A Candid Diagnosis of BRICS’s New Delhi Declaration: Rhetoric, Indicators & Stats

This article is not designed to skip the facts, just because its author is simply pro-BRICS. It’s an honest, realistic, friendly, and necessary analysis, that readers interested in a summarized diagnosis of the current state of geopolitical affairs need to know.

Tamer Mansour

Each summit requires a theme, and this year’s BRICS leaders chose an honest one almost accidentally. The theme “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability” is the kind of phrase a committee would come up with if no one wanted to argue about the noun, yet it includes a small, unintended admission showing a certain level of realism: BRICS is still expressing itself in the language of construction. Not a finished house. A building site.

On September 12, the eleven leaders gathered at Bharat Mandapam did what New Delhi’s diplomats had spent a year quietly engineering: they adopted, by consensus, a roughly 140-point document without a single member raising an objection.

For a bloc that now spans Brazil to Indonesia, Russia to the UAE, and includes at least two capitals — Tehran and Abu Dhabi — that were reportedly still trading sharp remarks over West Asian affairs in the drafting room, unanimity on anything is an achievement worth noting before we start dissecting the declaration.

It is more an on-going “journey”, than it is the “destination” both proponents and critics alike, tend to hastily or “propagandistically” present as a success or a failure

And there is a great deal of text to pick apart because the New Delhi Declaration is less a manifesto than a very long, very polite letter to an international order that has not been in the habit of answering its mail.

The Comparison Writes Itself

Strip away the diplomatic upholstery and the Declaration reads as a punch list against the institutions Washington built after 1945 and has since treated as permanent fixtures rather than living systems.

BRICS wants the UN Security Council reformed to give Brazil, India and the African and Latin American blocs a real seat at the table, a request first lodged decades ago and renewed, again, almost as ritual.

It wants the IMF and World Bank’s voting shares brought into line with the size of the economies actually generating global growth, rather than the size of the economies that generated it in 1944.

It wants the World Trade Organization’s two-tier dispute system restored to working order. And it’s demanding an end to unilateral tariffs, secondary sanctions and carbon border taxes dressed up as environmental policy, none of which names a country, yet all of which was written with one capital very much in mind. Needless to say which capital it is.

The comparison writes itself because the incumbent order has spent the intervening years demonstrating exactly the dysfunction BRICS is complaining about. The WTO’s Appellate Body has not been able to hear a new case since December 2019, after Washington spent several years blocking the appointment of judges it decided it no longer trusted; by this June, the selection process had been blocked for the ninety-eighth time.

The IMF’s sixteenth quota review, a 50% increase in the Fund’s resources, agreed by the Board of Governors backs in December 2023, still has not been ratified by the body that alone can hold it up the United States Congress, which controls enough voting power to veto any governance change on its own and has simply declined to schedule the vote.

It is visiting the irony for a moment: the very quota reform BRICS keeps invoking wouldn’t even shift relative voting power, since the 2023 increase was applied equally across the board. The real reallocation is supposed to happen under the next review, but nobody has set a date.

Borrowing the SC’s Unused Vocabulary

The security aspects of the Declaration are worthy of having their own paragraph since they serve as a subtle criticism of the organisation which BRICS claims it wants to reform rather than replace. The leaders called for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, for unimpeded humanitarian access, for rejection of any forced relocation of Palestinian civilians, and for full UN membership to be granted to a Palestinian state alongside the 1967 lines with East Jerusalem as its capital.

A position that, phrased almost identically, has been vetoed or watered-down inside the Security Council itself more than once in recent years by the same permanent member whose Congress is currently sitting on the IMF vote.

They condemned last year’s Pahalgam terror attack in Jammu and Kashmir, which killed twenty-six people, expressed alarm over strikes on nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, and called on Israel to withdraw from Lebanese territory under existing agreements.

None of it is legally binding. All of it is, in effect, the Security Council doing its own job by proxy, in a hotel conference center in New Delhi because eleven governments concluded that waiting for the Council to act on its own would mean waiting indefinitely.

It is hard to imagine a more efficient advertisement for UN reform than a group of member states quietly building a parallel one.

The Numbers on the Building Permit

To their credit, BRICS leaders did not walk into New Delhi with an empty portfolio. The bloc and its partner countries now account for something in the neighborhood of 40 to 44% of global GDP at purchasing power parity and well over half the world’s population, a demographic and economic mass that simply did not exist when the original four-country acronym was coined in a Goldman Sachs research note in 2001, when British economist Jim O’Neill’s research paper pointed to the rapidly developing economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, projecting that these nations would collectively dominate the global economy by 2050, meaning roughly 24 years from now.

So, let’s gauge the indicators and highlight some stats, and see.

