Showing posts with label Seth Ferris. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Seth Ferris. Show all posts

Thursday, September 12, 2019

Oil Tanker Off Syria: Sanctions-Busting or “US-Ego-Busting?”

Seth Ferris
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An oil tanker has been spotted off the coast of Syria and with that comes the latest news flash. This is hardly news, given the leading export of that region. But it was an IRANIAN oil tanker! Shock horror! Iran is again breaching sanctions it maintains it is not subject to! Is there no limit to its perfidy?
It is true that the US has previously detained the Adrian Darya 1, and that it now appears to have entered the Syrian port of Tartus, which is described as “Russian-controlled”, in violation of assurances Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif gave that it would not sail to Syria There also appears to be some confusion over whether it has actually delivered any oil, but the fact the tanker was seen off the Syrian coast, when the US had tried its best to prevent it going there, has caused an international outcry.
The US still has never forgiven Iran for conducting a revolution, a well justified one at that, when the State Department didn’t see it coming forty years ago. Revolutions are perfectly alright if the US promotes them, funds them or can anticipate them, highjack them and have a PR and humanitarian response ready. They are only a problem to the US, a country founded by revolution, if the revolutionaries take advantage of an opportunity others did not see – prove themselves better businessmen, in other words.
This is exactly what Iran is doing with its oil. The West wants it, the West claims it needs it. However, more is involved, as the US has bigger concerns about Iran, foremost of which is its alleged non-peaceful nuclear programme.
So Iran has taken to trading nuclear power for oil. It is prepared to make concessions on its nuclear programme in exchange for the ability to sell its oil products to significant markets. This makes sound business sense from an Iranian point of view, regardless of the importance of its domestic nuclear programme.
Iran is not planning to export its nuclear power, or sell nuclear weapons if it has them, but is not going to turn down oil export income when it can use this, Chinese-style, to hold potential enemies economic hostage. It is again taking advantage of an opportunity. Like any other business, it is pushing as far as it can to see what the political market can bear, with increased nuclear capacity, real or perceived, its counter to any objection by its opponents/customers.
So what now?

The tanker was told not to go to Syria, the Foreign Minister promised it would not go, but it has. Are the EU and US going to spell out exactly what their sanctions say, what authority they have and how they are going to be implemented, which they have consistently refused to do when challenged, merely repeating that “sanctions” are whatever the speaker says they are at any given time?
Hence the reason the US has a problem with the Adrian Darya is not that it is delivering oil to Syria, and by implication to its enemies there. It is because it is exposing US hypocrisy once again.
This has long been alleged to be a Russian tactic – wait for the US to compromise itself by acting contrary to its own values, then do the same thing the US just did and ask what it is doing wrong. Now Iran is getting away with the same thing, it puts the web of lies US foreign policy is based on under considerable strain – and other countries might be allowed to get away with doing that, but not Iran, the branded pariah state.

My lies and your lies

What hypocrisy is Iran exposing? This is revealed in one of the details of this story, which most reports only mention in passing, as if there is nothing extraordinary about it.
The tanker is captained by an Indian, not an Iranian. He is not an Iranian government functionary, or he would have Iranian nationality and diplomatic status. He is a merchant seaman doing his job for whoever hires him, as everyone in that profession, like Christopher Columbus, has done for centuries.
Obviously he has been paid by whoever is in charge of this tanker, whether it is the Iranian government, a maritime transport company or an oil company, to take the ship to a certain place carrying a certain agreed load. If he did not agree with the terms of his engagement, he wouldn’t have taken on the job, as the only people who would subsequently employ him would be criminals, who are not the most reliable or transparent of employers.
No one knows how much the captain was paid to take this ship to Syria, if this was even the original intention. But what we do know, because the US has admitted it, is that he was offered millions of dollars to take the ship to a different destination, where the US could seize its cargo.
You don’t offer people less money than they are already getting if you want them to do a special favour. Iran would have known when the tanker set out that any suspicion that is oil was bound for Syria would arouse US interest. It was the UK which detained the firsts ship, but ultimately had to let it go because it had no grounds for doing so, despite US objections. So if the US wanted to stop the ship it could not use legal means, leaving bribery as the best option.
It is highly unlikely that the captain would have been allowed to keep any millions he might have made from being bribed by the US to divert the ship. His employers would have taken the lion’s share, although he would doubtless have been given a consideration. So those employers knew that there were two ways of earning big money from commissioning this tanker: either they could sell the oil to Syria, in alleged defiance of sanctions, or earn more by getting the US to pay them not to do so.
The US complains, rightly, about Somali “pirates”. Yet here it is supporting a system which actively encourages piracy—American made kind. Let’s not forget America’s claim as why it went to war with Britain for the second time in 1812. It too was about the seas and allegations that American ships were being stopped on the high seas. However, that too is what fairy tales are made of.
If the captain had accepted the offered millions of US taxpayer dollars, he would have gained his employers a return on their investment without breaching any sanctions, and won US trust, encouraging further bribery and corruption. By not doing so, he guarantees the original earnings projection, but leaves the door open for future bribery. It is win-win for the ship owners, and would have been regarded as good business if a US company had done it – but it is criminality if Iran does it, simply because Iran is not allowed to be as clever as the US.
Over the limit, under the counter

