By Wesam Bahrani
TEHRAN – Why are some Syrians betting on the Israeli regime and its risks for Syria’s unity?
The most serious crisis facing Syrian society today is a deep sense of confusion and fragmentation. This has been accompanied by a harsh, polarized political divide unlike anything seen in the long history of the Levant, both in scale and in the level of violence, which has stretched over fifteen years.
The collapse of the former government triggered a major geopolitical shock across West Asia. Inside Syria, it led to profound social and political shifts, pushing the country and the region into a phase of redrawing borders and power balances.
Syria became the weak entry point for this process after losing its ability to protect itself or act as a coherent state.
Now in Syria, a growing number of actors have begun to place their hopes on the Zionist regime.
This trend intensified after the bloodshed on the Syrian coast against the Alawites and in Jabal al-Arab against the Druze. These events reinforced fears and deepened divisions, making political partition appear, to some, as an escape from a seemingly unsolvable crisis.
This bet on the Israeli regime is driven by short-term thinking and a flawed reading of the regime’s real goals in Syria. Some Syrians have come to see the regime as a possible protector of communities that feel threatened. This view is held mainly by groups that believe they have emerged “victorious” from recent political upheavals, even though Syria has been relatively unstable since the early years of statehood after independence in 1946.
The Zionist regime's interest in encouraging this dynamic can be summarized in three main objectives.
First, the occupying regime seeks a weak and fragmented Syria, absorbed by internal problems and unable to play a meaningful regional role. From this perspective, the destruction of Syria’s military capabilities after the collapse of the former government was strategic.
The Israeli regime’s involvement, direct or indirect, in Jabal al-Arab and the coastal violence helped create pressure on the new authorities in Damascus and pushed some communities blindly toward seeking Zionist protection.
Second, the Israeli regime wants to block rival powers. This includes preventing a strong Turkish military and political presence in Syria and stopping Iran from reestablishing land routes to the resistance in Lebanon and Palestine.
The Israeli regime is also suspicious of the supporters of the new rulers in Damascus, as their ideology makes full normalization with the Zionist regime unattractive. Any new alliances involving Turkey, Iran, or other regional powers could seriously challenge the Israeli regime’s interests.
Third, the Zionists aim to weaken Islamic movements globally in two ways.
The first is by exposing the new Syrian government’s inability to govern a diverse society. This failure deepens social divisions and undermines national unity.
The second is by pushing Islamic leaders to abandon core symbolic causes, especially Palestine and the al-Aqsa Mosque, in exchange for staying in power.
This, the Israelis believe, would strip political Islam of its moral legitimacy across the Muslim world. To achieve this, the regime relies on pressure combined with incentives, the “carrot and stick” approach.
Has the bet been decided?
The answer varies by region.
In northeastern Syria, the bet on the Israeli regime is indirect and unspoken. Backed by the United States, the Syrian Democratic Forces are pushing for near-total autonomy and even discussing a broader Kurdish confederation across Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran.
This path is accompanied by silence regarding the Israeli regime’s destruction of the Syrian army and its regional corridor projects.
In Jabal al-Arab, the bet is open and explicit. The violence against the local Druze population, followed by Israeli aggression under the pretext of ending the killings, tipped the balance toward secessionist voices.
Druze leader Hikmat al-Hijri emerged as a key figure calling for formal separation from Syria, relying on clear Israeli regime’s support. Yet the occupation regime bears significant responsibility for engineering this crisis and deepening internal divisions. And al-Higri didn’t stop to question why the regime doesn’t support Druze communities elsewhere.
The situation on the Syrian coast is more complex. Open calls for relying on the Israeli regime remain limited to activists abroad. On the ground, three main currents can be identified:
• A federalist current calling for decentralization without openly invoking the Zionists.
• A small current seeking accommodation with Damascus, but lacking real leverage or tangible gains.
• A broad majority rejects division altogether and opposes any reliance on the Israeli regime. This group prioritizes dignity, coexistence, and a unified Syrian identity that protects cultural and religious diversity.
A risky illusion
For many Syrians, betting on the occupying Israeli regime may seem like a shortcut out of fear and uncertainty. In reality, it risks deepening fragmentation, legitimizing division, and surrendering Syria’s future to external agendas.
The alternative, however difficult, remains rebuilding a shared national identity based on citizenship, dignity, and coexistence.
The question that remains is not whether this bet can succeed, but whether Syria can survive it.
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