As the US-Israeli war on Iran escalates, Ankara’s balancing act is under pressure – even as the region’s fragmentation threatens Turkiye’s own security paradigm.
The Cradle
In this framework, Washington sees Turkiye as occupying a critical position. American planners calculate that a regional architecture could be constructed around either an Israel–Turkiye–Saudi Arabia axis or an Israel–Saudi Arabia–Egypt alignment.
Over the past two years, the US strategy has taken a clear shape. It has pursued a sequence of steps designed to weaken the region’s resistance actors and political forces aligned with Iran.
Hamas has been severely weakened. Pressure continues on Lebanon to curtail Hezbollah’s military capabilities. Assad’s government has fallen in Syria. In Iraq, efforts have been made to block the return of Nouri al-Maliki as prime minister.
Emboldened by these developments, Washington and Tel Aviv believed that an intensive air campaign against Iran could ultimately trigger regime change. Yet the events of the past week have shown that this calculation was flawed. The expectation that domestic unrest in Iran would reignite under external attack has not materialized.
The consequences for Turkiye
Since 1991, US military and political interventions in West Asia have repeatedly produced negative political and economic consequences for Turkiye. A prolonged war with Iran would amplify those effects dramatically.
Despite these risks, the Turkish government ultimately aligned itself with Washington in both Iraq and Syria.
Support for the US invasion of Iraq left Turkiye with a new neighbor: the autonomous Kurdish region led by Masoud Barzani.
Backing US policy in Syria produced another set of consequences. Turkiye faced a massive refugee influx and the emergence of Kurdish autonomous structures along its southern border.
The Syrian conflict also created a new geopolitical reality. Through its involvement there, Turkiye effectively became a de facto neighbour of Israel. Although Ankara portrays itself as one of the winners in Syria, the country is gradually moving toward a structure resembling a US-Israeli mandate, reinforced by a Kurdish card that can be played again in the future.
In the current confrontation with Iran, the new Syrian order has already positioned itself openly against Tehran and its allies.
The Turkiye–Israel project
For years, Washington promoted a post-Assad Syria as the key to restoring cooperation between Turkiye and Israel. In both Ankara and Tel Aviv, there were those who saw such a scenario as opening the door to dividing influence over Syria between the two states.
This outlook stands in stark contrast to the founding principle of the Turkish Republic’s foreign policy: “Peace at home, peace in the world.” Ironically, it would also place Turkiye in direct neighborhood with Israel.
Following former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s downfall, Washington moved quickly to advance this agenda. The rise of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader Ahmad al-Sharaa (formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani) as Syria’s president was widely viewed as a development that could ease Turkiye–Israel cooperation.
From Washington’s perspective, such cooperation would also help secure the broader regional order built on Israeli dominance. The proposed framework extended across a wide geographical arc stretching from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf.
US ambassador to Ankara and special envoy for Syria Tom Barrack repeatedly hinted at this vision, declaring that Turkiye and Israel would soon cooperate across the region from the Caspian to the Mediterranean.
Even the proposed Zangezur Corridor linking Azerbaijan and Armenia – reportedly being transformed into a 99-year “Trump Corridor” initiative – was seen as part of this broader strategic project.
At its core lay a clear objective: the formation of a Turkiye–Israel front against Iran. Such a coalition would include not only Sharaa’s Syria but also Arab states and Kurdish forces in northern Iraq. Even Turkiye’s recent domestic political initiative, promoted under the slogan of a Turkish–Kurdish–Arab alliance, aligns closely with Washington’s broader strategy.
Ankara holds its line
Against this backdrop, the US-Israeli attack on Iran unfolded.
Yet Turkiye did not immediately align with Washington and Tel Aviv. During the first week of the conflict, Ankara pursued a cautious balancing policy. It criticized the US-Israeli assault on Iran while also objecting to Iranian threats against Gulf states.
Even before the operation began, subtle signals hinted at Turkiye’s stance. A photograph released by the White House showing US President Donald Trump meeting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu included a map in the background detailing the bases the US intended to use for the operation. Turkish bases were noticeably absent.
In practice, Ankara maintained this position during the first week. Turkiye neither opened its airspace nor allowed military bases on its territory to be used for attacks against Iran.
The missile provocation
Such a balancing posture, however, was unlikely to go unchallenged.
A breaking report soon claimed that a missile launched from Iran had been heading toward Turkiye and had therefore been intercepted. The missile was reportedly detected by the NATO radar system in Kurecik, while NATO units in the Mediterranean carried out the interception.
Within hours, however, the story began to unravel. Iran’s General Staff stated that no missile had been fired toward Turkish territory. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi echoed the denial.
On the same day, one detail in the Turkish Ministry of Defense confirmed a crucial detail:
“It has been determined that the fragment of the missile that fell in Dortyol district of Hatay province belongs to the air defense munition that intercepted the threat in the air.”
Three facts, therefore, stood side by side. Iran insisted it had not targeted Turkiye. NATO radar systems had registered a launch, and NATO interceptors had been fired. Yet the debris falling on Turkish territory did not originate from Iran.
