As Riyadh reclaims control over land and sea routes once dominated by Abu Dhabi, the Persian Gulf's transport and energy future is veering toward collision, not cooperation
The Cradle
When a British official in the 1940s asked him about the kingdom's perception of its borders, Ibn Saud's eyes were directed towards the sea. As the monarch envisioned that his kingdom would extend to the Arabian Sea and the entire Persian Gulf, he answered, “My border is where the gazelle stands.”
Ibn Saud succeeded in achieving part of his dreams of controlling large swathes of Yemen and extending his influence in the Gulf.
While these early ambitions collided with British colonial interests, they laid the groundwork for Saudi Arabia's regional assertiveness and the careful partitioning of Gulf territories that persists to this day. London, wary of any single power dominating the Gulf, created artificial borders and encouraged divisions. One such decision was to sever the land link between Qatar and Abu Dhabi, placing Saudi Arabia in the central logistical role that continues to define the region's infrastructure politics.
Old disputes, new arenas
Border disputes in the Gulf have simmered since the 1970s, following the independence of the UAE and the demarcation of new borders among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. The most prominent and long-standing of these involved the Buraimi Oasis, Khor al-Udeid, and the Shaybah oil field – zones rich in strategic and economic value. These disputes reflected deeper territorial frictions that were only superficially resolved.
According to the 1974 Jeddah Agreement, the UAE ceded expansive areas in the Al-Dhafra Desert and Al-Ain region in return for Riyadh’s formal recognition of the newly established federation. In turn, Saudi Arabia acquired control over the Sabkha Matti area, the contested Khor al-Udeid waterway, and part of the so-called Southern Triangle. Crucially, the kingdom came to possess 80 percent of the wells in the oil-laden Shaybah field.
But this exchange left a bitter taste in Abu Dhabi. Emirati officials viewed the concessions as unjust and strategically weakening. Particularly contentious was the maritime access point of Khor al-Udeid, which rendered the UAE dependent on Saudi goodwill for eastward transit. The agreement's vagueness over maritime boundaries, especially in areas like Yasat, only added to the Emirati grievances.
These underlying tensions never fully abated. Following the death of the UAE's founding president, Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, in 2004, Abu Dhabi reopened the Jeddah Agreement, but Riyadh refused to review it.
A direct maritime bridge project between the UAE and Qatar would have broken the geographical isolation imposed by the agreement, as well as reservations about the route of the Dolphin gas pipeline project, which is designed to transport Qatari gas to the UAE through disputed waters. With this overlap between borders, corridors, and energy, the conflict has gone from a tacit diplomatic framework to limited friction on the ground, most notably the 2010 shooting incident in Khor al-Udeid.
More recently, competition has intensified through passive obstruction, including Saudi reluctance to support infrastructure that bypasses its territory and Emirati attempts to deepen ties with Qatar and Oman through direct maritime access, undercutting Riyadh’s monopolistic position.
Riyadh's overland leverage
Today, Saudi Arabia leverages its geography to assert dominance over the Gulf's most strategic arteries. As the only country connecting Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman by land, Saudi Arabia is the indispensable link in the region's transport grid. From the ambitious 2,117-kilometer GCC railway network to the Yanbu-bound Petroline pipeline, the kingdom controls the flow of people, goods, and energy from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea.
Projects like the Riyadh–Doha high-speed rail, the Dammam–Jeddah land bridge, and the vast NEOM complex further entrench Saudi control over the region's logistics architecture. Other key ventures include the Desert Dream train initiative and the Riyadh Smart Metro, positioning the capital as a model for modern urban mobility. The proposed 950-kilometer Salman Water Canal through the Empty Quarter is yet another attempt to redraw the map – this time bypassing the Strait of Hormuz altogether.
In addition to its overland dominance, Saudi Arabia is a strategic hub for sea lanes, connecting the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf, and linking the Arab East to North Africa. Its borders with Iraq and Jordan further position it as a gateway for the distribution of goods across the Arab world. The kingdom’s ports handle approximately 7 million containers annually and receive more than 11,000 ships, underpinning an economy where shipping plays a pivotal role.
This logistical prominence is reinforced by a network of vital pipelines. Chief among them is the Petroline pipeline, which transports around 5 million barrels of oil per day (bpd) from the kingdom’s eastern fields to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, facilitating exports to Europe and the US. Complementing this is the Abqaiq–Yanbu line for natural gas liquids, with a capacity of 290,000 bpd.
Saudi Arabia has structured these projects to ensure that its territory remains indispensable to all north–south and east–west movement within the Gulf, making economic interdependence a tool of political leverage.
NEOM, in particular, reveals Riyadh's intent to go beyond transit. Envisioned as a central node in a new economic order, it aims to manage cargo and energy flows directly, insulating them from maritime chokepoints like Bab al-Mandab and the Strait of Hormuz. Situated between the Red Sea and Jordan, NEOM offers Riyadh a chance to reroute traditional trade flows and neutralize Emirati dominance at sea.
