Somaliland: the first recognition. A One-off or a Harbinger of Inevitable Change?

The Israeli government has officially become the first UN member state to formally recognize Somaliland as an independent state – an event awaited in Hargeisa for over 30 years.

Ivan Kopytsev

On December 26, 2025, nearly two years after the Memorandum of Understanding (which is still unimplemented) between Ethiopia and Somaliland was signed, Hargeisa achieved its primary foreign policy goal.

Somaliland: A Brief Background Note

During the colonial era, the territory currently known as Somaliland was part of the British Crown constellation from 1887 to 1960. In the “Year of Africa,” both British and Italian Somaliland gained independence from their former metropoles and, by a UN decision, were united within a single state of Somalia. Over the time, the Isaaq clan, an influential force in Somaliland, became dissatisfied with its secondary role in the country’s political system which, coupled with the defeat in the war with Ethiopia, led to the outbreak of a civil war, triggering centrifugal processes, primarily in the north regions of the country. Consequently, in 1991, during the Grand Conference of the Northern Clans in Burao, elders and leaders of various northern factions proclaimed the establishment of an independent Somaliland. This political entity never gained recognition from any state; however, within a few years, it became the most stable polity in the Somali territory. It was largely achieved through the policy of inter-communal dialogue, which ensured consensus-based transitions of power and the ability to counter threats coming from Islamists.

Notably, Israel opposes the unilateral recognition of Palestine while essentially applying a similar approach in the case of Somaliland

Futile Attempts at International Recognition

Until recently, all of Hargeisa’s successes in domestic politics yielded no significant results on the international stage: Somaliland’s independence was recognised only by the authorities of several cities in the UK, notably Cardiff and Sheffield. However, in 2024, Hargeisa stood a real chance for a “diplomatic breakthrough”: on January 1, it signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Ethiopia, envisaging the recognition of Somaliland’s independence in exchange for Ethiopia obtaining a long-term lease on a section of the Red Sea coast. Recognition by the region’s largest state seemed to open broad prospects for further strengthening Hargeisa’s international status. Yet, pressure from regional players, and particularly Turkey’s stance, prevented Addis Ababa from realising its plan.

Israel’s Recognition: What Do We Know?

Thus, on December 26, 2025, the Israeli government and Somaliland’s President Abdirahman Abdullahi signed an agreement to establish diplomatic relations and mutual recognition, with the latter being presented by Tel Aviv as an achievement in terms of continuing the Abraham Accords.

The Israeli authorities’ decision has already been condemned by Egypt, Turkey, Djibouti, and Somalia: the first three consistently support Mogadishu’s sovereignty over the entire country’s territory. However, for Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, opposition from external players is by no means a precedent. Notably, Israel opposes the unilateral recognition of Palestine while essentially applying a similar approach in the case of Somaliland. Another curious observation can be made regarding the Eritrean government’s position: despite being fierce opponents of any cooperation between Ethiopia and Somaliland, Eritrean leaders have so far refrained from criticising Tel Aviv’s decision, given their close informal ties with the Israeli government.

The following hypotheses, considerations, and factors can be cited among the reasons that prompted Israel to become the first state to de jure recognise Somaliland’s independence:

1) The government of Benjamin Netanyahu, having suffered severe reputational damage in 2023–2025, hardly fears criticism and pressure from third countries;

2) Israel is interested in strengthening its presence along the Red Sea coast to identify and deter potential threats, including those from Yemen’s Houthis;

3) Israel may gain some political dividends from such a move, including positive reactions from Ethiopia, the US, the UAE, and likely the UK;

4) With some reservation, it could involve exploring a scenario of using Somaliland’s territory within a plan for the resettlement of Palestinians, although the likelihood of such a scenario seems quite deem.

Evaluating the Event and Future Prospects

Undoubtedly, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence is one of the key events of the last month of 2025: beyond its own “geopolitical weight,” this step could pave the way for an entire wave of similar recognitions by other players interested in cooperation with Hargeisa. These include, first and foremost, Ethiopia and the UAE, as well as potentially the US and the UK. As Getachew Reda, Advisor on East African Affairs to the Ethiopian Prime Minister, noted in October 2025, even former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said that Ethiopia would not be the first country to recognise Somaliland, but it would not be the third either. In other words, the politician close to the head of government hinted at Addis Ababa’s readiness for such a decision, just ruling out its role as an initiator.

In essence, it is Ethiopia and the US that could become the immediate “continuators” of the series of recognitions. For Ethiopia, recognising Somaliland would permit Addis Ababa to legally initiate the process of diversifying trade routes; for the US, it would once again demonstrate the significance of its voice in the Horn of Africa region and establish additional presence in the strategic area along the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. In turn, the UAE, with their characteristic cautious strategy of relying on economic instruments of influence, will not risk current projects for symbolic steps and are more likely to continue supporting established informal contacts with the Somaliland government without resorting to high-profile decisions.

Ivan Kopytsev is a political scientist, Junior Research Fellow at the Centre for North African and Horn of Africa Studies, Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences; Junior Research Fellow at the African Studies Program, Institute for International Studies of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation