The continuation of war in the form of unrest: From the enemy’s shifting tactics to national vigilance

Ali Larijani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council

If we want to give an accurate answer to the question, “Where do we stand?” we must inevitably draw a broader picture of what has happened and what is still unfolding. In my view, by taking a comprehensive look at the 12-Day War and its connection to the current situation, it becomes clear that we are still in the midst of a war. A war that ended neither with peace nor even with a ceasefire in the precise legal and political sense of the term. What occurred was merely a mutual cessation of fire, without a written agreement, without monitoring mechanisms, and without binding commitments. Therefore, assuming that we have exited a wartime situation is an analytical mistake. We are still inside the war, and this reality carries its own specific requirements.

A country that is in a state of war cannot — and should not — simultaneously create a new crisis within itself by its own hand. Such an act is neither rational nor acceptable to the nation. If crises of this nature emerge, one must accept that there is an external agent or design at work. Past experience also shows that the enemy—especially the Zionist regime — has consistently relied on a recurring pattern in wars: creating “surprise” through changing tactics. In the twelve-day war, they began with a large-scale military operation and then, from the second and third days onward, clearly sought to transfer the crisis into society. Direct calls to draw people into the streets were part of this very strategy: first military pressure, then social explosion.

At the present stage, however, the same war is continuing with a different configuration. This time, the order of precedence has shifted: first a social crisis, then an attempt to attach it to military action. Even some hasty and blunt remarks by American officials—especially Donald Trump himself—unintentionally exposed this tactical shift; the very point that Netanyahu had previously implied in his meetings. Put simply, the enemy realized that the previous tactic had failed due to popular presence and social cohesion. So this time, it targeted our point of strength: national solidarity.

Here, a clear distinction must be made. There is no doubt that the country faces serious economic problems. Livelihood pressures have driven parts of society to protest, and such protest is, in itself, understandable. As has been emphasized, the government and responsible institutions must listen, sit down, engage in dialogue, and take action to address the root causes of economic problems. At the same time, however, one must see how the enemy seeks to exploit this real and legitimate context in a deviant manner.

What has occurred in recent days has clearly shown that there is a bright line between economic protest and violent actions. A merchant’s protest over inflation and price instability is one thing; the use of firearms, Molotov cocktails, arson, looting, and attacks on public and security centers is another. These cannot be explained under the banner of economic protest. Such behaviors indicate the activity of groups that can be described as “urban شبه-terrorist groups”—groups about which some officials of the Zionist regime had previously spoken explicitly, stating their reliance on “structures created inside Iran.”

The targets of these actions are not accidental either. Symbols of national and religious identity are deliberately attacked: the flag, symbols of resistance, mosques, and anything that represents national pride and cultural cohesion. This means the objective is not merely to create economic dissatisfaction; the objective is to break the collective spirit and fracture the identity bonds of society. Even the looting of shops and the destruction of service centers themselves testify that the issue is not the economy—because someone truly concerned about livelihood does not destroy the very infrastructure of their own and others’ livelihoods.

It must be stated plainly: a security crisis not only solves no problem, but deepens and complicates economic problems. A society plunged into insecurity is hindered even from carrying out its daily activities. Such a situation is neither compassionate nor aligned with the people; rather, it is an oppressive behavior that simultaneously targets national identity, social cohesion, religious beliefs, and people’s livelihoods.

Based on intelligence evidence and behavioral analysis, the central role of the Zionist regime—backed and directed by the United States—in this design is undeniable. Of course, this does not mean ignoring internal weaknesses and shortcomings. The domestic ground exists, and if it is not reformed, it will always be exploited. But denying the external design would be a strategic error.

Nevertheless, I believe this project will also fail, just as the previous one did. Iranian society, at moments when its national essence and collective identity are endangered, quickly returns to solidarity. The enemy has not properly understood the Iranian nation. It imagines that with a few urban tensions and terrorist acts, it can drag society into civil war and then pave the way for foreign intervention. But it overlooks two realities: first, the historical vigilance of the Iranian people; and second, the high level of readiness of the armed forces.

Today, the country’s armed forces enjoy a higher level of preparedness than in the past, and any external aggression will be met with a decisive response. Alongside this, the role of public clarification and dialogue with the people is vital. Media outlets, civil institutions, and officials must explain the real picture of the scene and not allow distorted narratives—spread by networks such as Iran International, which according to precise information was established by the Zionist regime—to poison the psychological atmosphere of society. Networks that operate in service of the enemy’s project attempt to present an exaggerated and collapsed image of the country, whereas reality is not so.

In all this, one essential point must not be forgotten: independence. No foreign power is benevolent toward the Iranian nation. Historical experiences—from the Pahlavi era to contemporary examples in the region—clearly show that bargaining away independence leads to the loss of everything. Independence comes at a cost, but national dignity has no meaning without it. Independence does not mean isolation; rather, it means the right to make independent decisions within the framework of engagement with the world.

Ultimately, at the current juncture, two paths must be pursued simultaneously: on the one hand, safeguarding security and national cohesion against destructive projects; and on the other, carrying out real reforms in the economy and governance. People must feel that they are heard and that they have a role in the country’s economy. In reducing state overreach and transferring affairs to the people, the government must take major steps to adjust bureaucratic conditions and provide facilities to the public.

This stage is a continuation of the same war, with a different tactic. Passing through it requires the same vigilance, sense of responsibility, and cohesion that the Iranian nation demonstrated during the twelve-day war. If this social capital is preserved, this phase too—despite all its difficulties—will be transformed into an opportunity for the country’s maturity and strengthening.