The Geo-Politics around “Unrest” in Iran

Salman Rafi Sheikh

Western officials and political pundits as well as their allies in the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia and Israel, have never hesitated to express their desire to see the Iranian regime falling on its feet and giving way to a pro-West ‘democracy’ to emerge, one that would provide the linchpin for Saudi hegemony in the region and remove Israel’s chief competitor from the scene. The recent protests in Iran provided the ‘regime-change’ gang that very opportunity even if the protests had ‘indigenous roots’ and were, as many in the West and Saudi Arabia claimed, a reflection of Iran’s growing economic problems due to the Trump administration’s “toughest” ever sanctions. Although the Iranian officials claimed that the “unrest” had been engineered by the West, particularly the US and Israel, the Iranian regime has once again shown its resilience and the deep roots it has in that society, not readily available to be undercut.

The US, however, saw the protestors as “harbingers of change” and a success of their policy of sanctions. It made its moves accordingly. Clearly, in the moves that the US made, an anticipation of protests spreading across the country was evident and so was a US possible resolve to ‘strike’ just when the Iron was hot enough. Of course, this plan could not materialise, but the way things proceeded show yet again the US and Israeli obsession with ‘regime-change’ in Iran.

A Brookings institute report thus described the ‘importance’ of these protests. “Tehran today is facing an epic, interconnected set of crises: the crisis of unmet expectations, which feeds a crisis of legitimacy” for the regime, which is “waning”, and “eventually, as happened 40 years ago in Iran, even the most well-fortified regime will shatter.”

This was and still is the classic assumption that, despite proving wrong on numerous occasions, continues to guide the US and Israeli policies. This was true in the present scenario as well.

As such, just when the crisis were brewing and the unrest was at its peak, the US decided to show-off its naval power and ability to manoeuvre in the Strait of Hormuz, one of the most significant flashpoints in the world. A US aircraft carrier strike group sailed through the strategic Strait of Hormuz. This carrier sailed through on November 20, 2019. Unsurprisingly, it was on the same day that Israel attacked Iranian forces in Syria, doing what it officially called two “wide scale strikes.”

Whereas the fact that Iran still continues to challenge US and Israeli designs in Syria despite hundreds of such ‘wide-scale’ strikes speaks volumes about Iranian resilience and resistance, the fact the latest strike coincided with the then ongoing unrest and the far from innocent passage of US naval carrier group through the Strait shows that the US and Israel were trying to provoke Iran into making a mistake, which would allow them to do identical strikes inside Iran, igniting a war to help, in their own calculation, the protestors overthrow the regime.

Also, at about the same time, the US president, who has never concealed his extreme dislike of the Iranian regime, had duly ‘informed’ the US Congress in a letter written just a day before the Israeli strike and the passage of US carrier through the Strait about the US decision to deploy additional US troops in Saudi Arabia.

The November 19, 2019 letter says the additional deployment aims to protect US interests “in the region against hostile action by Iran and its proxy forces.  Iran has continued to threaten the security of the region, including by attacking oil and natural gas facilities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on September 14, 2019.  To assure our partners, deter further Iranian provocative behavior, and bolster regional defensive capabilities, additional United States Armed Forces have been ordered to deploy to the Middle East.”

The letter continues, “With these additional forces, the total number of United States Armed Forces personnel in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will be approximately 3,000.  These personnel will remain deployed as long as their presence is required to fulfill the missions described above.”

While the long-term mission may be deterrence against Iran, the immediate context of this deployment undoubtedly was the events that were, as the US knew, the passage of US carrier through the Strait and Israeli strikes. Iran, as could be expected, did not strike back, or retaliated through any other way, nor did it attack US naval carrier, directly foiling US-Israeli sabotage attempts and thus prevented a Syria like scenario wherein local protestors had found in external countries certain hands who would then weaponise them to overthrow the regime.

But none of this could materialise not just because of Iranian prudence but also because of a complete mis-reading of Iranian politics and society by the US-Israeli political pundits. While protestors might have been genuine, the assumption that the society at large was ‘erupting’ into a mass anti-regime movement due to the ‘toughest ever’ US sanctions did not take into account the fact Iran, unlike Saudi Arabia, is not a solely oil-driven economy. Therefore, the impact of oil-sanctions, while it may be harsh, could never be expected to erode the domestic base of the Iranian economy. Even the IMF and World Bank reports have suggested that Iranian GDP, of which petroleum is no more than one fifth, will grow after ‘contracting sharply’ in 2019-2020.

