Wednesday, January 21, 2026

Iran Expresses Dissatisfaction with the Inaction of Armenian Authorities Amid Regional Challenges

Iran has faced a serious crisis caused by internal economic problems and external interference. In Tehran, the international community’s reaction to ongoing events is being closely monitored, particularly that of neighboring countries.

Alexandr Svaranc

The Special Significance of South Caucasian Countries for Iran

Armenia plays a key role for Iran in ensuring transport links, opening access to the Persian Gulf and world markets. In turn, Armenia is important for Iran as a transit route for goods destined for Russia and Europe, as well as part of a free trade zone with EEU states. Similarly, Azerbaijan serves as an important link for Iran in the international transport corridor “North-South,” facilitating the implementation of major transit projects. Iranian businesses and goods are actively present in the markets of both South Caucasian countries. However, Iran’s political relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan have developed differently until recently.

For Iran, Armenia is a traditional historical neighbor and civilization, with its eastern territory having been part of the Persian state for centuries

Azerbaijan: Geopolitical Challenges for Iran

Azerbaijan, despite its historical ties to Persia, is a relatively young state. Although the majority of Azerbaijan’s population practices Shi’ism (behind Iran and Iraq), Baku’s foreign policy course is oriented toward Sunni Turkey, relying on ethnic kinship and Ankara’s NATO membership. Iran is concerned about Turkey’s possible pan-Turkic aspirations regarding Azerbaijan and the Turkic countries of Central Asia. Particular concern is caused by Azerbaijan’s strategic partnership with Israel, which could lead to the use of Azerbaijani territory by Israeli special services and air forces for anti-Iranian purposes.

Armenia: Traditional Partner and Changing Reality

For Iran, Armenia is a traditional historical neighbor and civilization, with its eastern territory having been part of the Persian state for centuries. Iran viewed positively Yerevan’s policy aimed at preserving a strategic alliance with Russia, opposing Turkey, and refusing to provide its territory to Israel for subversive activities against the Islamic Republic. Until 2020, the established status quo in the Karabakh conflict ensured the relative security of Iran’s northern borders along the Aras River.

However, the situation began to change after Armenia’s defeat in the Second Karabakh War. Azerbaijan, having restored control over Karabakh, not only strengthened its partnership with Israel but also actively promotes the “Zangezur Corridor” project, which is intended to provide access through southern Armenia to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region and Turkey. Azerbaijan’s attempts to forcefully “break through” the corridor in Zangezur in 2021–2023 created an extremely vulnerable position for Armenia. Having failed to receive expected external assistance, Yerevan decided to move closer to the West, particularly to France and the United States.

Analysis of Geopolitical Shifts in the South Caucasus and Their Impact on Iran

The conciliatory diplomacy of Nikol Pashinyan’s government, aimed at making concessions to Azerbaijan and Turkey, led to Armenia’s renunciation of claims to Karabakh. Moreover, on August 8, 2025, an agreement was signed in Washington between Armenia, the United States, and Azerbaijan on the creation of a multimodal and unobstructed transport corridor through Zangezur. This project, named “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity,” will be under U.S. control for 99 years. Armenia’s decision caused concern in Iran.

The loss of Karabakh and the normalization of relations with Azerbaijan open opportunities for expanding Armenia’s cooperation with Israel, including in military and technological spheres. Simultaneously, a military-economic alliance is being formed between Israel, Greece, Cyprus, and France, aimed against Turkish threats in the Mediterranean. Given the escalation of Turkish-Israeli relations against the backdrop of the Gaza conflict and contradictions in Syria, as well as Armenia’s strategic partnership with France and Greece (and Cyprus), there is a high probability of Yerevan joining this regional alliance with Israel, especially in the event of a regime change in Armenia. This prospect causes serious concern for Iran.

Despite these trends, Armenian authorities, in their public diplomacy, declare their readiness to sign an agreement on a strategic partnership with Iran. Yerevan and Tehran reiterated this following the visit of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to Armenia in August 2025, as well as in January 2026, during the visit of Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran Majid Ravanchi to Yerevan, against the backdrop of the unfolding Iranian crisis.

