It Is a New Era, But China’s Balancing Act Will Fail in the Middle East

by Dr Ramzy Baroud

Although ties between Washington and Tel Aviv are stronger than ever, Israeli leaders are aware of a vastly changing political landscape. The US’ own political turmoil and the global power realignment – which is on full display in the Middle East – indicate that a new era is, indeed, in the making.

Unsurprisingly, this new era involves China.

China’s Vice President, Wang Qishan, arrived in Israel on October 22 on a four-day visit to head the fourth China-Israel Innovation Committee. He is the highest-ranking Chinese official to visit Israel in nearly two decades.

In April 2000, the former president of China, Jiang Zemin, was the first Chinese leader to ever visit Israel, touring the Yad Vashem Holocaust Museum and paying diplomatic dues to his Israeli counterparts. At the time, he spoke of China’s intentions to cement the bond between the two countries.

Wang Qishan’s visit, however, is different. The “bond” between Beijing and Tel Aviv is much stronger now than it was then, as expressed in sheer numbers. Soon after the two countries exchanged diplomatic missions in 1992, trade figures soared. The size of Chinese investments in Israel also grew exponentially, from $50m in the early 1990s to a whopping $16.5bn according to 2016 estimates.

China’s growing investments and strategic ties to Israel are predicated on both countries’ keen interest in technological innovation, as well as on the so-called “Red-Med” Railway, a regional network of sea and rail infrastructure aimed at connecting China with Europe via Asia and the Middle East. Additionally, the railway would also link the two Israeli ports of Eilat and Ashdod.

News of China’s plan to manage the Israeli port of Haifa has already raised the ire of the US and its European allies.

Times have changed, indeed. Whereas in the past, Washington ordered Tel Aviv to immediately cease exchanging American military technology with China, forcing it to cancel the sale of the Phalcon airborne early-warning system, it is now watching as Israeli and Chinese leaders are managing the dawn of a new political era that – for the first time – does not include Washington.

For China, the newfound love for Israel is part of a larger global strategy that can be considered the jewel of China’s revitalized foreign policy.

Qishan’s visit to Israel comes on the heels of accelerated efforts by Beijing to promote its mammoth trillion-dollar economic project,the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

China hopes that its grand plan will help it open massive new opportunities across the world and eventually guarantee its dominance in various regions that rotated, since World War II, within an American sphere of influence. BRI aims to connect Asia, Africa, and Europe through a “belt” of overland routes and a maritime “road” of sea lanes.

The China-US competition is heating up. Washington wants to hold on to its global dominance for as long as possible while Beijing is eagerly working to supplant the US’ superpower status, first in Asia, then in Africa and the Middle East. The Chinese strategy in achieving its objectives is quite clear: unlike the US’ disproportionate investments in military power, China is keen on winning its coveted status, at least for the time being, using soft power only.

The Middle East, however, is richer and, thus, more strategic and contested than any other region in the world. Rife with conflicts and distinct political camps, it is likely to derail China’s soft power strategy sooner rather than later. While Chinese foreign policy managed to survive the polarizing war in Syria through engaging all sides and playing second to Russia’s leading role at the UN Security Council, the Israeli Occupation of Palestine is a whole different political challenge.

For years, China has maintained a consistent position in support of the Palestinian people, calling for an end to the Israeli Occupation and for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. However, Beijing’s firm position regarding the rights of Palestinians, seems of little consequence to its relationship with Israel, as joint technological ventures, trade and investments continue to grow unhindered.

China’s foreign policymakers operate with the mistaken assumption that their country can be pro-Palestine and pro-Israel at once, criticizing the Occupation, yet sustaining it; calling on Israel to respect international law while at the same time empowering Israel, however unwittingly, in its ongoing violations of Palestinian human rights.

Israeli hasbara has perfected the art of political acrobats, and finding the balance between US-western discourse and a Chinese one should not be too arduous a task.

