The Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar, in an analytical report examining the formation and evolution of Yemen's Ansarullah movement, described the movement's relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran and Lebanon's Hezbollah as different from the model of dependency and obedience, and wrote that the experience of years of resistance has led to the formation of a set of military, intelligence, security, and industrial capabilities in Yemen; capabilities that, according to the newspaper, have played a decisive role in recent regional developments and the confrontation with America and the Zionist regime.
Al-Amin, at the beginning of this report, referring to the continuation of the resistance forces' activities after the martyrdom of a number of commanders and forces of this front, considered the relations between Ansarullah and other groups of the resistance axis to be the result of years of cooperation and interaction, and wrote that in these relations, a common understanding of the nature of the battle and, at the same time, an understanding of the role and characteristics of each party of the resistance axis has been formed.
He went on to describe the relationship between Ansarullah and Lebanon's Hezbollah as one of the special examples of this cooperation and considered it a sign of the type of relations between resistance groups and the Islamic Republic of Iran; relations that, according to the author, differ from the narratives put forward by opponents of the resistance axis about the "dependency" of these groups.
Emphasis on Ansarullah's Decision-Making Independence
Al-Amin, referring to the formation of Lebanon's Hezbollah and Yemen's Ansarullah, emphasized that neither of these two currents was formed by an administrative decision or political order, but according to him, the social and political demands of broad segments of the region's people were the basis for their emergence.
He also considered the role of the Islamic Republic of Iran in creating a center of support for resistance currents against American and Zionist regime occupation, while writing that each of the resistance groups has followed its own special path in accordance with its social, political, and historical conditions.
The Lebanese analyst also referred to the narratives of resistance opponents about Iran's relationship with Hezbollah and Ansarullah and wrote that some Western and Arab governments try to present these groups as merely branches of the Islamic Republic of Iran; while, according to the author, a more accurate understanding of these relations requires attention to the independence of each resistance current and the specific conditions of their operating environment.
The Role of Martyr Hashem Safi al-Din in Deepening Cooperation with Ansarullah
In another part of the report, the author referred to the role of Martyr Hashem Safi al-Din and other Lebanese resistance commanders in developing communication with Ansarullah and claimed that Martyr Hashem Safi al-Din traveled to Yemen many times over the years and, in conversations with Ansarullah's political, military, and security leaders, played a role in understanding the movement's capabilities and needs.
Al-Amin, quoting what resistance commanders have said about how they interacted with Ansarullah, emphasizes that the fundamental principle in this cooperation was respect for Yemen's internal conditions and leaving decisions related to this country to Yemeni forces.
In this narrative, cooperation among the parties of the resistance axis was formed not based on giving orders, but on the transfer of experience, consultation, and support; in such a way that decision-making on Yemen's internal and field issues remained with the forces present in this country.
Bab al-Mandab; A Turning Point in Yemen's Resistance Path
Al-Akhbar went on to consider developments related to Bab al-Mandab and Yemen's western coast as one of the turning points in Ansarullah's path of activity and wrote that this movement over the years has been able to take actions that, according to the author, have had consequences beyond Yemen's borders, by understanding regional conditions and choosing the appropriate time.
Al-Amin emphasized that the importance of Bab al-Mandab developments cannot be analyzed merely within the framework of Iran-US rivalry and added that, from the newspaper's perspective, the mentioned developments also have direct consequences for Yemen's internal and security equations.
He went on to criticize Saudi and UAE policies toward Yemen and claimed that ending the blockade and leaving decision-making about Yemen's future to the people of this country could pave the way for changing the equations.
"The School of Resistance"; From Field Experience to Capability Development
The second part of Al-Akhbar's report, titled "The Houthi School; Sciences and Ideas That Operate Around the Clock," is dedicated to the process of developing Ansarullah's capabilities.
The newspaper, referring to months of planning for operations related to the western coast and Bab al-Mandab, claimed that Ansarullah over about two decades has accumulated experience in various military, security, and intelligence fields and has tried to develop its needed capabilities inside Yemen.
The report states that Ansarullah, after the experience of various wars, including extensive clashes with Saudi- and UAE-backed forces, has conducted numerous assessments of its military performance and concluded that to increase operational capability, it must revise its methods of warfare, force structure, and use of internal capacities.
Reliance on Internal Capacities and Development of Military Industries
Al-Amin went on to consider the development of domestic military industries as one of the important axes of Ansarullah's transformation and wrote that this movement, alongside receiving foreign aid, has turned to attracting specialized and educated forces to develop internal capabilities.
According to the newspaper, part of the equipment and infrastructure left over from the era of Ali Abdullah Saleh has also come into the possession of Ansarullah forces, and this movement has tried to increase its domestic production capacity in areas such as missiles, drones, and naval equipment by developing and updating them.
The report also claims that there has been technical cooperation and transfer of experience between Tehran and Sana'a in various fields, but the process of developing Ansarullah's military capabilities has not been limited to the production of equipment and has also included areas such as communications, reconnaissance, and intelligence capabilities.
Development of Ansarullah's Intelligence Structure
One of the main sections of Al-Akhbar's report is dedicated to the transformation of Ansarullah's intelligence and security structure.
Al-Amin, referring to the intelligence cooperation of the former Yemeni government with America after the September 11 incidents, claimed that part of the intelligence equipment and infrastructure of that period came into the possession of Ansarullah after the fall of the Saleh government, and this movement in later years tried to rebuild, maintain, and develop these capabilities.
According to this report, Ansarullah went on to create multi-layered intelligence structures and tried to gain a more comprehensive picture of internal and regional developments by covering various regions of Yemen, including areas under the influence of forces aligned with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Al-Amin claims that this intelligence structure, in addition to monitoring Yemen's internal developments, also pursues regional and international issues and provides its information and assessments to political and military levels.
The Experience of Naval Confrontation with America
In the continuation of this report, Ansarullah's naval battle with America is presented as one of the most important tests of this movement's intelligence and operational capability.
According to Al-Akhbar, in this confrontation, Ansarullah has tried to focus on identifying the other side's movements, concealing capabilities, relocating equipment, and maintaining the element of surprise, instead of direct competition with the US Navy.
Al-Amin claims that this approach has made the operations of American forces in the Red Sea difficult and has caused Washington to face challenges in accurately identifying Ansarullah's positions and capabilities.
The report also refers to claims raised about Ansarullah's use of satellite capabilities and foreign technologies to monitor naval movements; claims that have been raised by various sources and require independent and precise examination.
Confronting the Enemy's Air and Technological Superiority
In the final part of the report, the author refers to what he calls "passive defense" and considers it part of Ansarullah's experience in confronting the enemy's air and intelligence superiority.
According to Al-Akhbar, Ansarullah during the years of war has tried to make it difficult for the other side to identify and target its military infrastructure by dispersing equipment, camouflage, using mountainous areas, and creating underground facilities.
The newspaper also refers to the existence of networks of tunnels and underground facilities in Yemen and claims that part of this infrastructure has remained from the era of Ali Abdullah Saleh's rule and was later developed.
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