BRICS Intra-bloc merchandise trade has grown more than thirteen-fold since 2003, reaching roughly $1.17 trillion in 2024. China has extended zero-tariff treatment to 53 African countries, a detail that received far less coverage than it deserved.

The institutional side of the ledger is more mixed, and honesty requires saying so plainly. The New Development Bank, headquartered in Shanghai, has approved around $42.9 billion in financing across 140 projects since it opened its doors roughly a decade ago, a genuine, usable pipeline of infrastructure and clean-energy money for the Global South, no doubt.

But, set against the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a rival Beijing-anchored lender that carries a top-tier AAA credit rating and has moved faster on a larger book (around $69 billion across 350 projects). The NDB looks less like a Bretton Woods killer and more like a promising regional bank still building its credit history.

And then there is the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, the $100 billion BRICS currency-swap facility meant to give members a crisis backstop independent of the IMF. It was announced with considerable fanfare a decade ago. It remains, by the account of the bloc’s own foreign ministers this year, essentially theoretical, capitalized on paper, untested in practice, the fire extinguisher nobody has actually mounted on the wall.

The Currency Question, Measured in Rupees

China has extended zero-tariff treatment to 53 African countries, a detail that received far less coverage than it deserved

No section of the Declaration draws more attention outside the bloc than its finance-and-payments language, and no section better illustrates the gap between rhetoric and plumbing.

Fact: There is no BRICS currency, and the Declaration does not propose one, a point India’s foreign minister has made repeatedly and pointedly, and one Russian officials themselves now downplay in public.

The Kremlin’s spokesman said this month that Russia now settles around 90 percent of its trade with BRICS partners in national currencies, up sharply from a figure closer to two-thirds just two years earlier, but he was careful to frame this as national-interest housekeeping rather than an ideological crusade against the dollar, since several members plainly do not want to be cast as founding members of an anti-dollar bloc head-on.

The way it is framed is not just a matter of rhetorical caution since it shows a genuine and dull problem which Moscow has had to explain rather than solve. As late last year President Vladimir Putin admitted, the rupee-ruble settlement mechanism with India has had difficulty in making progress, not on account of political reasons but because Russia now receives more rupees from the export of oil and fertilisers than the companies it has currently useful applications for within the Indian economy.

In a way it is a modest tribute to the limits of trade in national currencies since even if you refuse to accept dollars you will still have to find a place where you can spend what you receive.

This is the closest thing to a public airing of BRICS’ internal seams, not a rupture, but a candid admission that enthusiasm for de-dollarization is not evenly distributed across a bloc. A normal status quo at this stage, in my view.

Delhi’s caution and Moscow’s urgency are, in this sense, two entirely reasonable positions arising from two entirely different sets of exposure to Washington’s financial leverage.

But the global dollar’s own numbers have proven stickier than either side’s rhetoric suggests: it still accounts for about 58 percent of declared foreign exchange reserves worldwide, according to IMF data, and remains the currency in which oil, most trade finance and most of the world’s dollar-denominated debt is still priced.

Washington’s Counter-Offer/Offensive

If the Declaration is “diplomatic” enough not to name the United States, Washington has shown no equivalent restraint. Donald Trump has, since shortly after his 2024 election victory, repeatedly threatened BRICS members with 100 percent tariffs should the bloc create a common currency or formally back an alternative to the dollar.

A threat renewed often enough on social media that it has become something of a standing feature of the news cycle, and one that, notably, has never had to be triggered because no BRICS currency has ever existed for it to punish, so far.

What Washington has actually done is narrower, and arguably more effective: it went after individual members rather than the bloc as an abstraction. India was hit with a 25% “reciprocal” tariff in mid-2025, followed weeks later by an additional 25% penalty explicitly tied to its continued purchases of discounted Russian oil, bringing the total to 50$, among the steepest rates applied to any major economy.

Brazil received a comparably steep rate around the same time. The pressure on India was not merely rhetorical: Indian imports of Russian crude, which had surged more than sixty-fold after 2022 and peaked near two million barrels a day, fell to roughly 1.2 million barrels a day by December, a three-year low, following fresh sanctions on Russia’s largest oil companies.

India has publicly maintained it will not abandon Russian energy on Washington’s schedule, and by most accounts it has not, but the volume data suggests the tariffs and sanctions bought Washington something real, even if not everything it wanted.

That is the honest caveat BRICS enthusiasts tend to skip: the “counter-measures” are not just bluster from a superpower in denial. They are a demonstration that the incumbent order, whatever its institutional arthritis, still controls enough of the world’s shipping insurance, dollar clearing and market access to make dissent expensive on a case-by-case basis, even when it cannot be made expensive for an entire bloc at once.