Indeed, it seems that the oft-repeated cliché of Israel being “the only democracy in the Middle East”, is being slightly adjusted to meet the expectations of a fledgling superpower, which is merely interested in technology, trade and investments. Israeli leaders want China and its investors to think of Israel as the only stable economy in the Middle East.

Expectedly, Palestinian priorities are wholly different.

With the Palestinian struggle for freedom and human rights capturing international attention through the rise of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, more and more countries are under pressure to articulate a clear stance on the Israeli Occupation and apartheid.

For China to enter the fray with an indecisive and self-serving strategy is not just morally objectionable, but strategically unsustainable as well. The Palestinian and Arab peoples are hardly interested in swapping American military dominance with Chinese economic hegemony that does little to change or, at least challenge, the prevailing status quo.

Sadly, while Beijing and Tel Aviv labor to strike the needed balance between foreign policies and economic interests, China finds itself under no particular obligation to side with a well-defined Arab position on Palestine, simply because the latter does not exist. The political division of Arab countries, the wars in Syria and elsewhere have pushed Palestine down from being a top Arab priority into some strange bargain involving “regional peace” as part of Trump’s so-called “Deal of the Century”.

This painful reality has weakened Palestine’s position in China, which, at least for now, values its relationship with Israel at a higher level than its historical bond with Palestine and the Arab people.

Ramzy Baroud is a journalist, author and editor of Palestine Chronicle. His latest book is The Last Earth: A Palestinian Story (Pluto Press, London, 2018). He earned a Ph.D. in Palestine Studies from the University of Exeter and is a Non-Resident Scholar at Orfalea Center for Global and International Studies, UCSB.

Diktat diplomacy

BY JOHN CHERIAN

The United States is piling the pressure on India to whittle down its oil imports from Iran and retreat from the Chabahar port project.

THE United States has been piling the pressure on India in its ongoing efforts to isolate Iran after the Trump administration unceremoniously reneged on the historic nuclear deal that the Barack Obama administration had signed with the country. All the other signatories to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), including close allies of the U.S. like the United Kingdom, France and Germany, have said that they will honour the deal and will not reimpose sanctions on Iran. President Donald Trump, however, seems to have made the reimposition of sanctions a priority issue for his administration. He had raised the issue with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, during their recent meeting in Helsinki.

The Russian side has been openly critical of the American decision to unilaterally scrap the nuclear deal. China, which imports a lot of Iranian oil and gas, is unfazed by threats from the White House to blacklist companies and countries buying oil from Iran. In fact, Chinese companies placed new orders for Iranian oil after the U.S. government issued the warning. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said in the first week of August that Beijing stood firmly against unilateral American sanctions and emphasised that “China and Iran unwaveringly maintain normal trade and economic ties”. The Iranian economy continues to be dependent on oil.

In Asia, only the governments of India, Japan and South Korea seem to be buckling under the threats. Tokyo and Seoul are military alliance partners of Washington. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, following arm-twisting by the U.S., has given up plans to undertake a state visit to Iran in July. It would have been the first by a Japanese Prime Minister in more than 40 years. South Korea, the world’s fifth biggest oil importer, buys most of its light crude from Iran. Its government has denied reports that it will stop buying from Iran, but its oil imports from Iran have declined sharply from May. India also seems to following suit after the U.S.’ sharp warning to its “allies” to completely stop importing from Iran by November. The Trump administration has declined “special waivers” to countries like India, which have been traditional importers of Iranian oil.

A U.S. State Department spokesman said sanctions would be imposed on India and China if they did business with Iran. “And yes, we will certainly be requesting that their oil imports go to zero,” the official told the media in June. The Trump administration has been sending senior officials to New Delhi to demand that India act promptly on its recommendations. Among the high-profile American visitors to Delhi in the last two months was Nikki Haley, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, who is counted among the Trump administration’s top Iran-baiters. She told the media in Delhi that she had asked the Indian government to cut its oil imports from Iran and downgrade its relationship with the country. Two other top officials have called for regime change in Iran—Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Adviser John Bolton. Both of them are supporters of the terrorist grouping Mujahedin-e-Khalq.

