Showing posts with label Missile Program. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Missile Program. Show all posts

Monday, December 09, 2019

No agreement among Permanent Members that Iran is not complying with resolution 2231: Finaud

No agreement among Permanent Members that Iran is not complying with resolution 2231: Finaud

TEHRAN, (MNA) – Marc Finaud, a senior member of Geneva Centre for Security Policy, says that in the Middle East, several countries have wide-ranging missile capabilities that are the result of threat perceptions often fueled by the others’ arms build-ups.
Former Senior Resident Fellow at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) adds “This is why the only effective way of dealing with that issue is a regional framework.”
A senior member of Geneva Centre for Security Policy also says that “there is no agreement among the Permanent Members that Iran is not complying with resolution 2231.”
Finaud adds that “The E3 letter raises an important issue but it is bound to fail if it only seeks to pressure Iran and does not offer an opportunity to discuss the matter on a regional basis.”
Following is the full text of the interview:
The British, German and French ambassadors, in a letter circulated on Wednesday, called on UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to inform the Security Council in his next report that Iran’s missile program was “inconsistent” with a UN resolution that had endorsed the nuclear deal reached between Iran and six world powers (UN Security Council Resolution 2231). The claim is that some of Iran's missiles do not comply with the resolution, while the resolution “calls on” Iran not to work on missiles "designed to carry nuclear warheads". What is your assessment of this letter? And is it possible to vote against Iran at the Security Council meeting?
The provisions related to Iran’s ballistic missile program are part of the UN Security Council resolution endorsing the JCPOA but are not part of the JCPOA itself. The Security Council could theoretically discuss and adopt a resolution on those missile provisions, but in fact, there is no agreement among the Permanent Members that Iran is not complying with resolution 2231. The E3 letter raises an important issue but it is bound to fail if it only seeks to pressure Iran and does not offer an opportunity to discuss the matter on a regional basis.
This was Europe's action while Europe had already threatened Iran to investigate the trigger mechanism. Why, besides threatening to investigate the trigger mechanism, have they also raised the Iranian missile issue?
This initiative seems intended to push Iran to accept a broader scope of negotiation beyond its nuclear program in the hope of achieving a new deal that could be accepted by the United States. But it is unlikely to succeed unless Iran can derive some benefits from such a broader agreement.
These two actions of Europe while Europe failed to fulfill its obligations to Iran and the reduction of its obligations by Iran was also a reaction to the passivity of European countries. What is your assessment?
The problem obviously comes from the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in violation of the agreement itself and Security Council resolution 2231. Iran’s decisions to reduce the implementation of its commitments are consistent with the spirit of the JCPOA, based on reciprocity, if not with its letter. But it also increases the risk of collapse of the whole agreement. The Europeans did try to reduce the impact of American sanctions on Iran, but their efforts are restricted by bureaucracy and their limited influence on European companies which are deterred to trade with Iran by US sanctions.
Resolution 2231 uses the term “calls on” which does not have a legal requirement. Accordingly, while on the basis of arguments put forward by Europe, Iran has models of missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, but there are no legal entities for the legal review of countries' missile programs. This means that there is no international organization for recognizing the country's missile capabilities and its aims include defensive, offensive or capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. What is your assessment?
It is indeed regrettable that the international arms control framework on missiles is very weak: it only consists of the MTCR export control regime and The Hague Code of Conduct, a voluntary set of transparency- and confidence-building measures. In the case of the Middle East, means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction are part of the mandate of a WMD-free Zone, but discussions of this project have not made much progress so far.
Iran does not have a Continental missile and its missile range is eventually 2,000 kilometers. However, Israel has both a nuclear bomb and missiles that have far more missiles than Iranian missiles, and Saudi Arabia has a new, more advanced, missile program. Regarding this why Iran have no right to have a missile balance? If Iran is asked to limit its missile program, so should countries around Iran. What is your assessment?
Indeed, in the Middle East, several countries have wide-ranging missile capabilities that are the result of threat perceptions often fueled by the others’ arms build-ups. This is why the only effective way of dealing with that issue is a regional framework. With other experts, my organization has made proposals for a series of measures (such as limits on range and payload and ban on transfers) that could be adopted by the key regional states as one of the first steps towards the establishment of a WMD-free zone.
Interview by Javad Heirannia

Israeli-Saudi missile program should be consider when discussing Iran's missile program: Jenkins

Israeli-Saudi missile program should be consider when discussing Iran's missile program: Jenkins


