Arian Norouzi – International Relations Analyst
Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy should be considered a turning point in the evolution of U.S. security policy. This document is not a natural continuation of previous ones but rather a conscious departure from the strategic liberalism that, for decades, formed the basis of Washington’s foreign policy. In this new framework, security is no longer the product of normative commitments, multilateral institutions, or global responsibilities, but rather the result of direct cost-benefit calculations, bargaining power, and short- to medium-term interests.
In this document, the United States explicitly declares that its capabilities and resources are limited and it cannot play an active role on all fronts simultaneously. Therefore, reducing multilateral commitments, redefining alliances, and rigorously prioritizing major threats have been placed on the agenda. China and Russia are presented as the primary strategic rivals, while other dossiers, including West Asia, are relegated to lower levels of urgency and importance. This perspective, unlike previous narratives, views the world not as an arena for expanding a U.S.-centric order, but as a field of competition among major powers.
China and Russia at the Center; West Asia on the Margins
The focus of the 2025 National Security Strategy on China and Russia signifies a redistribution of attention, resources, and energy of U.S. foreign policy. Containing China in technology, economy, and supply chains, and managing competition with Russia in Europe, have become primary priorities. The natural consequence of this focus is a reduced U.S. appetite for costly and sustained engagement in other regions.
West Asia, which over the past two decades has been one of the main arenas for direct U.S. intervention, is now viewed by Washington primarily as a region for “minimalist management.” This management is defined not by rebuilding order or political engineering, but by case-by-case agreements, the delegation of responsibility to regional actors, and the avoidance of long-term commitments. In other words, the U.S. does not seek a complete exit but strives to minimize the cost of its presence and distance itself from draining conflicts.
In such an environment, the shift in the U.S. approach could unintentionally become an opportunity for Iran. Transactionalism, rather than ideology, means that Washington is more prepared than ever to separate dossiers and prioritize them. In this framework, Iran is no longer necessarily at the top of the list of immediate threats but is part of a larger equation shaped by competition with China and Russia.
The reduction of U.S. multilateral commitments, especially in regional security, could alleviate the sustained structural pressure on Iran. The “maximum pressure” policy made sense when Washington considered itself committed to actively managing the regional order and rallied its allies along this path. That policy, even by Washington’s own admission at the time, had already failed. But now, in a situation where the U.S. seeks temporary deals and even establishes cost-benefit relationships with its European allies, building a sustained consensus against Iran becomes more difficult. From a realist perspective, this situation does not mean the complete removal of pressures, but rather a change in their nature: pressures that are more unstable, case-specific, and dependent on temporary developments, which could provide Tehran with more opportunity to manage and neutralize them.
One important consequence of this development is the relative increase in the Axis of Resistance’s resilience to the United States’ unstable policies. Transactionalism, rather than a long-term strategy, leads Washington’s policies in West Asia to fluctuate and lack coherence. This instability, while potentially dangerous in the short term, benefits in the medium term those actors who rely on regional networks, informal ties, and indigenous capabilities.
The Axis of Resistance, with its long experience of facing pressure, sanctions, and instability, can, with a degree of flexibility, benefit from the vacuums created by the reduction of active U.S. presence in such an environment. The weakening of the U.S. role as the dominant player means an increased role for regional and non-Western actors in shaping security equations—a trend consistent with the logic and experience of the Axis of Resistance.
Rearranging Opportunities in the Transitioning Order
The shift in the U.S. approach from strategic liberalism to transactionalism shows that Washington is prepared to retreat, if necessary, even from commitments to its closest allies. Under such conditions, Iran can manage external pressures by strengthening relations with neighbors, expanding regional security cooperation, and leveraging the gaps among major powers. The U.S. focus on China and Russia creates more maneuvering space for middle powers, provided that this space is used with realism and avoidance of haste.
Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy is more than just a policy document; it is a sign of the international order transitioning into a more fluid and competitive phase. Transactionalism, reduction of multilateral commitments, and prioritizing competition with China and Russia confront not only America’s allies but also its regional rivals with new realities.
Capitalizing on the created opportunity requires strategic intelligence, internal cohesion, and active diplomacy. In a world where America has become more unpredictable than ever, the more successful actors will be those who rely less on the stability of Washington’s policies and more on their own capabilities and ties with others.
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