The United States risks catastrophe if it seriously considers nuclear war with Russia. A weak and outdated American nuclear arsenal offers no promise of victory. A senseless, unwinnable war is the worst-case scenario.
Bryan Anthony Reo
“You’ve got to know when to hold ’em,
Know when to fold ’em,
Know when to walk away,
know when to run.”
It is likely more Americans are familiar with the song I am quoting than will be with the words of Sun Tzu, who said, “He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight,” but the idea and theme are the same, and it just shows us that there seldom are new ideas; there is truly nothing new under the Sun. My American Christian friends might appreciate, “That which hath been is that which shall be; and that which hath been done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun.” (Ecclesiastes 1:9)
Almost all modern ideas are just modern repackaging of old ideas, whether good ideas or bad ideas. The West resurrects historically discredited and bad ideas (because it lacks any sense of history or gleaning truth from history since the West believes that any pre-modern history is primitive barbarism incapable of providing wisdom or insight), while Russia is a faithful steward of old ancient wisdom passed down through the traditions of the great civilizations of Greece, Rome, and Byzantium.
One ancient lesson is to never go to war unless it is necessary and then only if the likely gains outweigh the likely risks and if you can actually win.
A quick glance at American nuclear forces will reveal that the American nuclear arsenal is geriatric and comprised largely of Cold War legacy systems that are older than the average American. It isn’t the sort of arsenal that any rational person would want to enter into a nuclear war with, although few rational actors would actively seek a nuclear war as a first or second resort, as such weapons are for last resort use. Elements of the American arsenal are older than the Soviet Politburo members were in the 1980s. Our nuclear arsenal is now proper fodder for comedy the way American comedians made light of the advanced age of the old Soviet leaders in the early 1980s.
Let us begin the assessment with the land leg of the nuclear triad
The Minuteman III (the only ICBM of the American land leg of the nuclear triad) was first deployed in 1970, based on further development of the original Minuteman I that began in the mid-1950s, and is clearly about as cutting edge and modern as First World War dreadnoughts were in 1944; that is to say, their best days are long since behind them; their prime is over.
In a certain sense, the US political elite are using fears of Russia to justify a nuclear arms race as a way to redistribute money from Main Street to Wall Street by allowing the Military-Industrial Complex to drain the American taxpayers of their life’s blood
The Minuteman III is based on 1960s upgrades of 1950s designs and technology. I would wager US Marines or Russian VDV could go into battle with M1 Garands or 91/30 Nagants, or any other WW2 service rifle, and still acquit themselves well in infantry combat as they storm and seize a village or a trench, but few infantry squads would have an 80-90 year old rifle as their first choice if given a choice.
This begs the question, why is the entire land-leg of the US nuclear triad resting on the shoulders of the Minuteman III which is woefully inadequate compared to the cutting edge state of the art RS-28 Sarmat, Russia’s latest and most advanced land-based ICBM, already in service with more in production and entering deployment.
For the sake of brevity, I will spare the reader an assessment and analysis of how the US Military-Industrial Complex, for all its bloated budget and endless allocation of taxpayers money, has made virtually no progress on the LGM-35 Sentinel (the proposed/intended replacement of the Minuteman III) and has nothing to show after 5 years and $140+ billion except a Nunn-McCurdy review where the project had to overcome a legislatively imposed presumptive termination due to the project cost having soared from the initial approved $77 billion to more than $140 billion. The Department of Defense saved the project, and the revenue of Northrup Grumann, by certifying that this endless money pit was essential to national security; thus, the spending on the LGM-35 Sentinel continues without pause and without tangible results.
In a certain sense, the US political elite are using fears of Russia to justify a nuclear arms race as a way to redistribute money from Main Street to Wall Street by allowing the Military-Industrial Complex to drain the American taxpayers of their life’s blood.
To contrast the American procurement system with the Russian system, the Sarmat was approximately 8-9 years in design and development and was fielded in 2023, while after 5 years of work on the LGM-35, the US has nothing to show and no viable path to fielding the missile by 2030 as promised (let alone replacing all of the currently deployed Minuteman III systems). As an aside, I expect the entire LGM-35 project will fail, and there will be yet another “life extension” program on the Minuteman III to keep it in service into the 2040s and possibly the early 2050s.
Other Russian ICBM land-based systems already in service, such as the RS-24 Yars, which are more established than the Sarmat due to their having been in service in 2010, are likewise still more impressive and capable than the old, outdated 1970 Minuteman III, and the Yars has been in service long enough to be smoothed over, ironed out, and to have diligent, competent crews comfortable and proficient with the systems. In the category of land-based road-mobile ICBMs, the US has nothing to compare to Russia, as the US fields no such systems, having only silo-based ICBMs.
