US President Donald Trump has long promoted a blunt doctrine: American military bases in the Persian Gulf are not a charitable service. They are a security umbrella that must be paid for.
In Trump’s formula, security comes with a bill.
The logic is simple. Arab states of the Persian Gulf host US forces. In return, they finance their own protection. Yet the war now unfolding between the US and Israel against Iran is exposing a stark contradiction in that logic.
Rather than acting as a stabilizing shield, American bases across the Gulf have become prime targets. Iranian strikes have already reached several states hosting US facilities. The security umbrella itself is turning into a lightning rod.
In times of war, the very presence meant to guarantee stability can become a magnet for escalation. The question now confronting Gulf capitals is unavoidable: do American bases protect them, or do they draw the battlefield onto their soil?
Iran’s strategy: Widening the battlefield
Iran’s actions in the Persian Gulf since 28 February follow a clear pattern rather than a random escalation. Tehran’s strikes appear designed to raise the cost of war for every actor involved. Rather than limiting the confrontation to a direct US–Iran clash, Iran appears determined to push the battle outward.
Three objectives appear to guide this approach.
The first is the internationalization of the battlefield.
By targeting American assets and infrastructure across the Gulf, Iran is attempting to transform a bilateral conflict into a wider regional crisis. Economic hubs and energy infrastructure – the lifeblood of Gulf prosperity – are becoming part of the strategic equation.
Tehran is signaling that the Gulf will not remain a protected rear base while Iran absorbs attacks at home.
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) advisor Ebrahim Jabbari recently warned that “We are saying to the enemy that if it decides to hit our main centres, we will hit all economic centres in the region.”
The second objective is pressure on the American military presence itself.
Iranian officials have repeatedly emphasized that their strikes target US interests rather than Gulf governments. Tehran has framed its operations as retaliation against Washington, not a war with neighboring states.
In effect, Iran is telling Gulf monarchies that the American military presence is the real source of danger. If Gulf states want the strikes to stop, Tehran suggests, they should reconsider hosting US bases that now function as launch platforms for attacks on Iran.
The third objective is political pressure on Gulf leaderships.
Iranian strikes create a difficult dilemma for regional governments. They must decide whether to protect their strategic partnership with Washington or prioritize the immediate security of their own territory.
The more Gulf economies feel threatened – from Dubai’s financial and tourist hub to Qatar’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports or Saudi Arabia’s energy infrastructure – the greater the incentive to push for de-escalation.
In this sense, Iran’s campaign is not only military. It is also diplomatic pressure.
Gulf responses: Coordination without unity
So far, responses from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have followed a cautious pattern. The most notable feature is coordination on the security front without full political unity on the wider conflict.
On 1 March, the GCC Council of Ministers issued an unusually firm statement condemning Iranian attacks across member states.
The statement described Gulf security as “indivisible” and explicitly referenced the right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
The statement also stressed, more importantly, that the GCC countries had made diplomatic efforts to avoid escalation and stressed that their territory would not be used to launch attacks against Iran. In practical terms, Gulf states have activated joint air defense networks and expanded reconnaissance patrols.
At the same time, officials have issued warnings to Tehran through both public and private channels. The message is deterrence without immediate retaliation. But this balancing act grows more fragile with every new strike.
The more Iranian attacks land on Gulf soil, the harder it becomes to maintain a purely defensive posture.
Saudi Arabia: Avoiding war without absorbing blows
Saudi Arabia has tried to walk a careful line. Riyadh seeks to avoid being dragged into a war it did not start. Yet repeated attacks on its territory cannot go unanswered indefinitely.
Following an alleged Iranian drone strike near the US embassy compound in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia’s Cabinet warned that the kingdom would take “all necessary measures” to defend its security.
Energy infrastructure remains particularly sensitive. Saudi Aramco’s Ras Tanura complex – Saudi Arabia’s largest domestic refinery and a major export terminal – was targeted again on 4 March after an earlier strike forced a temporary shutdown. Saudi officials reported that the latest attempt caused no damage and did not disrupt exports.
At the political level, Saudi messaging has combined deterrence with calls for de-escalation.
The Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), called the president of the UAE, Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ), and “discussed regional developments and the blatant Iranian attacks targeting the United Arab Emirates and several other brotherly countries.”
The former, despite recent tensions with his smaller Gulf neighbor, expressed Riyadh’s “full solidarity” with Abu Dhabi and offered “all its resources to support any measures taken by the UAE,” while the Emirati president “expressed his gratitude and appreciation.”
Riyadh’s strategy relies partly on its ability to redirect some oil exports away from the Strait of Hormuz through pipelines to the Red Sea. But this workaround cannot shield the kingdom from the broader political consequences of repeated attacks on its territory.
The UAE: War threatens the Gulf’s economic model
The UAE faces a different type of vulnerability. Its national model rests heavily on investor confidence, tourism, aviation connectivity, and the perception that cities such as Dubai are insulated from regional conflict.
The attacks of 28 February shattered that perception.
Damage was reported in areas around Dubai and Abu Dhabi – an unprecedented shock for a state that has long marketed itself as a safe regional hub.
The UAE’s immediate response focused on risk management. Exchange offices closed temporarily before reopening days later. This move was intended to signal that financial stability remained intact.