Therefore, while Iranian economy may not be in the best shape today, its domestic base remains intact and it continues to receive foreign investment. And, while Tehran may not yet have healthy economic figures to show, it still has an economy that is resilient and can ward off shocks and prevent external powers from making inroads through engineered and/or otherwise caused mass protests.

Salman Rafi Sheikh, research-analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

JCPOA Saga: Iran Will Act if the Lame E3 Doesn’t

Salman Rafi Sheikh

Ever since the US’ unilateral exit from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, known as JCPOA, the EU members of the deal – France, Britain and Germany (E3) – have been trying to find ways to salvage the deal. The E3 first restored to ‘defying’ the US and created a so-called “special purpose vehicle” called INSTEX for Europe-Iran trade. Ever since then, they have failed to operationalise it, mainly out of their inability to actually defy the US and adopt an independent policy. At the same time, the economic benefits that Iran/Iranian economic market offers to Europe are abundant and too big for Europe to ignore. Europe is, therefore, in a fix. It recently threated Iran with invoking the dispute mechanism of JCPOA to resolve the issues related to Iran’s implementation of JCPOA, but it can hardly do so—and Iran knows it—unless other members of JCPOA i.e., Russia and China agree to it; hence, the E3’s dilemma whereby it can neither force the US to lift sanctions on Iran or force Iran to not resort to what is a legitimate course of action even according to the terms and conditions of the deal.

One important reason why Europe, unlike the US, continues to somehow cling to the deal is the economic potential Iran offers for the Europeans. For instance, as the latest available data indicate, the total value of Europe’s technology—industrial equipment and machinery— related exports to Iran have reduced by almost 50 per cent. Before the US sanctions resumed in November 2018, Europe’s average monthly technological export stood at US$970 million, falling to an average of US$433 million in 10 months subsequent to the sanctions. The continuing trade despite sanctions is between European companies and Iran’s private enterprises not covered under the US sanctions. Another worrying thing for Europe is that even a small decline in their exports to Iran is readily filled by China, which sees Iran as a key territorial link towards westward expansions of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Chinese expansion in terms of providing Iran with crucial industrial equipment and machinery is especially worrying some for Europe because Iran, ever since its last major industrial transformation in early 2000s, has been a buyer of European technology. While dependence on European technology may make it difficult for Iran to rapidly distance itself from Europe, Iran’s recent actions indicate that between industrial path-dependency and economic survival, it will choose the latter imperative; hence, Iran’s continuing distancing from JCPOA because of E3’s non-compliance.

Accordingly, on November 7 Iran announced that it has begun refining uranium at Fordow, a secretive site built inside a mountain to the north of the holy city of Qom, leading the E3 to criticise this step and linking it with (real or imaginary) “severe proliferation implications.” Iranian response, however, sounded not only adequately strong but potentially defiant. On November 11, Iran’s envoy to the United Nations Ali Nasimfar said in categorical words that “ Iran alone cannot, shall not and will not take all of the burdens anymore to preserve the JCPOA, adding further that “If timely adequate, serious and practical measures are not taken by other JCPOA participants, Iran will be forced to exercise its right under the JCPOA Paragraphs 26 and 36 to further limit the implementation of its commitment every 60 days.”

The reason why Iran remains defiant in the face of EU despite knowing that the EU might hit back with its own sanctions is the support it continues to receive from Russia and China. When Macron recently visited China and discussed with the Chinese the JCPOA, he was forced to emphasise, yet again, the need to lift some of the US sanctions to open a path of dialogue, adding that any pressure on Iran to force it to return to full compliance with JCPOA “must be accompanied by an easing of some [US] sanctions”, meaning thereby US unilateralism could not be hoped to ease the situation.

Russia, too, remains a critics of the E3’s position on JCPOA. Russian foreign ministry spokesperson, Maria Zakharova, recently said in an interview that “European partners” have “showed an inability to guarantee the conditions proposed to Iran.”

