Sina Raymand – International Affairs Analyst
Classic nuclear deterrence, which was built during the Cold War on the balance of terror, relative transparency, and stable communication channels, has gradually lost its effectiveness. In that era, although nuclear competition was intense, the existence of relatively clear rules and a shared understanding of red lines limited the probability of catastrophic miscalculations. Today, however, this common framework has been severely weakened.
The de facto suspension of the New START treaty, the halting or limiting of verification mechanisms, and the reduction of regular dialogue among nuclear powers have transformed the strategic environment into one of speculation. In such an environment, the perceived intentions of an opponent become more important than their actual capabilities, and this very issue exacerbates the unreliability of existing structures.
Deterrence, once based on predictability, has now transformed into suspicion-based deterrence. This fundamental shift has profound implications for strategic stability. When minimal trust between nuclear powers disappears, even defensive or deterrent measures can be interpreted as a prelude to aggression. This situation increases the risk of miscalculation and reduces the decision-makers’ reaction time. From a strategic perspective, this is the very condition in which deterrence, rather than containing crises, becomes part of the crisis itself.
Within this framework, the crisis of strategic trust has become the central element of the nuclear equation. This crisis not only affects the bilateral relations of nuclear powers but also spreads in a chain reaction to other actors. Allies, rivals, and even non-aligned countries are all forced to redefine their security policies based on the assumption of the fragility of the nuclear commitments of major powers.
New Nuclear Weapons and the Blurring Line Between Conventional and Nuclear War
The second axis of the return of the nuclear war shadow relates to changes in the nature of weapons and nuclear doctrines. Published analyses indicate that the increasing focus on weapons with limited explosive yield has transformed the traditional role of nuclear weapons. These weapons, sometimes referred to as tactical or low-yield nuclear tools, have blurred the psychological and practical line between conventional and nuclear war. In the past, the use of nuclear weapons was considered an absolutely unthinkable option, but today some doctrines seek to make their use conceivable at lower levels of crisis. This change has profound consequences for security calculations, as it obscures the nuclear threshold. Under such conditions, the nuclear threat becomes more of a political and psychological pressure lever than an ultimate deterrent tool.
Discussions concerning the potential deployment of new Russian nuclear systems in peripheral regions, including Belarus, fit within this framework. The primary goal of such actions is to create strategic uncertainty and increase the opponent’s security costs, not necessarily to prepare for a full-scale nuclear war. This logic, especially in the European security environment, carries simultaneously deterrent and destabilizing effects.
On the other side, developments in US nuclear doctrine are also noteworthy. Some analyses point to the emergence of an approach where nuclear weapons are considered part of a strategic bargaining package. Within this framework, deterrence is defined not by enduring commitments but by short-term cost-benefit calculations. While such an approach may create tactical flexibility, at the strategic level, it intensifies the trust crisis and makes existing norms vulnerable.
Global Consequences of the Nuclear Shadow and the Position of Non-Nuclear Actors
The third axis pertains to the broad consequences of the return of the nuclear shadow for the international order, especially for non-nuclear actors. The erosion of arms control regimes is not merely an issue among major powers; it confronts the entire global security architecture with a crisis. In the absence of binding rules, nuclear competition assumes a fluid, multi-layered nature, and other powers are also driven to reconsider their strategic calculations.
For non-nuclear countries, this situation means increased structural insecurity. These countries are, on one hand, exposed to the consequences of nuclear competition and, on the other hand, lack similar deterrent tools. Under such conditions, the credibility of security guarantees and collective commitments diminishes, and the room for foreign policy maneuver becomes more limited.
From an international law perspective, the return of the nuclear shadow also has concerning consequences. When nuclear powers practically distance themselves from arms control commitments, non-proliferation norms are also weakened. This situation could increase the motivation of some actors to reconsider their nuclear stances and lead to a global spread of uncertainty.
The world is entering an era where the shadow of nuclear war will intensify, not due to a sudden increase in the number of weapons, but because of the collapse of strategic trust and the transformation of deterrence logic. This shadow makes security decision-making more complex and riskier, and increases the likelihood of uncontrolled crises.
For non-nuclear actors, these developments carry multi-layered messages. On one hand, nuclear instability makes the surrounding security environment more sensitive and increases the cost of any regional crisis. On the other hand, precisely this situation highlights the necessity of pursuing active, multilateral, and independent security diplomacy, because reliance on the existing nuclear order no longer guarantees stable security. In a world where the nuclear shadow has once again spread, the intelligent management of the strategic trust crisis becomes one of the most crucial components of stability and survival for all actors in the international system.
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