Is it time for a historic paradigm shift in the Persian Gulf?

Seyed Hossein Mousavian

Middle East security and nuclear policy specialist at Princeton University and a former spokesman for Iran’s nuclear negotiators.

After the recent attempt by the United Arab Emirates to reduce tensions with Tehran, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani sent a letter proposing a peace plan to heads of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, Oman and Bahrain) and Iraq.

Since the 1979 Revolution, Iran and its Arab neighbors have never been able to forge a deep and sustainably friendly relationship. In fact, they have been trying to maintain minimalist diplomatic ties with each other, viewing the status quo as the most effective mode of relations.

Over the past few years, however, the degree of hostilities between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain has reached unprecedented levels, to the extent that observers saw prospects of military confrontation in the region.

The reasons behind the increasing tensions are worth discussing. After the Saudis waged war in Yemen starting in 2015, the UAE and Bahrain became parties to the conflict on the Saudi side, whereas Iran supported the Houthis. In 2016, Saudi authorities executed Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr — a popular Shiite cleric critical of the Saudi government — which was followed by an attack on the Saudi Embassy in Tehran by an angry mob. As a result of the attack, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain cut diplomatic ties with Iran, while the UAE reduced its diplomatic relationship. Last but not least, President Donald Trump's policy of maximum pressure against Iran was supported by US allies in the region, namely, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Israel.

While rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia has taken hold all over the region, including in Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria, news about improvement of diplomatic ties between the Arab states of the Persian Gulf and Israel shook Iran. Ongoing Israeli attacks on Syria and Iraq — including on Iran’s bases in these two countries — and the decision by the Trump administration to declare Jerusalem the capital of Israel and recognize the Golan Heights as part of Israel could not have come at a worse time for a Middle East experiencing mounting tensions.

With the new wave of turmoil in Beirut and Baghdad, where determined demonstrators have occupied streets for many weeks calling for the removal of the entire political class, the Middle East is desperate for a serious reconsideration of policies by all parties involved in the region. While the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains the most vital point of contention in the Middle East, resolving rivalries among the countries around the Persian Gulf, especially Iran and Saudi Arabia, would have a substantial impact on resolving crises in Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. But for such efforts and a reshaping of policies to be effective in the Persian Gulf, attention needs to be paid to the following points.

First, for the decades following the 1979 Revolution, the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have been allied against Iran, which has added much to the ethnically belligerent dichotomy of Arab vs. Persian. Over the past few years, tensions between the neighboring Arab countries also increased dramatically. Greater tensions began when Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990; more recently, a high point in hostilities between GCC countries took place when Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain cut diplomatic ties with Qatar in 2017. Thus, hostilities in the region are not just limited to Arabs vs. Persians, but also Arabs vs. Arabs. Hence the old formula to ensure peace, security, and stability is obsolete and we need a new one.

The second point comes as a result of the time and energy I have spent in recent years studying — in dialogue with experts of the Middle East and North Africa — both the contemporary and past history of the Arab world and its relations with Iran. It has been obvious to me that there are three main varieties of “fear of hegemony” among the smaller states in the Middle East, namely, the UAE, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain and Kuwait. The “blatant fear” is about Iranian hegemony. The “hazy fear” is about Iraqi hegemony. And the “subtle fear” is about Saudi hegemony and dominance in the region. The new model for sustainable peace and security should leave no place for anyone’s hegemony. I call this the “zero dominance and hegemony” model.

Third, all members of the GCC along with Iran and Iraq have complaints about the lack of respect for their sovereignty, interference in their domestic affairs and the tendency for sectarian policies to be bolstered. Therefore, the foundations of the new model for sustainable peace and security should be based on seven factors. These are non-interference; respect for national sovereignty; mutual respect; commitment to abandon sectarian and pan-nationalist policies; commitment maintaining the geographic status quo of the region; commitment to secure mutual interests among states; and commitment to collective security.

