Iran 40 years after victory of the Islamic Revolution (8)

When the US President, Donald Trump, announced al-Quds as the capital of the usurper Israeli regime, the Islamic Republic, in an extraordinary session of Organization of Islamic Cooperation, called for formation of an "expertise group" composed of legal, political and economic specialists of the member states to closely examine and compile the mechanisms for countering the illegal decision of the US government to transfer its embassy from Tel Aviv to al-Quds.

The Islamic Republic of Iran believes in a few principles with regard to the issue of Quds. Firstly, Palestinians are the real owners of the Land of Palestine and no fake alternative or identity can change this reality. Secondly, the international duty and responsibility should be done in exposing the goals of the US's and the Zionists' plot for complete occupation of al-Quds. Thirdly, we believe in the definitiveness of the rights of the Palestinian nation.

The Palestinian people have never accepted to compromise with the occupiers to liberate their land. Today, too, they have stood against the occupiers more decisively than ever; although some of the Arab regimes have approved the Zionist regime's occupation and usurpation of the Palestinian territories through formation of alliances and signing of accords with the regime.

Ayatollah Khamenei said, "Now, the Americans have named their devilish policy on Palestine as 'Deal of the Century', but they must know that, with the divine grace, this deal of the century will never materialize and, to the chagrin of the US statesmen, the issue of Palestine will not be forgotten and al-Quds will remain the capital of Palestine."

The Leader added, "Of course, some of the Islamic governments, which have no belief in Islam, have become the scapegoats of the Americans due to stupidity, ignorance and worldly desires; but with the divine help, the Islamic Ummah and the Palestinian nation will triumph over their enemies and you'll see that the root of the fabricated Zionist regime will be eradicated from the land of Palestine."

The fact of the matter is that the Palestinian nation faces a historical oppression as the usurper and child-killer regime in Tel Aviv, with the support of the US, has turned into an anti-human cancerous tumor. In such circumstances, the international community, including the United Nations and international legal institutions, which assume the heavy responsibility of defending the innocent Palestinian nation, should fulfill their duties; but the record of their performance shows that they have not adhered to their mission and been always danced to the tune of the world powers, especially the US.

A simple glance at the conditions in the world indicates that the culture of resistance is expanding and impacting the global developments.

'Iran's Defence Minister, Brigadier General Amir Hatami, in a speech, stressed that: "The authorities of the occupying and repressive Zionist regime have well understood that, in spite of superficial successes in expansionism till 1979, they haven't been victorious in any war since the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and they have been declining in achieving their illegitimate objectives; and this trend will continue in future, too, and their definite fate is what the leader has said. What has caused the defeats of this regime has been the lofty thought and ideal of the Islamic Revolution and the current of resistance has followed this thought."

The United States and a few western regimes, which claim to defend democracy, are real hypocrites and imposters as they support the most primitive and undemocratic regimes in West Asia such as Bahrain and Saudi regimes which have never experienced election. History has proved that the crimes of Israel against the Palestinian nation, which began since the very day of illegitimate birth of this regime, will not end except through resistance and perseverance. Abdul Bari Atwan, famous Arab analyst, says on the demonstrators in Gaza who are shot dead by the Israeli criminals, "They were unarmed people who had hoisted their flags and gone to the border. There was only a fence between them and the Israelis. The Israelis used long-range guns. But the western media describe this issue as violent rallies. Did the Palestinians have guns? Did they have explosives? This is indescribable. The measures of the western media are a sort of demonizing every event. They have hidden the reality."

The rights of the oppressed nations have been trampled upon for years and this oppression is not limited to Palestine. Criminal regimes have resorted to the tools like annulment of nationality whenever they see a protest.

This, while article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is based on the principle of "Nationality Right."

This declaration, which has been accepted by western regimes masquerading as defenders of human rights, stresses that no one can be deprived of his nationality. Nevertheless, the repressive tyrannical regimes like Ale Khalifa in Bahrain, with full support of the US and Saudi regime, deprive their opponents of their nationality while there is no cry of human rights by westerners. The Islamic Republic of Iran is vehemently opposed to such hypocritical conduct and keeps condemning it. The support for oppressed and downtrodden nations has been internalized in the Islamic Republic system. In the next episode we will further discuss the issue. 

History of Iran-US oil conflict

Heshmatollah Razavi*

Iran and the United States of America conflict on oil dated back to 1953, when the US in collaboration with the then British government overthrew the government of nationalist prime minister Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq, who was leading the oil nationalization movement against Britain.

