Friday, January 30, 2026

Iran under pressure: Protests and strategic stability

 By Xavier Villar

MADRID - In the early days of 2026, the Islamic Republic of Iran faces a complex juncture, characterized by persistent economic tensions, external geopolitical pressures, and the imperative of safeguarding national sovereignty and independence. The convergence of these factors creates a structural challenge that cannot be reduced solely to domestic or economic causes but must be understood within a long-term strategic framework, according to the perspective of the country’s authorities.

Protests that began in late December 2025, primarily among technology-sector traders in Tehran, were triggered by the persistent depreciation of the rial and rising currency-market uncertainty. What initially emerged as an economic grievance quickly evolved into a broader arena in which the State seeks to channel legitimate social demands, prevent the exploitation of unrest by external actors, and reaffirm the nation’s political autonomy.

Far from being an isolated episode, these mobilizations fit within a historical pattern of resistance to what the official narrative consistently describes as “global arrogance.” The State’s response combines selective economic adjustments, security measures, and measured ideological reaffirmation, reflecting a strategic understanding that internal stability is inseparable from the defense of sovereignty.

Economic pressures and perceptions of financial warfare

From Tehran, the prevailing interpretation among security agencies and political authorities is that the current economic crisis cannot be understood solely as a domestic failure. In this view, the depreciation of the rial and persistent inflation are largely the result of sustained external pressure. Speaking at a business forum, President Masoud Pezeshkian stated: “Today the enemy has placed much of its hope in weakening us through economic pressure.”

While domestic challenges exist, authorities emphasize that they must be assessed within a broader context, in which international sanctions and financial restrictions limit the country’s operational capacity. The Central Bank of Iran estimates it holds over $120 billion in international assets, much of it inaccessible due to U.S. secondary sanctions. From this perspective, inflation and currency shortages are not merely internal phenomena but instruments of external pressure designed to generate economic and political destabilization.

The State has proposed a “dialogue mechanism” with protesters, carefully distinguishing between legitimate protest and vandalism, in an effort to recognize the social dimension of the crisis while maintaining internal cohesion. This initiative reflects the official view that economic and political stability is closely linked to the defense of sovereignty and strategic autonomy.

Operational response and information control

The State’s operational response has followed a dual-track approach: openness to dialogue and firmness in the face of violence. While spokesperson Mohajerani emphasized the intention to “see and listen,” security forces acted decisively against violent outbreaks. In Lorestan, a member of the Basij militia died during confrontations described by state media as the actions of rioters. In Fasa, protesters attempted to storm the governor’s office, resulting in mass arrests and injuries.

Attorney General Movahedi-Azad warned that any escalation toward insecurity would be met with a “legal, proportional, and decisive” response.
The most disruptive measure was the temporary nationwide suspension of internet access, explained by the State as a national security tool.

The official narrative maintains that this action prevented the coordination of agitators and groups operating under external guidance, within a context described by authorities as a “hybrid war,” in which actors such as the United States and Israel seek to orchestrate instability. Internet restrictions are thus seen not as arbitrary censorship but as the modern equivalent of cutting an adversary’s communication lines in a conventional conflict.

Past experiences, including the 2019 and 2022 protests, have reinforced this perspective, with documented attempts by foreign intelligence agencies to use social media to identify targets and coordinate violent actions.
Balkanization and Secessionist Movements

Beyond the tactical management of protests, Iranian security and foreign policy circles highlight a deeper strategic concern: certain external actors may seek not merely regime change in Tehran, but the territorial disintegration of the Iranian state. This perception is informed by analyses from think tanks and statements from political figures in Washington and Gulf capitals.

The concept of “Balkanization” is recurrent in official discourse, with institutions such as the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) cited for studies advocating support for ethnic opposition groups within Iran. For Tehran, these ideas represent an operational “Plan B,” to be activated if maximum economic pressure fails to achieve its objectives. The mobilization of secessionist movements in western regions, among Kurdish, Arab, and Baluchi minorities, is seen as the spearhead of this strategy.