Going by past experience, the Indian government is likely to substantially reduce oil imports from Iran. The previous United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government had cooperated to a large extent with the sanctions regime that was in force from 2011 to 2016. However, most of the sanctions against Iran during that period were mandated by the U.N. After the U.N.-mandated sanctions were lifted in 2015, Iran once again became a top supplier of crude to India, just behind Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Iranian heavy crude is cheaper than Saudi and Iraqi oil. The Indian government also committed in 2016 to transfer $6.5 billion it owed to Iran as payment for oil supplies. The payment was held up owing to the sanctions. During the earlier sanctions period, India and Iran had agreed to conduct half of the oil trade between the two countries in Indian rupees. A rupee-rial arrangement was then in place. After the sanctions were lifted three years ago, India started paying Iran in euros for 55 per cent of its oil imports.

The new unilateral sanctions imposed by the U.S. are deemed to be illegal under international law. The Iranian government has been conveying to the Indian side that it understands the constraints India faces as it tries to balance relations between the U.S. and Iran. Interestingly, the Indian government, in the second week of July, gave permission to an Iranian bank to open a branch in Mumbai. The U.S. has not officially reacted to this development. Bank Pasargad will have the distinction of being the first Iranian bank to have an office in India. The presence of the Iranian bank will ensure a smooth flow of funds between the two countries. Then there is the question of the Chabahar port, located adjacent to the Gwadar port in Pakistan, which India is committed to developing. New Delhi has committed to invest $500 million in the port and has pledged to make it operational by 2019. There is, however, a question mark on whether India has the will to go ahead with the project in the face of open hostility from the U.S. Off the record, Iranian officials have been complaining about the slow pace of progress in the project. Japanese companies, which were supposed to invest in it, are now unlikely to do so.

The Iranian side has indicated that there are many other countries willing to develop Chabahar. Chabahar can be India’s gateway to the markets in Afghanistan and Central Asia, and the government should ensure that the project is expedited notwithstanding the U.S. threats. The Iranian government wants the Indian government to start work on infrastructure projects that will connect the port to the Iranian rail network and the city of Zabedan located close to the border with Pakistan and Afghanistan. Minister of State for External Affairs V.K. Singh reassured Parliament in July that India was “engaged in long-term partnership” in the energy sector with Iran and also gave assurances on the operation of the Chabahar port. He stressed that India’s ties with Iran were not dependant on relations with a “third country”. He said that the high-level exchange of state visits highlighted the strong relationship between the two countries.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Tehran in 2016. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani was in India in February this year. The declaration of “long-term friendship” between India and Iran came a day after the Trump administration despatched Assistant Secretary of State for Terrorist Financing Marshall Billingslea to New Delhi as part of the U.S.’ ongoing efforts to pressure India into drastically curtailing economic ties with Iran. Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Seyyed Abbas Araghchi, was also in New Delhi at around the same time to hold talks with Indian officials on the sanctions issue.

The Indian government has on previous occasions insisted that it will comply with the sanctions regime only if it is internationally mandated. External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj reiterated this position during the visit of her Iranian counterpart, Mohammed Javad Zarif, to New Delhi in May. She said India would adhere only to U.N.-mandated sanctions and not to those imposed by individual countries. But with the Trump administration fixated on the goal of regime change in Iran, it wants to ensure that most avenues for the export of Iranian oil are blocked, by hook or by crook. Iran has threatened to retaliate if its oil exports are blocked by closing down the Straits of Hormuz and disrupting the supply of oil from the Persian Gulf region. “You may begin the war, but it is us who will end it,” warned Major General Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards, in response to one of Trump’s belligerent tweets threatening to annihilate Iran.