The US played the key role in the coup against Mosaddeq and in the aftermath of the coup, in 1954, a consortium was set up to run Iran's oil industry in which the US oil companies and the UK, newly established BP, had equal shares: 40 percent. The remaining 20 percent shares went to two other European companies.

This was the beginning of direct US intervention in the management of Iran's oil industry and political affairs as well and Iran's revolution in February 1979 was partly a reaction to this meddling.

In 1977, before strikes in Iran's oil industry to reduce oil production to less than one million barrels per day in late 1978, Iran produced six million barrels per day — nearly 10 percent of the global oil production — a figure that was reduced to four million barrels per day after the victory of the revolution.

There were a number of factors behind this decision: First of all, it was believed that the country is not under domination of the US regional policies and it no longer needs to export a great volume of oil and spend it to buy weapons from the US (something similar to the role Saudi Arabia plays right now in the region).

Secondly, the opinion was that this lower amount of oil production is sufficient to meet the country's foreign exchange needs and thirdly, there was a common assumption that the oil reserves belong to the next generations as well and by lowering oil production they will last longer to the benefit of the coming generations. So, reducing oil production was a domestic and sacred decision by the revolution.

But less than a year before the revolution celebrated its first anniversary, a political incident happened which had a huge impact on Iran's oil production and exports: The seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran in November 1979 by a group of revolutionary students who insisted the US must extradite the deposed shah for trial.

Following this incident, US president, Jimmy Carter on November 12 announced a ban on oil purchase from Iran and Tehran stated reciprocally it has suspended all the US oil companies' orders for taking oil. Subsequently, Iran's 850,000 barrels per day of oil delivery to US companies came to a halt.

Even though Iran was able to find new customers to replace the purchases of US oil companies, the then Iranian oil minister, Aliakbar Moinfar, told MEES weekly that Iran's total oil production fell to 3.5 million barrels per day. This was the first time after the revolution that Iran's oil exports was pushed away from the market.

While hostage-taking was ongoing, European countries and Japan set May 1980 as the deadline for the release of the hostages. When the deadline was ignored, they suspended part of their oil purchases, a temporary decision that was revised after the hostages were released in January 1981.

It was in February 1981 that BP, Shell, and Japanese companies concluded new contracts to buy 380,000 barrels per day oil from Iran in total.

But the war with Iraq, hostage-taking incident and sanctions are not sufficient to explain the reasons for the declining trend in Iran's oil production.

OPEC policies on cutting production and defending high oil prices was another important factor. To defend higher oil prices, OPEC cut its production from 31 million barrels per day in 1979 to less than 16 million barrels per day in late 1985 and Iran's quota in the organization's total oil production stood at 2.4 million barrels in its March 1983 meeting after long dispute between OPEC and Iran over its quota.

After the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, Tehran which strongly believed in high oil prices decided to comply with the OPEC's new strategy: Market share.

Under the new strategy, Tehran tried to boost its oil production capacity steadily and could raise its oil production to four million barrels per day — the target it was looking for following the victory of Islamic Revolution in 1979.

But Iran's oil industry development was always under constraint due to the decisions were made in the 1990s and 2000s by different US administrations especially on investment in Iran's oil sector.

During the eight years of president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's administration from 2005, Iran's oil industry came under further pressure due to a dispute over Iran's nuclear program which resulted in a decline in Iran's oil exports from 2.5 million barrels to almost one million barrels per day.

In 2013, when the current president, Hassan Rouhani, took office; he decided to bring back oil industry development to normal by reaching a deal with world powers, the so-called P5+1.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015 was the result of around three years of tough negotiations over the nuclear program between Iran and world powers including the United States.

In January 2016, Iran's oil sanctions were lifted and after a year and a half, Iran once again succeeded in raising its oil production to nearly four million barrels per day.

But after 40 years of ups and downs, it seems the oil game between Iran and the U.S is not yet over.

US President Donald Trump, by violating an internationally agreed deal, decided to withdraw the deal unilaterally and impose "the toughest sanctions in history" to bring the Islamic Republic of Iran to its knees.

But what do the figures show at the start of the new round of sanctions which came into force as of Nov. 5?

Iran which produced nearly 10 percent of the global oil production forty years ago, now produces three percent of global oil consumption, if we assume total oil consumption stands at 100 million barrels per day. International energy organizations estimate that total world oil consumption will stand 100 million barrels per day over the fourth quarter of this year.