While Iran and its neighbors have both contradictory and opposing interests, they also have vital mutual interests. In fact, they share more common interests than contradictory ones. Hence, the neighboring countries must be willing to invest more on common interests rather than on those that are contradictory.

Coexistence and cooperation between the GCC, Iraq and Iran would lead to fundamental changes in the relations that Sunni Muslim communities have with their Shiite counterparts in the world of Islam. It would lead to more solidarity and brotherhood, which would then lead to better prospects of security, stability and economic development on a global scale.

In 1987, under UN Security Council Resolution 598 on the Iran-Iraq cease-fire, the council asked the secretary-general to examine measures to enhance the security and stability of the Persian Gulf in consultation with Iran, Iraq and other states of the region. This was a key task for the secretary-general, but unfortunately no efforts were made to carry out this essential mandate.

Sustainable peace and security in the Persian Gulf require a regional cooperation system similar to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Such a system would include the six members of the GCC plus Iran and Iraq to deal with common security concerns, including terrorism, extremism, sectarianism, organized crime, asymmetric threats/warfare and drug trafficking.

This regional cooperation system should take responsibility to guarantee safe maritime passage of energy exports through the narrow Strait of Hormuz and security for a quarter of the world's international energy exports and production with stability in pricing of the region's oil and gas resources. The member states could establish a task force to deal with regional crises such as in Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan through multilateral diplomacy and cooperation with influential foreign and regional players such as the United States, the European Union, China, Russia, Turkey, Egypt and the United Nations.

With a United States willing to reduce its presence in the region, such a regional cooperation system could facilitate a gradual withdrawal of US and other foreign military forces from the region by taking responsibility for security in the Persian Gulf region.

The time has come for a new and innovative model for peace in the Persian Gulf. Oman and Kuwait have already made good efforts toward achieving friendly relations and now the role of the UAE could be definitive. Some sources have confirmed that Tehran has received a positive response from Saudi Arabia and Bahrain to Rouhani’s letter on a peace plan with neighbors. In all of this, the UN Security Council must play a more robust role to ensure that security and peace are achieved in the region.

To fix Iran crisis, Trump must change course

By Seyed Hossein Mousavian*

US President Donald Trump has put the West on a collision course with Iran.

Since he was elected to the White House in 2016, Trump has consistently pursued an ill-advised policy of "maximum pressure" against Tehran, on the assumption the high levels of economic and political pressure will bring Iran back to the negotiating tables on its knees.

It has been unsuccessful, to say the least.

Not only has Trump's approach increased hostility between the two countries, it has also provoked both sides into pursuing unprecedented belligerent policies and actions. It's no wonder the international community is seriously concerned about the possibility of military confrontation.

If Trump continues to pursue his current course of action, he is doomed to failure. There will be no room for diplomatic negotiations between the two countries — even if he is reelected in next year's presidential election. And the implications for the region could be disastrous.

If there's any hope of a constructive resolution, the US president must abandon his bullying tactics and his sanctions policy.

Only a fundamental change of approach can yield a resolution to the escalating tensions. And yet there are a number of key obstacles to a positive diplomatic solution.

The first, and perhaps the greatest, challenge to any real dialogue between the two countries is that the US does not appear to have a coherent position. The views of several key US policymakers directly contradict the president's own views and course of action. National security adviser John Bolton, for example, has advocated over the past 40 years for a military confrontation and regime change in Iran. In Tehran, a majority of state officials believe that Trump, by contrast, simply wanted to destroy the legacy of his predecessor, Barack Obama, and create his own.

The second challenge to an agreement is the unprecedented influence that Israel and Saudi Arabia, both US allies, have in shaping the Trump administration's foreign policy. Iranian officials blame both for intensifying hostilities between Tehran and Washington.

Thirdly, no one believes the Trump administration can come up with a "better deal" in the next year and a half of its term, given the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action brokered in 2015 was the product of 12 years of intensive negotiations. After all, the deal is an international agreement whose inspection system the late director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Yukiya Amano, branded the world's most robust nuclear inspection effort.

