A deepening rift between Iraqi Kurdistan's two ruling parties threatens to revive the era of rival administrations, as Baghdad, Tehran, Ankara, and Washington weigh their interests.
The CradIe
Yet longstanding rivalries between the two parties have repeatedly undermined Kurdish political unity, threatening the constitutional gains Kurds secured within federal Iraq.
From his stronghold in Sulaymaniyah, PUK leader Bafel Talabani threw Kurdish politics into turmoil by announcing his party's withdrawal from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
The escalation was triggered by what the PUK, known as the Yekiti, regarded as a violation of the principle of consensus by its partner and historic rival, the KDP.
The KDP convened a parliamentary session in Erbil without its longstanding rival. Known as the Parti, it broke the political deadlock by securing a quorum of 52 lawmakers to elect the parliamentary leadership.
The move ended nearly two years of legislative paralysis following the 2024 elections, but raised new questions over the region's political future and how it would be governed.
The first steps toward separation
In Sulaymaniyah, the PUK had already begun translating its political break with Erbil into administrative measures. There, PUK officials who had withdrawn from the regional government gathered to establish mechanisms for severing administrative ties with Erbil.
A delegation of ministers, deputy ministers, directors-general, and senior officials affiliated with the Yekiti made the three-hour journey separating Erbil, the political capital, from Sulaymaniyah, the cultural capital.
The departing team, headed by KRG Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani, now forms the nucleus of a de facto administration, according to a senior PUK official speaking to The Cradle.
“It is an administration now concerned exclusively with managing governance in areas under the Patriotic Union’s influence, freed from any obligation to refer back to Erbil or maintain channels of communication with the government there.”
The official adds:
"The significance of this meeting goes beyond the attendance of PUK officials. It demonstrates the cohesion of the executive team, with no defections or public objections to the withdrawal decision. This unity is particularly significant given the actions of three party MPs who broke ranks and attended the parliamentary session convened by the KDP."
Following the administrative rupture, The Cradle's sources in Sulaymaniyah say strict instructions were issued alongside the announcement of disengagement, ordering an end to official correspondence and the transmission of government documents to Erbil.
The move amounted to a rejection of Erbil's status as the region's central authority and sole seat of government.
In a further escalation on the ground, sources tell The Cradle that instructions had been issued to PUK checkpoints along the boundaries of its areas of influence, requiring them to strip KRG ministers – whose government has effectively become KDP-dominated – of their official standing.
Under these instructions, ministers would be allowed through checkpoints only as ordinary citizens, without recognition of their official or protocol status.
With these measures, the Kurdistan Region is moving toward a revival of the "two administrations" era, two decades after their formal unification.
Yet the geographical extent of the administrative separation and its future consequences remain dependent on political decisions yet to be made in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah.
A marriage neither side can escape
In the mid-1990s, when gunfire drowned out political dialogue during the internal Kurdish conflict, PUK founder Jalal Talabani addressed a public gathering in Arabic, summarizing his party's doctrine with the declaration:
“Our slogan is: We befriend those who befriend us, and we oppose those who oppose us!”
Decades later, the slogan remains relevant to the rivalry between the two parties.
As British historian David McDowall observed in his account of the Kurdish infighting of the 1990s, the conflict was rooted in the personal rivalry between Barzani and Talabani, whose competing ambitions repeatedly undermined efforts to establish a functioning Kurdish government.
He also noted that KDP-PUK rivalry was merely awaiting the right circumstances to erupt.
Yet the complexities of this troubled relationship suggest another logic. Veteran PUK official Saadi Pira reveals its underlying nature when speaking to the writer:
“The relationship between the two parties closely resembles a Catholic marriage: a household full of problems, but one condemned to endure, with separation impossible.”
These two perspectives agree on the inevitability of disagreement but differ over its eventual outcome.
Between these competing approaches, Kurdistan's future remains uncertain, shaped by political developments in Iraq, regional upheavals, and the interests of outside powers.
The KDP turns Baghdad's tactics on its rival
The KDP's move also stemmed from earlier disputes with the PUK, particularly over the election of Iraq's president and the refusal of Yekiti lawmakers to back Parti candidates for ministerial posts in the federal government.
At the time, the PUK invoked the principle of "democratic voting," disregarding the three principles the KDP had proposed as a common roadmap for Kurdish parliamentary blocs: partnership, balance, and consensus. The Parti now appears to be turning those same tactics against its rival.
Speaking to The Cradle, KDP regional parliamentarian Basil Koran justifies the move:
“The 52 MPs proceeded to reactivate the regional parliament armed with an indisputable constitutional argument, which enabled the party to resume legislative activity by completing the legal quorum for the session. The Patriotic Union had already done this before us in Baghdad. Quite simply, we did nothing other than what they themselves had done.”
Baghdad's silence amid Kurdish fragmentation
In Baghdad, Arab political forces have remained conspicuously silent as relations between Erbil and Sulaymaniyah deteriorate.
While the crisis threatens the region's internal cohesion, technical meetings between representatives of the KRG and the federal government continue, particularly those aimed at resolving financial disputes and establishing the framework for the 2027 federal budget.
On 8 November, a high-level KRG delegation traveled to Baghdad for further discussions over the region's financial entitlements.
This institutional continuity suggests that Baghdad continues to treat the Kurdistan Region as a single administrative entity, in accordance with the constitutional framework of federal Iraq.
Constitutional law expert Muzhir Abdul Razzaq confirms this interpretation in comments to The Cradle, explaining:
"The rapidly unfolding political steps, including the withdrawal of Patriotic Union ministers, do not, from a legal standpoint, create any rupture or defect in the structure of the constitutional relationship governing the region and Baghdad."