During the last round of sanctions, Iran has lost its place in OPEC as the second largest oil producer and is now behind Iraq in the third place.

At the same time, the US, which George W. Bush said in his State of the Union Address in 2007 was addicted to oil, has been able to increase oil production and reduce its dependence on oil imports. The country now produces more than 10 percent of the oil consumed globally.

Over the forty years after the Islamic Revolution, Iran has always tried to reduce its dependence on oil revenues and has been succeeded relatively even though not considerably.

During the period, Iran's continuing oil production has been on the decline partly due to domestically set targets and partly due to foreign constraints.

Right now it is not easy to predict the outcome of newly imposed sanctions on Iran's oil industry because of the involvement of too many variables. On the threshold of the new sanctions, the US has considered waivers for Iranian oil consumers which has been evaluated as a kind of back down in Iran. What will be the next step from either side? We should wait and see. 

* Heshmatollah Razavi is a journalist

Trump’s strategy toward Iran doomed to fail

Afsaneh Reshad*

Tehran, Oct 23, IRNA - Many US politicians have adopted hostile policies toward Iran since the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. With Donald Trump coming to power, these policies have become more hostile.

The US withdrawal from the multilateral Iran nuclear deal, formally called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and imposing stiff economic sanctions on Iran by accusing it of sponsoring terrorism are some such hostile policies – for which the US has failed forge an international consensus.

On October 4, 2018, the US government unveiled its National Strategy for Counterterrorism document that puts focus on Iran. 
The new strategy is the first issued since 2011 under former US president Barack Obama.
Although these two documents, published in a span of seven years, have many similarities, they have fundamental differences as well.

Iran was cited only once – on the penultimate page – of the 2011 counterterrorism strategy as an “active” state sponsor of “terrorism” [sic].

But the current document, which mentions Iran ten times, shows how the Trump administration has dramatically put Iran at the center of US concerns.

“We continue to face threats from Iran, the most prominent state sponsor of terrorism, through its global network of operatives and its ongoing support to an array of terrorist groups,” the new document claims.

Most parts of the document, though, have been developed based on unfounded allegations against Iran.
It is clear that the US considers Iran as the main obstacle impeding its hegemonic policies in the region.

Psychological warfare campaign

Washington has now tried to wage an economic war against Iran to make it difficult for ordinary people to meet ends meet. And then, through a psychological warfare campaign, holds Iran’s policies and officials accountable for the deteriorating economic situation.

Undoubtedly, recognizing the enemy’s schemes, policies, strategies, tactics, and techniques will be a necessary step to foil them.
The new US strategy for counterterrorism has been made up from six major steps that each has its own “priority measures.”
• Step one: tracking terrorist threats to their origins
• Step two: cutting off terrorists’ financial and logistic supports
• Step three: modernizing and integrating the US resources to counter terrorism and protecting the country
• Step four: protecting the US infrastructure and strengthening preparedness 
• Step five: stemming extremism and terrorists’ hiring
• Step six: strengthening the capacities of US international partners to counter terrorism

Different US governments have created, strengthened and dispatched terrorist groups to corners of the world so as to advance US grand strategies by destabilizing other countries and abuse the notion of fighting against terrorism.

Publishing such documents can be seen in the line of US diversionary tactics to clear its name by accusing the others – which shows the hypocritical nature of some of the US politicians during the past decades.

Currently the Trump administration has resorted to illegal sanctions to achieve on the two following goals: First: To force the Iranian government to give in to some of US demands and return to the negotiating table for reaching what Trump calls a more comprehensive deal.

The second option is to tighten US economic sanctions on Iranian people in order to drive a wedge between the people and the establishment. The public pressure would then make the establishment to return to the negotiating table and give in to the majority of the US demands.

It is worth mentioning that the US, in line with its policy of maximizing pressure against Iran, will strive to project Iran as a threat and make the false impression that this threat has to be countered.

The US list of states sponsoring terrorism is drawn up as a tool, rather than based on reality, to be used by the US to exert pressure on countries which are against its policies.

Meanwhile, analyzing the statements of the former and current officials of the US administrations after the Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA indicate that Washington faces certain challenges in imposing crippling sanctions on Iran.

The US has created an Iran Action Group, headed by Brian Hook, to come up with plans to counter these challenges.
Hook underlined two main missions for his group; organizing and coordinating US organizations within the US and also diplomatic consultations with other US partners for imposing sanctions on Iran.

