The Cradle
The scale matters not only for its human cost, but for what it reveals about how war is being used.
Across these fronts, Israel has deployed a wide range of military systems, from precision missiles and drones to interception platforms, radars, and electronic warfare tools. The battlefield now serves as a proving ground, where these systems are not only used but also showcased.
The central question, then, is no longer simply who arms Israel. It is who enables the system that turns ongoing war into a sustained cycle of production, testing, and global sales.
For decades, US and western support formed the backbone of Israel’s military capacity, providing political cover, financial backing, and technological cooperation. That structure remains intact. But it is no longer the only pillar.
A second layer has taken shape over recent years: normalized Arab states, particularly those tied to the Abraham Accords. These states have become a growing market for Israeli defense exports, forming part of a financial circuit that feeds directly into the industries underpinning Israel’s wars.
The numbers behind the industry
Data released by Israel’s Ministry of Defense shows that defense exports reached a record $19.2 billion in 2025, marking the fifth consecutive year of growth. Over five years, exports have doubled; over a decade, they have quadrupled.
Roughly half of these deals, about $10 billion, are direct government-to-government agreements. That detail is critical. It points to a system where arms exports are not merely commercial transactions, but embedded in political and security relationships.
The trajectory of Arab participation in this market reflects the same pattern. In 2022, Abraham Accords countries accounted for 24 percent of Israeli defense exports, roughly $3 billion. In 2023, their share dropped sharply to around three percent, as the Gaza war reshaped public optics and political messaging.
That decline proved temporary. By 2024, their share had rebounded to 12 percent, or about $1.78 billion. In 2025, Israel reclassified its export categories under the broader label of “Middle East and North Africa,” which accounted for 15 percent of exports, approximately $2.88 billion. This grouping includes the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco.
The shift in terminology does little to obscure the underlying trend. Arab demand for Israeli military technology has resumed its upward path, even as the wars driving that demand continue.
Notably, in 2025, this regional category surpassed the US as a destination for Israeli defense exports, with 15 percent compared to 13 percent. That comparison underscores the extent to which normalization has moved beyond diplomacy into structured military and financial integration.
Three companies dominate this sector: Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, and Rafael Advanced Defense Systems. Together, they account for roughly 90 percent of exports. Their growth reflects not only rising demand, but a system in which battlefield use feeds directly into sales.
War as a sales platform
Israeli officials have not concealed the relationship between military operations and export growth. Statements from defense leadership consistently link battlefield outcomes to commercial success.
When announcing export figures, officials pointed explicitly to operations in Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iran as drivers of demand. The battlefield is increasingly presented as proof of commercial value. This is reinforced by a recurring phrase in Israeli defense marketing – systems described as “tested in battle” or “combat-proven.”
Each operation feeds into this narrative. Missile interceptions are presented as proof of air defense performance. Surveillance systems draw credibility from real-time targeting. Drone strikes and precision operations are folded into product portfolios as evidence of what works in the field.
In this framework, war sits inside the production cycle. Military operations generate both demand and validation, giving companies material to present their technologies as proven under pressure.
Civilian areas, contested territories, and active war zones become the environment in which systems are refined and marketed. As such, the line between operational necessity and commercial utility becomes increasingly blurred.
Normalization as integration
As The Cradle has previously documented, certain Gulf cooperation has extended far beyond diplomacy into trade, logistics, and military coordination. The emerging picture now goes further, pointing to a deeper integration with Israel’s defense economy itself.
When the Abraham Accords were signed in 2020, they were presented as a shift toward economic cooperation and regional stability. Trade, tourism, and technological exchange formed the public face of the agreements.
Over time, the security dimension has moved to the center. The integration of Israel into US Central Command (CENTCOM) structures facilitated direct and indirect military cooperation with Arab states operating within the same strategic framework.
This shift turned normalization into a layered security relationship. The UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco now sit within a broader network linking regional security architecture to Israeli defense industries.
Evidence of this integration appears in procurement patterns and defense engagement. Morocco has reportedly acquired around $2 billion in Israeli military equipment since normalization, with a growing share of its imports tied to Israeli systems. Israeli firms have also expanded their presence in Gulf defense exhibitions, with the UAE serving as a prominent venue.
The persistence of these ties during wartime is particularly telling. While some states have reduced the visibility of their cooperation amid the destruction in Gaza, the underlying relationships have continued.
