Showing posts with label Secularism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Secularism. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 27, 2019

Why India’s Hindu nationalists worship Israel’s nation-state model

India’s Hindu nationalists and the Israeli right have a remarkable mutual affinity. Binyamin Netanyahu welcomed Narendra Modi to Israel in 2017 with these words: “Prime Minister Modi, we have been waiting for you for a long time, almost 70 years … We view you as a kindred spirit.”
The two premiers, both battling for re-election in spring 2019, share a warm rapport, and regularly refer to each other on Twitter as “my friend Narendra” and “my friend Bibi.”
The Modi-Bibi bonhomie rests on much more than personal chemistry, or even the Israeli military-industrial complex’s significant role in servicing Indian needs. It is rooted in the profound admiration of generations of Hindu nationalists for Zionism and its product, Israel, whose model of nation-state they seek to emulate in India.
Indian secularists often claim that the Hindu nationalists intend to turn India into a Hindu version of Pakistan. This is not wrong. Just as Pakistan founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s politics fused religion, nation and state, so does “Hindutva”, the political ideology of Hindu nationalism born in the 1920s.
But the Pakistan analogy is limited. For more than 60 years, Pakistan has been a state dominated by the military. India is a highly evolved democracy. It has always been inconceivable that an equivalent of Zia-ul Haq, the Islamist military dictator who ruled Pakistan from 1977 to 1988, could appear in India and “Hinduise” the state. The intent of Hindu nationalism to remake India therefore needs to be pursued, and accomplished, in a way compatible with a democratic polity.
The prototype exists of a form of state which is simultaneously democratic and supremacist: Israel. Israel was a self-described “Jewish and democratic state” until July 2018, when the right-wing majority in its parliament narrowly won a vote to further tighten Israel’s identity to “the nation-state of the Jewish people, which respects the rights of all its citizens”. The revision reflects the ascendancy of hardliners and extremists in Israeli politics.

Affinity for Zionism and Israel

Successive generations of Hindu nationalists – from Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883-1966), who coined and elaborated the Hindutva concept, to Modi today – have professed a deep affinity for Israel. Savarkar wrotein the 1920s: “If the Zionists’ dreams are ever realised – if Palestine becomes a Jewish state – it will gladden us almost as much as our Jewish friends.”
In late 1947, Savarkar was very upset when the Indian delegate in the UN General Assembly argued for a binational Arab-Jewish state in Palestine and voted against the proposal to partition Palestine into a larger Jewish state and a smaller Arab state.
Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar (1906-73), who steered the Hindu nationalist movement in post-independence India as the chief of the volunteer organisation Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), wrote in the late 1930s that the Zionist movement exemplified his own “five unities” framing of Indian nationhood: “The Jews had maintained their race, religion, culture and language, and all they wanted was their natural territory to complete their nationality.”
Israel: model for a type of ethnic democracy. Nina Mikryukova/Shutterstock

Ethnic democracy as the shared ideal

It is Jewish Israeli scholars who have explicated the paradigm of “ethnic democracy”, using the case of their own country. One such scholar, Sammy Smooha defined ethnic democracy as “an alternative non-civic form of democratic state that is identified with and subservient to a single ethnic nation.” He said this is “best exemplified by Israel”, which is “based on Jewish and Zionist hegemony and the structural subordination of the Arab minority” – who are currently 20% of the population of the Jewish state. Propelling this is an ideology, Smooha says, that “makes a crucial distinction between members and non-members of the ethnic nation”. Non-members are seen as undesirable and threatening – as agents of biological dilution, demographic swamping, cultural degeneration, security risks, and even as a fifth column for enemy states.
This is the typical Hindu nationalist perspective on India’s Muslims who, at just under 15% of the population, are India’s largest religious minority.
The distinction made between members and non-members of the nation underlies a very controversial amendment to India’s citizenship laws that has been strongly pushed by Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government since 2016. The proposed legislation would confer Indian citizenship on members of designated religious minorities (Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, Buddhists, Jains, Zoroastrians) from three Muslim-majority countries in India’s neighbourhood – Bangladesh, Pakistan and Afghanistan – who have settled in India without legal status.
A protest in Assam against India’s citizenship bill in late January 2019. EPA
So, Hindus and other non-Muslims from these countries would have a fast track to Indian citizenship, the argument being that they are victims of religious persecution. The proposed law is, in a more limited scope, analogous to the Israeli policy of promoting migration of Jews from across the world to Israel. It sends an unmistakable signal of who are preferred as citizens and who are viewed as undesirables.

India as a clone of Israel?

