Thursday, November 18, 2010

Zionism needs the Israeli Jews to feel frightened: Alan Hart - Interview



By Kourosh Ziabari

Alan Hart is an indispensable name in journalism. Unquestionably, he has been one of the most influential British journalists with an expertise in the Middle East affairs. A former BBC Panorama presenter, Hart was a close friend of Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and Palestinian President Yasser Arafat. During his fruitful career, Hart interviewed several prominent leaders including Saudi Arabia's King Faisal, Jordan's King Hussein and Egyptian Presidents Nasser and Sadat.

He was a media correspondent for the Independent Television Network and has covered the Vietnam War and Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well.

He is a vocal critic of Israel and its expansionistic policies and has repeatedly reprimanded the Arab leaders for their implicit complicity with Israel in its suppression of the Palestinian nation.

Alan Hart joined me in an exclusive, in-depth interview to explore the prospect of Israel-Palestinian conflict, the roots of Zionist lobby's influence over the U.S. Congress, the 9/11 conspiracy theories and the possibility of a U.S.-directed military strike against Iran. 

Kourosh Ziabari: In your recent article "Zionism and Peace are Incompatible" you reach a point where you state "if it is the case that American presidents are frightened of provoking Israel, the conclusion would have to be that the Zionist state is a monster beyond control and that all efforts for peace are doomed to failure." Is it really the case that Israel possesses an uncontrollable, disproportionate power which enables it to violate the international law and enjoy immunity from being held accountable before the international community? What's the source of this unwarrantable power and influence? 

Alan Hart: Let's start with Reality Number One. There are two sets of rules for the behavior of nations, one for all the countries of the world minus Israel, the other exclusively for Israel. This double-standard is the mother and father of Arab and other Muslim hurt, humiliation and anger. Put another way, this double-standard is the best recruiting sergeant for violent Islamic fundamentalism.

In the story of the conflict in and over Palestine that became Israel as I tell it fully documented in my latest book, Zionism: The Real Enemy of the Jews, the moment when the major powers created the double-standard can be more or less pinpointed. In the immediate aftermath of the 1967 war, and because it was a war of Israeli aggression not self-defense, the major powers, through the UN Security Council, should have said to Israel something like the following: "You are not to build any settlements on newly occupied Arab land. If you do, you'll be demonstrating your contempt for international law. In this event the international community will declare Israel to be an outlaw state and subject it to sanctions." 

If something like that riot act had been read to Israel, there probably would have been peace many, many years ago. For background let me briefly explain why.  

The pragmatic Arafat was reluctantly reconciled to the reality of Israel's existence inside its pre-1967 borders as far back as 1969. In his gun and olive branch address to the UN General Assembly on 13 November 1974 he said so by obvious implication. Thereafter he put his credibility with his leadership colleagues and his people, and his life, on the line to get a mandate for unthinkable compromise with Israel. He got the mandate at the end of 1979 when the Palestine National Council, then the highest decision-making body on the Palestinian side, voted by 296 votes to 4 to endorse his two-state policy - a solution which any rational Israeli government and people would have accepted with relief. What Arafat needed thereafter was an Israeli partner for peace. He eventually got a probable one, Yitzhak Rabin, but he was assassinated by a Zionist fanatic who knew exactly what he was doing - killing the peace process. The more it became clear that Israel's leaders were not interested in a genuine two-state solution for which Arafat had prepared the ground on his side, the more his credibility with his own people suffered. 

Eisenhower was the first and the last American president to contain Zionism. After Israel had secretly colluded with France and Britain in the 1956 invasion of Eygpt to overthrow Nasser and take back the Suez Canal which he had nationalized, Israel's leaders tried to insist on conditions for Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai. Eisenhower confronted them by going over the heads of Congress in an address to the nation. In the course of it he said this: 

"Israel insists on firm guarantees as a condition to withdrawing its forces of invasion. If we agree that armed attack can properly achieve the purposes of the assailant, then I fear we will have turned back the clock of international order. We will have countenanced the use of force as a means of settling international differences and gaining national advantage... If the UN once admits that international disputes can be settled using force, then we will have destroyed the very foundation of the organization and our best hope for establishing a real world order."  

As I note in a chapter of my book titled Goodbye to the Security Council's Integrity, after the 1967 war there simply was not the Eisenhower-like political will to oblige Israel to behave like a normal state - i.e. in accordance with international law and its obligations as a member of the UN. 
What, really, explains this lack of political will - in 1967 and still today?

I used to believe the short answer was the stranglehold on American policy for the Middle East of the Zionist lobby and its stooges in Congress. There's no mystery about the prime source of the lobby's power. It's money to fund election campaigns. If you were an American and announced that you were going to run for Congress or any other significant public office, you'd be approached by the lobby. It would tell you the policy position on Israel and then offer you a choice. If you supported Israel, you would receive all the campaign funding you needed to defeat your opponent. If you were not interested, the funding would go to your opponent to enable him or her to defeat you. That's an over-simplification of how the system works but it's also the essence of the reality. 

Incidentally, I do NOT blame the Zionist lobby for playing the game the way it does. It is only playing according to The System's rules. I blame America's pork-barrel system of politics which puts what passes for democracy up for sale to the highest bidders. It just so happens that the Zionist lobby in association with its Christian fundamentalist allies is one of the highest bidders, if not the highest. If I had the opportunity to advise an American president, I would say to him or her: "The best thing you could do for your country is to give it some real democracy by putting an end to your corrupt, pork-barrel politics." 

Today, and as I indicated in my recent article from you quoted, Zionism and Peace Are Incompatible, I am beginning to think that the awesome influence of the Zionist lobby may not be the complete explanation of the lack of political will. Because it is obviously not in America's own best interests to go on supporting Israel right or wrong and making enemies of 1.4 billion Muslims by so doing, the question I am asking myself is this: Could it be that all American presidents are frightened of confronting Zionism because they know there is nothing nuclear-armed Israeli leaders would not do if they were seriously pressed to make peace on terms which they believed in their own deluded minds would put Israel's security at risk? 

That question was provoked by my recall of a statement made to me in a BBC Panorama interview by Golda Meir when she was prime minister. At a point I interrupted her to say: "I just want to be sure that I understand what you're saying… You are saying that in a doomsday situation Israel would be prepared to take the region and the world down with it?" Without the shortest of pauses for reflection, and in the gravel voice that could charm or intimidate American presidents according to need, she replied: "Yes! That's exactly what I am saying." 

In those days Panorama, the BBC's flagship current affairs program, was transmitted on a Monday evening at 8.10pm. By 10.0pm, The Times, then a seriously good newspaper not the Murdoch product it is today, had changed its lead editorial to quote what Golda had said to me. It then added its own opinion. "We had better believe her." 

Exactly what I am saying comes down to this. Even if an American president was free to read the riot act to Israel, if only to best protect America's own real interests, it does not follow that its leaders would say: "Okay. We'll do what you want." In my view it's possible, even probable, that they would say: "Mr. President, go to hell. If you push us too far, we'll create mayhem in the region." 

KZ: The pro-Palestinian journalist and activist Jeffrey Blankfort told me in a recent interview about the efforts made by the previous United State presidents to hold back the influence of Israel and Zionist lobby over the U.S. Congress. He cited the confrontation of George Bush Sr. with the Zionist network in 1991 and 1992 when he denied Israel its request for $10 billion in loan guarantees; however, Mr. Bush was eventually forced to surrender and endorse the loan. Will the same fate await President Obama who is said to be determined to put forward a proposal for the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders in the Security Council? 

AH: About President Obama let me first of all say this. I do not believe as many of his anti-Zionist critics do that he came into office as a Zionist stooge, programmed to do Zionism's bidding. If that was the case, why would he have challenged Netanyahu and the Zionist lobby over the settlements and set himself up to be humiliated? My view is that Obama meant well but was too naïve and inexperienced for the job and was therefore bound to become a prisoner of the Zionist lobby. I also think it is impossible for any new, first term president to be completely aware of the full extent of the Zionist lobby's stranglehold on Congress until he is in the Oval Office trying to get things done. 

As I write in Is Peace Possible?, the Epilogue of Volume Three of the American edition of my book, I think there was a reason why Obama moved so quickly to try to get a Middle East peace process going. 

He knew something that all American presidents know about when serious initiatives for peace can and cannot be taken. I know what that something is because a president told me a few months after events had denied him a second term in office. Any American president has only two windows of opportunity to break or try to break the Zionist lobby's stranglehold on Congress on matters to do with Israel/Palestine.  

The first window is during the first nine months of his first term because after that the soliciting of funds for the mid-term elections begins. Presidents don't have to worry on their own account about funds for the mid-term elections, but with their approach no president can do or say anything that would cost his party seats in Congress. The second window of opportunity is the last year of his second term if he has one. In that year, because he can't run for a third term, no president has a personal need for election campaign funds or organized votes. 

As things are there's a question mark over whether Obama will get a second term, but with the mid-term elections are out of the way, he might have one more opportunity to put some real pressure on Israel - if he has the will. There has been talk of a Palestinian and presumably wider Arab initiative to have the Security Council recognize Palestinian independence on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. If such a resolution does find its way to the Security Council, Obama could do what American Presidents always do when resolutions are not to Israel's liking - veto it. But he could also say and do nothing and effectively let the resolution pass. What then? 

In Ha'aretz on 20 October, Israeli commentator Aluf Benn offered this answer. A Security Council decision to recognize Palestinian independence on the West Bank and Gaza "would deem Israel an invader and occupier, paving the way for measures against Israel." In Aluff Benn's view the international movement to boycott Israel would "gain massive encouragement when Europe, China and India turn their backs on Israel and erode the last remnants of its legitimacy. Gradually the Israeli public will also feel the diplomatic and economic stranglehold." 

My guess is that such a resolution will not find its way to the Security Council because the Arab regimes are too frightened of offending Zionism too much; but if it does, Obama will have his last chance to demonstrate that, as it relates to American efforts for peace in the Middle East, his "Yes, we can" has not become "No, we can't." 

KZ. Arab leaders have shown signs that they're willing to renormalize their ties with Israel. Politicians in some of the Arab states have openly negotiated with high-ranking Israeli officials and invited them to their events. What are the benefits of this renormalization for the Arab leaders while anger and hatred against the Israeli regime is growing in the Arab world on a daily basis? How can the Arab leaders disregard the crowds of people who storm into streets en masse to protest the aggressive and belligerent policies of Israel in the West Bank and Gaza? 
AH: Most Arabs quietly despise their leaders but I'm not aware that they have stormed into the streets to protest against Israel's policies. I would re-phrase what I think is the essence of your question in this way: "Do Arab leaders care about what happens to the occupied and oppressed Palestinians?" 

My short answer is "No". My longer answer is this.The real history of the making and sustaining of the conflict in and over Palestine that became Israel invites the conclusion that the Arab regimes, more by default than design in my view, betrayed the Palestinians. And there's no mystery about the nature of this betrayal. 