Say the captain had taken the bribe, and steered the tanker to a US-controlled port. He would hardly have been arrested, as he had voluntarily given up his cargo to the US authorities. The oil itself would also have been cleansed of criminal associations, as no one could have proved that it had been destined for Syria, or terrorists or Russians, if it never reached there.
What would then have happened to the oil? Would the US have held it in a stockpile, or burnt it or thrown it in the sea? Is it not more likely that it would have used the oil, or sold it on to gain a return on its investment?
This opens up a third front in the bribery business. Many US operations are funded by illicit oil and drug sales, made through the ports of client states, at least in terms of the paperwork, such as Georgia It is no coincidence that the biggest of the internal rows of the Saakashvili government was over whether his uncle, or a third party, would control the Kulevi oil terminal, or that Saakashvili was put in charge of Odessa, a major port with a huge oil terminal, after he was spirited out of Georgia and into Ukraine, like many other aspects of the CIA operation in the region.
Oil seized from an Iranian oil tanker is not likely to be officially accounted for, as it has neither been bought on the open market nor become the proceeds of crime, the “crime” having been averted. So ships seized by the US can supply the illicit operations as well as earning money, like drugs and weapons.
Organised supplies would attract different bribery rates – probably smaller, but guaranteed in consequence. This is how groups like Daesh can mount long term operations, via secured supply lines protected by CIA operatives.
It would be no surprise if we suddenly saw a significant increase in oil tankers being “intercepted” by the US, in great victories for democracy, and then discovered the US had chartered them, via the usual suspects who supply the fake end user certificates for the arms deals. This may be the only way the US can recover from its embarrassment at being outsmarted by another Third World nation.
It is the US which insists that Iran’s domestic nuclear programme is a threat. So the US is keeping that issue on the table, and thus giving Iran the opportunity to win oil export concessions.
In this way Iran can hand control of its purported oil smuggling to the US in exchange for regular cash, without the US having to explain why it is dealing officially with Iranian oil. Another win-win situation for Iran, like Iran Contra, but this one works for the US too.

Floating allegiances

Of course organised bribery only works if you can find enough people to bribe and the right people. If you were going to look in any legitimate business to find them, it would be the maritime industry.
The individuals who work in this industry are not inherently corrupt. But the industry has thrived on selling itself to the highest bidder for many years. It knows how to play this game as standard business practice, and those who want to get ahead in it are schooled in its playbook.
The evolution of speedboats has been driven by the drug smuggling industry. The smugglers buy the latest and swiftest models, even subs. They even buy vessels, better ones are developed for the coastguards, then the smugglers want better ones, and on and one it goes.
How can you prove that a boat designer, manufacturer or retailer knew that their client was a drug smuggler? So the speedboat business is funded by the proceeds of crime, when it could not be from government contracts alone.
Larger ships operate the same way. They have bills of lading and inventories, but also unofficial cargo such as the weapons which did not appear on the Lusitania’s cargo list. The sinking of the civilian luxury liner was used as grounds for bringing the Yanks into WW1.
Obviously this contraband is not paid for at the normal rates, and deals have to be made at the highest levels of companies to enable such practices to be introduced – if there is a problem, paths have to be smoothed by people in authority. Ship = smuggling opportunity, and it cannot be otherwise, as they are difficult to stop or search without justification whilst at sea.
None of this has resulted in the maritime industry gaining a negative reputation. Quite the contrary, it is regarded as an important national resource in every country, and few comment on the deals made to support it. Most of it is indeed fully legitimate, so the side deals are not considered too unusual or important, unless a country like Iran is making them.
A certain level of corruption is considered necessary in most areas of life. But only the US and its allies are allowed to take advantage of it. This demonstrates to them that they are at the top of the tree on merit, because they are cleverer than lesser nations.
Only when that perception is challenged by the likes of Iran and North Korea does corruption pose a wider problem. When the US has given these countries the opportunity to challenge them by its own misconduct, it merely amplifies the problem. But the definition of “superpower” is a state which can consistently make sure that its problems are turned into somebody else’s—at least the blamed is fixed.

