Showing posts with label Sharmine Narawani. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sharmine Narawani. Show all posts

Monday, April 29, 2019

Sharmine Narwani on the end of the Syrian war and the "post-imperial Middle East"

Vienna, Austria during final round of Iranian nuclear
negotiations with the P5. Iranian Foreign Minister
Javad Zarif. July 2015.

Middle East correspondent Narwani sees a new era emerging in Asia, while Trump, Pompeo and Bolton bluster

PATRICK LAWRENCE

In part one of my exchange with Sharmine Narwani, the Beirut-based correspondent dissected the just-ended Syrian conflict as one of the very few journalists to witness it at ground level the whole of its eight years. As many readers wrote in to remark, Narwani’s account was a revelatory lifting of the lid. In the concluding part of our conversation, she takes a broader look at the post–Syria Middle East. Her insights are again original and her perspectives again thought-provoking. In Narwani’s view, the Middle East is poised at last to leave behind its long era of foreign interventions and Western dominance. “The region will now be led from within,” Narwani says. Syria, she argues persuasively, now stands as a case in point.
Once again, I have edited the transcript solely to manage its length.
Staying with this question of narratives, you once wrote about “just one too many lookalike mass protest movements that turn violent,” mentioning Syria, Egypt, Libya, Ukraine, Tunisia. Can you talk about your surmise concerning these “lookalikes”? I think I know just what you’re getting at but hope you can elaborate.
The four narratives that were utilized in undermining the Syrian state’s legitimacy and setting the stage for regime-change were: 1) The dictator is killing his own people, 2) the protesters are peaceful, 3) the opposition is unarmed, and 4) this is a popular revolution.
All four played off the themes of the preceding Arab uprisings that unseated leaders in Tunisia and Egypt. They became the pillars of the West’s propaganda against Syria, which meant anyone critically questioning them would be marginalized. Even today, after we know about the tens of thousands of ISIS and al–Qaida terrorists operating in Syria, and the thousands of tons of weapons shipped to Islamist extremists by the CIA, the Pentagon, the British, French, Saudis, Turks, Qataris, Emiratis and Israelis, we still hear things like “Assad killed 500,000 civilians.” Those numbers are all civilians, and no dead militants? Did ISIS or al–Qaida or Ahrar al–Sham or Jaysh al–Islam not kill anyone — at all — in this conflict, then? 
“Peaceful protesters?” Yes, but who shot at them? Government forces — or foreign-backed gunmen who knew that Syrians must die for the population to rebel?
Was this a “revolution?” This one is always fascinating to me. What “popular revolution” has command centers in Jordan and Turkey and receives instructions from at least seven foreign capitals? ...  Once you know the details of what happened in Syria these past eight years, you can pick apart the four narratives fairly easily.
When I talk about lookalike movements, I am speaking specifically of foreign-backed regime-change operations. These protests, no matter where they take place, all use similar symbols, language and stunts. There are organizations, many Western-funded, that train young people around the world — particularly in countries where the U.S. would like to gain more influence — on how to delegitimize a government and overthrow it….
When protests do not lead to unseating a leader, however, the big guns come in and we see unidentified gunmen shooting into crowds of civilians. We found out about this in Ukraine because of a leaked phone call between the Estonian and EU foreign ministers. We saw this in Syria right at the beginning, too, in Daraa. Daraa residents reported “foreigners” who suddenly started appearing in the city before all the shooting started. ... There are so many famous photos from Syria splashed across our newspapers, but I can assure you that most of these have long tales of deception behind them.
You made an especially good call — daring, too — in late 2013. You predicted the formation of a “security arc” from the Levant to the Persian Gulf — from Lebanon through Syria and Iraq to Iran. And now there has been a meeting in Damascus of top military officials from three of these countries, leaving out Lebanon for some reason. The topic is precisely what you foresaw: how to combat terrorism.
Please talk about this, if you would.  You suggested three objectives: territorial integrity, military and security cooperation, and a common worldview. Where is this project now and where’s it going?
It’s difficult to make predictions in this region because events, alliances and players change all the time. I decided to look at the long view of what was taking place in the region: Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Iran were targets of the Sunni extremism that was being funded by the West and its regional allies. A main goal was to cripple Iran’s growing influence in the region, but also to dismantle the “resistance axis” — Iran, Syria, Hezbollah. In amassing these jihadist armies, Sunni monarchs and Western leaders miscalculated horribly. Instead of destroying Syria, isolating Iran, and re-establishing hegemony over Lebanon and Iraq, the terrorism onslaught galvanized these four very different states into prioritizing security above all else. The battle against NATO–trained and GCC–funded extremists became an existential moment for them, and they would have no other choice but to work with each other, pool resources, create a central command, coordinate military operations, share intelligence. 
I believed the four states would weather the terror tsunami also because they had secured unusual great-power cover from Russia and China at the UN Security Council. These two powers were very vested in the outcome of the Syrian conflict, for different reasons, and had the West understood this at the outset, maybe the Syrian crisis would not have been pushed so far.
It may have sounded crazy back in 2013, but I could easily see Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon becoming an anchor of stability in this region. … Today, I see the “security arc” becoming a reality, though there are no declarations from their capitals. Certainly, the recent unprecedented meeting of the Iranian, Syrian and Iraqi defense ministers to overtly coordinate against terrorism was a sign, but all four countries have already demonstrated their commitment to this vision in countless military and intelligence operations over the past few years. Most important, these four states have discovered they can handle terrorism on their own, from within the region.
Drawing closer in, what do you mean by a common worldview?
Iran, Syria and Hezbollah already shared an anti-imperialist, anti–Zionist view of the world that valued nonaligned, independent positions, rejected a Western-dominated liberal world order, and prioritized development and self-sufficiency. Iraq and Lebanon tended to be more Western-centric, although significant segments of their populations were aligned with the resistance axis. I think what has emerged on the back of the Syrian conflict is a major, global, balance-of-power shift that will force these two states to reassess their political orientation and draw closer to their direct neighbors, who really have been the only ones they could reliably count on.
As [neoliberal] globalism recedes, the world will become economically more regionalized, and multipolarity will redefine global institutions. You can already see the rebalancing of U.S. influence in the region in the Middle East’s rush to deal with Russia and China — even by very close U.S. allies like Israel and Saudi Arabia. So a new worldview is very much emerging in this region — one that favors an Eastern outlook, regional cooperation and rising new centers of power.
We’ve now tipped into a prominent theme in your writing: an end to Western intervention. Middle Eastern solutions to Middle Eastern problems. In effect, you’re looking ahead to a post-imperial Middle East.