Conclusion: The Russian land-based systems are vastly superior and far more modern, in addition to Russia possessing impressive road-mobile capabilities.
Strategic missile carriers and hypersonic capabilities
In the air the match up is a bit more even, as both Russia and the US have impressive air-launched cruise missile capabilities, although Russia clearly has an absolute advantage in hypersonic systems such as Kinzhal, as the US presently fields no hypersonic nuclear delivery system for aerial-launching.
In regard to the 19 B-2 stealth bombers, which are the only stealth bombers presently in the US inventory, the only problem is their limited numbers and extremely expensive cost. Russia presently has no system comparable to the B-2 stealth bomber, although the Tupolev PAK DA is in development and will fill this role.
The US also has about 70 to 75 of the B-52 bomber, but that aircraft is about as old as Joe Biden and probably just as useful and reliable for a modern nuclear exchange.
If anybody believes a B-52 would be able to penetrate modern Russian air defenses and deliver a nuclear payload against a target, they’ve been watching Dr. Strangelove too many times (and possibly while under the influence of LSD). F-15Es and F-35As might be available for short-range tactical nuclear delivery, but this is a far cry from striking strategic targets deep inside a targeted adversary.
In the air it becomes clear that the US doesn’t have sufficient strategic delivery platforms and it lacks anything in regard to hypersonic capabilities, but it does have some impressive air-launched cruise missiles and stealth aircraft.
Who’s stronger underwater: Russia or the US?
At sea the main comparison will be between the Ohio class SSBN (with the Trident II SLBM) and the Borei-class SSBN (with the RSM-56 Bulava SLBM), although it is worth noting that while the Ohio SSBN is the only class of boomer presently in service in the USA, the Borei is not the only nuclear missile class in the Russian arsenal, as Russia also has a number of Delta-class in service, which are older, dating from the 1980s (around the same time as the Ohio class).
Ostensibly the Ohio class will be replaced by the Columbia class, which is now slated to enter service in 2031, which is something that probably won’t happen, as the US Military-Industrial Complex is usually known for two things: being behind schedule and over budget. Delivery was originally for 2028, and service entry was 2029.
In regard to the submarines themselves, the Borei class is very impressive, and the general preview given of the intended successor, the Arcturus class, is such that it seems Arcturus will be similarly impressive. The only downside I see with Russia’s procurement system is that rapid parallel production of larger warships is difficult due to limited shipyard capacity relative to the USA, but the quality is impressive. Although even American shipyard capacity is nothing today compared to what it was 40-60 years ago.
In regard to the SLBMs, I believe that from the published data, the Trident II edges out the RSM-56 Bulava on maximum range and on maximum MIRV potential, although it can’t be publicly discovered what the MIRV count is on any particular deployed missile, I would expect that given the American-instigated deterioration in relations with Russia over the last 5-10 years, the Americans have possibly increased (or maxed out) the deployed MIRV count on the Trident IIs on the boomers. This is ultimately speculation on my part, but not simply one of taking a stab in the dark, but rather based on what I think an aggressive declining hegemon would do. I don’t know if the US has maxed out or will max out with MIRVs, but it is plausible to consider that they may have; they certainly have motivation and opportunity to do it.
When considering the possibility of a full MIRV maxing out, it must be acknowledged that such a thing is not proven, but it is
- Plausible as a strategic act,
- Not confirmed,
- Not required by doctrine,
- But entirely feasible and not irrational.
New START governs the deployed MIRV warhead count. The treaty is set to expire on February 5, 2026. President Putin has offered to continue observing the quantitative limits (i.e., warhead and launcher caps) for one year past the expiration, if the U.S. reciprocates and observes similar limits. At the present time, the US has not formally responded.
Conclusion
Russia does not appear to want a new nuclear arms race, but the US seems to be dancing around the possibility of instigating an actual nuclear war, although it is not at all clear to me that the US would do particularly well in a nuclear war with Russia.
In the realm of statesmanship on the stage of international relations, the only thing worse than starting an unnecessary war is starting an unnecessary war that cannot be won.
If rational, logical, and sane voices prevail, then we might be fortunate enough to not have to find out. Unfortunately, there seem to be scant few such voices in the USA or the Collective West.
Bryan Anthony Reo is a licensed attorney based in Ohio and an analyst of military history, geopolitics, and international relations
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