The attempt to disrupt Ankara’s balancing policy failed. Another provocation soon followed.
The Azerbaijan angle
The next day, a similar narrative emerged in Azerbaijan. Reports claimed that Iranian drones had targeted the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, which is linked to Azerbaijan.
Iran again denied the claim, stating it had conducted no drone activity against Azerbaijan.
Unlike Ankara, however, Baku appeared more willing to adopt a confrontational stance. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev declared:
“We will not tolerate this unprovoked act of terror and aggression against Azerbaijan. Our Armed Forces have been instructed to prepare and implement appropriate retaliatory measures.”
Yet Aliyev himself described the incident as “unprovoked.” Iran had said it did not carry out such an attack. Despite this, a retaliatory move by Azerbaijan would undoubtedly please the US and Israel.
Aliyev, who has maintained good relations with Israel even during the Gaza genocide, may well have had another agenda.
Indeed, after his statement, calls began emerging among both Azerbaijani and Turkish circles – citing the defense agreement between the two countries – for joint action against Iran.
Pressure on Ankara
Recent history offers important context. During the 12-day Israel–Iran war eight months earlier, intelligence operations attributed to the CIA and Mossad relied on drones launched from inside Iran to identify targets and conduct assassinations.
Iran had little incentive to provoke Turkiye or Azerbaijan. The US and Israel, by contrast, had strong incentives to push both countries toward confrontation with Tehran.
For now, Ankara appears to have resisted the pressure.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan adopted a warning tone, stating, “Necessary warnings were issued to Iran. Despite these warnings, it continues to take the wrong steps.”
Turkiye's Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan also weighed in:
“We spoke with our friends in Iran and said if this was a missile that lost its way, that's one thing. But if this is going to continue ... our advice is: be careful, don't let anyone in Iran embark on such an adventure.”
Yet if the conflict continues, pressure from Washington is likely to intensify. The US will seek access to Turkish airspace and military bases.
Provocation attempts similar to those already witnessed could easily reappear.
Moreover, Ankara’s balancing strategy faces structural vulnerabilities, particularly its membership in NATO. Washington understands these dynamics well, having exploited similar circumstances in past regional conflicts.
Regional unity and Turkiye’s security
For Turkiye, the security equation has historically been straightforward. The unity of its neighbors contributes to the unity of Turkiye itself.
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s principle of “Peace at home, peace in the world” reflected this understanding. Stability in neighboring states reinforced stability within Turkiye, and vice versa.
For decades, this principle shaped Turkish foreign policy. Even after joining NATO, Turkiye largely preserved this principle despite occasional tensions involving Iraq and Syria.
The turning point came with Washington’s deeper involvement in West Asia.
When the US launched its war against Iraq in 1991 and sought Turkish support, Turkiye's president at the time, Turgut Ozal, signaled his willingness to cooperate. The principle of regional balance was effectively set aside, although the Turkish armed forces’ regional outlook limited the extent of Ankara’s involvement.
A similar situation emerged during the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. Like Ozal, Erdogan initially supported cooperation with Washington. The Turkish parliament’s rejection of the 1 March motion slowed the process, yet the government ultimately supported the war through other channels.
The result was the emergence of a Kurdish autonomous entity along Turkiye’s southern frontier.
A comparable pattern unfolded in Syria after 2011. This time, Ankara played a far more active role, sometimes criticizing Washington for failing to move quickly enough against Damascus.
After 14 years of turmoil, Assad’s government collapsed in 2025. Turkiye now faces another Kurdish political structure on its southern border.
The integration of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) forces into the Syrian army may appear to address this issue. In practice, however, it also creates space for a de facto autonomous structure.
The US intervention in Iraq and the war in Syria fundamentally altered the regional balance. Iraq was formally transformed into a federal state, while Syria effectively moved in the same direction.
For decades Turkiye had viewed the unitary character of both neighbors as a strategic advantage. The equation was simple. A unified Iraq and a unified Syria reinforced Turkiye’s own unity.
That equation has already been weakened. Washington now appears intent on undermining the third pillar: Iran’s territorial integrity.
If Turkiye repeats the mistakes it made in Iraq and Syria, the consequences could be far more severe. The destabilization of Iran would carry major repercussions for Turkiye.
There are also voices in both the US and Israel arguing that once Iraq, Syria, and Iran have been reshaped, Turkiye itself could become the next target.
The base trap
For this reason, Ankara must preserve its policy of controlled and balanced neighborhood relations.
One threat to this approach lies in further missile-related provocations. Another lies in the potential risks posed by foreign military bases on Turkish territory.
Regardless of their legal status, these bases represent a serious vulnerability so long as US operations there continue.
If Washington were to launch an attack on Iran from these bases without Ankara’s consent, the consequences for Turkiye could be severe.
Preventing such a scenario requires decisive action.
Until the conflict ends, Turkiye should suspend US operational activities at these bases and enforce that decision.
Only by doing so can Ankara avoid being drawn into a confrontation that threatens both regional stability and its own security
No comments:
Post a Comment