Lebanon’s ruling elite risks reopening the most dangerous chapter of its modern history by attempting to turn the national army into an instrument of internal political confrontation.
The Cradle
The government decision to “ban Hezbollah’s military activity” earlier this month and classify its military and security role as “illegal” has ignited intense debate across the country, extending far beyond political circles into serious questions about security, stability, and the future cohesion of the military institution.
In practical terms, the move places the Lebanese army before a theoretical implementation task that could push it into confrontation with Hezbollah. This prospect revives painful historical memories of periods when the military institution was dragged into internal power struggles, with devastating consequences for both the army’s cohesion and the country’s fragile stability.
The Lebanese army experienced a major split in 1976 during the civil war. A similar crisis resurfaced during the 6 February 1984 uprising, when political and sectarian divisions penetrated the ranks of the institution itself.
Revisiting these turning points is essential to understanding the risks inherent in any political path that seeks to position the army against the resistance – particularly within the delicate balance that has governed Lebanon since the end of the war and the adoption of the Taif Agreement.
When the army fractured
In the mid‑1970s, Lebanon entered one of the most dangerous phases of its modern history with the outbreak of civil war in 1975. At the heart of the unfolding turmoil stood the Lebanese army, an institution that was supposed to serve as the guarantor of national unity and stability.
Yet the complex political and sectarian scene gradually eroded the army’s internal cohesion, culminating in the split of 1976. Officer Ahmad al‑Khatib announced his defection alongside a group of officers and soldiers, declaring the formation of a new military force known as the Lebanese Arab Army. Khatib aligned his force with what was then called the Lebanese National Movement, which maintained an alliance with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
This development did not occur in isolation. It was the product of mounting political and military tensions inside Lebanon. At the time, the Lebanese state attempted to deploy the army to contain escalating clashes between right‑wing Christian forces on one side and Lebanese national forces allied with Palestinian factions on the other.
In the end, the political decision to involve the army in internal confrontations produced the very outcome many had feared. The institution fragmented into rival formations that mirrored the broader political and sectarian rupture gripping the country.
The warning of 6 February
The crisis of division did not end there. A similar turning point emerged during the 6 February intifada (uprising) in 1984, when sustained political pressure again pushed the army into internal clashes with various Lebanese forces.
Several military units collapsed or withdrew from their positions, while others saw their personnel join local factions. Once more, the army reflected the country’s deep political and sectarian fractures – reinforcing the lesson that internal confrontation carries existential risks for the institution.
Rebuilding after Taif
Following the end of the civil war and the ratification of the Taif Agreement, serious efforts were launched to rebuild the Lebanese army and prevent a repeat of the division experience.
Former president Emile Lahoud played a key role in this process. A new organizational formula was adopted, integrating officers and soldiers from different sectarian backgrounds within the same brigades and units.
During the war years, many formations had taken on a sectarian or regional character. The post‑Taif restructuring sought to restore the army’s national identity and make future fragmentation far more difficult.
The goal of this approach was to consolidate the army’s national character and make any attempt to divide it more difficult.
A dangerous internal mission
These historical precedents make one fact clear. Any political decision that pushes the Lebanese army toward internal fighting – particularly while Lebanon faces ongoing aggression from Israel – poses serious dangers to the unity and cohesion of the military institution.
Even so, current indicators suggest that such a scenario remains unlikely in the immediate term. Implementing a government decision of this nature requires both operational capability and an internal military consensus – conditions that are largely absent.
The army’s limited resources and the firm stance of its commander, Rudolphe Haikal, against confrontation with Hezbollah significantly constrain the feasibility of such a course. The specter of institutional fragmentation further complicates any attempt to impose a military decision in this direction.
In practice, pushing the army toward division would require a major political shift, leading Lebanon toward comprehensive civil war. Such a trajectory would not ultimately serve even influential external actors such as the US and Saudi Arabia. A full internal collapse could produce outcomes that undermine what remains of their political leverage in Lebanon.
Available information indicates that Haikal is highly cautious in approaching any step that could draw the army into internal conflict. His position became evident during discussions at the most recent cabinet session with Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, when he reportedly said: “I cannot ask a soldier who earns $200 to fight in the north, in the east, and in the south, and then fight his own people.”