The US strategy is that the sanctions on Iran would become biting before the reimposition of its oil sanction on November 4.
The Iranian government should try to explore all international venues to make the sanctions ineffective or less biting by using an active diplomacy and a ‘strategic patience’.

Although the enemy has staged an all-out campaign against Iran, what should not be ignored is that the permutation of forced on international level has undergone serious changes after the JCPOA was signed.

Before the conclusion of the JCPOA, some of the sanctions imposed on Iran had the backing of the UN, the then US administration had created a consensus against Iran, Washington had amicable and good relations with many partners. But, today, the sanctions are unilaterally imposed on Iran at a time when, due to Trump’s measures policies, US relations with many partners, including those in Europe, is conflictual.

The sanctions will not have the same effect that they had in the past. Trump will not achieve its goals. 
* Afsaneh Reshad is assistant professor at Islamic Azad University.

Iranian Athletes Come of Age

By: Kayhan Int’l

Iranian athletes once again made the country proud with their sparkling performance at the recently concluded Asian Games in the Indonesian capital, Jakarta, raking in 20 gold medals, 20 silver medals, and 22 bronze medals, with a total tally of 62, and standing 6th in the final rankings.

They deserved to win more medals as was clear from their dynamic display in several sporting events at the 18th Asian Games, but unfortunately certain dubious decisions by the referees robbed them of the goals of their spirited efforts.

Nonetheless, it would be unfair to cry foul over some of the results, as it is human to err. The overall atmosphere was excellent and the games played in a truly sporting spirit, with hosts Indonesia making all participants feel at home.

Iran has been participating in the Asian Games ever since the inaugural events in New Delhi in 1951, except for three absences, that is, Manila 1954, Jakarta 1962 and Bangkok 1978 – the height of the grassroots movement of the Iranian people to oust the British-installed and US-supported Pahlavi regime.

Incidentally, in 1974 Iran had hosted the 7th Asian Games, and to the utter astonishment of everybody, had finished second in the table of contestants with a record tally of 81 medals (36 gold, 28 silver, 17 bronze) – compared to a mere 23 medals (9 gold, 7 silver, 7 bronze) at the previous games in Bangkok, and the tally of 31 medals (6 gold, 8 silver, 17 bronze) at the 1966 Asian Games, also in the capital of Thailand.

Was it a fluke performance at Tehran in 1974, or were it the petrodollars of the regime, in view of the fact that in many of the sporting events in which Iran fielded winning teams (e.g. hockey) it had no earlier experience in that particular event nor did it ever compete in such categories ever after?

This is not to distract attention from the calibre, talents and records, of world class Iranian athletes in such sporting events as wrestling, weightlifting and to a certain extent football, which they have always dominated not only at the Asian Games but also at the Olympics and other international competitions.

The victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and establishment of the popular religious system of government was indeed a great boost for Iranian athletes, whose talents gradually became diversified in many other sporting events including basketball, volleyball, archery, equestrian, canoeing, sprinting, fencing, marksmanship, and boxing, in addition to the new categories at the Asian and other international games, such as Karate, Taekwondo, Judo, Kabbadi, water polo, Wu Shu, aquatics, etc.

Without the least doubt, the 378 athletes that competed in Jakarta this year, proved the prowess of Iranian athletes in almost all sporting fields, in which they have steadily excelled as is evident from their impressive record of the past three Asian Games – 20 gold, 15 silver, 24 bronze (total 59 and 4th rank) at Guangzhou, China in 2010, followed by 21 gold, 18 silver, 18 bronze (total 57 rank 5) at Incheon, South Korea in 2014.

The 6th position at Jakarta doesn’t mean that the ranking of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the Asian Games is on the decline. No this is not the case, as could be gauged by the growing number of teams from new participants, coupled with tough competition, and of course, the ‘inadvertent’ mistakes of the referees, often in favour of athletes from the host country.

Among Muslim countries, Iranian athletes, with woman participants clad in Islamic attire, clinching medals in various sporting events, speaks of homegrown talents and the care taken by the country to groom them.

The Ministry of Youth and Sports that was established in 2011 after the National Sports Organization was dissolved, should not sit on past or present laurels, but should devote more efforts to unearth talents throughout the country in various sporting fields – without petty squabbling or partisan attitudes – in order to build a solid foundation of Iranian athletes, both male and female.

