Showing posts with label M. K. BHADRAKUMAR. Show all posts
Showing posts with label M. K. BHADRAKUMAR. Show all posts

Saturday, August 31, 2019

India’s Narrative On J&K Is Hyperbolic

by M. K. BHADRAKUMAR
Editorials have appeared in two leading Delhi newspapers today (here and here) urging the government to present a credible, appealing diplomatic narrative on the J&K developments.
The Indian narrative so far is largely focused on the domestic audience. It has gone to ridiculous extents by projecting that the situation is actually quite “normal” in J&K. Pictures of National Security Advisor Ajit Doval savouring (mutton) biryani with Kashmiri Muslims on a street corner in Srinagar have been doing the rounds. (Indeed, it was a charade to hoodwink the public.)
Crude propaganda won’t win hearts and minds. A narrative has to be crafted rationally. It’s common knowledge that there is little  acceptance of the government move among Kashmiri Muslims.
When it comes to the external projection of the Indian narrative, given the fact that India’s case is flying in the face of international law and the UN Charter, the government must be capable of sensitivity.
The government would have seized the initiative at the diplomatic level if only soon after Home Minister Amit Shah piloted through both houses of the parliament at breakneck speed the legislation on abrogating Article 370 of the constitution, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar had stood up and made a suo moto statement offering to discuss all differences with Pakistan bilaterally in a comprehensive dialogue in the best interests of regional security, peace and stability.
Of course, such a momentous initiative would have required imagination, far-sightedness and wisdom — and, most important, political courage at the leadership level. The shortfall in statecraft and diplomacy is appalling.
A self-righteous attitude will not do. Take EAM’s demarche with the Chinese counterpart State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing on Monday. The MEA readout spells out the Indian stance on the following lines:
One, constitutional amendment is an “internal matter for India” and the “sole prerogative of the country”.
Two, abrogation of J&K’s special status (including changes in Ladakh’s status) is aimed at “promoting better governance and socio-economic development”.
Three, the government move has “no implication for either the external boundaries of India or the Line of Actual Control” with China.

Wang Yi in talks with S. Jaishankar
China’s State Councilor & Foreign Minister Wang Yi in talks with India’s Minister of External Affairs S. Jaishankar, Beijing, Aug. 12, 2019.

And, four, India is “not raising any additional territorial claims.”
Incredibly enough, this was how EAM brushed aside China’s “serious concern over the recent escalation of turmoil in Kashmir” –that any unilateral action that may complicate the situation in Kashmir should not be taken; that Kashmir issue is a dispute born out of the region’s colonial history and should be properly handled in a peaceful way in line with the UN Charter, relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council and bilateral agreements between Pakistan and India”; and, its expectation that “India will play a constructive role in regional peace and stability.” (here, here, here, here and here) 
EAM’s rejoinder may have some resonance domestically within India as a macho attitude, but it will only arouse mirth and derision abroad — even in the diplomatic enclave in Chanakyapuri area.
No P5 member country has officially voiced support for India. There is no shred of evidence that the Russian Foreign Ministry voiced support for India on the issue — not on the FO website; neither in a Tass or Novosti report nor even in the irrepressible Russian press. Some fly-by-night operator well-versed with the Indian rope trick, apparently spread fake news on a Friday night and it became “breaking news” in India by next morning. Pathetic.
Simply put, the Indian stance articulated by EAM is fundamentally flawed in logic and can only be counter-productive, as it shuts the door on discussion. The point is, Kashmir is an international dispute and India unilaterally changed J&K’s “status” in violation of the relevant UN resolutions. No one will accept India’s claim that it is an “internal matter”.
The world opinion accepts that Pakistan is party to Kashmir dispute. It is beside the point that India is not redrawing boundaries. And it’s gratuitous to say there is “no implication” for the LOC or the LOAC. If things were that simple, why couldn’t Modi government stomach the CPEC passing through Gilgit-Baltistan? We screamed, “territorial sovereignty” blah, blah.
The world opinion will only believe that Delhi’s real intention is to change the demographic balance so that there shall be no Muslim-majority entity henceforth within the Indian Union.
If such unilateral acts in modern history are as simple as “internal matter”, why is no one recognising Russia’s annexation of Crimea? Why is Beijing so sensitive on intervention in Hong Kong? Why is the US insisting on “freedom of navigation” in South China Sea? Why is the US raising eyebrow over the North Sea Route and the Arctic? What is wrong with Iran’s claim over Persian Gulf as sovereign territory? What prevents Sri Lanka’s Mahinda Rajapaksa from solving the Tamil problem in similar fashion (as he hinted last week)?
The Modi government will be creating a long-term, intractable problem for India for generations to come by adopting such an ostrich approach. Analysts have pointed out (here and here) that the change in Ladakh’s status makes India-China border dispute incredibly complicated and all but unsolvable. India’s international standing can get seriously damaged.   
The only way to address the conundrum is to propose to Pakistan that India is ready to discuss these differences. Fortuitously, Pakistan also faces the unhappy situation that no one in the international community is showing willingness to stand up and be counted as its partner to push back at India.
The bottom line is that India enjoys wide acceptance for its insistence on bilateralism to resolve differences with Pakistan. India should now tactfully exercise this privilege. It is always possible to hold out informal assurances that there’ll be no “colonisation” of Kashmir valley. After all, we have such safeguards for many regions of India.   