TEHRAN, (MNA) –Peter Jenkins, former UK Ambassador to the IAEA and UN, says that Israel has a significant missile program while Saudi Arabia has acquired a significant quantity of missiles from foreign suppliers and is reported to have embarked on an indigenous program.
A former associate fellow of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy also adds that “Both possess missiles of ranges in excess of 2000 km, unlike Iran.”
He adds that “These facts should be seen as of crucial relevance to any discussion of Iran’s missile program.”
Following is the full text of the interview:
The British, German and French ambassadors, in a letter circulated on Wednesday, called on U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to inform the Security Council in his next report that Iran’s missile program was “inconsistent” with a U.N. resolution that had endorsed the nuclear deal reached between Iran and six world powers)UN Security Council Resolution 2231(. The claim is that some of Iran's missiles do not comply with the resolution, while the resolution “calls on” Iran not to work on missiles "designed to carry nuclear warheads". What is your assessment of this letter? And is it possible to vote against Iran at the Security Council meeting?
The European claim that aspects of Iran’s missile program are inconsistent with UNSC Res 2231 is not new. We have heard it on more than one past occasion. It rests on paragraph 3 of Annex B of that resolution. In this paragraph, Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons. I say “aspects of” because I assume – I do not know – that the Europeans recognize that only some of the missiles in Iran’s inventory or under development would be capable of delivering nuclear weapons. 
Is such a claim watertight? No, it’s a controversial claim because of the word “designed”. That word enables Iranian representatives to assert that none of the missiles in Iran’s inventory or under development has been designed to be a nuclear delivery vehicle, and it places a burden of proof on the Europeans that they are likely to be unable to sustain.
Why have the Europeans chosen to resurface the claim at this point, by writing to the UN Secretary General? I assume there is a connection between this move and Iran’s policy of progressive non-performance of the 2015 nuclear agreement known as the JCPOA. I assume that the Europeans are seeking to put diplomatic pressure on Iran as a counter to the diplomatic pressure that Iran has been putting on Europe by threatening the survival of the JCPOA. 
If that is their tactic, will it be effective? Alas, it seems more likely that Iran will dismiss the European claim as unfounded and will continue to move progressively towards killing off the JCPOA. I say “alas” because, as I have told you in the past, I believe the policy of progressive non-performance to be both unwise and unfair: it amounts to punishing Europe to no constructive effect for injustices which the United States has committed and which Iran has prevented Europe from mitigating.    
 
These two actions of Europe while Europe failed to fulfill its obligations to Iran and the reduction of its obligations by Iran was also a reaction to the passivity of European countries. What is your assessment?
 
I do not think there are objective grounds for ascribing passivity to European policy over the 22 months that have passed since President Trump first declared war on the JCPOA. The Europeans have tried repeatedly to persuade Trump that the JCPOA is a precious component of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. They have consistently opposed Trump’s policy of subjecting Iran to “maximum pressure”, which they see to be both unjust and incapable of contributing to global peace and security. They have set up the trading facilitation mechanism known as INSTEX. President Macron of France has sought to create a basis for the resumption of European purchases of Iranian oil, but has been denied cooperation by President Rouhani.   
 
Resolution 2231 uses the term “calls on” which does not have a legal requirement. Accordingly, while on the basis of arguments put forward by Europe, Iran has models of missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, but there are no legal entities for the legal review of countries' missile programs. This means that there is no international organization for recognizing the country's missile capabilities and its aims include defensive, offensive or capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. What is your assessment?
 
You are right that UNSC Res 2231 does not impose on Iran a legally-binding obligation to refrain from developing a certain type of missile.  You are also right that there is no international agreement that Iran is violating by developing and holding a range of missile types. This explains why Europe is reduced to claiming that Iran’s missile program is “inconsistent” with 2231 and to making debatable assertions about the intention behind the characteristics of some of Iran’s missiles.
 
Iran does not have a Continental missile and its missile range is eventually 2,000 kilometers. However, Israel has both a nuclear bomb and missiles that have far more missiles than Iranian missiles, and Saudi Arabia has a new, more advanced, missile program. Regarding this why Iran has no right to have a missile balance? If Iran is asked to limit its missile program, so should countries around Iran. What is your assessment?
 