When the Palestine file was closed by Israel's 1948 victory on the battlefield and the armistice agreements, the divided and impotent Arab regimes secretly shared the same hope as the Zionists and the major powers. It was that the file would remain closed for ever. The Palestinians were supposed to accept their lot as the sacrificial lamb on the altar of political expediency. 

Nor is there any mystery about why the Arab regimes were at one with the Zionists and the major powers in hoping that there would never be a regeneration of Palestinian nationalism. They all knew that if there was, there would one day have to be a confrontation with Zionism; and nobody wanted that.  

When Yasser Arafat, Abu Jihad and a few others lit the slow burning fire of the regeneration, it was the security services of Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon which took the lead in trying to put it out. 

Fast forward to 1982, Before Sharon sent the IDF all the way to Beirut to exterminate the PLO's leadership and destroy its infrastructure, [Persian] Gulf Arab leaders met in secret, without advisers present, in order to agree a message to the Reagan administration. The message was to the effect that they would not intervene in any way when Sharon made his move. After that message was sent, one of the Arab leaders present, Oman's Sultan Qaboos, said to Arafat: "Be careful. You are going to ask for our help and it will not come."  

And let me add this. Last year I had a private conversation in London with a major royal from the Arab world. I said to him, "Nothing is going to change in the Arab world until your regimes are more frightened of their own masses than they are of offending Zionism and America". He replied, "You're right." I also said to him, "If the Zionists do resort to a final round of ethnic cleaning to close the Palestine file, Arab leaders, behind closed doors, will give thanks and celebrate." His reply was the same, "You're right." 

KZ. You've implied in your article "Obama speaks at the UN… Goodbye to peace" that if the Arab and Muslim leaders were effectively united against the United States whose ultimate objective is to consolidate and empower the quisling government of Mahmoud Abbas, Israel couldn't have succeeded in imposing its expansionistic wills on the Palestinian nation and its chances for legitimizing a Greater Israel which goes beyond the borders of 1967 would have been insignificant; however, we don't find such a solidarity among the Muslim and Arab leaders. except in the streets, as you put it. So what will be the fate of Palestinian nation? Should they surrender into what Israel has foreseen for them, that is displacement, homelessness and destruction? 

A: My point has never been that Arab and other Muslim leaders have to be "against" the U.S. The main difference at leadership level between the Jews and the Arabs is that the Jews know how to play the game of international politics and the Arabs don't. Put another way, Zionism's key players know how to play the cards they were dealt and Arab leaders don't. 

Zionism's five main cards were and are the obscenity of the Nazi holocaust for blackmail purposes; money (virtually unlimited funds) and the influence it buys; the organized Jewish vote in close American election races; overwhelming military superiority; and, more generally speaking, breathtakingly, brilliant organization and coordination.  

The Arabs had, and still have an ace that would have trumped all of Zionism's cards: OIL

Imagine what would have happened in the immediate aftermath of the 1967 war if Arab leaders had put their act together and sent one of their number secretly to Washington DC to say something very like the following to President Johnson behind closed doors: "If you don't get Israel back behind its pre-war borders, we'll turn off the oil taps."

If Johnson had believed that Arab leaders were united and serious, he would have replied with something very like the following: "I can't guarantee swift action on Jerusalem but give me two or three weeks for the rest." 

If the Zionists had been in the Arab position, that is how they would have played their hand. And that is not pure speculation on my part. Over the years I have been told so by a number of Israeli leaders including former Directors of Military Intelligence. 

The main point is that if Johnson had believed that Arab leaders were united and serious, they would not have had to turn off the oil taps. A secret, credible threat to do so would have been enough to cause Johnson or any president to put America's own best interests first. 

Against that background the question to be asked today is something like this: What, in theory, could Arab leaders still do to give themselves a reasonable chance of countering Zionism's influence on American policy for the Middle East?  

Prefaced by a summary statement of all the initiatives the Arabs including the Palestinians have taken for peace. They could threaten to 

- Sever their diplomatic relations with the U.S.
- Withdraw their financial support for America's broken economy
- Turn off the oil taps 

Will Arab leaders ever learn how to play their cards if only to best protect their own longer term, real interests? 

I think not, and that takes me to the second part of your question - What will be the fate of the Palestinian nation and should the Palestinians surrender to Zionism's will?  

The main point is that the occupied and oppressed Palestinians, the masses, are not going to surrender to Zionism's will and accept crumbs from its table; the crumbs being three or four Bantustans on maximum 40% of the West Bank, which would not come even close to satisfying the Palestinians' minimum demand and need for some justice but which they could call a state if they wished. It's not totally impossible that under pressure from the Arab regimes and America, a quisling Palestinian leadership will seek to do such a deal with Israel, but it would be rejected by the masses; and probably the quisling Palestinian leader would be assassinated. 

The question arising is what will Zionism's in-Israel leaders do when they conclude that with bombs and bullets and repressive measure of all kinds they cannot break the will of the occupied and oppressed Palestinians to continue their struggle? My guess is that they will create a pretext to drive the Palestinians off the West Bank and into Jordan or wherever. If that happens, the West Bank will be soaked in blood, mostly Palestinian blood, and honest reporters will describe it as a Zionist holocaust. 

It's because I truly fear that is the most likely scenario that I think the priority of the international community should stopping the final Zionist ethnic cleansing of Palestine. 

KZ: A growing number of internet writers and technical experts in America and many other countries believe that Israel was behind or implicated in the 9/11 attacks. Do you think this conspiracy theory is credible and, if you do, in what ways did 9/11 benefit Israel? 

A: In my view the starting point for any serious and honest discussion of 9/11 has to be this question: Did the impact of the planes and the heat of their burning fuel bring the Twin Towers down? If the answer is "Yes", there's no need for conspiracy theories. If the answer is "No", the speculative question has to be - Who did it and how and why? 

My answer is "No". In my analysis there's enough evidence - visual, technical and scientific, and from eye-witnesses including fire fighters - to invite the conclusion that the Twin Towers, like Building Seven, were pre-wired for controlled demolition with nanothermite, the highest-tech military explosive. 

For context, the first observation I'd like to offer is that the mainstream Western media's complicity in suppressing even questions and debate about what really happened on 9/11 is consistent. What I mean is that for the past 63 years - from the creation of the Zionist state of Israel mainly by terrorism and ethnic cleansing to the present the mainstream media have been complicit in the suppression of the truth about the making and sustaining of the conflict in and over Palestine that became Israel. Put another way, the mainstream media have been content to peddle Zionism's propaganda lies. The two biggest lies can be summed up in a very few words. 

The first is that poor little Israel has lived in constant danger of annihilation, the "driving into the sea" of its Jews. The truth, as I document in detail through the three volumes of the American edition of Zionism: The Real Enemy of the Jews, is that Israel's existence has never, ever, been in danger from any combination of Arab force. Zionism's assertion to the contrary was the cover that allowed Israel to get away where it mattered most - in the Western world and America especially - with presenting its aggression as self defense and itself as the victim when it was and is the oppressor

The second is that Israel "never had Arab partners for peace" That is complete nonsense. I've already mentioned Arafat's pragmatism and work for peace to make the point, but here's another example. From almost the moment he came to power in 1951, Eygpt's President Nasser wanted an accommodation with Israel. He had secret exchanges with Israel's foreign minister, Moshe Sharret, who was in my view the only completely sane Israeli leader of his time. For wanting to make peace with Nasser and the Arabs, Sharett was destroyed by Israel's founding father and first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion 

Prior to 9/11, the best single example of the mainstream media's complicity in the suppression of the truth as it relates to conflict in the Middle East is Israel's attack on the American spy ship, the USS Liberty, on 8th June 1967, the 4th day of the 6-Day war. (I was the first Western correspondent to the banks of the Suez Canal with the advancing Israelis, so I was in the Sinai desert at the time). That attack killed 37 Americans and seriously wounded more than 90 others. If things had gone according to the plan of the man who ordered that attack, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, the Liberty would have been sunk with all hands on board, leaving nobody to tell the story of what really happened… If it had been an Arab/Muslim attack on an American vessel, it's reasonable to speculate that America would have resorted to a military strike, if not war, on the country or countries it held responsible. What did President Johnson do? Out of fear of offending the Zionist lobby and its stooges in Congress, he ordered a cover-up which remains in force to this day. And the mainstream media went along with it, as it still does. 

Now to my summary thoughts on the possible, probable involvement of Israel's Mossad in 9/11. I will offer you two scenarios - A or B

In scenario A it's not impossible that 9/11 started out as an Arab/Muslim idea. But even if this was the case, Mossad would have had an inside track very quickly. From almost the moment of the Zionist state's birth, Mossad put great effort into placing agents inside every Arab regime, every Arab military and security establishment and every Arab/Muslim liberation movement and terrorist group. Many of Mossad's best and most effective agents were Moroccan and other North African Jews because they could pose most perfectly as Arabs. In a moment I'll tell you the short story of Mossad's penetration of the Abu Nidal terrorist group. 

In Scenario A the question is: Did Mossad tell anybody? My speculation is that it told some in the CIA and a few of Zionism's neo-con associates, Jews and non-Jews, including Vice President Cheney I call him the real Doctor Strangelove and the likes of Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle. In this scenario Mossad could have asked, "What do we do about this?" And the answer could have been something like, "We'll use it for the Pearl Harbor-like pretext we need." 

In this scenario, 9/11, even if it started out as an Arab/Muslim idea, was a joint Israeli/Mossad and American/neo-con conspiracy. 

For background here's a very short story about Mossad's penetration of the Abu Nidal terrorist group. Abu Nidal was a member of Arafat's Fatah but he broke with it when Arafat had come to terms with the reality of Israel's existence and was preparing the ground on his side for compromise with Israel. The Abu Nidal group, based mainly in Iraq, was responsible for the assassinations, mainly in Europe, of more than 20 of Arafat's emissaries who were telling Western governments behind closed doors that the Fatah-dominated PLO was serious about compromise with Israel. An investigation by Arafat and Abu Iyad, Fatah's counter intelligence chief, subsequently revealed that Abu Nidal was an alcoholic - he consumed between one and two bottles of whisky a day, and for much of most days he was drunk, not sober. His number two was running the show and targeting those to be assassinated and directing the killing. Abu Nidal's number two was a Mossad agent.  

It was, in fact, two Palestinian students in London who were activated by the Abu Nidal group to assassinate Israeli ambassador Argov. It was that assassination attempt in 1982 that gave Israeli Prime Minister Begin and Defense Minister Sharon the pretext they needed to launch their invasion of Lebanon all the way to Beirut, for the purpose of exterminating the entire leadership of the PLO and destroying its infrastructure… Ambassador Argov survived and quite some time after the event, he indicated that he suspected Israel's involvement (he could only have meant targeting) in the attempt to kill him. 

