Wednesday, November 18, 2026

How renewed US-Israeli aggression against Iran could put Israeli nuclear infrastructure in the crosshairs

Renewed US-Israeli aggression against Iran’s nuclear facilities could trigger stronger retaliation and expose Israel’s clandestine nuclear infrastructure to crushing Iranian missile strikes.

During the 12-day imposed war in June last year, Israeli aircraft, followed by American B-2 bombers, struck the Khondab nuclear reactor, the Natanz enrichment plant, the Fordow enrichment plant, and the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center in quick succession.

The so-called ‘Operation Midnight Hammer’ alone reportedly involved the use of at least fourteen GBU-57A/B bunker-buster bombs and submarine-launched Tomahawk missiles against the three Iranian facilities located in central Iran.

During the 40-day imposed war that began in February this year, Iranian nuclear facilities were struck once again, including the Khondab nuclear reactor near Arak, in the most openly declared and illegal assault on IAEA-safeguarded nuclear infrastructure in modern history.

Never before had the declared, monitored and peaceful nuclear and scientific facilities of a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) been attacked so openly by nuclear-armed rogue entities, while IAEA cameras and seals installed at the sites documented the darkness descending over some of the world's most closely monitored facilities.

Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, who had issued a religious ruling against nuclear weapons, was martyred in the opening strikes of the 2026 war. Iran swiftly suspended its cooperation with the IAEA in July 2025 and has yet to fully resume it amid continued US war-mongering and the UN nuclear body’s unconstructive and political approach.

Following the international silence over the unprovoked and illegal war of aggression against Iran, and the failure to force Tehran into capitulation, the American and Israeli regimes are now openly discussing further strikes against Iranian facilities, with the name "Pickaxe Mountain" increasingly being mentioned as a potential target.

The Natanz complex and the ridge known as Kuh-e Kolang Gaz Lā, or “Pickaxe Mountain,” sits roughly 1.5-2 km south of it. Analysts estimate the new tunnel complex is buried roughly 100 meters inside granite.
The next target, and why bombing it will not matter

Pickaxe Mountain, also known as Kuh-e Kolang Gaz Lā, is a hard-granite ridge located approximately two kilometres south of Natanz, in Isfahan province.

Iran has spent years excavating an extensive tunnel complex beneath the ridge, assessed to extend roughly 100 metres underground, about 20 metres deeper than Fordow.

US President Donald Trump has repeatedly threatened to strike the site. In October 2026, he publicly claimed that Washington was monitoring activity at Pickaxe Mountain and three other sites, telling reporters that he would not rule out another military campaign, perhaps “another little Epic Fury.”

Iran's response has been unequivocal: any attack on Pickaxe Mountain will be met with decisive and crushing retaliation. But there is a deeper problem with the entire premise of such a campaign, one that the architects of the previous two wars have never satisfactorily addressed.

A country's knowledge of uranium enrichment and centrifuge production cannot be destroyed by bombing. Even a successful strike on Pickaxe Mountain – a highly uncertain prospect given the depth of the facility and the surrounding granite – would do little to eliminate Iran's indigenous and impenetrable nuclear capabilities.

The most important components of those capabilities are its trained personnel, technical documentation and industrial know-how, all of which have become deeply institutionalized across the country.

Demonstrated Iranian capabilities

Iran’s warning rests not merely on rhetoric but on the military record of the two previous wars. In March 2026, following Israeli strikes on Iranian territory and nuclear facilities, Iranian ballistic missiles struck areas around Dimona and Arad in southern occupied territories.

Although the missiles were not intended to penetrate the Shimon Peres Negev Nuclear Research Center, they struck structures just a few kilometres from the reactor, delivering a clear warning.

In another demonstration of its reach, Iranian missiles struck the Bazan oil refinery in Haifa. The 2025 12-day war had already demonstrated a similar capability, when an Iranian missile strike caused extensive damage to Haifa's refinery and forced a suspension of operations.

In March, Iranian missiles fell near Dimona in retaliation for the Israeli strikes
What makes this development militarily significant is the failure of the extensive defensive architecture designed to prevent precisely such retaliatory attacks.

Israel's multilayered air-defence network, including Arrow-2 and Arrow-3, David's Sling, US-supplied THAAD batteries, Patriot systems and American Aegis-equipped warships in the Mediterranean, is integrated with ground- and space-based early-warning and tracking capabilities.

It is arguably the most sophisticated and expensive air-defence architecture ever deployed. Yet Iran managed to deliver precision-guided, solid-fuel ballistic missiles against sensitive locations inside the occupied territories using a relatively small number of projectiles.