Islam stresses the importance of sports and healthy bodies, as well as sound and sane minds, with emphasis on sporting spirit, rather than on unfair tactics for winning, or feeling

psychologically depresses in case of failure.

If this injunction is followed, there is no reason why Iran will not improve its rankings at sporting events, of course in an atmosphere of fair play.

Serious impediments to Iran's branding and rebranding

By: Mehrdad Pahlavani

TEHRAN, (MNA) – Brand Making is a silent strategy but the results could manipulate intentions and mark something or someone as favorable or as a stain during a short or long process.

Mindsets, international society, and social life are obsessed with variety and spectrum of brands. Few commodity brands are sold quickly because of the country where it is made and some brand's demand is huge only because of the brand. By and large, the name of a country and a brand often overlap.

The role of branded commodities has been also moved into political affairs as well as the international arena. The procedure over the branding process is fearfully underway in the Middle East in a different way. This includes interference with other's branding, investing in fake brands and also purchasing copied brands. Iran's branding has been influenced by a plethora of factors, including the fake branding revenue funneled into the pockets of rivals.

Politically, from 1979 onward, Iran's rivalries have been heard about more and more. Their media is strongly committed to the principals of their capitals and recently this has been advocated by the new generation of technology and also social apps. Browsing "Iran" via a variety of search engines always shows malicious news and pictures which are far from realities. Some selective news is often corrupted.

From economic perspective, imposed sanctions on Iran were the crucial big obstacles. Even Iranian scientists and businessmen were not allowed to participate in international conferences. Iranian economic branding has been grappling with restrictions, while doing business with Iran is threatened through notifications and confidential advisories. Technology reservations along with and in the framework of the sanctions led to a very costly economic development.

Iran’s rich history and civilization have been derailed and interpreted wrongly for political purposes.

An apprehension of the current brand of Iran illuminates three major problems:

1- It is hard to conceive the real inherent brand of Iran. Interpreters' deduction of Iran's real brand has baffled many.
2- The real, inherent brand is manipulated in such a way that misguides Iran’s audience as to what it is all about.
3- Iran branding has been politicized. Every issue which is related to Iran is portrayed abroad as a political matter. The simple definition of democracy has been warped despite a 73 percent participation of Iranian voters.

Iran branding encounters many problems and is rooted in extraordinary misunderstandings. In this connection, during the negotiation on the JCPOA, Iran chose "rebranding” to remove its tarnished image. Tehran proved that tendentious claims about Iran have been absolutely wrong. Rebranding needs many provisions to succeed and Iran was not very successful.

The US was ambivalent to comply with its commitment on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran's economic image remained negative and untouched. Sanctions were not lifted as the P5+1 promised.

A rebranding requires fast-track policies. While Iran's rebranding lasted a while, the promises of the JCPOA were not met by the signatories, especially the US.
Rebranding should be recognized by others, but it was resisted by neighboring countries and others.

Iran's political and security stability is a vital brand in the Middle East even when expenditures have been much higher and growing among other countries in the Middle East. The military spending over the past decade in the Middle East has been increased (at 2015 prices) in the UAE +122 percent, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia +20 percent, Israel +18 percent, Turkey +9.6 percent, but Egypt -5 percent and Iran -7 percent. The missile capacity and military expenditure of Iran’s neighbors have been much higher.

In any event, Iran has not yet fully benefited from the JCPOA deal. The issue right now is Iranian missile capability and its willingness to negotiate on reduction of the capability. Does this make sense?

The reduction in Iran's defensive capabilities leads to the creation of a potential “new Saddam” in the region. How will the West respond to that?

A weakened Iran calls for a new order in the Middle East. What are the Western options for the Middle East rebalancing?

If these questions are to be answered fairly, we may come to the conclusion that Iran correctly doubts trusting the other side of the negotiation table. This is exactly the right position for Iran to take.

1953 Iranian Coup d'État A Manifestation of US-British Hypocrisy: Larijani

TEHRAN (Tasnim) – Iranian Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani said the Washington and London governments’ role in devising the 1953 Iranian coup d'état is a “manifestation” of their hypocrisy.

1953 Iranian Coup'État A Manifestation of US-British Hypocrisy: Larijani

“One of the manifestations of hypocrisy in the history was the painful event of the 28 Mordad coup d'état, which was precisely devised by the United States and Britain, which overthrew the national government of (Mohammad) Mosaddeq and put Iran under their dictatorial domination for several other decades,” Larijani said, addressing an open session of the parliament on Sunday.