Seth Ferris, investigative journalist and political scientist, expert on Middle Eastern affairs, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Sunday, September 01, 2019

Kashmir: A Conflict of Convenience

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We have all seen the news from the disputed Himalayan territory of Kashmir: barbed wire fences across streets, Indian troops patrolling, Pakistani troops threatening. The latest flare up in this never-ending conflict is being blamed on the diplomatic sophistry which made it a disputed territory to begin with: as it has been, so it is now, with all actors making the same points they always have.
But we are not dealing with quite the same actors. True, it is India and Pakistan pressing their standard historic claims to ownership of the territory in a melange of different terms, the most recent being the move to deprive the Indian-controlled part of its special constitutional status
But if we look at who is running India and Pakistan, we get to the heart of the current problem.
India’s Prime Minister is Narendra Modi, an entrepreneur who has a great fondness for publicity, as his opponents keep reminding him. His political party, the BJP, is usually described as “Hindu Nationalist” but might more accurately be termed “Modi-ist”: unlike previous BJP leaders, even ones well-knownbefore taking office he has made his party an extension of himself, his own personal characteristics becoming synonymous with the platform of the party.
Pakistan’s Prime Minister is Imran Khan, the cricket star (and thus national hero to Pakistanis) and former international playboy who has revelled in being in the eye of publicity all his life He has taken advantage of the eminence his family and looks offered him to conquer every world he has entered, as since he left cricket his capacity for garnering positive publicity is what has set him apart from rivals.
Plenty of celebrities have entered politics, but few have provoked their incumbent national government to declare that it was “not intimidated” by them doing so, before they had even announced a candidacy. Thus is the power of the publicity surrounding Imran, and it represents the main reason this aristocrat has come from nowhere to rule Pakistan on a “populist” platform which sounds very similar to non-populist ones, when expressed by someone else.
Both men know that war sells newspapers. Like Kirk Douglas in the Billy Wilder film Ace in the Hole they know the personal rewards of spinning a story people want to hear,as the consumers of such stories are less interested in reality than sensation. This is one of the reasons Kashmir has always been disputed territory, when the dispute could have been resolved: it has given both sides an excuse to fan their domestic support through real or threatened conflict, which is what created the separate states of India and Pakistan in the first place.
So who benefits from the Kashmir conflict? Both India and Pakistan. It brings them both into the media spotlight for the reasons they would want, and gives them time to fix their other problems, if that can be done, before the clouds of suspicion hanging over both states start to weigh them down again.
Back in the parade
India currently faces challenges because it is like Modi – full of talk of its achievements, but not recognising that the reality doesn’t quite match. It may still be the big emerging superpower, but not much of that has got down to the majority of its population – one of the reasons the BJP, with its more visceral appeal to the majority of the population, comprehensively won the last election at the expense of the “Champagne Socialist” Congress Party, now seen as out of touch and elitist.
India ticks a number of boxes the world wants it to tick. The problem is that this no longer matters as much as it used to. China is even more of an emerging power, if it hasn’t already emerged. New Delhi can no longer play honest broker between its traditional Western and Soviet friends because the West doesn’t want to grant it such importance, and is increasingly demanding that each ally chooses one over the other. It can no longer offer the West a foothold in a region often in turmoil, as the West won’t need one for as long as it keeps selling everything to the Chinese.
Pakistan was created as a separate state to keep India in its place. Colonial powers do not like granting their former colonies independence on equal terms, as they then have to start treating them as equals. Pakistan was carved out of British India as the separate state of the Muslim minority, in an attempt to portray independence as being imposed upon the people, by Hindu rebels who did not care about the interests of their non-Hindu neighbours.
How much the West actually cared about the Muslim minority was seen in the fact that Pakistan was an unworkable state, the Muslim majority areas being on opposite sides of British India? This solution was bound to cause conflict, and this eventually led to East Pakistan gaining its independence as Bangladesh with Indian assistance, and enduring mass poverty with it
Pakistan was there to be the regional bad boy, to stop India getting above itself. The religious difference between the two countries was played for all it was worth by Western countries who never recognised it in colonial days.
But who needs bad Muslims now? There are so many terrorist groups around claiming to be “Muslim fundamentalists” that a functioning Muslim state is almost treasonous, in Western thinking. There are too many other Muslim bad boys around to threaten countries which step out of line.
Pakistan has other dimensions but has not been able to use them to its advantage because no one thinks about the country in that way. It has found itself isolated by not fulfilling its traditional role, not because it has no friends. It needs to be all the things it was created to be to regain the influence it once had, Imran Khan or no Imran Khan.