But this article is not designed to skip the facts, just because its author is simply pro-BRICS. It’s an honest, realistic, friendly, and necessary analysis, that readers interested in a summarized diagnosis of the current state of geopolitical affairs need to know.

A Journey, Not a Destination

Put the two arguments side by side, the New Delhi Declaration and the order it is implicitly arguing with, and the fairest verdict is neither the triumphant multipolar dawn some BRICS hasty proponents would describe this week, nor the toothless talking shop its opponents prefer.

It is a bloc that has genuinely reshaped the trade and population statistics of the twenty-first century, and has correspondingly done not yet achieve, so far, the institutional plumbing. Namely, a functioning reserve arrangement, a realigned IMF, a working WTO appeals court, anything resembling a shared payments rail, that would let those statistics translate into leverage on the days that matter, yet.

The United States, for its part, keeps demonstrating the case against itself: an order it built, whose reform it now blocks by veto, defended increasingly through threats, tariffs – and violence — rather than through the persuasive advantages a genuinely attractive system would not need.

Twenty years in, BRICS has poured the foundation. Whether the walls go up, or whether the site simply becomes a permanent feature of the skyline, is still to be witnessed. The rhetoric is eloquently written, agreed upon, well-funded on paper, but understandably never quite finished.

It is more an on-going “journey”, than it is the “destination” both proponents and critics alike, tend to hastily or “propagandistically” present as a success or a failure.

This is exactly why I found this candid diagnosis to be necessary, and timely.

Tamer Mansour, Egyptian Independent Writer & Researcher

Pakistan’s Saudi Commitment Must Not Become a Gateway to War

Pakistan should honor its defense commitments to Saudi Arabia through strictly defensive cooperation and protection of maritime commerce, while avoiding offensive military action against the Houthis that could drag Islamabad into a wider Middle Eastern conflict, alienate Iran, and deepen its domestic and strategic vulnerabilities.

Abbas Hashemite

The Makkah Joint Defense Agreement between Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia was widely considered the beginning of an Islamic NATO. People in all participating countries celebrated the joint defense agreement without realizing the strategic obligations and risks it entailed. For decades, Pakistan had been involved in extraneous issues, especially the United States’ regional wars and conflicts. This not only damaged Islamabad economically but also shattered its social fabric. In recent years, the country has reoriented its foreign policy from direct participation in regional conflicts to that of a mediating power.

However, the ongoing conflict between Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s Houthis has once again placed Pakistan in a difficult position. Nonetheless, Islamabad has not officially declared any active assistance to Saudi Arabia against the Houthi government. Any such declaration or indication by the government of Pakistan would signal a departure from prudent diplomacy, entangling the country directly in a conflict involving Iran, the Gulf states, the USA, Israel, and the future of the world’s most sensitive maritime trade routes and corridors.

Pakistan’s New Strategic Dilemma

Islamabad’s only option is to adopt a legitimate role. It can defend Saudi territory against any external threats under explicitly defined bilateral arrangements

Yemen’s Houthis are no longer just an insurgent group. They control most of northern Yemen, including the country’s capital, Sana’a, and possess drones, missiles, and maritime-strike capabilities. Reports of their attempt to build ballistic missiles using Anthropic AI demonstrate their active pursuit of modern advanced weapons. The Houthis’ confrontation with Israel and their attack on commercial vessels have projected them into the wider Middle Eastern conflict. Despite an international strategic divide over their actions, much of the Muslim world views them as supporting Palestinians and resistance to Israeli genocide in Gaza.

The Strategic Stakes of Bab el-Mandeb

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a narrow maritime route that connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and Asia with Europe, holds a central position in this conflict. The Houthis’ leverage around Bab el-Mandeb enables them to disrupt shipping, increase oil prices, raise insurance costs, and extend transit times. The Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb are two strategic maritime chokepoints whose disruption could destabilize global trade and increase inflation.

However, Islamabad must mark a clear distinction between entering the Saudi-Houthi war and protecting global commercial navigation. It needs to realize that supporting Yemeni or Saudi forces, conducting airstrikes, identifying Houthi positions, or helping any side capture another’s territory is different from naval protection of Pakistani shipping, intelligence sharing, and participation in globally defined anti-piracy operations. The first type would provide a legitimate defense option, while the other could make it a party to the Middle Eastern conflict.

This distinction holds critical significance as the Houthis are widely known as Iran’s proxy group in Yemen. Iran provides key military, technological, strategic, and political assistance to Houthis. Pakistan’s assistance to Saudi or Yemeni forces against the Houthis would be read as Islamabad joining the anti-Iran regional coalition, damaging an indispensable relationship between two South Asian neighbors.

