Assassinations, bombings, and proxy warfare continue to haunt Syria's fragile post-Assad transition, revealing how divided extremist groups in the country remain.
The Cradle's Syria Correspondent
At the time, their mission was sanctioned by both ISI emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Al-Qaeda’s leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Within months, their project would take shape under the name Jabhat al-Nusra (the Nusra Front), laying the foundation for a decade of violent splintering that still shapes the Syrian battlefield today.
More than 15 years later, assassinations and bombings have become the clearest indicators of Syria’s post-war order. These are targeted operations that expose the fragility of the new power structure, the unresolved legacies of extremist factionalism, and the survival of covert networks that predate the fall of Damascus.
Some operations bear clear signatures; others remain anonymous, opening the door to competing theories: covert warfare between surviving cells, internal vendettas, or state-aligned security operations in disguise. But taken together, these incidents are best understood as the aftershocks of a fragmented Islamist extremist order – one that never truly demobilized, only morphed.
The origins of Syria’s Al-Qaeda branch
The foundation of the Nusra Front began with a 25-page proposal authored by a Syrian, ‘Aws al-Mosuli,’ submitted to Baghdadi in 2011. Once greenlit by both Baghdadi and Zawahiri, Mosuli and five others – including Abu Julaybib al-Urduni, Abu Anas al-Sahaba, Abu Omar al-Filistini, Saleh Hama, and Abu Ahmad Hudud – crossed into Syria. They were received by Abu Maria al-Qahtani, forming the seven-man nucleus of what would become Al-Qaeda’s Syrian arm.
By January 2012, the group emerged publicly as the Nusra Front, with Mosuli assuming the alias Abu Mohammad al-Julani (now recognized as self-appointed Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa). Within months, Nusra gained ground across Syria, capturing Raqqa, swathes of Deir Ezzor and Idlib, parts of Aleppo, and establishing a commanding presence in Deraa. The group quickly became the most powerful armed force on Syrian soil.
The Nusra Front not only fought the Syrian Arab Army, but it also absorbed, sidelined, or clashed with many of the rebel factions born in the early uprising. Its access to seasoned fighters, smuggling routes, and regional backers allowed it to expand rapidly. Foreign fighters flooded in. Western media began to fixate on its Al-Qaeda ties, while regional powers like Turkiye and Qatar maneuvered between rival opposition groupings, each vying for leverage.
The rupture: Julani vs Baghdadi
Nusra’s rapid rise brought tension with its Iraq-based counterpart. In early 2013, Bakr al‑Baghdadi announced a merger of his forces with the Nusra Front and attempted to subsume it into what became the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). He also issued a series of demands: assassinate key figures in Damascus, send bombers to Turkiye, purge non-Sunni populations, and impose Al-Qaeda’s rule.
Julani rejected the move, insisting Nusra remain separate and loyal to Al‑Qaeda’s leadership, a rift that quickly escalated into an open split and territorial clashes across Syria.
Zawahiri sided with Julani, ruling against the merger. Baghdadi rejected the decision, broke from Al-Qaeda, and demanded loyalty to ISIS. The result was an ideological and territorial civil war between former allies.
Nusra itself fractured as some remained loyal to Julani, while others defected to ISIS, and a third group withdrew from the fray, joining factions like Ahrar al-Sham.
Centralism vs decentralism: An extremist fault line
The split exposed deeper ideological rifts. Julani’s model drew from Abu Musab al-Suri, a Syrian strategist who championed decentralized terrorist – autonomous cells tailored to local conditions. Baghdadi, in contrast, inherited the centralist vision of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who built Al-Qaeda in Iraq and imposed rigid control.
Julani’s decentralist approach allowed him to retain autonomy, while Zawahiri’s endorsement helped insulate his leadership. Baghdadi’s bid for absolute control, meanwhile, alienated rivals and drove further division.
These competing visions – between emirates governed by consensus versus caliphates imposed by fiat – formed the ideological bedrock of the terrorist wars that followed. In practice, they translated to bloody purges, village massacres, and urban warfare, with each faction claiming divine mandate.
The birth of HTS and a new Islamist extremist coalition
After suffering defeats at ISIS’s hands, Nusra rebranded as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham and declared its split from Al-Qaeda. This triggered another internal rupture. Founding members like Abu Julaybib and Abu Khadija broke away to form Hurras al-Din, reviving Al-Qaeda’s presence in Syria.
Julani doubled down. In 2017, he merged Fateh al-Sham with other factions – including Nour al-Din al-Zenki, Liwa al-Haqq, Jaysh al-Sunna, and Ansar al-Din – forming Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). With ISIS on the back foot, HTS expanded its control over Idlib, established the ‘Salvation Government,’ and monopolized key border crossings with Turkiye.