“Today, this imperialist hypocrisy is seen again in another way in Iran’s nuclear case and its regional influence and defense power,” he said.

“The Americans shamelessly speak of designing economic sanctions on Iran (under the pretext of) protecting the freedom, human rights, global and regional security,” Larijani added.

US State Department recently released a trove of confidential documents that disclosed more details of Britain’s role in the 1953 coup in Iran, an issue London strongly denied in the past.

On June 15, 2017, the US State Department released a long-awaited volume of declassified US government documents on the 1953 coup in Iran.

The publication of the documents put an end to decades of internal debates and public controversy after a previous official collection omitted all references to the role of American and British intelligence in the ouster of the legal government of prime minister Mohammad Mosaddeq.

London had previously denied any role in the coup but the new evidence confirmed Britain’s involvement in it.

In August 1953, the British and American intelligence agencies initiated a coup by the Iranian military, setting off a series of events, including riots in the streets of the capital, Tehran, which led to the overthrow and arrest of Mosaddeq.

Mosaddeq, who was convicted of treason by a court martial, served three years in solitary confinement and then died under house arrest in 1967.

His overthrow, which is still given as a reason for Iranians' mistrust of the UK and the US, consolidated the Shah's rule for the following 26 years until the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, led by Imam Khomeini, which toppled the US-backed monarchy.

The Iranian premier had played a key role in the country’s 1951 movement that resulted in the nationalization of Iran’s oil industry, which had been mainly controlled by the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), now known as BP.

Experts say the 1953 coup, known as the 28 Mordad coup, was aimed at making sure the Iranian monarchy would safeguard the West's oil interests in the country.

The challenges facing Iran, the world’s only Revolutionary Islamic state

Muzaffar Iqbal

Last month, the people of Iran went to the polls to elect a new president, the ninth presidential elections since the Revolution. In the first of two articles, MUZAFFAR IQBAL discusses the situation faced by the new president and challenges facing the world’s first and only modern Islamic State twenty-six years after the Islamic Revolution.

Even before the first vote was cast in Iran’s ninth presidential election since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, US president George W. Bush had passed his verdict: “Iran’s electoral process ignores the basic requirements of democracy.” He did not have the moral courage to make the statement himself; instead, it was issued by the White House. It was so absurd that within hours Stephen J. Hadley, the national security adviser, had to explain to the press his administration’s “logic” in condemning Iran’s electoral process while it had praised the sham elections in Egypt: “Egypt has not had an election for 7,000 years. They are trying to start one up, and it won’t be perfect,” Hadley said, “[Iran and Egypt] couldn’t be more different cases. Iran is the No. 1 state sponsor of terror. Egypt is fighting terror. Iran’s policy is to get rid of Israel. Egypt is fostering the peace process.” This statement exposes the reality of the White House’s black logic: judgments on Iran’s presidential elections are not based on electoral process, but on its policies toward Israel.

This criterion is not surprising, as US foreign policy has always been based on safeguarding Israeli interests. What is morally and ethically reprehensible in Hadley’s statement is the fact that it was issued on behalf of a president who came to power by stealing an election, and who has shown complete disregard for the views of an overwhelming majority of the world’s citizens against his invasion and continuous occupation of Iraq. There is, however, much more to be said on the matter. Iran’s presidential elections have been held under a constitution approved and adopted by the people of the Islamic Republic through an open and unprecedented process in which millions of men and women decided how they wished to run their affairs. Instead of acknowledging and respecting the decision of the Iranian people, Bush and his administration demand that Iranians follow what the US prescribes for them. This is their vision of democracy: all nations must adopt this model of democracy and freedom, otherwise their system is not democratic.

A month earlier, Counselor Philip Zelikow of the State Department had articulated this arrogant view unabashedly while speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies inWashington. Referring to a previous statement by Bush about the lack of democracy in Iran, he said: “What the president is arguing is that there are universal ideals—and they are definable –we urge all countries to find the way to express the ideals which we believe their own citizens hold dear—and we believe that assertion is no more true than in Iran.”

What is apparent from all this is a continuous disregard for international agreements and policies that is rooted in arrogance. Commenting on Bush’s statement, Iran’s foreign minister,Kamal Kharrazi, stated diplomatically that the statement was issued “due to [Bush’s] lack of knowledge about Iran”. It is not merely lack of knowledge but ignorance of and hatred for the ideals upon which the Islamic Republic is established.

