-Zamzami al-Shafi'i, Muhammad Salih, Imam of the Maqam Ibrahim in Mecca, wrote a book in 20 chapters against them according to al-Sayyid al- 
Haddad. 

See also: 

Ahmad, Qeyamuddin. The Wahhabi movement in India. 2nd rev. ed. New Delhi : Manohar, 1994. 

01 Throughout the article, (s) means "peace be upon him," and (ra) means "may Allah (swt) be pleased them." 

01 Lacy, Robert. The Kingdom: Arabia & the House of Sa' ud ? . p. 59. mZahawi, Jamal E (1996) The Doctrine of Ahl al-Sunna Versus the 'Salafi'Movement. Translated by Shaykh Muhammad HishamKabbani. As-Sunna Foundation of America. 

[4i For example, orthodox Sunni scholar Abu AlaBukhari accused people of unbelief ( kufr ) if they called Ibn Taymiyah "Shaykh". Imam Zahid al- Kawthari accused Ibn Taymiyah's positions onthe creed to be tantamount to apostasy. 

[5i Gilles, Kepel. Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, p. 72. 

[6iSivan, Emmanuel. Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics.Yale University Press, New Flaven and London, pg. 102-103. 

[7] Kabbani, Hisham M (1996). Islamic Beliefs & Doctrine According to Ahl al-Sunna A Repudiation of "Salafi" Innovations . Volume I. As-Sunna Foundation of America. 

[8] Safran, Nadav. (1988). Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security . Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY. Pg. 11. 

[21 Safran, Nadav. (1988). Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security . Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY. Pg. 12. 

[10] Bagot, Blubb, Sir J.(1961). Warin the Desert.New York: Norton. Pg. 44. 

11] Abdul Aziz ibn Abdullah ibn Baz. "Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abdul- Wahhab." Available: www.alinaam.org.za/library/hist_bio/ibnwahhaab.htm. 
02] Ibid., Zahawi. pp. 7-15.