HTS used its new leverage to suppress rivals, coerce smaller factions into submission, and negotiate ceasefires with both ISIS and Hurras al-Din. It also expanded its media apparatus and built parallel administrative institutions.
Its influence grew beyond mere territory. HTS enforced tax regimes, regulated NGOs, and monitored telecommunications. Its security branches conducted assassinations and abductions of rival commanders. International think tanks speculated whether Julani could be “rehabilitated” into a legitimate partner for the west.
Who survived the original cell?
Of the seven original founders of Al-Qaeda’s Syria branch, only Julani and Abu Ahmad Hudud remain active. Others were killed, sidelined, or vanished.
Abu Julaybib, who opposed Julani’s split from Al-Qaeda, was arrested, released, and later assassinated en route to Deraa. Abu Maria al-Qahtani was briefly detained in 2024 over alleged coordination with the international coalition – a charge later revealed to be sanctioned by HTS leadership.
Hudud reportedly warned Julani that Qahtani was plotting a coup, leveraging his popularity and US ties. Within weeks of his release, Qahtani was killed by a bomb hidden in a gift.
Saleh al-Hama – often confused for the activist Saleh al-Hamwi – is one of the founders of the Nusra Front and is the owner of the account ‘As al-Siraa fi al-Sham.’ He was expelled back in 2015 for breaking internal discipline and criticizing Nusra's Salafi ideology. Abu Omar al-Filistini and Abu Anas al-Sahaba vanished without a trace – whether killed or sidelined remains unknown.
Julani's grip tightened after the fall of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad's government. He assumed the presidency under his real name, Ahmad al-Shara, while Hudud served as interior minister under the name Anas Khattab. The insurgents had become Syria’s new state.
Shadow wars after Assad
An undeclared truce was in place between ISIS and HTS in the immediate aftermath of Assad’s fall. ISIS limited its attacks to minorities and the US-backed, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). That changed in November 2025, when the new Syrian government joined the international coalition. ISIS began directly targeting the new authorities.
In a series of communiques, ISIS claimed attacks on Syrian troops and government officials in Idlib and the Damascus countryside. It described the new military as “apostate,” and escalated its operations to include car bombs, improvised explosive devices (IED), and assassinations.
Some attacks went unclaimed, including a church bombing and the deadly Tadmur (Palmyra) operation that killed two US soldiers. While Washington blamed ISIS, the Syrian Interior Ministry said the perpetrator was one of its own personnel, radicalized and pending dismissal.
Maher Farghali, an expert on Islamist movements, tells The Cradle that not all such operations are the work of ISIS. Groups like Hurras al-Din or unaffiliated militants may be responsible, reflecting the enduring fragmentation of Syria’s militant scene.
Front groups and strategic deniability
The emergence of Saraya Ansar al-Sunna – a shadowy outfit with ISIS-style ideology – marked a new phase. The group claimed responsibility for high-profile attacks but denied formal ties to ISIS. Farghali argues that such fronts allow ISIS to evade accountability, preserve political ambiguity, and streamline recruitment.
These proxy outfits carry out bombings while masking the role of ISIS’s central leadership, a tactic designed to undermine the legitimacy of Syria’s new rulers without triggering overwhelming retaliation.
Farghali dismisses theories that such attacks are rogue actions, insisting they follow calculated targeting patterns and reflect deep infiltration across former factions, from HTS to Ahrar al-Sham.
Post-war violence, sectarian massacres, and international sanctions
Despite early infighting, factions under Syria’s Ministry of Defense have entered a fragile stability – at least for now. But violence has pivoted toward Syria’s minority communities, particularly Alawites and Druze.
In March 2025, armed groups massacred Alawite civilians in coastal villages. In July, similar atrocities targeted Druze communities in Suwayda. These events drew international condemnation and sanctions.
The UK and EU blacklisted figures like Mohammed al-Jassim (Abu Amsha), commander of the 25th Division and Sultan Suleiman Shah Brigade, and Saif al-Din Boulad of the Hamza Division. These units, part of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), were accused of murder, torture, and forced displacement.
The US had already imposed sanctions over abuses in Afrin. At the UN level, only Julani and Hudud were removed from terror lists – leaving many of Syria’s new military leaders still internationally designated.
The unfinished war
Syria’s new rulers face an entrenched inheritance of ideological conflict, covert rivalries, and embedded militant networks.
What they confront is not a clean slate, but a battlefield shaped by years of internal betrayal and shifting allegiances. This enduring violence is fed by unresolved schisms within the Islamist extremist movement, the political economy of factionalism, and the continued utility of shadow actors to both foreign and domestic players.
The success of Syria’s transition will depend not only on securing borders or drafting constitutions, but on whether the state can impose authority where parallel structures still operate in the dark.
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