The American attitude toward Iran is not new and there is no reason to believe that it is going to change in the near future. Expressed more openly on the eve of Iranian elections by US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice, this view declares one of the most remarkable developments in the modern history of the Muslim world as being backward: “the sad thing about Iran is it’s moving backward, not forward. I think everyone would say that the Iranian system, political system, was more open a few years ago than it is now.” By “a few years ago” she presumably meant the time of the Shah, when the CIA had its headquarters for the Middle East in Iran and the Shah’s police and secret service were kidnapping, torturing and killing people.

Regardless of the US’s attitude, the ninth presidential elections in Iran are historic in many ways. With close to 70 percent voter turnout in the first round of elections on June 17, they may very well prove to be a landmark for the future of the Islamic Republic, and not merely because this was the first election since 1979 to require a second round of polls. The importance of these elections lies elsewhere: in the nature of the electorate. A vast majority of those who voted in these elections are young people who have no personal experience of the events of a quarter century ago, when the Islamic Revolution established a unique system of governance in Iran. Twenty-five years after that major restructuring of Iran, the Islamic Republic’s present demographic, social, economic and political realities pose two kinds of challenge for the new leadership: internal and external. This section focuses on some aspects of the internal challenges; the next will, insha’Allah, discuss some of the most significant external challenges.

Twenty-five years after the Islamic Revolution, the men and women who took part in that epoch-making event are now in their fifties and sixties. That generation of Iranians is now on its way out. The most significant event for the generation that followed the Revolution was the Iraq-Iran war. This was a heroic generation that sacrificed everything for the defense of their land and its ideals and, though a large number of them are now in important positions in economic, political, and cultural fields, they do not really make up the demographic landscape of contemporary Iran; it is the new generation of men and women in their late teens and early twenties that is now the most important asset of Iran.

This generation participated in neither the Revolution nor the defensive war. Raised in relative comfort and stability in a country that was making significant advances in education, health and economic growth during their childhood, these men and women are more interested in careers, jobs, comfort, and “life” as they conceive it through the prism of their own immediate past, which is the product a profound social transformation. This tremendous remaking of Iranian society during the past quarter century has taken place through the following significant routes.

Firstly, Iran’s population doubled between 1979 and 2004, to 70 million. This increase has been unevenly distributed demographically: Iranians are now increasingly city-dwellers, with the urban population approaching 70 per cent, at least half of them living in the capital, Tehran. This is a very significant aspect of contemporary Iran, not merely because previously the vast majority of people historically lived outside the cities, but also because the move to cities in such large numbers brings with it a tremendous amount of social and economic pressure for the entire system.

Secondly, thanks to huge investment in the country’s education system, Iran has achieved near-complete literacy for the first time in its history: around 92 per cent of young Iranians are now literate. There has also been a corresponding expansion of higher education, with the significant indicator that more than 61 percent of all university students are women. This means that the current generation of young educated men and women expect jobs and career opportunities commensurate with their education, but the economic sector has not evolved in sync with this increased educational attainment, so there is a certain amount of disillusionment and discontent in this sector of the population.

Thirdly, the increase in literacy and higher education also comes with an increasing awareness of the world outside Iran. Because of the peculiar isolation imposed upon the Islamic Republic, this desire to know and communicate with the outside world has become a pronounced need of young Iranians, who are among the highest users of the internet in the Middle East. Estimates of the number of Iranian internet-users vary between 3 and 5 million, and there are approximately 60,000 to 70,000 weblogs run by Iranians, most of them in Persian, making it the fourth most-used weblog language. Another aspect of this new social revolution in Iran is the presence of over 3 million satellite connections with access to all the major Western channels—from CNN and BBC World to 700 other media outlets. A recent statistical survey suggests that BBC radio has more than 7.5 million listeners in Iran, and the BBC’s website has more than 250,000 Iranian visitors every day. This tremendous growth in the literate population requires a corresponding increase in the internal production of reading and viewing material, but this need has not been met, despite significant developments in the production of films by the private sector. This means that a very large number of Iranian youth are now directly exposed to the Western media, without a significant and credible counterbalance. Although there is a very large readership of Persian-language newspapers (the most popular newspaper in Iran has a circulation of around 450,000), the print media are not a substitute for the electronic media. The ideals of the new generation of Iranians are thus being shaped, to a large extent, by the West; this brings them into direct conflict with the centuries-old social and religious norms of their society.