It’s a large thought. For the first time in -- how long? -- you say decades, I would say centuries, the region’s direction and destiny are to be led from within. That’s to say not by foreign powers but by Middle Eastern states, non-state social sectors, political parties, etc. Where are we with this? One must take care to avoid angélisme. Do you know this word? A favorite of mine, given how much there is around, meaning naïve extremes of idealism.
Thank you for adding to my vocabulary — no, I didn’t know the word. I do sometimes get accused of idealism in my analysis — projecting onto the world those things I desire. That’s a fair opinion. I think we can determine if I have done that by examining my predictions in the past decade. Many of these have come to pass, or are in progress. A British ambassador in the region, as he was leaving his post, told me: “What you were saying two years ago sounded ridiculous, but now we are all talking the same language.” It was the nicest compliment ever — because he wasn’t exactly onside, you know?
While the Western powers can no longer invade and occupy countries — they’re broke and war isn’t popular — I believe they will continue to try to intervene in this region because their irregular warfare methods are cheaper and less detectable. That’s not going to work with their main adversaries, though, because these states now know the game and have cover from the Russians and Chinese — who also know the game. The legacy of U.S. interventionism is that it has left in its wake some very smart and efficient adversaries.
I always say “efficiency” is the most important word that defines the post–American era in the Mideast. The Iranians, Syrians, Hezbollah defeated the combined efforts of NATO and the GCC — no mean feat. They can make their own missiles, develop their own centrifuges, produce pesticides, chemo drugs, drought-resistant wheat and Coca–Cola. That’s what I mean when I say the region will now be led from within. We have the brainpower, will and efficiency here now and are outsmarting the old oppressors in leaps and bounds.
At a certain point in your work you begin to use “we,” as against “they,” meaning Westerners, as you just did. So we’re into the question of identity, or identities. It seems quite important to you. One understands entirely, but again it also seems important to tread carefully. Don’t we want to push past the “we-they,” “self and other” discourses characteristic of the Western-dominated centuries — the Orientalist centuries, we might say?
I don’t think “we” and “they” amount to absolute identities. … I am both Eastern and Western, and I derive great strength from this. It gives me a broad perspective that I know others in my field lack. I am also not at all ideological — I prefer to cherry-pick ideas that make sense to me. So I have no inherent hatred of “the Other.”
If I use the word “West” to suggest an enemy, you can be sure I mean a minority political class that manufactures consent under false pretenses to execute acts of aggression. I can’t use any other word. This is a Western thing, specifically, born of centuries of Western colonialism, imperialism, hegemony and its accompanying arrogances. If anything, I’m being historically accurate. 
I’ve said often that parity between West and non–West is an inevitable feature of our century. You seem to agree. You’ve written about the transformation of the global order by the non–West — the same thought in different language, if I understand you correctly. Can you expand on this?
Empires rise and fall. So do the power and economies of states and regions. … And now the world’s political and economic gravity is shifting. I often think about how this cycle never changes, and yet the powerful never learn this. When a country’s fortunes rise, it seems to take just a few generations for it to become fat, lazy, arrogant and lose its competitive edge. We see that on a micro-level with wealth and families all the time. Nobody learns, though.
East is not better than West in this regard. It just happens to be Asia’s time right now. All the ingredients for massive growth and transformation exist only in Asia today: money, vision, hunger, clout, essential alliances — and huge, underserved populations who lack critical infrastructure and networks. Think jobs, jobs, jobs. Economy has always driven political power, so we will also see a Western rush in Asia’s direction. The Europeans are quietly disregarding U.S. diktats on investing in China’s [Belt and Road] vision and will eventually do so with Russia as well. …
Historically, declining hegemons start to act like large dinosaurs — slow-moving, small-brained, unable to change their trajectories because of too much momentum and too little vision. You know, Trump was elected on a platform that promoted upgraded relations and more business with Russia and China. But the permanent state could not fathom or allow this: Russia and China had already been framed as America’s primary enemies. That’s a lack of vision. That’s a dead-end trajectory that will speed up American decline.
Where do you locate the center of gravity on this question — in the Middle East? In the Sino–Russian relationship? China, Russia, Iran, India, maybe?
There’s no question the Sino–Russian relationship is the transformative one ushering in this new era. The West has always sought, as a key foreign policy objective, to keep these two behemoths from forming a cooperative relationship. I recall watching Obama’s 2014 trip to the Far East with horrified fascination. The U.S. president was literally flipping off China during visits to Japan, Philippines, South Korea — challenging China’s geopolitical influence and territorial claims in its own neighborhood — all while, during the same trip, blasting the Russians with sanctions threats. I mean, really? What net result did he expect from that smooth move? 
This was about a year before Iran agreed to a nuclear deal with the U.S. and other Security Council permanent members, so Obama was also ratcheting up threats and pushing levers against Iran. At the same time, Iran, Russia and China had been “discovering” each other over the Syrian conflict. The U.S. really helped these three Eurasian countries find common cause amidst a hailstorm of American threats and bluster.
What Iran, Russia and China also discovered during this process is that they share critical similarities: These are three states that believe in realpolitik despite their differing ideologies, influences and histories. They all act in their own self-interest, believe that cleaving to international law benefits them, prefer soft power over hard, agree that international institutions and networks need a fundamental overhaul, and believe that U.S. behaviors constitute a grave danger to global peace and stability. … They’re looking to make economies grow, secure their neighborhoods and maintain domestic stability—within a multipolar framework. …
In short, the main center of gravity in this global transformation — in my view — is Iran, Russia, China. There are, of course, other countries that impact this in Asia, specifically the Koreas and India/Pakistan. Resolving those two conflicts will more seamlessly pave the way to a prosperous Asian century. Also, watch for a fundamental pivot in German–Russian relations. This event will be what ultimately ties Europe's fortune to Asia’s rise. 
I have to add that we also have to reckon with the West’s resistance to its loss of dominance, its relative loss of influence. It’ll be very formidable, messy and prolonged, don’t you think? The decades ahead seem to hold a ferocious fight.
Yes, nobody is expecting a “surrender” of any sort. The old hegemons will go down fighting, and that’s a real danger to us all. They have an opportunity here to recognize the natural order of things, the changes that are inevitable — then adapt and participate meaningfully with the new economies and political centers. But that would require some common sense and foresight, and I don’t see that in Washington, London or Paris today, unfortunately. If anything, they’re picking more fights — Venezuela, Ukraine, Iran — and clinging to old constructs like NATO that thrive on conflict.
