What Are Those Betting on the Fall of Iran’s Islamic System Overlooking?

Jihad Haydar

There is no dispute that the United States has the technological and military capacity to deliver devastating strikes against Iran. 

But the central - and more important-question is this: would such a strike be capable of toppling the system or forcing it into submission? This is precisely where “timing” becomes a misleading word if taken on its own. Because timing is not enough unless we understand something else first: what prevents collapse in the first place? And how does a system survive decades of security pressure, economic strain, and sanctions?

Some analyses promote the idea that if you strike at a moment of internal imbalance, the blow becomes a “final push” that brings the whole structure down. It sounds logical. But this view implicitly assumes that Iran is a “pyramid” standing on a single head. In reality, it more closely resembles a network of pillars. The Supreme Leader is not merely a “person,” but a node within a system of institutions, constitutional mechanisms, succession arrangements, and security bodies that give the state a resilience extending beyond the political apex.

The claim that assassinating the Leader- despite the enormous repercussions this would have for Iran and the region- would cause the state to collapse reveals a misunderstanding of Iran’s reality. He is not the sole center of gravity. Moreover, the Islamic Republic is an institutional state capable of selecting a successor, as it did after the death of Imam Khomeini. A country that has lived through a long, devastating war, continuous sanctions, and repeated crises has, over time, built a broad and solid social base, mechanisms of continuity, and notable experience in crisis management.

At every previous turning point, that broad popular base played a decisive role in thwarting plots and wars. Mechanisms of continuity prevent a leadership vacuum. There are legal arrangements, decision-making networks, balanced power centers, and institutions ready to step in and fill the space. There is also crisis management that has often shown considerable prudence—without denying the existence of serious mistakes—while preserving the system’s hard core.

That is why there is a major difference between a strike that “creates an event” and one that “produces a transition.” The first is always possible: it destroys, disorients, raises the level of deterrence or escalation. The second requires that the interior itself has already begun to shift—from protests in the street to fractures within the state.

The point most often ignored by the logic of a “decisive strike” is the existence of a solid popular base for the system—a base strong enough to enable Iran to endure global and regional upheavals and varied pressures without abandoning its constants and principles. This is not a matter of election numbers, but of a “critical mass” that gives the system what it needs at moments of shock: minimal legitimacy, counter-mobilization, and networks of social control. This bloc draws on a familiar mix of identity and ideology, national belonging, state-linked economic interests, welfare networks, and a historical memory that makes the “external threat” an effective tool of mobilization. Here, an external strike becomes a double-edged sword: it may inflict serious damage on the system, but it can also give it renewed momentum to reorder the interior under the banner of sovereignty.

Beyond the popular base, there is an institutional structure: multiple political and security bodies, an economy that has withstood some of the harshest forms of warfare, and decision-making circles capable of maneuver. Unless this system begins to crack from within, talk of toppling it remains more an analytical desire than a realistic assessment.

It is true that Iran’s economy is under severe strain and that economic hardship opens the door to protest. But turning the economic crisis into a deterministic “countdown clock” to collapse ignores the system’s core advantage: adaptation under sanctions. There is wide self-sufficiency, a shadow economy, and parallel trade networks. This does not mean the economy poses no threat to the system; it means the breaking point is not necessarily a straight line toward collapse. Iran retains a wide margin of maneuver here.

When does talk of a “moment of overthrow” become serious?

If we want a practical benchmark, stripped of slogans, it is this: collapse becomes possible when imbalance moves from the street into the state itself. It is not enough to hear about protests or see a falling currency. What must be monitored are signs of “systemic fracture.” If they appear together, the assessment changes:

●    A deep, broad rupture within the ruling elite: radical and public disputes between power centers that turn into mutual purges or decision-making paralysis.

●    Cracks in the hard core: declining mobilization in supportive environments, widening criticism within once-silent constituencies, or weakening commitment in support networks.

●    Disruption in the behavior of security organs: uneven enforcement of orders across regions, hesitation, or friction between security institutions themselves.

●    Financial/administrative paralysis that prevents buying time: prolonged disruption of salaries, collapse of basic services without the ability to restore them, and black-market expansion to the point that the state loses everyday control.

●    The emergence of an organized alternative: not just anger and slogans, but coordination networks, leadership, or reference authorities able to turn protest into a political pressure project.

●    A continuity/succession crisis: clear confusion over leadership that translates into paralysis of response and slow decision-making.

Without these indicators, a “big event” may occur with a small political outcome: a strike that raises the level of confrontation and risk, followed by a system that regains the initiative through national mobilization and suppresses the challenge internally and externally.

The appeal of the “decisive strike” is that it promises a huge result at limited cost. But experience shows that bombs alone do not decide the fate of states. What matters are the cohesion of the hard core, the institutions’ ability to manage crisis, and the economy’s flexibility under pressure. Timing is important, but it does not work on its own. A strike may accelerate collapse if fracture has already begun within the state. But if the state remains internally cohesive, the strike may instead give it a rare opportunity to entrench itself as the defender of land, people, sovereignty, and interests—and perhaps also buy it more time to address its internal faults. That is what has happened at many previous junctures.