The prospects for the Aras Corridor’s competition with TRIPP and the future of Iran’s position in the South Caucasus economic corridors depend on the geopolitical developments in the region, the effective implementation and ability of regional actors to manage external pressures, and Iran’s domestic capacity in infrastructure development and corridor diplomacy.
Samyar Rostami
After independence and the tensions of the 1990s, direct rail and road connections between mainland Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan region were severed. In these circumstances, Iran became the main transit route between mainland Azerbaijan, Nakhchivan, and Turkey by land.
While Armenian officials have repeatedly assured Iran that the TRIPP plan will not pose any threat to the Iran-Armenia border, from Iran’s perspective, the plan could create border, trade, transit, and geopolitical challenges in one of the most sensitive geopolitical regions
On October 9, 2023, Tehran and Baku signed an agreement to create a transit route called the “Aras Corridor.” The route will run from Iran’s East Azerbaijan province to Nakhchivan, bypassing Armenia.
The 107-kilometer-long road and rail transit corridor begins in Kalaleh or Jolfa and continues along the border, then connects to the Republic of Azerbaijan with a bridge. About 58 kilometers of this route runs parallel to the Nakhchivan border, 47 kilometers adjacent to the Armenian border, and another 6 kilometers along the border with the Republic of Azerbaijan.
Meanwhile, the US attacks on bridges and logistics in Iran are also a coordinated strategy to reduce Iran’s logistical capacity and limit Iran’s role in regional corridors.
From the perspective of officials in Tehran, Iran is the only country in BRICS and West Asia that is simultaneously located on three major Eurasian transport axes, connecting them to the Persian Gulf, the Sea of Oman, and the global maritime network.
Iran’s specific proposals for the establishment of a permanent corridor coordination council, the development of “green corridors” and knowledge exchange, and the integration of multi-purpose corridors indicate Tehran’s readiness to play the role of a secure communication link for BRICS in Eurasia.
From the perspective of Farzaneh Sadegh, the Minister of Roads and Urban Development of Iran, the country wants to return to the position of the logistics hub and transit hub of the region. Therefore, this approach is one of the main axes of policy-making on the agenda.
Apart from the leader’s attention, the President of Iran has repeatedly emphasized the importance of this project and has considered it one of the government’s main priorities. Also, while the Aras Corridor is the shortest and safest route between Central Asia and Europe, it is one of the most sensitive and priority projects of the Iranian Ministry of Roads.
Recently, the Governor of East Azerbaijan, emphasizing the strategic position of the Kalaleh-Jolfa project in regional equations, described it as more than a national project and called for its completion within a year.
In fact, while the “Trump Path for International Peace and Prosperity TRIPP” plan was formalized by the United States and Armenia in Washington in January 2026, the US-Israeli war against Iran in June 2025-2026 has increased the sensitivities of Iranian officials towards TRIPP near Iran’s northern borders.
The long-term economic and strategic presence of the US for 99 years, its operationalization, the participation of American companies in the construction and management of this corridor, and the transfer of construction and control of the region are worrisome for Iran.
While Armenian officials have repeatedly assured Iran that the TRIPP plan will not pose any threat to the Iran-Armenia border, from Iran’s perspective, the plan could create border, trade, transit, and geopolitical challenges in one of the most sensitive geopolitical regions bordering Iran. In fact, Tehran is paying more attention to the early construction of the Aras Corridor to prevent the establishment of US hegemony in Iran’s northwestern neighborhood.
The Aras Corridor is actually Iran’s strategic response to the changes in the transit equations of its neighbors, and Tehran will play a significant role in neutralizing the negative consequences of some Western projects. There is also the risk of Armenia’s withdrawal from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and deepening relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States.
In January 2026, Turkey announced its support for TRIPP. The process of normalizing relations between Armenia and Turkey will facilitate the implementation of the TRIPP plan.
So, while Baku is willing to continue the route through Iran, Azerbaijan has emphasized the Aras Corridor project as a major initiative. Tehran is more serious about the construction and early implementation of the Aras Corridor.
Opportunities and Benefits
In the economic dimension, given the specific geographical location of Nakhchivan, which is surrounded by Iran, Armenia, and Turkey, the Aras Corridor will be the safest and most stable communication route between Nakhchivan and Baku.
While Armenia is seeking to open all communications in the South Caucasus through the “Crossroads of the World” project, the Aras Corridor can better transport Iranian cargoes through Armenia to the Black Sea ports of Georgia.
The existence of two terminals along the Aras Corridor will play an important role in strengthening Iran’s trade and logistics ties with the Republic of Azerbaijan and its neighbors.
The Kalaleh-Aghband border bridge is almost completed on the Azerbaijani side, and the progress on the Iranian side is about 70 percent. Also, the waiting time for trucks at the border has been reduced to about three to four days.
With about one million tons of incoming and outgoing transit of goods annually from the two border terminals of Jolfa and Norduz, the Aras Corridor can play a better role in transit in the middle corridor and as a bridge connecting East Asia with European countries.
The western branch of the North-South Corridor along the western coast of the Caspian Sea reaches Iran through Russia and Azerbaijan. Considering the implementation of the Iran-Eurasian Economic Union Free Trade Agreement, the Aras Corridor can play an important role in connecting international corridors and increasing the transit volume of the North-South Corridor by 2028.
An employment boom in border areas, economic and job opportunities, industrial and service development in the region, and increasing the security factor of the country’s northwest borders, the volume of goods and passenger transit, and the boom in foreign trade and job creation in the region are also important. The Aras Corridor Railway will also significantly enhance Iran’s position in global transit by completing the East-West and North-South corridors simultaneously.
Outlook
The prospects for the Aras Corridor’s competition with TRIPP and the future of Iran’s position in the South Caucasus economic corridors depend on the geopolitical developments in the region, the effective implementation and ability of regional actors to manage external pressures, and Iran’s domestic capacity in infrastructure development and corridor diplomacy.
In the road sector, the physical progress of the entire project has reached 50 percent, and despite the technical and complex parts of this plan, the construction of 20 tunnels with a length of approximately 9 kilometers will enable the exploitation of important sections of this route with a length of 60 kilometers by the end of the year.
Although the construction of the railway line in the Aras Corridor is also more delayed, 50 kilometers have been completed so far; it requires more support and financing and can be accessible in one or two years.
Samyar Rostami, а political observer and senior researcher in international relations
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