There’s a very real possibility that we will see some catastrophic wars break out. As horrible as this sounds, since 2013 I have found myself sometimes wondering if a full-on war in the Middle East wouldn’t be a good thing, because I believe it would be over very quickly. The drawn-out bloodletting of the last eight years [in Syria] seems to me to be the worst possible scenario — one that, I believe, really suits the old powers. Oddly enough, they don’t yet seem to recognize that the bloodletting goes both ways, and what Americans have hemorrhaged in money, credibility and influence will never be regained.
It’s as if Washington is doing all it can to encourage alliances and cooperation among non–Western nations. The American withdrawal from the Iran nuclear accord, and then the re-imposition of sanctions — on two occasions now — are two good examples among many. How can one explain miscalculations of this magnitude?
I honestly don’t know how to answer this. U.S. actions defy logic. Every time the U.S. makes a move in this region, it shoots itself in the foot. For instance, Trump recently recognized Israel’s sovereignty over Golan in complete defiance of global opinion and international law. He thought he was boosting an ally, Netanyahu, before an Israeli election and showing the world who’s boss. But you know what else he did? Trump boosted regional players who fiercely oppose Syrian–Israeli negotiations and any compromise with Israel. There will be military repercussions for Israel because of this. And now every Arab leader will hightail it to Moscow because the U.S. is no longer viewed as an honest, reliable broker. Very stupid move in terms of Washington's interests. Excellent long-term benefits for its foes.
In all the years I have covered the Mideast, I have never seen U.S. adversaries this confident. While they remain very concerned about the potential for further U.S. military adventurism, they also understand that the U.S. has never been more isolated. Washington has managed to push the Europeans, Russians and Chinese into Iran’s corner over the nuclear deal. Imagine that. 
The trans–Atlantic rift is getting very serious, as you’ve already suggested. How far do you think this might go? Do you see ahead of us an historic realignment in “the Atlantic world,” with — as you’ve suggested — Germany in the lead?  
We’re not looking just at a trans–Atlantic rift. We’re also witnessing trans–European rifts, as populations and governments question unsuccessful or mediocre alliances in a fast-changing world. I was looking through a publicly available U.S. intelligence report some years ago, one of those five-year, trend-projection things. Two of its global trend projections interested me most: poor governance and the breaking up of states into more autonomous entities. We are watching those predictions play out throughout Europe, most still at relatively nascent stages.
In this same line, you reported something very intriguing in a piece published in January 2014. As far back as that, European ambassadors were going back to Damascus to share intelligence on the jihadist militias. How do you interpret that? Do you see it as another example of the divided West?
Actually, my impression is European intelligence agencies were reaching out to Damascus because they were worried about their jihadists coming home. They most definitely weren’t heading to Syria to help Syrians combat terrorism. After funding and supporting the militancy in Syria, European states got a big shock when Turkey turned on the refugee spigot and hundreds of thousands of Syrians descended on Europe’s shores.
These governments knew there would be blowback, and they were keen to eliminate their most dangerous nationals inside the Syrian military theater — hence the efforts to open up channels with Damascus. Europe’s outreach was entirely self-serving at that point in the conflict. This was not about breaking with the “American position” on Syria.
Indeed. You found Britain and France among the partners in a Military Operations Center established in Jordan a month after you reported on the diplomatic exchanges in Damascus. So they’re a hard read, the Europeans. Please tell us about the “MOC” Who else was in it, and what did it do? Is it still operational?
The MOC was a secret group of opposition-backing states that set up an ops room in Amman [the Jordanian capital], probably sometime in 2013. By early 2014, the “Southern Front” was established in the south of Syria. It was an umbrella group consisting of 54 militias backed by the MOC countries. As mentioned earlier, most of these militias that received funding, weapons, supplies, intelligence from Western states were co-located with al–Qaida throughout the key Daraa governorate bordering Jordan. There is no doubt that the MOC knew about this and yet continued to arm and support the al–Qaida-linked militants.
There’s not a lot of on-the-record information about the MOC, but through various news and think tank reports, plus some revelations from member states, it seems there are over a dozen members, including the U.S., Jordan, some European and Persian Gulf Arab states. I have personally heard that Israel is a member, too, and that — certainly toward the end — most of MOC’s focus was to ensure their militias protected Israel’s interests in the southwest of Syria.
Trump cut aid to Syrian militants in mid–2017, but when I was in Daraa a year later, just before the final southern battle, the MOC was being discussed as though it was still operational. I think, at that point, it had morphed into something a bit different: It wasn’t as interested in the Southern Front groups and had conveyed to them that they were basically on their own in the upcoming southern battle. MOC’s focus by then, I believe, was mainly to negotiate a beneficial outcome in the south since maintaining hostilities with Syria was becoming untenable for Jordan, the Syrian army was winning all over, and locals in Daraa were pressuring the militants to quit — but most important, to make sure that any political or military outcome would not leave Israel vulnerable.
Don’t forget, at the time the main conversation was about the U.S. trying to get Russia to keep Iran and Hezbollah out of those southern areas, so this makes perfect sense. A Daraa-based SAA [Syrian Arab Army, the government’s military force] commander I spoke with at length had information from various captured militants that MOC’s priority instructions were mostly all related to Israel.
This [John] Bolton–[Mike] Pompeo nexus in the Trump administration is very worrisome on the Iran question. I was distressed when Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister, announced his resignation in March — and relieved when it wasn’t accepted. Where do you think this is headed? Do you see the Americans pushing as far as open conflict with Iran?
The good thing about Bolton, Pompeo, [Elliott] Abrams and [Jared] Kushner is that they’re nuts and the international community doesn’t take them all that seriously. The bad thing about Bolton–Pompeo–Abrams–Kushner is that they’re nuts and you never know when they might get the president to take them seriously.
So far, it does not look like the administration has the necessary support from within its congressional and military centers to launch an open conflict against Iran. We know this partly because it has ratcheted up irregular warfare tactics against Iran — sanctions, subversion, sabotage, propaganda — which means the U.S. is currently not going to attack Iran. That can always change quickly, particularly if there is a “trigger incident,” which, by the way, both the U.S. and its regional allies are very proficient at manufacturing.
I think the Pentagon is actually afraid of a war with Iran. I was told several years ago by a friend who works there that the U.S. has never won an irregular warfare gaming exercise against Iran — unless it cheated. These war games cost millions of dollars. A real war will cost much more.
Then again, we’re dealing with crazy in the White House — with a direct line to crazy in Tel Aviv and crazy in Riyadh. …