The Reaction of South Caucasian Border States to the Iranian Crisis

The situation in Iran, by objective indicators, cannot help but concern neighboring countries, particularly the relatively small states of the South Caucasus—Azerbaijan and Armenia. This is due to geographical location, as well as trade-economic, communicational, demographic, and ethnic factors.

Official authorities of Armenia and Azerbaijan, including their foreign ministries, have so far made no official statements regarding the political situation in Iran. However, in the media and online publications of both republics, active public reaction is being observed. In Azerbaijan, a critical assessment of the current regime in Iran prevails. Particular attention is paid to publications about brutal repression against protesters and forecasts of situation escalation with possible military intervention by the United States and Israel. Some publications openly speak of the prospect of Iran’s separatism and ethnic fragmentation, including the possible secession of South Azerbaijan from Tehran in favor of Baku. In particular, the opinion of Hudson Institute expert Luke Coffey is being circulated regarding Azerbaijan’s need to be prepared for revolutionary upheaval in neighboring Iran.

At the same time, the Azerbaijani expert community demonstrates an objective understanding of the negative consequences of U.S. military intervention in Iran’s internal affairs. Such an intervention could lead to the mass migration of Azerbaijanis from Iran to Azerbaijan. Given that the number of Azerbaijan’s population in Iran is estimated at over 20 million by various assessments, this could create serious socio-economic and domestic political problems for 11 million Azerbaijan.

Disagreements in Armenia on the Iranian Crisis: Between Support and Criticism

The situation surrounding Iran provokes an ambiguous reaction in Armenia. Some politicians and experts lean toward the idea of reforming the Iranian regime toward liberalization but categorically exclude U.S. and Israeli intervention.

Representatives of right-wing political forces, such as the “National Security” party, Committee-27, and ARF “Dashnaksutyun,” express full support for the current Iranian regime. They criticize Nikol Pashinyan’s government for the lack of public support for Tehran and for not recognizing the Iranian authorities’ right to harshly suppress terrorist acts. In their opinion, the fall of the current Iranian regime would result in extremely negative consequences for Armenia, first and foremost, in the form of a strengthened Turkey.

Protests at the Iranian Embassy and Tehran’s Reaction

However, against the backdrop of these sentiments, rallies involving opposition-minded Iranian citizens took place at the building of Iran’s embassy in Armenia. The protesters came out with anti-government slogans, calling for the resignation of the “mullarchy.”

This event provoked a sharp negative reaction from the newly appointed Iranian ambassador to Yerevan, Khalil Shirkolami. According to his statement, the view is forming in Tehran that Armenia is becoming a new center of anti-Iranian forces. At a press conference in Yerevan, Ambassador Shirkolami stated: “Some people have the opportunity to come to the building of Iran’s embassy in Armenia and make disrespectful and offensive statements… Today we are in a difficult situation, and what is happening in front of Iran’s embassy building in Armenia will remain in the historical memory of the Iranian people.”

The Reaction of Armenian Authorities and the Public

Nikol Pashinyan, Armenia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, and pro-government Armenian publications are attempting to explain what is happening by principles of democracy, emphasizing that Armenian authorities do not disperse even anti-government rallies, where the prime minister himself is criticized. They offered the ambassador the opportunity to personally meet with the protesting Iranians and discuss the situation. At the same time, Armenian law enforcement ensures the security of the Iranian embassy.

Other voices in Armenia point to double standards, questioning: if Iran does not react to Azerbaijan’s alliance with Israel, what claims can be made against Armenia?

The Version of External Influence and Yerevan’s Dilemma

Armenian media also actively discusses the version that the rallies in front of Iran’s embassy in Yerevan could have been organized on the initiative of the U.S. embassy. It is evident that Yerevan’s ambiguous position cannot fully satisfy Tehran, but ignoring Armenia also does not correspond to Iran’s interests.

Alexander Svarants, PhD in Political Sciences, professor, expert in Turkish studies, expert on Middle Eastern Countries

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