And then, even if Iran and the United States were indeed to sit down at the negotiating table in the next year and half, there are no guarantees the Trump administration, or its successor, would end up holding up its part of the bargain.

The fourth obstacle to a successful negotiation is Trump's insistence on following self-defeating strategies and going against the diplomatic grain. His decision to sanction Iran’s Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif essentially sank any chances of constructive diplomacy with Iran.

And finally, perhaps the most obvious impediment is that the Trump administration is deeply unfamiliar with the dynamics of Iran's politics, culture and society. Iran is a proud country that cherishes its history as a civilization stretching back millennia. It is allergic to any policy it perceives as undermining its achievements and will refuse to succumb to bullying or attempts to bring its administration to its knees.

Instead, in the face of Trump's hostility, Iran has adopted a policy of "resistance" and "reciprocation of hostilities" toward the United States. It is becoming increasingly convinced that a policy of "constructive engagement" with the West — which was President Hassan Rouhani's platform when he campaigned for the election in 2013 — does not yield positive outcomes for the country. Tensions with Washington have also become an incentive to boost its alliance with its Eastern allies, namely China and Russia, whose governments appear committed to combating US dominance in the global order.

If there's any hope of a constructive resolution, the US president must abandon his bullying tactics and his sanctions policy in order to provide space for diplomacy. The most urgent task for the US administration is now to establish credible communication channels and to appoint a new team that has a better understanding of the political realities in Iran and across the region.

* Seyed Hossein Mousavian is a Middle East security and nuclear policy specialist at the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University. The above article was first published on politico.eu on August 12, 2019.

Princeton researcher says Abe visit shows Iran’s diplomatic skill

Mousavian enumerates seven conditions for success of Abe’s visit in mediating between Iran and U.S.

TEHRAN - Hossein Mousavian, a Middle East expert who now works as a researcher at Princeton University, has described a planned visit by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to Tehran as “positive” and said it shows effectiveness of Iran’s diplomacy.

In an interview with IRNA published on Sunday, Mousavian said that Japan’s intention to mediate between Iran and the United States is in line with the interests of the international community.

“Among the global powers, Japan is the closest international ally to the U.S. It has also relations with Iran based on mutual respect and interests and constructive cooperation. So, (Japan) is appropriate for this mission,” he pointed out.

However, the former diplomat said, Abe’s success depends on “seven factors”.

One is to convince Washington to follow principles of non-interference, mutual respect and also respect national sovereignty and territorial integrity, Mousavian stated.

“Multi-dimensional solutions have a higher chance of success. For example, security in the Persian Gulf as well as secure passage of energy from there is very vital for Japan. The Japanese prime minister can propose a long list of cooperation between the Persian Gulf states to the U.S., Iran, regional countries, world powers and the United Nations Security Council. 

“Such an initiative will be within the framework of the Article 8 of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 598 that can help ease tensions between Iran and the U.S., stop the Saudi-Iranian animosity, alleviate concerns about an imminent conflict, and pave the way for regional cooperation that would be aimed at resolving current crises in the Middle East. 

“Also, such an initiative will be welcomed by world powers such as China, the European Union, Russia and India,” he explained as the second factor.

Taking departure from warmongering figures in the U.S. by Trump and preventing Arab-Israeli influence on the White House’s decisions are two of the conditions that Mousavian says can help make the visit of Abe to Tehran successful.
As the third factor, Mousavian said, Trump should be able to take distance from radical war-mongering figures in the U.S. who are influential on his policies on Iran. 

“Otherwise they will block his efforts,” he noted.

Mousavian said that the fourth factor is preventing Israeli-Arab front, heading by Saud Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, from interfering in the White House’s decision-making process.

The fifth factor is that the U.S. should stop tightening sanctions and obstructing Iran’s economic relations with other countries and also return to the 2015 nuclear deal, said Mousavian who acted as a nuclear negotiator during the Khatami administration from 2003-2005.

Mousavian said that if the above mentioned factors are implemented, Tehran should also be prepared to “contain” heightened animosity with the U.S. and enter a “conciliatory” path.