This support is in addition to the support Russian continues to provide Iran in developing its nuclear power plant capacity. On November 10, just when the E3 were gearing up to meet next day to consider Iran’s actions and issue their warning, Russia and Iran began pouring concrete for a second reactor at Iran’s sole nuclear power plant in Bushehr on the Gulf coast, sending a clear message to both the E3 and the US, and compounding the E3’s ‘to be or not to be’ nuclear-deal dilemma. No matter what actions E3 might take, Iran will continue to act in a way that suits its interests.

Salman Rafi Sheikh, research-analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

On the Geo-Politics of Turkish Incursion into Syria

Salman Rafi Sheikh

Despite the fact that Turkey has been defying the US as of recently with regard to its purchase of Russian S-400 missile system, the US president has finally conceded to its NATO partner’s long-standing demand of invading northern Syria and wipe out the Kurdish militias. This is a critical decision since Kurdish militias were the main US ground allies in the war against the Islamic State in Syria. With the US now abandoning its only ground ally in Syria, a policy shift is in the air, a change that might ultimately go to Syria’s benefit. While we shall come to this point later, what is pertinent here to discuss is the factor that led the US to change its erstwhile position vis-à-vis Kurds.

There is hardly any gainsaying that the world is increasingly becoming multipolar, and Turkey being a ‘Middle Kingdom’ between two poles has been making the best use of its geo-strategic position in the emerging world order. As Erdogan said in his recent UNO speech, “the world is bigger than five.” He was referring to the five permanent members of the Security Council: Britain, France, Russia, China, and America. Perhaps he wants his country to be included as a sixth, or that the world has already changed too much for these countries to manage on their own without showing sensitivity to other powers’ interests.

As many reports in the mainstream western media have indicated, Turkey, despite its very explicit strategic ties with Russia, remains important for the US. The fact that the US, despite being so deeply accustomed to running the world unilaterally, has had to change its position reflects the necessary foreign policy and strategic adjustments that even the US is having to make in this increasingly multipolar world where a country, relatively much smaller than the US and lying on the intersection of Asia and Europe, can force a much bigger and powerful country to prioritise a smaller country’s interests.

Two things, as such, stand out. First, Turkey is no longer a pliant and a willing US partner and/or a strong adherent to the dead cold war agenda of ‘containment’ of the Soviet Union, or Russia and China in the contemporary era, although it still continues to provide İncirlik Air Base, a military airport in southeastern Turkey, which hosts fifty tactical nuclear weapons aimed at primarily reinforcing what NATO experts call ‘extended deterrence guarantee’ of their organisation against a Russian invasion of Europe. Secondly, the US, due to deep presence of Russia in the region, is no longer an external hegemon entrenched in the region, practically no longer in a position to force its policies on its partners. This means that Turkey is in a far better position to pursue its interests a lot more independently than was the case few years ago. This is perhaps the reason why Russia, despite knowing that Turkish territory can be used against Russia in any future conflict with the NATO, is still developing its relations in a way never known before to both countries.

This is something that the US cannot control. All it can do is to adjust its position to secure its long-term interests. Its decision to stand aside in the up-coming Turkish On the Geo-Politics of Turkish incursion reflects that adjustment.

On the other hand, Russia and Syria are also very much in the equation. While Syria and Russia may object to a larges scale military presence of Turkey in Syria—and both will reiterate that this presence is uninvited and has no legal basis—this objection will not turn into a practical opposition; for, a Turkish incursion and the US silence that followed together with its abandoning of Kurds might bring the Kurds closer to Syria and Russia.

Russian officials, as of recently, have been speaking of the “maximalist positions” the Kurds have adopted in their dealings with the Syrian government. Therefore, when cornered by the Turks and abandoned by the US, they might turn to the Syrian government for a settlement. This will, of course, provide Syria and Russia with an opportunity to reunify the whole of Syria, an ultimate objective that even Turkey has shown sensitivity to. A recent statement from the Turkish foreign minister, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, said that Ankara had “supported the territorial integrity of Syria since the beginning of the crisis and will continue to do so” and that by eliminating all ‘terrorist forces’ from that region, Turkey will only “contribute to bringing safety, peace and stability to Syria.”