Pakistan Must Avoid Another Regional Quagmire

Pakistan is already navigating a heavily burdened strategic environment. Islamabad’s historic rivalry with India has only been restrained by a fragile ceasefire, and the threat of escalation between two nuclear-armed neighbors continues. A new escalation could revive that conflict with unprecedented swiftness. On its western border, Pakistan is engaged in a precarious standoff with terrorists using Afghan soil. This standoff has also strained the Pakistani government’s relations with the Taliban government. Terrorist attacks in Islamabad continue to increase, and the Pakistani government accuses the Afghan government of its inaction against these organizations.

Pakistan would also have to face domestic repercussions, as the country’s Shia community is closely aligned with the ideology of the Iranian Islamic regime. Moreover, religious political parties, student organizations, civil-society factions, and opposition parties could also mobilize against the government for any action against the Houthis. The current Pakistani government is already struggling with declining popularity. Pakistani people would see any such move as a betrayal of the Palestinian cause.

Therefore, a direct Pakistani involvement in the Saudi-Houthi conflict would further weaken the government’s position at home. Moreover, Israel and the United States will also be skeptical of Pakistan’s expanded role in the region. In addition, it would be difficult for Islamabad to meet the US regional expectations. Thus, for Pakistan, calculations must not be based on how much Saudi Arabia may invest or deposit in Pakistani accounts. It should be based on Pakistan’s regional and domestic interests.

The history of Yemen also provides a significant warning, as the Houthi group has survived the Saudi attacks for decades despite the latter’s military superiority. Years of military conflict have made the Houthis a battle-hardened militia. Therefore, Pakistan needs to ask what its military involvement could achieve. Islamabad’s only option is to adopt a legitimate role. It can defend Saudi territory against any external threats under explicitly defined bilateral arrangements. Pakistan can train the Saudi military, protect Pakistani shipping, and offer its mediation to resolve the Saudi-Houthi conflict peacefully. Islamabad can also use its influence in the Muslim world to de-escalate the Middle Eastern crisis. However, any involvement in an offensive operation against the Houthis would place the country in a difficult position internationally and domestically.

Conclusion

Therefore, the most prudent approach is defensive cooperation with Saudi Arabia to protect its territorial sovereignty, protect legitimate maritime trade, refuse to participate in any offensive against the Houthis, and support diplomatic negotiations. Islamabad can stand with Riyadh without alienating Iran or any of its regional allies and supporters. Although this balance may be difficult, it is Pakistan’s only prudent option. Pakistan must consider its domestic and international responsibilities and interests before entangling in any Saudi offensive in the Middle East. Otherwise, it would once again be exposed to terrorism and international conflicts.

Аbbas Hashemite is a political observer and research analyst for regional and global geopolitical issues. He is currently working as an independent researcher and journalist

The Breaking of the Unipolar World – A Move Toward Multipolarity

 The world community is undergoing an irreversible transition towards multipolarity, driven by the weakening of US and Western influence, the rise of the economic and political power of Global South countries, and the emergence of new centers of power seeking an equitable international order.

Mohammed Amer

President Trump has undoubtedly changed world politics—he is blamed for many reckless, at times illogical actions, yet what is happening largely reflects an objective shift in the balance of power, characterized by the weakening of the West and, above all, the United States, and a movement toward decentralization oriented around specific problems of the international order.

Recently, a large number of scholars have leaned toward the conclusion that three main centers of the modern world—China, the United States, and Russia (which possesses the largest arsenal of nuclear weapons)—are now clearly manifesting their influence. Today, the world media is discussing the possibility of a trilateral summit of China, Russia, and the United States in the upcoming November during the APEC meeting in China.

We are witnessing an accelerating process of transition to a multipolar world

Even the American press writes about the growing role of China, whose economic might is felt in literally every single region of the globe. Whilst Western Europe per se, in current conditions, is increasingly characterized as a fading center of the world, situated on the periphery of the historical process.

The current American administration is doing its utmost to hold back the process of restructuring international affairs toward multilateralism, using coercive levers of influence (sanctions, direct military attacks, blackmail, economic pressure, the capture or killing of leaders, and so on), combined with strategic manipulation of the mass media. In the end, all of this only accelerates the formation of a multipolar world. This trend, in particular, manifests itself in the fact that middle powers and regional blocs are increasingly taking the initiative to bridge governance gaps: Trumpism, unwittingly, is helping to create a realistic system capable of addressing current geopolitical challenges.