Let me mention my view here and ask you to respond. Iran’s emergence as a regional power is as inevitable as parity between West and non–West. Not only is it futile for the U.S. to resist this, but Americans should embrace the Iranians as natural allies in all sorts of contexts. That’s my POV. What is yours?
My view is that Iran is unlikely to respond to any further U.S. entreaties until Washington alters its malign behaviors. And that’s not about to happen. After reneging on the nuclear deal, Trump has privately reached out to engage Iran in talks. No authority in Iran has even bothered to respond to him. The sentiment is shared by the Iranian public, who realize that the U.S. will never respect Iran, never uphold its commitments and never stop banging the war drums. Why would Iran want or need to engage the U.S. government? To stop sanctions? There are many in Iran who believe sanctions have saved the country by forcing Iranians to become producers, manufacturers, even exporters.
Iran is a regional power despite U.S. efforts to cripple it, so what could the U.S. possibly bring to the table? Have you seen what U.S. allies in the global South look like? They produce nothing, they import everything, they have underachieved in most developmental categories, they have staggering debts and they wear austerity’s shackles. Not a single one of their leaders could survive without U.S. patronage. “Parity” is simply not in the American vocabulary of international affairs.
We’ve had several new developments in the course of our exchange. Let’s look at them one at a time. You’ve just addressed U.S. recognition of Israeli sovereignty in the Golan Heights. So let’s go to the decisive defeat of ISIS, as recently announced.  Where does credit lie here? The American press routinely suggests that the U.S. got it done. Who actually defeated ISIS?
Brace yourselves. The view in this region is that the U.S. has spent the past five years enabling ISIS and encouraging its land grabs in Iraq and Syria. Contrary to U.S. media reports, the U.S. did not defeat ISIS. If anything, it mostly sat around not fighting ISIS.
John Kerry, the former secretary of state, even admitted: “The reason Russia came in is because ISIL [another name for ISIS] was getting stronger. ... And we know that this was growing. We were watching. We saw that Daesh [as ISIS is also called] was growing in strength, and we thought Assad was threatened. We thought, however, we could probably manage, that Assad would then negotiate. Instead of negotiating, he got Putin to support him.”
The U.S.–led coalition literally watched and did nothing as ISIS marched across the Iraqi border into Syria. … It ignored the ISIS oil trucks that crossed into Turkey to finance the terror group’s growth. It turned a blind eye to its allies funding and arming ISIS — Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are specifically named by U.S. officials in both public statements and leaked emails. ISIS was a valuable American asset in its regime-change war against Syria — and in its desire to create a Kurdish entity spanning the Iraqi–Syrian border that would cut off Iran’s land route to the Mediterranean. 
If years of media propaganda have you fuming at my very suggestion that the U.S. colluded with ISIS, then watch what the U.S. military did when ISIS first launched its territory grabs in Iraq. Nothing at all. In fact, the U.S. refused to get involved until the terror group threatened Kurdish Iraq. Even then, the U.S. military didn’t do much of anything except “manage” the Islamic State's fast-expanding territorial borders. …
In 2017, it took only three months for the SAA and its allies to liberate central and northern Syria from ISIS. At that time, the U.S. allowed over 3,000 ISIS fighters to flee Raqqa so it could rush southward to halt the Syrian army’s gains against ISIS at the Euphrates River. For 17 months, the U.S. and its Kurdish allies were co-located with ISIS east of the Euphrates — yet did nothing except fire upon Syrian–allied forces trying to eliminate ISIS remnants under U.S. protection. The Americans only recently eliminated ISIS in that remaining Syrian pocket, largely because Trump wanted the publicity of having “defeated” the terrorist group.
The U.S. isn’t finished with ISIS though. They have freed enough of them to keep terror attacks humming throughout the region for years to come, and Western media scene-set for this by constantly warning of more ISIS attacks — which then justifies continued U.S. presence in these nations. 
There is also the quite astonishing news that the U.S. is actively trying to prevent Syrian refugees in Lebanon from returning home as reconstruction proceeds. And I take it the Europeans are complicit in this. Again, they’re a hard read. Last August, France and Germany summited with Russia and Turkey in Istanbul to begin mapping reconstruction plans. I thought it was bad enough the Americans didn’t even attend. This latest development — well, the Americans, it seems, will stop at nothing. Hardly are they done with Syria.  Please unroll this for us.
I did some extensive research on IDPs [internally displaced persons] in Syria a few years ago and so had a chance to interview major international NGOs, UN agencies and Syrian officials. The Syrians have been encouraging refugees to return to Syria — and never wanted them to leave. Depopulating the country and simulating a “humanitarian crisis” was a foreign strategy against Syria from the start.
In 2012, I recall top UN officials in New York yelling about the Syrian “humanitarian crisis,” while in Syria, the International Committee of the Red Cross — the only organization that can officially designate the nature of a crisis — was telling me there is no humanitarian crisis in Syria: “A humanitarian crisis is when a large number of a given population does not have access to medical aid, food, water, electricity, etc. — when the system cannot any longer respond to the needs of the population,” the ICRC spokesman told me in January 2012, explaining this was clearly not the case in Syria once fighting stopped in any area.
Syrians were fleeing violence in their areas, and routes were made available for them to leave the country — but not return. The head of UNDP [United Nations Development Program] in Lebanon told me that he had not met a single Syrian refugee who did not want to return to Syria. So what was stopping them from doing so?
I don’t want to sound completely cynical, but there is a recognized problem in the “NGO industry,” where to justify ever-larger amounts of funding, NGOs tend to inflate crises. Don’t take it from me — there is a lot written about this issue. Syrian refugees meant money and programs, so where was the incentive to reverse this trend? The default NGO position was, “We are not allowed to encourage refugees to return. It is their perception of security that must dictate that.” Of course, we heard this in reference to Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan — and not so much when European states were shouting about sending refugees back to Syria.
But the other reason refugees were not returning is that foreign adversaries of Syria did not want them to. In Lebanon, Western powers have basically prevented return for years. Even Beirut-based Western media noted during the last Syrian elections that thousands of Syrian refugees poured into their embassy to cast their votes. This was not a population “afraid of Assad,” as many suggest.
What about this latest turn of events?
Why don't the U.S., U.K., etc. want Syrians to return home? Because then Syria will have the manpower to rebuild the country and secure its borders, because then the “crisis” is over, because then you lose leverage over Syria’s neighboring states and within Syria itself. It’s pretty crass stuff. Today, you have a disgusting situation in the south of Syria, where refugees and IDPs are literally dying in terrible conditions in Rukban camp, just south of the U.S.’s al–Tanf military base. The Russians are trying to open up a “humanitarian corridor” to get aid in and get people out, but the U.S. is refusing most of these measures. That camp acts as a shield for the American base. It’s leverage over an important border route.

