Trials and Tribulations of Central Asia Integration

The pros and cons of being the Heartland in the 21st century

Pepe ESCOBAR, Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan

Crossing Tajikistan from west to northeast – Dushanbe to the Tajik-Kyrgyz border – and then Kyrgyzstan from south to north all the way to Bishkek via Osh, is one of the most extraordinary road trips on earth. Not only this is prime Ancient Silk Road territory but now is being propelled as a significant stretch of the 21st century New Silk Roads.

In addition to its cultural, historical and anthropological pull, this road trip also lays bare some of the key issues related to the development of Central Asia. It was particularly enlightening to hit the road as previously, at the 5th Astana Club meeting in Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan, I had had the pleasure of moderating a panel titled Central Asia at the Intersection of Global Interests: pros and cons of being Heartland.

The Heartland in the 21st century could not but be a major draw. Any serious analyst knows that Central Asia is the privileged corridor for both Europe and Asia at the heart of the New Silk Roads, as the Chinese-led BRI converges with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).

And yet, less than 10% of trade in Central Asia happens within the region, while 60% is directed to the EU. Idiosyncratic practices among the five former Soviet “Stans” still somewhat prevail. At the same time, there’s a consensus that measures such as a proposed, online, unified Silk Visa plan are bound to boost tourism and trade connectivity.

Banking experts such as Jacob Frenkel, chairman of JP Morgan Chase International, insist that the path towards inclusive growth in Central Asia entails access for financial services and financial tech; Nur-Sultan, incidentally, happens to be the only financial center within a 3,000-mile radius. Only a few years ago it was basically a potato field.

So it will be up to Kazakhs to capitalize on the financial ramifications of their independent, multi-vector foreign policy. After all, aware that his young nation was a “child of complicated history,” First President Nursultan Nazabayev from the beginning, in the early 1990s, wanted to prevent a Balkans scenario in Central Asia – as proposed as a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy by Zbigniew Brzezinski in The Grand Chessboard. Recently Kazakhstan mediated quite successfully between Turkey and Russia. And then there’s the Kazakh hosting of the Astana process, which quickly evolved as the privileged road map for the pacification of Syria.

A link or a bridge?

Frederick Starr, chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute in Washington, made a crucial point in the sidelines of our debate: the UN recently passed a unanimous resolution recognizing Central Asia as a world region. And yet, there is no structure for cooperation inside Central Asia. Tricky national border issues between the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya rivers may have been solved. There are very few pending questions between, for instance, the Uzbeks and the Kyrgyz. Most “Stans” are SCO members, some are EAEU members and all want to profit from BRI.

But as I later saw for myself on the road as I crossed Tajikistan and then Kyrgyzstan, tariff barriers still apply. Industrial cooperation is developing very slowly. Corruption is rife. Distrust against “foreigners” is inbred. And on top of it, the fallout of the US-China trade war affects mostly developing nations – such as the Central Asians. A solution, Starr argues, would be to boost the work of an established commission, and aim towards setting up a single market by 2025.

At the Nur-Sultan debate, my friend Bruno Macaes, former Minister for Europe in Portugal and author of the excellent The Dawn of Eurasia, argued that the thrust for the New Silk Roads remains sea transportation, and investment in ports. As Central Asia is landlocked, the emphasis should be on soft infrastructure. Kazakhstan is uniquely positioned to understand differences between trading bocks. Macaes argues that Nur-Sultan should aim to replicate the role of Singapore as a bridge.

Peter Burian, the EU Special Representative for Central Asia, chose to stress the positives: how Central Asia has managed to survive its new Heartland incarnation without conflict, and how it’s engaged in institutional building from scratch. The Baltics should be taken as an example. Burian insists the EU does not want to impose ready-made concepts, and would rather work as a link, not as a bridge. More EU economic presence in Central Asia means, in practice, an investment commitment of $1.2 billion in seven years, which may not amount to much but targets very specific, practical-minded projects.

Evgeny Vinokurov, chief economist of the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development, touched on a real success story: the 15 day-only transportation/connectivity rail between China’s central provinces, Central Asia and the EU – now running at 400,000 cargo containers a year, and rising, and used by anyone from BMW to all manner of Chinese manufacturers. Over 10 million tons of merchandise a year is already moving West while six million tons are moving East. Vinokurov is adamant that the next step for Central Asia is to build industrial parks.