Every man’s no man’s land
In this context, the latest Kashmir Valley dispute makes perfect sense. India needs to be at the forefront of global progressive movements, Pakistan needs to restore its status as the contrary irritant to India. Modi and Khan may not have deliberately set out to go to war, but neither will make any serious effort to prevent it.
Kashmir is a disputed territory because the terms on which India and Pakistan became independent states gave both sides a claim to it. A former princely state, it had been purchased from the British in 1846 and was ruled by a Sikh maharajah, Hari Singh, independently in practice but under the ultimate authority of the British.
As it had a clear Muslim majority, Kashmir should have joined Pakistan in 1947. However the decision lay with the maharajah, who hesitated to do this because many of his Muslim subjects were not happy with the idea. Pakistan thus tried to force the issue with guerrilla raids. These prompted Hari Singh to ask the last British Viceroy of India, Lord Mountbatten, for protection.
Mountbatten insisted that he would send support if the maharajah gave Kashmir to India. After Indian soldiers cleared out most of the guerrillas, the UN was called in and promised a referendum on the future status of the state. As this has never been held, both countries claim the whole of Kashmir as their own – and to keep them both honest, a small part of it belongs to China, thus preventing either India or Pakistan from taking control of the whole area they claim anyway.
Since then India and Pakistan have fought four wars over Kashmir, and the Chinese incursion also led India to war with China. The majority of the population is still Muslim, but most of the Muslims are in Indian-controlled areas. Pakistan controls a portion of the old princely state, which has been divided into two de facto provinces. But in a typical British compromise, the Indian part has until now been given wide autonomy under India’s constitution – which gives the region a “special status”, but does not allow the Kashmiri Muslims to be part of the Muslim state the British insisted on establishing for people like them.
The Muslim Kashmiris are dissatisfied, wanting either integration with Pakistan or independence. India is dissatisfied with Article 370 its own constitution, because Kashmiri autonomy is seen as having promoted discrimination. Under that article, Kashmir can make its own laws in most areas, and this has meant that property rights and citizenship are not available to outsiders, or (in many cases) women. This is not the case in India itself, but the consequence of autonomy granted with the best of motives.
Autonomy only works if the autonomous get a better deal, and the rest of the country can live with that. If it makes people feel worse off, but they can’t decide which daddy to run to, it will ensure conflict simmers but never goes away. As we have seen in many other disputed territories, the argument is more valuable than the winning of it for most of the people, most of the time – a triumph of democracy, in other words.
Brothers in each other’s arms
India wants to be seen as progressive to retain its seat at the top table with the trendsetting countries. Kashmir’s policies are anathema to current Western thinking, and therefore unacceptable to India. Nor do they protect the Muslim population there from assimilation, but rather cut them off from Pakistan whilst leaving them as unequal non-citizens of India. So something has to give, but both India and Pakistan are merely exploiting the situation, not encouraging any resolution.
Modi knows very well that Islamabad cannot accept a solution in which the Indian part, Jammu and Kashmir, is divided into two union territories directly controlled from New Delhi. Of all the possible options, this is the one which is most likely to cause conflict, even though it is reasonable from an Indian point of view: if India wants to be progressive, it needs to show it will impose modern values from the top down, given the “backward” instincts of the locals who allowed the discrimination to happen.
Imran Khan also knows very well that New Delhi will not accept his pleas for dialogue over Indian territory. He may want the rest of the world to sanction India, but they are not going to do it for Pakistan.
India has resorted to the trick of claiming that terrorists from Afghanistan have entered Jammu and Kashmir, thus giving it an excuse not to talk by putting all Muslims beyond the pale. Pakistan is no use as the good guy, because accepting the notion of a decent Muslim nation would derail decades of carefully lain Western policy. So it has to be the bad guy, even though it can’t do that either with any credibility, assuming it would want to.
How Modi and Khan must long for the good old days, when both countries were poverty stricken and war was a way of life. India was the poor bedraggled ally which could get away with begging for Soviet assistance because of it. Pakistan was an ally because it was a big stick to use against India.
Western help made India a nuclear power, then Pakistan joined the club with the same Western assistance, despite the history of conflict between the two countries. The excuse given was that if the Soviets made them nuclear powers they would fall out of Western influence. In fact it solved every problem by forcing these combatants to become generally friendly, but still capable of conflict at any moment: still in their places, their traditional roles reinforced without the need for all the guns.
Time has seen India and Pakistan become more self-reliant, if not prosperous. The old paradigm doesn’t work anymore. But the rest of the world won’t accept these countries any other way. So it’s back to the war games so that they can reinvent their old roles in a blaze of international publicity – and if more powerful countries don’t like it, ultimately they only have themselves to blame.