Also, given that Russia has been eyeing an expansion of cooperation with Turkey beyond Syria, Moscow will not object to Turkish incursion and let Ankara slip out its hands. At the same time, Moscow would want to make sure that no large-scale fighting takes place, giving rouge groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda to resurface and reverse the gains Russia and Syria have made in last two years or so.

Moscow will, therefore, make its own adjustment and prefer to play a mediatory role between the Kurds and the Turks, and Kurds and Damascus in order to solidify Syrian control on all of its territories.

Given this, it is possible that a settlement might emerge out of the storm that Turkey is going to start. Moscow’s mediation might be acceptable to all the parties. Ankara, of course, would want a guarantee from Damascus and Moscow about Kurds being confined to their traditional areas and not engaging in any militant and activities against Ankara, or inciting separatism among the Kurds living in Turkey.

Salman Rafi Sheikh, research-analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Saudi War on Yemen Left the Kingdom Weak & Vulnerable

Salman Rafi Sheikh

The Saudis have run out of options in their against Yemen which began in 2015. The latest attack on Saudi oil infrastructure has demonstrated how this conflict can spread well within Saudi borders, threatening the Kingdom and its monarchical foundation. Notwithstanding the habit of pointing fingers at Iran, the Houthi statement about the attack hasn’t just confirmed who planned and executed the attack, but also reveals how this move recieved support from within Saudi Arabia itself, a fact that scared the House of Saud much more than the damage done to its oil infrastructure. The attack shows that the monarchy is vulnerable from both inside and outside. In a situation where the Kingdom can easily be hit where it hurts most, it’s clear that political rivals from within the Kingdom can go to any extent to weaken and eventually overthrow the Saudi royal family. The Saudi war in Yemen has thus already become a double threat, an albatross around the Saudi neck that Mohammad bin Salman finds almost impossible to get rid of.

In spite of Riyadh’s attempts to point fingers at Iran, there is no gainsaying that the Houthis in Yemen have developed their military capability over the last couple of years. Indeed, the rational behind UAE’s withdrawal from Yemen is the Houthi’s increasing military power coupled with their ability to directly hit Dubai. If the Saudia-led coalition was on course to win the war, the UAE would have never chosen to pioneer a so-called “peace first” strategy followed by a tactical withdrawal. The fact of the matter is that this withdrawal came in the wake of Houthi forces’ acquisition of ballistic missiles and drones, forcing a crucial Saudi-coalition partner to fundamentally reverse its strategy, leaving Saudi Arabia potentially alone in a shooting war it just can’t win.

It is equally curious that the statement released by the Houthi movement was directed against Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia alone:

“This operation is one of the largest operations carried out by our forces in the depth of Saudi Arabia and came after a[n] accurate intelligence operation and advance monitoring and cooperation of honorable and free mans within the Kingdom. We promise the Saudi regime that our future operations will expand further and be more painful than ever as long as it continues its aggression and siege. We affirm that our goals bank is expanding day by day and that there is no solution for the Saudi regime except to stop the aggression and siege on our country.”

The statement only mentions ‘Saudi aggression’ and addresses the ‘Saud regime’, making it clear as to who the main culprits carrying out atrocities against Yemen are. The scale of their attacks will expand just as their military capabilities have and will, and the success with which they hit the Abqaiq oil-processing facilities shows that they are capable of bringing the House of Saud down.

Both on a regional and international level, Saudi Arabia received little to no support in the aftermath of the attack, as its claims of Iran being behind them fell on deaf ears. With US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo being the only exception, no regional states — Egypt, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, Turkey, etc. — or any foreign power would support blaming Iran. Even US President Donald Trump said they needed “verification” if Iran was involved in the attack or was behind it.

An although Trump did say they were ‘locked and loaded’, the US is far from eager to take a plunge into a new war in the Middle East. Notwithstanding affirmations, the US approach is cautious and unlikely to materialize in all-out support for a possible Saudi war on Iran at a time when the Kingdom has badly failed in winning its war against the Houthis.

Washington may indeed rush for a Saudi rescue, in the words of the US president, if the Saudis can financially afford it and will be willing to foot the bill, which means that the fact that the US and Saudi Arabia are “strategic allies” plays no part in the equation. “The Saudis”, said Trump in a press conference alongside the visiting Crown Prince of Bahrain, “are going to have a lot of involvement in this if we [US] decide to do something. They’ll be very much involved, and that includes payment. And they understand that fully.”

