In HTS-governed Syria, the Druze community faces an uncertain future – caught between Salafi extremist rule, Israeli overtures, and their historical fight for self-preservation. Whether they secure autonomy or become geopolitical pawns, their next move will impact the region.
The Cradle
Understanding the evolving dynamic between the Druze and the new Syrian administration is impossible without factoring in Israel's recent maneuvers in Syria. Tel Aviv has been working to establish a legal and operational foothold in southern Syria under the guise of supporting the Druze. This shift in policy saw Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu instruct the Israeli military to “protect” a community that had long resisted Israeli overtures.
A history of resistance and hard choices
This is not the first time Syria's Druze have faced a historical crossroads. Nearly a century ago, the French offered them autonomy, an attractive proposition that was ultimately rejected. Instead, they fiercely resisted French rule between 1925 and 1927, and later played a significant role in Syria's fight for independence in 1947 under the leadership of Sultan Pasha al-Atrash. Now, the Druze find themselves at another pivotal moment, but the conditions have changed dramatically.
The regime change war in Syria, which spanned nearly 14 years, culminated in the collapse of the government of former president Bashar al-Assad last December. Virtually all civilian actors who shaped the early uprising have been sidelined.
In their place, HTS, a former Al-Qaeda affiliate that few expected to reach power, has taken control. With Idlib as its launching pad, HTS's rapid territorial gains bear the hallmarks of Israeli involvement. Now, Israel is deepening its influence in southern Syria, with the Druze emerging as a key target in its broader strategic calculations.
For the Druze, history presents both a challenge and an opportunity. The community has long grappled with tensions, not only with Salafi extremist factions that, from the earliest days of the uprising, derided the Druze way of life, but also with the Syrian government. From the very first days of the war, the extremists were disparaging the community in Deraa mosques with refrains such as, “Druze women in Suwayda are walking around in skirts.”
While some Druze commanders, like the late Issam Zahreddine, fought on behalf of the Syrian army in the past, younger Druze largely opted to withdraw to their own regions rather than fight for Assad. Recognizing this reality, Assad conceded to their demands.
The struggle for autonomy
Roughly 18 months before his fall, Druze in Suwayda openly rebelled against Assad's government in Damascus, raising the banners of democracy and freedom. But with HTS now in control, the Druze are reassessing their de facto semi-autonomy, and are seeking full autonomy instead.
The Druze remain wary of their new Islamist overlords in Damascus. Their deep-rooted secular values make them resist external interference, particularly from extremist factions whose austere vision of society is fundamentally at odds with their way of life.
The administration of President Ahmad al-Sharaa does not reflect the diverse fabric of Syrian society, and unlike in Assad’s era, the Druze now face outright exclusion from power. Their security concerns have also escalated.
Past traumas, including HTS’s land seizures in Idlib and the 2015 Qalb Loze massacre in which 30 Druze were killed by Nusra Front (precursor to HTS) militants, have made them deeply cautious. HTS has also pressured Druze communities to convert to Sunni Islam. Furthermore, the fate of Syria's Alawite minority, who suffered massacres and rights violations after surrendering their arms, serves as a grim warning.
The Druze's sole purpose today, as in history, is to protect themselves. The community has long brandished the motto “protecting the land and the after (honor).” In other words, they act with the dual intention of protecting both their own geography and their people from all kinds of threats.
Refusing to disarm
For these reasons, the Druze have refused to disarm or allow HTS forces to enter their regions without constitutional guarantees. Their resistance was evident in Jaramana, where the community openly barred HTS militants from entering their district.
While united in their goal of self-preservation, they are not monolithic in their approach. Speaking to The Cradle, Syrian journalist Sarkis Kassargian identifies three key Druze factions:
The first is Maher Sharaf al-Din’s faction, which enjoys backing from certain Arab states but has lost credibility due to its ties with the new administration.
The second is Rijal al-Karami (“Men of Dignity”), led by Leith Al-Balous, a militia that prioritizes Druze self-defense while maintaining distance from the HTS government.
The third is the Suwayda Military Council (SMC), an organization of former Syrian army officers that was officially announced in February but has been active for over two years. Led by Tariq al-Shafi, the SMC consists of approximately 900 former officers, NCOs, and soldiers, and its mission is to protect the Druze, curb smuggling, and prevent extremist infiltration.
