Iran is signaling that a US strike would not stay limited, but would ripple across West Asia in ways Washington may not be prepared to absorb
The Cradle
Rezaei’s high-pitched rhetoric forms part of a steady stream of escalating rhetoric and signaling from Iranian officials over recent weeks. They reflect a high level of Iranian readiness to enter what officials describe as a “battle of existence” if the US imposes it on Tehran.
For that reason, it is necessary to examine what options may be on the table in Tehran should Trump decide to move from pressure to direct military confrontation.
Is war Trump’s preferred option?
Trump is not the reckless madman he sometimes portrays himself to be. He performs unpredictably. That performance serves a purpose. He is, in fact, highly attentive to cost. What distinguishes him from other US presidents is not the absence of calculation, but the criteria guiding it.
Trump is less concerned with institutional legitimacy, alliance consensus, or international law. He is concerned with how his presidency is remembered and whether his decisions produce visible results at an acceptable price. High cost is the only reliable brake.
In Venezuela, Washington pursued regime change and intensified economic warfare but avoided direct military intervention that would have imposed immediate and measurable losses. In Yemen, the Trump administration reduced overt US military exposure once it became clear that escalation would not guarantee strategic success at a manageable cost.
In Lebanon and Gaza, Washington has repeatedly sought to prevent expansion into a full regional war that would force direct US engagement. In Ukraine, Trump has publicly questioned indefinite commitments and signaled a preference for recalibration rather than open-ended entanglement.
The pattern is consistent. Trump escalates rhetorically, reinforces the credibility of his threats, and amplifies uncertainty. Then he weighs two questions: Can I impose a clear political outcome? And what will this cost me politically, militarily, and economically?
In the Iranian case, those costs extend far beyond the initial strike.
They include: potential retaliation against US military bases across West Asia; the security of Israel; the effect of war on oil prices and global markets; domestic political pressure if US casualties rise; and the danger of sliding into a prolonged regional war without a defined endpoint.
Recent US defense planning in West Asia has emphasized reliance on regional partners rather than direct, large-scale US engagement. The preference has been to confront Tehran indirectly, primarily through support for Tel Aviv.
Inside Washington, the central debate is not whether the US has the capability to strike Iran. It does. The deeper concern is whether such a strike could produce a durable political reality – whether it would deter Tehran, extract concessions, or alter behavior without triggering sustained escalation.
That uncertainty defines the current moment.
Tehran studies the White House
Rather than operating blindly, Iranian decision-makers understand Trump’s sensitivity to cost and escalation. Their response has been to increase the perceived price of any US military move before it occurs.
The clearest warning has come from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who stated, “The US should know that if they start a war this time, it would be a regional war.” That formulation is precise. It signals that any confrontation would not remain confined to a narrow exchange.
Iran’s response, as indicated, would not be limited to Israel or to isolated US facilities. It would expand across a wider regional target bank that includes US interests and infrastructure throughout West Asia.
A second message came in institutional form. Tehran announced the formation of a Defense Council and appointed Ali Shamkhani as its secretary. Shamkhani is one of the most experienced figures in Iran’s security establishment.
He has served as defense minister, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, commander within both Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the regular armed forces, and senior advisor to the Supreme Leader.
The responsibilities assigned to the Defense Council include “designing and comprehensively strengthening defense preparedness, developing mechanisms to confront emerging threats … setting frameworks for defense diplomacy, and organizing activities related to strategic communications and cognitive warfare within the strategic defense sphere.”
Its composition is notable. The council includes representatives of the supreme leader, the intelligence minister, the chief of staff, the IRGC commander, the commander of the regular army, and the head of Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters. Compared with the Supreme National Security Council (which managed the 12-day US-Israeli war on Iran), this structure is more explicitly militarized and less politically weighted.
In practical terms, any future confrontation would be directed primarily by Iran’s military establishment, with the IRGC at the center of operational planning.