Demonstrators in Srinagar
Demonstrators shout slogans outside a hospital emergency unit during protest against lockdown, Srinagar, August 9, 2019

The window of opportunity shall not remain open for long. From all accounts, the ground situation in J&K is explosive and the grating roar of human misery is approaching. PM Imran Khan’s prognosis on another Pulwama is not off the mark. For Delhi to build a new architecture in J&K out of the debris all around, a dialogue with Pakistan is critically important.

Saturday, August 03, 2019

Zarif drives Trump to insanity

The latest idiotic move of the US in the unwarranted crisis it has stirred up with the Islamic Republic by withdrawing illegally from the international nuclear deal and then adopting a policy of economic terrorism, is the ill-defined sanctions it recently imposed on Iran’s Chief Diplomat, while pretending to be ready for unconditional talks for diplomatic solution to the conflict of its own making.
The following is an analysis by retired Indian diplomat, M.K. Bhadrakumar, titled “Zarif drives Trump to insanity” that appeared simultaneously in the  ‘Indian Punchline’ and ‘Globetrotter’.
Iran’s Foreign Minister, Dr. Mohammad Javad Zarif, a fluent English speaker, could tweet, debate and spar with any American with delectable ease – a factor that has unnerved the US administration of Donald Trump.
At a time when the Trump administration has no problem negotiating with the secretary of the Russian National Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, who has technically been under US sanctions since April 2018, the cut and thrust of Washington’s move to sanction the Iranian Foreign Minister needs to be understood properly.
How did US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo try to explain the sanctions on Zarif?
Pompeo’s statement last Wednesday attributed to Zarif the following sins:
A) Zarif “acted on behalf of the Leader” of the Islamic Revolution – Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei”;
B) Zarif took “direction from the Supreme Leader and his office”;
C) Zarif was “a key enabler of Ayatollah Khamenei’s policies throughout the region and around the world”;
D) Zarif has been “a senior official and apologist” of the Iranian government and has “for years now been complicit in these allegedly malign activities.”
Basically, Pompeo’s grouse narrows down to this: Zarif is a disciplined, dutiful, loyal Iranian public servant who abided by the Iranian system of government based on the concept of Velayat-e Faqih, or “Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist.”
Has that become a sin? Any foreign minister has his job cut out for him – in accordance with the system of government of his country – even Pompeo.
Pompeo has no pretensions that he is holding the job entirely at the pleasure and discretion of his own leader, President Donald Trump. Trump, in fact, is an unforgiving stickler for loyalty.
Anyone in doubt should ask James Mattis or Rex Tillerson – respectively the Secretaries of Defense and State, whom Trump unceremoniously removed for objecting to his quixotic policies.
The US establishment knows very well how the concept Velayat-e Faqih operates, how the alchemy of political power is formed in Iran, and how the decision-making process is reached. Even Trump would know it.
That is why Trump even tried to get through to the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, and was duly snubbed.
So, where is the beef?
Simply put, Zarif per se is the problem. The Trump administration is desperately trying to put an end to Zarif’s contacts with the American elite. Zarif lived and worked for several years in the US from the age of 17 – as a high-school student, university student and career diplomat, ending up as Iran’s representative at the United Nations from 2002 to 2007.
He also kept closely in touch with the US academia and intellectual circles in his capacity as a professor and editor of scholarly journals in Tehran and has written copiously on disarmament, human rights, international law and regional conflicts.
Indeed, what rankles the Trump administration is that Zarif has extensively networked with American intellectuals, politicians, think-tankers and media people – figures as diverse as Joe Biden, John Kerry, Nancy Pelosi, Chuck Hagel, Nicholas Kristof, Thomas Pickering, James Dobbins and Christiane Amanpour.
Zarif took his job seriously, and, being a fluent English speaker, he could tweet and debate and spar with any American with delectable ease. Zarif outclassed the mediocre American foreign-and security-policy team – a “B Team” or second grade team in the words of the Iranian Foreign Minister.
Zarif’s periodical visits to New York – to attend UN events – increasingly became a nightmare for the Trump administration as the Iranian Foreign Minister cast his net wide and ably put across the Islamic Republic’s narrative. Trump singled out more than once the fact that Zarif had meetings with Kerry, the former US Secretary of State who negotiated the 2015 deal with Iran – along with Russia, China, France, Germany and Britain, known as Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
This is the crux of the matter. By imposing sanctions on Zarif, the US can deny a visa to him and render unlawful any contact between him and any American national – liable to prosecution unde law.
In effect, Trump has made sure that Zarif does not come to New York between now and the 2020 November election so his detractors and critics cannot hear from him the Iranian narrative.
Trump feels exasperated that Iran is winning the information war. And he is worried that between now and November 2020, his re-election campaign may get booby-trapped. For any longtime observer of the US-Iran stand-off, it is obvious that a sea change has appeared in the American discourses on Iran.
There is an influential and ever-growing body of opinion in the US today that disagrees with Trump’s so-called “maximum pressure” strategy. This constituency rationally argues that Trump should not have dumped the 2015 nuclear deal.
Equally, there is a far better understanding today in informed American opinion regarding Iran and its policies.
The surprising part is that such an awakening has happened despite the Herculean efforts by the Israeli lobby to demonize Iran and to stymie all contrarian views in the media, think-tanks and campuses – and Capitol Hill.
In view of these fact, will Trump’s ploy work?
The answer is obvious – unlikely.
The point is that Zarif is irrepressible. He will continue to tease, taunt, disparage, humiliate and expose and run down Trump’s Iran policies. Worse still, Zarif has driven a knife into the heart of the “B Team” driving the US administration’s Iran policies.
Trump’s sanctions against Zarif will not set an example for any other country that has diplomatic relations with Iran. In the final analysis, Trump will have to deal with Zarif, whether he likes him or not.
The best way to counter Zarif would have been to handpick an intellectually resourceful, dynamic state secretary. A mediocrity like Pompeo stands no chance with Zarif.
In 2001, Zarif was Iran’s main representative at the Bonn Conference, which brought together regional players in the aftermath of the US invasion of Afghanistan and the ousting of the Taliban. His American counterpart at the event, James Dobbins – who was later named as Barack Obama’s special envoy to Afghanistan – wrote a memorable essay The Washington Quarterly titled “Negotiating with Iran: Reflections from Personal Experience” about Zarif’s erudition, wit and charm – and his pragmatism, which helped the two diplomats to thrash out “over morning coffee and cakes” a deal that led to the setting up of the interim government led by Hamid Karzai.
Washington has now sanctioned the man who played a pivotal role in that fateful transition in Kabul leading to stabilization in the Hindu Kush. Some gratitude!