“The final solution should bring about a win-win situation both for Trump and Tehran because it’s impossible that either of the sides give up to the other,” he said.

Abe will visit Tehran on June 12-14. The visit will be the first by an incumbent Japanese prime minister to Iran since 1978.

According to Bloomberg, Abe plans to meet with President Hassan Rouhani on June 12 and Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on June 13, the Mainichi reported.

The visit is aimed at helping encourage dialogue with the U.S. and ease tensions, according to the Mainichi.

During his talks with U.S. President Donald Trump in Tokyo on May 27, Abe reiterated his intention to act as an intermediary between the U.S. and Iran.

At a joint press conference with Trump, Abe said Japan “would like to do whatever it can. Japan and the U.S. should collaborate closely so that tensions surrounding Iran are lessened and do not result in armed conflict.”

Tensions have been rising between Tehran and Washington since the U.S. withdrew from the UN-endorsed nuclear agreement in May last year and ordered sanctions on Iran.

Tensions entered a new stage since April when the U.S. designated the IRGC (part of the Iranian military) as a terrorist organization, announced that it does no renew waivers for the eight major buyers of the Iranian oil, and started beefing up its military presence in the region, particularly in the Persian Gulf.

Japan was a major buyer of Iranian oil for decades before the sanctions.

How US, Iranian regional security strategies diverge

By Seyed Hossein Mousavian

The top commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari, earlier this week declared that Iran has trained 100,000 voluntary forces to share experiences and know-how with the Iraqi and Syrian militaries. In this vein, Jafari also asserted that Iran’s strategy in the region has been far more effective in containing the Islamic State’s (IS') terrorism compared to that of the United States, which has spent a hefty amount for the same purpose.

The appreciation for these collaborative efforts was manifested in the recent official visit of Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani to Iraq, which attracted international attention. Rouhani arrived in Baghdad at the invitation of his Iraqi counterpart. The visit was publicly announced. His plane touched down in the capital in broad daylight, and high-ranking authorities warmly received him. During his three-day tour of the country, he met with virtually all top officials in Iraq — and also the highest religious authorities, including Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.

The trip stood in glaring contrast to that of US President Donald Trump, who at the end of December 2018 paid a secret visit to Iraq that involved landing at a US military base with plane lights turned off and with no Iraqi officials at hand to welcome him. The Iraqi president, prime minister and speaker of parliament all refused to meet with him.

The root causes of these contrasts lie in the divergent regional strategies of the United States and Iran.

For some analysts both in the Middle East and beyond, Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution is taken to be the landmark juncture from which many of the regional developments are engendered. One of the notable features of post-revolutionary Iran has been its contumacious and trouble-ridden relations with the United States. As many have argued in the past, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that in some crucial areas, the national interests of Iran and the United States systematically converge. For instance, both the United States and Iran found the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein of Iraq to be their shared nemeses. Similarly, both Washington and Tehran presently find IS as well as an extensive network of extremist groups such as al-Qaeda, al-Nusra and Boko Haram to be their top priority national security threats.

However, the question is why such a convergence of national security interests does not pave the way for a resumption of bilateral relations between Iran and the United States. One could, of course, argue that the answer lies in the dogmatism and shortsightedness in the making of foreign policy of successive US administrations, such as consistent support of allies in the region who reportedly bolster terror. There are indeed many US intelligence reports that confirm the persistent financial and logistical support of Saudi Arabia for terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda, al-Nusra and IS. In other words, the ideological sustenance and financial resources of these extremist groups come directly from US allies. Similarly, the United States is providing political and military support to supposed Arab allies that are responsible for instability in the region via disastrous wars such as the one in Yemen.

But perhaps a more important reason for the absence of constructive relations between Tehran and Washington is that consecutive US administrations have viewed their national interests as best served by only capitalizing on allied states as opposed to nations in the Middle East. From the toppling in 1953 of the government of democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh — who nationalized Iran’s oil industry from colonial forces — to supporting authoritarian regimes in the region, the United States consistently supports unpopular and undemocratic states as anchors to protect its interests. The latter include the Shah of Iran, Arab totalitarian monarchies such as Saudi Arabia, and the autocracies of North Africa such as Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak and Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.