Two Summits – New Steps Toward Multipolarity

A SCO summit recently took place in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, where the ten members of the organization—Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Belarus, and the five Central Asian states—put forward pragmatic goals for eliminating the distortions of current policy. An important milestone was the de facto defeat of the United States in the war it unleashed against Iran together with Israel six months ago. Washington does not know how to exit the dead end created by the US per se, while the courageous resistance of the Iranians evokes sympathetic admiration from the majority of the world’s states. A consequence of these processes has been attempts by a number of states in the Middle East and Near East to unite their efforts without the participation of external powers. According to the magazine Le Monde diplomatique, the creation of a pact between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan means that the Middle East and its nearest neighbors, situated at the crossroads of Africa, Asia, and Europe, are entering a new phase of their modern history—a phase conditioned by the political and strategic upheavals that began in 2023, which are changing the dynamics of a region shaped by wars and borders established at the beginning of the last century.

This trend manifested even more clearly during the recently concluded BRICS summit, an association that, together with partner states, comprises almost half of the world’s population. Speaking at the summit’s closing meeting in New Delhi, President V. V. Putin emphasized that in BRICS countries, population growth rates are increasing year by year, domestic markets are strengthening, powerful industrial, technological, financial, and scientific-educational centers have been formed, and modern transport, energy, and digital infrastructure have been built. Internal trade within the association has already reached $1.2 trillion; member states account for almost a quarter of global exports, and it is BRICS that provides the main dynamic of world GDP—49%.

Amid the shrinking influence of the United States, primarily due to the six-month war with Iran, Global South states are increasingly active in advocating equality and democratization of international relations, and in accelerating the reorganization of both political and economic global institutions.

Notably, the world press has begun to take a more critical view of Israel’s actions: the Saudi newspaper Arab News on September 5 published a lengthy article entitled “Netanyahu’s Recklessness Repels Friends and Allies,” detailing the harm the Netanyahu government has “caused to its own people, as well as to its neighbors.” The conclusion: the country is becoming increasingly isolated and subjected to ostracism at the international level.

The problem of the growing gap between rich and poor is actively knocking on the door of the world agenda. The Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram, summarizing the general opinion of Global South countries, stated that “the rich are getting richer, while the rest of society finds itself worse off”: wealth remains with the wealthiest, and wealthy individuals and corporations do not share the fruits of accumulated wealth with the rest of society. (Wealthy people can afford to pay accountants to reduce taxes, even though taxes are already significantly lower than the income tax paid by most people: such tax avoidance differs from tax fraud, but those who receive a monthly salary can do neither, since taxes are withheld directly from wages.)

Heightening Contradictions Within the Western Coalition

Perhaps two factors stand out today characterizing the current stage of international development. First, the approaching end of the conflict in Ukraine: the Kyiv regime is in a state of agony—despite enormous Western assistance, it is suffering defeat on the battlefield, and it is rocked by colossal corruption scandals involving Zelensky’s main supporters. Things have even come to shootouts in the Ukrainian capital between representatives of various Ukrainian security structures in disputes over who will “take over” the control over the flows of money.

The second factor is the heightening of contradictions within the Western coalition supporting the Kyiv regime with the positions of the United States and Western European countries are increasingly diverging. Here one should note the resignation of former British Prime Minister K. Starmer (due to his weakness and incompetence, he was even forced to leave Parliament), as well as the victory of the opposition party “Alternative für Deutschland” in the elections in Saxony-Anhalt. This victory produced an earthquake effect for German politics. But due to the former traditional parties no longer enjoying the trust of voters, many observers believe that the resignation of current Chancellor F. Merz will occur as early as this year.

All these trends are clearly recorded in the Global South’s mass media: for instance, the Saudi newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat noted on September 11 that Western European governments in power are preoccupied with fear of the Russian Federation, “Meanwhile, the growing right-wing youth believe that Russia should not be feared. In fact, various governments fear not so much Russian President Vladimir Putin as the gradual departure, the withdrawal of American troops, as well as the tendency—like the European right has been doing—towards reconciliation with Russia and building a better future with it.”

We are witnessing an accelerating process of transition to a multipolar world.

Muhammad Amer, Syrian publicist, expert on current issues of global and regional politics

Diplomacy in Action: Masoud Pezeshkian Strengthens Iranian Positions at BRICS Summit

Iran’s participation in the BRICS Summit sends a clear signal: the West’s attempts to isolate Tehran have failed. The series of meetings held by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian with world leaders at the 18^th BRICS Summit in New Delhi were a clear confirmation of that.

Alexandr Svaranc

Dialogue Instead of isolation

BRICS summits long ago outgrew the framework of formal meetings, transforming into a key platform for building bilateral relations. The fact that Iran is now a full member of the association puts an end to the plans of the US, Israel, and Europe to blockade the country diplomatically.

During the summit, Masoud Pezeshkian held a series of key talks with leaders of member countries and partners of the association, including Russia, China, India, the UAE, South Africa, Egypt, Malaysia, and Ethiopia. The Iranian side demonstrated high diplomatic activity, discussing issues of regional security (in particular, the situation in the Strait of Hormuz), economic cooperation, and the strengthening of bilateral ties according to the principles of mutual benefit.