Thursday, July 25, 2019

Iran Seizes UK Tanker In Counter-Escalation

Written by M. K. BHADRAKUMAR
The seizure of a British oil tanker by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps on July 20 in the Strait of Hormuz has all the hallmarks of a retaliatory act in the downstream of the seizure of an Iranian tanker by the British Navy exactly two weeks ago on July 4 off Gibralter.
On July 16, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had warned, “Iran will respond to the vicious Britain’s piracy. Iran’s response will come at the right time and the right place.” Four days later, IRGC struck. An IRGC statement gave a detailed account of what happened. Footage of the incident has also been released — just as Britain did.
Iran is taunting Britain and making it look foolish. Britain is now left with no option but to negotiate. And the outcome of any negotiations can be easily foretold — Britain will have to unceremoniously set free the Iranian tanker.
Quite obviously, the seizure of the Iranian tanker by Britain was done in tandem with the hardliners in Washington and it is by now clear that the EU distanced itself from it in considerable embarrassment. Britain’s dilemma now will be that all its ships in the Strait of Hormuz are in Iran’s crosshairs. And Britain is left all alone to take the flak after precipitating a crisis needlessly. (See Guardian columnist Simon Tisdall’s stunning piece, How Trump’s arch-hawk lured Britain into a dangerous trap to punish Iran.) 
Yesterday’s incident was a calculated act by the IRGC, enacted right under the nose of a British warship, which was escorting the tanker. When the warship threatened to open fire, IRGC retorted that it would also retaliate with fire. Thereupon, an Iranian helicopter dropped masked men on the British tanker and took control of it. The intention is to make the Brits look impotent and stupid. (See the Press TV commentary The Royal Navy: From Piracy to Impotence.)

