Lebanon faces mounting pressure over security arrangements in the south, placing the army at the center of a battle over its future role amid the country's deep political divisions.

The Cradle

The issue has gained urgency as Lebanese President Joseph Aoun adopted a sharper tone on questions of sovereignty, Hezbollah, and Iran. At the same time, LAF Commander General Rudolphe Haikal was preparing to travel to Islamabad at the invitation of his Pakistani counterpart, General Asim Munir. While the visit had been arranged weeks earlier, its timing has attracted attention, given the sensitive political climate.
Aoun’s recent remarks offered the clearest indication yet of the direction the Lebanese state appears to be taking. In an interview with CNN, he accused Iran of using Lebanon as a “bargaining chip” in negotiations with the US and argued that Lebanese interests do not necessarily align with Tehran’s.
He went further by saying Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem does not represent the Lebanese people: “They are Lebanese people. They are not Naim Qassem’s people,” adding that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) must understand that Lebanon belongs to the Lebanese by stating: “It’s not your country, it’s our country.”
The comments coincided with the emergence of the so-called Washington Declaration, which includes a ceasefire arrangement, a larger LAF deployment in the south, restrictions on military activity outside state institutions, and continued political and security negotiations.
For Qassem, the declaration is just a “roadmap for the annihilation of part of the Lebanese people and the subjugation of the rest.”
Nevertheless, behind the proposals lies an important question: what exactly is expected of the Lebanese army in the coming period?
The army at the center of any settlement
Across Lebanon’s political spectrum, there is broad agreement that the LAF has become the cornerstone of any plan for the south.
The arrangements under discussion do not rely on new international forces or monitoring mechanisms. Instead, they depend on expanding the army’s presence and reinforcing its role as the primary authority on the ground.
But what appears straightforward on paper is far more complicated in practice. Parts of southern Lebanon remain occupied, Israeli attacks and violations continue, and many of the political issues tied to the conflict remain unresolved.
The question is therefore not simply whether the army can deploy, but what mission it will be asked to carry out and under what political conditions.
Berri draws a red line
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri’s position reflects one side of the debate unfolding within the Lebanese state.
Berri has objected to what he calls a “hybrid agreement,” arguing that any serious framework must begin with a comprehensive ceasefire on land, at sea, and in the air, alongside a clear Israeli withdrawal from occupied Lebanese territory.
At the same time, Berri has strongly defended the LAF and its leadership.
Political sources following the file tell The Cradle that he believes the military institution is approaching developments professionally and providing realistic assessments of what can be achieved on the ground.
The same sources say Berri has confidence in both the army command and its ability to manage the next stage, viewing the institution as one of the few state bodies that has consistently prioritized stability.
Sources familiar with the matter describe Haikal’s recent meeting with Berri as positive. The Lebanese army commander reportedly briefed the speaker on military discussions held in Washington related to negotiations with Israel, with both sides stressing continued coordination.
According to those sources, Berri later remarked: “There is no doubt about this man’s wisdom.”
They also describe Haikal’s visit to Islamabad as part of efforts to keep open channels that could support a broader ceasefire. Haikal reportedly expressed reservations about the idea of “pilot zones” while reaffirming that the army’s priority remains stability and civil peace in the country.
In this context, a well-informed military source says the LAF is implementing the decisions of the political authorities according to its professional assessment of the exceptional circumstances facing the country. It is working to complete its duties without internal clashes or confrontations, placing the national interest above all other considerations.
Hezbollah’s warning: Do not test the army
Senior Hezbollah sources view the issue differently.
According to those sources, the problem is not the army itself but the attempt to move directly to security arrangements before resolving key political questions related to guarantees, implementation, and Israeli compliance.
The resistance movement strongly rejects the concept of “pilot zones” included in the Washington Declaration, arguing that phased experiments of this kind have produced poor results elsewhere in the region.
The sources point to previous experiences, including the Oslo Accords, as examples.
At the core of their argument is a simple question: should the LAF be asked to achieve what Israel failed to impose through years of military pressure?
They argue that placing the army in such a position carries risks, not only because of conditions on the ground but also because of Lebanon’s delicate political and sectarian balance.
The sources also note that the army already faces challenges related to manpower, equipment, and resources while carrying responsibilities across the country.
Any additional sensitive role, they argue, requires broad national consensus. They further warn that assigning the army tasks perceived as serving Israeli objectives could affect morale within the ranks and damage the institution’s standing as one of the few national bodies that has largely remained above political divisions.
Between pressure and caution
Despite the heated debate, there is little indication that either Lebanese authorities or foreign actors are seeking to push the army into direct confrontation with any Lebanese faction.
That remains the case despite recent US discussions about training specialized units tasked with disarming Hezbollah.
What appears clearer is that the army understands the dangers of internal conflict better than most institutions in the country.
At the same time, Lebanon’s major political forces, despite their differences, recognize that the army remains one of the last pillars of national stability.
The more likely scenario is that the military will continue operating as it has in recent years: implementing state decisions, avoiding internal confrontation, and expanding its presence where conditions on the ground permit.
There is little evidence that the LAF leadership sees its role as one of confrontation. Instead, it appears intent on preserving stability and shielding the country from another round of internal strife.
Beirut’s vision for the next phase is increasingly taking shape. Its advocates speak of restoring state authority, strengthening sovereignty, limiting arms to official institutions, and removing Lebanon from the regional conflicts that have exhausted the country for decades.
Turning those goals into reality, however, is another matter.
The challenge is not the army’s deployment itself, but whether Lebanon’s political forces are willing to provide the cover needed for the institution to carry out its mission without being dragged into the country’s internal battles.
The success of the next phase depends less on military deployments than on the ability of Lebanon’s political forces to reach an understanding that protects the army from polarization and gives it the cover needed to do its job.
The army may be central to any future settlement. But it cannot resolve Lebanon’s political divisions on its own, nor can it carry the burden of the regional conflicts that continue to spill into the country.
In a Lebanon exhausted by war, an economic crisis, and political fragmentation, the military remains one of the few institutions still viewed as a shared national space – and, for many, the last line of defense against another internal rupture.
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