Scenario B has to be considered because it's a fact that some of the Arab/Muslim plotters, actual or alleged, were under surveillance by various Western intelligence agencies for years before 9/11. The agencies who were tracking them as possible/probable terrorists included those of America, Germany and Israel. 

In this scenario it's not impossible that the idea for 9/11 was put into the heads of possible/probable Arab/Muslim terrorists by Mossad agents

In this scenario, Mossad was actually running the show with key American neo-cons fixing things in America to make sure the attack was successful. From all that happened on the day, I'm not convinced that President Bush was in the pre-9/11 fixing loop. I think Cheney was most probably in control of the American executive oversight of what was essentially a Mossad false flag operation. Who else, for example, could have authorized the blocking of President Bush's electronic communications with Defense Secretary Rumsfeld for a critical period? 

Question: How did 9/11 serve the interests of the lunatic right in Israel and its neo-con associates in America? 

In their view Saddam Hussein represented the only foreseeable potential Arab challenge to Greater Israel's continued military domination of the whole Arab world. He had to be removed. By falsely claiming that Iraq was implicated in the 9/11 attack, Zionism and its neo-con associates in America set the stage for President Bush to be conned into going to war. 
Zionism's intention to get rid of Saddam Hussein was not, in fact, a secret. In 1996, under the chairmanship of Richard Perle, widely known in informed circles as the "Prince of Darkness", American Zionism presented a policy document with the title A Clean Break: A New Strategy For Securing The Realm.  

It urged incoming Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to have no second thoughts about making a clean break with the Rabin policy of negotiating with the PLO and trading land for peace. Israel's claim to all the land it occupied was "legitimate and noble", the policy paper said. "Only the unconditional acceptance by Arabs of our rights is a solid basis for the future."After the clean break Israel would be free to shape its "strategic environment". What would that involve? Among other things, "re-establishing the principle of pre-emption (pre-emptive strikes)... focus on removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq... weakening, containing and even rolling back Syria, Hizbollah and Iran." 

In fact the commitment of Zionism's in-America fixers and their neo-con associates to getting rid of Saddam Hussein goes back further than 1996. They were angry when President Bush the First refused to complete the job when he assembled a coalition to eject Iraq from Kuwait. After that Zionism's in-America fixers and their neo-con associates needed two things: 

A president who was dumb enough to buy their ideas - they got that with George "Dubya" Bush; and 
A "Pearl Harbour" like event to trigger the action. They got that with 9/11. 

But there was much more to it. 9/11 was a win-win for Zionism in another way.  

Predictably it provoked a rising tide of Islamophobia throughout the Western world and across America especially. In the minds of uninformed and ignorant Americans (i.e. most Americans), that in turn gave added credibility to the Zionist state's claim to be America's only true and reliable ally in the whole of the Arab and wider Muslim world. 

As I say in the Dear America introduction to the American edition of Volume 1 of my book, when Americans asked "Why do they hate us?", they were more or less all Arabs and Muslims everywhere. And I asked this question: What would Americans have learned if, instead of rushing to declare his war on global terrorism, President Bush had caused the Why-do-they-hate-us question to be addressed seriously? 

The short answer I give in my Dear America Introduction - the long answer is in the three volumes of my book - begins with the statement that the overwhelming majority of all Arabs and Muslims everywhere do NOT hate America or Americans. What almost all Arabs and Muslims everywhere DO hate is American foreign policy - its double standards in general and, in particular, its unconditional support for an Israel which ignores UN resolutions, demonstrates its contempt for international law and human rights conventions and resorts to state terrorism… A related truth is that for decades very many Arabs and other Muslims would, if they could, have migrated to America to enjoy a better life there. Today, however, the number of Arabs and other Muslims who would opt for American residence and citizenship if they could is greatly reduced because of the fact, sad but true, that the monster of Islamophobia is on the prowl across the Land of the Free and licking its lips. 

KZ: Over the past five years and since the escalation of international controversy over Iran's nuclear program, Israel has repeatedly threatened Iran with an imminent military strike and supported the imposition of financial sanctions against the country over its nuclear activities. Will Israel eventually attack Iran? What will be the consequences of such an attack for the Middle East?

AH: I do not believe that Iran is developing nuclear weapons but, for the sake of argument, let's assume that I am wrong and that in the not too distant future it does possess some. Does anybody seriously think it would launch a nuclear first strike on Israel? Of course it would not. If it did, the whole of Iran would be devastated by a retaliatory response. No Iranian leadership is ever going to invite such a catastrophe. Unless Zionism's leaders are completely out of their minds, they know this. So why, really, are they playing up the alleged Iranian nuclear threat?

I think they are doing so for three reasons.

One is to deflect attention from their crimes, in part to reduce the prospect of real pressure on them to be serious about peace on terms virtually all Palestinians and most other Arabs and Muslims everywhere could just about accept.

Another is what might be called a strategic consideration. Israel's leaders know that if Iran did posses nuclear weapons, their freedom to go on imposing their will on the region would be greatly restricted.

But most of all there is Zionism's need for Israeli Jews to feel frightened.

A good explanation of why was provided by Ira Cherna in a Truthout post in November 2009. It was headlined Israel's Pathology. Cherna asked - How can it be that pathological feelings of fear, weakness and victimization are "comforting" to very many Israelis? His answer was the following:

"For starters, they automatically put Jews on the side of innocence. Who can blame the weak victim for the violence? All the trouble, it seems, is started by the other side... And if all the trouble is started by the other side, then all the fault must lie with the other side. Weakness and victimization seem to prove that ‘We're moral.' Obviously, it's our enemies who are immoral and thus to blame for all our problems. So Israelis have no reason even to consider changing any of their policies or behaviors."

Will Israel eventually attack Iran?

Where Zionism is concerned nothing is impossible, but I prefer to think that even Israel's leaders, despite their rhetoric, are not that mad. As I'm sure you know, there have been reports that Obama sent messengers to Israel to tell its leaders that attacking Iran was not an option. That suggests to me there won't be an attack on Iran on his watch. But what if Obama doesn't get a second term? If the Republican and Tea Party lunatics come to power in the 2012 American elections, I imagine that all bets will be off. In a worst case scenario there's a Mossad nuclear false flag operation in America which is blamed on Iran. Within minutes if not seconds of it happening, the cry goes up, "Bomb the bastards!" The only thing then to be decided would be whether the U.S. should give Israel the greenlight or do the job itself.

What would be the consequences of an attack on Iran?

Short answer, catastrophe for the region - sustained conflict and instability; huge damage to American and other Western interests throughout the Arab and wider Muslim world; and quite possibly the collapse of what remains of the global economy, this because Iran has the ability to disrupt oil exports from the Gulf and provoke a worldwide oil crisis.

It's also not impossible that an attack on Iran would encourage its leadership, any leadership, to acquire nuclear weapons.  

KZ: What's your prediction for the future of Israel's political entity? Will it continue to survive or will it terminate in a destiny like that of the apartheid regime of South Africa or the Soviet Union?  

AH: I personally think Zionism's colonial enterprise is doomed. In my analysis there was a pre-condition for the survival of the Zionist, not Jewish state. When it closed the Palestine file in 1948/49, it had to keep the file closed, prevent a re-generation of Palestinian nationalism. It has failed to do that.

That fact takes us to the real threat to Israel's existence. It is not Hamas, Hizbollah, Iran or any combination of Arab and other Muslim force. The real threat is the demographic time-bomb of occupation.

In occupation of the West Bank, Israel has three options:

1. Formally annexing it and granting all of its citizens equal rights, this to enable Israel to go on claiming that it is a democracy. The problem with this option s that it would bring about an end of the Zionist state by political means because, in due course, the Arab citizens of Greater Israel would outnumber and outvote its Jewish citizens.

2. Formally annexing the West Bank but denying Greater Israel's Arab citizens (the majority in the making) equal rights. In this scenario Greater Israel would have to treat its Arab citizens even worse than the black majority in South Africa was treated by the apartheid regime. And that would not be acceptable to many Jews of the world and, perhaps, a significant number of Israeli Jews. It would also present the governments of the international community with no choice, at some point, but to declare Greater Israel a pariah state and impose sanctions on it.

3. Resort to a final round of ethnic cleansing - provoking an all-out confrontation with the Palestinians to give the IDF and the armed settlers the pretext to drive the Palestinians off the West Bank and into Jordan or wherever, in the name of self-defense, of course. If the Palestinians refused to flee, there would be, as I said earlier, a bloodbath. A Zionist holocaust.

As things are today it's my view that, at a point, Israel's leaders will go for the third option.
When they do there will such outrage in the world that governments including the one in Washington DC will have to say to Israel, "Enough is enough!" And the Zionist state will then be subjected to diplomatic isolation and crippling sanctions, with serious efforts to call and hold its political and military leaders to account for their crimes.
How will Israel's leaders respond?

As Golda Meir said, in a doomsday situation they will be prepared to take the region and possibly the world down with them.

If you asked me if I really believe that's how the story of the struggle for Palestine could end, I would answer "Yes", and this is why.

Zionism is not only Jewish nationalism which created a state for some Jews in the Arab heartland mainly by terrorism and ethnic cleansing. Zionism is a pathological mindset. And what the deluded Zionist mind actually thinks is this: "The world has always hated Jews and always will." In other words, the pathological Jewish mindset assumes that Holocaust II (shorthand for another great turning against Jews) is inevitable.

In the shadow of the Nazi holocaust, that way of thinking led Zionism's leaders into believing there was nothing they should not do to preserve Israel as a refuge of last resort for all Jews when the world turned against them again.
And the end, mad, Zionist logic speaks for itself. "If the world won't let us do whatever we believe to be necessary to preserve Israel as a refuge of last resort for all Jews, our enterprise is doomed, but we won't go down alone."

- Kourosh Ziabari is an Iranian freelance journalist and media correspondent. He has interviewed political commentator and linguist Noam Chomsky, member of New Zealand parliament Keith Locke, Australian politician Ian Cohen, member of German Parliament Ruprecht Polenz, former Mexican President Vicente Fox, former U.S. National Security Council advisor Peter D. Feaver, Nobel Prize laureate in Physics Wolfgang Ketterle, Nobel Prize laureate in Chemistry Kurt Wüthrich, Nobel Prize laureate in biology Robin Warren, famous German political prisoner Ernst Zündel, Brazilian cartoonist Carlos Latuff, American author Stephen Kinzer, syndicated journalist Eric Margolis, former assistant of the U.S. Department of the Treasury Paul Craig Roberts, American-Palestinian journalist Ramzy Baroud and the former President of the American Motion Picture Arts and Sciences Sid Ganis.

Wednesday, November 03, 2010

The Rahbar’s fatwa of respect, and unity



Early last month, Imam Seyyed Ali Khamenei, Rahbar (Leader) of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, issued a fatwa of far-reaching importance for the unity and solidarity of the Ummah. It was immediately welcomed by leading scholars in the Muslim world, including the Rector of Al-Azhar University in Egypt. In his fatwa, the Rahbar said disrespect or insult to the Sahabah (Companions), or wives of the noble Messenger (pbuh) is haram (forbidden).