The U.S. has shown its displeasure at the Indian government’s reluctance to immediately comply with its demands by rescheduling, at the eleventh hour, the first ever 2+2 meeting from June to the first week of September. Under the 2+2 format, the Ministers for External Affairs and Defence will hold talks with their U.S. counterparts, the Secretaries of State and Defence.

All of a sudden the Trump administration, which had made an issue out of India’s decision to purchase the potent S-400 missile systems from Russia, has indicated that it will not impose sanctions on India for arms purchases from Russia. But then the Trump administration is not known to speak in one voice on foreign policy issues. The U.S. Congress has passed a “Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act” Bill. It went out of its way to provide special “waivers” for India in relation to the purchase of Russian weaponry. Justifying the decision, Secretary of Defence James Mattis said: “The fundamental question we must ask ourselves is, do we wish to strengthen our partners in key regions or leave them with no other option but to turn to Russia, thereby undermining a once in a generation opportunity to more closely align with nations with the U.S. vision of global security and stability?”

In an obvious quid pro quo, the Indian government has agreed to buy even more military equipment from the U.S. There are reports that the Modi government wants to install an American missile shield for the country costing billions of dollars. The Indian government has also also let it be known that it would like President Trump to be the chief guest at next year’s Republic Day celebrations.

Concurrently, the Indian government seems to be on the verge of signing the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) with the U.S. India has been under pressure to do so after the signing of the logistics exchange agreement in 2016. If the Indian government initials the COMCASA, the Indian military will be further drawn into the American military alliance. The logistics exchange agreement allows the U.S. military to use Indian Army bases and ports. COMCASA will give the U.S. access to the Indian military’s communications systems. It will also compromise the sophisticated Russian equipment which is in the service of the Indian armed forces, besides sending a message to China that India is now a key part of the U.S.’ grand strategy of isolating it militarily in the Asia-Pacific region.

Modi in recent months has started talking about the need for strategic autonomy and ambiguity in India’s foreign policy. In a speech in Singapore he said that India’s friendship with the U.S. should not be viewed as an alliance that seeks to contain any other country in the region. Modi had emphasised in his speech at the Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore that New Delhi gave equal importance to its ties with Washington and Moscow. India is a member of both the BRICS and the SCO. These two groupings have made it clear that they will call the Trump administration’s bluff on Iran. Russia is participating in Iran’s aerospace and nuclear industries. The two countries have played an important role as allies in quelling the jehadist threat in West Asia. China plays an important role in Iran’s economy.

Many of the key Belt and Road projects are located in Iran. Iran is also part of the International North South Transportation Corridor that is essential for enhancing connectivity between Asia countries and the European market.

Cooperation, not rivalry, will help China, India expand relations with Iran

Iran Daily

Iran's excellent geographical location in West Asia and its undeniable political importance in the region, had pushed Beijing and New Delhi into a competition with each other to establish closer relations with Tehran.

At present, however, both Asian states have realized that they are required to cooperate to further expand relations with the Islamic Republic.

A strategic region

Iran is a strategic region and these two Asian powers have competed with each other in the past few years to gain greater advantage. Nevertheless, in light of the rapid pace of global developments, the two states have now inevitably realized that Tehran is a junction of collaborations.

What made these two tough rivals to come to this understanding was the fact that they both need Tehran: China to complete its 'One Belt, One Road' project and India to implement the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC).

Commenting on this, earlier, Asia Times wrote: "Currently, further penetration in Iran's market has become a priority for China and India as they both seek to expand their role in regions in which their strategic interests lie."

Iran is located in a very important geographical location, linking Central Asia to Caucasus and the Middle East. In addition, its abundant energy resources can supply a major part of the energy needs of China and India. These factors have always played a determining role in Tehran's relations with Beijing and New Delhi. In other words, the two states' ties with Iran have always been in the form of a strategic transaction.