Such diplomatic activity by Tehran could become a signal for a de-escalation of tension in the region, confirming that Iran is betting not only on forceful methods but also on the art of diplomacy

Tehran once again confirmed its commitment to the principles of a multipolar world. The position of the President of Iran is unambiguous: international relations must be built on respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. Aggression, in the view of the Iranian side, is not only a criminal but also a dead-end path for resolving geopolitical disputes.

Talks with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi

Tehran and New Delhi discussed a strategy for long-term mutually beneficial partnership on bilateral and multilateral bases. The sides touched upon international transit corridors (including the logistics port of Chabahar and the North–South ITC), which facilitate the expansion of trade bypassing Western sanctions.

An important subject of the meeting was the adoption of measures to protect freedom of navigation and the safety of the merchant fleet amid regional instability. India remains one of Iran’s key economic and political partners, with whom it shares common interests and threats due to the escalation of new regional conflicts.

Pezeshkian emphasized the importance of economic and financial interaction between BRICS members, as well as the need to continue implementing strategic agreements between Iran and India. Modi confirmed India’s commitment to dialogue and diplomacy in resolving regional disputes, and its focus on maintaining peace and stability in West Asia.

Meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chairman Xi Jinping

Masoud Pezeshkian held brief working contacts with colleagues, where the sides confirmed their course toward forming a multipolar world and developing trade in national currencies with the aim of reducing dependence on Western financial systems.

Important Talks with the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed Al Nahyan

This became a landmark meeting given the regional tension in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf zone that has arisen due to the actions of the US and Israel. It can be said that the talks between Pezeshkian and Nahyan on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in India turned out to be one of the main diplomatic events of the forum. It should be recalled that the background was unfavorable due to the crisis in relations between the Islamic Republic and the Emirates, since ten days before this meeting Iran struck military facilities in the UAE, and Abu Dhabi announced, on the eve of the summit, the suspension of financial and trade operations with Tehran.

Before the start of the summit, the simultaneous participation of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates was a difficult factor to be considered. Considering the ongoing war in the Middle East and Iranian strikes on facilities in the Persian Gulf zone, the prospect of agreeing on a single text of the declaration remained unclear for a long time. Iran demanded an unequivocal condemnation of the actions of the US and Israel, while the UAE insisted on equivalent condemnation of the Iranian strikes. In the end, India’s diplomatic mediation made it possible to smooth over the contradictions regarding the text of the final BRICS document.

It is likely that Pezeshkian and Nahyan also touched upon the recent escalation between the Houthis and the Saudis on the Red Sea coast and in the waters of the Bab al-Mandab Strait. The leaders of the two countries took a key step toward each other and agreed to turn the page and move toward overcoming past disagreements, to develop future relations on the basis of economic cooperation, and to deepen dialogue at the level of foreign ministers.

The issue of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz remains one of the most acute and controversial topics on the regional agenda. Earlier, adviser to the President of the UAE, Anwar Gargash, stated that the Emirates would not allow their energy exports and trade to become hostages of the policy of one country, i.e. Iran. However, at the BRICS summit the emphasis shifted, as the sides focused on finding a balance to ensure the security of maritime communications. On his account on X, Gargash characterized President Pezeshkian’s position on overcoming the regional crisis as “balanced and rational”.

Talks with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and South African President Cyril Ramaphosa

With Cairo, a large portion of talks was linked to issues of overcoming the regional crisis, reducing escalation, and unblocking key maritime arteries for world trade. It is clear that the conflict between Israel and the US with Iran also put Egypt in the line of fire of the opposing forces. At the same time, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and the critical situation in the area of the Bab al-Mandab Strait in Yemen create potential difficulties for Egypt connected with a sharp decline in the transit of goods through the Suez Canal.

As the ISNA News Agency reports, with the leader of South Africa, Pezeshkian discussed the conflict in the Gaza Strip and the need to support Palestine. The sides also exchanged views on resolving the Middle East crisis and the prospects for trade and economic cooperation.

Fruitful Meetings with the Leaders of Malaysia and Ethiopia

During the summit, important talks were held between Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and the Prime Ministers of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim, and Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed. The sides discussed deepening trade and economic ties, as well as expanding scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation.

Anwar Ibrahim confirmed Malaysia’s course toward strengthening partnership with Iran, placing emphasis on economics and education, and once again condemned any encroachment on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In turn, the meeting with the Prime Minister of Ethiopia focused on the prospects for economic interaction: Tehran regards Addis Ababa as a key “gateway” to the African continent.