PATRICK LAWRENCE

Patrick Lawrence is Salon’s foreign affairs columnist. A longtime correspondent abroad, chiefly for the International Herald Tribune and The New Yorker, he is an essayist, critic, editor and contributing writer at The Nation. His most recent book is “Time No Longer: Americans After the American Century”. 

Friday, September 07, 2018

Excuse Me, but Israel Has No Right To Exist



The Zionist entity called Israel is a spurious state planted on the soil of Palestine by the British in 1948 through the illegal settlement between the two world wars of hundreds of thousands of East European Khazar Jews, who had no connection, whatsoever, to the ancient Israelite tribes.
Since then Israel has embarked on a policy of state terrorism to seize more Arab lands and stockpile a dangerous nuclear arsenal with the help of the US, which has now forced Arab reactionary regimes to make common cause with the Zionists against most of the Muslim world. These Arab regimes, who do not represent the people they rule, have, to the agony of the oppressed Palestinians, officially recognized the illegal Zionist entity, which the Father of the Islamic Revolution, Imam Khomeini (God bless him) had said in clear words that “this cancerous tumour should be weeded out”. Beirut-based Palestinian researcher and political analyst Sharmine Narawani, explicitly says in one of her interesting articles “Excuse Me, but Israel Has No Right to Exist”.
The phrase “right to exist” entered my consciousness in the 1990s just as the concept of the two-state solution became part of our collective lexicon. In any debate at university, when a Zionist was out of arguments, those three magic words were invoked by him to shut down the conversation with an outraged, “are you saying Israel doesn’t have the right to exist??”
Of course, at an American university, you couldn’t challenge Israel’s right to exist – that was like saying you were negating a fundamental Jewish right to have…rights, with all manner of Holocaust guilt thrown in for effect.
Except of course the Holocaust is not my fault – or that of the Palestinians. The supposed program of ethnically cleansing Europe of its Jewish population has been so callously and opportunistically utilized to justify the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian Arab nation, that it leaves me utterly unmoved. I have even caught myself – shock - rolling my eyes when I hear Holocaust and Israel in the same sentence.
What moves me instead in this post-two-state era, is the sheer audacity of Israel even existing.
What a fantastical idea, this notion that a bunch of rank outsiders from another continent could appropriate an existing, populated nation for themselves – and convince the “global community” that it was the moral thing to do. I’d laugh at the chutzpah if this wasn’t so serious.
Even more brazen is the mass ethnic cleansing of the indigenous Palestinian population by persecuted Jews, newly arrived from their own experience of being ethnically cleansed.
But what is truly frightening is the psychological manipulation of the masses into believing that Palestinians are somehow dangerous – “terrorists” intent on “driving Jews into the sea.” As someone who makes a living through words, I find the use of language in creating perceptions to be intriguing. This practice – often termed “public diplomacy” has become an essential tool in the world of geopolitics. Words, after all, are the building blocks of our psychology.
Take, for example, the way we have come to view the Palestinian-Israeli “dispute” and any resolution of this enduring conflict. And here I borrow liberally from a previous article of mine…
The United States and Israel have created the global discourse on this issue, setting stringent parameters that grow increasingly narrow regarding the content and direction of this debate. Anything discussed outside the set parameters has, until recently, widely been viewed as unrealistic, unproductive and even subversive.
Participation in the debate is limited only to those who prescribe to its main tenets: the acceptance of Israel, its regional hegemony and its qualitative military edge; acceptance of the shaky logic upon which the Jewish state's claim to Palestine is based; and acceptance of the inclusion and exclusion of certain regional parties, movements and governments in any solution to the conflict.
Words like dove, hawk, militant, extremist, moderates, terrorists, Islamo-fascists, rejectionists, existential threat, holocaust-denier, determine the participation of solution partners -- and are capable of instantly excluding others.
Then there is the language that preserves "Israel's Right to Exist" unquestioningly: anything that invokes the Holocaust, anti-Semitism and the myths about historic Jewish rights to the land bequeathed to them by the Almighty – as though God was in the real-estate business. This language seeks not only to ensure that a Jewish connection to Palestine remains unquestioned, but importantly, seeks to punish and marginalize those who tackle the legitimacy of this modern colonial-settler experiment.
But this group-think has led us nowhere. It has obfuscated, distracted, deflected, ducked, and diminished, and we are no closer to a satisfactory conclusion…because the premise is wrong.
There is no fixing this problem. This is the kind of crisis in which you cut your losses, realize the error of your ways and reverse course. Israel is the problem. It is the last modern-day colonial-settler experiment, conducted at a time when these projects were being unraveled globally.
There is no “Palestinian-Israeli conflict” – that suggests some sort of equality in power, suffering, and negotiable tangibles, and there is no symmetry whatsoever in this equation. Israel is the Occupier and Oppressor; Palestinians are the Occupied and Oppressed. What is there to negotiate? Israel holds all the chips. They can give back some land, property, rights, but even that is an absurdity – what about everything else? What about ALL the land, property and rights? Why do they get to keep anything – how is the appropriation of land and property prior to 1948 fundamentally different from the appropriation of land and property on this arbitrary 1967 date?
Why are the colonial-settlers prior to 1948 any different from those who colonized and settled after 1967?
Let me correct myself. Palestinians do hold one chip that Israel salivates over – the one big demand at the negotiating table that seems to hold up everything else. Israel craves recognition of its “right to exist.”
But you do exist - don’t you, Israel?
What Israel fears is “de-legitimization” more than anything else. Behind the velvet curtain lies a state built on myths and narratives, protected only by a military behemoth, billions of dollars in US assistance and a lone UN Security Council veto. Nothing else stands between the state and its dismantlement. Without these three things, Israelis would not live in an entity that has come to be known as the “least safe place for Jews in the world.”
Strip away the spin and the gloss, and you quickly realize that Israel doesn’t even have the basics of a normal state. After 69 years, it doesn’t have borders. After almost seven decades, it has never been more isolated. Over half a century later, and it needs a gargantuan military just to stop Palestinians from walking home.
The fact of the matter is that Israel is a failed experiment. It is on life-support – pull those three plugs and it is a cadaver, living only in the minds of some seriously deluded foreigners who thought they could pull off the heist of the century.
The most important thing we can do as we hover on the horizon of One State is to shed the old language rapidly. None of it was real anyway – it was just the parlance of that particular “game.” Grow a new vocabulary of possibilities – the new state will be the dawn of humanity’s great reconciliation. Muslims, Christians and Jews living together in Palestine as they once did.
‘Naysayers’ can take a hike. Our patience is wearing thinner than the walls of the hovels that Palestinian refugees have called “home” for three generations in their purgatory camps.
These universally exploited refugees are entitled to the nice apartments – the ones that have pools downstairs and a grove of palm trees outside the lobby. Because the kind of compensation owed for this failed western experiment will never be enough.
And no, nobody hates Jews. That is the fallback argument screeched in our ears – the one “firewall” remaining to protect this Israeli Frankenstein. I don’t even care enough to insert the caveats that are supposed to prove I don’t hate Jews. It is not a provable point, and frankly, it is a straw man of an argument. If Jews who didn’t live through the Holocaust still feel the pain of it, then take that up with the Germans. Demand a sizeable plot of land in Germany – and good luck to you.
For the so-called anti-Semites salivating over an article that slams Israel, ply your trade elsewhere – you are part of the reason this problem exists.
Israelis who don’t want to share Palestine as equal citizens with the indigenous Palestinian population – the ones who don’t want to relinquish that which they demanded Palestinians relinquish over 69 years ago - can take their second passports and go back home. Those remaining had better find a positive attitude – Palestinians have shown themselves to be a forgiving lot. The amount of carnage they have experienced at the hands of their oppressors – without proportional response – shows remarkable restraint and faith.
This is less the death of a Jewish state than it is the demise of the last remnants of modern-day colonialism. It is a rite of passage – we will get through it just fine. At this particular precipice in the 21st century, we are all, universally, Palestinian – undoing this wrong is a test of our collective humanity, and nobody has the right to sit this one out.
Israel has no right to exist. Break that mental barrier and just say it: “Israel has no right to exist.” Roll it around your tongue, tweet it, post it as your Facebook status update – do it before you think twice. Delegitimization is here – have no fear. Palestine will be less painful than Israel ever was.

