Damascus may be buying time to keep the lights on, but in a region wired to Tel Aviv’s pipelines, not a single molecule of gas is politically neutral.
The Cradle
The agreement was inked in the presence of Syrian Energy Minister Mohammad al-Bashir and his Jordanian counterpart Saleh al-Kharabsheh.
To guarantee continuity, Amman is leasing a new regasification vessel. On 8 January, Bashir announced that gas would be directed to the Nasiriyah power plant in the Damascus countryside.
According to Bashir, the agreement “represents an important step within the government’s efforts to enhance the supply of the electricity sector with the necessary fuel and improve the reliability of electricity supply, especially in light of the challenges that the energy sector has faced in recent years.”
Kharabsheh, for his part, said that the supply enhances the stability of the Syrian electricity sector, noting that pumping began on 1 January at levels ranging from 30 to 90 million cubic feet (0.85–2.55 million cubic meters) per day.
Years of war, sanctions, and infrastructure degradation have left power plants operating far below capacity, while households endure blackouts that stretch for hours and paralyze entire neighborhoods. In that context, any additional supply is framed not as politics, but as relief.
Yet from the moment pumping began, a more uncomfortable question surfaced beneath the official language of “stability” and “cooperation.”
Where does this gas actually originate?
An agreement that avoids the source
Is it Egyptian, as some statements imply? Is it Jordanian production? Or is it Israeli gas moving through Arab intermediaries before reaching Syrian turbines?
The agreements signed in January between Syria, Jordan, and Egypt provide volumes, timelines, and ceremonial photographs. What they do not provide is clarity on origin. In the eastern Mediterranean’s tightly interconnected energy grid, origin is neither simple nor politically neutral.
Officials and regional sources confirm that the gas reaching Syria is not Egyptian in any direct production sense. Pumping operations rely on a floating storage and regasification vessel leased from the Egyptian side at the port of Aqaba, suggesting that Cairo’s role is infrastructural rather than extractive.
According to official Jordanian data, the last liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipment to reach the kingdom arrived in November 2025 from the US. That cargo was sufficient for less than one month of export to Syria at the announced flow rates, immediately raising doubts about the sustainability of any non-Israeli supply narrative.
The Egyptian corridor: Producer or platform?
Parallel to the Jordanian arrangement, Egypt and Syria reached an understanding under which Damascus would receive roughly 60 million cubic feet (1.7 million cubic meters) of Egyptian gas in exchange for allowing the transit of gas and electricity from Egypt and Jordan to Lebanon via Syrian territory. The agreement situates Syria not only as a recipient, but as a conduit in a broader regional energy chain.
Egypt’s Ministry of Petroleum announced on 5 January the signing of two memorandums of understanding (MoU) between Petroleum Minister Karim Badawi and a Syrian delegation headed by Deputy Energy Minister for Petroleum Affairs Ghaith Diab. Official statements emphasized regulating supply and meeting Syrian oil-sector needs, framing the agreement as administrative rather than strategic.
CNN, citing an Egyptian official, reported that the arrangement is linked to Cairo–Beirut understandings regarding Lebanese supply. According to the source, what Syria receives functions as compensation for transit rights, tying Damascus’ benefit directly to its role in enabling onward flows.
The same official indicated that Syria signaled readiness to facilitate passage following the cancellation of Caesar Act sanctions, in exchange for gas volumes and LNG shipments delivered to Egyptian vessels. Transport occurs through the Arab Gas Pipeline project, approved in 2000 and extending approximately 1,200 kilometers across the region.
Yet Egypt’s position in this arrangement cannot be evaluated without examining its import structure. Cairo currently receives approximately 1 billion cubic feet (28.32 million cubic meters) per day through its pipeline connection with Israel. In addition, interconnections with Jordan enable transfers exceeding 1.2 billion cubic feet (28.32 million cubic meters) per day within the integrated system.