Seth Ferris, investigative journalist and political scientist, expert on Middle Eastern affairs, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Saturday, August 24, 2019

End Game and Afghanistan Bombing: Blame the Author, Not the Messenger

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There is a classic real life murder mystery called the Wallace Case. William Herbert Wallace, an insurance clerk, was originally convicted of murdering his wife, but later acquitted on appeal after the presentation of new evidence – and though supported by his employers, he was accused by some of his neighbours.

The case is regarded as a classic because each piece of evidence can be interpreted to prove Wallace either guilty or innocent, with equal probability. No one has any real idea, almost ninety years after the event, whether Wallace really was the murderer. The answer depends on which evidence you wish to think important, what sort of things you generally believe and what personal points you wish to make.

The forty years of conflict in Afghanistan never used to be like this. Everyone knew who was who, and who was funding who. Then the world lost interest in the seemingly eternal war because there was no happy ending on the horizon.

What is transpiring now is all about ruining the End Game, as was mentioned in the movie Charlie Wilson’s war.
“These things happened. They were glorious and they changed the world… and then we f**d up the end game”
This evolved situated created an opportunity for new players to come along, often very little different from their alleged sworn enemies. Together they made the situation so complex, and guilt and innocence so unprovable, that everyone left those with the most interest in causing trouble to their own devices.

The 17th August bombing in Kabul is just another in a long line of atrocities committed against Afghanistan and its people by many players. But dig a bit deeper, and it has all the makings of another Wallace Case.

The Islamic State has been blamed for it, and has accepted responsibility. But all the evidence in the ledger of guilt or innocence can point either way – almost as if it was supposed to, because somebody wanted us to think a certain way, for their own ends.

Worst amongst equals

The Islamic State no longer controls much territory, if any. But as a military force, it is making a comeback – or so we are told.

Earlier this year Donald Trump claimed “victory” over the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. In English, that means it had served its purpose. Most articles about the IS refer to its funding, without specifying where this comes from. Ask anyone in Afghanistan what happens when the US develops a specific policy objective, and you know where the sudden influx of funds and arms enjoyed by various “terrorist groups” actually comes from.