The operational record of March 2026, including the refinery strike and the demonstration of missile reach near Dimona, answered a critical question: Tehran possesses the capability to penetrate Israeli defences and strike strategically sensitive locations.

So far, it has stopped short of directly striking the Dimona reactor itself. That restraint should be understood as a strategic choice, not evidence of an inability to reach the facility.

Why Dimona is not Fordow

The debate in Western capitals about Iran's vulnerability to bunker-buster bombs has a largely overlooked counterpart: Israel's own strategic vulnerabilities. Iran is a vast country, covering approximately 1.6 million square kilometres, with its peaceful and science-centric nuclear infrastructure dispersed across numerous locations, including Natanz, Fordow, Isfahan, Arak, the Bushehr coast and, more recently, Pickaxe Mountain.

These facilities are separated by hundreds of kilometres, making the country's nuclear infrastructure geographically dispersed and more difficult to disable through a concentrated and multi-layered military aggression.

Israeli-occupied territories are comparatively smaller in size and the regime’s nuclear infrastructure is considerably more concentrated. Its principal nuclear installation is located at the Shimon Peres Negev Nuclear Research Center, approximately 13 kilometres from the city of Dimona.

According to open-source analyses and statements by experts familiar with the site, the complex consists of multiple structures, known as Machon facilities, distributed across an area of approximately 36 square kilometres in the Negev. The installation is surrounded by extensive military infrastructure, including electrified fencing, patrol roads and air-defence systems.

In January 2026, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimated that Israel possessed approximately 90 nuclear warheads, alongside fissile-material stocks potentially sufficient to produce a considerably larger arsenal.

The reactor, constructed with French assistance and operational since the early 1960s, is a heavy-water, natural-uranium facility historically associated with the production of plutonium and tritium. Its role within Israel's nuclear program has long been a subject of open-source analysis and international scrutiny.

The strategic point is not that Iran would necessarily need to destroy the Dimona complex outright. Rather, the concentration and interdependence of Israel's nuclear infrastructure create vulnerabilities of a different kind from those confronting Iran.

Disruption to critical supporting infrastructure, industrial capabilities and associated facilities could have consequences extending well beyond the immediate damage, potentially affecting the continuity of Israel's nuclear program for years.

The reactor and its supporting infrastructure

The heavy-water reactor occupies a central place in the development of Israel's nuclear program. Its operation depends on a broader network of supporting infrastructure, industrial capabilities, maintenance systems and specialised facilities.

These functions are interconnected, meaning that the resilience of the overall installation depends not simply on the protection of the reactor itself but also on the continued functioning of the wider complex.

This distinction is important when comparing the strategic vulnerabilities of Iran and the Israeli regime. Nuclear infrastructure is not defined solely by the physical protection of a reactor or enrichment facility. It also encompasses the industrial, scientific and logistical systems that sustain a country's nuclear capabilities over time.

In March, Iranian missiles fell near Dimona in retaliation for the Israeli strikes
The reprocessing and components complex

This is the heart of the Israeli nuclear weapons program. The reprocessing plant extracts plutonium from Dimona’s waste, alongside the production of lithium deuteride and beryllium components for nuclear weapons.

The surface buildings around it are operationally significant as well.

Satellite image of the Dimona reactor block, with the cooling tower, hoist/work-storage building, and waste-pool structures outlined in colored boxes
Lithium and fuel-rod production

This is a largely surface-level plant producing raw lithium and lithium deuteride for the previous facility, and the natural-uranium fuel rods that feed the Dimona reactor.

Because so much of it is above ground, it is among the more exposed nodes on the site.

Water treatment and uranium recovery

This plant treats wastewater from the reprocessing complex and recovers uranium from it. Its loss indirectly degrades the reprocessing and components complex’s operation.

Other facilities in the Shimon Peres complex include aluminum cladding production for fuel rods, laser and gas-centrifuge enrichment, depleted-uranium metal production, and research-and-development functions.

Open-source analyses identify further high-value points among them whose loss would cascade across the whole complex.

The inherent weakness

The Dimona complex is not simply a reactor that can be switched off or rendered irrelevant by a single strike. It is an integrated nuclear installation encompassing multiple functions associated with spent-fuel storage, reprocessing and the handling of nuclear materials.

Israel's nuclear infrastructure is concentrated, interdependent and, in part, exposed above ground, while its supporting systems present vulnerabilities distinct from those of its more heavily protected core facilities.

This broader picture raises important questions about the resilience of Israel's nuclear infrastructure in the face of Iran's demonstrated missile capabilities, including its precision-guided, solid-fuel ballistic missiles and its ability to penetrate even highly sophisticated air-defence systems.