Svante Cornell, from the Institute for Security and Development Policy, emphasized a voluntary process, possibly with six nations (Afghanistan also included), and well-coordinated in practice (way beyond mere political integration). Models should be result-oriented ASEAN and Mercosur (presumably before Bolsonaro’s disruptive practices). Key issues involve facilitating smoother border crossings and for Central Asia to position itself as not just a corridor.

Essentially, Central Asia should think eastwards – in an SCO/ASEAN symbiosis, keeping in mind the role Singapore developed for itself as a global hub.

What about tech transfer?

As I saw for myself days later, when for instance, visiting the University of Central Asia in Khorog, in the Pamir Highway in Tajikistan, set up by the Aga Khan foundation, there is a serious drive across Central Asia to invest in universities and techno centers. In terms of Chinese investment, for instance, the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is financing hydropower in Kyrgyzstan. The EU is engaged in what it defines as a “trilateral project” – supporting education for Afghan women and universities in both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

This may all be discussed and deepened in an upcoming, first-time-ever summit of Central Asian presidents. Not bad as a first step.

Arguably the most intriguing intervention in the debate in Nur-Sultan was by former Kyrgyz Prime Minister Djoomart Otorbaev. He remarked that the GDP of four “Stans,” excluding Kazakhstan, is still smaller than Singapore’s. He insisted the road map ahead is to unite – mostly geoeconomically. He emphasized that both Russia and China “are officially complementary” and that’s “great for us.” Now it’s time to invest in human capital and thus generate more demand.

But once again, the inescapable factor is always China. Otorbaev, referring to BRI, insisted, “you must offer to us the highest technological solutions.” I asked him point-blank whether he could name a project with inbuilt, top technological transfer to Kyrgyzstan. He answered, “I didn’t see any added value so far.” Beijing better go back to the drawing board – seriously.

asiatimes.com

All Central Asian states oppose UNGA’s human rights resolution against Iran

TEHRAN, (MNA) – All five Central Asian countries [including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan] opposed the UN General Assembly’s human rights resolution against the Islamic Republic of Iran and voted against the move unanimously.

Other countries such as Afghanistan, Armenia, Belarus, China, Iraq, Pakistan, Russia and Syria also opposed the UNGA’s human rights resolution against Iran.

Totally, 66 countries gave abstention vote and 30 countries voted against the resolution.

Yesterday, the 3rd Committee of UNGA, with the repetition of its unproven and threadbare accusations, approved a resolution with fragile votes against “Situation of Human Rights in Iran”.

Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Abbas Mousaci condemned the resolution, saying “Iran has always been committed to the human rights in line with its national security and interests and also based on religious requirements.”

Mousavi termed the approval of the resolution as ‘unilateral and unrealistic’ and added, “this resolution is put forward against Iran at a time when one of the chief supporters of this resolution, i.e. US, is violating the most basic rights of over 83 million Iranian people especially women, children, the elderly and patients.”

Khan Sets the Table for US Pull Out of Central Asia

Tom LUONGO

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan has been nothing less than a breath of fresh air in a world grown stale with the status quo of geopolitics. Like Trump, Brexit, Volodymyr Zelensky in Ukraine, Matteo Salvini in Italy and even AMLO in Mexico, Khan represents the desire of people to live in a vastly different world than the one erected by the transnational oligarchy I like to call The Davos Crowd.

So I looked forward to Khan’s first meeting with Trump at the White House. Pakistan’s relationship with the US looks strained on the surface as Trump cut off aid packages to Pakistan at a time when the country’s finances have been, to say the least, challenging.

Khan is in a incredibly difficult position, trying to legitimize the civilian government while reining in the de facto military one. I don’t pretend to understand all the ins and outs but it should be obvious that Khan is facing the same kind of ‘deep state’ pushback that Trump, Salvini and others like him are experiencing.

Pakistan is the lynchpin on which China’s Belt and Road Initiative rests. China has pumped more than $60 billion into Pakistan through the China Pakistan Economic Corridor. That money has itself become a political football Khan has had to deal with.

At the same time, the US is still obsessed with keeping central Asia chaotic and unsettled.