Casting further doubts on how strong and close the US-Saudia strategic alliance is, Trump said:

 “Saudis want very much for us to protect them, but I say, well, we have to work. That was an attack on Saudi Arabia, and that wasn’t an attack on us. But we would certainly help them… we will work something out with them. But they also know that — you know, I’m not looking to get into new conflict…”

Where does the Kingdom stand, then? Over its war on Yemen, it is potentially isolated, weak and vulnerable to new attacks both from within and beyond its borders. While Saudi officials have been stressing that the Kingdom has the ability to deal with the crisis on its own, there is no gainsaying that they will have to tread this path alone.

The Abqaiq attack has shown that the entire Middle East’s production of over 18 million barrels of oil a day – including Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia – can be easily knocked out, a possibility that regional states cannot stomach. As for Saudi Arabia, it can neither fight the war in Yemen, nor win it on its own.

Salman Rafi Sheikh, research-analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

How European Powers Have Sold Iran Out

Salman Rafi Sheikh

While European powers – the UK, Germany and France – are officially trying to ‘salvage’ the Iran nuke deal, the fact of the matter is that they have already sold out the deal to the US And while European officials continue to visit Tehran, they are not doing this to convince Iran of staying in the deal; their primary purpose has been to convince Iran of the importance of accepting core demands of the US and re-negotiate the deal. It is obvious that the European states have, although they officially continue to emphasize the importance of the deal, already succumbed to the US as far as the desire to re-negotiate the deal is concerned. As such, while British Middle East envoy was recently in Iran to discuss the crisis and salvage the deal, it was the UK that recently deployed UK Special Boat Service (SBS) frogmen to the Persian Gulf. Apart from these, elite commandos and highly-trained Royal Navy divers, who specialize in defusing explosives, have also been sent there to support the SBS to potentially protect British ships from Iranian attacks.

What this development shows in nutshell is that the British authorities believe, just like the US., that Iran is provoking attacks in the Gulf and that Iranian behaviour is unacceptable, completely overlooking the fact that Iran is still in the deal and that it is the US. that has violated the deal and imposed unilateral sanctions on Iran and that the core cause of the Gulf crisis is the US, not Iran.

Unsurprisingly then, Iran was reasonably disappointed at what British minister, Andrew Murrison, had to offer them in Tehran. Kamal Kharrazi, the head of Iran’s Strategic Council of Foreign Relations that works under Khamenei, said that meeting was “repetitive” with nothing new to offer, reiterating also that the three European countries, France, Germany and the UK “did not take serious actions” to save the JCPOA. Equally unsurprising was to see Murrison blatantly accusing Iran for oil attacks in the Gulf, adding UK believes Iran “almost certainly bears responsibility for the attacks”, meaning thereby that if the US retaliates for these [alleged] attacks, the UK will be ‘forced’ to side with it, since Iran, in such a scenario, would have failed to ‘correct’ its behaviour in the Gulf.

The UK isn’t the only European country that believes that Iran was behind the oil attacks. Germany’s Merkel, too, believes that there is “strong evidence” that suggests Iran as the culprit. With Germany, too, having fell in line with the US over Iran, the recent visit of German foreign minister to Iran more or less constituted a representation of US interests than German concerns vis-à-vis the deal or what Iran is widely thought to be doing.

An important development has been an undeclared imposition of ‘no fly zone’ over the Gulf. The US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has ordered all of the US airlines to avoid the Gulf because of an “Iranian threat”. Accordingly, among the airlines that have followed US dictate include those of the UK (British Airways), Germany (Lufthansa), and France (Air France), adding further credibility to the contention that Europe is actually playing with Iran and that it is, in reality, clearly siding with the US and is in the middle of preparing for a war in the Gulf. A no-fly zone is not a decision taken during peaceful times.

