Introduction
In Pan-Turkist literature, ‘Southern Turkestan’ refers to the territories located south of the Amu Darya River, corresponding to parts of present-day northern Afghanistan, including the provinces of Jowzjan, Faryab, Sarpul, and Balkh, as well as portions of Samangan and Kunduz. From this perspective, these regions maintain cultural and linguistic linkages with Turkic-speaking countries.
In recent months, Naqibullah Faiq – the former governor of Faryab – initially wrote: ‘If global developments continue at this pace, Afghanistan might disintegrate, and a new state called “Southern Turkestan” could be established in its northern regions.
Turkey may be the sole actor that views the ‘Southern Turkestan’ discourse positively
The causes and roots of the ‘Southern Turkestan’ discourse
The increased attention given to the ‘Southern Turkestan’ idea is best understood within a framework of domestic and external causes, historical transformations, geopolitical rivalries, the legitimacy crisis of the central state, the challenge of ethno-political power-sharing, and the concomitant soft Pan-Turkic mobilizations.
Afghanistan has historically grappled with the nation-state problematic. The Taliban’s policies constitute one of the key factors reinforcing centrifugal discourses. With the intensification of structural injustices and the weakening of national governance, the ground has increasingly been set for the renewed salience of ethnic cleavages and the reproduction of identity discourses in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s return to power and the establishment of a centralized, predominantly Pashtun-centric political structure have reinforced the perception of political marginalization among Afghanistan’s ethnic communities.
At the regional and international levels, the role of intellectual and cultural networks associated with Pan-Turkism is also significant – manifesting through academic scholarships, research centers, cultural institutions, and the reinforcement of Turkic identity literature. Turkey had previously trained hundreds of academic, social, military, and cultural cadres, thereby establishing a soft network endowed with considerable cultural and social influence. It appears that a considerable segment of them advocate for the establishment of ‘Southern Turkestan’ or, alternatively, a form of federalism with extensive autonomous powers. In addition, Turkey is among the countries hosting the highest number of senior officials from Afghanistan’s previous government (i.e., opponents of the Taliban) who are engaged in political activities against the Taliban on Turkish soil. Consequently, Turkey may be the sole actor that views the ‘Southern Turkestan’ discourse positively, whether directly or indirectly. Also, other actors seeking to exert geopolitical and security pressures on China, Russia, and Iran, may also utilize this instrument to their advantage.
Obstacles to the realization of ‘Southern Turkestan’
The realization of the ‘Southern Turkestan’ idea faces serious obstacles at the provincial, intra-ethnic, domestic, regional, and international levels. Obstacles, which, in practice, considerably limit the likelihood of this idea evolving into a viable political project.
Northern Afghanistan consists of complex regions with a mixed ethnic fabric comprising Tajiks, Hazaras, and Pashtuns. The provinces of Jowzjan, Faryab, Sarpul, Balkh, as well as portions of Samangan and Kunduz, neither possess a homogeneous Uzbek-Turkmen ethnic composition nor enjoy the requisite social cohesion necessary for the formation of an independent political unit.
Previously, the ‘Pashtunistan’ idea failed to offer a solution. New secessionist schemes, without accounting for the region’s political and security complexities, international structure, multipolar order, Afghanistan’s social fabric, and the dispersed demographic distribution of its ethnic groups, are practically impossible.
A significant portion of Afghanistan’s Turkic-speaking communities fundamentally lack secessionist inclinations, and the ‘Southern Turkestan’ discourse has not become widespread. The Uzbek and Turkmen communities in Afghanistan are also far from homogeneous, with cleavages between modern – secular currents, traditional elites, the new generation, religious forces, and pro-Taliban constituencies.
According to Enayatullah Babar Farahmand, a former deputy of Abdullah Abdullah, the ‘Turkestan’ movement is understood primarily as a means of safeguarding identity, promoting nativism, preventing demographic change, and countering land usurpation. Previously, several armed Turkic-speaking anti-Taliban factions-such as the ‘Turkestan Freedom Tigers’ and the ‘Southern Turkestan Front’ declared their formation in 2021. In the current context, the ‘Southern Turkestan’ proposal is also a kind of political and symbolic instrument for protesting power monopoly and articulating ethnic discontent. However, the country’s problems cannot be resolved through its partition.
At the regional level as well, it appears that Central Asian countries – particularly Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan – will not welcome the formation of a secessionist movement in northern Afghanistan. Certainly, moving in the direction of the ‘Southern Turkestan’ discourse would lead to the reinforcement of Uyghur separatist currents in Xinjiang. Consequently, China would regard any Turkic-centered ethno-nationalist discourse as a threat to its national security. Iran and Russia are likewise sensitive to any redefinition of ethnic boundaries based on Pan-Turkism in the region, and will oppose new ethno-nationalist templates in their respective peripheries.
Risks Ahead
The heightened attention to the ‘Southern Turkestan’ idea reflects the deepening of the national crisis and the failure to establish an inclusive government in Afghanistan.
The Taliban can form an inclusive government. The current situation, however, will reinforce the ground for the growth of secessionist discourses. Under conditions of power monopoly in Afghanistan, the proposal of ideas such as ‘Southern Turkestan’ can become a platform for foreign intervention, ethnic polarization, and further disintegration of national cohesion. The escalation of ethnic tensions on social media can shift the climate of coexistence toward hostility, humiliation, political, economic, and social mistrust.
While Taliban officials continue to emphasize the provision of nationwide security in the country, armed opposition groups have claimed that, coinciding with the fifth anniversary of the Taliban’s takeover, they carried out at least fifty attacks against Taliban positions and forces across Afghanistan – particularly in the north – in August.
At the international level, the United States has no inclination to re-engage directly in Afghanistan. However, Afghanistan could become more prominent in the U.S. foreign policy, as a means of exerting pressure on Eurasian actors.
Turkey’s support, in the current context, appears to be more at the level of soft power. Yet, if the establishment of the framework “Turk countries association OTS+”, the emergence of a novel military alliance under the OTS framework are indeed taking shape, it would unequivocally impinge upon the strategic interests of Russia, Iran, and China. Thus, greater emphasis on the ‘Southern Turkestan’ project could also serve as a tool for future pressure on these three powers.
Moreover, another important variable is Pakistan’s broader inclination toward weakening the Taliban government. This could steer the future of Afghanistan’s territorial stability onto a different trajectory. Should the unprecedented increase in anti-Taliban mobilizations in recent months, coupled with a strategic shift by opposition forces from guerrilla warfare to front-line engagements, persist, it could actively trigger conflicts in northern Afghanistan and in Uzbek- and Turkmen-majority areas, potentially leading to the risks of the country’s fragmentation.
Samyar Rostami, аpolitical observer and senior researcher in international relations
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