To understand the significance of the fatwa, a brief detour into history is necessary. Based on differences of opinion over leadership after the Prophet (pbuh), Muslims have been divided into two camps — Sunnis and Shi‘is. The Sunnis believe that the process of succession was agreed by the consensus of the community while the Shi‘is are of the view that the Prophet (pbuh) had designated his cousin and son-in-law, Imam ‘Ali as his successor. Based on these differences, followers of the two opinions became so rigidly entrenched that they started to denounce each other. During Mu‘awiyah’s reign (when the system of khilafah was subverted into hereditary monarchy), it was official policy to denounce Imam ‘Ali during the Jumu‘ah khutbah. Umar ibn ‘Abdul ‘Aziz ended this un-Islamic practice during his rule. He was a man committed to the character and practice of the Prophet (pbuh) but his rule did not last long. His own family members poisoned him. They were unhappy with his restoration of Islamic principles to the practice of governance.

In reaction to such un-Islamic practices by the Umayyads (family of Mu‘awiyah), the Shi‘is resorted to their own denunciations. They condemned not only Mu‘awiyah and his drunkard son Yazid — whose army martyred Imam Husayn at Karbala, perpetrating the most heinous crime in Islamic history — but all the Sahabah that had not supported Imam Ali’s position for leadership. These Shi‘is went further; they cursed ‘A’ishah, the wife of the noble Messenger (pbuh), as well. In turn, some Sunnis started to hurl allegations of takfir against the Shi‘is.

Naturally such mutual denunciations have poisoned the atmosphere among Muslims and prevented genuine unity from taking root. Not only ordinary Muslims unaware of the details of Islamic history but also those knowledgeable about it have used such differences to stoke conflict and discord. It must be said that while there are sholarly positions on both sides that want to end such differences because they understand that history cannot be reversed and mutual recriminations do not serve the larger interests of the Ummah, there are others that want to stick to their entrenched positions. Imam Khamenei’s fatwa bridges this gap considerably. While it provides guidance to the Shi‘is to show more respect to the Companions and the wives of the Prophat (pbuh), it also reassures the Sunnis that their sensitivities are being respected. At the same time, it deprives those that want to stoke sectarian differences of a major argument.

The quality of true Islamic leadership is that it is able to lead all the Muslims regardless of their schools of thought (madhhabs). Imam Khamenei’s fatwa does just that. The Ummah must thank him for his sincerity and taqwa.

Ahmadinejad comes “home” to a hero’s welcome



By Afeef Khan



One ordinary spectator said, “I just came today to say welcome to our home… Iran helped to rebuild Lebanon, and most of all, they helped in building a strong resistance, the first to defeat Israel, the strongest army in the region.” But this and more could have been the sentiments of any one of the estimated one million people who came out to receive Iran’s President Ahmadinejad on his first official state visit to Lebanon. Nearly one-third of the country’s population, comprising members from all of its confessional groupings — Christians, Shi‘is, Sunnis, Durzis, Palestinian refugees, and migrant workers from Sudan, Sri Lanka, Yemen, Central Asia, etc. — lined his motorcade route throwing rice and flower petals, witnessed his speeches shedding tears of joy, and for those few who could get close enough, shook his hands thanking him and offering their continued allegiance.

Such a cathartic outpouring of emotion and spontaneous eruption of excitement and exuberance all rolled up into a hero’s welcome is not easily offered up for anyone, especially heads of state in a world where the utilitarian, self-serving motivations of the global aristocracy of “leaders” cause it to be wholly repugnant to the masses. During the few days of his visit, Oct. 13–15, the people of Lebanon brought back memories of Imam Khomeini’s triumphant return to Iran in 1979, capping a long struggle to ignite the first contemporary Islamic revolution; and it is no accident that the beneficiaries of the momentum the Imam created are the increasingly free-minded people of Lebanon and the current leadership of the Islamic Republic, which has rekindled fealty to the ideological resolve and the military determination of the Imam’s line. After nearly 30 years of confidence building, problem solving, and alliance building, hardened by confronting, engaging, expelling, and outsmarting the cancerous Zionist tumor in the south of the country, the moved and the shaken of Lebanon finally had a chance to break bread with the movers and shakers.

Despite all Western media attempts, still ongoing two weeks after the president’s visit, to misrepresent this as a Hizbullah-only affair or to dilute excitement by diverting attention to Iran’s human-rights violations, in the geopolitical context, it must be viewed as a historic event. For a brief moment, the majority of people in a very troubled country with a divisive history inured in its very culture and exploited by foreign aggressors had something they could agree on.

And so they turned out not because they were paid to throw roses at a hated conqueror, not because they were protesting the ineptness of their own government, and not because they had nothing better to do for a few days due to nonexistent opportunities. No indeed. They turned out to express their love, honor, respect, admiration, and reverence for the representative of an indomitable ally that has followed through on all it said it would do and more. Respect is earned; it comes not by demand, and it is not for sale. But when it is deserved, it cannot be withheld.

According to Franklin Lamb, a writer who has been doing research in Lebanon, “An important reason for the outpouring of popular support was the quarter century of Iranian assistance to Lebanon for social projects, and for rebuilding much of Lebanon following the 1993, 1996 and 2006 Israeli aggressions. Massive aid that was detailed by Hezbollah’s Secretary-General in a recent speech and the cost of which is estimated to be in excess of one billion dollars… Iran’s President is widely believed in the diplomatic community here to have promoted sectarian unity in Lebanon, calmed the current political atmosphere, and delivered on offers of more desperately needed economic projects via 17 bilateral agreements. A particularly appreciated offer throughout Lebanon is Iran’s major pledge of an electrical complex that will deliver 7 times Lebanon’s current power supply, which in 2010 still sees power cuts throughout Lebanon. The current deficiencies range from three hours to 12 hours daily power cuts everywhere in Lebanon plus total blackouts for days at a time in some areas. Iran’s President is widely believed to have achieved a major advancement for Lebanese stability, sovereignty, and independence… What seems quite evident is that Iran’s President and the large delegation of business people comprising his entourage have opened a new era of bilateral relations between the two countries. His positive personal and political connections with virtually all Lebanon’s leaders, including compliments from rightist Christian politicians including Samir Geagea, will likely lead to big joint economic projects, the Iranian arming of the Lebanese Armed Forces, and strategic political cooperation, starting now.”

There is a reality here staring the Zionist/Euro/Americentric “place-your-national-interest-first” world in the face, but it cannot see that because of its ideological and racist blinders. For the better part of 80 years, they could have done something about and with Lebanon, not to mention the rest of the Islamic East, but they chose to make their Middle East a giant gas pump and used Israel as a staging area to convert the entire region into a nuclearized war zone; and in particular they made Lebanon into a closet where they could hide their skeletons.

Now somebody comes in and deals with the Lebanese as real people, makes them a priority and starts advancing all the people on a destiny of peace and prosperity built upon self-respect and dignity borne of saying “no” to any kind of abuse, degradation, humiliation, exploitation, and occupation. Only the pompous and narcissistic world of those who view the “values” of the Enlightenment as universal and who expect the rest of the world to kowtow as servants as they march toward their destiny can view President Ahmadi-nejad’s visit as a provocation or as some kind of chest thumping to tell Washington that the road to any reconciliation in the area goes through Tehran. Only they could say that the President of Iran is there to put pressure on Sa‘ad Hariri to reject the UN investigations into the mysterious death of his father, Rafik Hariri.


Why don’t they characterize President Kennedy’s visit to the Berlin Wall in 1963 at the height of the Cold War — the last time a comparable visit by a foreign head of state, viewed as a liberator, to a people divided by ideology and war took place — as a provocation, occurring as it did a few months after the Cuban Missile Crisis, which apparently brought the entire world to the edge of a nuclear winter? Why don’t they say that President Kennedy was there to put pressure on the Germans to reject the findings of UN commissions investigating the murder of East Germans trying to scale the Berlin Wall that were routinely blamed on the Soviets?

We are all used now to this double and foul “standard.” In fact, President Ahmadinejad’s visit to Lebanon went beyond President Kennedy’s largely symbolic speech at the Berlin Wall. The President of Iran was acclaimed by all the varying cultures, religions, and ethnicities along with the majority of political groupings in Lebanon; and this is despite the fact that he hails from a land that has historically had an ethnic antipathy for the Arabs and vice-versa. By contrast, President Kennedy went to a largely homogenous society that shared with the United States a basically common culture, a religious racism, a similar ethnicity (especially as far as the ruling classes are concerned), and an aversion to communism.

Thirty years ago, no one could have predicted that Iran, of all countries, would be the one to liberate the Lebanese from Israeli aggression and American duplicity. But what is happening today in Lebanon is more than just gratitude to an Iranian president, it is the sign of an awakening that is taking place not only in the Islamic East, but throughout the Muslim world from Morocco to Indonesia, and from South Africa to Russia. American imperialism, European exceptionalism, and their Zionist pit bull are neither the center of the world nor are they at the center of man’s attention. The people of the world are discovering they can do much better with their problems if they don’t invite these parasites, contagions, and pesticides into their frank discussions.

And this is exactly what President Ahmadinejad went to Lebanon to say. You do not belong here, not because of who you are but because of your attitude, what you do, what you don’t do, and what you should have done. You are not on the short list or the long list of parties that need to be consulted for solutions to regional and local problems; in fact, you are not even on the map. Your mentality doesn’t belong anywhere in the discourse of sane and rational people committed to justice, peace, and liberty. To say these things requires integrity, courage, character, and conscience. And these are the ingredients of which real leaders are made. Give the Lebanese people credit for this acknowledgement.

Monday, October 18, 2010

Turkey’s bold political moves







Turkey has always been an important player in the Muslim world. During Ottoman rule, it was the leading edge of the Islamic world. Its armies marched triumphantly into Europe reaching the gates of Vienna in 1683. Much earlier, Sultan Muhammad II who rightly earned the title of Fatih (liberator) took control of Constantinople (today’s Istanbul) in 1453. He was barely 21 years old at the time. Today, this is celebrated by a stunningly beautiful exhibition, titled Panorama, on display in Istanbul to which millions throng every week from all parts of Turkey.





As Turks rightly celebrate their past, they can be equally proud of the strides their leaders have taken for the future. Two events can be identified as turning points in recent history: the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in October 2002 and its consolidation ever since; and the Israeli attack on the Mavi Marmara on May 31, 2010 that left nine Turkish peace activists dead. The second may even be more significant than the first.

The fortunes of political parties rise and decline with the flow of politics but the martyrdom of nine peace activists seems to have galvanized the entire Turkish population.