Ethnic democracies do not totally exclude or disenfranchise the citizens viewed as undesirables. Israeli Arabs are entitled to cultural and religious rights. Arabic is officially recognised (though the July 2018 revision asserted the primacy of Hebrew), and usually around 10% of the Knesset’s members are Israeli Arabs. Still, a range of formal and informal policies ensure that the Arab community mostly remains ghettoised in deprived enclaves, relegated to what is in effect second-class citizenship.
Israel is not the only example of an ethnic democracy. There is Sri Lanka, where the post-colonial state was captured by majoritarian Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism from 1956 onward. There is Croatia, since 2013 a member-state of the European Union. It proclaimed independence in 1991 as: “The national state of the Croatian people, and a state of other nations and minorities who are its citizens.”
What ethnic democracies do is to create a de facto but very real hierarchy of citizenship, in which some are full, first-class citizens and others are second class – at best. The current Hindu nationalist movement is remarkably faithful to the ideological creed laid down by its pioneers Savarkar and Golwalkar eight decades ago. In 1938, Savarkar declared that “the Hindus are the Nation in India and the Moslem minority a community” just as “the Turks are the Nation in Turkey and the Arab or the Armenian minority a community.” Golwalkar wrote in 1938: “The non-Hindu people of Hindustan … may stay in the country, wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation.”
The type of “democratic” state exemplified by Israel – and not Pakistan – is the model the Hindu nationalist movement, led by its core RSS organisation, aspires to establish in an Indian variant. But will its vision prevail? It’s far from certain that a 1.3 billion-strong country, defined culturally by multiple identities and politically by cross-cutting cleavages, can be turned into a giant-sized version of Israel, Croatia, or Sri Lanka.

Wednesday, November 14, 2018

Religion is not major determinant of international actors' behavior: Hunter

Religion is not major determinant of international actors' behavior: Hunter

TEHRAN, Nov. 13 (MNA) – Shireen Tahmaasb Hunter, a professor of political science at Georgetown University, says that Analysis of international relations has shown that very seldom religion per se determines behavior, whenever it does, it is by being part of the states' and non-state actors' ideational, ideological and value systems.
“All IR theories, including the realist theory that emphasizes the role of power and search for security, account for the impact of ideational and value related factors and thus they can address the role of religion as well. The problem is that religion as such is not a major determinant of international actors' behavior,” Hunter tells the Tehran Times.
Following is the text the interview:
When did the religious issues has been a matter of great in Theorizing of International Relations?
Focus on religion and its role in international affairs occurred after the fall the USSR and the end of an ideological era in international relations best exemplified in the Cold War. The end of ideology left a paradigmatic vacuum which was filled by theories such as the Clash of Civilizations. Prior to that, the ideologization of religion especially in Muslim societies increased its impact on the domestic politics of some countries and on their foreign policy. However, this ideologized religion is different from the traditional religion and is similar to secular ideologies and plays the same role.
Some argue that if the theory of International Relations means a constitutive and critical theory, then bringing religion into International Relations is possible, but if the theory of International Relations is an explanatory-empirical theory, the theorizing religion in International Relations is not possible and, in fact, there is not theological positivism theory in International Relations. What is your opinion?
Most theories, certainly those related to social sciences, which includes international relations, are explanatory. They try to make sense of what is happening and identify consistent patterns and factors that help shape these patterns. If the observations show that religion is impacting the behavior of international actors, then they will factor that in. So far, however, analysis of international relations has shown that very seldom religion per se determines behavior. Whenever it does, it is by being part of the states' and non-state actors' ideational, ideological and value systems. All IR theories, including the realist theory that emphasizes the role of power and search for security, account for the impact of ideational and value related factors and thus they can address the role of religion as well. The problem is that religion as such is not a major determinant of international actors' behavior.
Some scholars such as “Michael Allen Gillespie” in the book “The Theological Origins of Modernity” believe that modernity was not initially against religion, and in later years, as a result of social, cultural and political conditions, it has led to secularism. So Based on this conception, religion is not in conflict with modernity, so can it be said that religion is not in conflict with the International Relations theory stemming from modernity?
The foundation of modernity is based on rational thinking. According to this way of thinking, the reason is the source of knowledge and there is no magical explanation for natural phenomena. Religion, by contrast, believes that revelation is the source of knowledge. As such, all religions are at odds with rational thinking. The other foundation of modernity is secularism. Secularism is not against religion. However, it believes that it should be relegated to the private sphere of life. In public life, religious people can express their views, but they cannot demand special privileges as representatives of a higher truth or value. The foundation of legitimacy in modern societies is the will of the people and not some divine source and those who claim they represent this divine source. Thus a modern society is one that as Max Weber puts it is disenchanted and does not rely on metaphysical explanations for natural phenomenon.
Some argue that the current International Relations theory cannot explain some of the current phenomena of international relations and we need a religious theory of International Relations, especially with regard to religious issues. What is your opinion? In general, theorizing Religion in International Relations is feasible?
I do not agree with this view. Exiting theories of international relations do explain the current phenomenon. In particular, the realist theory based on the centrality of power and security is still valid. Most of the post -Soviet era developments have their roots in states' quest for regional and international hegemony and other states' efforts to prevent and defeat their ambitions. I don't see how religion can explain these realities unless we accept Huntington's thesis of the clash of civilization and his contention that all civilizations are based on religion.
If theorizing Religion in International Relations is possible, can this religious theory in International Relations explain all the unresolved issues and problems?
Religion cannot solve today's problems any more than it was able to solve problems of bygone eras. Some of the most terrible wars in history were caused by religious differences and zealotry. Remember the Crusades, the thirty years wars, the Sunni-Shia conflicts etc. Religion tends to make compromise more difficult because adherents of every religion believe that they alone are the representative of God's word. If religion was a source of unity, the Christian world would not have been divided into states nor Muslims would have been fighting one another. To some extent conflict is inevitable. The important thing is how to create a condition that actors' would be inhibited from acting in violent ways. This is best achieved through an adequate balance of power and the cultivation of a culture of compromise.
Interview by Javad Heirannia