The bilateral talks on the sidelines of the summit demonstrated Iran’s pragmatic approach, aimed at overcoming past disagreements and building a constructive future. Such diplomatic activity by Tehran could become a signal for a de-escalation of tension in the region, confirming that Iran is betting not only on forceful methods but also on the art of diplomacy.

Alexander SVARANTS, Doctor of Political Science, Professor, Turkologist, and expert on Middle Eastern countries

The War Is Spreading: What the Houthi Front Means for the Region

Amid the ongoing US–Iran war and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the emergence of a Saudi-Houthi confrontation has added a new layer of complexity to the Middle Eastern conflict, with the potential to widen and prolong the war while drawing additional regional actors into an increasingly broader confrontation.

Abbas Hashemite

The Saudi-Houthi conflict is not officially part of the US-Iran war. However, the former’s alliance to the United States and the latter’s inclusion in the Axis of Resistance have made this confrontation a part of the conflict between Tehran, Washington, and Tel Aviv. History offers several examples of states becoming embroiled in conflicts in which their direct involvement was neither strategically necessary nor clearly aligned with their core national interests. The Suez Crisis of 1956 illustrates how military intervention in a conflict driven by another state’s interests can impose costs far beyond the original strategic objective. Britain and France intervened alongside Israel against Egypt, only to face intense international pressure and withdraw within weeks.

US military planners and strategists would seek to avoid the recurrence of the shameful and embarrassing Afghan experience

A New Front, A Wider War

The recent US refusal to the Saudi request to launch airstrikes against Houthis, after their capture of strategic points in Yemen, improving their ability to access the significant Bab el-Mandeb Strait, is one of the prime examples of prudent strategic thinking and policymaking. By this refusal, the United States seems to have avoided embroiling itself in a war it did not need to be in. However, if the US policymakers ever had this prudence and sanity, Washington would arguably not have initiated military action against Iran in the first place. So, another possibility is that the USA did not want to use its military resources against the Houthis because they might be needed later in the conflict with Iran. The issue, therefore, may not have been a lack of capability, but a reluctance to commit forces that could become important elsewhere.

Similarly, there could be a possibility that some of the US policymakers and commanders might have recalled the US experience in the so-called War on Terror against the Afghan Taliban. The Houthis have some resemblance to the Taliban, especially in their mode of warfare and their persistence. Moreover, Yemen’s rocky, arid terrain, much like Afghanistan, gives the Houthis a significant advantage, as they are well adapted to the country’s climate and geography. US military planners and strategists would seek to avoid the recurrence of the shameful and embarrassing Afghan experience.

Washington’s Shrinking Military Options

Even with the emergence of another front, Washington would still face the difficult reality that its remaining military options in Iran carry high strategic and political costs. The first option that the US has is to launch a ground invasion of Iran. However, in that case, the US military will have to suffer unimaginable and horrific losses, as its forces will meet strong resistance from the Iranian military and civilians. Contrary to the Trump administration’s calculations, the Islamic regime has emerged stronger than before after the US-Israeli attack on Iran, as Iranians remember the war crimes of the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Iranian youth has emerged as the strongest support for the Islamic regime against the US and Israeli aggression.

The other option would be to launch a nuclear attack on Iran. Reports suggest that the Trump administration is considering a nuclear action against Iran after the failure of its conventional military power. However, this would have horrific global implications. The prospect of a nuclear-armed state using a nuclear weapon against a non-nuclear state would be deeply alarming, with potentially devastating humanitarian, environmental, and geopolitical consequences.

Its geopolitical fallout would not only affect the Gulf states but would also have serious repercussions for Israel. Moreover, the use of nuclear weapons to prevent nuclear proliferation will bury the US-Israeli notion of starting the war to stop Iran from gaining nuclear weapons. In addition, any such actions will infuriate Russia and China to an unprecedented level, leading to an all-out global nuclear war. Therefore, the only option that President Trump has is to hope that the US airstrikes and increasing sanctions will weaken Iran.

Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey: The Next Front?

Similarly, the Saudi government also seems to have limited options against the Houthis. After the initiation of this war and significant Houthi gains, the Saudi forces will have to launch a military action to reverse these gains. Even after years of military operations and technological superiority, the Saudi forces have failed to defeat the Houthis. After Trump refused to launch airstrikes against Houthis, Riyadh seems to be looking towards its new security guarantors, Pakistan and Turkey. Recently, the Pakistani military and civilian leadership have signaled their intent to fulfil the country’s commitments under the Makkah Joint Defense Agreement.

The Pakistan military has decades of experience fighting against the Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan* and other terrorist outfits in mountainous terrain of ex-Tribal areas. Similarly, the Turks have also been fighting Kurds in similar terrain. The recent alleged Houthi attack on Makkah city, although denied by the Houthi leadership, could be used as an excuse to invoke the Makkah Defense pact and raise public sentiment against Houthis in Pakistan and Turkey. Pakistani troops are already positioned in Saudi Arabia. Under this pact, Turkey would also place its military in Saudi Arabia for the implementation of the Makkah pact and defend the Saudi territory against the Houthi attacks.

