As US-Israeli strikes intensify, Tehran insists it is fighting a lawful defensive war. Reprisals and third-state complicity are now shaping a parallel legal front.
The Cradle
Even accepting western allegations against Iran, there is no clear legal basis for the US‑Israeli campaign. Claims of “protecting Iranians” and “pre‑emptive self‑defense” are not recognized grounds for the use of force under the UN Charter or customary international law. Yet at the UN Security Council (UNSC), condemnation was directed not at Washington or Tel Aviv, but at Tehran – particularly for retaliatory strikes across the Persian Gulf.
Iran argues it has acted within international law. Its strikes have focused on military installations and infrastructure tied directly to the war effort. Officials frame the campaign as one of survival rather than punishment. In Tehran’s telling, the primary violations lie with those who initiated the aggression against the Islamic Republic.
The use and abuse of International law
International law is far from perfect. Its modern architecture took shape alongside imperial expansion and has often reflected prevailing power hierarchies. Enforcement remains selective, while legal interpretations are frequently shaped by geopolitical influence. Yet even this imperfect system imposes constraints. It provides a framework intended to limit escalation and shield civilian populations from the worst excesses of war.
Under the UN Charter, force is permitted in only two circumstances: self‑defense following an armed attack, or explicit authorization by the Security Council. Article 51 affirms the inherent right of individual or collective self‑defense if an armed attack occurs:
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.”
Articles 39 and 42 empower the Council to authorize military action to restore international peace and security:
“Article 39 – The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”
“Article 42 – Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.”
Neither Israel nor the US was attacked by Iran prior to launching their strikes. Nor did they obtain UNSC authorization.
Instead, alternative legal narratives had been advanced. One centers on regime change framed through the doctrine of the “responsibility to protect” (R2P), invoked in cases involving genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.
However, R2P has not crystallized into binding customary law. Critics argue its ambiguity risks lowering the threshold for intervention by allowing powerful states to repackage strategic objectives as humanitarian imperatives.
As per Jason Athanasios Doukakis for the Yale Review of International Studies, R2P “Does not possess the status of a legal obligation due to its vague definition and scope, lack of a prescribed mechanism through which to delegate authority, and unspecified framework of implementation.”
Using the R2P to justify attacking Iran is even more absurd, given Tel Aviv and Washington’s genocide of Palestinians in Gaza and attacks against Iranian civilians.
A second justification is the doctrine of pre‑emptive self‑defense – the claim that force may be used to prevent an imminent attack. Even the US realized the absurdity of this argument during the Iraq War, instead making convoluted arguments that UNSC authorization during the Gulf War allowed the use of force to stop Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Not even that argument is available today.
Article 51 refers explicitly to an armed attack that has already occurred. Expanding the doctrine to include anticipated threats would weaken one of the Charter’s central restraints on unilateral force.
Measured and proportionate response
Not only is the war itself illegal under international law, but so is its conduct. Under international law, self-defense must be proportionate (in response to an attack) and necessary (furthering objectives to prevent future attacks). Otherwise, a small border skirmish could become nuclear.
Proportionality and necessity are part of customary international law, a legal source that comes from the consistent practice of states over a long period of time.
It has been affirmed in international legal cases such as ‘Nicaragua v. United States of America,’ where the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated there was a “specific rule whereby self-defense would warrant only measures which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in customary international law.”
On the first day of the war, the US and Israel assassinated Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and bombed a girls’ elementary school, killing at least 180, of whom 165 were little girls. In no way does this achieve any military objective. In fact, by assassinating Khamenei and killing innocent civilians, the aggressors made negotiation more difficult.
Meanwhile, despite Iran launching thousands of missiles and drones in retaliation, officially, only 16 Israelis, 13 US soldiers, and 20 people across the Gulf have been killed. Iran’s main targets have been military bases and buildings hosting US soldiers – legitimate targets given their role in attacking the Islamic Republic. Iran has also struck embassies, not with the goal of assassinating diplomats, but to destroy spying operations.
Most controversial has been the attack against a desalination plant in Bahrain, which provides water. As per Article 52(1) of the Additional Protocol of the Geneva Convention, “Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals.” Specifically, Article 54 states, “It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.”
Iran argues it was responding with tit-for-tat to the destruction of a desalination plant on Qeshm Island, the only one providing water to the 150,000 residents, while Bahrain possesses multiple facilities capable of maintaining supply.