Wednesday, June 03, 2015

Pentagon game to divide Iranians and Arabs

Sharmine Narwani

Pentagon game to divide Iranians and Arabs
(Image by Robert Christine)
Sharmine Narwani says: “If you want to understand what’s going on in the Middle East today, go back to see what the US Military was doing 4 years ago, as the ‘Arab Spring’ kicked off, and US-backed dictators were falling like flies. Shia-vs-Sunni and Iran-vs-Arabs was the script being developed by the Pentagon. My article in 2011: “Pentagon game to divide Iranians and Arabs”
This secret exercise would not have been remarkable except for its timing in March 2011. Washington was losing stalwart allies – Tunisia’s Ben Ali, Egypt’s Mubarak – and at the time there was unrest brewing in Jordan, Bahrain and Yemen too. So why, of all things, was the Pentagon test-driving “Iran-vs-Arabs” narratives during the height of this crisis?
The introduction to the article follows with a link to see the full story, read on:
Analysts and pundits have spent the past two weeks puzzling over the alleged Iranian plot to assassinate a Saudi diplomat in Washington, in part because of a complete lack of either motive or benefit for the Islamic Republic. Iran, reputed to place much stock in cost-benefit analyses of its geopolitical calculations, clearly fails to gain materially or politically from any part of the allegations thus far. So what gives?
Instead of scrutinizing the “whys” of Iran’s involvement, it may be more illuminating to examine Washington’s motivation in advancing this bit of political theater.  The criminal charges were followed by high-profile statements and sanctioned leaks from the White House, the departments of State, Justice, Treasury, Defense, FBI and the CIA, well orchestrated for maximum impact. The U.S. government then sought to persuade the global community via the U.N. Security Council and “phone calls to many capitals” of the gravity of the charges.
Such fanfare went beyond the service of prosecuting a single crime.  More likely, the charges being leveled at Iran came in the service of “public diplomacy,” an attempt to establish a broad narrative that serves a policy decision. Pushing the narrative of the Iranian “boogeyman” is not unusual in U.S. policy circles. What may be new is the emphasis on this story in the aftermath of Arab uprisings throughout the Middle East.
Bring in the “Red Team”
Last March, as the Arab revolts swept through the Middle East and North Africa, the U.S. military’s Central Command for military operations in 20 countries — including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain and Jordan — held a “Red Team” exercise to examine a political narrative that perpetually pits Arabs and Iranians against each other, according to a source involved in the project.
CENTCOM’s Red Team was formed in 2006,  a spokesman told me last year, to “think outside the box, offer contrarian thinking [and] … sharpen the reasoning and force intellectual rigor” on critical issues for the benefit of senior military officials.
 Here are some of the premises and questions included in CENTCOM’s Arabs versus Iranians exercise. (Note: The Red Team refers to Iranians as “Persians.”)
  • Premise: “The Arab-Persian dynamic is a divide.  History, religion, language and culture simply pose too many obstacles to overcome.”
  • Premise: “A general Arab inferiority complex relative to Persians means that many Arabs are fearful of Persian expansion and hegemony throughout the Middle East.  In their minds, the Persian Empire has never gone away and it is more self-sufficient than most Arab states.”
  •  Premise: “Barring a “clash of civilizations” – i.e., a modern crusades, Islam vs Judeo-Christians, warfare between the West/Israel vs Arabs/Persians – there does not appear to be a scenario where Arabs and Persians will join forces against the US/West.”
  •  Question: “Is it appropriate to frame the discussion as Arab-Persian or is Sunni-Shia a more appropriate framework?”
  •  Question: “Assuming a schism, what could unite Arabs and Persians, even temporarily?”
These narratives assume two things: that the division between Iranians and Arabs is a fact and that the greater unity of the two groups in the wake of the Arab uprisings is a potential threat to U.S. interests. Hence the worried question:  What could unite them, even temporarily?
Does the goal then become to ensure a state of chronic hostility between Iranians and Arabs?
Read more:

Pentagon game to divide Iranians and Arabs

A military planning exercise illuminates the story driving Washington's response to the Arab Spring

