Unable to defeat Iran from the air, the United States and Israel are reviving an old imperial playbook, yet a recent strategy: instrumentalizing Kurdish forces to ignite internal unrest and push the country toward a Syria-style fragmentation.
Ricardo Martins
From the perspective of Donald Trump, the calculation is relatively straightforward. A rapid military victory against Iran through air power alone is unlikely. Tehran’s military infrastructure is deeply dispersed, and its political system has demonstrated resilience under external pressure. As a result, the prospect of a «Balkanization» of Iran has begun. The model is not new. It repeats the Syrian playbook, where the CIA supported and armed groups that transformed internal unrest into a prolonged civil war.
The Kurdish card may prove far more explosive than those currently playing it anticipate
This is not new in Iran either. In particular, Baloch militant groups operating across the Balochistan region of Iran and Pakistan have received external backing from the CIA. Unrest in the region and several attacks targeting Chinese interests linked to the Belt and Road infrastructure projects in Pakistan’s Balochistan have also been linked within the broader framework of geopolitical competition surrounding China’s expanding presence in the region.
Within this framework, attention has now turned to Iranian Kurdistan. Kurdish populations, like other ethnic minorities in Iran, are concentrated in peripheral regions where historical tensions with the central government have periodically erupted. Some Kurdish militias have, in the past, advocated autonomy or even secession. For strategists seeking pressure points within Iran’s territorial structure, such movements may appear as potential leverage.
Yet the implications of such a strategy are enormous. Iran is a country of more than ninety million people, composed not only of Persians but also Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, Baloch and other minorities. Many of these communities inhabit frontier regions that already experience socio-economic marginalization. External encouragement of separatist dynamics could transform isolated unrest into a much wider conflict.
Trump suggests he is exploring this possibility. Only one day after the beginning of Operation Epic Fury, Donald Trump, according to Axios, held phone conversations with Masoud Barzani, a leading figure of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, and Bafel Talabani, head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. The talks were reportedly facilitated by Benjamin Netanyahu, suggesting that the Kurdish dimension has been actively discussed between Washington and Tel Aviv.
The Kurdish Corridor: How Iraq Becomes the War’s Logistical Front
The geographic centre of this dynamic lies in Erbil, capital of the autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The city hosts a major American military installation at Erbil International Airport, which has already become a focal point of regional tensions. Shortly after the start of the conflict, several drones were intercepted over the base, attacks claimed by the Iran-aligned «Islamic Resistance in Iraq». These incidents highlight the fragile strategic environment surrounding any attempt to transform Iraqi Kurdistan into a logistical platform for operations against Iran. However, some geopolitical analysts say arms will be flowing in the next few days from Iraq to Iran to arm some Kurdish groups in the country.
For Iraq, the situation represents a profound political dilemma. Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al‑Sudani has insisted that only the Iraqi state can decide questions of war and peace, warning against the country being dragged into a wider confrontation. Yet the reality is more complex. Without Iraqi territory serving as a supply line and staging ground, any Kurdish-led operation against Iran would be extremely difficult. In effect, Iraq risks becoming the rear base of a conflict it does not control.
The Regional Domino: Syria and Turkey on the Edge
The Kurdish question also reverberates beyond Iraq. To the west, the fragile political equilibrium in Syria could quickly fail. Earlier in 2026, the interim Syrian government led by Ahmad Al‑Sharaa reached an integration agreement with the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces. The arrangement represented a tentative step toward stabilizing northeastern Syria after years of war. However, if the United States were to mobilize the same Kurdish forces again as part of a broader campaign against Iran, Damascus would likely abandon that agreement, which could reopen another Syrian conflict.
An equally volatile variable is Turkey. Ankara has spent decades fighting the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, the PKK, which it considers a terrorist organization. Any Western attempt to empower Kurdish armed groups across the region risks undermining fragile peace initiatives inside Turkey itself. Even Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned PKK leader, recently called for renewed reconciliation efforts. A sudden militarization of Kurdish forces linked to American strategy could derail that process overnight.
Washington has travelled this road before. Kurdish forces were crucial allies during the 2003 invasion of Iraq and later during the campaign against Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Each time, however, American alliances proved temporary. Local partners were embraced when strategically useful and dumped when U.S. geopolitical priorities shifted.
The Kurdish Question: Strategic Opportunity or Strategic Trap?
Some Kurdish leaders appear well aware of this pattern. Iranian Kurdish opposition figures have already signaled reluctance to become pawns of the Trump and Netanyahu war. Khalil Nadiri, spokesman for the Iranian Kurdistan Freedom Party, has publicly stated that Kurdish groups do not intend to wage war against Tehran at the request of any foreign country.
This hesitation reflects a broader reality: the Kurdish issue intersects simultaneously with the internal stability of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey. Any attempt to instrumentalize it risks triggering a chain reaction across the entire region, amplifying further the scope of this war.
For Israel, the calculation may be that air superiority combined with internal fragmentation could weaken Iran and turn it into a failed state, so it can be the hegemon in the region. Yet history suggests otherwise. External military pressure often produces the opposite effect: strengthening nationalist mobilization within targeted states.
The paradox of the current strategy is therefore striking. A campaign intended to weaken Tehran could instead consolidate Iranian internal cohesion, destabilize neighbouring countries, and ignite new cycles of regional conflict.
The Middle East rarely responds to controlled experimentation. What begins as calibrated pressure frequently evolves into a cascade of unintended consequences. In such an environment, the Kurdish card may prove far more explosive than those currently playing it anticipate.
Ricardo Martins – Doctor of Sociology, specialist in European and international politics as well as geopolitics
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