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) has framed the megaproject as the nucleus of a post-oil Saudi Arabia, a symbol of national resurgence and regional leadership. By positioning NEOM at the intersection of new global supply chains, Riyadh seeks not just to compete with Abu Dhabi’s Jebel Ali or DP World, but to set the rules of Gulf connectivity for decades to come.
Abu Dhabi’s maritime empire
Abu Dhabi, unable to compete on land, turned to the sea. The UAE now handles 60 percent of the Persian Gulf's maritime cargo. DP World's global footprint spans over 100 ports and terminals, offering unmatched port-to-port continuity and financial services integration. Its 12 ports and 310 berths anchor a maritime empire stretching from the Indian Ocean to East Africa.
But this empire rests on contested waters and precarious alliances. The UAE's port acquisitions in Eritrea, Somalia, and Djibouti have been shadowed by accusations of neocolonial ambition. In Yemen, Abu Dhabi's control of ports like Aden, Mukalla, and Socotra was secured not through trade but through military force and local militias, often sidelining the Saudi-backed coalition.
In Sudan, the UAE’s involvement in Red Sea port development has faced criticism for bypassing national frameworks. In Somalia and Somaliland, DP World’s long-term port deals have become lightning rods for accusations of backdoor control and sovereignty erosion. These moves, while lucrative, risk overextension – particularly as Riyadh eyes similar African entry points to balance Emirati reach.
These outposts have allowed the UAE to bypass Saudi Arabia's overland chokepoints, while also embedding itself in Africa’s east coast. However, the militarization of these corridors, and Abu Dhabi’s increasing assertiveness, has provoked quiet pushback – not just from Riyadh but from local actors and resistance movements cautious of foreign control.
A strategic gateway for Tel Aviv
Since its 2020 normalization deal with Tel Aviv, the UAE's ports have also become an access point for the Israeli occupation. Through covert cooperation on maritime surveillance and cargo monitoring, Emirati ports now serve as nodes in a wider intelligence and logistics network that stretches across the Gulf, the Red Sea, and East Africa.
Ports in Egypt, East Africa, and Yemen have effectively been opened to Israeli influence via Emirati intermediaries. This includes Ain Sokhna on the Suez Canal, and the rehabilitated ports of Beirut and Tartous, both eyed by Emirati firms. Such infrastructure is increasingly entangled with Israel-aligned projects like the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).
Framed as economic cooperation, IMEC’s infrastructure map bypasses traditional chokepoints and folds key ports into a system of indirect Israeli access. While Tel Aviv deepens its regional footprint, Riyadh watches closely, wary of external actors shaping Gulf connectivity.
The UAE's normalization has thus given Tel Aviv a stealthy maritime corridor, one that avoids direct Israeli presence while delivering surveillance and strategic depth. In return, Abu Dhabi has gained diplomatic capital with Washington and a technological edge in port management, further emboldening its regional reach.
The Yemeni theater
Nowhere is, or was, the Saudi–Emirati rivalry more pronounced than in southern Yemen. For Riyadh, Hadhramaut serves as a buffer zone and a strategic fulcrum for connecting the Arabian Sea to the Red Sea – one that allows it to export oil and goods without relying on the Strait of Hormuz.
For Abu Dhabi, it is a gateway to expand its maritime domain. The now-dissolved UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) has long undermined Saudi efforts to centralize authority in Yemen, drawing Riyadh's ire.
Today, the kingdom is actively rolling back Emirati influence in southern Yemen and East Africa. After sidelining the STC in Hadhramaut, Saudi Arabia has stepped up its outreach across the Horn of Africa, positioning itself as a rising power in port and corridor politics.
Saudi efforts to develop alternative export routes through Yemen, including ports in Al-Mahra and oil pipelines bypassing the Bab al-Mandab Strait, reveal an attempt to contain not only Emirati expansion but also to secure its own energy future in a world of shifting alliances.
Collision course
The confrontation between Saudi Arabia and the UAE has left the shadows. It unfolds in competing port deals, in disrupted transport corridors, and in the quiet dismantling of what was once a coordinated Gulf strategy.
Hadhramaut’s significance lies not just in geography, but in its function as a launchpad for Gulf energy diversification and an exit route from Hormuz dependency. Its ports and pipelines are now central to Riyadh’s bid to rewire the region’s commercial arteries through Saudi terrain.
The Saudi–Emirati split reflects a deeper unraveling of Gulf power-sharing. As Riyadh lays down railways and ports to lock in influence across land and sea, Abu Dhabi relies on private contracts, military outposts, and foreign partnerships to project reach. Their methods diverge – but the destination is the same: dominance over the arteries of trade, energy, and regional movement.
Saudi Arabia is pursuing a strategic direction rooted in its founding ethos, adapted to the demands of regional logistics and control. The deeper question is how its moves will be received – by a neighbor whose maritime dominance is under pressure, and by regional actors navigating the ripple effects of a Gulf order in flux.
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