Europe’s tacit capitulation is a result of an active strategy of persuasion followed by the US officials. Acting secretary of defence and Pentagon chief Mark Esper, a well know hawk, said, on his way to Brussels, recently that he wants to advance the idea of forming a broader international coalition to deter Iran and compel its leaders to return to the negotiating table for nuclear talks. His visit to the NATO countries was aimed at reinforcing a message delivered the previous week by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who met with Saudi and Emirati leaders and discussed options about countering any military threat from Iran by building a broad coalition that includes Asian and European countries; hence, Europe’s reluctance to implement its commitments according to the Iran nuke-deal and its willingness to impress upon Iran to somehow accept US demands so that they can continue to do business with Tehran.

Making his intentions crystal clear, Esper further said his goal is, first of all, to convince allies to express outrage over Iran’s activities in the Gulf. Secondly, he said, he wants allies to support “any range of activities” vis-à-vis conflict with Iran. While “any range of activities” officially includes “talks”, Esper is someone who is known as an advocate of an aggressive military preparation and its active use on a global level to protect and project US interests. Talks are, therefore, going to be lesser concern, if a concern at all.

Another reason for Europe’s quick fall to the US dictate is that they the US has, as circumstance show, been able to persuade European countries of the “irrefutable” evidence of Iranian involvement in the Gulf attacks. As a matter of fact, the US is trying to show the Europeans that Iran threatens them as well and they must protect the Strait of Hormuz. For instance, Trump has recently said that European countries must “pay up” if they want security in the Strait.

An alternative, on the other hand, to “paying up” might just be standing with the US when the push comes to shove. The US is thus actively seeking to enlist European support against Iran and has already achieved reasonable success in this context, leaving Iran with little to no belief in Europe’s ability to avert crisis and normalize the situation.

Salman Rafi Sheikh, research-analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

https://journal-neo.org/2019/06/27/how-european-powers-have-sold-iran-out/

Is the US on a Major About-turn on Iran?

In May 2018, more than a year ago, when the US threw the hard-negotiated nuclear deal with Iran out of the window of the Oval office, it did not come as a surprise, for Donald Trump was only fulfilling the promise he had made to his voters during his presidential election campaign the year before. When the deal was thrown out, the secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, made a speech in Washington and laid down 12 demands that, if Iran fulfilled them, would pave the way for normalisation of US relations with Iran and bring ‘peace’ in the Middle East. Among other things, his demands included an end of “proliferation of ballistic missiles”, “withdraw all forces under Iran’s command throughout the entirety of Syria”, “End the Islamic Revolutionary Guard corps-linked Quds Force’s support for “terrorists” and “militant” partners around the world”, and end its “threatening behaviour” towards its neighbours i.e., the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

None of the demands was about making Iran abide by the deal (because Iran wasn’t in violation) and only two were strictly about proliferation of nuclear weapons and/or uranium enrichment, although no evidence existed, and none exists to-date, that shows Iran was/is developing uranium beyond its limits or that it was/is taking steps towards potential proliferation of nuclear weapons. By focusing on Iran’s regional policies and influence, the US showed that it only wanted Iran to roll back and end expansion of political influence.

However, while Iran’s influence remains very much intact in Syria and in Iraq and elsewhere, Mike Pompeo’s recent offer to engage “unconditionally” with Iran in talks shows that the very author of the 12 demands has backed out of his otherwise non-negotiable conditions of talks with Iran. “We are prepared to engage in a conversation with no preconditions. We are ready to sit down with them,” said Pompeo in a news conference in Switzerland on June 2, 2019, although he also said that the US would continue to make efforts to roll back Iranian influence in the region.

What really is important here is the question of why is the US offering unconditional talks to Iran at a time when its (the US) president thinks that their sanctions on Iran are really working?

Donald Trump was recently in Japan where he minced no words in highlight how his sanctions were really ‘working’. To quote him, “Iran, when I first came into office, was a terror.  They were fighting in many locations all over the Middle East.  They were behind every single major attack, whether it was Syria, whether it was Yemen, whether it was individual smaller areas, whether it was taking away oil from people.  They were involved with everything…..Now they’re pulling back because they’re got serious economic problems.  We have massive — as you know, massive sanctions and other things.  I mean, we just said the other day: steel, copper, different elements of what they used to sell.  The oil is essentially dried up.”

However, despite the fact that Donald Trump thinks that his sanctions are working, he, too, seemed to sound a reconciliatory note during his press conference in Japan and said “and I think we’ll make a deal.  I think Iran — again, I think Iran has tremendous economic potential.  And I look forward to letting them get back to the stage where they can show that.  I think Iran — I know so many people from Iran.  These are great people.  It has a chance to be a great country, with the same leadership.”