Again, you are right: Israel has a significant missile program while Saudi Arabia has acquired a significant quantity of missiles from foreign suppliers and is reported to have embarked on an indigenous program. Both possess missiles of ranges in excess of 2000 km, unlike Iran (although Iran has developed a “space launch vehicle” that could be modified to deliver payloads over a longer distance than 2000 km). These facts should be seen as of crucial relevance to any discussion of Iran’s missile program. To my mind they lead to at least two conclusions: it is reasonable for Iran to seek to deter the use of missiles against Iran by acquiring a capability to retaliate, and only a regional approach to controlling missile proliferation has any chance of obtaining Iranian assent.
You mention that Israel possesses nuclear weapons. This too is a fact. It would not justify the Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons since “two wrongs do not make a right”. But it does justify Iran’s possession of an effective anti-Israeli deterrent in the form of missiles.
Interview by Javad Heirannia

Tuesday, January 08, 2019

Tel Aviv fears Hezbollah more than ever

Tel Aviv fears Hezbollah more than ever


By: Mohammad Ghaderi

TEHRAN, Jan. 07 (MNA) – Israelis are riddled with fear, fear of Hezbollah missile capability and the invaluable experience of Lebanese resistance fighters in the Syrian War.
Israeli troops in the newly created Gates of Fire Battalion simulated war with Hezbollah in northern occupied land in December 2018. The battalion held a training program during the past month in which it practiced a wide range of scenarios it might encounter during a war.
Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth quoted Yuval Steinitz, Israel's Minister of Energy, saying that “Hezbollah missiles may target all of Israel. Zionists consider Hezbollah a very dangerous and highly experienced enemy.”
The Israeli Defense Forces, referring to the precision of the Lebanese Hezbollah missiles, writes: “Hezbollah is capable of targeting Israel's critical facilities, and the 2006 Lebanon War seems nothing compared to a conflict with Hezbollah in future.”
Daniel “Danny” Rubinstein, an Israeli journalist, said that “Hassan Nasrallah is a great figure. Gamal Abdel Nasser fought for six days, but Hassan Nasrallah kept Israelis four weeks in their place in 2006.”
Tamir Yadai, the head of Israel's Home Front Command warned that “Hezbollah is capable of targeting deep inside Israel massively. In 2019 there will be a more complex and challenging threat to Israel.”
Today, Hezbollah has an arsenal that stores high-precision missiles that can reach all over Israel.
Hezbollah is now considered Israel’s first enemy, and this prediction says it all. The Israeli regime has announced a plan to evacuate 22 settlements in the northern part of occupied Palestine in the wake of a war with Hezbollah.
Lately, in a video message with Hebrew subtitles, the Lebanese Hezbollah movement has warned Israel against any offense in Lebanon. The video titled, “If you are impudent, you will regret it”, is part of Nasrallah’s speech against the Zionist regime. The Lebanese Secretary-General says in the clip that any Zionist attack on Lebanon will have a response by Hezbollah. “We will definitely answer any aggression, air strike, and bombing of Lebanon.” The video has brought terror among the Israelis, particularly that 80 percent of Israelis who believe what Nasrallah says while having no faith in their own officials.
They are fearful of Nasrallah's threats because they know all too well that the Hezbollah Secretary-General Nasrullah does what he says he will.
An Israeli expert bin Ami says, “The problem that Israel faces is that Nasrallah has already proved to be honest and he continues to deter a battle with his threats.”
In contrast, Zionist authorities, especially Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have taken measures to fight Hezbollah to reassure the Israeli Home Front Command. For example, they launched the so-called Operation Northern Shield on December 4 to allegedly locate and destroy Hezbollah tunnels that cross the Blue Line from Lebanon into northern Israel.
On Nasrallah’s reaction to the Israeli operation, Ray Al-Youm newspaper wrote “since Israel started the Operation Northern Shield to destroy the alleged Hezbollah tunnels, the Israeli media have not been able to get a reaction from the Lebanese Secretary-General, and that has frustrated the Tel Aviv policymakers.” The print media also points out the dispute between Prime Minister Netanyahu and commanders of the Israeli army and says that “Netanyahu has called for the renaming of the operation, but the commanders of the Israeli army opposed it.”
At the request of the US - to discuss Hezbollah's cross-border attack tunnels - the UN Security Council was scheduled to meet on December 19. However, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) confirmed the tunnels do not appear to surface in Israel and thus far to have exit points on the Israeli side.
Following that failed Operation Northern Shield in the early days of the New Year, Israelis established a new battalion, called the Fire Gates, to defend the Northern Front against Hezbollah.
According to the Times of Israel, the newly formed battalion is under the command of Amir Baram Brigade general in the northern Palestine territories. The unit is made up of reservists freshly released from the Golani Infantry Brigade's Reconnaissance Battalion. The drill lasting about five days and focused on “conquering Hezbollah.”
The Israelis Gates of Fire battalion has been ridiculed in Lebanon. Ali Shoeib, a prominent Lebanese journalist said on his Twitter “thank God we live in a time when our enemies, because of the fear of our resistance, launch defensive battalions, after they said they were capable of occupying our capital with only military music.”
What remains certain is that the operations carried by the Israeli forces show they fear the Lebanese and Palestinian resistance fighters and live in fear.