Israel's intelligence network reaches into the defense industry, diplomatic missions, and research institutions, where lesser-known security agencies operate beyond the familiar Mossad, Shin Bet, and Aman
The Cradle's Military Correspondent
Yet behind these powerful institutions operates another network of intelligence bodies, each with its own responsibilities, sources, and access to sensitive information.
The institutional struggles that shaped Israel's intelligence establishment eventually produced these three agencies, but also gave rise to additional organizations carrying out separate or complementary missions.
Some operate with considerably less public scrutiny, despite handling matters no less sensitive than those assigned to their better-known counterparts.
A study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) describes a network of security and intelligence bodies operating with considerable autonomy, each pursuing its own priorities and competing for influence despite established divisions of responsibility.
Research on these lesser-known institutions points to three particularly important bodies: Malmab, the Defense Ministry's security directorate; the National Security Council (NSC); and the Foreign Ministry, whose diplomatic activities also serve intelligence purposes.
A security establishment without a single command
Israel's intelligence system evolved through successive institutional changes and disputes over authority. The CSIS study notes that the country's intelligence and defense agencies have historically operated with little central direction, adapting their structures and priorities independently.
Aman remains the principal institution responsible for producing national intelligence assessments. Yet its relationship with the political leadership is complicated by the military chain of command.
Military intelligence chief Shlomi Binder reports through Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir, who falls under the authority of Defense Minister Israel Katz.
This arrangement creates several layers between military intelligence specialists and the prime minister, raising questions about whether their assessments always reach decision-makers promptly and without distortion.
At the same time, that institutional separation provides Aman with a degree of protection against direct political interference.
Unlike Mossad and Shin Bet, which answer directly to the prime minister, military intelligence operates within the army's command structure. This has made it a potentially important counterweight to political pressure, particularly amid Benjamin Netanyahu's confrontation with Shin Bet and his efforts to reshape the leadership of Israel's security establishment.
Previous attempts to develop intelligence assessment capabilities within Mossad and Shin Bet as alternatives to Aman's dominant role have yielded mixed results. Israel has also established mechanisms for cooperation among the intelligence chiefs, but these have never amounted to a unified command.
The Committee of Intelligence Chiefs meets periodically to exchange information and coordinate assessments, with the prime minister's military secretary playing an important coordinating role. The committee, however, does not have binding decision-making authority over the agencies represented.
The military secretary's importance has consequently grown, particularly in managing relations among the prime minister, the army, and the intelligence services. Much of this coordination has developed through practice rather than through the creation of a separate statutory intelligence authority.
The division of responsibilities also creates opportunities for duplication, rivalry, and gaps in intelligence sharing, even when no disputes over the recruitment of specific agents or the control of intelligence sources have surfaced publicly.
These difficulties are especially apparent in Palestinian affairs. Shin Bet's responsibilities for internal security, interrogations, and monitoring Palestinian organizations give it access to information that may not always be fully available to Aman.
Different agencies may also interpret the same developments differently, leaving the political leadership to choose between competing assessments.
Netanyahu's appointment of figures aligned with his security outlook to senior intelligence positions has added another political dimension to these institutional tensions. Yet the broader intelligence apparatus includes bodies whose relationship with the political leadership has long been less visible.
Among them is Malmab, whose responsibilities reach into the most sensitive sectors of Israel's military and technological establishment.
Malmab: Israel's fourth intelligence agency
The growing number of alleged Iranian espionage cases inside Israel has brought renewed attention to Malmab, formally known as the Director of Security of the Defense Establishment.
On 19 December 2025, Shin Bet and Malmab jointly announced the arrest of a Russian national working in Israel on suspicion of carrying out intelligence assignments for Iranian operatives.
The suspect, 30-year-old Vitaly Zvyagintsev, was accused of photographing sensitive infrastructure, ports, military vessels, and other strategic facilities.
According to the joint investigation, Zvyagintsev was arrested in early December after maintaining contact since October 2025 with an alleged Iranian intelligence handler using the name "Roman," who claimed to be living in Russia.
Investigators said the suspect carried out photographic assignments under the cover of tourism and received payments through digital channels. The assignments reportedly included ports, industrial installations, and vessels belonging to the Israeli and American militaries.