These vulnerabilities also undermine the escalation logic set in motion by the previous two imposed wars. A rogue entity that attacks a democratic, sovereign country's nuclear facilities risks inviting retaliation against its own strategic infrastructure.

But a strike on Dimona resulting in a significant radiological release would go far beyond a conventional act of military action, potentially creating consequences that extend widely.

This is precisely why the distinction between Iran's demonstrated capabilities and its actual choices matters. During the 40-day war, Iranian missiles struck areas near Dimona rather than the nuclear facility itself. They also struck a refinery and an area without directly attacking the reactor. Tehran thus demonstrated its reach while stopping short of hitting the reactor.

The game that was started, and who can end it

The sequence of events matters. The military aggression against Iran's safeguarded nuclear facilities was not initiated by Tehran. It began with unprovoked Israeli and American attacks on Natanz, Fordow, Isfahan and Arak in 2025 and 2026, accompanied by repeated declarations from Israeli and American leaders that the objective was to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear bomb.

Like the nuclear infrastructure of any other entity, Israel's facilities cannot be considered immune from military attack. Their geographical concentration raises additional questions about their strategic vulnerability. This is a description of the strategic environment that the previous two wars have helped create.

If the third war, now being discussed, proceeds against Pickaxe Mountain, Tehran will have further grounds to regard the precedent established by attacks on its own nuclear infrastructure as justification for expanding the scope of potential retaliation.

 It should be noted that all these facilities are situated in the Negev, far from any major population center and at a distance from the cities and settlements inside the occupied territories, so that, on this reading, no danger would be posed to the people, Palestinians or Israeli settlers.

On the other hand, the Dimona complex has never been placed under IAEA safeguards, Israel has refused to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the site’s military character has been concealed from international inspection for six decades. Responsibility for any release, on this account, would fall on the regime that secretly built an unsafeguarded weapons plant in the desert.

Written by

Arman Shariati

Arman Shariati specialises in defense matters, with a focus on aerospace developments.

Tuesday, November 17, 2026

General Rezaei’s Postcard to Lakenheath

Larry C. Johnson

Washington has a well-worn method for handling Iranian threats: dismiss them as bluster, then act surprised when the missiles show up. We ran that play in March. Tehran had insisted for twenty years that its missiles stopped at 2,000 kilometers, and the Pentagon was happy to believe it. Then two Iranian ballistic missiles went screaming toward Diego Garcia, about 3,900 kilometers from Iran’s southern coast. Pete Hegseth later told the Senate he’d seen a 4,000-kilometer missile fired at the base. Oops.

On Wednesday, Mohsen Rezaei sent another postcard. If American planes take off from bases in Europe to bomb Iran, he said, Iran will hit those bases. He promised strikes on “remote American bases” that have “not yet been attacked,” and on “some islands, which they think our missiles can’t reach.” Then came the line that should keep a few wing commanders up at night: Iran’s “defensive and offensive capabilities are much greater now than they were on the first day of the war.”

The reflex in Washington will be to roll its eyes. I’d suggest a different exercise. Assume Rezaei is telling the truth. Assume he is quietly admitting that Iran now has a longer-reaching, more numerous missile force than the one it fired in March. Then look at where the US Air Force keeps its airplanes in Europe.

This is not a backbencher talking

Earlier this month the threats against Europe came from the usual chorus. A member of parliament’s National Security Committee told Euronews that Iranian missiles would fly toward Europe if America used its bases in Italy and Germany. Kayhan, the paper that speaks for the Supreme Leader’s office, said the target list now reaches “the heart of Europe.” Tehran’s Hamshahri reported that Iran had updated its target bank to include US support bases in Europe, under a doctrine of “response without geographical limits.” Western commentators filed all of this under noise.

Rezaei is harder to file. He is the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Iran’s top security official, appointed in August by Mojtaba Khamenei. He commanded the Revolutionary Guards for sixteen years. When the man who coordinates Iran’s war policy names your bases, the polite response is to stop calling it rhetoric.

The threats also followed a reported US strike on an Iranian missile facility on Qeshm Island. Tehran is not issuing these warnings in a vacuum. It is telling Washington what the next round will cost.

Get out a ruler

I did the arithmetic so the Pentagon doesn’t have to. Measured from Iran’s western and northwestern border, every major US air base in Germany, and the main ones in the UK, sits inside the 4,000 kilometers Iran demonstrated in March.