On 17 December 2025, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced approval of a new gas agreement with Egypt valued at roughly $35 billion, describing it as the largest deal in Israel’s history. NewMed Energy, a partner in the Leviathan Field, disclosed that the amended agreement includes an additional 4.6 trillion cubic feet (130.3 billion cubic meters) supplied in two phases, with commitments extending until 2040.
This arrangement consolidates Israel’s role as a leading exporter in the eastern Mediterranean through what functions effectively as an Egyptian gateway. Jordan, for its part, imports Israeli gas under a 2016 agreement that entered into force in 2020 for a 15-year term valued at approximately $10 billion.
Both Egypt and Jordan, therefore, rely structurally on Israeli imports. Both have signed supply agreements with Syria. Neither has publicly specified the ultimate origin of the gas destined for Syrian power plants, and neither has clarified how volumes are contractually designated once they enter the regional network.
The structure of mixing
To unpack the mechanics of this system, The Cradle spoke with Mulham Jazmati, a researcher at Karam Shaar Consulting, who argues that the debate must move beyond accusation and examine structure.
Jordan, he explains, is not structurally a major gas-producing country. Domestic output remains limited compared to demand, particularly in electricity generation and industrial sectors. For years, the principal source has been pipeline gas delivered directly from Israel, making Israeli supply the dominant component of Jordan’s energy mix.
Although Jordan operates an LNG terminal in Aqaba that allows cargoes from global markets, those volumes function as supplements rather than replacements. Israeli gas remains foundational to the system’s stability.
Egypt presents a more layered configuration. After discovering the Zohr Field in 2015, Cairo re-emerged as a significant producer, reaching peak output of nearly 7 billion cubic feet (198.2 million cubic meters) per day in subsequent years.
Since 2023, however, production has declined while domestic consumption has increased, prompting Egypt to raise imports through pipelines from Israel as well as LNG shipments from global markets.
Jazmati notes that Egypt now functions as a regional hub for aggregation, liquefaction, and re-export. Its facilities in Idku and Damietta receive gas from domestic fields and Israeli imports, then re-liquefy volumes for export to Europe and Asia according to price dynamics and contractual commitments.
In 2018, Cairo signed a long-term agreement to import Israeli gas, part of which feeds domestic networks, while another portion is re-exported after liquefaction. Within such an interconnected mesh, gas molecules mix physically once they enter the system, rendering geological origin secondary to contractual designation.
Before 2011, the Arab Gas Pipeline transported Egyptian gas directly into Syrian power stations. Today, the same infrastructure operates within a fundamentally altered supply architecture defined by Israeli export expansion, Egyptian hub strategy, and Jordanian dependency.
Syria’s domestic production once approached 1.06 billion cubic feet (30 million cubic meters) per day. Today, it represents only a fraction of that level, leaving external supply as an emergency stabilizer rather than a discretionary supplement.
Jazmati concludes that Jordan’s reliance on Israeli gas is clear, with alternatives limited by volume and cost. Egypt remains bound by import agreements with Israel and redistributes part of those volumes through its liquefaction infrastructure. In such a network, identifying the final source of gas reaching Syria requires contractual transparency, not rhetorical assurances.
The Egyptian position
Also speaking to The Cradle, Egyptian academic Dr Imad Anan situates the Syrian supply file within three overlapping frameworks: political positioning, economic necessity, and regional stabilization.
First, the January agreement granting Syria roughly 60 million cubic feet (1.7 million cubic meters) of gas forms part of a broader arrangement that includes Lebanon, linking Syrian transit rights to Egyptian supply. This configuration allows Cairo to position itself as a stabilizing intermediary while maintaining influence in both Damascus and Beirut.
Second, Anan stresses that the gas allocated to Syria will inevitably draw from the broader pool that includes Israeli imports under agreements in place since 2019, supplemented by limited new discoveries that cannot independently satisfy export commitments.
A significant portion of Israeli gas imported into Egypt is used to meet European export obligations established after the outbreak of the Ukraine war, enabling Cairo to secure hard currency during periods of dollar shortage.