According to the indictment, Zvyagintsev was tasked with photographing Israeli and American military vessels, including a Dolphin-class vessel and an American warship at Eilat port.
Israeli reporting indicates that he received $700 for photographing the Dolphin vessel and $500 after recording and transmitting six videos during a separate assignment involving the American ship. He also reportedly received $500 for filming Haifa port and another $700 for photographing the city's oil refineries.
The case also exposed the range of military and civilian infrastructure targeted by Iranian intelligence handlers, from naval facilities to strategic industrial installations.
Israeli media also reported that Zvyagintsev was detained while attempting to photograph Ramat David airbase.
The investigation was significant because it involved Malmab alongside Shin Bet, bringing a normally discreet Defense Ministry unit into a highly publicized counterespionage operation.
Some Israeli sources have linked Malmab's growing involvement to the mounting number of espionage investigations and the difficulty Shin Bet faces in handling them alone. Military police investigators, whose responsibilities include offenses involving army personnel, have also become involved in confronting attempts to recruit members of the armed forces.
Malmab occupies an unusual position within the Israeli intelligence system. Its principal responsibility is protecting the defense establishment from espionage, leaks, and security breaches, but its remit extends across military industries, strategic installations, and sensitive technological programs.
It monitors classified information, investigates suspected security violations, and oversees protective arrangements at facilities whose activities are largely shielded from public scrutiny.
These responsibilities have led some observers to describe Malmab as Israel's fourth intelligence agency, alongside Aman, Mossad, and Shin Bet.
Its close relationship with Shin Bet reflects the overlapping nature of Israel's security institutions. Shin Bet participates in security vetting and counterespionage cooperation, while Malmab maintains responsibility for protecting defense technology, sensitive installations, and personnel within the military-industrial establishment.
Malmab oversees security aspects of defense exports, including the disclosure and transfer of classified technologies.
Malmab combines counterespionage, protection of classified information, industrial security, and investigations involving the defense establishment under a single directorate.
Malmab's secretive intelligence operations
Malmab's authority extends to some of Israel's most closely guarded military and scientific institutions.
These include facilities for nuclear research, biological research, military production, and the development of weapons and defensive systems.
Its security responsibilities include installations at Dimona and Soreq, as well as the Israel Institute for Biological Research in Ness Ziona.
The directorate also oversees security arrangements for state-owned defense manufacturers such as Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and Israel Aerospace Industries, as well as for private companies including Elbit Systems.
These institutions form a central part of Israel's military-industrial infrastructure, developing technologies used by the army and exported to foreign governments.
Unlike many other Defense Ministry departments, Malmab operates under extensive secrecy. Detailed information about its budget, internal activities, and operational responsibilities is generally absent from publicly available ministry reports.
Its work includes questioning personnel, conducting security inspections, approving certain disclosures of sensitive technology, and investigating suspected leaks of classified information.
According to Israeli reports, the directorate also handles agents tasked with acquiring technological intelligence in foreign countries. This specialized recruitment gives Malmab an overseas intelligence function distinct from its better-known counterespionage and industrial security responsibilities.
Such operations focus on obtaining technical knowledge, industrial information, and material relevant to military research and technological development.
The directorate's counterespionage responsibilities likewise extend beyond hostile states. It investigates suspected contacts between defense establishment personnel and foreign intelligence operatives, including those linked to countries that maintain friendly relations with Israel.
Malmab also investigates suspected misconduct related to defense exports and the unauthorized transfer of sensitive information. Consequently, it has access to some of Israel's most sensitive military personnel, facilities, and technological programs, with little public scrutiny of its activities.
The NSC’s intelligence reach
Another institution operating within Israel's wider intelligence structure is the NSC.
Israeli warnings advising soldiers and civilians against traveling to particular countries, together with periodic changes to threat assessments, frequently emerge from the council's work.
Its main responsibility is to coordinate national security policy and provide the prime minister and government with assessments drawn from across the security establishment.
The council was established in 1999 under Netanyahu's first government and remains directly subordinate to the prime minister. Its authority was strengthened in 2008, when legislation formalized its responsibilities in response to criticism of Israel's decision-making during the 2006 Lebanon war.