BaseWhat’s thereDistance from western Iran
Incirlik, TurkeyUS tactical aircraft, munitions storage810–950 km
Souda Bay, CreteNaval air station, Sixth Fleet logistics1,810–1,940 km
Sigonella, SicilyNavy patrol aircraft, Global Hawk drones2,530–2,760 km
Aviano, Italy31st Fighter Wing, F-16s2,630–3,040 km
Ramstein, GermanyUSAFE headquarters, airlift hub for the region3,040–3,310 km
Spangdahlem, Germany52nd Fighter Wing, F-16s3,110–3,380 km
Lakenheath, UK48th Fighter Wing, F-15Es and F-35s3,570–3,840 km
Mildenhall, UKTankers, special operations aircraft3,570–3,840 km
Fairford, UKRotating B-52, B-1 and B-2 bombers3,720–3,990 km

Notice who sits at the bottom of that list. Fairford is where American bombers stage when Washington wants to hit a target in the Middle East without asking a Gulf monarch for permission. Mildenhall’s tankers keep those bombers in the air. Those are exactly the “planes taking off” Rezaei described.

The islands are another matter. Cyprus and Crete are well within reach of Iran’s ordinary 2,000-kilometer missiles. Sicily is just past it. If you’re stationed on a Mediterranean island and were told Iran couldn’t reach you, I’d ask for a second opinion.

Parked airplanes don’t dodge

In March, Iran fired two missiles at Diego Garcia. Two missiles make a demonstration, not a campaign. The comforting assumption in Washington is that Iran’s intermediate-range force is a handful of prototypes. If Rezaei means what he says, that assumption has expired. “Much greater than the first day of the war” means more of those missiles, longer legs, or both.

Think about what that does to the bases on my list. The fighter wings at Lakenheath, Spangdahlem and Aviano at least have Cold War hardened shelters. The bombers at Fairford and the tankers at Mildenhall don’t. They’re too big for shelters and sit on open ramps, lined up like a parking lot at a county fair. A missile doesn’t need surgical accuracy to wreck a row of KC-135s. It doesn’t need to destroy a B-52 to ground the whole bomber force for a week. A cratered runway does that nicely.

Then there is the defense. Here the irony is almost too rich. For fifteen years NATO told Moscow that the Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland were built to stop Iranian missiles headed for Europe, and the Russians called it a fig leaf. We are about to find out whether the fig leaf works. Those sites carry a limited number of interceptors. Meanwhile Patriot batteries have been drawn down for Ukraine and the Gulf. A defense sized for a few rogue missiles is not a defense against a salvo.

In fairness, missiles fired at maximum range carry lighter warheads, and Iran’s accuracy at 3,500 kilometers is unproven. That is a real limitation. It is also the kind of limitation that sounded very reassuring right up until March 20.

The message isn’t for the Pentagon

Read Rezaei’s condition again: Iran strikes the bases “if American planes take off from them and bomb Iran.” That sentence is addressed to Rome, Berlin and London, not Washington.

Some European capitals got the message before he sent it. Italy and Spain have already blocked the United States from using bases on their soil to attack Iran. London allowed it only for what it called “specific and limited” purposes, mainly hitting Iranian missiles in depots or on launchers. Every one of those governments now has to ask whether a B-52 sortie out of Fairford is worth an Iranian warhead landing in Gloucestershire.

That is the real weapon here. Iran doesn’t have to hit anything in Europe. It only has to make European governments believe it can. Each capital that says no to Washington shrinks the US bomber campaign back to the Gulf bases, which Iran has already shown it can reach with ease.

Take him at his word

I spent a career watching Washington underestimate adversaries because the alternative was inconvenient. Iran said its missiles stopped at 2,000 kilometers, so we planned around 2,000 kilometers. Iran fired at Diego Garcia, and we decided two missiles were a fluke. Now Iran’s top security official tells us he has more, and that he will use them on the bases our bombers fly from.

Maybe he’s bluffing. But if Rezaei is telling the truth, the airplanes at Lakenheath, Fairford, Ramstein and Aviano are no longer sitting in a rear area. They are sitting in a war zone, with no shelters for the big ones and a missile defense built for a threat that just got bigger. The prudent response would be to disperse the aircraft, stock up on interceptors and think hard before launching the next strike from European soil. The likely response is a Pentagon spokesman calling it rhetoric. We’ll find out which one was right the same way we did in March.


Pepe and I discuss the latest twist and turns in the JD Vance effort to negotiate an end to the war in Iran:

Mario and I discuss the latest psyops percolating across the internet:

I discuss why Pete Hegeseth merits an impeachment with Kyle Anzalone:

Nima and I discuss General Rezaei’s threat to strike Europe if the US launches a new war:

New Wave of Iran War Propaganda from CNN and the New York Times

Caitlin Johnstone

There has been a marked uptick in mass media propaganda for war with Iran, notably from outlets like CNN and the New York Times who had up until now been relatively restrained in their militarist spinmeistering regarding this particular war.