But the IS has a much wider reach than Syria and Iraq. Afghanistan remains a haven for extremist Islamist groups, because in practice there is very little else for the locals to choose from. It is also because this venue is where the money comes from too, and thanks to the various programmes set up to funnel money under the guise of assistance and democracy building, including those funded by the US State Department, USAID and USAID.

All the while the US designated terrorists go about protecting the populations they want to be seen supporting, even if those populations disown that support – as residents of Northern Ireland found for thirty years. They also often profess a clear ideology which people can understand, even if they don’t agree with the violence and fundamentalism that goes with it.

One of the reasons the Taliban was successful against domestic opposition was that it promoted the traditions of Pashtunwali, a moral code everyone knew and understood, rather than “Islamic fundamentalism”, a label its opponents likewise used as justification. Whatever else it did, it connected the people with something they understood in real terms, not ideology.

In a country which once deposed its king for “turning Christian “because he started building factories – and you just can’t do things the way the Western powers do now – conducting a “reconstruction” which brings in politicians who are obliged to play a Western-style game in public because the Infidel says that is the right thing to do. The Taliban may have been bloodthirsty, arbitrary and corrupt, but in the eyes of many, that was not necessarily important. They were the Devil they knew, who spoke a language they understood.

Not many who accepted the Taliban when it first flushed out the Mujahedeen do now, because the criminal aspect of that regime later became apparent. Quite rightly, Muslims do not associate their religion with criminality, particularly when it involves the misuse of poppies forbidden by the Quran.

But the Islamic State does have some support, as an extension of what the Taliban represented for many Afghans in better times. It may be another brutal terrorist group, but amongst all its crimes it professes the same Islam that millions of non-violent Afghans understand, even if they disagree with its practice.

Quranic scripture versus a pathological liar and womaniser who represents all the Quran says is wrong with the West? We all know which side millions of Christian Westerners would come down on, never mind Afghans.

So why would such a force send a suicide bomber to a wedding? To embarrass the government? To show that the IS still remains? Or to serve the purposes of the same US which claims to have defeated its fair weather allies in Syria and Iraq?

Elephants in every room

The Afghan government was another Western creation, put there after the Taliban regime was overthrown by the US and its allies in 2001. Though the change was by then generally welcomed, it soon became clear to many Afghans that the US was an occupying force whose agendas had little to do with the welfare of Afghanistan or international security.

Even the best intentions of the best Afghan government (and the Karzai government wasn’t notably badly behaved or incompetent) could not compete with the perception that the country no longer belonged to Afghans, even if those Afghans were bad ones. The re-emergence of the Taliban as an insurgent force was not motivated by nostalgia but the fact that it filled a gap, which the US had created by driving a wedge between the understanding of the people and the imposed values of their politicians.

The Islamic State is even better equipped to fill that gap, simply because it isn’t the Taliban, which Afghans have seen before. It is hardly a saner or more reasonable version of the Taliban, but the dream of a global Islamic Caliphate, where everyone has common values, has a resonance people of any type of religious or political belief can relate to. A lot still depends on who has the bigger gun pointed at you, but what destiny you are prepared to accept in such circumstances is also a motivating factor.

So the Afghan situation can be boiled down to five actors: the US and its allies; the Afghan government; the Taliban; the Islamic State; and the remnants of the Mujahedeen groups of old, who still control certain strongholds and make themselves available to the highest bidder. Each of these has sound reasons to sponsor a suicide bomber.

The bombing both furthers and harms their respective causes, and those of their opponents. But the important factor is: who wants to draw attention to Afghanistan, and their own deeds, right now?

Houses of carefully placed cards

Each actor has equal reason to be behind this bombing and equal reason not to be. The Islamic State has claimed responsibility, but it would, wouldn’t it? It wants to show it’s still around, particularly now Trump has halved the troop complement in Iraq and Syria on the grounds that it has been defeated.

When governments do things, all their various agencies do not fall into line immediately. Often the members of one department want to score points over another, or keep a lucrative gravy train going. It is equally likely that the Islamic State either didn’t send the bomber or was asked to do so by part of the US military-industrial complex, which would never have gone into Afghanistan if it had not seen the move as a benefit to itself. It never does, as the inaction against North Korea testifies.