Although the council primarily coordinates national security policy, its assessments draw on intelligence gathered abroad through Israel's security agencies and other foreign contacts.
Its intelligence and integration division prepares assessments for the political leadership by combining material from different intelligence bodies, foreign affairs institutions, and security agencies.
The council consequently occupies a position between intelligence collection and political decision-making, bringing together information that may otherwise remain divided among separate institutions.
Intelligence supplied through other agencies can influence the assessments it produces, particularly on developments in foreign states and organizations.
The backgrounds of its former directors are revealing. Among them was Yaakov Amidror, a former director of Military Intelligence's Research Division who served as Netanyahu's national security adviser and as chairman of the NSC from April 2011 to November 2013. Other former heads include retired Major General Giora Eiland, widely associated with the "Generals' Plan," and former Mossad chief Efraim Halevy.
Another prominent figure is Meir Ben-Shabbat, who served for decades in Shin Bet and held intelligence positions in the military.
Diplomats, researchers, and intelligence assets
Israel's intelligence activities also extend into the Foreign Ministry, research institutions, and organizations operating under academic, diplomatic, or commercial cover.
These include Israeli research centers, Jewish institutions in the US and Europe, and American or European organizations whose work may align with Israel's political and security interests.
The nature of such activity differs from the conventional espionage discussed in earlier installments of this series.
Intelligence gathering through diplomatic and research networks can involve political analysis, assessments of influential figures, and access to decision-making circles, alongside the collection of classified information.
The Foreign Ministry's contacts with political and diplomatic figures abroad can also provide opportunities for intelligence gathering, including through cooperation with Mossad.
Such relationships may involve individuals in senior positions within states or organizations hostile to Israel, where access to decision-making circles can be as valuable as access to classified documents.
These assignments may include political research, detailed assessments, and efforts to influence decision-making in targeted institutions.
An agent may be asked to prepare specialized studies, political reports, or assessments for the Foreign Ministry, the NSC, or the agency responsible for handling the source. These assessments may concern developments within the individual's own country, political organization, or institution.
Israeli intelligence has also used misleading information to influence foreign institutions.
A historical study of Mossad's operations in Europe documents how the agency supplied disinformation to European intelligence services during its assassination campaign in the 1970s, seeking to shape their assessments and deflect responsibility for Israeli operations.
Such methods have also appeared in the activities of private Israeli intelligence and influence firms.
A 2023 investigation by Le Monde documented companies staffed by former intelligence personnel that used false identities, manipulated online discussions, and sought compromising information on political activists.
During the 2015 Iranian nuclear negotiations, reports emerged that Israeli intelligence had obtained confidential information about the talks through surveillance, informants, and diplomatic contacts.
The disclosures gave Tel Aviv insight into negotiating positions and were reportedly used in its campaign against the emerging agreement.
The episode illustrated the value of political and diplomatic intelligence to Israeli officials seeking to influence negotiations.
Commercial enterprises, including trading companies and tourism businesses, can also provide cover for intelligence operations, allowing operatives to combine legitimate business activities with clandestine assignments.
The Foreign Ministry itself maintains a research capability distinct from the military intelligence directorate.
Israel's Political Research Center developed in the aftermath of the 1973 war, when the Agranat Commission called for greater diversity in intelligence assessments and less dependence on Aman's conclusions.
The Foreign Ministry's research role was also documented in a declassified 1979 CIA study of Israel's intelligence establishment, which examined the ministry's intelligence unit alongside Mossad, Shin Bet, and Aman.
Its existence demonstrates that intelligence analysis is conducted by agencies outside the three bodies most commonly associated with Israeli espionage.
The wider structure encompasses military security officials, diplomatic researchers, national security advisers, and specialized personnel working within institutions whose intelligence responsibilities are rarely discussed publicly.
For foreign states and resistance movements seeking to identify Israeli intelligence activity, Mossad's overseas networks and Shin Bet's recruitment methods represent only part of the challenge.
Israel's other intelligence bodies operate through diplomatic contacts, research institutions, military industries, and commercial networks, drawing on forms of access and technical expertise that conventional counterespionage efforts may overlook.
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