Those forces within both the US and British Deep States have worked hard to sabotage any gains made by Khan to navigate the roiling waters around him. They cling to the more than 150 year-old view of disrupting central Asia, what Halford Makinder called “The Heartland,” as the key to maintaining supremacy over China and Russia.

Preventing rapprochement between India and Pakistan was the point behind the terrorist attack back in February which nearly set the two countries to war, as Khan made a strong first impression at ending the forever war between the two countries.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, a committed neoliberal if there ever was one, took full advantage of the attack to ensure his re-election in May.

And since then he has gone out of his way to virtue signal how upset he is with Khan over not getting control over ‘terrorism’ in Pakistan. No invitation to his inauguration, snubbing him at the recent SCO conference. Modi knows full well the challenges Khan is facing and his behavior has been nothing short of abominable these past few months.

But he also knows that the Afghanistan peace process is proceeding without India’s input. And both sides of the conflict have been elevating Pakistan to get what they want. While India has fumed and stamped its feet over both BRI and Afghan talks the world has moved on without it.

Trump is moving forward with some form of end to the Afghan war. He needs this for political purposes. It won’t be a full withdrawal, not with the people surrounding him in place.

India is wedded to the Ghani government, barely hanging on in Kabul by the grace of US support, and keeps making investments outside of BRI, namely the port at Chabahar in Iran, and railways to Afghanistan, to spite the Chinese, who they are still angry with over the Tibetan border.

And India’s pride has ultimately isolated them because they are not central to solving Afghanistan like Pakistan is.

Talks with the moderate Taliban leaders began in December 2016 when China, Russia and Iran elevated Pakistan to lead the talks, knowing full well that for any lasting peace between the two countries, Pakistan would have to be a primary negotiator. This has kept India on the sidelines, hoping the US would support them in talks.

But it hasn’t worked out that way at all under Trump. If anything Trump has been dismissive of India, relegating their concerns to the back burner. Russia, China, the US and Pakistan have all agreed, in principle, to a path forward towards de-escalating the situation in Afghanistan.

This is why it was important for Khan to come to Washington D.C. now while Trump is mad at Modi for buying Russian S-400 missile defense systems and giving Khan a stage.

And, to Khan’s credit, he did just that.

Going on Fox News and making the public offer to give up Pakistan’s nuclear weapons if India would was a masterstroke of diplomacy. Will anything come of it? Not directly. India isn’t giving up its nukes because Imran Khan asked nicely.

Will the war hawks in Washington decry Trump for meeting with Khan and talking peace? Yes.

In fact, to over-shadow Khan’s offer the media, both US and Russian sadly, has focused on Trump’s tweets about ending the war in Afghanistan (10 million dead) and India denying there was an offer to mediate on Kashmir.

Lost in all of that was Khan, again playing it very smart, saying he made the offer to Trump back in February to mediate a settlement on Kashmir.

“Nuclear war is not an option between Pakistan and India. The idea of nuclear war is actually self-destruction,” he replied.

Speaking on the recent tensions between the two South Asian neighbors in February, Prime Minister Imran Khan said he had asked President Trump to play his role and mediate between the two countries.

“The US is the most powerful country in the world, the only country which could mediate between Pakistan and India and resolve the only issue which is Kashmir. The only reason for 70 years we have not been able to live like civilized neighbours is Kashmir,” Prime Minister Imran Khan told Fox News.

“I really feel that India should come on the table, US could play a big part, and President Trump can certainly play a big part. We are talking about 1.3 billion people on this earth. Imagine the dividends of peace if somehow that issue could be resolved,” he added.

And the answer from Modi was to deny there was ever an offer of such mediation and Trump had to back down as the State Department went into spin control mode. Modi, of course, has to say that, even though it’s clear that the subject has come up.

But Khan has been consistent in his working towards peace in the region since his election.

It’s all ridiculous and sad, as it is becoming clearer by the day that the forces of the status quo and war are working over-time to erect phantom barriers to peace through perceived slights and political chicanery.

Modi is still playing up the terrorism angle and hard-liners in India prevent him from moving forward with any real diplomacy outside of the SCO, of which both India and Pakistan are full members. No one in the West is happy about this arrangement and it’s clear to me the terror attacks in February were meant to split either Pakistan or India from the SCO and set things aright in The Heartland.