In Washington and Tel Aviv, the IRGC is often characterized as the most uncompromising institution within Iran’s power structure. Its prominence in the new configuration will be read as preparation for decisive escalation.
The Strait of Hormuz card
Iran has also revived one of its most consequential strategic levers: the Strait of Hormuz.
On 17 February, Iranian state media reported that naval forces temporarily closed the strait during military exercises. IRGC Navy Commander Alireza Tangsiri emphasized that the authority to close Hormuz rests with senior leadership and that Iran’s forces are prepared to execute such a decision if ordered.
Approximately 20 percent of global oil flows transit this narrow waterway. Even a limited disruption would send immediate shockwaves through energy markets and global supply chains.
The signal is unmistakable. A war with Iran would not remain confined to missile exchanges. It would rapidly translate into economic destabilization with global repercussions.
Expanding the battlefield
Beyond official statements, indirect messaging has reportedly targeted regional states hosting US military infrastructure.
In a televised segment aired on Ofogh TV, a channel affiliated with Iran’s state broadcasting authority, commentators warned that the UAE could fall within Iran’s target bank if Washington launches military operations from its territory. The segment drew a distinction between the Emirati population and what it described as an “American UAE” – portraying the country’s strategic infrastructure as an extension of US regional power.
The rhetoric went further, referring to the UAE as the “51st state” of the US and outlining potential targets tied to US commercial and military presence, including hubs in Dubai and the Jebel Ali area.
Reports have also indicated that Tehran conveyed warnings to Lebanon and Jordan that facilities used to support US military operations could be drawn into confrontation if war erupts. In Lebanon, Hamat Air Base has been highlighted. In Jordan, Muwaffaq Salti Air Base remains a critical site for US and coalition forces.
If conflict escalates, Iran’s initial focus would likely be US military assets across the region – air bases, command centers, logistics facilities, and naval deployments.
Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar, which hosts forward US Central Command (CENTCOM) operations, is strategically significant. The US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain is another central node. Additional US facilities in Iraq and Syria would also be vulnerable.
This indicates that Tehran’s strategy encompasses defending its territory while expanding its response to include maritime domains and areas hosting US bases, and that its messaging has extended to regional partners and allied movements. As outlined in an analysis published on the supreme leader’s official website titled “In the event of any enemy aggression, what will Iran’s strategy be?”, Tehran warns that past red lines would be fundamentally redrawn and the battlefield would extend far beyond previous boundaries. “If Iranian territory or the lives of its citizens are harmed, American interests and personnel would not be safe anywhere,” the statement says. Unlike during the 12‑day June war, when Iran acted alone, any future conflict would confront the enemy across multiple fronts and diverse zones of engagement.
At the same time, Israel remains central to Tehran’s calculus. Iranian officials, including the defense minister in May 2025, have stated that any US attack would trigger strikes against US and Israeli “interests, bases, and forces.” The language intentionally extends beyond purely military targets.
Deterrence through escalation
A confrontation between Washington and Tehran would ultimately hinge on cost, not capability alone.
Trump’s strategy relies on pressure calibrated just below the threshold of uncontrollable escalation. The objective is to extract concessions while avoiding a conflict that expands beyond defined limits. Tehran’s response has been to signal that such limits cannot be assumed.
Any strike, in its view, would trigger reactions across multiple fronts, drawing in US positions, regional infrastructure, and energy routes that anchor global markets.
Both capitals are studying the other’s pressure points. Washington projects force from afar and depends on a network of bases and regional partners. Iran sits inside the geography of confrontation itself, surrounded by US installations, allied movements, maritime chokepoints, and critical energy corridors.
Should Trump judge the blowback manageable, he may act. Should Tehran succeed in convincing him that escalation would spread quickly and unpredictably, restraint may prevail.
The upcoming talks will revolve around these calculations. Each side is measuring how far the other is prepared to go – and what it is willing to risk.
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