These groups are classified as “terrorists” due to their attacks on civilians and security infrastructure and are viewed as tools of external actors seeking to weaken territorial cohesion.
When demonstrations reach provinces such as Kurdistan, Ilam, or Kermanshah, the official interpretation emphasizes the need to distinguish between socio-economic protest and separatist agendas, prioritizing the protection of national unity as a central policy goal.

US statement and the ideological response

On January 2, 2026, U.S. President Donald Trump posted a direct warning on Truth Social: “If Iran shoots peaceful protesters and violently kills them… the United States will come to their aid. We are armed and ready to act.”

From the State’s perspective, this message confirms the narrative that external powers seek to exploit any internal difficulty to intervene and promote regime change. The response was immediate and multidimensional.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the Swiss chargé d’affaires, representing U.S. interests, to lodge a formal protest, describing Trump’s statement as a violation of the U.N. Charter and international law.

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei addressed senior officials and commanders of the IRGC, reminding them that historical figures characterized by arrogance and oppression—from Pharaoh to the last Pahlavi Shahs—were defeated at the height of their power. This framing links the current confrontation to Iran’s political and ideological tradition and reinforces the narrative of resistance to external pressure.

Foreign mercenaries and terrorism

The Secretariat of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) issued a statement emphasizing that “security forces and the judiciary will show no leniency toward saboteurs.” It notes that recent violent incidents involved elements linked to U.S. and Zionist intelligence services, as well as secessionist groups. The statement stresses that national unity neutralized sabotage attempts during the prior “12-day war” and that internal cohesion remains key to countering external interference.

State television reported the dismantling of armed cells and arrests of foreign-linked operatives in Borujerd, Qazvin, and Tehran, including a suspected Mossad agent coordinating street violence and digital operations. In Lorestan, security forces neutralized an armed team planning a false-flag attack, seizing weapons, ammunition, and improvised explosive device (IED) equipment.

These actions reflect the official perspective that certain actors attempted to instrumentalize economic protests, including Kurdish, Arab, and Baluchi secessionist movements, responsible for attacks on civilians and security infrastructure. For the first time, according to state sources, a Shia shrine was attacked during the unrest, whereas in 2022 incidents were limited to monuments and statues of modern ideologues.

Casualties and security operations

At least four police officers died in separate provinces during confrontations with armed individuals (foreign sources report more than 30 deaths in recent days). Their bodies were transferred to martyr cemeteries, highlighting the narrative of sacrifice for national security.

In Mashhad, Chenaran, and Neyshabur, vandalism and attacks on public property were recorded, including the temporary removal of the national flag, later restored with citizen participation.

Tasnim News reported that Kurdish secessionist factions based in northern Iraq have shifted from logistical support to active operations inside western provinces, including Ilam and Kermanshah. Additionally, five individuals were killed in an attack on a police station in Chenaran, Khorasan Razavi. Arrests included individuals allegedly acting as foreign intelligence liaisons, coordinating digital operations and street violence.

Strategic resilience and state perspective

From the State’s viewpoint, the current crisis reflects the logic of a system operating under a permanent state of siege. The combination of economic, media, and political pressure is interpreted as part of a multifaceted conflict. Trump’s statement and evidence of foreign support for secessionist movements validate this perception, allowing the leadership to respond with a historically grounded narrative of resistance.

The internal challenge remains: managing economic and social discontent without allowing it to be instrumentalized into violence. The continuity of the system depends on the population perceiving tangible relief amid economic difficulties, while security structures maintain control over regions most vulnerable to violent separatism.

The message is twofold: for internal actors, any participation in sedition is considered treason; for external adversaries, underestimating the resilience of the State disregards institutional cohesion and the effectiveness of a strategic narrative refined over decades. The conflict between revolutionary sovereignty and external pressures remains active, ready to re-emerge at any point of economic or political rupture.

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