Between Washington and Islamabad: Saudi Arabia’s Double Nuclear Hedge

Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of civilian nuclear cooperation with the United States while simultaneously deepening its strategic partnership with Pakistan reflects a broader shift in Gulf security, where regional states are diversifying their alliances instead of relying on a single external guarantor.

Abbas Hashemite

Washington’s Conditional Nuclear Offer

In a ceremony at the Department of Energy headquarters in Washington, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States signed a nuclear agreement, providing Riyadh with a framework to enrich nuclear fuel on its soil and requiring the country to buy its nuclear reactors and fuel from American firms, reinforcing a long-term strategic and commercial partnership. Riyadh had chased this kind of deal for over a decade. However, less than a day after signing this deal, US President Donald Trump derailed the agreement himself, announcing a new condition that had not been part of the signed document: that the kingdom would have to join the Abraham Accords and formally establish diplomatic relations with Israel to materialize the deal. Due to this condition, the deal was put in doubt within twenty-four hours of the signing session.

Pakistan: Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Hedge

The Gulf states have rationally concluded that no single guarantor is reliable alone

However, this does not leave Saudi Arabia in any isolation or insecurity. The Kingdom already has a strong strategic nuclear option that is not dependent on Washington, and that is Pakistan. Under the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA), signed between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in September 2025, an attack on one country is to be treated as an attack on both. Soon after this agreement, Khawaja Asif, the Defense Minister of Pakistan, publicly stated that the country’s nuclear arsenal “will be made available” to Riyadh under this agreement if the need ever arose, a statement widely interpreted as a message aimed at the Zionist regime. This demonstrates that Saudi Arabia is not entirely dependent on an unreliable country like the US for its security and nuclear enrichment.

This tells the real story. Saudi Arabia hedging its nuclear future in two directions, the civilian one with the US, and the strategic one with Pakistan, illustrates that trust in single-patron security guarantees is eroding; the Gulf states are attempting to expand their security relations with more than one country as recent regional developments have exposed the reality of US security guarantees and their reliability.

The US-Saudi Arabia deal provides the latter with an opportunity to enrich uranium without the so-called “gold standard” restrictions that bar fuel sourced from other suppliers, or enrichment, and it does not mandate the expanded IAEA oversight. However, Trump’s condition, binding the technology transfer to signing the Abraham Accords, demonstrates that this nuclear cooperation is transactional and reversible. For a country deciding how much to rely on any of the allies, this precondition is not reassuring.

Saudi Arabia signed the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement after an Israeli attack on Hamas officials in Qatar jolted the Gulf capitals. The deal binds the two countries in a collective security mechanism. Islamabad’s subsequent signal of the possibility of extending its nuclear arsenal to Saudi Arabia was likely a political signal rather than a formal policy. This sort of signaling plays a critical role in deterrence, providing Riyadh with strategic reassurance while Washington continues to debate gold-standard clauses and normalization of diplomatic relations with Israel.

From a Saudi Strategy to a Gulf Security Trend

Recently, Kuwait has also been mulling expanding the Defense Cooperation Agreement, which the two sides signed in 2023. The Kuwaiti officials seek a Saudi-style upgrade with Pakistan. This ambition is not arising in a vacuum. Kuwait is one of the Gulf states that endured the heaviest Iranian missile and drone strikes during the recent US-Israel-Iran war, illustrating how exposed the Gulf nations are in a regional crisis that they did not even choose. Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia are also drafting a separate mutual defense agreement, while Jordan and Bahrain have also shown their interest in a similar weapons and training deal. What once seemed an isolated Saudi initiative is now evolving into a broader regional security framework, with Pakistan playing a crucial role in the region.

What Riyadh’s Hedge Means for Washington and Israel

This situation weakens the US position for leverage-based nuclear diplomacy with a hedging client state. While Riyadh has Islamabad’s support as an unconditional ally, it will accelerate its hedging. For Israel, two parallel trends are likely to raise strategic concerns: a US-Saudi deal lacking key safeguards, and Pakistan’s growing security footprint in the Gulf. Former Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman’s warning that the US deal could fuel a regional arms race may equally apply to the Pak-Saudi Arabia Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement. However, this does not mean a rapid end to US influence in the region. It implies that the Gulf states have rationally concluded that no single guarantor is reliable alone. Nonetheless, this conclusion has significantly diminished US influence in the Gulf region.

Аbbas Hashemite is a political observer and research analyst for regional and global geopolitical issues. He is currently working as an independent researcher and journalist