Export data reflects this continuity. The share of Israeli defense exports going to the region rose even as the war expanded. In 2024, after the first year of the war, Abraham Accords countries accounted for 12 percent of Israeli defense exports. By 2025, the share had risen to 15 percent. The trajectory suggests that normalization has created durable channels that are not easily reversed by political pressure or public opinion.
While Israel rarely discloses the identities of buyers, export categories reveal the nature of demand. In 2025, missiles and air defense systems made up 29 percent of exports, followed by surveillance and reconnaissance systems at 22 percent, while radars, electronic warfare, and aviation-related systems each accounted for significant shares.
Elbit as a model: The company that profits from war
Elbit Systems offers a clear window into how this model operates at the corporate level. The company reported revenues of $7.9 billion in 2025, a 16 percent increase, alongside an order backlog of $28.1 billion. Roughly 72 percent of that backlog comes from outside Israel.
Company leadership has linked this growth directly to ongoing conflicts. Statements to investors and media highlight increased demand following operations in Gaza and the US-Israeli war on Iran.
Executives have also pointed to interest from Abraham Accords countries, framing it as part of a wider trend among states facing similar security concerns.
What emerges is a cycle linking conflict to demand and demand to production. Companies position themselves within it, presenting battlefield experience as a competitive edge.
Customers, in turn, seek systems that have been deployed under real conditions. The preference for “proven” technology reinforces the link between active conflict zones and commercial success.
Expanding fronts, expanding markets
The growth in defense exports aligns closely with the widening scope of Israeli military activity.
In Gaza, the war has produced one of the most severe humanitarian crises in recent history. In the occupied West Bank, displacement has surged, with tens of thousands forced from their homes in areas such as Jenin, Tulkarem, and Nour Shams.
In Lebanon, ongoing ceasefire violations have sustained a volatile front. In Iran, direct strikes have marked a shift from covert confrontation to open engagement. In Yemen, maritime and missile dynamics have added another layer to the conflict environment.
These overlapping fronts form a continuous operational landscape. In Israeli defense discourse, they are treated as proof of capability across multiple domains.
For the industry, this breadth means more systems tested across multiple theaters, not just a single scenario. That record is what gets sold.
At the same time, the continuity of war ensures that production and export commitments remain uninterrupted. Israeli defense officials have emphasized that industries continue to supply the military while fulfilling international contracts, indicating that conflict has not constrained output.
Financing the system
The expansion of defense exports is part of a broader strategy aimed at reinforcing Israel’s military capabilities.
According to official statements, export revenues contribute to strengthening the armed forces, supporting industrial development, and expanding the defense budget. Each contract feeds into a system that links industry, military planning, and foreign policy.
Within this framework, funds from external buyers – whether western allies or normalized Arab states – become part of the financial base sustaining Israel’s military operations.
Government-to-government deals deepen this connection. They are negotiated directly with institutions that oversee both defense production and military deployment. The distinction between buyer and strategic partner becomes less clear.
For complicit Arab states, the implications extend beyond procurement. Financial flows are integrated into a cycle that supports the production of systems used in ongoing conflicts across the region.
A regional economy shaped by war
What has taken shape is a regional dynamic in which conflict, commerce, and political alignment intersect.
Israel presents its military capability as a source of reliability and strength. Its defense industries promote systems validated through continuous operations. Buyers seek technology that has been tested under real conditions.
Normalization agreements have facilitated this exchange, creating pathways through which capital, technology, and security cooperation move with fewer constraints. The result is an environment where war underpins economic activity.
For West Asia, the consequences are not limited to immediate security concerns. They extend into the structure of economic and political relationships, shaping how states interact and where their priorities lie.
The question that follows is not only about policy, but about alignment. As financial and security ties deepen, the space for neutrality narrows.
The cost of alignment
After years of expanding conflict across multiple fronts, the contours of this system are now visible.
The Abraham Accords have evolved beyond diplomatic agreements into mechanisms that connect Arab capital to Tel Aviv’s defense industry. Arms deals, joint frameworks, and security coordination have created a network in which economic exchange and military activity are closely linked.
The impact of these relationships cannot be separated from the wars in which the systems are used. The same technologies marketed abroad are deployed across the region, and the revenues they generate feed back into the structures that sustain them.
As the cycle of conflict and commerce continues, the lines between battlefield, marketplace, and political alignment grow increasingly difficult to distinguish.
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