So if Modi continues to act like an inconsolably aggrieved party that may be your signal that we’re no closer to regional peace than we’ve been. But it hasn’t been for a lack of trying by all the major players.

In the end, it all comes down to Trump and his parallel position within the US government to Khan’s in Pakistan’s. Does he have the clout and the will to achieve his goals of ending the war in Afghanistan while effecting a tactical retreat from the Heartland?

I don’t know, but it’s beginning to look like that is his plan. So much has changed since the G-20 and the meetings in Doha and Beijing since then concerning Afghanistan, that it is possible to entertain this hope.

Trump has little control over the forces unleashed in his maximum pressure campaign on Iran. His presidency represents a threat to a very old policy that transcends governments and political systems.

Like with North Korea he is doing what he can to signal to his ‘partners,’ as Russian President Vladimir Putin would put it, that he won’t make things worse in Pakistan and Afghanistan while they work out the details and through his inaction force players like Modi to accede to reality.

Trump needs a way to save face after doubling down in Afghanistan at the behest of the war hawks in 2017. Khan can give him that, publicly. It may be Russia, China and Iran doing the heavy lifting but it’s Khan and Pakistan that can be the politically palatable face on it.

Tom LUONGO

Tom Luongo is an independent political and economic analyst based in North Florida, USA

Analyzing the Politics of Central Asia

Islamic momentum being contained by totalitarian rule

By Ahmed Makhmoudov

Muslims around the world associate Central Asia with classical Islamic scholars like Muhammad al-Bukhari or Abu Mansur al-Maturidi and the so-called Muslim golden age. Thus, most Muslims have a romanticized and often unrealistic perception of contemporary Central Asia. Many Muslims simply do not realize that after living under Russian colonialism for 70 years as part of the communist and atheist USSR, many Muslim countries of Central Asia have become greatly detached from Islam.

Even worse, the current unelected regimes in Central Asia are as hostile to Islam as the Soviet Union was. In fact, today, in most non-Muslim states of the former Soviet Union (FSU), the basic rights of Muslims are far better guaranteed than in any Central Asian state.

With this in mind, let us briefly consider what to realistically expect in Central Asia in terms of socio-political developments in the near future. In Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, all these countries’ ex-communist officials rule with an iron fist. They have established family-based ruling castes, except for Kyrgyzstan.

Over the past years, Crescent International has conducted several analyses on Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in particular. In our recent analysis on US-Russia relations in a post-Donald Trump presidency we have stated that “…NATO regimes see the Achilles heel of Russia. Thus, the campaign of destabilization in Central Asia is coming, as this will also create additional headaches for China. Beijing’s harsh measures against the Muslims of East Turkistan and the Western corporate media’s wide coverage of their plight are warning signals.” Taking this into consideration, let us briefly examine what likely developments might occur in each Central Asian country.

Turkmenistan was for decades ruled after its independence in the 1990s by a megalomaniac ex-Soviet official, Saparmurat Atayevich Niyazov. During his presidency, Niyazov wrote a “holy” book and hinted that he was a prophet. After Niyazov’s death in 2006, an equally ridiculous ruler replaced him, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, who is grooming his son to succeed him. All the visible opposition to the regime exists only abroad, mainly in Western countries. The regime in Turkmenistan used to provide free gas, water, and electricity to people; this ended in October 2017. No one objected, not only due to the iron-fist rule but also because Turkmen society made no intellectual and institutional transformation from the Soviet era. For example, even though neighboring Azerbaijan has an autocratic regime, during the period 1988 to 1995, the Azerbaijani society had a short-lived break with Soviet style control, something Turkmens never experienced.

Thus, it is unrealistic to expect any sort of real socio-political transformation soon. One of the “problematic” features of Niyazov’s presidency was that he did not appoint a successor. He did not trust even his own family. Thus, after his death Berdimuhamedow took over. The current ruler is clearly grooming his son for succession.

There is very little authentic information about what is taking place in Turkmenistan. However, if at Niyazov’s death the system did not experience any shocks during the short power vacuum, it is highly unlikely that any changes will take place under the current circumstances.