This comes as, given that relations between China and India have always been subject to diverse challenges, the new method — a combination of cooperation and competition — they are using to manage their differences with each other and be able to collaborate with the Middle Eastern state is indicative of the changing nature of their ties.

China and India now know that, despite their traditional competition in international arenas, they are required to acquiesce to a long-term coexistence with each other in Iran as this will be indicative and an example of their strategic relations in non-neighboring regions.

On the same issue, dailypioneer.com said, "India's economic cooperation with Iran is in line with New Delhi's geopolitical objectives to improve its regional relations, ensure its energy security and gain access to European markets."

Being a joint project undertaken by India, Russia and Iran to develop transportation infrastructure from Russia to Iran and thence to the Indian Ocean, it said, the INSTC is the key strategic part of India's economic puzzle. Once the project is completed, easy access to Central Asia's landlocked energy resources will be provided at greater pace. Currently, the resources are accessible only through the Suez Canal. The INSTC will also link India to Europe through Russia.

To accelerate the implementation of the project, India's investment in Iran has been focused on modernizing and developing the southeastern Iranian port of Chabahar, which is Iran's closest and most crucial access point to the Indian Ocean and a terminal for the INSTC.

The potential capacity of Chabahar Port, when financially and technologically supported by India, will challenge the capabilities of Pakistan's Gwadar Port, which is backed by China. Located at a distance of less than 170 kilometers from each other, the two ports are indicative of the growing pragmatic geographic competition between New Delhi and Beijing in the region.

On the other hand, since the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between Iran and P5+1, China has constantly been seeking to increase its role in Iran's financial system and turn into one of the most important players in the Middle Eastern state in the field of economy and trade. This is because Iran is located in a strategic geographical region which is of crucial importance to China's long-term transportation plan.

Thus, the increase in direct oil inflow from Central Asia and the Middle East will help China cut its dependence on Strait of Malacca. Currently, a major part of China's oil imports are via this strait.

In addition, the new railroad link between Tehran and Baganuur in Mongolia is another sign increasing the likeliness that Beijing may turn a blind eye to US efforts aimed at isolating Iran, particularly at a time when China's national interests are threatened.

To counter US President Donald Trump's threat, Iran is seeking to increase its foreign contracts and attract more overseas investments. Such efforts provide China and India with the opportunity to improve interaction with each other.

Beijing and New Delhi are well aware of the consequences of US sanctions against Iran and Trump's threats against countries which would continue to cooperate with Tehran. However, continuation of investments in the Middle Eastern state's projects would act as an index in the two countries' future strategic competition for expanding relations with Iran.

Stressing the same point, Sanjeev Miglani, an analyst, wrote, in an article published by Reuters, that given Iran's fundamental status and position in the regional strategies of China and India, it is necessary for Beijing and New Delhi to maintain relations and interactions with each other despite their different approaches. While India has focused its investments in the INSTC, which is related to the country's long-term plans in the field of security and economy, China has adopted an extensive strategy to achieve a similar objective.

This situation's benefits for Iran is that the country is not forced to choose between China and India. In fact, in a competitive relationship, there would be ample opportunities for limited cooperation between China and India in Iran.

Unlike power-based competitions, which are focused on expanding political and military capabilities, economic relations with a regional power poses no obstacles to others.

The reinstatement of unilateral US sanctions and the imposition of news ones will provide Iran an opportunity to encourage joint investments by China and India in the development projects of its economic sectors. To remove the ambiguity surrounding India's investment in Iranian projects, Iran has put forward an idea seeking to secure China's cooperation in development of Chabahar Port and connect the Iranian port with its Pakistani counterpart Gwadar. These developments push powerful countries, such as India and China, toward close cooperation even if they both express reluctance about it.

Latest developments in relations between China and India, which have led to a shift in the nature of their ties from traditional rivalry to harmonious coexistence, does not imply that their relationship in Iran will be free from a competitive spirit. They, however, confirm that competitiveness will remain an important motive for the two sides' future cooperation in Iran.