Crescent International
As expected, the Aliyev regime denied the allegations.
The more important question is not whether a particular operation occurred.
The real question is why such claims appear plausible.
Today, Baku is arguably a more permissive environment for Israeli military, intelligence, and political activities than some Arab capitals.
How did Israel become so comfortable in Azerbaijan that reports of Israeli military or intelligence activity on Azerbaijani soil may be regarded as credible?
While much attention is paid to the corrupt nature of the Aliyev and Israel’s regional strategy, Tehran’s policy mistakes that helped create this reality need a deeper analysis.
The first mistake was excessive caution toward Azerbaijan in the name of preserving relations with Russia.
Iran over-estimated Moscow’s negative reaction if Tehran asserted its legitimate interests within Russia’s historic geopolitical sphere.
The Iranians understandably sought to avoid disrupting ties with Moscow, whose cooperation has been critical in countering western aggression.
However, maintaining good relations with Russia should never have required Iran to remain soft on the Aliyev regime’s policies that directly threatened Iranian and Islamic interests.
Over time, Baku learned that Iran’s desire for stability would often outweigh its willingness to impose costs.
This encouraged increasingly hostile behavior while creating space for Israel to deepen its presence on Iran’s northern border.
A second mistake was Iran’s response to Azerbaijani nationalism.
Israel and western regimes promoted narratives portraying Azerbaijani identity as opposed to Iran.
Tehran frequently responded with its own nationalist rhetoric.
This approach was counterproductive because it accepted the framework established by its enemies, namely that of nationalism.
This is a framework western regimes have imposed on West Asia to divide and conquer it.
A more effective strategy would have been to co-opt Azerbaijani nationalism rather than confront it.
The historic reality is that Azerbaijani identity and statehood are deeply intertwined with the history of Islamic Iran.
The Safavid state, which shaped Iran’s Islamic identity, emerged from a political and cultural milieu rooted heavily in Azerbaijani lands and elites.
Rather than treating Azerbaijani nationalism as an external threat, Iran could have emphasized that Azerbaijani history is inseparable from the broader history of Islamic Iran.
Such an approach would have undermined attempts to weaponize Azerbaijani identity against Tehran.
It would also have brought the conversation into the realm of Islamic intellectual paradigm, taking out of the imposed secular nationalist rhetoric, as the Safavid-Azeri roots are Islamic in their essence.
Iran could also have performed better in the information sphere.
During the First Karabakh War (1990s), Iran not only mediated between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Tehran provided training and military assistance to Azerbaijani forces at critical moments of the conflict.
Since the early 1990s, the Rahbar, Imam Seyyed Ali Khamenei had on numerous occasions spoken out against the Armenian occupation of Karabakh.
There is a highly popular video in Azerbaijani blogosphere, featuring General Mansour Haghighatpour of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) directing the training of Azeri forces during the initial outbreak of the conflict in the 1990s.
In the video, General Haghighatpour is standing next to the former ruler of Azerbaijan, Geidar Aliyev.
In the widely read and publicly available memoirs of Iran’s former President Hashemi Rafsanjani on the conflict in Karabakh, he details Iran’s concrete military and economic assistance to Azerbaijan in the 1990s.
Yet Tehran did not highlight these facts through a sustained media and public diplomacy campaigns.
As a result, many Azerbaijanis grew up hearing narratives that portrayed Iran as indifferent or even hostile to Azerbaijani interests, while Iran’s own contributions faded from public memory.
Finally, Iran’s handling of the Islamic movement in Azerbaijan proved overly cautious.
Tehran deliberately avoided creating the impression that Azerbaijani Islamic activists were Iranian allies and gave local movements significant autonomy.
While this was intended to preserve their indigenous character, the Aliyev regime interpreted Iranian restraint as a free hand to brutally suppress Islamic activists.
Religious scholars, activists, and organizations faced immense oppression, while Iran’s responses remained largely symbolic.
Instead of viewing Tehran’s restraint as respect for sovereignty, Aliyev interpreted it as weakness.
Taken together, these policies produced a dangerous outcome.
Iran’s caution toward Russia became passivity toward Azerbaijan.
Its response to nationalism strengthened divisive narratives.
Its reluctance to massively publicize its historical support for Azerbaijan allowed anti-Iranian myths to flourish.
And its muted reaction to the suppression of the Islamic movement convinced the Aliyev regime that Tehran would tolerate almost any provocation.
The result is the geopolitical reality visible today: an Azerbaijan where Israel feels comfortable to plot its destabilization schemes.
With the experience of the Ramadan War, Iran will likely review its approach towards the Aliyev regime.
Only time will tell what specific steps Tehran will take.
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