After the death of dictator Islam Karimov in 2016, Uzbekistan witnessed a swap within the ruling elite. Karimov’s family was sidelined and the presidency was taken over by Karimov’s Prime Minister, Shavkat Miromonovich Mirziyoyev. Thus, it was a simple change of faces where no substantial policy or institutional transformation occurred.

Even though Uzbekistan possesses more internal politically active opposition groups in comparison with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, they are weak and under severe government pressure. The Islamic organizations in Uzbekistan have been harshly persecuted and the regime intentionally allowed the Wahhabi minded groups in the country to co-opt some of the youth to undercut authentic local Islamic organizations.

The smooth transition after Karimov’s death indicates that the ruling caste in Uzbekistan managed to organize itself into a coherent faction. Unless there is a severe economic crisis, the ruling caste is under no immediate threat. The socio-economic situation in Uzbekistan depends largely on how Moscow would treat the more than 1.5 million Uzbek migrant workers in Russia who send substantial amounts of remittances back home. It is highly unlikely that Moscow would deliberately sabotage its neighbors who could destabilize Russia itself. Thus, the autocratic regime in Uzbekistan is under no immediate threat.

Kazakhstan nearly the size of Western Europe, possesses vast natural resources and a population of about 17 million. It is one of the more prosperous states of Central Asia. Like its neighbors, it is ruled by an ex-communist official, Nursultan Nazarbayev. He has transformed the government of Kazakhstan into a family affair. Compared to other Central Asian states, the Kazakh society is the most Russified and secular. Kazakhstan is estimated to have 3.7 million Russians and since the days of the former Soviet Union, non-Muslim Russian cultural norms have been dominantwithin Kazakhstan. There is no strong opposition; the only potential upheaval may occur during the transition period when the 78-year-old Nazarbayev dies. Considering Kazakhstan’s better socio-economic situation than other Central Asian countries, there is no reason to believe that the ruling elite will not be able to repeat the transition pattern of Uzbekistan.

Kyrgyzstan has proved to be the country of major surprises in Central Asia. The Kyrgyz people overthrew the remnants of Soviet rule in 2005. Once the new government was formed in 2010, it began to openly slide toward corruption. This phenomenon was a major shock to regional despots and powers. Currently Kyrgyzstan is the least authoritarian state in Central Asia. 

Sooronbai Zheenbekov

It is highly unlikely that it will slide back to the same degree of authoritarianism as the people have mustered enough confidence to challenge any group in power. In terms of an Islamic movement rising to power in Kyrgyzstan, it is highly unlikely because it is disorganized and the Russian default position in Central Asia is to have less Islam in the public sphere. Thus, the secular Kyrgyz government can count on Moscow’s assistance in containing the limited Islamic revival within Kyrgyz society.

Tajikistan has always been the pioneer of Islamic revival in the post-Soviet era, a perspective confirmed by facts and even by the detractors of Islamic revival. However, overall, the track record of the most successful Islamic organization in Central Asia, the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) should serve as a lesson for all Islamic movements about how not to behave with despotic regimes and be defeated by them.

Currently, the regime of Emomali Rahmonov has successfully eliminated all challengers in Tajikistan and is promoting his son, Rustam to succeed him. The regime’s primary advantage is that it maintains a Russian military base in the country and can count on Moscow’s unequivocal support to sustain itself in power.

In Central Asia, every regime’s survival depends on how friendly it stays with Russia. The US might be powerful worldwide, but it is Russia that decides who rules in the post-Soviet space. Washington can destabilize situations and create headaches for Moscow in the post-Soviet regions, but its clout is limited and cannot establish functioning governments there. It failed in Georgia and Ukraine with Russia successfully aborting Washington’s plans in both locales.

One of the primary challenges for grassroots Islamic movements in Central Asia is that the Wahhabi narrative is gaining traction in the region, something Crescent International has discussed in-depth. This phenomenon is cultivated artificially by the regimes to justify the use of force against grassroots Islamic organizations. Another key obstacle is the regimes’ brutality and how easily they resort to force against even mild dissent. The two phenomena combined make a deadly mixture as it opens numerous manipulation mechanisms for the regimes.

Today Central Asia is fertile battleground for global powers. The only thing that can deter this from evolving into something very brutal and nasty is that all powers involved — NATO, China, and Russia — will suffer from regional destabilization instigated by whichever side.