Even otherwise secular Turks did not remain immune from being touched by the drama on high seas last May. The arrogant Zionists overplayed their hand this time and will definitely pay a high price for it.

Turkey has undergone a perceptible change in policies since the rise of the AKP to power.







AKP leaders have been careful to play according to the rules. They are aware of the pitfalls of pushing too hard too fast. The measured steps taken so far, the last of which was the September 12 referendum that it won with a comfortable majority of 58%, has given it a commanding presence on the political scene. General elections, due next year, may be held sooner. There were two articles in the 26-article referendum package that were crucial: reform of the Constitutional Court and curtailment of military powers. The Constitutional Court is a blunt instrument and an important pillar of the “Deep State” through which the secularists maintain their grip on power by frustrating the will of the people. Until now, the 14 judges to the Constitutional Court were appointed by the president and served for life. Under the approved referendum, its strength has been increased to 17 and the three new judges will be appointed by parliament. Judges will serve for only 12 years. This will begin to dilute the dictatorial powers of the Constitutional Court that have been used against parties that do not show adequate subservience to Kemalism. Similarly, military courts are now barred from trying civilians. An additional provision is that military officers involved in coup plots will be charged for treason. While this may not necessarily dampen their penchant for coup-making — witness Pakistan where carrying out a coup is a treasonous offence, but the military has repeatedly stormed presidential or prime ministerial palaces to grab power — Turkish politicians are not as craven as their Pakistani counterparts.



Turkey is well on its way to playing its rightful role in the Muslim world. The pathetic Arabian regimes are on their way out. Together with the Islamic State of Iran, Turkey can play a major role in reshaping the entire political and socio-economic landscape of the Middle East and indeed the larger Muslim world. No one should doubt that the US and the Zionists would sit idly by and allow this to happen. It will depend on the wisdom and sagacity of Turkey’s leaders with the help of the people to chart their country through these challenging times.

Wednesday, October 06, 2010

Political Dimensions of the Seerah




Written by Kalim Siddiqui


...A messenger reciting unto you the revelations of Allah made plain, that he may bring forth those who believe and do good works from darkness unto light. -- Al-Qur'an, 65:11 This is how Allah Subhanahu wa ta'ala describes the Prophet, peace be upon him and his pure progeny, in the Noble Qur'an.

But the point is addressed not only to his contemporaries, but also to all people in times yet to come. This is why he was the Last, or Seal, of all Prophets [1]. Prophethood ended with Muhammad, upon whom be peace, because his Seerah could be applied by ‘those who believe and do righteous deeds' at any time and place in history and would lead them ‘from the depth of darkness into light'.

The ‘depth of darkness' today is represented by the West and the Western civilization on the one hand, and the conditions into which Muslim societies have sunk on the other. This is the modern equivalent of the state of jahiliyyah which confronted the great Exemplar [2]. And this contemporary darkness is total because the Western civilization encompasses the whole world. It is everywhere. The Islamic Revolution in Iran has made a bold attempt to escape this darkness and to move into light.

There is no doubt that the rest of the Ummah today remains immersed in ‘the depth of darkness' in every conceivable way. This darkness has spread to include everything from the individual behaviour of Muslims to their collective condition, identity and behaviour. Merely to describe the condition of the Ummah today would require many volumes of thoroughly researched books. A simple way to achieve the same result is to say that Muslims today have reverted to the state of jahiliyyah, or darkness (zulumat), without formally stepping out of Islam. Thus, once again, we are faced with the same problem that faced the great Exemplar himself, upon whom be peace. And, clearly, the only way forward is to follow the Seerah and the Sunnah of the Prophet.

But the issue—how to follow the Seerah and the Sunnah of the Prophet?—is not so simple. In today's conditions the Seerah cannot be followed in the shape and form in which it is recorded in the classical texts on the subject. The Seerah and the Sunnah, like the Qur'an, are sources of knowledge and guidance for all times. The Seerah is there to be researched, written, understood and applied in each new historical situation as it emerges. In recent times a variety of Islamic movements have emerged, claiming to be based on the Seerah. But the results they have achieved have varied from the dubious successes of most of the ‘Islamic parties' that emerged during the colonial period to the recent triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Perhaps each new generation, in each new historical situation, has to apply the Seerah afresh according to its peculiar circumstances and requirements. Perhaps a process of trial and error is inevitably involved in recapturing the ethos of the Seerah in today's conditions.

It is also possible that the historical situation and the intellectual climate of the time when the first classical works on the Seerah were compiled imposed their logic, limits and needs on such works as those of Ibn Ishaq, al-Waqidi and Ibn Hisham. The politically dominant position of Islam, indeed the geographically expanding dominion and power of Islam, were taken for granted as part of a divinely ordained plan. This persuaded the early compilers of the Seerah to concentrate on issues of the personal qualities of the Prophet, upon whom be peace, and the taqwa (piety) of early Muslims. They followed the simple historical method of compiling a chronological record of events with great accuracy. There was no attempt to link early events with later events, or to discover patterns in the Seerah as guides to the underlying methods used by the Prophet, upon whom be peace.

Significant in this connection is the use of power. Power relationships are the basis of all relationships in nature. Power inequalities are inherent in the state of nature itself, and defining factors in determining behaviour. Stronger animals eat or otherwise exploit the weaker and the weakest try to seek refuge underground or in thick undergrowth. The Qur'an describes mankind as the best of Allah's creation [3]. This means that mankind has been given the power or ability to acquire control over all things. Man can also have power over other men, and rulers can replace other rulers.

Allah has promised, to those among you who believe and work righteous deeds, that He will, of a surety, grant them in the land inheritance of power, as He granted it to those before them; that He will establish in authority their religion—the one which He has chosen for them; and that He will change (their state), after the fear in which they (lived), to one of security and peace; ‘They will worship Me (alone) and not associate aught with Me.' If any do reject Faith after this, they are rebellious and wicked. -- Al-Qur'an, 24:55.

Perhaps what is wrong with the modern world is that human relations are defined almost purely by real or perceived power considerations. The powerful impose their will and their interests on the weak. The weak generally submit to those with more power. Clearly when human behaviour is determined purely by power differentiations, there can be no justice (‘adl); husbands will oppress their wives, employers their employees, monopolistic suppliers will impose unjust prices on customers, officials will oppress their juniors, rulers will oppress their people, and strong States will bully, invade, occupy or impose unjust ‘treaties' on weaker States. Islam achieves justice by regulating the use of power in all relationships. Islam does not equalize power; that would be against the state of nature. No order would be possible without power differentiation. But what Islam does is that it places strict limits and moral codes on the exercise of power at all levels.


They are those who, if we establish them in the land, establish regular prayer and give zakat, enjoin the right and forbid wrong; with Allah rests the end and decision of all affairs. -- Al-Qur'an, 22:41.

Permission is also given for the weak to fight their oppressors [4]. The Prophet's use of power and the limits he placed on the use of power are a rich source of new research [5].



The Seerah of the Prophet, upon whom be peace, is also a model for the acquisition and use of power. At birth Muhammad was an orphan. He grew up unable to read or write in a society which had a highly developed language and where literary and cultural symposiums were regularly held. But they were divided into tribes and misused their power even among themselves and against the weakest in their society; for example, blood feuds among tribes lasting over many generations were common, and female children were buried alive. Tribal leaders and elders wielded enormous power which they mostly misused against their own people, families and neighbours, and by spilling the blood of the innocent. There was little moral or political framework to regulate the power of those in authority.

In this environment the Prophet began life without any claim to power. When he died he had achieved unchallenged power and built a power base, the Islamic State, that was to demolish all other centres of power. What was this power and what was the source of this power? The power the Prophet sought and achieved was not power to rule and oppress or to invade and lay waste other lands and peoples. His power was not in numbers of men, or material or territory at his disposal; the secret of his power lay in the belief, commitment and obedience of the men and women around him.

The whole of the Seerah can be written, read and understood in the framework of the Prophet's acquisition and use of power. The fact that this has not been done is one of the great failures in the intellectual and political history of Muslim scholarship which the Islamic movement must immediately redress. Research must now be begun to define power in the Seerah, to identify the methods for the acquisition of power, and to draw up principles for the use of power. To do this, some scholars will also have to attempt to draw a profile of the political structures created by the Prophet within which the power of Islam resided. This opens up the whole issue of leadership and the limits of power, if any, that the leadership must be subjected to. Did the Prophet limit his own power? Did he share power? Did he use shura as a method of decision making? Examples of these will have to be found in the Seerah and thoroughly researched. What is needed is not mere description of what happened; we need to analyse each situation and try to compare it with similar situations at other times in the Seerah. We have to answer these and many more similar questions; and we have to conceptualize our answers in such a way that when the concepts are applied to the Seerah as a whole the results are consistent.

Immediately following the issue of power is the issue of the definition of ‘politics'. Once again we are in a minefield of conflicting ideas. Can we separate the meaning of ‘politics' in Islam from the general meaning that this term has come to have in the modern world under the influence of the West? This issue cannot be resolved by simplistic affirmations, such as that politics in Islam is moral while politics outside Islam is immoral. There is something more to politics in the Seerah than ‘politics based on morality'. How can it be defined or, at least, delineated? Is there a consistent pattern in the Prophet's political conduct from the beginning to the end? If so, what are the principles and rules of politics in the Seerah?

Muslims of all schools of thought have always regarded the ‘Islamic State', or the khilafah, as the physical structure and the ultimate manifestation of Islam. It is also agreed that the Prophet, upon whom be peace, established the first Islamic State in Madinah. As such, the Islamic State established by the Prophet, upon whom be peace, is an integral and inseparable part of the Seerah of the Prophet. Yet the State of Madinah is not included as such in the classical Seerah literature. Only in relatively recent, politically-motivated literature on the Seerah has attention been given to the State of Madinah. In fact the duty to establish the Islamic State is as much part of the Muslims' obligatory ibadah as salat, saum, zakat, hajj and so on.

This obligation cannot be suspended or modified under any circumstance.

O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those charged with authority among you. -- Al-Qur'an, 4:59 [6].

There is evidence that even in Makkah, from the earliest stages of his mission, the Prophet organized the small Muslim community on the lines of a State. He dealt with the mushrikeen of Makkah and with the Negus across the Red Sea as the leader of a political entity called Islam. This is an important area of research from which scholars could begin to trace the power of Islam in order to define it. To confine our understanding of political power to something that only a territorial State can possess may be one of the mistakes that modern Muslim political thought has made under the influence of the West. It is possible that power is an all-pervasive quality of Islam related to the belief and taqwa of Muslims individually and collectively, whether or not they have control over a territory. If so, this would have enormous implications for the Islamic movement and Muslim minorities throughout the world. It would then be possible to mobilize the power and resources of Islam in small groups as well as in great States and Empires. If so, relatively small groups of Muslims, living together or living far apart, may be able to successfully assert and exert the power of Islam using today's information technology and organizational skills.