Third, Anan frames Egypt’s engagement as part of a wider Arab effort, including Saudi-backed initiatives, aimed at preventing renewed destabilization in Syria and Lebanon. Energy supply thus operates not merely as commerce, but as a mechanism of political management embedded within regional balances.
Gas flows rarely move without consequence.
Jordan’s production limits
In Jordan, Professor Hassan Abdullah al-Dajah of Al-Hussein Bin Talal University identifies the Risha Field as the kingdom’s primary domestic source of gas, with officially announced reserves estimated at around 12 trillion cubic feet (340 billion cubic meters).
Optimistic projections have suggested that the figure could rise further. However, Dajah stresses the importance of distinguishing clearly between estimated reserves and actual production capacity, warning that the two are often conflated in public discourse.
While reserve estimates point to long-term potential, current output remains modest and is directed primarily toward covering domestic electricity demand, which constitutes the backbone of gas consumption in the kingdom. This structural reality, he explains, limits Jordan’s ability at present to secure large or stable export volumes to Syria without significant expansion of upstream capacity.
Increasing production, Dajah notes, requires more than optimistic reserve figures. It demands intensified drilling operations, sustained capital investment, advanced extraction technologies, and the development of associated infrastructure for processing and transportation. Export capability is not achieved through a single discovery; it depends on cumulative and continuous work to raise extraction efficiency and stabilize output over time.
In parallel, Jordan benefits from a strategic infrastructure advantage. The Arab Gas Pipeline remains operational and historically transported Egyptian gas northward to the Syrian border. This existing network enables Amman to redirect flows without constructing entirely new lines, reducing both technical barriers and the political exposure that accompanies new infrastructure projects.
From the perspective of international relations, Dajah emphasizes that gas agreements between Jordan and Syria cannot be read in isolation from broader regional balances. Jordan seeks to consolidate its position as an energy broker linking the eastern Mediterranean with the Levant, leveraging geography and infrastructure to enhance its political relevance.
In this sense, energy diplomacy becomes a tool that extends beyond direct economic return, allowing Amman to maneuver within delicate relationships that include the US, Arab states, and regional powers.
Between electricity and occupation
The structural evidence points toward a single reality: gas reaching Syria through Jordan and Egypt travels within an integrated regional system in which Israeli supply constitutes a dominant component, whether directly through Jordan’s long-term import contract or indirectly via Egyptian liquefaction channels.
Official opacity preserves plausible deniability, yet the architecture of the grid reveals interdependence that cannot be easily compartmentalized.
Syria and Israel have not signed a peace agreement, nor has any official normalization framework been announced. If Israeli gas is embedded in current flows, it arrives ahead of any declared political settlement and outside a publicly articulated legal framework.
Economic transactions between adversarial states typically rest upon formal diplomatic foundations that provide legal clarity and political cover. In this instance, no such foundation has been acknowledged.
Should Israeli gas indeed be entering Syrian infrastructure through intermediaries, the mechanism likely functions through layered contractual arrangements designed to contain domestic backlash and regional political cost.
The contradiction is acute. Syrian territory remains under Israeli occupation, stretching from the Golan Heights to Mount Hermon and encompassing areas of Quneitra Governorate as well as parts of Deraa. Israeli forces continue arrests, demolitions, and agricultural spraying operations that deepen civilian hardship and sustain political tension.
Against that backdrop, the prospect of Israeli gas powering Syrian turbines carries symbolic weight far beyond energy metrics.
At the same time, Syria confronts an electricity crisis shaped by years of war, sanctions, infrastructure damage, and resource loss. Extended blackouts disrupt households, constrain industry, and strain hospitals operating under fragile conditions. In such circumstances, energy policy becomes survival policy.
The question hence persists with uncomfortable clarity: Is Syria receiving Arab gas, or is it consuming recycled Israeli energy routed through Arab networks?
Until contracts are disclosed with precision and supply chains are clarified transparently, the answer will remain embedded within a system designed to blur origin while sustaining flow.
Gas in the eastern Mediterranean is embedded in political arrangements that shape leverage, dependency, and regional alignments.
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