Some reports claim the SMC has received tacit approval from spiritual leader Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajari, the most influential Druze cleric in Syria. Later, Al-Hajari's side announced that he would remain “equidistant” from all of the factions as his main role was “religious and not political.” The cleric's support of any one of these groups can bestow instant legitimacy - such is his clout in the closed Syrian Druze community.
The second important dynamic is the faction of Maher Sharaf al-Din and his supporters, which has the smallest number of adherents but has secured support from some key Arab states.
Notably, Sharaf al-Din was residing in Qatar – a major supporter of the regime change war against Syria – before being summoned back home by HTS's Sharaa. It is, however, his good relations with the new administration that significantly reduces his chances to lead the Druze. Like Sharaa, Sharaf al-Din invokes talking points that emphasize the “territorial integrity” of Syria.
Sharaf al-Din’s reception at the People's Palace by Sharaa, along with the statements he made following the visit – and his appearances with diplomatic representatives from certain Arab countries – indicate that he maintains a cooperative relationship with the new government. This alignment is further reflected in his posts on X, which many believe have the backing of Turkiye.
The Druze in a web of regional interests
Kassargian points out that the US-backed Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has shown interest in the Druze cause, and that Kurdish representatives visited Suwayda months before the Military Council was officially formed. While no formal alliance exists, the similarity between the SMC's flag and that of the Kurdish region suggests a degree of ideological alignment.
In these developments, Israel sees an opportunity. As Syrian journalist Somer Sultan emphasizes to The Cradle, the occupation state seeks to prevent another “Axis of Resistance” from forming among the Druze, as it once did under Lebanese Druze revolutionary Samir Kuntar, who was assassinated by Israel in 2015.
Netanyahu’s rhetoric on southern Syria reveals Tel Aviv’s desire to establish a pliable Druze ally. Jordan may become a key player if a Druze-controlled border crossing in Suwayda is opened – an old demand that Damascus has promised to consider, says Sultan.
If realized, this crossing could serve as an economic lifeline for the Druze, bypassing the Nasib crossing in Deraa. However, Jordan’s stance remains unclear, and Israel could exert pressure on Amman to block the initiative.
Tariq al-Ahmet, one of the leaders of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), visited Suwayda approximately 1.5 years ago after the anti-Assad demonstrations began in Suwayda and again after Assad was overthrown.
“As political parties,” he says, "we formed a joint committee and visited and held meetings with various places in the country. We also met with Mazlum Abdi in Hasakah in various provinces and places such as Suwayda and Damascus. We also visited Suwayda and met with Sheikh Hikmet al-Hajari, Sheikh Hinnavi, and Sheikh Cerbu. In other words, these are the ‘Sheikhs of Reason’ [in the Druze community, clerics are called ‘Sheikh al-Aql’ – which translates to ‘Sheikhs of Reason’].”
But Ahmet draws attention to the fact that Israel attacked the Syrian army immediately after Damascus fell and that the army was then disbanded by the successive rulers. Despite the pontifications of HTS, he tells The Cradle:
“There is simply no army to protect the unity of Syria anymore."
He adds: “The Arab countries with whom we have a defense agreement, and Turkiye, which directs this administration, do nothing, and there is no serious activity to protect Syrian lands from Israeli aggression.”
“This situation is very dangerous,” Ahmet stresses. “The idea of some Syrian groups establishing relations with Israel and the idea of separation is being heavily advanced by some parties.” Today, however, the main powers in Suwayda do not want separation and want to stay with their own country.
Israeli calculations and the Druze factor
According to Sultan, in addition to external calculations, the occupation state treats the Syrian Druze differently than the Alawites in order not to lose the support of the Palestinian Druze, who carry Israeli citizenship and are Tel Aviv's frontline troops on many of its borders.
“In the past few years, Israel has managed to weakened the resistance project that developed among the Druze under the command of Lebanese Druze revolutionary Samir Kuntar with the support of Hezbollah. He was killed by Israel along with Jihad al-Mughniye, the son of Hezbollah’s legendary commander Imad Mughniyeh)”
A century after rejecting foreign-imposed autonomy, the Druze once again face a historic decision. They face a situation where power is fragmented, and alliances are fluid. While internal divisions persist, their collective goal remains unchanged: securing their survival and autonomy.
The outcome of this struggle will shape not only the future of Syria’s Druze but also the broader geopolitical balance in West Asia. Whether they manage to carve out an independent path or become pawns in a larger game, the next chapter of Druze history in Syria is being written in real-time.
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