OCTOBER 26, 2011

SHARMINE NARWANI

Analysts and pundits have spent the past two weeks puzzling over the alleged Iranian plot to assassinate a Saudi diplomat in Washington, in part because of a complete lack of either motive or benefit for the Islamic Republic. Iran, reputed to place much stock in cost-benefit analyses of its geopolitical calculations, clearly fails to gain materially or politically from any part of the allegations thus far. So what gives?
Instead of scrutinizing the “whys” of Iran’s involvement, it may be more illuminating to examine Washington’s motivation in advancing this bit of political theater.  The criminal charges were followed by high-profile statements and sanctioned leaks from the White House, the departments of State, Justice, Treasury, Defense, FBI and the CIA, well orchestrated for maximum impact. The U.S. government then sought to persuade the global community via the U.N. Security Council and “phone calls to many capitals” of the gravity of the charges.
Such fanfare went beyond the service of prosecuting a single crime.  More likely, the charges being leveled at Iran came in the service of “public diplomacy,” an attempt to establish a broad narrative that serves a policy decision. Pushing the narrative of the Iranian "boogeyman" is not unusual in U.S. policy circles. What may be new is the emphasis on this story in the aftermath of Arab uprisings throughout the Middle East.
Bring in the "Red Team"
Last March, as the Arab revolts swept through the Middle East and North Africa, the U.S. military’s Central Command for military operations in 20 countries -- including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain and Jordan -- held a “Red Team” exercise to examine a political narrative that perpetually pits Arabs and Iranians against each other, according to a source involved in the project.
CENTCOM’s Red Team was formed in 2006,  a spokesman told me last year, to “think outside the box, offer contrarian thinking [and] ... sharpen the reasoning and force intellectual rigor” on critical issues for the benefit of senior military officials.
 Here are some of the premises and questions included in CENTCOM’s Arabs versus Iranians exercise. (Note: The Red Team refers to Iranians as “Persians.”)
  • Premise: “The Arab-Persian dynamic is a divide.  History, religion, language and culture simply pose too many obstacles to overcome.”
  • Premise: “A general Arab inferiority complex relative to Persians means that many Arabs are fearful of Persian expansion and hegemony throughout the Middle East.  In their minds, the Persian Empire has never gone away and it is more self-sufficient than most Arab states.”
  •  Premise: “Barring a “clash of civilizations” - i.e., a modern crusades, Islam vs Judeo-Christians, warfare between the West/Israel vs Arabs/Persians - there does not appear to be a scenario where Arabs and Persians will join forces against the US/West.”
  •  Question: “Is it appropriate to frame the discussion as Arab-Persian or is Sunni-Shia a more appropriate framework?”
  •  Question: “Assuming a schism, what could unite Arabs and Persians, even temporarily?”
These narratives assume two things: that the division between Iranians and Arabs is a fact and that the greater unity of the two groups in the wake of the Arab uprisings is a potential threat to U.S. interests. Hence the worried question:  What could unite them, even temporarily?
Does the goal then become to ensure a state of chronic hostility between Iranians and Arabs?
Spokesman Maj. T.G. Taylor told Salon that CENTCOM planners "postulate multiple scenarios and potential outcomes to better anticipate and understand the nature of a complex and diverse region.  It is through this prudent military planning and cultural research that we are able to evaluate how to best protect U.S. and partner interests while reducing the risk of miscalculation stemming from ethnic and national differences."
There is no disputing the region is rife with fault lines that divide populations.  I call the three biggest the Stink Bombs of the Middle East: Sunni versus Shia, Arabs versus Iran, Islamists versus secularists.  While there may be some natural tension between these groups, since the 1979 Iranian revolution there has been a marked increase in narratives that create fear of Shiites, Iranians and Islamists for geopolitical advantage.  And U.S. allies in the region -- Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, Bahrain, Yemen -- have been at the forefront of these efforts.
“... is Sunni-Shia a more appropriate framework? Arabs are afraid of Persian hegemony ...  Islam vs Judeo-Christians ...”
Such  themes have been embedded in superficial narratives of the Middle East that recur in our media.  The Red Team exercise was not particularly exceptional in many respects. But two things are highly unusual about this drill: the timing and its sponsor. The question baffles: Why did the U.S. militarydecide to shine a spotlight on the Arabs vs. Iran narrative three months into the uprisings sweeping through the Arab world?
Why not a broader, more urgent evaluation of how to realign U.S. interests with emerging democratic actors in the region?
The balance of power shifts
At the time of the Red Team exercise, peaceful, political protest had swept away pro-American regimes in Tunisia and Egypt and reached a critical mass in Bahrain and Yemen. The former is home to the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet. The latter is an operational center for al-Qaida and a recent proxy battleground for Saudi-Iranian tensions.