Travel has also opened new doors of perception for Iranians. Today, there are around 2 million Iranians who live outside Iran, mostly in Western Europe, Canada and the US, with significant numbers in Japan too. Most of these expatriates have kept their links to Iran, and every year about 200,000 Iranians travel abroad to visit relatives or for business. This has made a significant impact on social awareness in Iran.

All of this has produced a new mini social and intellectual revolution in Iran. Men and women who are part of this mini-revolution have a tendency to view the Islamic Revolution without a proper historical consciousness. They lack knowledge of the nature of life in the country before the Revolution that brought them the fruits of education, distribution of national wealth unlike any previous era, and the very freedom to be part of this new mini-revolution. Shaped by the new intellectual forces that came into existence during the late 1990s, this mini-revolution is based on discontent and disillusion, and is fired by the undefined, yet powerful, ideas of “reform” and “freedom”.

Covertly and overtly supported by hundreds of foundations, the so-called “pro-democracy” and “pro-change” organizations funded by the US, this new social and political force within Iran is doubly handicapped: firstly, most of its young members have little or no knowledge of the vast historical process that shaped their own society in the post-World War II period; and secondly, they have an unrealistic, idealized and often erroneous understanding of the West.

Yet, regardless of the limited historical understanding of this generation, the leadership in Iran has to face the fact of this social and political revolution that has taken place in Iranian society caused by lapses in the guidance of the Revolutionary process especially after the death of Imam Khomeini. Needless to say, what is being called as “lapses” were mostly the direct result of the conditions imposed on Iran shortly after the Revolution that amounted to a battle for survival of the country itself. Nonetheless, the newly elected president of the Islamic Republic, along with the Parliament and the Guardian Council, face a challenge that needs a thorough and well-planned strategy. There are various aspects of this challenge, including social, political and economic, but perhaps none is as important as the intellectual challenge that has re-opened the question of the role of Islam in Iranian society.

The young populace of Iran has access to the works of many secular thinkers who advocate separation of religion and state. These young people are not always rooted in their own tradition, and this one-sided exposure to ideas of men like Isaiah Berlin and Hannah Arendt has created confusion in young minds. They have also seen some of the religious people involved in corruption, and this has added fuel to their desire for change.

A characteristic peculiar to the Iranian situation is that most of these young men and women are not abandoning religion; rather they are viewing Islam from the Western perspective, which construes it as a private affair. This view is not only in direct conflict with the founding principles of the Islamic Revolution, it is a concept foreign to Islam itself. Yet, for something as serious as this, there seems to be a lack of proper intellectual response to this challenge that has many other aspects, in addition to its political aspect. In fact, it comes with a bag full of some of the most vicious attacks on Islam by the West—a bag especially prepared for the discontented and disillusioned Muslim youth in all the traditional lands of Islam. This bag includes questions about women’s rights, personal freedom and autonomy; it questions the nature of traditional social interactions in Muslim societies, and it attempts to create illusions of unrestrained freedom for the youth. All of this is packaged in attractive wrappings and high-sounding words: human rights, liberalism, democracy, pluralism, and the like.

Acceptance of this package actually means a complete secularization of society and adoption of Western norms of social and personal behaviour. The so-called women’s rights are a disguise to make women a commodity in the market place; the so-called pluralism and manifestos of human rights declare that all truths are relative, and hence each person’s religious, moral and ethical beliefs should be respected and considered equal to the rest. In other words, it advocates that there is no such thing as true or false, Haqq and Batil, because one person’s truth is his or her own truth. It proposes that there is no such thing as Absolute Truth, and hence it makes each person an autonomous source of truth. The embodiment of this concept in a polity makes revelation and revealed truth a thing of the past, and effectively reduces a people to a society without a center, without any orientation toward the One Who sent the Glorious and Discerning Qur’an with a Truth, a Truth that comes from the One Who Himself is al-Haqq (The Truth).

This subjective belief system is in direct conflict with the vision of Islam. For Iran, it is doubly dangerous because the Islamic State is based on a foundation that takes Islam’s revealed Truth to be the supreme principle. Thus one of the most important internal challenges faced by the new leadership in Iran is to address this intellectual crisis faced by the new generation of Iranians. Preaching and sermonizing alone will not solve the problem; these men and women require subtle and delicate handling. How well the new leadership in Iran meets this challenge may very well determine the course of future events in Iran.

 

Muzaffar Iqbal