The Cradle
Inside Pakistan, the same sense of siege ran through an economy drifting toward collapse and a political order bent under the weight of the military’s ambitions. The country’s most popular leader, Imran Khan, was languishing in jail on corruption charges, while the army openly manipulated the elections, putting Khan’s party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, under the thumb to secure victory for its preferred political bloc.
That sense of isolation began to break almost overnight when Pakistan not only absorbed the Indian onslaught, but also inflicted heavy losses on the Indian air force by downing a significant number of fighter jets and drones.
From that moment, Pakistan’s stature rose sharply, with the US becoming all praise for Pakistani Field Marshal Asim Munir and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, hinting at billions in investments for mineral exploration and cryptocurrency in Pakistan. Washington also showed significant interest in Balochistan, where China has already invested heavily in developing the deep-seaport at Gwadar.
With that shift in status, Pakistan’s strategic outlook has also begun to move. Inside the army’s inner circle, Iran is now being reconsidered as strategic depth, rather than Afghanistan, which many in the establishment now believe has never been a true strategic asset for Pakistan.
Washington embraces a former problem child
The relationship between Pakistan and the US has evolved to the point that Washington chose Pakistan as a mediator in its conflict with Iran. This development comes despite open dissent in US media and among lawmakers, who have raised concerns about Islamabad’s role.
Prominent legislators, including US Senator Lindsey Graham, have questioned Pakistan’s neutrality and urged Washington to reassess Islamabad’s position as mediator. Graham also called on the US State Department to warn Islamabad over trade with Tehran.
The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) took a similar line in its 21 May issue, questioning Pakistan’s mediation role and arguing that the nuclear-armed Islamic Republic is not a “reliable interlocutor” for such high-stakes negotiations.
US President Donald Trump, however, brushed aside these objections and continued to applaud Pakistan’s efforts toward a peaceful settlement, praising Munir and Sharif. Munir has become Trump’s blue-eyed general, shuttling frequently between Islamabad and Washington for closed-door meetings with the president.
Washington’s sudden closeness to Islamabad, despite its long distrust during and after the Afghan war, has baffled many observers. They have struggled to identify the force behind this growing synergy. Trump’s embrace of Pakistan’s military and civilian leadership has become so intense that he repeatedly snubbed his longtime ally, India, by counting the Indian jets Pakistan managed to hit during the war.
Trade routes through the pressure point
Washington has become so lenient toward Pakistan that, even while acting as mediator, Islamabad allowed Iran to move cargo through six overland routes to keep foreign trade flowing despite the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
Although the move could have triggered US anger, business has continued as usual, and Pakistan has received neither a threat nor a warning from the Pentagon. The question, then, is why Washington is allowing Islamabad to extend trade facilitation to Tehran without visible pressure.
Aimen Jamil, a journalist and researcher covering West Asian affairs and Pakistan’s foreign policy, tells The Cradle:
“Pakistan’s decision to facilitate limited transit trade for Iran is less about joining an anti-US bloc and more about managing difficult regional realities in a very tense environment. The ongoing Iran crisis and disruption in the Strait of Hormuz have directly affected Pakistan’s economy, trade flows, and energy security. Pakistan depends heavily on Gulf trade routes, so instability in the region immediately creates pressure on imports, shipping, and the domestic industry. By opening overland transit channels, Islamabad is trying to ease commercial disruptions, generate some economic activity, and position itself as a regional connectivity state.”
For Jamil, geography is also decisive because Pakistan shares a long border with Iran and cannot afford serious instability on its western frontier while dealing with economic stress and internal security concerns. Maintaining workable relations with Tehran is therefore a practical necessity.
“Pakistan doesn’t want a confrontation with Washington and values its relationship with the US for economic, diplomatic, and security reasons. What we are seeing is more of a balancing strategy: maintaining close ties with China; improving regional connectivity with Iran and Central Asia; and exploring opportunities linked to Gwadar and the INSTC [International North–South Transport Corridor], while also keeping communication and cooperation open with the United States,” she explains.