CNN has just published an article titled “US intel indicates Iran developing plans to potentially detonate a dirty bomb in Washington, sources say.”

The “sources” who “say” are of course anonymous officials in the United States government, and there is of course zero evidence provided for their claims.

As we have discussed many times in this space, quoting unnamed officials making evidence-free assertions about a US-targeted nation is not journalism. It is propaganda. It is a press release by the American war machine disguised as a news story by the independent media.

Separately, CNN’s Fareed Zakaria has put out a special titled “Iran and the Bomb”, babbling about “the current nuclear crisis with Iran” and baselessly asserting as an established fact that “Iran has pursued a nuclear weapon despite decades of sanctions, security threats, and now war.”

“The pursuit of nuclear power, intended to make Iran stronger, has brought it into confrontation with the world’s most powerful nations, leaving it poorer and weaker,” Zakaria says in closing. “The US and Israel’s military strikes have not solved the fundamental problem either: Iran retains the knowledge to build nuclear weapons while its leaders have more reason than ever to believe that they need them. At the end of this war, the task will be for diplomacy to achieve what the bombings have not: pressure and persuade Iran that it will be safer without a nuclear bomb than with one.”

There is to this day exactly zero evidence that Iran is trying to build a nuclear weapon, or that it had been trying to build a nuclear weapon when Trump began this war earlier this year, or that it was trying to build a nuclear weapon when Trump bombed its nuclear energy infrastructure last year. It’s a completely evidence-free claim being presented as a verified threat by a media outlet trying to drum up support for more war.

And it should here be noted that CNN’s parent company Warner Bros. Discovery was recently acquired by David Ellison, whose billionaire father Larry Ellison has donated unprecedented sums of money to the Israeli military. The Ellisons have been scrambling to buy up influence over major platforms like CNN, CBS News and TikTok amid Israel’s genocide-induced PR crisis.

Not to be outdone, The New York Times has also joined in the propaganda feeding frenzy with an article speculating that Iranian water infrastructure might actually be weapons.

Yes, you read that correctly.

Here’s an excerpt:

“Environmentalists have long been mystified by the significant proliferation of dams and water transfer projects like pipelines and tunnels across Iran, especially in regions that had no apparent need for them.

“Some analysts think they now know the answer after U.S. and Israeli airstrikes on concealed Iranian missile sites this year targeted many of the same areas. These analysts have concluded that the water projects may have been developed to support the country’s military buildup.

“Given the secrecy surrounding Iran’s missile program, any connection between it and Iran’s ambitious, decades-old initiative to develop water infrastructure remains speculative. But some experts find the evidence highly suggestive.”

If The New York Times was a real news outlet, a reporter admitting that their own reporting was “speculative” would guarantee that the article never got past the editors. But The New York Times is not a real news outlet. It is a propaganda service for the US empire which has enthusiastically supported every American war while being operated by the same family for over a century.

“New York Times preparing narrative to justify U.S. strikes on Iranian water infrastructure in coming war,” tweeted Drop Site News reporter Murtaza Hussain in response to the article.

I would agree.

These narratives can safely be dismissed without further discussion. As Hitchens’ razor reminds us, “What can be asserted without evidence can also be dismissed without evidence.”

But it is revealing that the mainstream press have joined the bandwagon for this particular war now. In the lead-up to Trump’s attack on Iran this past February, I marveled publicly at how little the empire was doing to manufacture consent.

“This time they’re not even pretending to care about the will of the American people,” I wrote shortly after the war began. “They’re not even pretending to care about humanitarian interests or the future of the people they are bombing. They’re just spouting extremely obvious lies that get fact-checked and debunked by the mainstream media in real time, and then murdering people and bragging about it.”

Back then only the explicitly Trump-aligned press were unified in justifying this war, and they were pushing half-assed narratives about nuclear weapons and the Iranian people wanting to be bombed that no serious person believed.

That appears to have changed. As Ali Ahmadi quipped on Twitter regarding this new wave of propaganda from CNN and The New York Times, “It seems that the lesson the Trump admin took away from the midterms is that they need to do more to manufacture consent. All the old Bush admin tactics from 2003 are back and the ‘liberal’ media is back on board.”

Well yes indeedy.

The empire plainly has more horrors in store for Iran, and it doesn’t seem to care how bad the consequences of that war hurt the rest of us.

The US empire must end.