In contrast, the Iranian leadership’s regional security strategy is focused on nurturing ties with nations rather than just states — a strategy that it commenced at home. Entrenched in a protracted eight-year war of aggression that Saddam Hussein waged against Iran and faced with a shortage of human resources in the Iranian national army, the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, founder of the Islamic Republic, ordered the establishment of the Basij — an army of 20 million ordinary Iranians, to fight off the Iraqi army. This new yet increasingly militarized force played a significant role in safeguarding the territorial integrity of Iran.

Induced by nationalistic tendencies, Iranians from all walks of life volunteered to defend their country in an illegitimate war of aggression that dragged on between 1980-88. Over the past four decades, this model has been replicated elsewhere in the region. In the early 1980s, Lebanon’s Hezbollah movement was established with Iran’s assistance and training to safeguard Lebanese borders from Israeli aggression. With the rise of IS, the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) in Iraq were formed in response to a religious edict — a fatwa — issued by Grand Ayatollah Sistani, the supreme religious authority in Iraq. The PMU, with its tens of thousands of ordinary Iraqis, played a vital role in the defeat of IS in Iraq. Hence, the Iraqi government’s reliance on popular forces to deal with national security threats was inspired by the Iranian model of the Basij.

The United States is in a difficult relationship with Baghdad and the PMU amid tensions with Iran. Despite the fact that the US military has praised the PMU as a capable partner in retaking Iraq from IS, Washington deems the Iran-backed Shiite force a menace to the United States. Nevertheless, the Pentagon has stressed that the mission of the US military in Iraq is the defeat of IS, not combating Iran-allied fighters. Therefore, the United States would not attack the PMU since it is a popular Iraqi movement and the hope for the future of Iraq.

In short, the United States and Iran pursue two distinct and divergent strategies in the Middle East. The former invests in maintaining relations with solely regional states, while the latter additionally tries to engage with nations and when necessary help organize popular forces. This divergence of strategies in the region has implications for the bilateral US-Iran relationship — or better put, for the absence of it. For as long as the United States ignores the voices of regional publics, confronts grassroots movements and undermines the will of nations in the Middle East — including the Palestinians — it will only intensify the resentful sentiments in the region.

Princeton researcher urges Tehran-Ankara Moscow axis to settle Syria crisis soon

TEHRAN - Hossein Mousavian, a Middle East expert who now works as a researcher at Princeton University researcher, has urged the Tehran-Ankara-Moscow coalition to immediately put an end to the conflict in Syria now that the United States has decided to withdraw its troops from the country.

“The U.S. pullout from Syria will be beneficial to the triangle of Tehran-Ankara-Moscow if they can deepen cooperation and manage the Syrian crisis immediately,” he told ISNA in an interview published on Sunday.

U.S. President Donald Trump on Wednesday announced that U.S. troops had defeated the Daesh terrorists in Syria and he sought to pull some 2,000 U.S. troops out of Syria.

Mousavian said that there are various views in the U.S. on the issue if withdrawal of forces from Syria.

“The Pentagon and a majority in Congress are against this decision. The U.S. National Security Council has not taken a decision yet, because of internal differences,” he said.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Bahram Qassemi has welcomed Trump’s decision to withdraw American forces from Syria, saying the U.S. military presence in the Middle East fuels insecurity in the region.

“Basically, U.S. forces’ arrival and presence in the region was a wrong, illogical, tension-provoking and crisis-inducing move from the outset, and has always been one of the key contributors to instability and insecurity in the region,” said Qassemi, the Foreign Ministry website reported on Saturday.

Iran, Russia and Turkey, known as the Astana Group, have succeeded to bring the warring sides in Syria to the negotiating table and guarantee ceasefire in some parts of the country.