Yet politically, Abu Dhabi has adopted a tougher tone toward Tehran than many observers expected.
The UAE announced the closure of its embassy in Tehran and withdrew its ambassador in response to the strikes. The decision marked a sharp diplomatic escalation.
“What has now been proven is that we – not the United States – are in the line of fire,” Dr Ebtesam al-Ketbi, president of the Emirates Policy Center, was quoted by Reuters as saying. “When Iran struck, it struck the Gulf first under the pretext of targeting U.S. bases.”
For the UAE, the strategic challenge is profound. Its traditional approach has been de-escalation in order to preserve economic stability. Now policymakers must decide whether de-escalation without credible deterrence simply invites further pressure.
Qatar: Mediator under fire
Qatar occupies an especially delicate position. Doha hosts one of the most important US military facilities in the region while simultaneously positioning itself as a diplomatic mediator in regional conflicts.
The war now threatens both roles.
Qatari officials confirmed that their air defenses intercepted incoming projectiles during the attacks of 28 February. Authorities issued public warnings urging residents to avoid military installations and potential debris zones.
The Qatari Foreign Ministry condemned the targeting of its territory while calling for immediate de-escalation and a return to negotiations. But tensions quickly escalated further.
On 2 March, Majed al-Ansari, a spokesperson for the Qatari Foreign Ministry, told reporters, “The attack on our sovereignty, the blatant attack on our people, on the security and safety of our nation has already crossed every possible red line. And therefore we have taken all possible measures and we reserve the right to retaliate.”
The Iranian strikes had targeted civilian infrastructure, including areas near Hamad International Airport. Doha has also suspended liquefied natural gas (LNG) production temporarily after strikes near the Ras Laffan industrial zone.
Two days later, QatarEnergy declared force majeure on some LNG deliveries, highlighting the war’s potential impact on global energy markets. Even a brief disruption in Qatari LNG exports can ripple across international energy supply chains.
Three possible trajectories
Beyond the immediate military exchanges, the wider economic and maritime environment of the Gulf is also shifting.
Shipping companies have already begun rerouting vessels, insurance premiums for war-risk coverage have surged, and several energy traders are quietly reassessing exposure to Gulf infrastructure. Even limited strikes can ripple through global markets when they occur near the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly a fifth of the world’s oil supply normally passes.
Some regional officials also fear that repeated attacks could gradually normalize the targeting of economic infrastructure. Oil terminals, LNG plants, ports, and airports – long considered off-limits in previous Gulf crises – are now openly discussed as potential pressure points. The longer the war drags on, the greater the risk that economic coercion becomes a central feature of the conflict rather than a secondary effect.
Taken together, these pressures point to three possible trajectories for the war. Each carries different consequences for the region.
Limited war and containment
In the first scenario, the conflict remains brutal but contained. Military strikes continue, but the Gulf does not become a full-scale battlefield.
Iran avoids actions that would force Gulf governments into direct retaliation. Gulf states maintain their current strategy of condemnation, defensive coordination, and warnings to Tehran.
Markets adjust to the conflict as a high-risk disruption rather than a systemic shock.
Airspace gradually reopens. Maritime traffic resumes under naval escorts. Insurance markets cautiously return. Energy infrastructure continues operating despite occasional attacks.
In this scenario, diplomacy eventually creates an off-ramp that allows both sides to step back without declaring defeat.
Oman’s traditional mediation channels could once again become relevant.
Expanding regional war
The second scenario is far darker. In this trajectory, the logic of escalation becomes self-reinforcing.
A single successful strike could transform the conflict. Heavy civilian casualties in a Gulf city, a devastating attack on major energy infrastructure, or evidence that Gulf territory was used for offensive operations against Iran could trigger direct retaliation.
At that point, the delicate balance of deterrence collapses.
Gulf governments may conclude that limited military responses are preferable to absorbing repeated attacks without consequence. Energy markets would face severe disruption.
The Strait of Hormuz could become effectively unusable for extended periods. War risk insurance would disappear. Shipping routes would shift dramatically.
Temporary disruptions would evolve into structural changes in global energy markets. Asian importers would scramble for alternative suppliers.
At the same time, the Gulf’s narrative of economic diversification and regional stability would suffer a profound shock.
Frozen conflict with fragile diplomacy
The third possibility is an uneasy freeze.
Under this scenario, the economic costs of continued escalation become unbearable for all parties.
Shipping disruptions, soaring freight costs, and global energy shocks push external powers to demand a halt to hostilities.
Yet the mechanisms for enforcing such a freeze remain weak.
Diplomatic channels – including Oman’s mediation efforts and previously scheduled talks in Geneva – could provide the framework for a temporary pause.
But the underlying tensions would remain unresolved. Gulf states would insist on guarantees that their territory and shipping lanes will not be targeted again.
Such guarantees are difficult to enforce in a region crowded with drones, decentralized armed actors, and rapidly evolving military technologies.
For now, the Persian Gulf sits uneasily between these scenarios.
What began as a confrontation between Washington, Tel Aviv, and Tehran is rapidly becoming a crisis that threatens the security architecture of the entire region.
US bases – once marketed as the ultimate guarantee of stability – may now be the very factor pulling the battlefield toward Gulf soil.
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