The Trump administration is, as is evident, in a U-turn mode. One wonders why would that be the case if sanctions are working and why not let Iran ‘sink’ in the sea of sanctions and force it to emerge as a ‘reformed’ actor? This would obviously be the case unless the sanctions, as opposed to what Trump said in Japan, aren’t actually working. While sanctions have certainly hurt Iran’s economy; US sanctions have essentially failed to modify Iran’s policy the way the US and its allies would have ideally wanted.

A second reason for why the US is now finding itself in a U-turn mode is that Iran, instead of capitulating, has raised the stakes by moving an inch closer to closing the Strait of Hormuz. According to some analysts, if the Strait is blocked and the flow of energy from the Gulf—which is about twenty per cent of the whole world—-is completely shut down, it could lead to the price of oil reaching $200 a barrel, or much higher over an extended period. This would potentially crash the derivatives market, creating an unprecedented global depression. The Bank for International Settlements said last year that the “notional amount outstanding for derivatives contracts” was $542 trillion.

While it is not for the first time that Iran has threatened closure, what really makes it a serious threat today is that stakes have equally been never higher for Iran or even for the US.

While the US officials continue to mention that they would continue to pursue Iranian roll-back, there is little to no gainsaying that achieving this is hard to materialise, given that Iran, even after facing toughest ever US sanctions, has managed to bring the situation to a stalemate where the U.S. now feels compelled to change the tone and initiate the talk of ‘unconditional talks with Iran.’

This is a paradigm shift, evident also from the way US naval deployment has already started to decrease in the Persian Gulf. The USS Abraham Lincoln, which was scheduled to move towards the region, has stopped in the Arabian Sea, some 200 miles off the coast of Oman. Naval officials are also praising Iran for its professional behaviour. Rear Adm. John F. G. Wade, commander of the Lincoln strike group, said Iran’s naval forces have adhered to international standards of interaction with ships in his group. There are thus already signs of no-conflict in the Gulf and mediation and talks to ease down the military stand-off even if a deal doesn’t immediately take place.

Salman Rafi Sheikh, research-analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs

https://journal-neo.org/2019/06/14/is-the-us-on-a-major-about-turn-on-iran/

Trump re-sets the sail for U.S. nuclear supremacy

While for many the scrapping of INF at the hands of Donald Trump is a symbolic revival of cold war geo-politics, there are many important differences, which strongly indicate there is much more to it than meets the eye. Salman Rafi Sheikh, research-analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs, has more in an article titled “Trump re-sets the sail for U.S. nuclear supremacy.”

This isn’t just a second coming of cold war; rather at the heart of the matter is the U.S.’ dwindling nuclear capability vis-à-vis its competitors, Russia and China. This capability has dwindled not because the U.S. hasn’t been spending enough, but because Russia and China have developed themselves into much more (militarily) powerful states than the U.S. could imagine. Scrapping INF is thus only a step, although a major one, towards re-establishing U.S. supremacy. As a matter of fact, the writing for the return of nuclear arms race was always on the wall ever since Trump assumed presidency.

Soon after becoming the U.S. president, Donald Trump had made his intentions clear. In an interview given to Reuters in February 2017, he said that the U.S. had “fallen behind on nuclear weapon capacity”. Trump added further that “I am the first one that would like to see everybody – nobody have nukes, but we’re never going to fall behind any country even if it’s a friendly country, we’re never going to fall behind on nuclear power.”
This resolve to build weapon capacity boiled down in 2018 to the other resolve to expand the nuclear arsenal when the U.S. announced to scrap the 1987 INF treaty.

And, in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, then Defense Secretary of the US, James Mattis brought to limelight what the U.S. is aiming at and what factors are driving the U.S. towards an expanded arsenal. The reason, according to Mattis, was the growing power and capability of Russia and China. He said “We must look reality in the eye and see the world as it is, not as we wish it to be…… Russia is modernizing these weapons as well as its other strategic systems……China, too, is modernizing and expanding its already considerable nuclear forces. Like Russia, China is pursuing entirely new nuclear capabilities tailored to achieve particular national security objectives…..Elsewhere [North Korea, Iran, India, Pakistan] the strategic picture brings similar concerns….”

