The unfinished equation
In the current situation, after the signing of a 14-point memorandum of understanding between the presidents of Iran and the United States following the Ramadan War, the Israeli regime's continuous violation of the ceasefire in southern Lebanon still continues.
The first paragraph of this understanding declared an immediate and permanent end to the war on all fronts, including Lebanon, and the parties pledged to refrain from any hostile action, threat, or use of force.
However, the presence of Israeli forces in the border areas and southern Lebanon and attempt to create a superior field position indicate that Tel Aviv is either unwilling to fully implement its commitments or is pursuing it within the framework of separate calculations.
This situation poses a fundamental question for Iranian decision-makers: What should the Islamic Republic of Iran do in the face of this blatant violation of the ceasefire and attempt to change the equation in Lebanon?
This issue cannot be analyzed solely at the level of a tactical violation of the ceasefire. Rather, it must be analyzed in the context of the structural relationship between the United States and Israel, the impact of the Ramadan War on deterrence, and the imperatives of establishing a new security order for Iran.
Despite signs of a rift between the US and Israel, the principle of a strategic alliance between the two sides remains intact. Even if this rift is real, the likelihood of a complete separation of paths is small and may even reproduce the pattern of good and bad police; in the sense that Israel's advance will open up America's hand at the negotiating table and remove the Lebanese equation from the framework of the agreement.
After the Ramadan War and the failure of the other side to achieve its maximum goals, Iran is now in a position to take the initiative to consolidate its new security order. Iran's main rival in this equation is the Zionist regime, which must be influenced by the agreement. In such circumstances, Iran's policy requires a balance between maintaining active deterrence, exploiting geopolitical levers (straits), and tactical and intelligent flexibility in the nuclear file.
The US-Israeli relationship: Real divide or structural harmony?
The current situation shows that after the Ramadan War and the failure and defeat of the American Zionist side against the Islamic Republic of Iran, there are signs of tension and disagreement between Netanyahu and Trump. However, these differences are more a reflection of the differences in goals and, possibly, the way they exploit the crisis than a sign of a separation of paths between these two old allies.
On the other hand, Israel continues to act as America's key security proxy in the West Asian region, and Washington is not willing to sacrifice this strategic asset easily. Meanwhile, the Zionist regime's ground and step-by-step advance in southern Lebanon could be beneficial to both actors in two ways at the same time; on the one hand, it helps create leverage for the American side in negotiations with Iran, and on the other hand, it provides a platform for changing the field equations in southern Lebanon in Tel Aviv's favor and institutionalizing a new security order on this front.
This possible synergy between the American and Zionist sides makes clear the requirements of Iran's foreign policy in this situation. If Iran is content with merely mechanically implementing the 14-point understanding, there is a risk of establishing an asymmetric situation and the regime's continued presence in southern Lebanon without retreating, which changes the deterrence equation to the detriment of the resistance axis.
Iran's leverage and operational options
In this situation, Iran has several options that it can use intelligently and in stages. Closing the Strait of Hormuz or Bab al-Mandeb, as powerful and strategic geopolitical levers, can greatly increase the cost of violating the ceasefire for the other side and fundamentally change the cost-benefit equations of Washington and Tel Aviv. These levers not only have a direct impact on the global energy flow, but also have the ability to increase economic and political pressure on the US government and, on the other hand, show that any attempt to unilaterally change the equations on the Lebanese front will not go without a proportionate response.
Of course, such measures must be taken in stages, gradually, and proportionate to the severity and scope of the violation of the agreement, in order to prevent it from turning into another full-scale conflict, while at the same time conveying Iran's decisive and controlled message.
In the nuclear case, Iran could demonstrate intelligent tactical flexibility at low enrichment levels, a flexibility that would have significant symbolic and practical significance for the American side and could create room for progress in negotiations. This flexibility is unlikely to pose a security challenge for the country, because by maintaining its enriched stockpile at 60 percent, the country would remain on the brink and retain the capacity to change doctrine and rapidly upgrade capabilities in the future. In fact, this tactical flexibility should be managed in such a way that it is exercised only in exchange for tangible and strategic gains in other areas.
A ceasefire on the Lebanese front and Israeli withdrawal from the region, control of the Strait of Hormuz, and full preservation of 60% of reserves are probably Iran's uncrossable red lines. The ultimate goal of this intelligent balance is to force the Zionist regime to accept the new reality after the Ramadan War and a complete withdrawal from southern Lebanon; a reality in which Israel can no longer exploit the gaps in the agreement to unilaterally change the field, and the security equation of the Middle East region is stabilized in favor of the axis of resistance.
Requirements for establishing a new security order
To establish its desired security order in the region, Iran needs to redefine the security equation of the Lebanese front. Hezbollah, as a key player in the axis of resistance, plays an important role in this security equation. Any agreement without considering Hezbollah's current situation is likely to cause irreparable blows in the future.
Therefore, Iran’s policy should be based on strengthening coordination among members of the resistance axis, activating geopolitical cards, and simultaneously exploiting diplomacy and deterrence. The experience of the Ramadan War showed that Iran’s resilience and the coordination of the resistance axis invalidated the narrative of the resistance front’s weakness. Now is the time to turn this resilience into a sustainable strategic achievement.
Concluding remarks
The outcome of developments after the signing of the 14-point understanding shows that the violation of the ceasefire in southern Lebanon is a serious test of the validity of the agreement and Iran's will to redefine the security order in the region. The gap between the United States and Israel, although real, will probably continue to an extent that does not disrupt the principle of Tel Aviv's proxy. Therefore, Iran cannot rely solely on Washington's goodwill for Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon, but must combine its leverage to force the Zionist regime to accept the new equation.
Consolidating Israel's presence in southern Lebanon not only renders the ceasefire ineffective, but also increases the risk of reproducing subsequent crises. Considering the strengthened position after the Ramadan war, Iran has the capacity to change this equation in its favor. The optimal strategy is neither excessive confrontation nor diplomatic passivity, but intelligent crisis management with the aim of achieving a new depth of security in Lebanon and stabilizing regional deterrence. The security future of the region and the credibility of Iran's deterrence depend on Tehran's decisiveness at this critical stage.
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