U.S policymakers had reason to worry. The de facto beneficiary of the uprisings was Iran, a country that for three decades has challenged the primacy of U.S. and Israeli interests in the Middle East.  The fall of pro-U.S. dictators all but guaranteed that, in the hands of new populist leaders, the region’s foreign policy outlook would likely shift toward Iran’s perspective, although not be steered by Iran.
According to the New York Times’ David Sanger, the U.S. administration never lost sight of this development. Last February, a month before the Red Team exercise, he wrote;
“Every decision — from Libya to Yemen to Bahrain to Syria — is being examined under the prism of how it will affect what was, until mid-January, the dominating calculus in the Obama administration’s regional strategy: how to slow Iran’s nuclear progress, and speed the arrival of opportunities for a successful uprising there.”
Viewing the Arab uprisings through an Iranian lens offered a possible advantage for the United States. Arab public polls consistently favor Iran when it is contrasted with the United States, but not nearly as much when it is compared to other Arab regimes, even unpopular ones.  This tendency has long provided opponents of Iran to sow discord in the Arab world– even before the 1979 Islamic Revolution, but especially afterward. Narratives about expansionist, aggressive aspirations of the Iranian Shia have been sown far and wide in the largely Saudi-controlled Arab media, even though there has not been a serious conflict between Iranians and Arabs since the Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988.
A testimony to the power of propaganda and the knowledge deficit it encourages, mistrust between Iran and many Arab nations has simmered on low boil ever since. As Washington seeks to manage its losses and assert some control over future developments in the region, this narrative tool becomes a cost-effective way to wrest back some of its primacy by defining a new Middle East and drawing others into those  assumptions.
The Pentagon and social media
 The Red Team exercise did not take place in a vacuum. The Arab revolts have, to a large degree, been driven by the existence of social media platforms, valuable communication assets in countries where public congregation is not encouraged, or is altogether banned.
The Pentagon is actively seeking to understand, influence and control these platforms and the messages they transmit. In July, the technology arm of the Department of Defense, DARPA, announced a $42 million program to enable the U.S. military to “detect, classify, measure and track the formation, development and spread of ideas and concepts (memes)” within social media.
Wired magazine calls the project the Pentagon’s “social media propaganda machine” because of its plans for “counter messaging of detected adversary influence operations.”
In order to “allow more agile use of information in support of [military] operations” and “defend” against “adverse outcomes,” the project will enable the automation of processes to “identify participants and intent, measure effects of persuasion campaigns,” and ultimately, infiltrate and redirect social media-based campaigns overseas, when deemed necessary.
With cyberspace now designated an “operational domain” for the armed forces, we don't know when and where these online tools will be mobilized. But we can be certain one of the most likely targets is Iran, which earlier this year announced plans to disconnect from the rest of the world and establish its own national Internet.
Manufacturing narratives
Promoting the narrative that casts Iran as a regional threat to Arab nations serves several urgent interests today: It justifies the upcoming sale of more than $120 billion in weapons to Arab governments, and works toward preventing Iran from gaining a further foothold in Iraq once U.S. troops complete their withdrawal in December.
But the Arab uprisings have interfered with Washington’s story. Saudi Arabia, Iran’s main rival and the U.S’s closest Arab ally, has sent troops into Bahrain to violently quell protests, has offered sanctuary to embattled dictators and is subsidizing many of the remaining autocratic Arab regimes throughout the region.
Counter-revolutionary Saudi Arabia's substantial treasury insures its perspective will be heard in Washington. The Saudis will pay for more than half -- $67 billion -- of the total value of the region's controversial arms purchases. The monarchy is also developing an elite 35,000-man force to “protect the kingdom’s oil riches and future nuclear sites,” to be overseen by none other than CENTCOM.
The Arab revolts pose a threat to such business. In recent months, the Obama administration has been hard-pressed to gain approval for even a mere $53 million slice of its weapons sale to Bahrain, which has been censured internationally for its suppression of peaceful protests.  Withstanding pressures from Congress and human rights groups, a State Department official last week finally announced the approval of the sale.
 “The deal is part of a move to defend Bahrain from aggression,” a spokesman told the Gulf News, a not so subtle reference to Iran.
As these Arab uprisings continue to dismantle the regional status quo – for better or for worse – it appears the United States is acting not in accordance with its declared values, but is instead allowing financial and hegemonic calculations to drive foreign policy. Narratives manufactured to support myopic interests over fundamental values cast a long shadow over our ability to play a leading role in global affairs.  We don’t reason, we spin.  And, in the case of this newly vulnerable Middle East, nobody is more proficient in the business of keeping conflict humming.

SHARMINE NARWANI