The foreign ministers of the three countries met in the UN-sponsored talks in Geneva on December 18 for talks on the proposed Syrian constitutional committee and a following election. The sides agreed to meet early next year.

The sides should still agree on the makeup of the 150-memebr constitutional committee. 

The talks were chaired by the United Nations secretary general’s special envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura.

Princeton researcher lists reasons why Iran must focus on its missile power

Seyed Hossein Mousavian, a former Iranian nuclear negotiator and a current Princeton University researcher, believes at a time that Iran is being militarily threatened from all sides, it is a “simple folly” to expect Tehran to “dismantle” its missile program.

“Under current circumstances, where the countries of the region are aggressively arming themselves, it is simply folly to expect that Iran will dismantle the backbone of its defense doctrine,” Mousavian wrote in Al-Monitor published on Thursday.

Following is the text of the article headlined “Six factors shaping Iran’s missile decision-making calculus”:

The UN Security Council convened Dec. 12 to address the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo said that Iran’s pace of missile activities has not diminished since the JCPOA and that the United States seeks to reimpose ballistic missile restrictions that were outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 1929. European countries, however, distanced themselves from the United States by saying Iran had been in compliance with the Iran nuclear deal, while at the same time saying the missile tests were in noncomformity with UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the nuclear deal. Meanwhile, China and Russia said Iran’s missile tests were not a violation of Resolution 2231. 

Iranian officials, including Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, have rejected that there have been any violations, reiterating that the UN resolution does not ban Tehran's missile activities.

One reason President Trump cited to justify his decision to withdraw the United States from the nuclear deal was Iran’s missile program. Pompeo also demanded that Iran dismantle its ballistic missile program. Iran has repeatedly rejected calls for dismantling its arsenal, insisting that its defensive capabilities are non-negotiable. Moreover, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards warned that if threatened, Tehran would increase the range of missiles to above 2,000 kilometers (1,240 miles).

The following interconnected factors shape Iran’s missile policies and its defense strategy:

One is the horrific memories of Iraq’s invasion of Iran in 1980; hundreds of thousands of Iranians died in an eight-year war bankrolled by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and supported by major world powers, including France, the Soviet Union and the United States. The conflict left an indelible mark in the Iranian political psyche that the country must fight for its survival at all costs.

Second, Iraq’s systematic use of Scud missiles to bombard defenseless Iranian cities gave Iran the incentive to begin investing in its ballistic missile program. Over the period of eight years, the Iraqi army launched 533 ballistic missiles on Iranian cities, resulting in 2,300 deaths and injuries to 11,600 Iranians. By the end of war in 1988, Tehran had been attacked 118 times, resulting in 1,600 casualties. In a potential future conflict, Iran can use its inventory to deter and retaliate against an adversary.

Third, the traumatic experience of Saddam Hussein’s systematic use of chemical weapons against Iran, and the international community’s indifference to such violations, has convinced Iran that it cannot rely on international institutions to deter and punish such flagrant violations. A CIA declassified assessment reveals that Iraq began using chemical weapons early in 1983, only to escalate in 1984. Iraq's 11,000-page report to the UN Security Council listed 150 foreign companies — including from the United States, Germany, and France — that played a role in Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction program.

“Under current circumstances, where the countries of the region are aggressively arming themselves, it is simply folly to expect that Iran will dismantle the backbone of its defense doctrine.”

Fourth, the current imbalance of conventional forces in the region play a critical role in Iran’s missile policies. While Iran has been under an arms embargo for decades, its regional rivals, especially Saudi Arabia, have de facto carte blanche to purchase any advanced weapon systems. With defense spending of $69.4 billion in 2017, the kingdom became the largest arms importer in the world. Meanwhile, Israel, with military spending of $19.6 billion, is equipped with the most-advanced military hardware. In comparison, Iran’s defense spending stood at $14.5 billion, a fraction of its neighbors'.