Washington: The fear of abandonment
Since the withdrawal of US forces from the Kurdistan Region on 30 September, unease has spread across Kurdish political circles, reviving fears that Washington has once again abandoned its Kurdish allies.
These concerns draw support from earlier statements by Washington's envoy for Iraq and Syria and ambassador to Ankara, Tom Barrack, who has favored centralized governance in Syria, prompting questions about Washington's broader approach to Kurdish autonomy.
His remarks were interpreted as an indication of US displeasure with fragmented decision-making and multiple centers of authority among its allies.
Against this backdrop, the US administration issued only a routine statement following the Yekiti's withdrawal, with a State Department spokesperson reiterating support for a "strong and resilient" Kurdistan Region while avoiding the complexities of Kurdish politics.
Henry Sultan, an associate analyst at the Al-Ain Center for Strategic Studies, explains Washington's position to The Cradle:
"Washington is content to remain a cautious observer, showing no appetite for immediate and decisive intervention. It will neither intervene negatively to consolidate the reality of two administrations nor intervene positively by exerting heavy pressure to force the parties concerned to turn back the clock to before the controversial parliamentary session."
Tehran: The decisive vote and its price
As the KDP sought to resume parliamentary activity with whichever members were willing to attend, securing support from eight lawmakers who broke ranks with their parliamentary blocs, the seat held by the Kurdistan Social Democratic Party, led by veteran politician Mohammed Haji Mahmoud, emerged as a decisive vote.
Despite Mahmoud's repeated calls for consensus and Kurdish unity, his party changed course on 4 November.
With the blessing of his party's leadership, its representative entered parliament and voted in favor of the leadership backed by the Parti.
Regional analysts did not view this shift as coincidental. Their assessments pointed to what they described as a clear Iranian role in facilitating the KDP's path forward.
Evidence of this influence, they argued, could be seen in the diplomatic activity of Iran's consul in Erbil, Faramarz Asadi, who visited Mohammed Haji Mahmoud in Sulaymaniyah province on 30 October, just days before the decisive parliamentary session.
These developments culminated in the attendance of foreign diplomats the following day to congratulate the newly elected parliamentary leadership, according to parliamentary reporting.
Behind the scenes of this support, media circles have circulated claims suggesting that Tehran shifted its position following an undisclosed commitment by the Parti to dismantle the armed presence of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups within the Kurdistan Region.
The alleged arrangement was presented as a goodwill gesture based on mutual benefit.
Tehran had already been pressing the issue. In an October interview, Asadi called for legal action against Iranian Kurdish opposition groups operating in the region, drawing a sharp response from the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan.
According to views circulated by activists on news platforms, the move amounted to a limited geopolitical bargain.
This is particularly striking when contrasted with the speech delivered by the PUK leader announcing the rupture with the regional government, during which he appealed to Kurdish national solidarity by declaring: "We care about the affairs of our people in Rojhelat."
He was referring to the Kurdish regions of Iran.
Perhaps the clearest indication of this political and security convergence between Tehran and Erbil came with the 8 November visit of Mohammad Reza Mesgarian, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) official responsible for Kurdish regional affairs, to Kurdistan Region President and KDP Deputy Leader Nechirvan Barzani.
The presidential statement stressed security cooperation and regional stability, underscoring Tehran's growing engagement with Erbil amid the Kurdish political rift.
Ankara: Centralization and 'cold neutrality'
As Ankara announced the gradual withdrawal of its forces from the Zilkan base in Bashiqa, near the Kurdistan Region, it also agreed with Baghdad that the base would be handed over to Iraqi federal authorities, rather than the Peshmerga.
Security analyst Wafa Mohammed Karim offers a different interpretation in comments to The Cradle, pointing out that:
"The Peshmerga, in practice, possess the greatest ability to understand the region's complexities and manage its security."
Ankara prefers to confine direct security and geopolitical dealings to Baghdad, bypassing both Erbil and Sulaymaniyah.
This comes at a time when Turkish relations with Sulaymaniyah are witnessing a notable improvement, partly closing a difficult chapter of mistrust long fueled by accusations of cooperation with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).
Karim adds:
"In this sense, whether the region splits into two administrations or remains under a unified government is not, from the Turkish perspective, an existential matter requiring mobilization or immediate intervention. Ankara therefore converges with Washington's position in this area of 'cold neutrality.'"
The security and economic costs of division
Any assessment of the complex relationship between the two major rivals in Iraqi Kurdistan cannot overlook the security and economic "minefields" scattered along the geographical boundaries separating their respective spheres of influence.
This fragmentation raises major questions about the durability of the recently completed unification of the Peshmerga forces – formerly divided between Units 70 and 80, affiliated respectively with the Yekiti and the Parti – and whether security coordination can withstand the political upheaval.
On the other side of the equation are oil and energy facilities, revenues from border crossings, and the intertwined interests of companies operating in the services sector.
Together, these factors raise serious concerns about the economic viability and security risks of comprehensive administrative separation in a region surrounded by instability.
These questions go beyond testing the two parties' ability to manage their internal security and economic affairs independently. They also concern the relationship each administration would establish separately with the federal capital, Baghdad.
Washington's warning still hangs over Kurdistan
Looking back to 17 September 1998, one defining moment returns to the forefront: the meeting at the US State Department in Washington between then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and the leaders of the KDP and PUK, Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani.
During that meeting, Albright delivered a warning: "Without unity, the road ahead will remain very difficult."
Nearly three decades later, the difficulty she warned of now confronts not so much American policymakers as the Kurdish leadership itself.
The consequences extend to the Kurds' relations with Baghdad, neighboring powers, and international partners, whose interests may be served by either a divided Kurdistan weakened by internal rivalries or a unified region able to defend its political and constitutional gains.
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