Iran has raised the cost of any aggression to a level that can no longer be managed within the framework of a limited operation. At the current juncture, it seems that Iran has a strategic advantage in the field of deterrence.
Samyar Rostami
The government is trying to make the Iranian armed forces’ place among the citizens more valued. Iran has no intention of returning to the pre-war status quo and wants to turn battlefield realities into political gains.
Iran’s ultimate and primary goal is not agreement; it is the military and economic defeat of the enemy. Negotiation is a political tool for coercion and obtaining real concessions.
Iran has succeeded in creating a kind of mutual deterrence that influences Washington’s calculations and decisions
It seems that the combination of “pressure and negotiation,” i.e., negotiation based on field pressures (in case of non-implementation of commitments), is of greater interest to Tehran.
Apart from the contacts that the Iranian Foreign Minister had with his counterparts to prevent the escalation of insecurity and secure Iran’s interests, Tehran had shown by increasing its defense preparations, sending clear deterrent messages, and emphasizing the country’s senior officials on a decisive and proportionate response to any aggression that any action against Iran’s interests and national security would come at a heavy cost to the other side.
From Tehran’s perspective, as long as the naval blockade and American evil continue, nothing special will happen in the situation in the Strait of Hormuz.
From Iran’s perspective, activating the southern route through Omani waters is also incompatible with environmental considerations and the country’s national security. Therefore, the Iran-Oman negotiations are focused on designing a temporary middle route, a route that, while ensuring the sovereign rights of the two countries, will replace the northern and southern routes.
While Donald Trump had been speaking of the possibility of a large-scale military attack on Iran by issuing numerous messages until the past few days, he suddenly canceled the attack. Disagreements in the White House, opposition from some military commanders, and even doubts from figures such as J.D. Vance, the decline in U.S. weapons stocks, concerns about Iran’s missile capabilities and new technologies, the activation of new fronts by the resistance movement, the decline in Benjamin Netanyahu’s influence, and the role of mediators such as Qatar, Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey have also played a role in the U.S. retreat from Iran.
In fact, the reason for the U.S. withdrawal from operations against Iran was the credible threat from Iran and concerns about the consequences of a strategic error, which changed Washington’s calculations.
In the view of many in Tehran, Iran has raised the cost of any aggression to a level that can no longer be managed within the framework of a limited operation. At the current juncture, it seems that Iran has a strategic advantage in the field of deterrence. Iran has succeeded in creating a kind of mutual deterrence that influences Washington’s calculations and decisions.
Iran has also shown that it is capable of imposing high strategic costs on the Persian Gulf countries. Therefore, it is a win-win situation for all countries in the region to see themselves as stakeholders in the future of the region. America’s war against Iran is a war against the entire region.
From this perspective, the aggression and America’s attack on Iran’s energy infrastructure is a gamble with the world’s energy security.
On March 22, Abdollahi, commander of Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya Central Command, said that the Islamic Republic’s military doctrine had shifted from a defensive to an offensive stance. In the view of Mehdi Mohammadi, Qalibaf’s advisor, recent developments in the field, especially the preemptive operations in Jordan, indicate that the regional battlefield has entered a completely new phase. This approach neutralizes the enemy’s plan before it is put into action and places the initiative in determining the rules of battle in Iran’s hands.
That means Iran has taken the initiative in confronting the Trump administration by bypassing the defensive reaction and expanding the conflict to vital bases and routes. Also, a change in the platform of the conflict and the rewriting of the rules of war based on past lessons, accurate recognition of the enemy’s capabilities and intentions, and long-term planning for the future are being considered.
In another dimension, it seems that apart from creating new conditions and platforms, fronts are increasing in different directions in the region; the fronts are coordinated with each other, yet act independently. A new axis of resistance with new actors is emerging.
Despite paying attention to the independence of the circles of the axis of resistance, the strategy of increasingly using the axis of resistance to consolidate achievements, change the shape of the field, and strengthen Iran’s regional leverage has become more important.
Tehran appears to have used the ceasefire negotiations to buy time, secure resources, and reshape strategy and tactics. Tehran is attempting to redefine the terms of the conflict by eroding U.S. power, increasing the cost of its regional presence, expanding the battlefield, and reducing the operational freedom of Israel and the United States.
This approach is a kind of rewriting of the rules of war based on past doctrines, an accurate understanding of the enemy’s capabilities and intentions, and long-term planning.
Other goals include increasing costs to the enemy over time, demonstrating resilience and flexibility under constant pressure, and redistributing the costs of war. Also, the use of newer drones, such as the “Hadid 110” drones, a new generation of Iranian missiles, more precise missiles, more up-to-date intelligence capabilities, and Iran’s newer networks has made it possible to carry out better and more effective surprise attacks.
Outlook
War and aggression against Iran have profound regional and global implications. The future of international action and response is tied to the nature of this war.
Amid the conflict between Vance and Rubio over how the Trump administration should manage the U.S. war against Iran, about three-quarters of the American public, according to the latest polls, see the war as unnecessary.
Aside from Donald Trump’s massive decline in net approval ratings in at least 11 states he won by double-digit margins in the 2024 election, polls show that war with Iran has become deeply unpopular at home, weakening Republicans’ chances in the November midterm elections. Meanwhile, Tehran is pursuing goals such as the defeat of Republicans in both houses of Congress in the U.S. and the surrender of America.
By examining oil prices, the status of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), the share of the energy sector in inflation, and the interest rate of the 30-year U.S. Treasury bond, it is clear that any escalation of tensions in the long term will face the United States with serious challenges. Therefore, Washington will probably refrain from escalating tensions and prolonging the war in the region.
However, Washington may seek to increase pressure on Tehran by taking advantage of its allies to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, assassinate high-ranking officials, and attack military and civilian infrastructure to expand the geography of war and create new routes. In contrast, Tehran, by creatively solving its weaknesses, is preparing to expand the geographical scope of its war to completely expel the U.S. military from West Asia and form a new concept of the power structure in the region.
Iran hopes that in the possible new order, regional enemies will become friends and common interests will be formed without dependence on the U.S. military umbrella.
In another dimension, from the perspective of many in the United States and Israel, the effective strategy is the continuation of economic pressure, sanctions, blockade, and internal pressure. Therefore, the economic lever may be maintained as a “long-term lever of pressure” and the military option as a “short-term threat.” But in reality, ignoring Iran’s “strategic resilience” and the “identity bonds” of Iranians will turn any prediction based on economic collapse into a mirage.
Samyar Rostami, а political observer and senior researcher in international relations
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