The US and the Taliban are involved in prolonged negotiations over the future of the country. The Afghan government, despite being a US creation, is not usually a party to these talks. Imagine that – a government is installed by the Infidel which beat the Taliban, and then that same Infidel, having failed to completely eradicate the Taliban, goes running into negotiations with it and then side lines the very same people it said were the right ones to run the country.

Neither the US, the Taliban nor the Afghan government want the Islamic State to rise again. But they all need to demonstrate that it remains a threat.

The US and the Taliban can argue that they need to intensify their negotiations, which are largely about control of the drug smuggling routes, to prevent further atrocities because the Afghan government is ineffectual. The Afghan government wants to portray the US-Taliban negotiations as undermining the country, as they have brought about a return of violence and Taliban-type tactics.

The Mujahedeen groups and their small ethnic cores of support must be dying laughing with all this. The most successful of these groups dissolved long ago, either crushed by the Taliban or joining the new Afghan government which followed it. As with the Real IRA in Northern Ireland, only a few of the old combatants remained unconvinced, and felt more at home in the old divisions.

The Mujahedeen, many of whom are now exiled in Pakistan or former Soviet republics such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan depending on their ethnic base, know they will bring the full force of the other actors on their heads if they try and bomb anywhere. That is also the exact reason they would do it regardless.

Publicity is the one avenue they can still exploit to further their cause if they go about it the right way – and their sponsor governments, who also want a toehold in Afghanistan to prevent any further governments they don’t like taking charge, would be very happy to see the country disintegrate on the watch of the US, Taliban and Afghan government if they think they can remove those forces in this way.

Faced with these plausible options, most observers within Afghanistan and without would shake their heads and say “I don’t know where to begin”. That leaves them with two options – either believe whatever the media tells them, or fall back on pre-existing assumptions.

Those assumptions themselves are usually carefully lain – ask any Serb, whose compatriots have always had to endure a world where everyone thinks all the Serbs living together in their own country is a bad thing, without being able to explain why. So what are the authors of this atrocity assuming we will think about Afghanistan, the US, the Taliban and the Afghan government, based on what they have been told seemingly since time immemorial?

Playing the unseen side

First, we know that Afghanistan has been home to endless conflict for two generations. The world is a very different place now to 1979, when the long-vanished Soviet Union moved in to remove the independently minded Afghan Communists, but Afghanistan in Conflict has remained a constant.

So no one expects lawfulness or effective government there. Another suicide bombing would be business as usual, strangely comforting for those who do not have to live under the threat of being caught up in such actions because they live alongside those who see them as acceptable.

Second, the Islamic State is no longer the force it once was in the general consciousness, regardless of what it does on the ground. No longer is it seen as a terrifying whirlwind of extreme violence consuming everything in its path, but as yesterday’s news, and thus a spent force.

Everything the Islamic State does now is seen as another random act of violence. No longer do its actions have the quasi-official status they had when performed by a landholding institution, even if it was branded “terrorist”. The bombing doesn’t persuade us that the IS is alive and well, but that it very nearly isn’t.

But people who hear about the suicide bombing also have assumptions about the Taliban. This, fundamentally, is what the bombing was about. The US is openly consorting with what it long branded the wickedest and evillest of forces on earth. Whatever the rights and wrongs of this action, the assumption everyone has been encouraged to make is hindering a US policy objective, and few think this is a bad thing.

The US has long shown itself happy to create a little more “collateral damage” in terms of murder and mayhem to get its own way. If the Afghan government is useless, and IS is still around but a dangerous rump, this sanitises the relationship between the US and the Taliban.

The Taliban can’t run the country again, but is well equipped, in the popular imagination, to do all the dirty stuff. Then the US can restore order as the nice guys. Just like it did before, to create the present situation, though it won’t admit it.

When a monument is described as having been built by a certain nobleman, we don’t infer that the nobleman literally built it with his own hands – he ordered the construction and oversaw the work. Whoever sent a suicide bomber to a wedding in Kabul to kill 63 people and wound 182 is just as responsible for those deaths and woundings as the bomber. Maybe not enough people care. But when you lose your home and family because someone made up a story, you will.

Seth Ferris, investigative journalist and political scientist, expert on Middle Eastern affairs, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.