Within the law of armed conflict, such actions are sometimes analyzed through the doctrine of belligerent reprisals – a narrowly defined concept referring to measures that would normally be unlawful but may become permissible as a last‑resort response to a serious prior violation.
Customary interpretations stress that reprisals must remain proportionate, must aim solely at compelling the opposing party to return to lawful conduct, and must be employed only after other avenues of redress have failed. Tehran frames the strike on Bahraini infrastructure as a coercive signal intended to deter further unlawful attacks on indispensable civilian facilities inside Iran.
Supporters of this position argue that when international institutions fail to prevent violations, limited reprisals may function as one of the few available enforcement mechanisms through which states facing militarily superior adversaries can impose costs and restore a degree of legal reciprocity.
Lies at the UNSC
This interpretation has found little traction at the UNSC. With the US wielding veto power as a permanent member, any resolution condemning American actions was unlikely to pass. Instead, Iran was blamed for escalating the war.
Resolution 2817 affirms the territorial integrity and political independence of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Jordan, while reiterating their right to self‑defense – despite their role in hosting foreign military bases used in operations against Iran.
There is no evidence Iran has deliberately targeted any civilian infrastructure (with the exception of Bahrain’s desalination plants to deter attacks against Iran’s plants). Even including military personnel, the total death toll from Iran’s attacks is under 50. Among the few civilians who were killed, many were struck by falling debris from intercepted missiles. It is not Iran that strikes hospitals, schools, and innocent civilians. It is Israel and the US.
Tehran and its allies point to UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 3314 (1974), which defines aggression to include situations in which a state allows its territory to be used by another state to launch attacks against a third country. Article 3(f) identifies the provision of airspace, bases, or logistical platforms for military action as conduct that may itself constitute aggression.
From this perspective, states that facilitate such operations risk losing neutral status and may become subject to proportionate defensive measures aimed at halting ongoing attacks.
Resolution 3314 has informed subsequent legal developments, including jurisprudence at the ICJ and the Kampala Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which expanded the possibility of individual criminal liability for leaders involved in planning, facilitating, or supporting acts of aggression.
The recent resolution also condemns Iran’s selective closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran counters that wartime blockades are recognized under customary maritime law if declared and effectively enforced. It further notes that the strait lies partly within Iranian and Omani territorial waters.
Perhaps what the Resolution was actually alluding to was the right of innocent passage, which allows for non-military ships to pass through territorial waters. This right is part of customary international law, but is codified in Article 17 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
However, the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea provides further details on existing customary international law. Articles 93 to 108 permit blockades as they are declared (Article 93) and effective (Article 95). As long as this is followed, Article 98 states that:
“Merchant vessels believed on reasonable grounds to be breaching a blockade may be captured. Merchant vessels which, after prior warning, clearly resist capture may be attacked.”
The closing of the Strait of Hormuz should be viewed not just as Iran applying pressure on the global economy, but as a blockade for goods coming to the Gulf states. Iran announced its blockade, and it is proving effective in weakening Gulf countries. Contrary to the Resolution, this action is compliant with international law.
China and Russia ultimately abstained, criticizing the resolution as unbalanced while seeking to preserve diplomatic and economic ties with Gulf partners.
Before it passed, Beijing and Moscow condemned the Resolution for being unbalanced and failing to call out the root cause of the conflict.
Another failure
The UNSC was formed after World War II with the goal of preventing conflict. Its recent Resolution has encouraged it, in failing to denounce the aggressors: America, Israel, and the countries hosting hostile military bases.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has similarly argued that international law is being applied selectively, pointing to western responses to Gaza and the Strait of Hormuz as evidence of what Tehran views as double standards in enforcement.
Even a vague statement condemning war – which Russia drafted but failed to pass – would have been better. Instead, the UNSC made matters worse by occluding the Gulf states’ role in bombing Iran and condemning Tehran for defending itself.
Iran maintains it has sought to limit civilian casualties and focus on targets directly linked to the war effort. If international law is applied selectively – shielding aggressors while condemning those who claim to defend themselves – its authority risks erosion.
For states facing existential threats, compliance with the laws of war may cease to appear a strategic choice and instead resemble a dangerous illusion.
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