Nor can we ignore the fact that the Islamic State and the quality of its leadership have played a crucial part in history. We can argue that the moral foundations of the Islamic State were shaken soon after the demise of the Prophet, upon whom be peace. This took the form of the introduction of malukiyyah [7] from the beginning of Umayyad rule. The continuation of dynastic rule, in one form or another, albeit in the name of Islam, ultimately led to the defeat and dismemberment of dar al-Islam at the hands of the European colonialists. Muslim historians have shied away from researching and identifying the processes of decline and defeat that were implicit in malukiyyah as a form of government and leadership. This gap in our knowledge must now be filled.

European colonial rule over all parts of dar al-Islam and its partition into more than fifty weak and subservient nation-States has created an unprecedented situation. To emerge from this predicament and reintegrate the Ummah requires fresh insights into the Seerah and the political methods of the Prophet, upon whom be peace. A great deal of descriptive, analytical and prescriptive political thought has been written in the last one hundred years. The results range from the minimal or nominal participation in secular government of ‘Islamic parties' in such countries as Egypt, Turkey, Malaysia, Pakistan and Sudan, to the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. There is also the victory of the mujahideen in Afghanistan, followed by a bloody civil war among competing groups, some calling themselves ‘Islamic'. The decline of Muslim power, then the total loss of Muslim power, followed by Western sponsored nationalism in new Muslim nation-States and the rise of incipient ‘Islamic parties' and ‘movements', offers a rich source for checking historic results with the Seerah. In this important area researchers have to come up with answers and insights from the Seerah not sought after before. This era may be described as the era of neo-jahiliyyah. Can modern nationalism be equated with tribalism of the time of the Prophet? If so, how did the Prophet, upon whom be peace, deal with tribalism? When the mushrikeen of Makkah made the removal of those who were not racially Arab a condition of their joining Islam, the Qur'an was emphatic:

Send not away those who call on their Lord morning and evening, seeking His Face. In naught art thou accountable for them, and in naught are they accountable for thee, that thou shouldst turn them away, and thus be (one) of the unjust -- Al-Qur'an, 6:52.

Can Muslims today deal with nationalism in the same way as the Prophet dealt with tribalism? What likelihood is there of civil wars breaking out in different parts of dar al-Islam between nationalism and Islam? Are such civil wars inevitable or perhaps even desirable? What will be the implications of such wars, including the near certainty of external intervention? Maybe such civil wars are already under way at low levels in many Muslim countries? Does the Seerah point to the inevitability of armed struggle between the Islamic movement and the nationalist, secular, post-colonial élites? If so, what steps have to be taken to minimize the intensity of armed conflicts among Muslims and between Muslims and non-Muslims? What are the rules of engagement in such armed struggles? [8]

Then there is a whole range of modern political concepts, with their origin in the political history, experience and philosophy of the West, that have found their way into everyday usage in Muslim political thought and vocabulary. These include such concepts as democracy, representative government, elections, multi-party systems, pluralism, socialism, communism, capitalism, equality, freedom of speech, emancipation of women and so on. Each of these needs to be closely scrutinized in light of the Seerah and, if necessary, totally rejected and repudiated. This exercise is essential if Muslims are to produce their own conceptual tools for the reordering of Muslim societies. It is not enough to assert that Islam and Western civilization are incompatible; this incompatibility has to be demonstrated within the framework of the Seerah. We need to develop and present a complete outline, indeed a detailed map, of the alternative civilization of Islam. This is perhaps the most important challenge facing Muslim scholarship today.

This leads us to the crucial issue of opposition. The opposition to the Prophet, upon whom be peace, was no less total and vicious than the opposition the Islamic movement confronts in its attempt to create, or recreate, a global civilization today. The West is already opposing, with all the cunning and might at its disposal, even the minor political goals currently pursued by Islamic groups in many parts of the world. A total statement of the political goals of Islam in terms of the Seerah is certain to attract total opposition from the West, and the agents of the West in Muslim countries [9]. To deal with this situation, the Seerah has to be studied to produce the defensive and offensive strategies of Islam at every stage of this global confrontation over a very long period of time. We must also recognize that there may be no precedent in the Seerah for certain current situations. The best we can hope for in these situations is to apply qiyas, the principle of analogical inference.



Then there are the great issues of morality and economics mixed together. How will Islam redistribute the resources and wealth of the world? How would this affect capital formation and investment? Is there a limit to growth? Is such a limit desirable? What minimum standards of living must be provided for all before the few can be allowed to add to their already lavish living? How can the West be stopped from using Asia, Africa and Southern America as a hinterland to be exploited for the benefit of the rich northern hemisphere around the North Atlantic? The West's role in the modern world perfectly fits the description in the Qur'an as ‘mischief on earth' [10]. In what way might the Seerah guide us in these vital contemporary issues of social disorder, iniquity and injustice?

All the issues relating to corporate capitalism, paper currency, banking, interest, exchange rates, capital formation and investment need to be tackled. A whole body of literature has emerged under the general title of ‘Islamic economics'. By and large, it is similar in character to the political literature of the ‘Islamic democracy' variety. Essentially it is an attempt to import into Islam all the West's economic and political experience. In recent years it has become clear that the West's drive for the wholesale economic and political exploitation of the world will inevitably lead the world to the brink of ecological and environmental disaster. This brings us back to the mutual incompatibility of Islam and the West, and all the issues raised by this basic clash between the two. Answers to these questions have to be sought in the study of the Seerah.


It has to be admitted and realized that some of these issues have never before been raised in the context of the Seerah. Therefore, much of the early work on these issues will be exploratory and tentative. This is inevitable. But the publication and debating of such exploratory work will then generate new research and thinking, leading to new ideas and higher quality literature in the future. The fact is that Muslims have never explored the Seerah to find answers to some of the questions raised in this paper; at this stage we can only hope to make a start in this direction.


The major objectives of the new research required on the Seerah can be summarised as follows:


To use the Seerah as source material to map out in detail a new civilization of Islam;

To use the Seerah to define the stages by which the ‘depth of darkness' may be turned into light in the conditions prevailing today;

To use the Seerah to outline the likely opposition to Islam and how this could be overcome;

To use the Seerah to define the good and just order that Islam wishes to create for all mankind;

To use the Seerah to define the leadership requirements of Islam, the global Islamic movement and all parts of it;

To develop and apply new research methodologies to the Seerah that shall yield the answers required to solve the problems of the Ummah and mankind in today's conditions;

To free the classical Seerah literature of its narrow, descriptive and chronological straitjacket;

To develop assumptions and hypotheses for future action and to test them in the framework of the Seerah;


To define such key concepts as 'adl (justice) and to apply them to the political, economic and social conditions prevailing today;

To define the Islamic State and how such States may be brought about in today's conditions; and

To plant the roots and methods of the Islamic movement firmly in the Seerah of the Prophet, upon whom be peace.

Once the long process of applying the Seerah to achieve convergence of Muslim thought on current issues is begun, we must avoid the sort of theological disputations which have led to obscurantism and bitterness among the various schools of thought in the past. Such issues are now, for all practical purposes, dead or at least irrelevant. New ideas require a new and open approach. The new ideas thrown up by an open-ended study of the Seerah can then be applied and the results checked against the Seerah. The Seerah then becomes a dynamic paradigm for new ideas, actions and results. These new ideas can then be refined and modified and applied again to achieve results at any particular time and place. This process should become a permanent process for shaping history, for creating new Islamic societies, for establishing new Islamic States, and so on, indefinitely into the future. In this way we shall have made the Seerah a permanent source of new ideas, hypotheses, and policy options. It is only when Muslims have learned to use the Seerah as an active guide in contemporary history at every step that they shall have achieved the full potential of the Seerah of the Prophet, upon whom be peace. This will not necessarily mean success at every step; even the Prophet experienced occasional failure. But what it could do is to minimize the rate of failure and facilitate the evaluation of the causes of failure and thus the revision of policy. A political system based on the Seerah should be stable and long lasting. It will facilitate the continuous emergence of broad public consensus on major issues and offer a framework for public debate free of acrimony over personalities or party positions.

Below are listed some of the areas in which ulama, scholars, researchers, students, and writers may seek topics for their particular research. By the very nature of the Seerah, and of our problems, such a list cannot be exhaustive. The knowledge we have of the Seerah is already very extensive; the emphasis must now be on seeking new insights from the Seerah to solve the problems now facing the Ummah. For example, if we were asked to name one factor more responsible than any other for our present maladies, we should have to say that it was the lack of power. Therefore, the issue of power, its definition, acquisition and use must occupy a substantial proportion of our attention.

We know that the Prophet, upon whom be peace, embarked on his career destitute of power. He ended his life at the head of a State that commanded overwhelming power over the Arabian peninsula, and had the ability to generate sufficient power to defeat and replace the ‘superpowers' of the time, Persia and Byzantine. These are feats of history that Muslims have to repeat in today's conditions. The defeat of the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the defeat of the United States in Iran, Vietnam and Somalia, and the defeat of Israel in Lebanon are glimpses of what is possible under even the most imperfect conditions. Clearly, if conditions improve, a great deal more can come within our reach. Drawing up the outline and detailed map of an alternative civilization, based on the Seerah, is not an exercise in futility. It is the logical next step on the road to the recovery of Islam and the Ummah from our own dark ages of defeat, dismemberment, and subservience to the power of kufr.

Proposed Areas of Research


1. Review of modern Seerah literature


The early sources of Seerah in the Arab cultural traditions of the time form a fascinating study. The verbal tradition of stories and poetry led to Ibn Ishaq's full-scale Seerah and al-Waqidi's Maghazi, among many others. We are not concerned here with that period; what we want to know is in what ways the decline of Muslim power has affected and influenced the study and writing of the Seerah and Sunnah of Muhammad, upon whom be peace. We are clearly not the first to seek solutions to our modern problems in the Seerah. Uthman dan Fodio established the Sokoto Caliphate in West Africa in the early part of the 19th century. He, his family and followers are said to have followed the method of the Seerah, including hijrah, in a struggle that also included jihad. There are many more similar figures throughout the last two hundred years who in seeking to resist the power of the West drew on the Seerah for their inspiration and methods of struggle. Literature written by them or about them is of crucial importance, and needs to be critically analysed. Some very recent literature in such languages as Turkish, Urdu, Bengali, Malay, English and Hausa appears to be influenced by the Islamic Revolution in Iran. How far and in what ways the Seerah has influenced developments in the Shi'i tradition leading up to the Islamic Revolution is also a question clamouring for attention. A survey of Seerah writings over the last 200 years might produce insights into how the Seerah has influenced Muslim political and religious thought during a period of rapid decline of Muslim power.