She adds that Pakistani policymakers believe Islamabad’s current mediator role between Tehran and Washington gives the country diplomatic space. Because Islamabad is among the few capitals able to maintain communication with both sides despite deep mistrust, the US appears willing to tolerate limited Pakistani facilitation for Iran, provided it does not seriously undermine sanctions enforcement or broader US objectives.
Speaking to The Cradle, Sajjad Azhar, an Islamabad-based analyst, says:
“Trade corridors between Iran and Pakistan have always remained open. Transactions in bilateral currencies already take place, and this specific kind of trade arrangement has an element of humanity, also because Pakistan allowed the transit of food and essential goods at a time when the Strait of Hormuz was closed. I believe this step was most likely taken after taking the United States into confidence.”
Iran returns as strategic depth
Major Amir, a Pakistani analyst, Afghan affairs specialist, and former key member of the premier spy agency Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), tells The Cradle that Iran has always been a cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy.
In the 1960s, Pakistan signed the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) with Iran and Turkiye, and during the 1965 war with India, Iran served as strategic depth for Pakistan.
He recalls that, in 1987, the US planned to overthrow the Iranian government and sent an operative to Pakistan to create a spy network for that purpose. However, former Pakistani president Muhammad Zia ul-Haq ordered officials not to collaborate with the US spy, who returned without achieving his goal.
“The late Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei knew about this episode; hence, he had special regard for Zia Ul Haq and Pakistan,” he adds.
Amir, known for his role in “Operation Midnight Jackal” to oust slain Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto in 1989, says Pakistan has never considered Afghanistan a strategic asset. The belief that Afghanistan was ever part of Pakistan’s strategic depth is, in his view, a misconception.
India, he argues, has always used Afghanistan against Pakistan, while Afghanistan has shown open hostility toward Pakistan. Iran, by contrast, has remained a loyal friend of Pakistan aside from a few minor incidents. As Amir argues:
“Since 1948, Afghanistan has been demonstrating animosity toward Pakistan. In 1948, they gave refuge to Prince Abdul Karim in conjunction with India and the erstwhile Soviet Union. Prince Karim went to Afghanistan with a militant force to fight Pakistan's annexation of the Kalat division in Balochistan. In the 60s, Sher Bukhsh Muri revolted and sought refuge in Afghanistan with Indian help. Afghanistan provided training camps and sanctuaries to Pushtoon and Baloch militants in the 70s and Al-Zulfiqar in the 80s. Now they are harboring Tehreek-e-Taliban, Pakistan (TTP) with Indian support.”
Gwadar looks north
Pakistan took another step last week that points to a shift in Islamabad’s policy toward multipolarism and Eurasian integration, despite the risk of displeasing Washington.
Special Assistant to the Prime Minister (SAPM) Talha Burki disclosed that Pakistan was keen to become part of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s vision by linking the INSTC with Gwadar Port. Federal Minister Rana Mubashir Iqbal and Talha Burki were addressing the inaugural session of “Russia–Islamic World: KazanForum” in Kazan, Russia, on 13 May.
“Pakistan is not formally establishing a new group with Iran, Russia, and China, but it is deepening strategic ties with all three, particularly through economic and security cooperation,” Azhar says.
He also says this alignment reflects Pakistan’s desire to diversify its foreign policy under regional instability and US pressure:
“The US refrains from strong pressure due to Pakistan’s strategic value in regional stability, counterterrorism efforts, and its role in facilitating dialogue – especially between Iran and other nations. Additionally, Pakistan's balancing act helps manage tensions in South Asia and the Middle East [West Asia] without escalating conflicts.”
Amir says Pakistan has military and economic collaboration with China, and Washington knows this well. He also says that the US has no concerns about transit facilities to Iran or the extension of the INSTC to Gwadar because Washington competes with China, not Iran or Russia. “Pakistan employs sometimes covert and sometimes overt diplomacy depending on the situation, which also benefits the US,” he stated.
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