British tanker
The British tanker seized by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps in Strait of Hormuz, Jul 20, 2019

In a broader perspective, therefore, it appears that Iran may have underscored that its earlier threat must be taken very seriously — that if its oil exports ever got intercepted or blocked, then no one will be allowed to export oil via the Strait of Hormuz. More fundamentally, this is an unambiguous  message that if the “other side” escalates, make no mistake, Iran will counter escalate.
****
On July 17, Iran’s semi-official news agency Fars News had carried an interviewwith me (in Persian) on the seizure of the Iranian oil tanker by Britain and its likely consequences as well as the related issues of the Iran-EU cogitations over the mechanism known as INSTEX, which Brussels has put in place to circumvent US sanctions against Iran.
In the context of yesterday’s incident in the Straits of Hormuz, my interview with the Fars correspondent Mahdi Khodabakhsh may be of interest. The English translation of the interview follows:

‘Indian diplomat: British action against Iran on behalf of the United States.’

QUESTION: As you know, some days ago UK royal navy seized a Tanker containing Iranian crude oil off Gibraltar. UK claimed it was bound to Syria which is under sanctions. Do you think UK’s move was legal? What does the international law say about it?
ANSWER: As far as I can gather from media reports, the legality of the British action is highly questionable. Syria is not under any UN sanctions and under international law, there is no embargo on oil supplies to that country.
QUESTION: How do you see the development and what effect it can have on Iran relations with EU? (also considering recent JCPOA tensions) 
ANSWER: This is an act of blatant provocation with a view to inciting an Iranian reaction that could in turn be used as an alibi for some other downstream action by the US. I cannot see how the EU can endorse the British action because the group has no such policy to enforce a naval blockade of Syria. At least, I have not seen any EU country endorsing the British action so far. There are also signs that UK is seeking some sort of a patch-up with Iran, while saving face, because the international opinion did not support the British action. 
QUESTION: In your opinion would it be proper for Iran – in this tense situation – to react to UK’s move and do something retaliatory? If No, why is that; and if Yes what could the response be? 
ANSWER: I have no doubt that Iran views the British belligerence with utmost seriousness and there will be consequences. Having said that, in my opinion, it is only proper that Iran has refused to be provoked into any knee-jerk response but is taking its own time. There could be a range of responses that Iran could consider, but importantly, Iran should only give a measured response that does not provide excuses for the US for doing something reckless or aggressive. The US or the so-called B Team, to my mind, has most likely instigated the British action. This is a surcharged atmosphere and Iran has so far acted with restraint and dignity — and rationally.
QUESTION: As we know, Iran started taking second step in reducing its obligations under JCPOA from yesterday due to Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the deal and of course because Iran did not benefited from economic relief. So how do you think EU and other remaining parties in JCPOA will react to these steps by Iran? Are they going to trigger the dispute mechanism and snap-back lifted UN sanctions? 
ANSWER: The EU foreign ministers meeting in Brussels on Monday reportedly took the decision that the situation does not warrant any move to trigger the dispute mechanism or to demand snap-back sanctions. 
QUESTION: Yesterday EU ministers held a meeting in Brussels with a focus on the Deal however many of the diplomats including French, Britain, German, Dutch, Finnish Foreign Ministers and even Mogherini called on Iran to stay committed unilaterally to JCPOA but say nothing about  US withdrawal. Do you think with this trend, JCPOA will survive? Considering European partners’ inaction against US sanctions on Iran and its unilateral withdrawal from the deal, despite 14 months period Iran given to them for some efforts; do you think that EU really wants the JCPOA? Are they sincere in what they say about Iran deal? UK, Britain and France tried to put together a mechanism to evade US sanctions for trading with Iran called INSTEX. However Tehran says it was not fruitful. How do you elaborate its effectiveness to benefit Iran from JCPOA economic relief? Is US capable of sanctioning the whole INSTEX?
ANSWER: The EU is walking a fine line. It is unrealistic to expect the US’ European allies — make no mistake, there are still allies — to publicly condemn Washington even if they disagree fundamentally on the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA. Clearly, the EU is keen that the JCPOA survives and there should be no doubt on that score. One can see that the EU is on the defensive, as it realises that the EU and the E3 have not been able to fulfil their obligations under the JCPOA. What they are trying to do, in my opinion, is to mitigate to some extent Iran’s losses. As of now, there is a visible shortfall. The issue is not about sincerity but about politics, which is the art of the possible. 
The INSTEX has just become operational.  The EU foreign policy chief Mogherini is on record that the mechanism is fleshing out some business proposals already. She also said that certain non-EU third parties have shown interest in the INSTEX. These are encouraging signs. To my mind, these are early days and it is difficult to pass final judgment. Mogherini claimed that the E3 are also discussing the feasibility of oil trade being included in the INSTEX mechanism. 
As things stand, the US may see the INSTEX as contravening its sanctions and the ‘maximum pressure’ policy. But then, on the other hand, US is also interested that the JCPOA survives (according to Mogherini.) Therefore, a pragmatic US attitude toward INSTEX cannot be ruled out, either. As I said earlier, this is an evolving situation.