The ‘National Officers’
At the same time, controversy erupted after a short statement published in a local newspaper close to Hezbollah and attributed to a group calling itself the “National Officers” warned against assigning the army the task of “pursuing those confronting an external attack on the country.” The text cautioned that such decisions could “weaken the unifying role of the army and expose its internal unity to dangerous tremors with unpredictable consequences.”
The statement, which ran only a few lines, quickly moved from a media report to the center of political debate in a country deeply sensitive to any discussion involving the military institution. Observers viewed its publication as an attempt to pressure political authorities amid ongoing plans to place all weapons under exclusive state control.
Army Command swiftly denied any link between the alleged group and the institution, stressing that “there is absolutely no truth to what has been reported regarding army officers,” and affirming that military personnel remain loyal only to the army and the nation. Prime Minister Salam also described the statement as “suspicious and devoid of patriotism,” raising doubts about its authenticity and warning of legal consequences if it were found to incite strife.
Despite the official denials, the episode deepened anxiety within political circles. Its rapid circulation exposed underlying tensions over the army’s potential role in confronting Hezbollah and highlighted fears that any attempt to draw the institution into internal conflict could shake its cohesion.
A military source notes to The Cradle that “the army leadership is fully aware of the sensitivity of the current phase, and that preserving the cohesion of the military institution remains a fundamental priority amid the security challenges Lebanon faces.”
The same source stresses that the army command remains acutely aware of the lessons of 1976 and 1984 and is determined to avoid any scenario that might reopen the question of internal division. In its view, the problem lies less with the army itself than with hasty political calculations within the ruling elite that overlook realities on the ground and treat the military institution as a tool in domestic power struggles.
Preserving institutional cohesion, it adds, remains a top priority for the army leadership amid the security challenges Lebanon continues to face.
Power calculations and battlefield realities
A political source discloses to The Cradle that “these calculations and government decisions do not serve the interests of the current administration, whether in relation to [Lebanese] President Joseph Aoun or Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. Any path that weakens the army or draws it into internal division will ultimately be counted against their political tenure.”
The source adds:
“The preliminary political assessments that formed the main factor behind the government decision, alongside external pressure, were based on a hasty reading that Hezbollah had reached a position of weakness that could be exploited internally in parallel with Israeli aggression. However, field developments have shown that this reading was inaccurate and that the party still possesses effective organizational, military, and security capabilities.”
“Had the session been delayed by only a few days, until after the surprise generated by the party’s military strength, it is likely the session would not have been held at all or would not have issued a decision at this level.”
The confrontation also extends beyond a purely local struggle. Hezbollah does not operate in isolation, nor does it face current pressures alone. Contrary to claims promoted in recent months that the party opened a support front on behalf of Iran, several indicators suggest that Tehran itself is actively contributing to supporting Hezbollah in this confrontation.
The party appears to have seized the regional moment to reaffirm its deterrence posture against the Israeli enemy – whether by reinforcing Lebanon’s defensive capacity, halting attacks, or re‑establishing the rules of engagement.
Statements by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) referring to coordinated military operations with Hezbollah point to a high level of alignment. This coordination reflects the broader concept of the “Unity of Fronts,” linking military confrontation with parallel political and negotiating tracks.
In practice, Hezbollah confronts internal and external pressure as part of a wider regional network. This dynamic gives it greater strategic room to reorganize its domestic and regional position and strengthen its political and military standing in the period ahead.
Judicial pressure as another front
Alongside the political and military debate, the judicial handling of the weapons file has hardened. Information indicates that Justice Minister Adel Nassar has directed a stricter approach, including harsher legal measures against individuals found in possession of unlicensed weapons.
Sources point out that these measures do not affect Hezbollah alone, but also impose a pressing reality on the Lebanese army and Internal Security Forces, placing them before additional challenges.
A familiar and dangerous outcome
Ultimately, the problem in decisions of this nature does not lie within the army itself, but within political calculations inside the ruling authority. Lebanese history repeatedly shows that attempts to use the army to alter internal balances lead to the same result – weakening the institution.
In a country like Lebanon, turning the army into an instrument of political confrontation risks destabilizing its unity. Pushing the institution into conflict with influential domestic forces will not produce decisive political outcomes.
It risks undermining the state itself and reopening dangerous fault lines within the army – and within Lebanon as a whole.
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