He added, “given the range of potential adversaries….” the review argued that the need for a new nuclear strategy coupled with a “modernization programs” has never been greater than now.

The U.S. has already scrapped the INF, and president Trump’s recently delivered State of the Union address officially launched this arms race to purposefully re-establish U.S. nuclear supremacy.
Trump was explicit when he said that the US is “developing a state-of-the-art Missile Defense System.” He saw no reason to be apologetic about “advancing America’s interests” and cast his decision to withdraw the US from the INF in that light.

And, while the U.S. president did show that negotiating a new treaty was possible, he was quick to re-affirm his often-repeated resolve that the US “will outspend and out-innovate all others by far” in an arms race, underscoring that he is all but concretely seeking the U.S. nuclear superiority.

This is essential for the U.S. to maintain its position of strengthen in regions that it has been dominating ever since the end of cold war, but is increasingly become incapable. A case in point may be China’s rapidly growing military capability in the South and East China Sea regions. According to U.S.’ own estimates, China has set-up about 1,000 medium and short-range missiles, purportedly intending to prevent the U.S. from entering the waters with impunity. These missiles are capable of hitting U.S. aircraft carriers and military bases, strategic tools the U.S. uses to dominate remote regions.
Another case in point may be Russia’s testing of RS-24 Yars intercontinental ballistic missile following Trump’s State of the Union speech and within hours of an earlier similar American test-firing of a Minuteman ICBM in California. Russian missile system is capable of evading missile defense systems (which Trump boasted about.) It manoeuvers during the flight and carries both active and passive decoys and has at least 60-65% chance to penetrate defenses.

Sensing the seriousness of the challenges the Russians and Chinese are posing to the U.S.’ previously un-challenged supremacy, the Pentagon recently announced a special missile defense report, in which it stressed that the US should revamp its missile defense program to combat what it referred to as foreign threats. It includes plans to study a possible orbital sensor system (weaponizing the space) to intercept and stop missiles in their tracks. President Trump said as he unveiled the review “The world is changing and we’re going to change much faster”.

Significantly enough, the review was announced only months after an expert commission published a report on President Trump’s defense strategy and argued the U.S.’ “margin of superiority” is now “profoundly diminished”.
In this context, the U.S. decision to scrap the INF because Russia has been as the American officials said “violating,” it is only scapegoating; while the other developments we have noted show the true nature of the U.S. exit from INF, an exit that is nothing more than a U.S. resolve to keep the world under its unilateral domination, having the ability to hit and intervene anywhere and anytime with no strong adversaries, having the capability of hitting back the U.S., to counter.

But the true intentions notwithstanding, the possibility of the U.S. succeeding in re-establishing its supremacy is low, given that the U.S. withdrawal from the INF is only going to push its strategic peers, Russia and China, to give a befitting reply. Russia’s testing of RS-24 Yar is only an indication of what is to come.
As it seems, America's announced withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) with Russia indicates that US President Donald Trump has no interest in nuclear arms control. Dennis Etler, a former professor of Anthropology at Cabrillo College in Aptos, California, said, that the US withdrawal will lead to nuclear proliferation and fuel a new arms race.

Etler added, “It should be clear to one and all that the US under the Trump administration has no interest in nuclear arms control.” “Rather than seek avenues to reduce tensions and solve differences of opinion about adherence to the INF Treaty the US has opted to scuttle the treaty in opposition to the desire of other concerned nations.”
INF requires the US and Russia to eliminate all their nuclear and conventional missiles with ranges of 1,000–5,500 km (620–3,420 mi). It also bans either side from stationing short- and intermediate-range, land-based missiles in Europe.

The accord was signed towards the end of Cold War in 1987 between former US President Ronald Reagan and former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

The US argues that Russia has jeopardized the treaty for years by deploying ground-launched missiles that fall within the banned range.

Russia has dismissed violating the agreement and has accused the US instead of breaking the deal, adding that a withdrawal from the accord would trigger an arms race

Russia’s President Vladimir Putin warned in December that Moscow will develop missiles currently banned under INF if the United States withdraws from the bilateral treaty.