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2. The Last Prophet or the Seal of Prophethood


The finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad ibn Abdullah, peace be upon him, is a key part of the aqida of all Muslims [11]. As aqida, it needs no restatement. But there are certain implications of this fact for history and for the evolution of Muslim thought, especially Muslim political thought. For example, the fact that no new Prophet is to come and that direct revelation (wahi) has been completed for all time, puts great emphasis on the Seerah. It is the Seerah, the living manifestation of the Qur'an, that is the key to the Qur'an as well. This is why the Seerah is sometimes described as the first tafseer. Scholars may wish to explore all the implications of this. It surely means that Muslim divergences from the roots of Islam can only be small and temporary; that Islam has an in-built versatility, magnetism and mechanism to guide Muslims back to itself after long periods of divergence. We can also learn a great deal about the nature and limits of Muslim divergences. We can also learn about the nature of Muslim attempts to return to the roots of Islam and the historical processes that may be involved. There is also the important issue of structural impediments that Muslims and Islamic movements face in their search for correction of their thought processes and political programmes. The obvious examples of these structural impediments are nationalism and nation-States, as well as the secondary theological positions—often deviant—that have been taken up by various schools of thought and religious traditions in many parts of the world. This is not to deny the importance to Muslims of developing dynamic intellectual traditions within the bounds of the Seerah at all times in history. We need guidelines for the growth and flowering of such intellectual traditions at different times in history, or in different parts of the world at the same time.


3. The opposition to Islam


Islam faced intense opposition from the beginning of the Prophethood of Muhammad, upon whom be peace, and throughout the Prophet's life. The Prophet's method in dealing with this constant opposition is an integral part of the Seerah. We need to identify and study it, and examine how it can be applied in today's conditions.

Moreover, while the broad outline of this opposition is recorded and described in the Seerah literature, the opposition itself as a phenomenon has not been analysed. Is the opposition to Islam in the modern world essentially a continuation of the opposition to Islam at the time of the Prophet? If so, then we are better equipped to understand the modern hostility to Islam and how best we can meet this challenge.


4. Leadership



As the Prophet, upon whom be peace, was the undisputed Leader of his people from the advent of his risalah until the end of his life, the Seerah is clearly a rich source from which to identify the qualities necessary in a leader. The concept of the leader and leadership in Islam as exemplified by the Prophet is also an important area of research [12]. What were the Prophet's leadership training methods and programmes? The answers to this may hold the key to many of our contemporary problems in the field of education and training. The failure of leadership in the ‘Islamic parties' may be traced to the systems of education of which they were products. Did the system of education and training in the Shi'i school create the leadership that made the Islamic Revolution possible? What lessons are there in it for systems of ‘Islamic education' in other parts of the world? This offers a rich area for research.

Leadership in the Seerah also has a strong conceptual base for its continuation after the death of the Prophet, upon whom be peace. There has been considerable controversy on the issue of succession to the Prophet between the Shi'i and Sunni schools of thought. A great deal of ‘secondary theology' has been written around this subject. We do not need to go over this ground again. But, in the conditions prevailing today, there are signs pointing towards a convergence of Muslim political thought on this issue.

However, one point is particularly important here: the new research done in the framework of the global Islamic movement must focus on areas which minimize differences and expand on the new common ideas on which there is clearly convergence and agreement. Papers written in a sectarian spirit, or presenting a sectarian position, on this issue, or any other issue, are no longer acceptable. We must, in the words of the Qur'an, put our historical differences aside and learn to be ‘compassionate amongst each other' [13].


5. The tribal society in Makkah


An examination of the structure of society in Makkah is important to identify its power structure and hierarchy, and so understand the context in which the Prophet took the decisions he took. There were men in Makkah who wielded great power and influence. The Makkan society also had great weaknesses, rivalries and conflicts. The Prophet's strategy in dealing with this society, and using Makkan society and its immediate environs, is an essential part of the Seerah. The organization of the small Muslim society in Makkah offers many lessons on how relatively small communities can deal with and win over much larger communities. The first migration to Habasha (Abyssinia) and the negotiations with the Negus may also be examined in this framework.


6. The hijrah


Clearly the hijrah to Madinah is the greatest single event in the Seerah of the Prophet, upon whom be peace. How he prepared for it is dealt with summarily in the traditional Seerah literature. This event needs to be examined in depth as an underlying method of overcoming great difficulties at one place by building a power-base at another. Clearly the Prophet did not mean to leave Makkah for good; he intended to return as a conqueror or liberator. The steps the Prophet took immediately upon his arrival in Madinah were clear indications of his intention to challenge the Makkan power. That this would involve war was also clear from the Prophet's early moves in Madinah and the agreements he entered into with the tribes there, who were committed to defend him. Moving out of one's normal hostile habitat to prepare for eventual return to rule over it is a familiar pattern in history. The Prophet's use of this method needs very careful handling. There are political lessons to be learned and techniques to be developed for use in today's conditions.

The first migration to Habasha and the negotiations with the Negus may also be examined in this framework. Did the results of this migration encourage the Prophet, upon whom be peace, to seek and plan for another, greater hijrah, to secure a greater power base outside Makkah? Did this lead to the Prophet's eventual migration to Madinah? Hijrah as a method of developing an alternative power centre needs to be examined in some detail.


7. The pursuit of power


This is clearly the heart of the Seerah that we have set out to explore. Power in Islam is not like power in other historical and political situations. Power in Islam does not mean the same thing as in the use of such contemporary terms as great powers, superpowers, regional powers, minor powers and so on. Power in the Seerah has an additional quality over and above all other forms of power. Nothing else can explain the global power and presence that Islam continues to exercise in the world today in spite of hundreds of years of continuous decline and physical defeat. Perhaps the colonial powers succeeded in defeating and destroying the structures in which Muslim power resided. But there is another level of Islamic power that cannot be destroyed by military power. Islam has a regenerative capacity that does not depend on political and military structures. Islam has no political and military structures but has secured its long-term survival in a form of power that remains immune against destruction by physical action, occupation or military invasion. What is this power? How can it be described? What evidence of it is there in the Seerah? The Seerah is also a guide for the reconstruction of the structural foundations and institutions of Islamic power after a period of defeat and dismemberment.

This ability to separate power from its structures is also peculiar to Islam. The process of establishing the Islamic State can be seen as the drive to build new structures for power. All earlier civilizations in history—Chinese, Indian, Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Greek, etc.—have enjoyed their heyday and then declined, never to reappear. The civilization of Islam is unique in this respect; unique in that it is in the process of regeneration, and unique in that it has the diffuse power base in history that can be used for this purpose. A global Ummah is now committed to this cause, exploring all possible options and exploring the Seerah for guidelines.


8. Negotiations, treaties and agreements


These have played an important part in the Seerah. Instances of them are found in the life of Muhammad before he was called to Prophethood. He was known as a man of integrity and honesty. The Arabs called him al-Amin, the trustworthy. He also mediated in and averted a potentially bloody conflict over the rebuilding of the Ka'aba and the placement of the Black Stone. After he became Prophet, he pursued peace with his enemies in Makkah and with the tribes around Makkah. During this period he is known not to have retaliated aggressively against those who tormented him or other Muslims. The Prophet patiently negotiated two pacts of Aqaba that laid the foundations for the hijrah to Madinah. Once in Madinah he entered into a covenant with all the parties in that city, many of them his enemies, including the two Jewish tribes. This social contract in Madinah, known Seerah literature as the Sihafah, is also known as the Constitution of Madinah. It raises many questions. For example, was the Constitution of Madinah designed to neutralize his internal enemies in Madinah against his external enemies, with whom the Prophet expected early wars? The Constitution of Madinah has not been analysed as extensively and profoundly as it ought to be. In the sixth year of the hijrah the Prophet entered into an agreement with Quraish of Makkah, known as the Treaty of Hudaibiyyah. Many of the Prophet's companions thought the terms were too favourable to Makkans and humiliating to Muslims. The Prophet was, therefore, obviously a man of peace who did not want to fight if he could avoid it; yet, after the hijrah, he had sought an early military engagement with Quraish of Makkah. It can also be argued that peace treaties and agreements that the Prophet entered into with his foes were designed to buy time to accumulate power for the ultimate victory of Islam. Only two or three episodes of this kind are mentioned here; the Seerah offers many more examples. Detailed research and analysis in this area may provide a pattern for the future conduct of the Islamic movement and the Islamic State.


9. The definition of ‘politics'


Politics in the modern world is almost universally perceived as a ‘dirty game'. It is also widely regarded as a game ‘to fool all of the people all of the time'. In more serious or academic circles, politics is regarded as a study of the powerful seeking to retain or increase their power in their own State or in their relations with other States. It is a zero-sum game—the loss of one is the gain of another, or the gain of one equals or exceeds the loss of another. It should be noted that siyasah, the Arabic word for politics, does not appear in the Qur'an at all, or in the early Seerah literature. Yet the Prophet, upon whom be peace, engaged in all the activities that together go to make up what is today called ‘politics'. This includes the organization of men at all levels, collection of taxes or religious dues, regulation of markets, leadership, rulership (hukm), despatch of embassies to foreign rulers, appointment of governors, military training, intelligence gathering, wars and other lesser military expeditions, and so on.

What is more, the Prophet, upon whom be peace, carried out all or most of these activities in Makkah as well as in Madinah. The difference is that in Makkah he did not have a territorial State, while in Madinah he did. This may mean that all aspects of ‘politics' in Islam are applicable and obligatory with or without a territorial base. Is it the case then that ‘politics' in Islam are applicable and obligatory with or without a territorial base? And that it is also an obligation (fardh) to seek a territorial base as soon as possible, even if this should involve migration (hijrah)? If so, then an important distinction emerges: politics and political processes are not necessarily related to the State at all times. It is possible that the political processes of Islam, if practised without a State, inevitably lead to the State. Should this be the case (and the Seerah appears to support this view) then the implications for the Islamic movement are profound.

In this regard perhaps the recent experience of the Shi'i school may be examined, preferably by Shi'i ulama themselves. For many hundreds of years the Shi'i view was that the political processes of Islam, including rulership (hukm), must remain suspended during the absence (ghaibah) of the Twelfth Imam. This position started to be questioned some three hundred years ago, leading to the emergence of marjaiyyat as a form of interim leadership. But this ijtihad reintroduced the political processes of Islam to the Shi'i part of the Ummah, though initially it was in the guise of ‘religious institutions' and azzadari (grieving for the Prophet's family) only. But slowly, in stages, this led to the full flowering of the political power of Islam and the establishment of the territorial Islamic State of Iran after the Islamic Revolution. What appears to have happened is that every marja' was effectively a khalifah ruling over his own ‘non-territorial Islamic State' consisting of his muqallideen, perhaps comparable to the condition of Muslims in Makkah before the hijrah. It was inevitable, therefore, that sooner or later one marja' would take the next logical step of setting up a fully-fledged territorial Islamic State. This is what has happened in Iran.