While Iran’s missile arsenal is the most diverse of its kind in the region, it has voluntarily limited the range of its missiles to 2,000 kilometers. However, Saudi Arabia’s Chinese made DF-3 and Df-21 missiles are reported to have an increased range of 2,800 kilometers (1,740 miles), with some claiming a range of up to 4,000 kilometers.

Fifth, Iran is surrounded by U.S. military forces in the region and a number of nuclear-weapon states, such as Israel and Pakistan. Israel, which has the most hostile relations with Iran, has an inventory of 200 nuclear warheads that are deliverable by ballistic missiles, including Jericho II, with a range of 3,500 kilometers (2,175 miles), Jericho III (6,500 kilometers, or 4,000 miles) and air- and sea-launched warheads.

Last but certainly not the least, over the past four decades, the United States has used economic, cyber and political warfare to isolate and weaken Tehran, and has repeatedly called for regime change in the country. Moreover, the Trump administration has firm intentions to create a new political alliance with six Persian Gulf Arab states, Egypt and Jordan aimed at confronting Iran.

The Nuclear Threat Initiative chaired by former U.S. Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz found in a study that between 2005 and 2012, when the world powers imposed the most comprehensive sanctions on Iran, the country developed new, liquid-fuel ballistic missiles and tested at least 33 missiles, more than twice the number of missiles tested in the preceding 20 years. From 2012, when Iran-U.S. high-level direct nuclear talks began, until the signing of the deal in July 2015, Iran conducted only one missile test. The study said that in the 2012-2017 period since the negotiations began, Iran decreased the overall number of tests and focused more on solid-fuel short-range missile capabilities rather than intercontinental ballistic missiles. However, the German newspaper Welt am Sonntag reports that Western intelligence services maintain that Tehran, after Trump’s departure from the nuclear deal, this year has doubled the number of last year's missile tests.

In such a hostile environment, an acceptable framework to alleviate mutual concerns should address the legitimate security concerns of all parties. Such a framework could include a multilateral arrangement for the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and a regional conventional arms arrangement beneficial to all parties. Otherwise, under current circumstances, where the countries of the region are aggressively arming themselves, it is simply folly to expect that Iran will dismantle the backbone of its defense doctrine.

Iran, Saudi Arabia and a history of American aggression

By Seyed Hossein Mousavian

Tehran has repeatedly delivered on its promises, while Washington has fallen short and backed Riyadh’s disastrous regional adventures

In a recent op-ed in The New York Times, Thomas Friedman criticised former US President Barack Obama's bet on Iran and President Donald Trump’s bet on Saudi Arabia, noting that both countries responded with their worst impulses. 

Friedman argues that the Iran nuclear deal was a bet worth making, but like many critics of the deal, he claims that it enabled Iran’s overreach in four Arab capitals: Baghdad, Damascus, Sanaa and Beirut. I believe he is wrong.

In the Iran-US wrangling over the past three decades, Tehran has repeatedly delivered on its promises, while the US has fallen short. In the late 1980s, President George HW Bush asked Iran to help with the release of Western hostages in Lebanon, vowing “goodwill for goodwill”. Iran facilitated the release; in return, the US increased pressure on Iran.  

The 'axis of evil'

In 2001, when the US asked for Iran’s support in its "war on terror" in Afghanistan, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps gave crucial intelligence to the US military. Tehran also played a constructive role in Afghanistan by throwing its full support behind the US-backed president, Hamid Karzai - but President George W Bush responded by putting it on the "axis of evil". 

According to Ryan Crocker, the former US ambassador to Afghanistan and Iraq, Iranian diplomats were "pragmatic and focused" when it came to assisting in Afghanistan, at one point even producing “an extremely valuable map showing the Taliban’s order of battle just before American military action began”.

In each of these important episodes, Iran respected the rules of the game, while the US reneged on its promises

That all ended after the infamous "axis of evil" speech, as the Iranian leadership “concluded that in spite of their cooperation with the American war effort, the United States remained implacably hostile to the Islamic Republic”.