Ultimately, theHouthi dimension could widen and prolong the conflict rather than produce a decisive shift in its course. If the war fails to deliver a quick and demonstrable victory, political considerations could make it increasingly difficult for Washington and Tel Aviv to acknowledge failure, particularly as elections approach. This could create an incentive to sustain military operations in the hope of achieving a more favorable outcome. Yet, a prolonged and costly campaign may still leave the fundamental issues unresolved, including the security of the Strait of Hormuz and the future of Iran’s nuclear programme. Therefore, the result could be an extended conflict in which the human, military and economic costs continue to rise without producing a clear strategic resolution.

* The movement has been added to the list of terrorist organizations and is prohibited in the Russian Federation.

Аbbas Hashemite is a political observer and research analyst for regional and global geopolitical issues. He is currently working as an independent researcher and journalist

Sanchez Condemns Gaza Genocide, Calls for End to UN Security Council Veto

 By Palestine Chronicle Staff

Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez addresses the UNGA 81 in New York. (Photo: Video grab)

Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez condemned Israel’s genocide in Gaza at the UN while demanding Security Council reform and abolition of veto powers.

Key Takeaways

• Sanchez called for abolishing the veto held by the UN Security Council’s permanent members and ensuring fair representation for all regions.
• He reiterated Spain’s “unequivocal” condemnation of what he described as the genocide Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is perpetrating in Gaza.
• Sanchez warned of a “planned and coordinated” attempt to dismantle multilateral institutions and called for renewed international support for the UN.

‘No Country Should Be a Judge in Its Own Case’

Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez called Wednesday for sweeping reform of the United Nations Security Council, including abolishing the veto power held by its five permanent members.

Addressing the 81st session of the UN General Assembly in New York, Sanchez said the current structure needed to be changed to ensure more equitable representation across the world.

“We need to reform the Security Council so that all of the regions in the world have fair representation, and so that we can do away with the right of veto of the permanent members,” Sanchez said, according to Anadolu news agency.

Because, as established by the UN Charter, “no country should be a judge in its own case, no matter how powerful they are,” he added.

Sanchez warned that the principles underpinning the international system, including peace, sustainability and equal opportunities, were increasingly under attack from governments and political forces seeking to return the world to what he described as a “dark past.”

“I don’t need to point them out. We all know who they are and what their modus operandi is,” he said.

The Spanish prime minister argued that Madrid had sought to defend the principles of the UN Charter in its foreign policy, citing sanctions against Russia and Spain’s arms embargo on Israel.

He also reiterated Spain’s “unequivocal” condemnation of the “genocide that Netanyahu is still perpetrating in Gaza,” referring to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

‘Planned and Coordinated’ Attack on Multilateralism

Sanchez warned that international institutions were facing what he described as a deliberate and coordinated attempt to undermine multilateralism.

According to Anadolu, he characterized the process as a “planned and coordinated demolition attempt,” arguing that its proponents initially question international rules before openly violating them and weakening the institutions created to enforce them.

“They start by questioning the rules, then they break them, knowing well that nobody will dare to hold them accountable,” Sanchez said.

“They cut their contributions to multilateral bodies like this one. They obstruct these organizations’ ability to act, so then write them off as useless entities that we can do without,” he added.

Despite those pressures, Sanchez argued that multilateralism remained the most effective means of managing an increasingly interdependent world.

He urged governments to “ramp up our trust” in the United Nations and strengthen the organization so it could again perform what he described as the central international role it played during the previous century.

Sanchez acknowledged that rebuilding the UN’s effectiveness would “not be easy,” but argued that weakening international institutions would leave the world increasingly governed by power rather than common rules.

A Woman from Latin America to Lead the UN

The Spanish prime minister also called for the next UN secretary-general to be a woman from Latin America, pointing out that all nine people to have held the position since the organization’s creation have been men.

“The time has come for a woman from Latin America to become United Nations Secretary-General,” Sanchez said, describing the issue as a “historic debt that we must settle.”

Sanchez also addressed the migration crisis in the Spanish enclave of Ceuta, rejecting calls for policies that would treat migrants as enemies or abandon human rights protections.

According to the Spanish government, around 72,000 people crossed irregularly from Morocco into Ceuta on July 30 and 31. More than 3,000 migrants, including several hundred minors, remained on the streets of the enclave according to the latest official estimates cited in the report.

“Spain does not choose the easy route,” Sanchez said. “We always choose the fairest route, and I also want to recognize that the world knows this.”

(PC, AA, UN News)