Some sufi shaikhs, calling themselves khulafa, have also run their orders (tariqat) as non-territorial Islamic States. But none has succeeded in establishing an Islamic State on the foundations of sufi orders, though some are known to have opposed tyranny and launched jihad movements. This is an important area for new research. Some of these papers need to take into account the Qur'anic injunctions on rulership, eg, ulul amr, khilafah and vilayah [14].


10. The Islamic movement


The term ‘Islamic movement', or al-harakah al-Islamiyyah, is unknown in the history of Islam and in the literature on Seerah, history, fiqh and usul al-din. It has come into common parlance only recently, especially after the constitutional fall of the Uthmaniyyah khilafah in 1924. Yet it is not difficult to assert that the Seerah itself was the first complete, all-inclusive Islamic movement. If so, the question which arises is: why, for over 1300 years, was the Seerah not viewed as an Islamic movement? The answer to this question may well be that so long as there was an Islamic State in existence and a khalifah in office, the need for an Islamic movement did not arise, or at least was not recognized. After 1924 the ‘Islamic movement' became the non-territorial Islamic State that filled the vacuum, at least in the Sunni world, caused by the absence of the khilafah. The struggle to re-establish the territorial Islamic State came to be known as the Islamic movement.

The emergence of the Islamic movement inaugurates a new phase in Islamic history. The movements launched by Hasan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928 and by Abul Ala Maududi in India in 1941 can be regarded as the first post-khilafah experiments in bringing together the elements necessary to re-establish the Islamic State. The Islamic movement is now a global phenomenon transcending modern political boundaries imposed by nationalism in the interest of global imperialism. The Islamic Revolution in Iran is a product of a revolution in the theological formulations based on ijtihad within the Shi'i school. But it may be of great value and guidance when it comes to the final stages of overthrowing the established order and creating a new Islamic State in its place. To the extent that the Islamic Revolution also represents a convergence of Shi'i/Sunni political thought in matters of leadership and rulership, it has great value in the study of the Seerah. It is almost certainly the case that divergences within Islam can only converge within the framework of the Seerah. The Seerah is a common ground for all Muslims; it is also the only ground on which all Muslims can stand. The conscious development of the Seerah as the foundation of the global Islamic movement will integrate the movement and clarify common goals across the Ummah. The Seerah as the foundation will also work to remove such tensions as are found today in parts of the Islamic movement over issues such as leadership, stages of growth, and the final goals.

Research in this important area offers great scope for original thought and reformulation of the Seerah for the solution of crucial issues confronting Muslims in all parts of the world today. There are also many definitions of the Islamic movement found in journals and newspapers published by Islamic groups. An attempt to define the Islamic movement in terms of the Seerah should be of great assistance towards its development and the harmonization of its methods and goals. Research in this area might also help us develop assumptions and hypotheses for future organization, priorities, methods and goals of all parts of the Islamic movement. In a sense, the Islamic movement simply means the following of the Seerah in today's conditions. For this to happen two conditions have to be met: (a) the understanding of the Seerah in such great depth that it can be applied today; and (b) an accurate understanding of the conditions that prevail today. It seems that for a very long time Muslims have not met either of these conditions to any great extent. Those who studied and claimed to have understood the Seerah did not understand the modern world; and those who claimed to understand the modern world did not understand the Seerah. This is a common weakness in all parts of the Islamic movement; hence their frequently far from impressive performances.


11. The definition of the Islamic State


Confusion in this area is widespread. The modern nation-States, creations of the colonial powers, also claim to be Islamic States. They have set up an ‘Islamic Secretariat' and hold an annual conference of ‘Islamic foreign ministers'. Some parts of the Islamic movement take the view that these nation-States can be ‘democratically' modified in some respects and turned into Islamic States. There is also the view held in some parts of the Islamic movement that all that requires to be done is for an ‘Islamic party' to win an election and that would convert that country's government into an ‘Islamic government'. This was the view entertained by Maulana Maududi in Pakistan, and this is still the position of the Tanzim al-Dawli wing of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimoon. What is wrong with this view is that it fails to recognize that a State, any State, founded on the basis of nationalism cannot be converted into an Islamic State without first uprooting nationalism and other colonial influences from its history and foundations. This is now coming to be commonly accepted in all parts of the Muslim world and the Islamic movement. In classical Sunni thought there also appears to have been a willingness to accept a State as ‘Islamic' so long as its ruler styles himself khalifah. Thus the debate on the issue by-passed the State, and Sunni ‘secondary theology' concentrated on defining the minimum conditions a ruler must meet before he is entitled to bai'ah. Moreover, these conditions were whittled down to such an extent that any dynastic ruler was more than willing to meet them in order to protect his throne and dynastic rights. The time has come to define the Islamic State in terms of its origin in the Seerah. Once this has been done, khilafah and vilayah as sources of authority and leadership need to be restated in the context of the Islamic State rather than merely as a question of bai'ah on minimal conditions. The explication of historical processes involved in transforming the present political structures into Islamic States is a major challenge facing Muslim intellectuals working in the Islamic movement framework.


12. Military campaigns of the Prophet


This is an important area that offers particular challenges. There were no fewer than 68 military campaigns launched by the Prophet, upon whom be peace, from Madinah. These included a number of raids to harass the trading caravans of Quraish of Makkah that led to the Battle of Badr in only the second year of the hijrah. Another empire builder, ruler or adventurer in a similar position might have sought some years of peace in Madinah for the consolidation of his power before taking on his adversaries. The Prophet did precisely the opposite. He chose an early confrontation in the battlefield between his handful of followers and the extensive might of Quraish of Makkah and their allies. He clearly realized that an early victory over Makkah was essential for the consolidation of his power even in Madinah. To provoke the Makkans at that time was clearly an act of faith, not of reason. We need to put all of the military campaigns in a similar context. What were the underlying goals the Prophet pursued through his military campaigns? Why did he launch so many military campaigns in such short a time?


13. Source of an alternative civilization


Today all mankind is in the grip of a single civilization, its power, values, culture and economy. This dominant civilization is the Western civilization, while the civilization of Islam now exists only as a dismembered sub-culture in various forms in different parts of the world. Islam no longer has a civilization that can claim to have global power or a working economic system, though it still has strong values that are global, and also retains a global cultural and political identity. It is this global political presence that the West is now trying to brand as ‘fundamentalist' and ‘terrorist'. Can we justifiably compare the West with the Quraish and its civilization with jahiliyyah? It is now universally accepted among Muslims that the West is determined to eradicate all remaining traces of Islam from the world. Having established its political and economic hegemony over most parts of the world, the West is determined to make sure that its power can never be challenged by Islam again. The West views Islam as the only possible source of challenge to its domination. This challenge does indeed exist in the form of a widespread realization among Muslims everywhere that they have to escape from the stranglehold the West has acquired over them and over Islam. At one level, it is a question of generating Islamic Revolutions in all Muslim countries to escape from the West's manipulation and control. But this is not enough. We have to go on to create, or recreate, a new civilization of Islam that offers mankind peace, security, moral upliftment, and economic and social justice (‘adl). The Seerah of the Prophet, upon whom be peace, is clearly the soil in which the roots of this new civilization exist. These roots have to be found, defined and developed. Ultimately the struggle between Islam and the West will not be decided by bombs and technology; this war will be decided by the emergence of a superior civilization in which mankind is assured of security, physical and moral health, and, above all, justice. The foundations of the Western civilization are based on oppression, aggression, enslave-ment, exploitation, brutality, war, genocide, immorality, inequality and injustice. The true face of the West has to be exposed to all mankind, including people in the West itself. And, simultaneously, an alternative civilization of Islam has to be shaped from the Seerah of the Prophet, upon whom be peace. This also offers new challenges in the form of research methodologies that shall have to be applied to the study of the Seerah. This clearly is a rich area for original, even speculative, research.

Conclusion

The Seerah of the Prophet of Islam, upon whom be peace, is a vast ocean which cannot be charted in a short paper. Any attempt to do so would be futile. The object of this paper has been to indicate, as briefly as possible, some of the issues that need to be addressed. Ulama, scholars, intellectuals, students and writers will need to focus on one or more of these areas and build on them according to their own preferences. Once work in this direction is started, fresh ideas and approaches to the understanding of the Seerah, and new issues for debate on the subject of the Seerah, will continue to emerge for many, many years to come. Such an intellectual revolution, pulling the Ummah together on the common ground of the Seerah, is an essential pre-requisite for the future success of the global Islamic movement. Only then can the Ummah be lifted out of its present state of neo-jahiliyyah, and the foundations laid for a new era of Islamic civilization in the future.


Notes

See also Al-Qur'an, 62:2-3; 21:107; 7:158. - (Back to text.)

"uswatun hasana", Al-Qur'an, 33:21. - (Back to text.)

Al-Qur'an, 95:4. - (Back to text.)

Al-Qur'an, 22:39. - (Back to text.)

Al-Qur'an, 28:83, 38:26. - (Back to text.)

See also Al-Qur'an, 5:44-49, 4:65. - (Back to text.)

Malukiyyah is defined in the Qur'an in answer to the Prophet Ibrahim's (pbuh) request that his children too should inherit leadership. Allah replied: ‘But my Promise is not within the reach of evil-doers' (2:124). Here the message is that being the progeny is not enough. The successor must also be muttaqi. The Qur'an also defines malukiyyah as an unjust system in which the ruler is succeeded by a member of his family. - (Back to text.)

Al-Qur'an, 25:31. - (Back to text.)

On this issue, see Sayyid Qutb, Milestones, first published in Arabic in 1964, especially the chapter on 'Jihad in the cause of Allah'. - (Back to text.)

Al-Qur'an, 28:83. - (Back to text.)

Al-Qur'an, 33:40. - (Back to text.)

Al-Qur'an, 3:159, 9:128, 15:88. - (Back to text.)

Al-Qur'an, 48:29. - (Back to text.)

Al-Qur'an, 38:26. - (Back to text.)


About this paper


Dr Kalim Siddiqui (1931-1996) was Director of the Muslim Institute, London, and one of the leading thinkers of the global Islamic movement. His commitment was to helping generate an ‘intellectual revolution' in Islamic social and political thought, which could lay the foundations for a future Islamic civilization and world order.

The Seerah of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) was a lasting influence on Dr Siddiqui's ideas and work. Many of the key areas on which he wrote — Muslim political thought, the use of power, the unity of the Ummah, the concept of leadership in Islam, the nature of the Islamic state — were based on his reading of the Seerah. He also regarded the Seerah as the common ground on which all Muslims, of all schools of thought, could stand together to work for the good of the Ummah as a whole and the establishment of a new Islamic civilization and world order.

Above all, Dr Siddiqui believed that studying the Seerah from ‘a power perspective' was the key to an intellectual revolution in Muslim thought. At the time of his death, he was planning to launch an international research project into the Seerah as his next major work. This paper, on which he was still working at the time of his death, outlines some of the areas in which he believed Islamic movement intellectuals must work. It was first published by the ICIT in 1998.