Iran also delivered on its promises in the 2015 nuclear deal. The International Atomic Energy agency repeatedly confirmed that Iran was upholding its end of the bargain - but not only did the US withdraw from the deal, it has also since engaged in a maximum pressure policy, aiming to force Iran to capitulate to its demands.  

In his recent statement, Trump launched straight into an attack on Iran as the root of all evil, rather than immediately addressing what was meant to be the subject at hand, namely Saudi Arabia and the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Trump should also know that 15 of the 19 hijackers who perpetrated the 9/11 attacks on the United States were Saudis. There was not even one Iranian among them.

Carl Bildt

✔@carlbildt

Summary of Trump statement today: If you buy US weapons and if you are against Iran - then you can kill and repress as much as you want. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/11/20/trumps-full-statement-giving-saudi-royal-family-pass-jamal-khashoggi-annotated/ …

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Analysis | Trump’s statement smearing Jamal Khashoggi and giving Saudi Arabia a pass, annotated

In the exclamation-point-laden statement released before the CIA report is due, Trump makes clear that he's not going to punish Saudi royalty for Khashoggi's killing.

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In each of the important episodes outlined above, Iran respected the rules of the game, while the US reneged on its promises. It is also important to recall that Iran's engagements throughout the region predated the nuclear deal. After the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Iran intervened in Iraq only after a number of US officials openly called for an American invasion of Iran to follow that of Iraq. 

In Syria, Iran's involvement has not happened in a vacuum, either. 

Projecting Saudi power

On Saudi Arabia, Friedman argues that Trump vowed to advance US interests in the region by selling $110bn in arms to Saudi Arabia and betting on Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman - but bin Salman "used his carte blanche" to project power and stretch far beyond his capabilities by intervening in Yemen, blockading Qatar, abducting the prime minister of Lebanon, cracking down on female activists and "permitting, if not ordering, his team to murder moderate Saudi democracy advocate Jamal Khashoggi". 

Friedman is wrong about Saudi Arabia too. The wars in Yemen, Syria and Libya have all been joint Saudi-US campaigns. Moreover, Washington and Riyadh jointly supported Saddam’s invasion of Iran and the use of chemical weapons against Iranians. The US turned a blind eye to Saudi Arabia, even though it was well aware of the latter’s support for extremist groups. 

In the 1990s, the Saudis heavily funded madrassas that taught a fundamentalist version of Islam, Obama acknowledged, according to a 2016 Atlantic article. The US-backed Saudi campaign in Yemen has led to the world’s worst humanitarian disaster, and has bolstered extremist groups in the region and beyond. Even after the gruesome murder of Khashoggi, the US imposed severe sanctions on Iran, but did nothing to punish Saudi Arabia.

US domination

There is no doubt that Obama’s strategy was different from Trump’s. “The competition between the Saudis and the Iranians - which has fuelled proxy wars and chaos in Syria and Iraq and Yemen - requires us to say to our friends as well as to the Iranians that they need to find an effective way to share the neighbourhood and institute some sort of cold peace,” Obama told the Atlantic. Yet, despite the Khashoggi affair, Saudi Arabia today lies at the centre of Washington’s strategic and political policy in the region. 

While the West and some regional actors are concerned about Iran’s regional influence, Tehran also has serious and legitimate concerns. As a confidence-building measure, all parties to the nuclear deal - including the US - should respect their obligations to foster peace and stability in the Middle East.The Middle East has been dominated by the US for decades. Multiple wars in the region - from Afghanistan, to Iraq, to Libya, to Yemen - are the real source of instability, sectarian conflict and the rise of terrorist groups such as the Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda. “Iran has not launched an aggressive war in modern history (unlike the US or Israel), and its leaders have a doctrine of ‘no first strike’," notes University of Michigan history professor Juan Cole. 

- Seyed Hossein Mousavian is Middle East Security and Nuclear Policy Specialist at Princeton University and a former spokesman for Iran’s nuclear negotiators. His book, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir, was published in 2012 by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His latest book, “Iran and the United States: An Insider’s view on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace” was released in May 2014.